What is It to Be European (1)

8/13/2019 What is It to Be European (1)

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What is it to be European?

This is a complex and multifaceted question which may be answered in a variety ofways. It is a problematic issue because all attempts to define the general concept ofidentity indicate that the term is made up of several layers of different forms of

identities. This may include, inter alia, social, personal, family, professional,geographical and national identity. In such a context then, what is it to be European,to have a European identity? Recently, James Kurth (2006) gave an insightfulaccount of European identity in terms of the dialectic of great wars. Specifically, heargues that great wars often emerge out of forms of conflict of identity, and theresults of such wars is a transformation of those identities. He suggests that a pre-modern Europe was essentially Christian, but that the beginning of the modern eraproduced a protestant reformation which led to the thirty years war, which in turncreated as an output not only Protestant and Catholic identities, but emergent,secular, non-Christian identities. These secular alternatives then led in turn to thecreation of specific political philosophies, such as liberalism, socialism and

nationalism. Such products of enlightenment in their turn created conflicts of theirown, and from these liberalism became transformed into democracy, socialism intocommunism, and nationalism into fascism. With these, of course, we have the greatconflicts of the twentieth century, spectacularly exemplified by the Second WorldWar. It was sheer scale of the consequences of this war that led, according to Kurth(2006) to the triumph in Europe of a strong form of liberal identity, one predicated onan open society, free market capitalism and a focus on individualism, what he calleda hyper-individualism.

Like all broad assessments, there is much that one might challenge here, or muchthat could be said to be overly simplistic in terms of its representation. Yet there isalso something generally correct in Kurths view and also much that assists us inunderstanding why answers to the question of what it is to be European or have aEuropean identity is not only multifaceted, but also contextually and historicallysensitive. Consider, for example the ongoing debate on Turkeys membership of theEuropean Union. The essentially Christian nature of Europe noted by Kurth has beena stumbling block for some members of the Union. Gole (2005) suggests that manyTurks see candidacy for the European Union as a continuous and almost naturaloutcome of their history. This would not sit easy with most European views or withKurths analysis. Or consider, Kurths assessment of an emergent hyper-individualism which suggests for example a self-centred philosophy for Europeans,

one which may be seen in the welfare state, immigration, and falling birth rates. Butwe want to suggest that, as has always been the case, there is not one identitycategory available at any one time but several, all of which may or may not reflect ahyper-individualism. The sense of a European Union, for example, which developsa transnational perspective, might be exactly what an immigrant needs in order toresolve their problems of citizenship (Europe), state, residence and country of origin.Here, a shared sense of a single vision of Europe (at some levels) beyond nationalboundaries becomes attractive. Equally, for the ordinary individual at the levels of lawor economics, choices can made to transcend national limits (European Court, EUtrade laws) for ones own needs. This may be hyper-individualism, but it is certainlya pragmatic reaction to available circumstances. For many then, being European or

having a European identity may simply reflect a personal, needs-based analysis.


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There is little doubt that however we view Europe and European identity, thequestion of European identity has been a topic of significant interest in the lastdecade. This is in part a consequence of the recent and continuing growth of the EUsince European identity, at an official level at least, was always intimately tied to thecoordination and development of the member states (again a pragmatic issue). As

long as 1973 at the Copenhagen summit, the then nine member countries issued atext entitled Declaration on European Identity.In section 22 it is noted that:

The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction ofa United Europe. In their external relations, the nine propose progressively toundertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries.

This approach suggests, as for other forms of identity, that it will be progressivelyconstructed out of a clear view of what European identity is not i.e. it is thedifferences between Europe compared with other countries that provide the definitionof what it is to be European. Hobsbawn (1990) has noted that this is the natural

history of identities, i.e. that they develop to separate one group or nation fromanother. Bauboeck (1997) goes one step further arguing that the project of building acommon European fatherland, when based on an ethno-cultural Euro nationalism,requires for its success not just the presence of the other, but the threat of theother. He believes that such a threat does not exist in reality, but acknowledges thatEuro-chauvinism and xenophobia appear as very real side-effects of the imaginaryproject of European nation-building, with the Orient including Islamicfundamentalism, being created as the external threat. Certainly when Europe isdefined in civilization terms as a shared cultural heritage (e.g. classical learning,Christianity, the Enlightenment), it is possible to exclude the Judaic and Islamicworlds from this cultural community (Asad 2002).

The official, institutionalized EU approach to European identity has always attemptedto avoid the problems of national identity in that nationalisms are not challenged orforced into a form of integrationist identity which blurs any nations independence.However, the idea that EU is a threat to the concept of the nation is one that hasassumed a central importance in considering the potential emergence of a Europeanidentity (see Fossum 2003). Yet with the continuing growth of the Union, and theexpansion of movement across borders, it may be that national identities arereaching a level of maturity wherein one can be European without any sense of lossof national identity. For instance, in a review of Euro-barometer data (data on

attitudes to Europe collected by European Commission on a regular basis) van derVeen (2002) suggest that:

cross national differences in the strength of a European identity are notrelated to a fear that the national identity might be displaced or replaced by theEuropean identity. Instead, they may be explained in part by differences acrossmember states in the shares of their population that lived and/or studied anothermember state.

It seems then that ones sense of place is affected by ones geographical and socialmobility, and the incumbent experiences gained therein. This can be seen in the

figures from Euro-barometer 65 (2006). Attachment to Europe varies by country, asone would expect: the overall EU level is 63%, but , at the lower end of scale, wehave 46% for the UK, 43% in Greece, 42% in Lithuania, 38% in Estonia and just a


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ce este de a fi european sau s aib o identitate european este nu numai multiplefaete , dar, de asemenea, n funcie de context i sensibil punct de vedere istoric .Luai n considerare, de exemplu, dezbaterea n curs privind aderarea Turciei laUniunea European . Caracterul esenial cretinal Europei remarcat de ctre Kurth afost o piatr de poticnire pentru unii membri ai Uniunii . Gole ( 2005) sugereaz c

muli turci vedeau candidatura pentru Uniunea European ca " ... un continuuiaproape " natural " rezultat din istoria lor " . Acest lucru nu ar sta usor cu cele maimulte vederi europene, sau cu analiza lui Kurth. Sau s ia n considerare, evaluarealui Kurth a unui urgent " hiper-individualism ", care sugereaz , de exemplu, ofilozofie centrat pe sine pentru europeni, una carepoate fi vzut n bunstareastatului, imigrarea , precum i scderea natalitii . Dar vrem s sugeram c , aacum a fost ntotdeauna cazul , nu exist o categorie de identitate valabil la unmoment dat , ci mai multe , toate de care poate sau nu poate reflecta un " hiper -individualism " . Sentimentul de o Uniune European , de exemplu , care dezvolt operspectiv transnaional , ar putea fi exact ceea ce un imigrant are nevoie pentru arezolva problemele lor de cetenie ( Europa ) , de stat , de reedin i ara de

origine . Aici, un sentiment comun de o singura viziune a Europei (la unele nivele )dincolo de frontierele naionale devine atractiv. n egal msur, pentru individulobinuit la nivel de drept sau economie, alegerile se pot face pentru a depi limitelenaionale (Curtea European, legile comerciale ale UE ) pentru nevoile proprii. Acestlucru poate fi " hiper-individualism " , dar aceasta este cu siguran o reaciepragmatic pentru situaii disponibile.Pentru muli atunci, fiind Europeansau care auo identitate europeanpoate reflecta pur i simplu o analiz personal, pe baz denevoie .

Nu existndoial c oricum privim Europa i identitileeuropene, problemaidentitii europene a fost un subiect de interes semnificativ n ultimul deceniu. Acest

lucru este n parte o consecin a creteriirecente i continui a UE din identitateaeuropean, la un nivel oficial, cel puin, a fost ntotdeauna strns legat decoordonarea i dezvoltarea statelor membre (din nou o problem pragmatica ). Attatimp ct la summit-ul de la Copenhaga 1973, cele nou rimembre au emis un textintitulat Declaratie asupra identitii europene. n seciunea 22 , se observ c:Identitatea european va evolua n funcie de construcia dinamic a Europei Unite .n relaiile lor externe , cele nou tari propun progresiv s ntreprind definireaidentitii lor n raport cu alte ri .Aceast abordare sugereaz, ca i pentru alte forme de identitate, care vor ficonstruite treptat dintr-o imagine clar a ceea ce identitatea european nu este -adic diferenele dintre Europa n comparaie cu alte ri care ofer definiia a ceea

ce nseamn s fii european. Hobsbawn ( 1990) a remarcat faptul c aceasta esteistoria naturala de identiti, i anume c acestea dezvolta pentru a separa un grupsau naiune la alta. Bauboeck (1997) merge un pas mai departe argumentnd cproiectul de construire a unei patrii europene comune, atunci cnd se bazeaz pe un" naionalism etno - cultural Euro " , cere pentru succesul su nu doar prezena"celuilalt " , dar ameninarea altora" . El crede c o astfel de ameninare nu exist nrealitate, dar recunoate c " Euro - ovinismul i xenofobia apar ca fiind foarte realeefecte secundare ale proiectului imaginar de construire a naiunilor europene " , cuOrientul , inclusiv fundamentalismului islamic , a fost creat ca ameninare extern .Desigur, atunci cnd Europa este definit n termeni de civilizaie ca un patrimoniucultural comun (de exemplu, nvarea clasic , cretinism , Iluminismul ) , esteposibil s se excludlumea iudaic i islamica din aceast comunitate cultural(Asad 2002) .


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Abordarea oficiala, instituionalizata UE a identitii europene , a ncercat ntotdeaunasa evite problemele de identitate naional, n care naionalismul nu sunt contestatesau forate ntr-o form de identitate integraionist care estompeaz independenaoricarei naiuni. Cu toateacestea, ideea c UE este o ameninare la conceptul de"naiune " este unul care i-a asumat o importan central n considerare

posibilitatea apariiei unei identiti europene(a se vedea Fossum 2003). Cu toateacestea, cu creterea continu a Uniunii, precum i extinderea micarii dincolo defrontiere, ar putea ca identitile naionale sa atinga un nivel de maturitate care poatefi european fr nici un sens de pierdere a identitii naionale .De exemplu, ntr-orevizuire a datelor Euro-barometrului (date privind atitudinea fa de Europa,colectate de ctre Comisia European, n mod regulat ) van der Veen ( 2002 )sugereaz c :... Diferenele naionale transversale n puterea unei identiti europene nu suntlegate de o team c identitatea naional s-ar putea fi strmutata sau nlocuitacuidentitatea european . n schimb, ele pot fi explicate n parte prin diferenele dintrestatele membre n aciunile populaie lor care au trit i / sau au studiat intr-un alt stat

membru .Se pare c atunci simamantul/sentimentul locului este afectat de cel de mobilitategeografica i sociala, precum i de experiena acumulat ce i revine din acesta .Aceasta se poate vedea n cifrele din Eurobarometrul 65 ( 2006) . Ataamentul fade Europa variaz n funcie de ar , cum ar fi de ateptat : nivelul global al UE estede 63% , dar , la captul de jos al scar , avem 46 % pentru Marea Britanie , 43 % nGrecia , 42% n Lituania , 38 % n Estonia i doar un sfert ( 27 % ) dintre cei din Cipru. Dar cel mai important, n lumina observaiilor de mai sus, este c ataamentul esteafectat, de asemenea, de vrst , educaie , ocuparea forei de munc i alti factorisociali. Dintre cei educai la vrsta de 15 sau mai jos ,cifra este de 36 % , comparativcu 59 % pentru cei educai la 20 sau peste . Pentru manageri icei care desfoaractiviti independente, cifrele sunt 68% i 58% , respectiv . ntr-un asemeneacontext variat de opinii, credine i atitudini, este dificil s vorbim de o singuridentitate european sau de a fi european .

n cele din urm, v sugerm c aceasta este o vedere de bun sim de utilitatepragmatic,care centreaza ceea ce nseamn s fii european, iar acest lucru esteceva care este continuu fluid i mereu n schimbare de circumstane sociale, istoricei politice. Dar atunci cum poate cineva obine un sentiment de aceste limiteschimbare de sine i de alii n Europa? Cercetare pe Europa este inundat dechestionare, sondaje, studii de focus-grup i aa mai departe, care ncearc sabordeze o astfel de problem. Cu toate acestea, nu este o munc de calitate

scazuta, i aproape nimic despre cum sentimentul oamenilor despre ei nii nEuropa se reflect n comunicarea de zi cu zi.Poate c aici am putea gsi unelenelegeria ceea ce nseamn s fii european, lund n considerare despre ceea ceeuropenii vorbesc.

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What is It to Be European (1)