Western Pacific Operations of...Western Pacific Operations HISTORY OF U. S. MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II VOLUME IV By GEORGE W.GARAND Other Volumes in this Series I LtCol

Western PacificOperationsHISTORY OF U. S . MARINE CORPS

OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

VOLUME IV

By

GEORGE W.GARAND

TRUMAN R. STROBRIDGE

Historical Division, Headquarters, U . S. Marine Corps

1971

Other Volumes in this Series

ILtCol Frank 0 . Hough, Maj Verle E . Ludwig, and Henry I . Shaw, Jr .

Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal

IIHenry I. Shaw, Jr. and Maj Douglas T . Kane

Isolation of Rabaul

IIIHenry I . Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T . Turnbladh

Central Pacific Drive

VBenis M. Frank and Henry I . Shaw, Jr .

Victory and Occupation

Library of Congress Catalog Card No . 58-60002

PCN 19000262700

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U .S . Government Printing OfficeWashington, D .C . 20402 • Price $10

Foreword

This book is the fourth in the five-volume history of Marine Corpsoperations in World War II . The story of Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Marineartillery and aviation in the Philippines, as previously narrated in separatedetail in preliminary monographs, has been reevaluated and rewritten todepict events in proper proportion to each other and in correct perspectiveto the war as a whole. New material, particularly from Japanese and othersources that has become available since the earlier monograph series waspublished, has been included to provide fresh insight into the MarineCorps' contribution to the final victory in the Pacific .

The period covered by this history, essentially from mid-September1944 to late March 1945, covers the continuation of the United States drivefrom the Central Pacific to the Western Carolines and the Volcano-BoninIslands at the very doorstep of Japan . Once again it became the task of theMarine Corps to put into practice the amphibious doctrine that had beendeveloped during the prewar years, modified and perfected during earlieroperations in the Solomons, Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas . The courseof events on Peleliu and Iwo Jima demonstrated the basic soundness ofMarine Corps tactics and techniques in the face of skillful and tenaciousresistance offered by a highly motivated and well trained foe who wasdetermined to defend his possessions to the last .

While the American amphibious assault team fought its way throughthe Japanese defenses towards the Home Islands, Marine aviation wrote aglorious chapter of its own . Frequently denied the opportunity of flyingdirect support in amphibious operations, Marine aviators developed andput into practice a doctrine of close air support that more than proved itsworth during the recapture of the Philippines . The continuous neutraliza-tion of bypassed enemy-held islands in the Central Pacific by Marine airisolated sizable Japanese garrisons from their bases of supply and renderedthem powerless to support the enemy war effort until their surrender atthe end of the war .

The numbers of men and quantities of materiel employed during theoperations narrated in this volume defy the imagination . In this connectionit is worth recalling that the successful execution of these operationsdepended on joint Army-Navy-Marine cooperation, which became evermore pronounced as the war approached its final phase . Combined withimproved tactics and weapons on the field of battle was the highly flexible

IV

FOREWORD

and efficient Marine command organization designed to meet the require-ments of modern warfare.

As on other battlefields before World War II and since, the Marineswho fought and died in the Philippines, on Peleliu, and on Iwo Jima wrotewith their blood an indelible account of courage and sacrifice that will liveon in their country's history, to serve as a guide and inspiration to futuregenerations .

Reviewed and approved26 May 1970

L. F. CHAPMAN, JRGENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Preface

In a series of boldly conceived and executed operations, Americanforces in the Pacific Theater captured and developed a number of strategi-cally placed islands that were to serve as springboards for the inexorableadvance towards the Japanese home islands . The Guadalcanal campaign,first offensive step after a year of reverses in this theater, marked thebeginning of the American counteroffensive that gathered momentum untila steamroller of unprecedented force smashed its way across the vastexpanses of the Central and Western Pacific .

Hand in hand with the accelerating tempo of operations went im-provements in the techniques employed in the amphibious assault and thesometimes protracted operations inland. By the time the Peleliu operationwas launched in mid-September 1944, the Japanese had changed theirtactics of defending the beaches and launching a final banzai once theinevitable end was in sight to a far more sophisticated defense thatamounted to an extended delaying action conducted from well dug tunnelsand cave positions which had to be taken at great cost to the attackingforce. The battle for Iwo Jima, which got under way on 19 February 1945,represented a battle of attrition in the truest sense, with losses in men andmateriel far out of proportion to the size of the objective . Aside from itstactical value, Iwo Jima assumed strategic importance in signalling theJapanese government and people that the United States was determinedto bring the war in the Pacific to a victorious conclusion and that even theheaviest losses would not deter Americans from this purpose .

New tactics employed by the Marine Corps in the course of the warwere not limited to fighting on the ground . The speedy expansion ofMarine strength following the Pearl Harbor debacle was accompanied bya proportionate growth of the air arm that had existed in miniature sizeup to that time . Denied the use of carriers during the early years of thewar, Marine aviators discovered through trial and error that they couldmake an important contribution to the ground troops in furnishing a typeof close air support that could be rendered quickly and with devastatingresults to the enemy . Together with this support came the creation andperfection of the air liaison team which provided a direct and vital linkbetween troops on the ground, whether Marine or Army, and the support-ing aircraft . The bombing of bypassed islands in the Central Pacific, ascarried out by Marine aviation over a prolonged period of time, under-

VI

PREFACE

scored the fact that enemy bastions of considerable strength could beeffectively neutralized from the air without having to be subjected tocostly ground assault.

A section of this volume has been devoted to the evolution of theorganization that had to be created to coordinate the training, flow ofreplacements and supplies, and overall employment of Marine field com-ponents. This was the Fleet Marine Force, which was conceived longbefore World War II. Its growth and development clearly mirror theorganizational demands made on the Corps during the war years . Thechapters provide the reader with a better understanding of the commandorganization that made possible many of the famous amphibious assaultsof World War II .

Our purpose in publishing this operational history in durable formis to make the Marine Corps record permanently available for study bymilitary personnel and the general public as well as by serious students ofmilitary history . We have made a conscientious effort to be objective inour treatment of the actions of Marines and of the men of other serviceswho fought at their side . We have tried to write with understanding aboutour former enemies and in this effort have received invaluable help fromthe Japanese themselves . Few people so militant and unyielding in war havebeen as dispassionate and analytical about their actions in peace . We owea special debt of gratitude to Mr . Susumu Nishiura, Chief of the WarHistory Office, Defense Agency of Japan and to the many researchers andhistorians of his office that reviewed our draft manuscripts .

This five-volume series was planned and outlined by Mr. Henry I .Shaw, Jr., Chief Historian, while Mr. George W. Garand was responsiblefor Volume IV itself. Mr. Truman R . Strobridge, originally assigned asthe author of this volume, wrote the first four chapters of the Peleliucampaign before he left the Marine Corps to become a historian with theDepartment of the Army. Mr. Garand wrote the rest of this book, revisingand editing it for publication . In his research on the Peleliu operation,Mr. Garand frequently consulted the material assembled for the mono-graph The Assault on Peleliu by Major Frank 0. Hough ; material dealingwith the Philippines was obtained from the monograph Marine Aviationin the Philippines by Major Charles W . Boggs, Jr. In preparing the narra-tive for Iwo Jima, the monograph Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic, preparedby Lieutenant Colonel Whitman S . Bartley, served as a valuable guide .Mr. Garand also prepared all the appendices . The Director of MarineCorps History made the final critical review of portions of the manuscript .

A number of leading participants in the actions described have com-mented on the preliminary drafts of pertinent portions of the book . Theirvaluable assistance is gratefully acknowledged . Several senior officers, inparticular General Oliver P . Smith, Admiral George H. Fort, Admiral

PREFACE

VII

Jesse B. Oldendorf, Lieutenant General Julian C . Smith, Lieutenant Gen-eral Merwin H. Silverthorn, Lieutenant General Thomas A . Wornham,Lieutenant General Louis E . Woods, Major General Ford 0 . Rogers, MajorGeneral Dudley S. Brown, and Brigadier General John S . Letcher madevaluable contributions through their written comments, as did LieutenantGeneral Lewis B . Puller and Brigadier General John R. Lanigan duringpersonal interviews .

Special thanks are due to the historical agencies of the other servicesfor their critical readings of draft chapters of this book. Outstandingamong the many official historians who measurably assisted the authorswere : Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian and Mr . Robert R . Smith, Head,General History Branch, Office of the Chief of Military History, Depart-ment of the Army ; Dr. Dean C. Allard, Head, Operational ArchivesBranch, Naval History Division, Department of the Navy ; and Dr. RobertF. Futrell, Historian, Historical Research Division, Air University, Max-well Air Force Base, Alabama .

Captain Charles B. Collins and his predecessors as Historical Divi-sion/Branch Administrative Officers, Chief Warrant Officer Jo E . Kennedy,Second Lieutenant Gerald S . Duncan, and First Lieutenants John J .Hainsworth and D'Arcy E . Grisier ably handled the many exacting dutiesinvolved in processing the volume from first drafts through final printedform. The bulk of the early preliminary typescripts was prepared byMiss Kay P. Sue, who, with the assistance of Sergeant Michael L . Gardner,also expertly handled the painstaking task of typing the final manuscriptfor the printer . Miss Sue, assisted by Miss Charlotte L . Webb, also per-formed the meticulous work demanded in preparing the index .

The maps were drafted by Sergeant Earl L . Wilson and his successor,Sergeant Kenneth W. White.

F. C . CALDWELLCOLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RETIRED)DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY

Contents

PART I BACKGROUND

CHAPTER

PAGE

1. Introduction

3

PART II FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

1. The Development of FMFPac 132. Administration and Aviation 33

PART III THE PALAUS : GATEWAY TO THEPHILIPPINES

1. Strategic Situation 512. Pre-Assault Preparations 773. D-Day on Peleliu . . . . 1064. The Drive Inland : 16-22 September 1325. Angaur and Ulithi . . .

. . .

1626. Securing the North : 23-30 September1857. The Umurbrogol Pocket : 29 September-15 October . . . 2198. To the Bitter End 254

PART IV MARINES IN THE PHILIPPINES

1. Background and Planning 2912. The Leyte Landings 3093. The Luzon Campaign 3344. Southern Philippines Operations 358

PART V MARINE AVIATION IN THE WESTERNPACIFIC

1. Mounting The Offensive2. Marine Aviation in the Marianas, Carolines, and at Iwo

Jima

IX

393

422

X

CONTENTS

PART VI IWO JIMA

CHAPTER

PAGE

1 . Background to DETACHMENT 4432. Offensive Plans and Preparations4623. The Preliminaries 4824. D-Day on Iwo Jima 5025. The Struggle for Suribachi 5286. Drive to the North 5477. 3d Marine Division Operations on Iwo Jima5718. Airfield Development and Activities Behind the Lines . . 5949. The 5th Marine Division Drive on the Left616

10. The 4th Marine Division Drive on the Right64511. Final Operations on Iwo Jima 68412. Summary 71313. Conclusions 729

APPENDICES

A. Bibliographical Notes 739B. Guide to Abbreviations 752C. Military Map Symbols 758D. Chronology 759E. Fleet Marine Force Status-31 August 1944765F. Table of Organization F-100 Marine Division 780G. Marine Task Organization and Command List782H. Marine Casualties 797I. Unit Commendations 798

Index 813

ILLUSTRATIONS

Amphibious Exercises, Puerto Rico 18Testing Higgins Boat 18Landing Exercise, New River, N . C 37Change of Command, FMFPac, 1945 37Assault Troops Off Peleliu 107Peleliu Beach on D-Day 107Abortive Enemy Tank Attack, Peleliu 125Machine Gun In Action, Peleliu 125Artillery in Firing Position 140

CONTENTS XI

ILLUSTRATIONS-ContinuedMarine Tanks at Peleliu Airfield

PAGE

140Close Fighting Near Airfield 149Casualty Evacuation 149U. S. Army Troops Assault Angaur 167Closing in on the Enemy, Angaur . . 167Men and Supplies Crossing Peleliu Reef 188U. S. Army Troops Arrive at Peleliu 188Marine Aircraft Preparing for Napalm Attack 194Bombing of Japanese Ridge Positions, Peleliu 194Assault on Ngesebus 213Advance Inland, Ngesebus 213Battle of the Ridges, Peleliu 243Final Operations on Peleliu 243Navy Planes at Dulag Airfield, Leyte 313Marine Night Fighters, Leyte 313Close Air Support for U . S. Army Troops, Luzon 355Marine Dive Bombers on Luzon Returning from Mission . 355New Dive Bombers for Marine Aviation in the Philippines

. 360Filipino Guerrillas On Mindanao . . . 360LSTs Unloading at Zamboanga . . . 369U. S . Army Ceremony Honors Marine Aviation 369Marine Dive Bombers En Route to Bypassed Islands . . . 419U. S. Personnel Touring Mille Island, Marshalls 419Bombs Away at Iwo Jima 488Amphibious Assault, Iwo Jima 4884th Marine Division Troops on Iwo Beach 507Landing of 2/27, Iwo Jima 507Japanese Painting of Iwo Invasion 511War Dog and Handler Approach Enemy Cave . 51137mm Gun in Action 529Debris of Battle, D plus 2 529Flamethrowers in Action 532Marine on Mt. Suribachi and View of Landing Beaches . . . . 532First Flag Raising on Iwo Jima 541Second Flag Goes Up on Suribachi 544Marines at Mass 596First "Grasshopper" Lands on Iwo 596B-29 Superfortress After Emergency Landing 5994th Marine Division Observation Post 599

XII

CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS-Continued

PAGE

155mm Gun in Action 606Rocket Fire Support 606Birdseye View of Iwo Beachhead 609Shore Parties Hauling Supplies 609Captured Japanese Tank 619Combat Patrol in Northern Iwo 619Enemy Positions near Nishi Village 696Japanese Prisoner and Escort 696Air Force Bivouac Area on Iwo After Banzai709Motoyama Airfield No . 1 After Restoration709

MAPS1. Strategic Situation, Central and Western Pacific532. Palau Islands 563. Japanese Defense Plan, Peleliu 744. D-Day, Peleliu 1115. Peleliu, Second Operational Phase 1336. Angaur Island 1647. Ulithi Atoll 1828. Commitment of the U.S. Army 321st Infantry Regiment,

Peleliu 1919. Isolation of Umurbrogol 196

10. North Peleliu and Ngesebus 20311. Securing the North 21512. Umurbrogol Pocket 22013. Drive from the North 23914. Final Marine Action, Peleliu . . . . 24715. Final 81st Infantry Division Operations, Peleliu 25516. Philippine Islands 29517. Sixth Army Area of Operations 31118. Lingayen Gulf Landing 33819 . Luzon 34120. Route to Manila and XI Corps Landings34521 . Main U. S. Drives in the Victor V Operation36422. Area of Responsibility, Commander Aircraft, Northern

Solomons 39423. Marshall Islands-MAG-22 Operations, 194440624. Iwo Jima-Sulphur Island 44625. Japanese Defense Sectors 460

CONTENTS

MAPS-Continued

PAGE

26 . Landing Plan, Iwo Jima27. Naval Gunfire Areas of Responsibility, D-3 and D-228. VAC Front Lines D-Day, 19 February 1945 . . . .

I. Scene of Battle, 1944-1945Map SectionII. Progress of the Attack, VAC Front Lines, D-Day-

D Plus 5 Map SectionIII. 3d Marine Division Zone of Action, Iwo Jima,

25 February-1 March 1945Map SectionIV. 3d Marine Division Zone of Action, Iwo Jima,

1-10 March 1945 Map SectionV. 5th Marine Division Zone of Action, Iwo Jima,

24 February-2 March 1945Map SectionVI. 5th Marine Division Zone of Action, Iwo Jima,

2-10 March 1945 Map SectionVII. 4th Marine Division Zone of Action, Iwo Jima,

24-28 February 1945 Map SectionVIII. 4th Marine Division Zone of Action, Iwo Jima,

5-7 March 1945 . . . .

. . Map SectionIX. 3d Marine Division, Final Operations

. . . . Map SectionX. 4th Marine Division, Final Operations

Map SectionXI. 5th Marine Division, Final Operations

Map Section

CHARTS

1. Genealogy of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific2. Japanese Command Organization-Defense of the Philippines3. Organization of Air Command, Southwest Pacific Area . . .

470494524

22299302

XIII

PART I

Background

Introduction

The military operations narrated inthis volume cover neither the beginningof the greatest global conflict in historynor its end. They do, however, describein detail two of the major amphibiouscampaigns in the Western Pacific, Pel-eliu and Iwo Jima, and the prolongedfighting that followed until all enemyresistance was quelled. In addition, thelittle-known exploits of Marine artilleryand air in the Philippines and the ac-complishments of Marine flying squad-rons in the reduction of enemy positionsin the Central and Western Pacific arecovered .

In themselves, the day-by-day ac-counts of terrain seized, sorties flown,rounds fired, numbers of enemy killed,and casualties sustained tend to have anumbing effect. The mere recitation ofthe thousands of tons of artillery ammu-nition expended in the preliminary bom-bardment and small arms ammunitionfired in weeks of close combat tend tooverwhelm the imagination. Nor doesthe spectacle of 90,000 men battling forweeks at close quarters appear realisticunless it is remembered that such com-bat actually took place on Iwo Jima .Even though this volume tells of theexploits of Marines, both ground andair, in the Western Pacific, it should berecalled that their heroism was but asmall part in the mosaic of global war,and that their sacrifice was directlylinked with that of the remaining mili-

CHAPTER 1

tary services of the United States andits Allies .

World War II had its roots in thepolitical, economic, and social conditionsthat arose or prevailed in the yearsfollowing the end of the greatest con-flagration the world had experienced upto that time. In a carefully preparedaddress to the Senate on 22 January1917, President Woodrow Wilson hadvoiced the view that any lasting peacehad to be a peace without victory, since"victory would mean peace forced upona loser, a victor's peace imposed uponthe vanquished. Only a peace betweenequals can last ."'Almost prophetically, the President

continued that "peace must be followedby some concert of powers which willmake it virtually impossible that anysuch catastrophe should ever overwhelmus again ."'

As part of the peace settlement fol-lowing the end of World War I, theGerman island possessions in the Cen-tral Pacific, notably the Marianas, Caro-lines, and Marshalls, were mandated tothe Japanese, who also gained controlof former German concessions in China .

'President Woodrow Wilson's address to theU.S. Senate, 22Jan17, as cited in Oscar Theo-dore Barck, Jr., and Nelson Manfred Blake,Since 1900-A History of the United States(New York : The Macmillan Company, 1965),pp. 210-211 .

a Ibid.

3

4

While Germany was being stripped ofher outlying possessions and the ground-work for future trouble was being laidin Central Europe, where strips of terri-tory inhabited by ethnic Germans werebeing incorporated into adjacent coun-tries, Japan emerged as the strongestpower in the western Pacific . While theJapanese, under the terms of the man-date given to them by the League ofNations, were permitted to govern anddevelop the islands placed under theircharge, they were forbidden to constructfortifications on them, a point furtherunderscored by the Washington NavalTreaty of 1922 .

Quite possibly, given a few decades ofglobal peace, the major nations of theworld might well have succeeded inrestoring their shattered economies, re-building their political structures, andlearning to live with their neighborsacross the multitude of newly createdborders. Unfortunately, this was not tobe the case. The severe bloodletting thatthe big powers had undergone in WorldWar I bred distrust, dissatisfaction, andan increasing trend towards nationaland international violence among thevictors and vanquished alike .

Even before the end of World War I,two major upheavals occurred in Rus-sia, with inherent loss of life and de-struction of property unheard of sincethe Mongol invasion . While the Redand White factions were locked in astruggle to the death, the peasants,workers, and remnants of the erstwhilearistocracy suffered drastic privations .In the end little changed, and oneoppressive regime was succeeded by.another . Lack of faith in their respec-tive leaders and/or national destinies

WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

was to cause overwhelming changes inItaly and Germany where fascist dic-tatorships were established withoutrecourse to civil war, once the peoplehad lost faith in the parliamentaryforms of government they had enjoyedsince the end of the war .

In the United States, following theconclusion of the armistice, there was aconsiderable amount of confusion as tothe shape in which the postwar worldwas to be rebuilt . President Wilson wasan ardent advocate of a League of Na-tions in which every member, regardlessof size, would have one vote . The fivebig powers, Great Britain, France,Italy, Japan, and the United States,were to sit on an executive council per-manently, while non-permanent seatswere to be allotted to four of the smallernations . A permanent Court of Interna-tional Justice was to arbitrate disputesbetween the member nations. Amongthe foremost functions of the League ofNations was the preservation of peace,as expressed in Article 10, which Presi-dent Wilson regarded as the heart of itsconstitution . This article provided that

The Members of the League undertake torespect and preserve as against externalaggression the territorial integrity andexisting political independence of all mem-bers of the League. In case of any threatof danger of such aggression the Councilshall advise upon the means by which thisobligation shall be fulfilled .'

Enforcement of a global peace waspredicated on the assumption that noaggressor could withstand the combinedstrength of outraged humanity, and thatall member nations would take con-

8 Article 10 of the Constitution, League ofNations, as cited in ibid., p . 251 .

INTRODUCTION

certed action without delay against anyform of aggression. The United Stateshad joined the Allies "in order to makethe world safe for democracy," andPresident Wilson clearly perceived thatthe future of world peace could be safe-guarded only if all the major powerscombined their strength, manpower,and resources in stabilizing a shakyworld. Many influential Americans feltnow that the war had been won, in nosmall measure by virtue of their efforts,that the time had come to withdrawfrom the arena of international politics .In this they were guided by the partingwords of the first President of theUnited States who had clearly stated

The great rule of conduct for us inregard to foreign nations is, in extendingour commercial relations to have with themas little political connections as possible. . . It is our true policy to steer clear ofpermanent alliances . . . Taking care al-ways to keep ourselves by suitable estab-lishments on a respectable defensiveposture, we may safely trust to temporaryalliances for extraordinary emergencies

Continued upheavals in Europe, eco-nomic considerations, and disillusion-ment with prolonged bickering at theconference table soon led the UnitedStates to revert to its hallowed traditionof isolationism, thus deserting Wilson'sleadership that, had it been carried outto its fullest extent, might have assuredthe world a period of peace and stabil-ity. Instead, the American nation re-jected not only Wilson's vision of a justpeace, but along with it his politicalparty and the League of Nations. On

`Victor Platsits, ed., Washington's FarewellAddress (New York: New York Public Library,1935), pp. 155-56 .

5

the positive side, the Republican admin-istration of President Warren G.Harding convened a disarmament con-ference in July 1921, initially limited toGreat Britain, France, Italy, and Japan .The number of participants was subse-quently expanded to include several ofthe smaller countries. Soviet Russia,socially still unacceptable and far re-moved from obtaining official UnitedStates recognition, was excluded .On 12 November 1921, three years

after the World War I armistice, theconference was held in Washington .Considering the differences that existedbetween the attending powers, substan-tial agreement was quickly reached bythe three major nations, the UnitedStates, Great Britain, and Japan, as wellas by France and Italy, with referenceto the ratio to be employed as to theships to be retained by each country'snavy and the number to be scrapped . Atthe same time, the participants agreedto halt the construction of warships, butnot aircraft carriers, in excess of 10,000tons or equipped with guns larger than8 inches in caliber for a period of 10years. The participants agreed to theterms of the agreement largely becauseit resulted in a sizable cut in militaryspending at a time when the varioustreasuries were badly depleted by thedrain of World War I . Japan receivedan additional incentive as her rewardfor agreeing to the ratio, which wasto become a major factor in shapingthe policies that the major powers wereto adopt in dealing with various areasof the Pacific.By way of a compromise, the United

States agreed that she would not fortifyany of the islands under her control in

6

the Pacific, except for Hawaii . TheUnited States specifically agreed not tofortify the Philippines, Guam, Wake, orthe Aleutian Islands ; Great Britain like-wise agreed not to fortify Hong Kong,Borneo, the Solomons, and the Gilberts .In turn, the Japanese agreed not to for-tify Formosa or any of the former Ger-man possessions in the Pacific north ofthe equator, including specifically theMarianas less Guam, which was underAmerican control, and the Carolines .A Four-Power Pact, to which Eng-

land, France, Japan, and the UnitedStates were signatories called for amutual recognition of insular rights inthe Pacific. This pact, which was to bein force for a 10-year period, called forthe adjustment of any difficulties thatmight arise by way of the conferencetable. In order to eliminate a furthersource of irritation in the Far East, aNine-Power Treaty, subscribed to by theUnited States, Great Britain, Japan,Portugal, Belgium, Italy, The Nether-lands, France, and China attempted toregulate the often precarious and com-plicated relations of China with variousoutside powers . At least on the surface,the Washington Conference seemed toassure a period of international coop-eration that, coupled with a reduction inarmaments, could lead to a lengthy spanof global peace .

Under the terms of the Naval Treatyof 1922, the United States destroyed 19capital ships of pre-World War I vin-tage and 13 that were still under con-struction. Expressed in tonnage, theUnited States destroyed 842,380 tons ;Great Britain 447,750 tons ; and Japan354,709 tons . On the part of American


naval experts the scrapping of majorships as well as the agreement to leavethe western Pacific area unfortifiedevoked sharp criticism, since "the strictobservance of these treaties left theUnited States crippled. It was to be-come apparent soon enough that theWashington Conference had left a majorloophole in that the quota system did notapply to submarines, cruisers, and de-stroyers . As a result, it was not longbefore those nations interested in evad-ing the provisions of the disarmamenttreaty concentrated their efforts on theconstruction of these "permitted"vessels .

By 1927, the euphoria that had fol-lowed in the wake of the WashingtonConference had largely given way to aspirit of sober contemplation . In anattempt to revive the hopeful spirit of1922, and in order to put an end to thesmaller vessel naval armaments racethat had been developing, PresidentCalvin Coolidge deemed it advisable tohold a second disarmament conference,which convened in late June 1927 atGeneva. Even though once again theUnited States offered her good offices inreviving the feeling of trust and con-viviality that had marked the Washing-ton Conference, the climate abroad hadundergone a distinct change in the fiveyears that had passed since the earlierconference. Both Italy and :France re-fused to participate at all ; the UnitedStates, Japan, and Great Britain failed

E Maj C. Joseph Bernardo and Dr . EugeneH. Bacon, American Military Policy-Its De-velopment Since 1775 (Harrisburg : The Mili-tary Service Publishing Company, 1957),p. 391 .

INTRODUCTION

to reach any substantial agreement inlimiting the construction of the smallernaval vessels and, in consequence, theGeneva Conference ended in failure .

Nearly three more years were to passbefore the London Naval Treaty ofApril 1930 once more brought somesemblance of order into the interna-tional naval armament situation, thoughonce again France and Italy refused tocomply with the terms of the agreement .A World Disarmament Conference, con-vened at Geneva in 1932 under theauspices of the League of Nations, failedto yield concrete results, even thoughthe United States, this time under theleadership of President Herbert Hoover,attempted to have all offensive weaponsoutlawed, and, failing this, made aneffort to at least obtain a sizable reduc-tion in such weapons. Once again, theAmerican proposals fell on deaf ears ina world increasingly beset by social,political, and economic problems . Onehistory was to sum up the overall situa-tion in these words

America had entered the postwar periodwith hopeful visions of a new world orderin which reason, logic, and disarmamentwould pave the way toward world peace .But the unsettled problems and bitternessof the Versailles Peace Conference pro-vided anything but the proper milieu forthe entertainment of such thoughts . Theworld was in ferment, but America slept,trusting in diplomacy and disarmamentto protect her from a cruel and implacablefate.'

It was the fate of the United Statesto emerge on the international scene asa dominant power at the very time thatthe problems of the major nations cried

'Aid., p . 392 .

7

for a solution that even an older andmore experienced country might havebeen able to mediate only with greatdifficulty. World War I had broughtforth only bitter fruit for victors andvanquished alike and the balance ofpower that had existed prior to 1914had largely vanished . It was succeededby new forms of government and tenu-ous alliances more often engaged in asfleeting expediences rather than solu-tions of a more permanent nature . Seem-ingly abounding in material wealth,possessed by a sharp sense of business,and dwarfing the Old World powerswith her sheer physical size and enor-mous resources, the appearance of theyoung giant on the world scene, andparticularly in the sphere of diplomacy,was greeted by her elders with a mixtureof amusement, admiration, envy, andscorn. Few could deny President Wil-son's sincerity in putting forward hisFourteen Points aimed at restoring sta-bility to a troubled postwar world . Evenfewer could question the honesty of theattempts made by Presidents Harding,Coolidge, and Hoover in forestalling ageneral world armaments race thatsooner or later was bound to result in ashooting war that once again might en-gulf one nation after another . Yet, inassessing its own political aspirationson the international scene, a nation em-barked on pursuit of its national destiny,real or imagined, could not help but feela sense of frustration and irritation atthe continuous American efforts thatcould well be considered as direct or in-direct interference in the affairs ofothers. No matter how well meant orinspired the American quest for world

8

peace, the very honesty and often lackof complexity within these proposalscould hardly fail to act as an irritant tothose nations that by virtue of age, cul-ture, and social fabric considered them-selves somewhat superior to the some-times clumsy diplomacy of the NewWorld .

On the international scene, fluctua-tions in American foreign policy occa-sioned by succeeding administrationsthat were in themselves reflections ofinternal developments within the coun-try frequently were misinterpreted byforeign observers . Central and SouthAmerica were generally regarded as thepreserve of the United States, and sev-eral small-scale military incursions byU .S. forces into these areas wheneverAmerican interests were threatenedunderscored this point. In other parts ofthe world, the United States attemptedto make available its good offices in medi-ating disputes, but isolationism withinthe country failed to furnish the outsideworld with an image of firmness andresolution, backed by military power .

The isolationism that gripped theUnited States in the early 1930s in itselfwas the outgrowth of several factors,all of which combined to imbue Ameri-cans with a spirit of withdrawal fromthe troubles of other nations . The pro-longed economic depression with its sideeffects of widespread discontent furthercontributed to a public apathy towardsexternal developments underscored bygrowing public disillusionment with thestate of the world in general . As onehistory dealing with this particular sub-ject matter was to comment

To many Americans, World War I hadbeen fought in vain ; the world had not


been made safe for democracy. There wasa growing feeling that wars were engi-neered by munitions makers so that theymight make money . . . . Another factor inthe isolationist trend was the failure ofthe debtors to repay what they had bor-rowed during World War I. And what madeit worse, Americans felt that this moneywas being used to build up national arma-ments which would lead to future wars :

The rising number of dictatorshipsacross the globe could also serve as abarometer warning of future trouble ininternational affairs. By the end of the1920s a growing number of nations hadentrusted their destinies to the hands of"strong men," notably the Soviet Union,Hungary, Italy, Spain, Portugal, andPoland. The trend toward authoritarianforms of government was still gainingground and the concept of a single-partystate that, at the cost of individual free-dom, could operate more efficiently in astate of crisis than the parliamentarysystem, made great inroads . Thus, thesix million unemployed in Germany re-sulting from the Great :Depression,played an important part in the rise topower of the National Socialist Party .In Japan, the militarists were also mov-ing into the saddle by degrees, thoughthe Emperor continued to rule supreme .As the evil of totalitarianism spread,the differences between opposing sys-tems became diffused

Communism and fascism became moreclearly movements international in char-acter, each thriving in the fertile soil ofpopular frustration and social distress,and on fears aroused by the other. After1933, when the National Socialists tookabsolute control of Germany, the accumu-lating crises merged into one supremecrisis : The direct challenge of unbridled

' Barck and Blake, op. cit., p. 551 .

INTRODUCTION

organized violence to all that men hadtried to achieve in 1919 and had still hopedto achieve in 1925 8

Trouble in Europe and Asia was notto be long delayed . In Central Europe,within three years after Adolf Hitler'srise to power, there occurred the Ger-man remilitarization of the Rhineland,followed by the annexation of Austria inearly 1938 and occupation of the Sudet-enland in September of that year undera policy of appeasement by the WesternEuropean powers . Within six months ofthe Munich settlement, the Germansoccupied the remainder of Bohemia . InSeptember 1939, Hitler launched hisfateful attack against Poland, thus ush-ering in a global conflict of then un-heard of dimensions. On the other sideof the globe, Japan had launched an at-tack on Manchuria in September 1931and by May 1933 had withdrawn fromthe League of Nations . Italy, under theleadership of Benito Mussolini, launcheda war of aggression of its own againstEthiopia and in late 1935 thwartedLeague action condemning the attack .In 1936 Germany, Italy, and Japanaligned themselves, ostensibly againstthe threat of Communism, but each withher own separate interests . Both Chinaand Spain represented additional trou-ble spots, each country engaged in civilwar that was fuelled from outsidesources. The League of Nations, lackingan effective police force to check thespiralling aggression of the totalitarianpowers, proved unable to assert itsauthority ; its role eventually was re-

e David Thomson, ed . The Era of Violence,1898-1945-The New Cambridge Modern His-tory, vol. xii (Cambridge : Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 1960), p . 558, used with permission.

duced to that of a debating society whosemembers, when chastized, walked out atwill,During the 1930s, some Americans

were watching the increasing trend to-wards international violence with risingconcern, though the country was still inthe throes of the Great Depression . Con-sidering the state of the United States'defenses, this concern was only too welljustified . In 1933, the then Chief of Staffof the Army, General Douglas Mac-Arthur, estimated "that the UnitedStates stood seventeenth in rank amongthe world's armies ." 9 In order to counterthe general apathy towards military pre-paredness then engulfing the country,several veterans' organizations spoke upin behalf of increased allocations for thearmed forces, but theirs was a voice cry-ing in the wilderness in a country stillbeset by major economic troubles . As tothe outlook for bolstering America'sarmed forces during this period, the sit-uation was bleak

A new administration would take officein 1933, faced not only with the grimspecter of hunger stalking the streets, butalso the sound of marching boots in Europeand Asia. The Roosevelt Administrationwas to fall heir to a depleted militaryestablishment, acute economic distress, andintensified international difficulties."

Within the budget-starved militaryestablishment of the United States thereexisted a force that was lean in numbersbut strong in history, tradition, and rep-utation : the United States MarineCorps. In 1933, the entire Corps con-sisted of 1,192 officers and 15,343 men .As war clouds gathered over Europe in

° Bernardo and Bacon, op. cit., p. 401 .10 Ibid ., p . 400 .

9

10

the summer of 1939, this number sawonly a nominal increase, though a sub-stantial enlargement was authorized byexecutive order of 8 September 1939 .Specializing in the amphibious assault,the U.S. Marine Corps was to occupy aunique position in World War II . One ofthe official histories in this series, whichdiscusses the role of Marines prior toand following America's entry into thewar in detail, makes this observation

While his country battled a coalition ofenemies, and most of his countrymen inarms were fighting halfway across theglobe from him, the Marine trained tomeet only one enemy-Japan. As the warmoved inexorably onward, the men whoflocked to join the Corps in unprecedentednumbers were literally and consciouslysigning up to fight the Japanese. Thisorientation toward a single enemy andtowards one theater, the Pacific, coloredevery Marine's life in and out of battle


and had an incalculable but undeniablybeneficial effect on the combat efficiency ofthe Fleet Marine Force .'

The development of the Fleet MarineForce in conjunction with the evolutionof amphibious doctrine will be discussedin greater detail in the following chap-ters as a prelude to the account of twoof the major amphibious operationsundertaken by the U .S. Marine Corps inthe Western Pacific. To this end, anunderstanding of the principles of theamphibious assault and knowledge ofthe Marine command organization thatevolved in the Pacific during World WarII, should prove helpful .

'Henry I. Shaw, Jr. and Major Douglas T .Kane, Isolation of Rabaul-History of U.S .Marine Corps Operations in World War II,v. II (Washington : Hist Br, G-3 Div, HQMC,1963), p. 4, hereafter Shaw and Kane, Isolationof Rabaul .

PART II

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

The Development of FMFPac 1

BACKGROUND 2During World War II, the primary

tactic employed by the United States in

' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thischapter is derived from : Administrative His-tory of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 10Apr44-31Aug45, dtd 15May46, hereafter FMFPacAdministrative History ; Historical Outline ofthe Development of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,1941-1950 (Preliminary), HQMC, n.d ., here-after The Development of FMFPac ; LtColFrank 0. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, andHenry I. Shaw, Jr ., Pearl Harbor to Guadal-canal-History of U. S. Marine Corps Opera-tions in World War II, v . I (Washington :HistBr, G-3, HQMC, 1958), hereafter Hough,Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadal-canal ; Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C . Nalty,and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive-History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations inWorld War II, v. III (Washington : HistBr,G-3, HQMC, 1966), hereafter Shaw, Nalty,and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive ; MajEdwin N. McClellan, The United States in theWorld War (Washington : HistBr, G-3, HQMC,1968 Reprint of 1920 Edition) ; General HollandM. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral and Brass(New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949),hereafter Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass,used with permission ; Jeter A. Isely and PhilipCrowl, The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War,Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific(Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1951),hereafter Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines andAmphibious War ; Clyde H. Metcalf, A Historyof the United States Marine Corps (New York :G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), hereafter Metcalf,A History of the U . S. Marine Corps ; Robert D .Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea-The UnitedStates Marine Corps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis :United States Naval Institute, 1962), here-after Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea .

' Additional information in this section isderived from : William H. Russell, "The Gen-

CHAPTER 1

the Pacific Theater was the amphibiousassault. In photographs, newsreels, andbooks dealing with the progress ofAmerican operations against Japan,there appears the familiar sight ofUnited States Marines wading throughthe surf to assault a hostile beach or ofwaves of amphibian tractors approach-ing enemy-held shores. So closely has theU.S . Marine Corps been identified in thepublic mind with amphibious warfarethat such terms as "The Marines havelanded" have long since become a com-monly-used phrase in the Americanvocabulary. Amphibious warfare andamphibious assault, over a period ofmany years, have assumed a very defi-nite meaning : that of landing a force towrest islands or other terrain from theenemy, as opposed to uncontested am-phibious landings. Generally, the pre-paredness of the United States to con-duct amphibious operations during theearly phase of World War II has beenconceded to be the result of foresightand planning on the part of the U .S .Navy and Marine Corps .3

In order to obtain a balanced pictureof the U.S. Marine Corps, its organiza-tion and its tactics in World War II, it

esis of FMF Doctrine : 1879-1899," MarineCorps' Gazette, v . 35, nos. 4-7 (Apr-July 1951) ;LtGen Holland M . Smith, "The Developmentof Amphibious Tactics in the U . S. Navy,"in Marine Corps Gazette, v . 30, nos . 6-10 (Jun-Oct 1946) .

' Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Am-phibious War, chaps. 1-2.

13

14

becomes necessary to follow the evolu-tion of that service since its inception .The tradition of Marines serving onboard ships and landing on foreignshores dates back to the RevolutionaryWar. Throughout the Nineteenth Cen-tury, as occasion demanded and as dic-tated by the expanding interests of theUnited States, Marines distinguishedthemselves in operations on the seas oron foreign soil . Their exploits becamelegend at home and abroad ; their exist-ence and immediate availability in timeof need became a factor in the foreignpolicy of the United States . To thoseviewing this country with unfriendlyeyes, they became a force to be reckonedwith .

Even though, from the very inceptionof the Corps, ship-based Marines hadmade landings on enemy soil, real inter-est in amphibious warfare, as the termhas since become widely known, did notdevelop until the Spanish-AmericanWar. At that time, both in Cuba and inthe Philippines, a military force wasneeded to accompany the fleet to seizeand hold advanced bases 4 Once this re-quirement had been established, TheGeneral Board of the Navy recom-mended the activation of a permanentbase force. In November 1901, the Secre-tary of the Navy ordered the Command-ant of the Marine Corps to organize abattalion for such advance base work .Instruction of Marines in this specialactivity began in 1902 at Newport,Rhode Island and Annapolis, Maryland .The training covered field fortifications,transportation of guns, construction oftelegraph and telephone lines, and theplanting of land mines . Of necessity, it


was limited in scope, since the MarineCorps was fully occupied with othercommitments abroad. Amphibious land-ing exercises were not held until 1914 .Advance base training was shifted toNew London, Connecticut in 1910 andto Philadelphia a year later. There itremained until 1920, when the activitymoved to Quantico, Virginia .During World War I, the Marine

Corps gained little combat experience inadvance base warfare despite the exist-ence of an Advance Base Force of morethan 6,000 officers and men . The bigbattles of that war were fought on terrafirma by large land armies locked forweeks or months in trench warfare thatfeatured little movement . As in the past,Marines distinguished themselves on thebattlefield, but the war they waged wasthat of the foot soldier . Since armiestend to refight battles of a previous warin peacetime in anticipation of the nextconflict, instruction in the years follow-ing World War I emphasized the Army-type of fighting that had become thetrademark of that war. As a, result, em-phasis in those years was on land war-fare at the expense of amphibioustraining .

Another reason for a lack of interestin amphibious warfare in the immediatepost-World War I years was the dismalexperience of the British in launchingtheir ill-fated Dardanelles-Gallipoli op-eration in 1915 . The general conclusionamong military strategists at the timewas that large scale amphibious opera-

'For a detailed account of Marine involve-ment in shaping the concept of amphibiouswarfare, see Hough, Ludwig, and. Shaw, PearlHarbor to Guadalcanal, Pt. I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FMFPAC

tions against a defended shore werecomparable to a "Charge of the LightBrigade," particularly if such an assaultwere attempted in the daytime . Still,there were others who did not share thispessimism. The subject of amphibiouslandings was discussed in the AnnualReport of the Commandant of the Ma-rine Corps in 1921 . At the same time, athen unknown student at the Naval WarCollege at Newport, Rhode Island, MajorHolland M. Smith, began to expound hisviews on behalf of the role he envisionedfor the Marine Corps of the future inthe realm of amphibious warfare.'

During the immediate postwar period,the voices raised in support of the feasi-bility of amphibious warfare were cry-ing in the wilderness . By mid-1921, at atime of isolationism and retrenchment,the strength of the U .S. Marine Corpsdiminished to 1,087 officers and 21,903enlisted men," a figure that was to dropeven lower during the late 1920s andearly 1930s. In the wake of demobiliza-tion the entire Corps was suffering froma letdown that invariably follows thereturn of a military organization topeacetime conditions. Most of the menwho had signed up for the emergencyhad returned to their civilian pursuits .Many wartime officers had left the serv-ice and wholesale demotions in rank hadbecome necessary, while recruiting wasslow. The status of the officers who re-

'Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, pp .47-54.

'Historical Statistics of the United States-Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington : Depart-ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,GPO, 1961), hereafter U. S . HistoricalStatistics.

15

mained was uncertain and, as with theother Services, retrenchment and budg-etary restrictions obscured the peace-time mission and status of the Corps .

Postwar economy and public apathysubjected the Marine Corps and theother Services to severe limitations inmen and resources, notwithstanding thefact that Marines were deployed in theCaribbean and later in Central Americaon peace-keeping missions that occasion-ally extended to fighting brushfire wars .The lean years, which were to extend tothe very eve of World War II, placedsevere restrictions on the scope of Corpsoperations, yet the maxim that "neces-sity is the mother of invention" onceagain proved its validity during thisperiod. Lack of manpower and equip-ment forced Marines to concentrate onintellectual pursuits, primarily that ofdefining their mission and planningahead for the future . At times, bignesstends to stifle initiative ; lacking all butthe most elementary resources, Marinesrelied on improvisation that, despitesome manifest disadvantages, was toserve them well in the years to come."

Two factors combined to bring abouta gradual reversal of the negative think-ing regarding amphibious operations .One resulted from the Five-PowerWashington Conference of 1921-1922,which put an end to the further fortifi-

° Recalling this period many years later, oneMarine was to comment : "Prior to World WarII, the Marine Corps was a great "make do"outfit despite extremely limited means . Whereelse could you find men who, after four years,shipped over for PFC?" Col R. M. Baker ltr toHead, Hist Br, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 21Jul69,in FMFPac History Comment File.

16

cation of naval bases in the Pacific westof the Hawaiian Islands ; the other wasthe emergence of the Japanese presencein the Pacific, one of the consequencesof the Treaty of Versailles, the bitterfruits of which were not to be confinedto Europe alone . Having jumped on theAllied bandwagon just in time in WorldWar I, Japan was free to consolidateand expand her foothold in the Centraland Western Pacific .

Among the first to recognize that ex-pansion-minded Japan might well be-come a major adversary in any futurewar was Major Earl H . Ellis, a MarineCorps officer who by 1921 foresaw thepossibility that the United States someday would have to seize bases fromJapan in the Marshall, Caroline, andPalau Islands .8 Though high-rankingMarines, including the Commandant,Major General John A. Lejeune, sharedhis views, little concrete planning couldbe accomplished at the time. Major Elliswent on to write an ingenious plan for"Advanced Base Operations in Micro-nesia," which was to become a partialblueprint for American operations inthe Central Pacific 20 years later duringWorld War II. But Major Ellis was farahead of his time and was destined toperish obscurely in the Palaus-eitheron a personal or semi-official reconnais-sance-before his seeds could fall onfertile soil .

8 As a captain prior to World War I, Ellishad already written on "The Security of Ad-vanced Bases and Advanced Base Operations"(IntelSec, DivOps and Trng Files, HistDiv,HQMC) .


CREATION OF THE FLEETMARINE FORCE s

During the early 1920s, the MarineCorps involvement with amphibiouswarfare very gradually gained ground,though a number of years were to elapsebefore it became the Corps' primarymission. In 1921, the Advance BaseForce at Quantico was superseded bythe Marine Corps Expeditionary Force .Emphasis was on support of the fleetand in 1924 and 1925 this force tookpart in extensive maneuvers in theCaribbean and in Hawaii. By 1927, aJoint Army-Navy Board recommendedthat the Marine Corps, in keeping withits close association with the Navy, begiven special preparation for the con-duct of amphibious warfare.Thus was laid the groundwork for

what was to become the main occupationof the Corps. But the road from recom-mendation to concrete planning to actualimplementation was a rocky and tortu-ous one, and in the late 1920s a cleardefinition of the primary Corps missionwas still lacking . By this time, largeLeatherneck contingents were stationedabroad, notably in Nicaragua and China .Neither funds nor personnel were avail-able for the creation of an amphibiousforce as envisioned by some of the far-sighted Marine commanders . Onceagain, internal and external develop-ments lent a helping hand to the bud-ding amphibious force. The year 1929

'Additional material in this section is de-rived from : MajGen John H. Russell, "TheBirth of the FMF," U. S . Naval InstituteProceedings, v. 2, no. 515 (Jan 1946) .


saw a significant reduction in the num-ber of Marines on foreign service ; byearly 1933 the last contingent had leftNicaragua .

Major General John H . Russell, whocommanded the Marine Corps at thetime, took the initiative in approachingthe Chief of Naval Operations with aplan that would supplant the Expedi-tionary Force Staff at Quantico with a"Fleet Base Defense Force" or "FleetMarine Force." Under the new conceptespoused by the Commandant, this forcewould not be subject to continuous inter-ruption in training through detachmentor diversion to other tasks . It was visual-ized that the new force would become anintegral unit within the Fleet underoperational control of the Commanderin Chief, U. S. Fleet. General Russell'srecommendations were approved andthus was created on 7 December 1933the Fleet Marine Force 10 with headquar-ters at Quantico, Virginia, an event thatwas to be described as perhaps "the mostsignificant development within the Ma-rine Corps ."11

Immediately following the establish-ment of the 3,000-man Fleet MarineForce, the Marine Corps Schools atQuantico prepared an amphibious oper-ations manual which set forth a philoso-phy of command relations, modernconcepts, and techniques for a controlledship-to-shore movement ; possible meansof ship-to-shore communications ; doc-trines for air support and naval gunfire ;

10 Navy Dept GO No. 241, as cited in TheDevelopment of FMFPac, pp . 6-7 .u Metcalf, A History of the U. S. Marine

Corps, p. 550 .

17

combat loading of troops and supplies ;and basics of shore party organization.The finished guide was introduced as theTentative Landing Operations Manual .Within four years, the manual was to beadopted by the Navy as official doctrinefor all landing operations. Subsequently,with additional modifications, it alsoemerged as an Army Field Manual .In September 1935, Headquarters,

Fleet Marine Force moved from Quan-tico to San Diego. At the same time, theFleet Marine Force was organized intotwo brigades. The 1st Brigade was sta-tioned at Quantico, while the 2d movedto the Marine Corps Base, San Diego . Inorder to have available an organizationthat could cope with the testing ofequipment that was to be used for am-phibious warfare, a Marine CorpsEquipment Board was established atQuantico, which subsequently was in-strumental in the development of theamphibian tractor .

Beginning in February 1934, units ofthe Fleet Marine Force took part in theannual maneuvers of the U . S. Fleet . Inthe Pacific, such maneuvers were heldoff the coast of California, in Hawaii,and at Midway, while similar landingexercises in the Atlantic were conductedin the Caribbean . In 1936 and again in1938, elements of the U . S. Army partic-ipated in some of the exercises, but in1939 the Army declined to take part,thus for all practical purposes leavingthe field of amphibious warfare entirelyin the hands of the Marine Corps . Alongwith the refinement in landing tech-niques during the late 1930s came theintroduction of suitable vessels that

18


AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES at Culebra, Puerto Rico, 1936 . (USMC 529463)

MARINES in steel Higgins boat, 1939 . (USMC 526331)


would move an assault force from thetroop transports to its objective. Follow-ing extensive experimentation and con-troversy, Higgins-designed landing craftwere found to be best suited to this pur-pose, and their manufacture in largenumbers was initiated .When World War II broke out in

Europe in September 1939, the MarineCorps, with a strength of less than20,000 men, already had laid a soundbasis for its subsequent expansion. Thisgot under way when President Rooseveltproclaimed a state of limited nationalemergency and, in keeping with a gen-eral expansion of the armed forces, in-creased Marine Corps strength to25,000. While the war in Europe ran itscourse and a victorious German Armyoverran Poland, Denmark, Norway, theLow Countries, and finally France-inthe end placing Great Britain underthreat of imminent invasion-the Ma-rine Corps continued to train for a warin which the United States might even-tually become involved .

In the autumn of 1940, the 1st MarineBrigade departed from Quantico forCuba and subsequently underwent ex-tensive amphibious training in the WestIndies. On 1 February 1941, the newlyorganized 7th Marines joined the 1stBrigade at Culebra, where the two com-bined units were designated as the 1stMarine Division, commanded by HollandM. Smith, who up to this time had head-ed the 1st Marine Brigade .

In the course of the landing exercisesconducted by the division, various typesof landing craft and new tank and artil-lery lighters were tested . The boats em-ployed to bring the Marines ashore weretotally unsuitable in high surf, such as

19

existed off Culebra, as were the Navytank lighters tested. On the other hand,the Higgins boat, which made its firstappearance during 1940, had much torecommend it and, according to GeneralSmith, "this craft, in my opinion, didmore to help win the war in the Pacificthan any other single piece of equip-ment . . . . Without it our landings onJapanese-held beaches in large numberswould have been unthinkable ."12

Also on 1 February 1941, the 2d Bri-gade was designated the 2d MarineDivision . It is interesting to note that atthe very threshold of the greatest expan-sion the Marine Corps had even seen, theFleet Marine Force was temporarily dis-banded. This development resulted fromwar plans that called for the establish-ment of a two-divisional expeditionaryforce with each fleet for the specificpurpose of carrying out amphibiousassaults as required . These amphibiousforces were to be further supplementedby an additional division per fleet ob-tained from the Army and to be trainedby the Marines. Upon the recommenda-tion of the Commandant of the MarineCorps, Major General Thomas Holcomb,the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions wereassigned to the Atlantic and PacificFleets respectively, while the defensebattalions of the Fleet Marine Force,which had been created in 1939 for ad-vance base service, were distributed toother commands .

For all practical purposes, the FleetMarine Force was converted into atraining command that would pass onits knowledge and experience to theother Services . In June of 1941, barely

" Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p . 72 .

20

six months before the attack on PearlHarbor, certain organizational changesoccurred . Major General Holland M .Smith on 13 June relinquished commandof the 1st Marine Division and becameCommanding General of I Corps (Provi-sional), U. S. Atlantic Fleet, composedof the 1st Marine Division and theArmy's 1st Infantry Division . Twoweeks later, the organization was re-designated as Task Force 18, U .S . Atlan-tic Fleet, followed within two days, on28 July 1941, by a redesignation to the1st Joint Training Force, U. S. AtlanticFleet. By mid-August 1941, the title hadbeen changed again to Atlantic Amphib-ious Force, and in late October of thesame year, the organization became theAmphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. Thisdesignation was retained until 3 March1942, at which time the command re-ceived yet another title, that of Am-phibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet .? 3 Signifi-cantly, regardless of this multitude oftitles bestowed upon the organization,there was a continuity of command ifnot in name, and General Holland Smithcontinued to preside at each consecutivebaptism .

By mid-1941, with war clouds nowlooming ominously over the Pacific, Ma-rine Corps strength had doubled overthat of the preceding year totalling over54,000 . 14 The rapid expansion continuedthroughout 1941 and skyrocketed afterthe Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor . By30 June 1942 the Marine Corps num-bered 142,613 officers and men .' ,' Evenduring the period of rapid expansion in

' Ibid., pp . 82-83 .' U. S . Historical Statistics, p . 736 ." Ibid .


the summer of 1941, no one could sur-mise the scope of global warfare inwhich the United States would shortlybecome involved . Thus, in May of thatyear the Navy General Board, in dealingwith the expansion of the Marine Corps,concluded that

The composition, organization andstrength of the Marine Division as sub-mitted to the General Board by the U . S .Marine Corps appear to be satisfactoryfor the overseas landing operations to berequired of Marine Corps ground troops .The question as to the number of MarineDivisions necessary has been fully dis-cussed and while it appears that a majorwar conducted in both the Atlantic andPacific might require three Marine Divi-sions, most of the probable operationsincident to the seizure of any one outlyingoverseas base probably can be carriedthrough successfully with one MarineDivision fully supported as it would beby a Naval Attack Force .°

The global commitment of the MarineCorps was to go far beyond the strengthcontemplated in early 1941, but at thetime a steady increase in strength overa protracted period of time was envi-sioned. Hand in hand with the augmenta-tion of the Corps went the enlargementof existing bases and acquisition of newones. One of these on the East Coast wasthe New River base in North Carolina,later to become Camp Lejeune ; anotherwas the Marine air station at CherryPoint, North Carolina . On the WestCoast, Camp Holcomb, subsequently re-named Camp Elliott, came into being.Early in the year, the first planes of the2d Marine Aircraft Group were sta-

10 Report of General Board on Expansion ofU. S. Marine Corps, G . B. No . 432, Serial No .139, dtd 7 May 1941, in Organization and Ex-pansion of the USMC, 1940s (OAB, NHD) .


tioned on Oahu at Ewa . 17 Marine defensebattalions at the outbreak of the warwere stationed on Midway, Palmyra,and Johnston Islands, and on Wake .Other detachments held forward out-posts in the Pacific in American Samoa,at Subic Bay, Luzon, and in the Aleu-tians.

As the expansion of the armed forcesof the United States continued and wasfurther accelerated during 1942, a con-cept was adopted which charged theArmy with primary responsibility in theAtlantic, while the Navy was to reign inthe Pacific. As a result of this concept,amphibious training activities on theEast Coast of the United States gener-ally became the responsibility of theArmy, while similar activities on theWest Coast were assigned to the MarineCorps. In line with this thinking, the 2dJoint Training Force had been createdon 1 November 1941 at Camp Elliottnear San Diego. This force had beenplanned as a joint Marine-Army train-ing organization, paralleling GeneralHolland Smith's setup on the EastCoast. There were similar gyrations inname and title to those the Marine es-tablishment on the East Coast had ex-perienced . On 10 February 1942, MajorGeneral Clayton B . Vogel's command be-came the Amphibious Force, U . S .Pacific Fleet, to be rechristened as Am-phibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, less thantwo months later . (See Chart 1 .) Effec-tive 3 August 1942, General Vogel, whoup to this time had also acted as thesenior Fleet Marine Force commanderat San Diego, was placed in command

"'The growth of Marine Corps aviation andthe evolution of its command organization willbe dealt with in a separate chapter .

of all Fleet Marine Force units, bothground and air, in the 11th NavalDistrict .

WORLD WAR II EXPANSION 1s

By mid-1942 it had become apparentthat predominance of the Army on theEast Coast had deprived the Amphibi-ous Training Staff, Fleet Marine Force,of the lion's share of its training missionin the Atlantic or the Caribbean . At thesame time, developments in the PacificTheater left very little doubt that theoffensive in the South Pacific would bebased on large-scale amphibious war-fare, all or most of which would be car-ried out by the Marine Corps . As aconsequence of this shift in strategicemphasis, General Smith and his Am-phibious Training Staff, Fleet MarineForce, departed from Quantico in Sep-tember of 1942 and proceeded to SanDiego. There, the Amphibious TrainingStaff was disbanded and its personnelassigned to Headquarters, AmphibiousCorps, Pacific Fleet . At the same time,General Smith took over as Commanderof the Amphibious Corps and as Com-manding General, Fleet Marine Force,San Diego Area . General Vogel, whohad been displaced by the arrival ofGeneral Smith, took charge of the I Ma-rine Amphibious Corps (IMAC) at SanDiego, a unit whose staff was composedlargely of personnel who had previouslyserved with General Vogel on the staffof the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet.Shortly thereafter, General Vogel left

11 Additional material in this section is de-rived from : BGen D.A.D. Ogden (AUS),"Amphibious Operations," Reprint of Lectureat the U. S. Army Engineer School, Ft. Bel-voir, Va., 15Mar49 .

21

22

CHART 1

GENEALOGY OF FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

Headquarters, Marine

Administrative Command

YAmphibious Corps

10 Apr 44 - 1I Jun 44

Headquarters

Administrative Command

Fleet Marine Forces,Pacific

12 Jun 44 - 23 Aug 44

Headquarters,

2d Joint Training Force

I Nov 41 - 9 Feb 42

Headquarters,

Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet

10 Feb 42 - 31 Mor42

Headquarters,

Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet

I Apr 42 - 24 Aug 43

I

Headquarters,

Y Amphibious Corps

25 Aug 43 - 1I Jul 44

Headquarters,

Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific

12 Jul 44 - 23 Aug 44

Provisional Headquarters,


24 Aug 44 - 16 Sep 44

IHeadquarters,


17 September 1944


Headquarters

YAmphibious Corps

K.W White


the West Coast to assume command ofthe IMAC in the South Pacific .

Despite the tortuous and somewhatconfusing road that the Marine Corpscommand organization had travelled, aneffective command organization was be-ginning to emerge by the middle of 1942,though many difficulties remained to beovercome. In his capacity as Command-ing General, Amphibious Corps, PacificFleet, General Smith was responsiblefor the organization and training ofFleet Marine Force units as they becameavailable for employment with the Am-phibious Force, Pacific Fleet . At thesame time, in his dual capacity as Com-manding General, Fleet Marine Force,San Diego Area, General Smith wascharged with the administration oftraining activities at San Diego, CampPendleton, and Camp Dunlap, as well ascommand of Fleet Marine Force unitsthat were not specifically assigned to theCorps. Since the Amphibious Corps wasa joint command and consisted of U . S .Army as well as Marine units, its pri-mary mission for a number of monthswas to train Army units, specifically foroperations in the Aleutians .Meanwhile, American troops were

pouring into the Pacific Area in ever in-creasing numbers, making it necessaryfor the I Marine Amphibious Corps,originally planned only as an adminis-trative command for Marine units, toassume tactical functions . By late 1943,augmentation of the Pacific Fleet andavailability of manpower made possiblethe initiation of the Central Pacificoffensive, whose purpose was to strikeout westward across the Pacific alongthe most direct route to Japan. Pursuantto this mission, Vice Admiral Raymond

23

A. Spruance became commander of theCentral Pacific Force and the FifthFleet. In August 1943, the Fifth Am-phibious Force was organized underRear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, andlater that month the Amphibious Corps,Pacific Fleet, was redesignated as the VAmphibious Corps (VAC), with GeneralHolland Smith in command .

Even though the newly-created VACdirectly succeeded the AmphibiousCorps, Pacific Fleet, there was a majordifference in its mission, which became adual one. First, the organization was toconstitute an administrative commandwith control of Marine units in the Cen-tral Pacific. Secondly, it had the tacticalmission of directing amphibious assaultsof both Marine and U. S. Army troops .At the time of these administrativechanges, the new organization turnedover its responsibility for amphibioustraining on the West Coast of the UnitedStates to a newly established TroopTraining Unit, Amphibious TrainingCommand, Pacific Fleet . In September1943, VAC moved to Hawaii, wherepreparations were then in full swing forthe invasion of the Gilbert Islands .

It soon became apparent that theorganizational expedient that had beensought in establishing such a multitudeof organizations whose missions werebound to overlap would not be a happyone. In the words of one history dealingwith this organizational maze

Assumption of tactical functions byAmphibious Corps headquarters gave riseonce again to the problem of conduct ofadministrative matters of Fleet MarineForce units in the Pacific. Now two par-allel echelons functioned directly withHeadquarters, Marine Corps while per-forming duplicate administrative activities

24

with respect to subordinate units . It be-came necessary to divorce tactical elementsfrom administrative elements during oper-ations, hence the formation of rear eche-lons of substantial size for each amphib-ious corps headquarters ."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had decidedas early as 1942 to split command in thePacific Theater between the SouthwestPacific Area under General MacArthurand the Pacific Ocean Areas underAdmiral Nimitz. Until 1944, most FMFunits had served in the SouthwestPacific under MacArthur, but the newCentral Pacific drive demanded trainedamphibious troops and the Navy wantedMarines for the assault role. Effective25 March 1944, the I Marine Amphibi-ous Corps passed to the command ofAdmiral Nimitz, who now controlled itin addition to the V Amphibious Corps .

General Holland Smith, who had justreceived his promotion to lieutenantgeneral, recognized that the time wasripe for a reorganization of the Marinecommand structure under the new setupin the Central Pacific. He recommendedthe creation of Headquarters, Amphibi-ous Troops, Pacific, to include I MarineAmphibious Corps, II Marine Amphibi-ous Corps, an Army Corps, along withDefense Troops, Expeditionary TroopsArtillery, and the Service of Supply,Amphibious Troops Pacific. The neworganization, which for all practicalpurposes constituted a field army, wouldbe divided into two echelons : an admin-istrative rear headquarters in Hawaii totake care of administrative and logisti-cal matters, and a forward headquarters

"FMFPae Administrative History, p. 11 .


to command and direct amphibiousassaults 2 0

On 29 March 1944 the Commander inChief, United States Fleet, authorizedthe Commanding General, VAC, to exer-cise, as an additional duty, completeadministrative control and logistical re-sponsibility for all Fleet 'Marine Forceunits committed for operations in theCentral Pacific 2 1 General Alexander A .Vandegrift, who had been appointed asCommandant of the Marine Corps on 1January, was on an inspection tour inHawaii when the above authorizationarrived and on this occasion proposedthe establishment of an AdministrativeCommand, VAC . The latter was to func-tion just below VAC with responsibilityfor the administrative work of allPacific Fleet Marine Force units con-cerning supply, evacuation, sanitation,construction, salvage, personnel man-agement, quartering and general super-vision of censorship . Further, it was tohandle the command and administrationof all Fleet Marine Force units in thePacific which remained at bases duringcombat operations or which were as-signed by the Commanding General,VAC. Finally, the Administrative Com-mand was to supervise the routine ad-ministrative activity of units that wouldnormally be handled by the rear echelonof the Corps headquarters .Admiral Nimitz expressed his belief

that the efficiency of both the adminis-tration of Marine units in the PacificOcean Areas and the logistic support of

.° Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p . 154 ." CominCh ltr ser 001015, dtd 29Mar44 as

cited in FMFPac Administrative History, p . 11 .


their combat operations would begreatly improved by the measures pro-posed by General Vandegrift, exceptthat he desired the new organization tobe designated as the V AmphibiousCorps Marine Administrative Commandin order to avoid any misconception thatthe functions assigned to the new organ-ization would affect such Army units aswere assigned or attached to VAC . TheCommandant's recommendations wereput into effect without further delay andon 10 April 1944, the Marine Admin-istrative Command, VAC, was acti-vated .22

Under the reorganization, the newlycreated unit consisted of Headquarters,Marine Administrative Command, VAC,and Marine Supply Service, VAC . Atthe same time that the organizationalchanges became effective, the Command-ing General, I Marine AmphibiousCorps, was relieved of his administra-tive functions, retaining only those of atactical nature, unless otherwise di-rected by the Commanding General,VAC. Under the new setup, the func-tions of the Supply Service, IMAC andthose of the Marine Supply Service,VAC, were consolidated .

While the above reorganization andconsolidation no doubt were steps in theright direction, it soon became evidentthat additional changes were necessaryas a consequence of the constantlychanging tactical situation in the Pa-cific Theater. By April 1944 the FleetMarine Force units in the theater con-sisted of four divisions, a brigade which

' VAC GO No . 53-44, dtd 6Apr44, as citedin FMFPac Administrative History, p . 14.

25

lacked only a regimental combat team inorder to constitute a full division, corpstroops and a steadily expanding SupplyService. The 5th Marine Division wasstill being trained and equipped in theContinental United States, but its ar-rival in the theater was also expectedaround the turn of 1944-1945.

During 1944, imminent operations inthe Marianas made the establishment ofan overall Marine Command in the Pa-cific highly desirable, if not imperative .Since operations in the Marianas wereto be carried out in two major phases-an attack against Saipan and Tinian inthe north, followed by the assault againstGuam farther south, two task forceswould be necessary . One of these wasthe Northern Attack Force under ViceAdmiral Richmond Kelly Turner, whoalso led the Joint Expeditionary Force .The Southern Attack Force came underRear Admiral Richard L . Connolly . Gen-eral Holland Smith was to wear two hatsduring the operations, for he was toserve as Commanding General, Expe-ditionary Troops and at the same timeas Commanding General, NorthernTroops and Landing Force . Major Gen-eral Roy S . Geiger, commanding the IIIAmphibious Corps (ILIAC), a new titlefor IMAC, was to command the South-ern Troops and Landing Force in theassault on Guam . 23 In order for GeneralSmith to exercise tactical command inboth ILIAC and VAC, a higher head-quarters had to be organized . Prior tothe landings, VAC thus had to set upI The redesignation which became effective

on 15 April 1944, reflected the fact that thecorps, like VAC, was a command includingtroops of all Services, not just Marines .

26

two tactical staffs. Organization of thestaff took place at Pearl Harbor on 12April 1944, on the same date that theMarine Administrative Command wasformed. For all practical purposes, aHeadquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pa-cific was now in existence in all respectsexcept for the name .

Events occurring during the spring of1944 were designed to correct this defi-ciency. On 27 May 1944, the Commanderin Chief, U. S. Fleet queried the Com-mander in Chief, U . S. Pacific Fleet withrespect to the desirability of creating aHeadquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pa-cific Ocean Areas, under General HollandSmith. In reply, Admiral Nimitz ex-pressed his concurrence and recom-mended that the change become effectiveupon completion of the assault phase ofthe campaign in the Marianas. As faras the organizational structure was con-cerned, Admiral Nimitz recommendedthat the Fleet Marine Force, PacificOcean Areas, consist of a headquarterswith the ILIAC, the VAC, and the Ad-ministrative Command, Fleet MarineForce, Pacific Ocean Areas, as subordi-nate units .

Following the above discussions, on 5June 1944 Admiral King designated theCommanding General, VAC, as the typecommander for all Fleet Marine Forceground units in the Pacific Ocean Areaseffective that date . He further specifiedthat, as ordered by the Commander inChief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, a Headquar-ters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, beestablished under the command of Gen-eral Holland Smith. The Marine Admin-istrative Command, VAC, was to be re-


designated as Administrative Command,Fleet Marine Force, Pacific . 24

Since at the time General HollandSmith was participating in the Saipan-Tinian campaign as Commanding Gen-eral, VAC, the Commander in Chief,Pacific Ocean Areas directed that in hisabsence the Commanding General, Ma-rine Administrative Command, FleetMarine Force, Pacific, assume additionalduty as Deputy Commander, Fleet Ma-rine Force, Pacific . Upon his returnfrom the Marianas, General Smith as-sumed command of Fleet Marine Force,Pacific. On 24 August 1944 Headquar-ters, Administrative Command, FleetMarine Force, Pacific, was redesignatedProvisional Headquarters, Fleet MarineForce, Pacific." Subordinate units of theAdministrative Command, Fleet MarineForce, Pacific were redesignated unitsof Fleet Marine Force, Pacific . Head-quarters and Service Battalion, Admin-istrative Command, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, also underwent a change in thatit became Provisional Headquarters andService Battalion, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific .

Presumably, the term "provisional"was inserted in the titles of Force Head-quarters and Force Headquarters andService Battalion because it had pre-viously been stipulated that the Admin-istrative Command would continue tofunction as a separate entity underHeadquarters, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific . Instead, the Provisional Head-quarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

'FMFPac Administrative History, p . 15 .'FMFPac SpecO No . 2-44, dtd 23Aug44 .


now assumed those functions previouslyassigned to the Administrative Com-mand.

Within a week, there was to be a fur-ther change in the round of redesigna-tions and reorganizations . On 31 August1944, the Commandant ordered the abo-lition of the Administrative Commandand organization of the Fleet MarineForce, Pacific. At the same time an or-ganizational chart was drawn up listingas components of the Fleet MarineForce, Pacific, the FMFPac Headquar-ters Troops, III Amphibious Corps, VAmphibious Corps, FMF Air Pacific,Force Artillery, Force Antiaircraft Ar-tillery, Force Amphibian Tractor Group,Force Reserve, FMF Supply Service,Force Service Troops, FMF TransientCenter, and Marine units under islandcommands for administration only . 26 Inline with this authority from CMC,Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pa-cific, and Headquarters and Service Bat-talion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific wereformally activated effective 17 Septem-ber 1944 . 27

As of this date, the following majorelements comprised Fleet Marine Force,Pacific

Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific

Headquarters, III AmphibiousCorps, and Corps Troops

Headquarters, V AmphibiousCorps, and Corps Troops

1st Marine Division

"CMC Itr to CG, FMFPac, Serial003E23944, dtd 31Aug44 .

FMFPac GO No. 12-44, dtd 18Sep44 .

27

2d Marine Division3d Marine Division4th Marine Division5th Marine Division6th Marine DivisionAircraft, Fleet Marine Force,

Pacific, with1st Marine Aircraft Wing2d Marine Aircraft Wing3d Marine Aircraft Wing4th Marine Aircraft WingMarine Fleet Aircraft, West

Coast1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion5th 155mm Howitzer Battalion7th 155m Gun Battalion8th 155mm Gun Battalion9th 155mm Gun Battalion10th 155mm Gun Battalion11th 155mm Gun Battalion12th 155mm Gun Battalion1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion2d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion3d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion4th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion8th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion9th Antiaircraft Artillery

Battalion, Reinforced10th Antiaircraft Artillery

Battalion11th Antiaircraft Artillery



Battalion, Reinforced

28

15th Antiaircraft ArtilleryBattalion




52d Defense Battalion, with twodetachments

1st Seacoast Artillery Battalion1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion1st Armored Amphibian Battalion2d Armored Amphibian Battalion3d Armored Amphibian Battalion

(Provisional)1st Base Headquarters Battalion3d Base Headquarters Battalion1st Separate Engineer Battalion2d Separate Engineer Battalion

Supply Service, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, with1st Field Depot3d Field Depot4th Base Depot5th Field Depot6th Base Depot7th Field Depot8th Field Depot16th Field Depot1st Service and Supply Battalion2d Service and Supply Battalion


3d Service and Supply Battalion4th Service and Supply Battalion"

The far-reaching changes in the or-ganizational structure of the MarineCorps found their echo in the status ofthe Fleet Marine Force aviation units inthe Pacific, which also was subject tomodification . On 7 September 1944, Gen-eral Vandegrift acted on instructions re-ceived from Admiral King and ordereddeletion of FMF Air Pacific from theinitial organizational chart of 31 Au-gust, leaving the command status of avi-ation units to be clarified at a laterdate. On 16 September, Marine AircraftWings, Pacific, was redesignated as Air-craft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific .

A final decision on the status of theaviation units of the Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, was reached on 11 October 1944in Pacific Fleet Letter 53L-44, whichalso regulated the status of FMFPac .Accordingly, the Commanding General,FMFPac, was a type commander for allunits comprising his command and inthis capacity came under the direct com-mand of the Commander in Chief, Pa-cific Fleet. He had responsibility for theoverall administration and supply of allsubordinate units, except for aviationsupplies. He was charged with coordi-nating the activities of the Fleet MarineForce ; establishing policies relating toits organization, maintenance, and sup-port ; issuing directives for its training,operations, administration, and supply,except for the operation of aircraft .Further, he was to keep the Commander

FMFPac Administrative History, pp .113-114.


in Chief, Pacific Fleet, informed of mat-ters affecting the readiness or operatingcapabilities of subordinate units ; allo-cate and distribute personnel ; and exer-cise operational control of all FMF units(except aviation) unless they were oth-erwise assigned. In addition to the above,the Commanding General, FMFPac wasto act as advisor to the Commander inChief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific OceanAreas on matters pertaining to the Ma-rine Corps in general and on amphibiousoperations. He was to study and keepabreast of the strategic situation andmake recommendations for the employ-ment of the Fleet Marine Force . Finally,he was to command a task force in com-bat operations when directed to do so .29

With reference to the aviation units,the same letter spelled out the status ofAircraft, FMFPac. The latter organiza-tion was defined as a major unit ofFMFPac. Its Commanding General wascharged with performing type-commandfunctions under the Commanding Gen-eral, FMFPac within the latter's fieldof responsibility. In aviation matters,the Commanding General, Aircraft,FMFPac, was to perform type-commandfunctions under the Commander, AirForce, Pacific Fleet . Operational controlof Aircraft, FMFPac tactical units wasto remain with the Commander, AirForce, Pacific Fleet, unless such unitswere otherwise assigned .

Even though the letter more clearlyspelled out the mission and responsibili-ties of FMFPac, and as such signified alarge step forward for the Marine Corpscommand structure, it still fell short of

'Pacific Fleet Letter 53L-44, dtd 110ct44 .

29

one objective . There now existed anamphibious organization in the Pacificwhich had come a very long way fromthe basic structure that had existed atthe time of the Pearl Harbor attack .Nevertheless, the new establishment stillhad not attained the status of a tacticalfield army type of headquarters thatGeneral Smith had envisioned and pro-posed in March .1944 and which theCommandant had previously endorsed .A gap in the doorway had been openedthrough the provision that the Com-manding General, FMFPac, could attimes act as a task force commander incombat operations, but at this stage thedoor was still far from ajar .In November 1944, General Smith

submitted proposed tables of organiza-tion for his headquarters staff . Theseproposals rested on the premise thatFMFPac would represent a tacticalheadquarters for a Marine field armyof two corps, as well as an administra-tive headquarters in the rear . In thecourse of January 1945 these proposalsformed the subject of discussion be-tween representatives of General Van-degrift, Admiral Nimitz, and GeneralSmith. When it became apparent thatno operations were scheduled calling forthe commitment of a Marine field army,and in the light of personnel shortages,it was decided that the staff of Head-quarters, FMFPac would be largeenough only to take care of the admin-istrative duties, with sufficient addi-tional personnel for inspection parties,observers, and small task force staffs30

3° FMFPac Administrative History, pp . 19-22,33-34.

30

Assurances were provided that Gen-eral Holland Smith in his capacity asCommanding General, FMFPac, wouldretain responsibility for conducting com-bat operations as a task force command-er when directed to do so . In practice,he was able to exercise such commandonly during the Iwo Jima operation inFebruary-March 1945 . Prior to the endof World War II, the status and or-ganizational structure of Headquar-ters, FMFPac remained essentially un-changed. The only other major changewas the redesignation of the SupplyService, FMFPac, as Service Command,FMFPac, which became effective on 1June 1945 .

At the time of the Japanese surren-der, FMFPac consisted of the ServiceCommand, FMFPac, the III and V Am-phibious Corps, composed of six Marinedivisions, and Aircraft, FMFPac con-sisting of four Marine Aircraft Wingsand Marine Fleet Air, West Coast .

The American drive across the Pa-cific to the doorstep of Japan renderedacute the question of the forward dis-placement of Headquarters, FMFPac .It was proposed initially to move ele-ments of Headquarters, FMFPac, fromHawaii to Guam in the Marianas . Astudy of the question brought out thefact that there was a continuing neces-sity for certain sections of GeneralSmith's headquarters to maintain liai-son with Headquarters, Commander inChief, Pacific. There was an additionalrequirement for other headquarters sec-tions to advise the Commanding Gen-eral, FMFPac, in the forward area. Ba-sically, the latter would comprise thepersonnel who would act as the operating


staff of the Fleet Marine Force in thefield .As of December 1944, it was en-

visioned that major portions of theG-2 and G-4 Sections, Headquarters,FMFPac, would remain in Hawaii, sincethe Joint Intelligence Center, POA, andmost of the logistical operating sectionswould also remain there. The DeputyCommander, FMFPac, was to remain atPearl Harbor, and all staff sections wereto be represented on his staff, so thatnormal administrative functions as anarea command could be retained . Sincea Field Service Command was alreadypresent on Guam, no further displace-ment of Headquarters, Supply Service,FMFPac, was anticipated .

After a considerable delay resultingfrom General Holland Smith's partici-pation in the Iwo Jima operation, herecommended to Admiral Nimitz thatHeadquarters, FMFPac, and Headquar-ters, Supply Service, FMFPac, displaceforward either to Guam or Okinawaonce VAC embarked upon its next am-phibious operation . General Smith feltthat since FMFPac constituted a majorelement within the Pacific Fleet, theeventual location of his :headquartersshould depend on that of the PacificFleet. In any case, he felt that all of theFleet Marine Force should in time belocated either in the Marianas or fur-ther west, in any case at least as farwest as Guam .31

On 26 April 1945, the Commander inChief, Pacific Ocean Areas authorizedthe forward displacement of Adminis-trative Headquarters, FMF:Pac,to Guam

I I bid., pp . 73-74.


subsequent to 1 July. However, inas-much as the primary function of theCommanding General, FMFPac, wasthat of an administrative commander,General Smith felt that it would not befeasible for the main body of the admin-istrative staff to remain in Hawaii whilehe himself relocated to Guam . Since hewas divorced from operational duties,the bulk of the daily decisions dealt withquestions of personnel and logisticswhose solution required immediate ac-cess to all of the records retained inHeadquarters, FMFPac . The physicalseparation of the major portion of hisstaff from these records would, for allpractical purposes, strip him of his pri-mary function as administrative com-mander of FMFPac while delegating thecommand of that headquarters to theDeputy Commander, FMFPac .An additional factor mitigating against

the forward displacement of FMFPacwas the lack of headquarters facilitieson Guam. There was a critical shortageof engineers and it was felt while someconstruction could be completed for sub-ordinate elements of FMFPac with lim-ited space requirements, adequate hous-ing for the Headquarters would not beavailable on Guam for an indefinite pe-riod. In view of this problem, the Com-manding General, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific reversed his thinking as to theforward displacement of his headquar-ters and requested that his earlier rec-ommendation to this effect be held inabeyance, pending a major change inthe overall situation .

In July 1945, following the assump-tion of the command of FMFPac byLieutenant General Roy S. Geiger on 3

31

July, action on the forward move of theheadquarters was again initiated . It wastentatively planned that the forwardheadquarters would consist of the com-manding general and a small operatingstaff and that initially the bulk of theadministrative work would be handledin Hawaii under the Deputy Command-er, FMFPac. As before, Guam was toserve as the forward location . Initialhousekeeping support at the forwardheadquarters was to be provided bysmall advance echelons of the Headquar-ters and Service Battalion, the SignalBattalion, the Marine Detachment (Pro-visional), Marianas Area, and the Tran-sient Center, Marianas Area . Subse-quent echelons were to displace forwardover an extended period of time . In or-der to provide for an uninterrupted han-dling of the workload, it was anticipatedthat certain Headquarters files and rec-ords would have to be duplicated andthat certain special staff sections wouldhave to be combined with appropriategeneral staff sections at either location .

In response to General Geiger's re-quest, the Commander in Chief, U . S .Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas on19 July 1945 authorized FMFPac to es-tablish an advance headquarters onGuam, to consist of approximately 72officers and 350 enlisted men . However, itwas specified that the Island Command-er, Guam, was not in a position to fur-nish engineering assistance for the con-struction of the necessary facilities .Despite difficulties that could be ex-pected with reference to office space andquarters, final preparations for the for-ward displacement were all but com-pleted by early August 1945 . The initial

32

echelon which was to include GeneralGeiger, the Chief of Staff, G-3 Section,and appropriate general and special staffrepresentatives, was slated to be estab-lished on Guam on or about 3 September1945 32 The main body of Headquarters,FMFPac was to remain in Hawaii underthe Deputy Commander, FMFPac, asstipulated in the earlier plan .

During the absence of General Gei-ger, the Deputy Commander was to ex-ercise the former's administrative func-tions, in addition to controlling andsupervising units and the staff groupsremaining in Hawaii . The division ofstaff functions between the forward andrear echelon was to be handled in sucha way that operational planning, allo-cation of troop units, training direc-tives, organization, and troop move-ments would all be taken care of onGuam while personnel administration,allocation of replacement drafts, intelli-gence functions, procurement of mapsand aerial photographs, supply andevacuation, transportation, and otheradministrative matters both special androutine would be the responsibility ofthe Deputy Commander .

The end of the war forestalled theforward displacement of FMFPac, andthe headquarters remained at PearlHarbor . 33 The immediate problems in-" FMFPac GO No. 75-45, dtd 30Aug45 .' The Japanese surrender voided the immi-

nent move of Headquarters, FMFPac to Guam.Detailed notes pertaining to this move for theperiod 12-27Aug45 are contained in LtGenMerwin H. Silverthorn ltr to HistBr, G-3 Div,HQMC, dtd 20Jun69, in FMFPac History Com-ment File.


herent in the invasion of Japan, forwhich planning was well under way bythe time of the Japanese surrender,could now be shelved as the uncontestedoccupation of the Home Islands becamea reality . In nearly four years of globalwarfare, the Marine Corps had suc-ceeded in putting an untried concept ofamphibious warfare to the acid test .The evolution of the administrativestructure of the FMFPac represented asmall but vital link in the chain ofevents that led from prewar experi-mentation with the ways and means ofamphibious assault on the peacefulshores of islands in the Caribbean tosuch places as Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian,Guam, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Tomake these assaults feasible requirednot only vast quantities of materiel andmen trained in their use, but also anefficient organization that could assurethat both were available when andwhere needed .

The twists and turns taken duringthe evolution of the Fleet Marine Forceare but a reflection of the ever-changingwar situation that called for a highlyflexible command organization . Thus,the development of the Fleet MarineForce saw its beginnings before warcame to the United States ; it was des-tined to continue long after the lastshot had been fired . The lessons of thatwar, many of them learned by trial anderror, were to become an invaluableasset in the overall offensive and de-fensive capability of the United States,to be available as needed for the use offuture generations .

Administration and Aviation'

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONSAND CONTACTS

When the guns fell silent in 1945,the time had arrived to take stock anddetermine where the organizationalstructure of the Marine Corps had goneduring the war years and what direc-tion it would take in the future. Theexpanded Fleet Marine Force in thesummer of 1945 bore little resemblanceto the embryo organization that hadexisted during the early days of WorldWar II, when a few defense units hadbeen scattered among widely separatedislands in the Pacific. Within the overallstructure of the Marine Corps and theremaining armed forces of the UnitedStates, the Fleet Marine Force was notan isolated entity. All of its titles andfunctions resulted from tactical consid-erations ; in fact, the numerous changesin both were inherently the result of aflexible response to widely varying de-

1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thischapter is derived from : FMFPac Adminis-trative History; The Development of FMFPac ;Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central PacificDrive ; Reports of Organization and Expan-sion of the U . S. Marine Corps during the1940s (OAB, NHD) ; Smith and Finch, Coraland Brass ; Isely and Crowl, U. S . Marines andAmphibious War ; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea ;Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Avi-ation in World War II (Washington : CombatForces Press, 1952), hereafter, Sherrod,Marine Corps Aviation in World War II ; U. S.Historical Statistics.

CHAPTER 2

mands made on the Corps in the courseof the evolution of amphibious warfare .

One name that recurs unfailingly dur-ing all of World War II in connectionwith this evolution is that of GeneralHolland M. Smith. This officer, amongothers, made it his life purpose to per-fect amphibious doctrine and organiza-tion to a point where both won generalacceptance, despite numerous skepticsand critics who still remembered theunsuccessful Allied expedition to theDardanelles in World War I. The ex-perience of the U.S. Marine Corps inall aspects of amphibious landings dur-ing World War II removed that typeof warfare once and for all from thesphere of experimentation that had oc-cupied much thought and time of plan-ners during the 1920s and 1930s . It wasfortunate that "this tough, egocen-tric, cantankerous, exacting little Ma-rine general, who became one of themost controversial figures in World WarII, provided the main power drive toall amphibious training on the eastcoast in the crucial year of 1941 ."2Nor did this drive diminish during thewar years, for throughout the war Gen-eral Smith kept in mind the fundamen-tal reason for the existence of the FleetMarine Force : the Navy's need for anefficient, highly mobile striking force

2 Isely and Crowl, U. S . Marines and Amphib-ious War, p. 62 .

33

34

that was the master of amphibious as-sault. In assessing the role played byHolland Smith in the evolution of hiscommand and in enumerating some ofhis personal qualities, one historical ac-count concluded

Whatever may be the judgment of hiscontemporaries or of history concerninghis role in the Pacific War, there can belittle doubt that he played the leading partin forging a fighting amphibious team thatmade possible the eventual successful land-ings in both the Atlantic and the Pacific .

General Smith's primary qualificationsfor the particular job at hand were thathe was a driver and a perfectionist. Neverdid he allow himself the comfortable satis-faction of believing that the training exer-cises under his direction came off as wellas might have been expected under thecircumstances and therefore could passmuster. Never did he allow his subordi-nates in the Navy and Marine Corps orhis equals and superiors in the Navy torelax in the drive for perfect planningand execution of all phases of landingoperations.'

The very nature of the successivelyredesignated commands he headed dic-tated that General Smith should workin close coordination with elements ofthe other Services. Thus, during theearly phase of World War II, he notonly supervised the amphibious train-ing of the 1st Marine Division but atthe same time initiated the U.S. Army's1st and 9th Infantry Divisions into theintricacies of amphibious warfare .While this activity was in progress onthe East Coast of the United States, the2d Marine Division and the Army's 3dInfantry Division were similarly trainedin California . Once his activities hadshifted to the West Coast, General Smith

3 I bid.


took over the amphibious training ofthe 2d Marine Division and the Army's7th Infantry Division. Almost from thevery outset, both the embarkation anddebarkation of troops from the vesselsthen available posed serious problemsas did accommodations on the trans-ports themselves . At the time, the Hig-gins craft with bow ramp remained tobe perfected. Once a landing force madeit ashore, endless confusion ensued un-til an effective shore party organiza-tion could be established .

Within the scope of any amphibiouslanding, overall coordinatiion and thequantity and quality of naval gunfiresupport loomed as ominous factors . Thecontroversy regarding the effectivenessof such support was to flare up hereand there across the Pacific! throughoutthe war. In 1941 there were no concreteanswers to this question since duringthe landing exercises held at the timeall naval gunfire support was simulated .One problem arising in the course ofthese exercises was the difficulty of co-ordinating the efforts of the! three Serv-ices ; the naval shore observation partieswere without adequate communicationsequipment and lacked experience, whileArmy officers were generally unfamiliarwith standard naval signal procedure . 4

Similar exercises conducted in 1942resulted in answers to some of theseproblems only to have new ones cropup, notably in connection with the shoreparty. In the end, the elements of am-phibious training were decentralized sothat various centers could devote theirfull resources to a specified activity . Inconsequence, special schools to conduct

`Ibid., p . 65 .

ADMINISTRATION AND AVIATION

the training of shore fire control partieswere set up at Quantico and ParrisIsland. Transport-loading training wasgiven at Quantico and Norfolk, whileboth Quantico and Fort Bragg, N. C .,provided much needed theoretical andpractical instruction in radio code, theoperation of message centers, and thefundamentals of joint Army-Navy com-munications procedure . The effects ofthis training were to be felt across theglobe as the Marine and Army divisionswho had absorbed it headed for differ-ent theaters of operations .Along with improvements in training

came significant technological develop-ments in the machinery of war thatwould move amphibious assault troopsto their objectives. First came the Hig-gins boats, which had already beentested and improved during the late1930s, followed in 1941 by the adop-tion of the Higgins tank lighters whichwere to become the standard mediumlanding craft (LCM) used in amphibi-ous landings throughout World War II .The development of the tracked landingvehicle, subsequently to become knownas the LVT, followed a tortuous pathsimilar to that of the Higgins boat .Initially invented for rescue work inthe Everglades of Florida, the amphib-ian tractor first came to the attentionof the Marine Corps in the 1930s . Inlate 1940 the first of the Roebling "Alli-gators" was demonstrated at Quantico,after which time funds were set asideby the Navy for the large-scale produc-tion of this vehicle .While these developments were in

progress, the Marine Corps EquipmentBoard was working on plans for anarmored amphibian vehicle based on

35

the design of the "Alligator ." As thisproject got under way :

Plans called for a vehicle of over twentyfeet in length, twelve feet wide, and sixand one half feet high . The hull was to becomposed of structural steel, turrets wereto be of %-inch steel castings and wouldbe operable by hand . Each such vehiclewas to be armed with a 37-millimeter gunand one .30 caliber machine gun in thecenter turret, one .50-caliber machine gunin each side turret, and two fixed .50 cal-iber machine guns fired by the driver bymeans of buttons at the top of the twosteering levers. Propulsion would be ob-tained from 4-inch T-shaped curved cleatsbolted to roller chains . Roebling acceptedthe idea with modifications. By November1940, Marine Corps Headquarters hadgiven approval, and production of the firstmodel armored amphibian (LVTA) wasbegun .'

Also during the early phase of thewar, rapid improvements were made innaval gunnery that would assure anassault force effective fire support asit approached and seized an enemyshore. Once again, General Smith, onthis occasion with the active support ofAdmiral Ernest J . King, initiated a gen-eral reorganization of the shore firecontrol party. One of the basic changesadopted was the substitution of a Ma-rine or U. S . Army officer for navalpersonnel who had previously acted asnaval gunfire spotters . Henceforth, spe-cially trained naval officers were to actas liaison officers of the shore fire con-trol party. Signal personnel of the as-sault units, either Marine or Army, wereto be made available to the gunfire spot-ter. In order to familiarize naval per-sonnel with the problems that an am-phibious assault force could expect to

Ibid ., p . 69 .

36

face during actual landings, a numberof naval gunfire liaison officers weresent to Quantico and Parris Islandwhere they received joint training withMarine artillery officers between Sep-tember 1941 and March 1942 . Artilleryofficers of the 1st Marine Division re-ceived similar training with those ofthe Army's 9th Infantry Division atFort Bragg, N. C. around the sameperiod. Eventually the graduates ofthese courses, though their number re-mained small, found their way into thevarious theaters of operations, wheretheir special training benefited thoseheadquarters to which they were as-signed .

In a parallel development, naval ob-servation pilots received special instruc-tion in spotting shore targets duringearly 1942, both at Quantico and atFort Bragg. In order to train theseofficers in practical gunnery withouthaving to resort to extensive travel inthe Caribbean, an island was purchasedoff the eastern shore of Maryland inChesapeake Bay to serve as a firingrange for naval bombardment . It wasthe first amphibious gunnery range everestablished for this specific purpose,and a new chapter in the history ofnaval gunfire training got under way .

As combat operations expanded andthe size, mission, and capabilities of theMarine Corps increased, the administra-tive contacts between the various com-ponents of the Corps became more com-plex . The directive establishing theFleet Marine Force, Pacific, had definedthe role of the commander of that or-ganization as that of a type commanderfor all units comprising FMFPac . Assuch General Smith came under the di-


rect command of the Commander inChief, U . S . Pacific Fleets At the sametime, however, the Commander, FMFPacalso was a direct administrative sub-ordinate of the Commandant of theMarine Corps. In line with this organi-zational structure, overall tactical con-trol of the Fleet Marine Force wasvested in the Commander in Chief, U . S .Pacific Fleet, while CMC handled rou-tine administrative matters . Since nodistinct line existed between mattersof tactical and administrative concern,there evolved a no-man's-land in whichthe Commander in Chief, U. S. PacificFleet, exercised a certain influence. Anychange in the organization of the FleetMarine Force, for example, could havea direct and profound effect on thetactical employment of Marine unitsdespite the administrative nature ofsuch changes .

During the Central Pacific Campaignsuccessive islands were seized, whichmade it incumbent upon General Smith'sheadquarters to establish and maintaincontact with the commanders of themore recently seized islands, notablythose on Tinian, Guam, and Peleliu . Intheir capacity as island commandersthese Marines were indirectly subordi-nate to the Commander in Chief, PacificOcean Areas, the channel of commandleading to them from the latter by wayof the area commander.

There was no chain of command be-tween Headquarters, FMFPac and theCommander, Marianas Area, or theCommander, Marshall-Gilberts Area .Each of the latter was directly underthe Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean

' Pac Flt ltr 53L-44 dtd 110ct44 .


MARINE INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY landing exercise, New River, N .C. 1942 .(USMC 5125)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROY S . GEIGER takes command of the Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, from Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith at Oahu, Hawaii, 7 March 1945 .(USMC 127386)

37

38

Areas. The area commanders exercisedoperational control over certain unitsof the Fleet Marine Force, eitherthrough the island or the atoll com-manders. In relation to the business ofthese commands, the normal flow ofcommunications passed through theCommander in Chief, Pacific OceanAreas, though shortcuts were frequentlytaken to simplify procedures and con-serve time .

The Commander, Amphibious Forces,U. S. Pacific Fleet and the Commander,Air Force, U. S . Pacific Fleet were typecommanders under the direct controlof the Commander in Chief, U . S. Pa-cific Fleet . Their status thus paralleledthat of the Commanding General,FMFPac. In the case of these com-mands, the Commander in Chief, PacificOcean Areas acted as the hub of thewheel, though liaison officers were oftendirectly employed between the com-mands .

Even though no administrative com-mand relationship existed between unitsof the U . S. Army and the Fleet MarineForce in the Pacific Ocean Areas, it wasinevitable that interservice cooperationand coordination would be required onan ever increasing scale as joint opera-tions became more commonplace . Dur-ing the early phase of the war in 1942,the Joint Chiefs of Staff had alreadyauthorized the creation of the amphib-ious corps, under a Marine officer whosestaff included such Army and Navy per-sonnel as were required . Of necessity,such officers provided the necessary liai-son with their respective Services . Inline with this concept, most of the U . S .Army personnel attached to Headquar-ters, VAC, were transferred to Head-


quarters, FMFPac when that organiza-tion was activated . 7 There, they re-mained in their respective capacitiesand continued to serve on the generaland special staffs until the cessation ofhostilities .

By early 1945, it had become commonpractice to exchange staff representa-tives monthly between Headquarters,Marine Corps and FMFPac. Such anexchange provided a better liaison be-tween the two headquarters in additionto routine communication that alreadyexisted. At the same time, a liaisonofficer of the Fleet Marine Force at-tached to the staff of Admiral Nimitzlooked after the interests of his organi-zation. The principal contacts betweenHeadquarters, FMFPac, and Headquar-ters, Department of the Pacific per-tained to the exchange of administra-tive information on personnel mattersand business mutual to Marine garrisonunits of the Navy's shore establishmentand the Fleet Marine Force . A similarexchange of information took place withthe Commanding General, Marine Gar-rison Forces, Fourteenth Naval District,since no chain of command existed be-tween that command and Headquarters,FMFPac.

During the early part of 1945, thetrend towards representation of theFleet Marine Force, Pacific, on Armystaffs continued in the Pacific Theater .Towards this end, based on purely tac-tical considerations, the Marine De-tachment, Tenth Army was activatedon the first day of the year and assignedto Headquarters, U. S. Tenth Army,where it carried out a vital liaison func-

FMFPac SO No . 3-44, dtd 26Aug44 .


tion during the planning and execu-tion of the Okinawa campaign. TheMarine Detachment, U . S. Sixth Army,was slated for a similar role during theimpending assault on Kyushu in theHome Islands, in which VAC was toparticipate .Pursuant to an agreement reached

between the Commander in Chief, ArmyForces, Pacific, and the Commander inChief, Pacific Ocean Areas on 16 May1945, provision was made for Head-quarters, FMFPac to be represented onthe staff of the Commanding General,United States Army Forces, WesternPacific. The liaison officers thus as-signed were to provide the Army head-quarters with information on the capa-bilities of FMFPac, obtain logistic sup-port for Fleet Marine Force units underU. S. Army operational control, andmake certain that directives of Armycommanders corresponded to the capa-bilities of FMFPac . It was intended thatrepresentatives of the Fleet MarineForce would become an integral partof the Army staffs to which they wereassigned ; their primary duty would beto assist in planning for future opera-tions. In their capacity as representa-tives of FMFPac, they could contactthat headquarters directly in all matterspertaining to Fleet Marine Force pol-icy. Activation of the Marine Detach-ment (Provisional), U. S. Army Forces,Western Pacific, took place on 19 June1945 . This detachment remained at-tached to the Army headquarters untilthe end of the war .

The expansion of Marine Corps staffsand headquarters in the course ofWorld War II can be understood onlywhen viewed in an overall relationship

39

with the expanded responsibilities andsize of the Corps. From a total strengthof 54,359 officers and men in the sum-mer of 1941, the Marine Corps ex-panded eight-fold within the span offour years ; on 30 June 1945, withinsix weeks of the war's end, the Corpsnumbered 37,067 officers and 437,613men, a total of 474,680 .$

By the time the war entered its finalphase, the Marine Corps in the Conti-nental United States had become a hugereplacement training organization. Thelast Fleet Marine Force unit to be or-ganized was the 29th Marines. Whenthat unit left Camp Lejeune in 1944,training shifted for the most part toindividual replacements who, upon com-pletion of boot camp, either went onto technical schools or moved in a steadyflow towards the combat areas of thePacific Theater, according to the dictumthat "there are only two kinds of Ma-rines : those who have been overseasand those who are going." 9 Thus, in afew short years, the Fleet Marine Forcetruly had come a long way, eventuallycomprising some 185,000 trained menin ground organizations, organized intosix divisions and other supportingunits . 1o

Beyond training members of the U. S.Marine Corps, an additional temporaryfunction emerged for the Fleet MarineForce in 1943, when Dutch Marineswere trained at Quantico and CampLejeune in line with the reorganizationof the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps,

8 U. S. Historical Statistics, p . 736 .s Statement attributed to General Vandegrift

in Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p . 508 .10 Furer, Administration of the Navy Depart-

ment in World War II, p. 595 .

40

which was then being reconstituted inexile. Before the end of World WarII, several thousands of these Nether-lands Marines were to absorb some ofthe doctrine and experiences of theirAmerican counterparts .THE DEVELOPMENT OFAIRCRAFT, FMFPACII

The development of the aviation armof FMFPac during World War II paral-leled that of the ground units . It por-trayed the gradual ascendancy of aninstrument of war which, long neglectedin peacetime appropriations like mostof the military establishment, was tobe forged into a potent striking force .The history of Marine aviation passedthrough several stages of growth . Fol-lowing the establishment of the FleetMarine Force in the 1930s, the fledg-ling force grasped for a clearcut mis-sion. The years prior to World War IIsaw the training of pilots and groundcrews and the acquisition of newer typeaircraft. After the Pearl Harbor attack,Marine aviation initially maintaineda defensive posture during the earlymonths of the war in the face of over-whelming enemy superiority. Eventu-ally, there followed the establishmentand consolidation of bases along theouter perimeter of the Japanese ad-

" Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : Division of Aviation,Marine Corps Aviation Status Sheet (Pers&Loc, May42-Dec46) ; Aircraft, Fleet MarineForce, Pacific Administrative History, 7Aug42-16Sep44, hereafter AirFMFPac Adminis-trative History ; Marine Aircraft Wings,Pacific, War Diary, Aug1942-Sep1944, here-after MAWPac WarD ; Aircraft, Fleet MarineForce, Pacific, War Diary, Sep1945-Dec1946,hereafter AirFMFPac WarD ; Sherrod, MarineCorps Aviation in World War II .


vance ; and finally, a gradual movementgot under way to the northwest, acrossthe Pacific, towards the Japanese HomeIslands, slow at first, but steadily accel-erating as the offensive across the Pa-cific gained momentum .

The mission of Marine aviation, asset forth by the Navy General Boardin 1939, was primarily to support theFleet Marine Force in landing opera-tions and in the field. As a secondarymission, Marine air was to furnish re-placement squadrons for carrier-basednaval aircraft . To carry out their mis-sion, Marine pilots had to utilize air-fields within a relatively short rangeof the objective ; the only alternative tonearby airfields was to station Marinesquadrons on carriers. During the early1930s, Marine aviators gained consider-able experience in that type of opera-tion when stationed on board the Sara-toga and Lexington . A lack of carriers,on the other hand, precluded such com-bat employment of Marine squadronsuntil the final phase of World War II .

Attempts to obtain carriers for theexclusive use of Marine aviation invari-ably resulted in a rebuff similar to thatadministered by the Chief of NavalOperations, Admiral H . R. Stark, whoon 15 March 1941 made this comment

In fleet landing exercises recently com-pleted, naval squadrons were landed fromand marine squadrons embarked in bothcarriers available, and so doing is consid-ered to be in accordance with correct prin-ciples . Assignment of a few particularcarriers to the Fleet Marine Force wouldinevitably fail to meet possible require-ments in carrier operation of marinesquadrons. At the same time it wouldpermanently reduce the number availablefor purely naval operations . Thus therewould be imposed definite disadvantages


without adequate compensating advan-tages .

The assignment of a carrier to operatemarine squadrons only could not be per-mitted to involve any replacement of theship's own personnel by marines . It couldnot, without definite reduction of efficiencyand definite violation of principles of un-questionable standing, be permitted toinvolve command of important units, suchas carriers and their necessary supportingships, by marine officers'

The U. S. Navy's attitude with respectto the exclusive assignment of carriersto Marine aviation is understandableenough when it is recalled that duringthe 1930s the Saratoga and the Lexing-ton were the only carriers the Navy had .As more of these types of ships becameavailable, they had to be assigned toother uses . As a result, for most ofWorld War II, Marine air support ofamphibious ooperations was limited tolandings carried out within range ofland-based airfields .

Organizationally, Marine Corps avia-tion had humble beginnings . There were129 Marine pilots in 1931, a figure thathad increased by 9 four years later . Bymid-1940, there were 245 Marine pilots ;expansion of the Corps then under wayresulted in an increase to 425 by theend of that year. 13 In 1935, Marine avia-tion was transferred from the Divisionof Operations and Training at Head-quarters, Marine Corps and establishedas an independent section under theCommandant. Less than a year later,on 1 April 1936, the Officer in Charge,

" CNO ltr to Chairman, General Board, Op-12A-4-drc (SC)A21-2/CV, Ser 020512, dtd 15Mar41, in Organization and Expansion of theU. S. Marine Corps, 1940s (OAB, NHD) .'Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in World

War II, p . 30 .

41

Colonel Ross E . Rowell, was appointedDirector of Marine Corps Aviation . Inthis capacity, he continued the func-tions his predecessors had carried outsince the days of Major Alfred A . Cun-ningham in 1919, by advising the Com-mandant on all matters pertaining toMarine aviation and acting as liaisonbetween the Marine Corps and the NavyBureau of Aeronautics .

When Congress established a 10,000-plane program for the U . S. Navy inJune 1940, Marine Corps aviation wasallotted slightly more than 10 percentof this number, a total of 1,167 planes .In line with this expansion, the 1st and2d Marine Aircraft Wings were acti-vated at Quantico, Virginia and SanDiego, California, respectively . Onpaper, a wing was authorized 4 airgroups with 16 squadrons, though atthe time there were not even enoughaircraft on hand to equip a single group .When the Japanese struck at PearlHarbor, the total Marine aviation or-ganization consisted of 13 squadronswith a total of 204 aircraft of all types,as follows :14

" In this table, adapted from Sherrod, MarineCorps Aviation in World War II, p. 33, Vequals aircraft (heavier-than-air) ; M standsfor Marine ; F equals fighter ; SB stands forscout bomber; J designates utility ; R equalstransport; 0 stands for observation . (*) Onmaneuvers at New Bern, N . C. Returned toQuantico 9 December . (**) No record has beenfound which indicates how many planes wereat San Diego in wing headquarters, if any .The same is true of group headquarters atEwa. (***) Commissioned 1 December atNaval Air Station, San Diego. No record ofany planes received by 6 December. (****)Available records show only 204 planes in theMarine organization as of 6 December 1941, ascompared to a figure of 251 compiled in His-torical Division, HQMC in 1944 .

2d Marine Aircraft Wing, BGen Ross E . Rowell, San DiegoWing Hq**

MAG-21, LtCol Claude A. Larkin, Ewa, T .H .

VMF-211

12 F4F-3

at Wake

Maj Paul A. Putnam10 F4F-3

1 SNJ at EwaVMF-221

12 F2A-3

in Saratoga

Maj Verne J. McCaulVMO-251***

Capt Elliott E . BardVMSB-231

18 SB2U-3

in Lexington

Maj C. J. Chappell, Jr .7 SB2U-3

at Ewa

VMSB-232

19 SBD-1

3 SBD-2

Maj Ira L. KimesVMJ-252

2 R3D-2

1 JO-2

Maj Perry K. Smith2 J2F-4

1 SB2U-31 JRS-1

1 SBD-1

Virgin Islands, Base Air Detachment 3VMS-3

7 J2F-4

1 JRF

Maj Roger T. CarlesonTotal planes, 204****

Just one week prior to the Pearl Har-bor attack, the Chief of Naval Opera-tions, Admiral Stark, once more com-mented on the size of the MarineCorps contemplated under the then ex-isting state of limited emergency . In

outlining the overall mission of theCorps in the immediate future, theAdmiral foresaw three types of opera-tions calling for the employment ofMarines. These were broken down into

a . small expeditions for the seizure of

42 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

VMF-111*

MARINE CORPS AVIATION, 6 DECEMBER 1941

Director : COL RALPH J . MITCHELL

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, BGen Roy S. Geiger, Quanti:coWing Hq, 1 JRB-2, 1 SBC-4

MAG-11, LtCol Harold D . Campbell, Group Hq, 2 SBD-JL

15 F4F-3A 2 SNJ-3 Maj Thomas J . Walker, Jr.VMF-121* 20 F4F-3 2 SNJ-3 Maj Samuel S. JackVMO-151* 12 SBC-4 Maj Thomas C. GreenVMSB-131 18 SB2U-3 5 spares Capt Paul MoretVMSB-132 19 SBD Maj Albert D. CooleyVMJ-152 1 JO-2 3 J2F-4 Maj Thomas J. McQuade

2 R3D 1 J2F-1


small islands, such as a small atoll ; or acompact group of islands, well separatedfrom other islands or land masses, such asthe Azores ;

b. large expeditions requiring the simul-taneous or successive capture of severalislands spread over a considerable area,with a view to developing a secure ad-vanced base area for future operations ofthe fleet, and

c . large expeditions to overseas con-tinental areas for the seizure of bases tobe used subsequently as bridgeheads forextensive land campaigns."

In cautioning against too large anexpansion of the Marine Corps, Admi-ral Stark stated :

It seems apparent that were the Navy toinsist on building up amphibious assaulttroops in numbers sufficient for all threeof the categories of operations mentionedin paragraph 3, the effect would be thatthe Navy would be attempting to create aseparate army of its own, entirely inde-pendent of the United States Army, andof a size greater than has heretofore beencontemplated . Unfavorable reactions wouldensue, which might even result in the ab-sorption by the Army of all Marine Corpsunits at shore stations . Were this to occur,the Navy would be deprived of troopsespecially trained to work with the fleet,and to take the lead in amphibious opera-tions. Assembling all the equipment for athird Marine division would be of littleuse, because it takes a long time to enlistand train the personnel of a division, andduring the training period the two existingdivisions would be more or less broken upto provide for the new division a nucleusof trained men . The net result would bethat, for a considerable period, the Navy

' 1 CNO ltr to SecNac, dtd 1Dec41 Op .12-VDS (SC) P-16-1KK Serial 0120712, in Organ-ization and Expansion of the U . S. MarineCorps, 1940s (OAB, NHD) .

43

would be without the services of even onetrained division ."

At the same time the Chief of NavalOperations also outlined his objectionsto provisions that the General Boardhad made in the summer of 1941 withrespect to the 15,000-plane programthen recommended. This plan called fortwo air wings, each to be attachedto a Marine division, and the establish-ment of four base defense air groupsfor the defense of advance bases in co-operation with Marine defense bat-talions. According to the program thatthe General Board had approved, me-dium bombers were to be eliminatedfrom the aircraft wing and dive bomb-ers substituted in their place. In viewof the mission of the Marine Corpswhich was to capture positions and de-fend them once they had been seized,Admiral Stark felt that medium rangebombers would be far more valuablethan dive bombers. In outlining his ob-jections to the proposed course of ac-tion, the Chief of Naval Operationsadded :

Once the wing is established ashoreafter capture of the position, mediumrange bombers are needed for reachinginto back areas for attack on enemy rein-forcements which may be coming up, or,if established on an island, to reach out atconsiderable distances to attack enemybases or naval vessels . Providing only divebombers for Marine aircraft organizationsis considered unsound, since dive bombersare not effective against well armed shipsor shore bases except at considerable sac-rifice. War experience has demonstratedthe need not only for dive bombers, butalso for long range bombers and torpedoplanes?°

ie Ibid., p . 2 .17 Ibid., p . 4 .

44

This high-altitude bomber versus divebomber controversy remained unsolved,for the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-bor, immense enemy victories duringthe initial phase of the war in the Pa-cific, and requirements in men andmaterial that now became global innature put an end to the gradual in-crease of Marine Corps strength . In thewords of one historical account

The amphibious character of the war inthe Pacific imposed on the Marine Corpsgreater tasks than any it had ever beencalled on to perform . Expanding the Corpsand equipping it with the weapons andsupport facilities demanded by modernamphibious undertakings was an adminis-trative achievement of the first magnitudebut was overshadowed by the readiness ofthe Fleet Marine Force to undertake theGuadalcanal Operation at a critical timeearly in the war when other ground forceswere still undergoing training.'s

The development of the command or-ganization of Marine aviation was tofollow a course that was somewhatsimilar to that of the ground units . InAugust 1942, at a time when Marineaviation was undergoing a rapid expan-sion in line with the demands of thewar in the Pacific, the need for a com-mand echelon above that of the Marineair wing became apparent . In order tomeet this requirement the Commandant,General Holcomb, on 10 August 1942ordered the establishment of a newcommand to be known as Marine Air-craft Wings, Pacific, under Major Gen-eral Ross E. Rowell, who up to this timehad commanded the 2d Marine AircraftWing.

I Furer, Administration of the Navy Depart-ment in World War II, p . 595 .


The new command was to consist ofthe Headquarters, a Service Group, the1st Marine Aircraft Wing, the 2d Ma-rine Aircraft Wing, and the 4th MarineBase Defense Aircraft Wing . 19 WhileHeadquarters was to be located at PearlHarbor, the Service Group was to besituated at a place where it could bestcarry out its function of dealing withpersonnel and supplies . The 1st and 2dMarine Aircraft Wings were to retainall units assigned to them at this time,except for squadrons and groups sta-tioned at outlying bases for defensepurposes. These latter units were to beincorporated into the 4th Marine BaseDefense Aircraft Wing .

Operating under Admiral Nimitz, thenew headquarters was responsible forthe organization, administration, anddistribution of personnel and supplieswithin the command. Its area of respon-sibility extended to all Marine aviationunits in the Pacific except for thoseassigned to a specific task organization .General Rowell was to make recommen-dations to Admiral Nimitz as to theemployment of Marine aviation unitsin the Pacific Theater .

Headquarters Squadron, Marine Air-craft Wings, Pacific, was activated atthe Naval Air Station, San Diego on15 August 1942. Initially, the organiza-tion consisted of 10 officers and 24 en-listed men . 20 Five days later, the Serv-ice Group was activated, in accordancewith the original authority which hadstated that the group was to be estab-lished "for the distribution of per-sonnel and material with operating

CMC ltr to MajGen Ross E. Rowell, dtd10Aug52, App 1 to MAWPac WarD, p. 1.

MA WPac Hist, p . 2 .


agencies at such localities as may beappropriate.1121 The first officer to com-mand the Service Group was ColonelLewie G. Merritt .

One of the first measures initiated byGeneral Rowell was to field the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, commanded byBrigadier General Roy Geiger. Ordersto this effect were issued on 21 August,directing Headquarters and ServiceSquadron, 1st MAW and MAG-12 tohead for the South Pacific . There, thebattle for Guadalcanal was just gettingunder way, and General Geiger's pilotswould soon make a name for themselvesin the defense of Henderson Field . By24 August, the 4th Marine Base DefenseAircraft Wing was organized underColonel Claude A . Larkin . Initially, thiswing was to consist of units of the 1stand 2d Marine Aircraft Wings whichwere assigned to the defense of outlyingbases.

Once the 4th Wing had been organ-ized, the time had come for MarineAircraft Wings, Pacific, to leave theContinental United States. Accordingly,Admiral Nimitz on 5 September re-quested General Rowell to move hisheadquarters to Hawaii, where it wasto be based at Ewa, which had beencommissioned as a Marine Air Stationonly five days earlier . The move toHawaii was designed to bring aboutcloser liaison between Marine AircraftWings, Pacific, its subordinate units inthe Pacific Theater, and the headquar-ters of Admiral Nimitz. Pursuant tothese orders22 General Rowell left San

1 CMC ltr to MajGen Rowell, dtd 10Aug42,Ibid .

27 CinCPac Dispatch #050113, as cited inMAWPac Hist, p . 1 .

Diego for Hawaii on 16 September, fol-lowed less than two weeks later byHeadquarters Squadron, Marine AirWings, Pacific, which made the voyageby ship and reached Pearl Harbor on4 October. On 19 November, MAG-23returned from Guadalcanal en route tothe Continental United States, wherepersonnel of this group were broken upand split into cadres that were to be-come Marine Aircraft Groups 41, 42,43, and 44 . Some of these cadres becamethe nuclei for new Marine air stationsto be established at El Centro, SantaBarbara, and Mojave .23

Meanwhile, the expanding needs ofMarine aviation in the Pacific Theaterplaced a heavy workload on the ServiceGroup, both with respect to personnelreplacement and the procurement ofmateriel . In order to furnish additionalsupport for the Service Group, whichhad remained in the Continental UnitedStates, General Rowell on 3 December1942 ordered it to be expanded into alarger unit designated as Marine FleetAir, West Coast . This organizationwas activated on 22 January 1943 underthe command of Colonel Merritt, whohad previously been in charge of thenow defunct Service Group.

One of the immediate problems fac-ing General Rowell's recently consti-tuted headquarters was that of chan-neling replacements into the combatarea. The 1st Wing estimated at thetime that 5 percent enlisted groundpersonnel, 25 percent pilots, and 20percent radioman-gunner replacementswould be required for each month ofcombat in the South Pacific 24 In re-I MA WPac Hist, p. 4 .u Ibid., p. 5.

45

46

sponse to this problem, the 2d MarineAircraft Wing, commanded by ColonelFrancis P. Mulcahy, was ordered intothe South Pacific area to relieve GeneralGeiger's wing in late February 1943 .

Major General Ralph J . Mitchell, whohad served as Director of Aviation un-til late March 1943 assumed commandof Marine Aircraft, South Pacific on 21April, thus heading the principal sub-ordinate echelon of Marine AircraftWings, Pacific . Both the 1st and the 2dMarine Aircraft Wings came under hisheadquarters. In a reflection of thestepped up operations in the South Pa-cific during the summer of 1943, sev-eral changes were made in the organ-ization of Marine aviation. In August,Admiral Nimitz ordered Headquar-ters of the 4th Marine Base DefenseAircraft Wing to be established inSamoa, where it was to function underthe operational control of the Com-manding General, Samoan Force. Onthe 21st of the month, Brigadier Gen-eral Harold D. Campbell assumed com-mand of the Aircraft Defense Force,Samoan Area. Embarkation of the firstechelon of the 4th Wing for Samoa gotunder way on 28 August .

The continued expansion of Marineaviation in the field necessitated addi-tional changes in the areas farther tothe rear. Accordingly, on 1 September1943, Marine Aircraft, Hawaiian Areawas activated . In another developmenthighlighting the increasingly importantpart played by Marine aviation in theSouth Pacific, General Mitchell, in No-vember 1943, became Commander ofAircraft in the Solomons Area (ComAir


Sols) in addition to his other duties,relieving Army Air Forces Major Gen-eral Nathan Twining .As of the beginning of 1944, Marine

Air Wings, Pacific, still commanded byGeneral Rowell, functioned, under AirForce, Pacific Fleet, alternately desig-nated as Task Force 59 .11 . The unitssubordinated to General Rowell's head-quarters at this time were Marine Air-craft, South Pacific ; the 4th MarineBase Defense Aircraft Wing ; MarineAircraft, Hawaiian Area, and MarineFleet Air, West Coast. By this time thestaff at Headquarters, Marine AirWings, Pacific, numbered 27 officers and118 enlisted men . 25On 8 May 1944 the 3d Marine Air-

craft Wing, which had previously beena training command on the East Coast,and was on this date commanded byBrigadier General Walter G . Farrell,who had just taken over from BrigadierGeneral Larkin, reached Ewa. There, itassumed the functions which had pre-viously been assigned to Marine Air-craft, Hawaiian Area . The latter head-quarters was deactivated . 26 All elementsof the former command were incorpo-rated into the new wing .The establishment of Headquarters,

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in the sum-mer of 1944 brought with it the questionas to who was to control the Fleet Ma-rine Force aviation units . In August ofthat year, the Commandant had directed

' Ibid., p . 7.MAWPac Chronology in MAWPac WarD,

p. 4 .


that Marine aviation in the Pacific wasto be under the newly organized FleetMarine Force, Pacific . This order hadbeen revoked at the direction of Admi-ral Nimitz, and for a month the statusof these aviation units remained un-clarified . This uncertainty ended on 11October 1944, when Marine AircraftWings, Pacific was redesignated as Air-craft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. 27 Theimplementation order issued by GeneralMulcahy, who had assumed command ofMarine Aircraft Wings, Pacific on 16September, spelled out in detail :

Aircraft Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, isa major unit of the Fleet Marine Force,Pacific. The Commanding General, Air-craft, Fleet Marine Force performs typecommand functions under the Command-ing General, Fleet Marine Force with re-spect to matters for which the latter isresponsible. He also performs type com-mand functions under Commander AirForce, Pacific Fleet, with respect to avia-tion matters. The operational control ofthe tactical units of Aircraft, Fleet MarineForce, rests with Commander Air Force,Pacific Fleet, unless they are otherwiseassigned .'

Two additional subordinate com-mands were established on 21 October1944. One was the Provisional Air Sup-port Command at Ewa under ColonelVernon E. Megee. The overall purposeof this command was to act as a liaisongroup in amphibious operations be-

:7 Pacific Flt Ltr 53L-44, dtd 11Oct44, inOrganization and Expansion of the U . S .Marine Corps, 1940s (OAB, NHD) .' FMFPac GO No . 3-44, dtd 240ct 44, App 2

to MAWPac WarD .

47

tween ground forces and supportingaircraft. The other was Marine CarrierGroups, Aircraft, FMFPac, which wasorganized at Santa Barbara, California,under the command of Colonel Albert D .Cooley. Creation of the latter organiza-tion marked the end of years of Marineefforts to have men and aircraft as-signed to carriers . Colonel Cooley'scommand consisted of MBDAG-48 atSanta Barbara and MAG-51 at Mojave,shortly thereafter redesignated as Ma-rine Air Support Groups. Each AirSupport Group was to consist of fourcarrier air groups, each with an 18-plane fighter squadron and a 12-planetorpedo-bomber squadron .

At the beginning of 1945, the unitssubordinate to Aircraft, Fleet MarineForce, Pacific, were the 1st, 2d, 3d, and4th Marine Air Wings ; Marine FleetAir, West Coast, and the newly estab-lished Provisional Air Support Com-mand . This organization remained ineffect during the early months of 1945,though changes in command were fre-quent. Thus, on 23 February, MajorGeneral James T . Moore, who had ledthe 2d Marine Aircraft Wing duringthe campaign in the Palaus, traded com-mands with Major General Mulcahy .General Moore became CommandingGeneral, Aircraft, FMFPac, whileGeneral Mulcahy assumed command ofthe 2d Wing, which subsequently wasto take part in the invasion of Okinawa .One final change was to mark the

Marine aviation organization in the Pa-cific Theater prior to the end of the war .On 21 April 1945, the Provisional AirSupport Command was disbanded and

48

the personnel and equipment of thatunit were taken over by the newlyestablished Marine Air Support ControlUnits, Amphibious Forces, Pacific . Thiscommand, under Colonel Megee, con-sisted of a headquarters and four teamsdesigned to furnish close air supportcontrol for ground forces in amphibiousoperations. The command, functioningunder the Commander, AmphibiousForces, Pacific, continued to carry outits administrative function at Ewa un-til the end of the war.

The evolution of Marine Corps avia-tion administrative headquarters mustbe viewed from the organizationalrequirements levied on that arm . Thus,by the end of World War II, Marineaviation had expanded to a total of 103tactical squadrons, numbering 10,049pilots and a total of 116,628 personnel .29

Not included in these figures are thosenontactical squadrons used for trans-port and observation . In a span of fouryears, Marine aviation had mushroomedfrom 2 aircraft groups with 9 aircraftsquadrons to 5 aircraft wings, 32 "Ibid., p . 434. An additional monthly break-

down of Marine aviation units, location, andpersonnel is contained in Division of AviationMonthly Status Sheets, Mar43-Dec46, Division

War II, p . 422.

of Aviation, HQMC .Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in World


aircraft groups, and 131 aircraftsquadrons .3o

In retrospect, the organization ofMarine Aviation met the demands madeupon it, oftentimes by trial and error,within the limitations imposed by timeand recurrent shortages in manpowerand materiel . The flexibility of theadministrative support available to thetactical squadrons in the field contrib-uted much in helping these units tocarry out their tactical missions . Thus,when compared to the development ofthe Fleet Marine Force organization asoutlined in the previous chapter, itbecomes readily apparent that thegrowth of Marine aviation was di-rectly proportionate to overall Marinestrength . The effect of this administra-tive expansion on the units in the fieldwill be demonstrated in subsequentparts of this volume which describe indetail the performance of Marine avi-ators and their equipment in a tacticalenvironment .

PART III

The Palaus: Gateway To The Philippines

Strategic Situation 1

Most American planners agreed byearly 1944 that the next important goalin the increasingly successful waragainst Japan was to secure a base inthe strategic triangle formed by thePhilippines, Formosa, and the coast of

1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : Maj Frank 0 . Hough,The Assault on Peleliu (Washington : HistDiv,HQMC, 1950), hereafter Hough, Assaulton Peleliu ; Isely and Crowl, U. S . Marinesand Amphibious War ; The War Reports ofGeneral of the Army George C. Marshall-General of the Army H. H. Arnold-FleetAdmiral Ernest J. King (Philadelphia andNew York : J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947),hereafter War Reports with appropriate origi-nator; Robert Ross Smith, The Approach tothe Philippines-The War in the Pacific-U. S. Army in World War II (Washington :OCMH, DA, 1953), hereafter Smith, Approachto the Philippines ; USSBS(Pac), NavAnalysisDiv, The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Wash-ington, 1946), hereafter USSBS(Pac), PacificCampaigns ; Samuel Eliot Morison, Leyte June1944-January 1945-History of United StatesNaval Operations in World War II, v . XII(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958),hereafter Morison, Leyte ; Wesley FrankCraven and James Lea Cate, eds ., The Pacific :Matterhorn to Nagasal:i--The Army AirForces in World War II, v. V (Chicago : TheUniversity of Chicago Press, 1953), hereafterCraven and Cate, The Pacific . Where locationcitations for documentary sources for this partare missing, the material is in the followingfiles of the Archives, Historical Division, Head-quarters Marine Corps : Palaus Area Opera-tions; Peleliu Monograph and Comment File ;Unit Historical Report .

CHAPTER 1

China. Such a move would sever thelines of communication between Japan'shome islands and her rich conqueredlands in the Netherlands Indies andSoutheast Asia. Moreover, the planenvisaged sites for long range bomberairfields, as well as a valuable base fromwhich future invasions, including theultimate assault of Japan itself, couldbe mounted. After much debate over theproper avenues of advance, the JointChiefs of Staff agreed to a compromisewhich would set in motion a two-pronged attack along the two most prac-ticable routes of approach : one throughthe Central Pacific, and the other alongthe New Guinea-Mindanao axis origi-nating from the Southwest Pacific .

Both of these offensives were welladvanced by the summer months of1944. By a series of amphibious land-ings, General Douglas MacArthur'sSouthwest Pacific Area forces hadreached the western extremity of NewGuinea. As a result, the island wasneutralized as a base for enemy oiler-_ations, and the way . was cleared for amove against Mindanao (See Map 1) .In the Central Pacific, meanwhile,troops controlled by Admiral ChesterW. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pa-cific Ocean Areas (CinCPOA) hadseized Saipan and consolidated theirhold on the Marianas . When these twoavenues of attack converged in a pincermovement on the Philippines, the

51

52

planned encirclement of bypassed Jap-anese bases would be complete, and theCentral Pacific for all practical pur-poses would be turned into an Americanlake. First, however, thought had tobe given to the safeguarding ofMacArthur's invasion route north fromNew Guinea .Some 530 miles directly east of

Mindanao lay Japan's main bastion inthe Western Carolines, the Palau Is-lands. General MacArthur believed thathe could not mount an amphibiouscampaign against the Philippines unlessthis potential threat to his lines of com-munications was eliminated . It ap-peared that land-based aircraft couldnot neutralize this danger, for theenemy stronghold was too far distantfrom newly-acquired bases for sus-tained and effective air attacks. Perma-nent neutralization of the Palaus, Pa-cific planners decided, could be gainedonly by amphibious assault.

Although three excellent targetsstood out in the Western Carolines-thePalaus' airfields and anchorages, Yap'sair base, and Ulithi's exceptionallyspacious and deep anchorage-the highlevel planners envisioned, at first, onlythe seizure of the Palaus . This under-taking was given the rather propheticcode name of Operation STALEMATE,

-fbr'revisions, postponements, and dras-tic changes characterized it right up tothe moment of actual consummation .Before the campaign initiated bySTALEMATE was ended, all three ofthe targets were to be included in itsoperation plans, although only the is-lands of Peleliu and Angaur in thesouthern Palaus and the Ulithi Atollactually would be invaded .


As Admiral Nimitz later explained,the reasons for STALEMATE weretwofold : "first, to remove fromMacArthur's right flank, in his progressto the Southern Philippines, a definitethreat of attack ; second, to secure forour forces a base from which to sup-port MacArthur's operations into theSouthern Philippines ."2 On the sameday proposed for the landing on Peleliu,infantry units of the Southwest Pacificcommand would assault the island ofMorotai in the Moluccas, thus securingMacArthur's left flank and providinghim with a suitable airfield site forland-based aircraft to support his inva-sion armada mounting from NewGuinea .

Whether or not the Palau Operationwas a necessary prerequisite forMacArthur's return to the Philippinesremains a matter of unproductive spec-ulation. Except for those who partici-pated in it, Peleliu largely remains aforgotten battle, its location unknown,its name calling forth no patrioticremembrance of self-sacrifice or gallantdeeds as do the battles of Guadalcanal,Tarawa, and Iwo Jima. For the Marineswho stormed ashore on Peleliu, how-ever, the strategic value of the islandmay not have been clear, but duty was .They had been given a job to do, andthey went ahead and did it . As MajorFrank O. Hough, a veteran of the fight-ing on "Bloody" -'Peleliu, commented

Whatever might have been, the Marineshit the Peleliu beaches on 15 September1944, and history records that nine daysafter the assault phase was declared at an

FAdm Chester W . Nimitz Itr to Philip A .Crowl, dtd 50ct49, cited in Isely and Crowl,U. S. Marines and Amphibious War, p . 392 .

54

end, MacArthur invaded Leyte. For betteror for worse, his flank had been secured,and with the action which followed thePacific War entered a new and decisivephases

GEOGRAPHICAL ANDHISTORICAL BACKGROUND4

As the westernmost extremity of thevast Carolines Islands chain, whichspans some 33 degrees of longitudeacross the Pacific Ocean just north ofthe equator, the Palaus lie roughly 500miles from both the Philippines to thewest and New Guinea to the south, and240 miles from Yap to the east . Thisremoteness, especially from the rest ofMicronesia, long retarded the islands'development and delayed knowledge oftheir existence to the outside world .

Although Ruy Lopez de Villalobos isgenerally credited with the discovery of

3 Hough, Assault on Peleliu, p . 1 .Unless otherwise noted, the material in this

section is derived from : Joint IntelligenceStudy Publishing Board, Joint Army-NavyIntelligence Study of Palau Islands (JANISNo. 103), 2 vols, dtd Apr44, hereafter JANISNo. 103 ; CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin No . 124-44, Southern Palau, dtd 15Aug44 ; JICPOA,Information Bulletin : Palau, dtd 15Feb44,hereafter JICPOA Bulletin No . 17-44 ; JIC-POA, Information Bulletin : Palau Islands, dtd1Jun44, hereafter JICPOA Bulletin No . 87-44 ; Hough, Assault on Peleliu ; Herbert W .Krieger, Island Peoples of the Western PacificMicronesia and Melanesia : Smithsonian Insti-tution War Background Studies Number 16(Washington : The Smithsonian Institution,1943) ; R. W. Robson, The Pacific Islands Hand-book 1944 : North American Edition (NewYork : The Macmillan Company, 1945) ; LCdrDorothy E . Richard, United States NavalAdministration of the Trust Territory of thePacific Islands, 3 vols (Washington : CNO,1957) .


the Palaus in 1543, the first recordedvisit to the island was made in 1712by Spanish missionaries. Afterwards,Spain was to maintain a shadowy claimof ownership over the Palaus and therest of the Western Carolines ; yet shemade no real attempts at the economicdevelopment or social improvement ofthem. Except for visits by Englishships in 1738 and 1791, the Palaus re-mained unknown to the Western Worlduntil the middle of the 18th Centurywhen trading ships plying the Chinesemarket rediscovered them .

By 1885, Spain's long failure to de-velop the Western Carolines encouragedImperial Germany, anxious at this timefor overseas colonies to supplement herrapidly growing industrial factories, toland naval forces at Yap and take pos-session. This challenge to Spanishsovereignty proved fruitless, for a neu-tral arbitrator soon disallowed theGermans' claim to the disputed islands .In 1899, however, Spain suddenly de-cided to withdraw completely from thePacific area ; she wanted no more terri-torial losses such as she had suffered inthe Spanish-American War. As a result,she sold the Carolines, Marshalls, andMarianas to the Germans, who imme-diately began to exploit the islands withvigor. By 1914, this exploitation hadprovided the Palaus with a telegraphstation and modernized transportationfacilities. In addition, the mining ofphosphates and the production of coprahad been initiated .

At this point, the outbreak of WorldWar I gave Japan a golden opportunityfor expanding into the Central Pacific .Quickly joining the Allies, she organ-ized naval expeditions and set about

STRATEGIC SITUATION

seizing Germany's Pacific possessions .This energetic land-grab was more orless legitimized after the war, when thenew League of Nations granted Japana mandate over the former Germancolonies north of the equator . Aftertheir abrupt withdrawal from theLeague in 1935, the Japanese continuedexercising a de facto sovereignty overthe Palau Islands, as well as the rest ofthe mandated islands .

Geographically, the Palaus consist ofseveral large islands and well over ahundred smaller ones, extending gener-ally in a northeast-southwest directionfor nearly 100 miles (See Map 2) . Ex-cept for Angaur in the south and twosmall atolls in the north, the wholegroup lies within a great encirclingcoral reef which is largely a barrierreef on the west and a fringing reef onthe east. The maximum width betweenthe outer reefs is about 20 miles, andthe whole island group covers approxi-mately 175 square miles . All of theislands are irregularly shaped and mostare hilly, but they vary greatly in phys-ical character, ranging from flat atollsin the north to volcanic central islandsand, finally, to coral-limestone islandsin the south .

Lying only a few degrees above theequator, the Palaus have a humid andhot climate typically equatorial, and theseasons are monotonously uniform andunchanging. In any month, the rainfallis rarely less than 4 inches, and themean monthly temperature is seldomless than 80 or more than 82 degreesFahrenheit. While temperatures arenot excessively hot, the relative humid-ity (82 %) remains high at all timesand is most discomforting and debili-

55

tating. Also typical of equatorial con-ditions are the threats to health causedby dengue and dysentery ; strangelyenough, however, malarial mosquitoesare not present in the Palaus .

During the fall season (September-November), westerly winds predomi-nate, and there are usually three heavythunderstorms a month, while typhoonsare an ever-present threat . In addition,these fall months normally have 18 to20 rainy days, the average rainfall forany one month being just over 10inches . Visibility is usually good, how-ever, with mean monthly amounts ofcloud cover varying from four-tenths tosix-tenths. Fogs are rare and mistsinfrequent .

The natives inhabiting these equato-rial islands are basically Micronesians,a racial blend of the lighter Polynesianand the darker Melanesian stocks .Physically, however, Palauans mostnearly resemble the Malay people of theNetherlands Indies, probably becauseof interracial mixing that occurred asthe result of an eastward seaborne im-migration of the Malays . The Palaulanguage shows obvious Malayan influ-ences also. In fact, Americans foundgreat language and cultural differencesbetween the people of the WesternCarolines and those whom they encoun-tered in Micronesia .

Like other native ethnic groups in thePacific islands, the Palauans suffered apopulation decline following the comingof the white man, usually as a result ofhis diseases . From an estimated 40,000in 1800, the number of Palauans hadshrunk to a pre-World War II total of6,500. An estimated 20,000 Japanesecivilians, who had emigrated from the

STRATEGIC SITUATION

Home Islands prior to the war, lived inthe Palaus. As a result, a certain inter-mingling of Japanese and Palauan bloodlines occurred .

While the natives enjoyed an ade-quate food supply due to the islands'staple taro crop, large quantities of ricehad to be imported from the HomeIslands each year to feed the numerousJapanese living there . Fish from thesurrounding waters, of course, providedan important dietary supplement. Theonly agricultural export produced bythe natives was copra, but the extensivephosphate deposits on Angaur andPeleliu supplied the Palaus' most valu-able export. Trade between the variousislands and the outside world was re-stricted by the Japanese almost solelyto the Home Islands .

The principal islands in the Palauchain from north to south are Babel-thuap, Koror, Arakabesan, Malakal,Urukthapel, Eil Malk, Peleliu, andAngaur. Larger than all others com-bined, Babelthuap has a rugged interiorwith heights up to 800 feet, and is cov-ered with a typical rainforest growth .Just north of the large island liesKossol Passage, a valuable naval an-chorage because of its spacious reef-enclosed area with a coral and sandbottom. Centrally located and near thebest anchorages and harbors, the townof Koror on the island of the same nameis just to the south of Babelthuap . Un-der Japanese rule, it functioned as thecommercial, administrative, and com-munication hub for the island group, aswell as governmental headquarters forthe entire mandated territory . It was,however, the southernmost islands,Peleliu and Angaur, upon which the

57

attention of the American plannerscame to focus .

Located just inside the southwest tipof the huge Palau reef, Peleliu is anoddly shaped island with two elongatedarms of land. Often described as resem-bling the claw of a lobster, this coral-limestone island is approximately sixmiles long, is aligned in a north-southdirection, and has a maximum width ofslightly more than two miles . The rela-tively flat and wide southern sectioncontrasts sharply with the northernelongated arm which is dominated byan irregular series of broken coralridges, narrow valleys, and ruggedpeaks. The key terrain from a militaryviewpoint, this ridge system derived itsname from the 550-foot UmurbrogolMountain. Literally honeycombed withnatural caves, a nightmare of crags,pinnacles, and coral rubble, this typeof terrain lends itself well to defensivetactics (See Map 3) .

To the east, Peleliu's other peninsulasoon tapers off into a series of smallerislets, separated from each other andthe longer northern arm by a complexof swamps and shoal coral . This easternarm of land extending out from thesouthern portion of Peleliu is virtuallyseparated from it by a tidal coral flatchoked with mangroves . The southern-most part of the island, on the otherhand, terminates into two promontorieswith a cove between. The southwesternpromontory, sometimes called Ngar-moked Island, is larger and more ruggedthan the southeastern one, which isconnected to the mainland only by anarrow spit of sand .

The island is heavily wooded with athick scrub jungle growth, and on the

58

thin topsoil of the Umurbrogol ridgesgrew a sparse, scraggly vegetation thatcloaked the contours beneath and defiedall attempts of pre-invasion aerialreconnaissance . A dense tropical growththrives along most of the island'sshores, with mangrove swamps border-ing the northeastern beaches . The is-land has no rivers or lakes, and exceptfor a few swamps, its soils drain withina few hours after a heavy rainfall . Fortheir water supply, Peleliu's inhabitantsdepended chiefly upon rain water storedin cisterns .

Amphibious planners found no dearthof suitable beaches on Peleliu, for land-ings were feasible at almost any point,providing the reef was passable . Alongthe east coast is a narrow reef whichborders the shoreline, except to thesouth where small bays occur, and to thenorth where the reef lies 1,200 to 5,000yards offshore . On the western side ofPeleliu, there is a broad, shallow reefshelf, varying in width from over a milein the north to 400 yards in the south .The outer part, somewhat higher thanthe inner portion, was strewn withboulders. At a few points, there arebreaks in the reef, where restrictedchannels permit passage of small boatsat high tide. The northern part of thereef is from 1,400 to 1,600 yards off-shore, while in the south it averages500 yards. During the fall months, thewest shores of Peleliu receive only alight to moderate surf, and the meanrange of its tides is from 3 .3 to 3 .9 feet.

The beaches on the western side, thebest in terms of amphibious assaults,are extensive. Composed of coarse tex-tured coral sands, they are trafficableat all times, particularly when wet .


Their surface is generally rough andrubbly, with much coral debris lyingabout. The slope of the beaches is usu-ally moderate to steep, and passageinland encounters, in general, onlymoderately rising wooded areas .

The main military value of Peleliu,and of the Palaus, lay in its southernlowlands, where the Japanese had al-ready built two unusually good runwaysin an X pattern . Surfaced with hard-packed coral, this airfield was suitablefor bombers and fighters, and wasserved by ample taxiways, dispersalareas, and turning circles . A scrubjungle, interspersed with wild coconuttrees and an occasional grassy clearing,flanked the field on both the west andsouth, while a dense mangrove swampbordered it on the east. To the northwas an extensive area of buildings, andright behind them began the sharpridges of the Umurbrogol system, whichwere to prove such an ideal position forthe defenders . Also of military interestwas the auxiliary fighter strip in theprocess of being constructed on Ngese-bus Island, which lay off the northerntip of Peleliu, connected by a woodencauseway across a shallow reef to themainland .

The Japanese airfield, near the vil-lage of Asias, was the central focus ofPeleliu's road system. From the air-field, the West and East Roads ran upthe northern peninsula, flanking theUmurbrogol highlands . In the northwhere the ridges flatten out briefly,these two roads converged into one thatcontinued to the northernmost tip ofPeleliu and the village of Akalokul, siteof a phosphate crushing plant and ahand-operated, narrow-gauge railroad .

STRATEGIC SITUATION

About half way up the West Road, nearthe village of Garekoru, a trail angledacross the ridges to link up with theEast Road. From Asias, a road rannortheast across the narrow causewayand up the eastern peninsula toNgardololok, where the Japanese hadset up a radio-direction finder, a powerplant, and a few other military instal-lations. A southern extension of theEast Road served the promontories tothe south .

The other island attracting the atten-tion of American planners was smallerand more compact than Peleliu . Angauris the southernmost of the Palau Islandsand lies outside of the complex of reefssurrounding them. The island is com-posed of raised coral and is shapedsomewhat like a half-moon, with itsconcave side facing to the west . Approx-imately 5,000 yards north to south andnearly 4,000 yards at its maximumwidth, Angaur has an estimated areaof 2,000 acres. Its highest elevation,about 200 feet, is in the more ruggednorthwest corner, and there are steep20- to 40-foot cliffs along much of theshoreline. The remainder of the denselywooded island, however, is almost flat,and its capability of being readily trans-formed into a heavy bomber site madeit a military objective worthy of seizure .Barriers to overland movement werethe dense jungle growth, swampy areasinland, steep cliffs, two small lakesformed by water collecting in abandonedphosphate diggings, and the brokenridges of the northwest corner .

Several excellent beaches for landingoperations occur on Angaur, with move-ment immediately inland hamperedonly by the rainforest and thick under-

59

growth. Where reefs fringe the coast,they are generally narrow and drop offsharply into deep water. A shelteredwater area exists on the west side nearthe village of Saipan. The port andtrade center of the island, this villagewas connected with the other coasts byroads, trails, and narrow-gauge rail-way lines.

Two other potential targets, besidesthe Palaus, also played an importantrole in the evolution of STALEMATEYap Island and Ulithi Atoll . Yap, actu-ally a cluster of islands grouped to-gether on a triangular reef, possesseda well-developed and strongly garri-soned Japanese airbase . None of Uli-thi's some 30 islands, on the other hand,was considered suitable by Japanese en-gineers for the construction of an air-strip, and the atoll was only lightlyheld. Ulithi, however, possessed an ex-cellent sheltered anchorage, and occu-pied a central position in respect to otherPacific islands the Americans hadseized or intended to seize . After itscapture, it was destined to become thevital hub of naval operations in theWestern Pacific during the last days ofthe war .

OPERATION STALEMATE 115

Initial Allied planning for the captureof the Palaus started during the First

Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : ComThirdFlt, Rpt onSeizure of Southern Palau Islands and Ulithi,Concurrent Ops in Support of the Seizure ofMorotai, dtd 14Nov44, hereafter ThirdFlt AR ;ComWesPacTFs OPlan No. 14-44, dtd 1Aug44 ;III PhibFor, Rpt on STALEMATE II Op, dtd11Nov44, hereafter III PhibFor STALEMATEII Rpt ; TF 31 OPlan A302-44, dtd 4Aug44 ;

60

Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) inAugust 1943 . During this top level meet-ing, a tentative date of 31 December1944 was fixed for the assault on thePalaus ; the campaign would follow theseizure of the Marshalls and Truk, butprecede the attack on the Marianas .Subsequent strategic revisions, how-ever, provided for the bypassing of Trukand the capture of the Palaus in Sep-tember following the occupation of Sai-pan, Tinian, and Guam . This new sched-ule was formulated by the Joint Chiefsof Staff directive of 12 March 1944 .

Preliminary steps, meanwhile, hadalready been initiated by top Pacificcommands. A Marine general, passingthrough Pearl Harbor on his way to thefront in January 1944, found the Plan-ning Section of CinCPOA Staff, headedby Colonel Ralph R . Robinson, USMC,far advanced in its preparation for afuture assault of Babelthuap . In fact,the general noted that the plannerswere utilizing the same landing area asused by a Marine Corps Schools prob-lem in the thirties .e A month later, JointIntelligence Center, Pacific OceanAreas distributed a bulletin settingforth what was then known about thePalaus. This was little enough, for suchconvenient intelligence sources as coast-

ExTrps, ThirdFlt, SAR, Palau Op, dated120ct44, hereafter ExTrps SAR ; ILIAC, Op-Rpt-PalausOps, dtd 240ct44, hereafter ILIACPalaus Rpt ; Peleliu Comment File ; Hough,Assault on Peleliu ; Smith, Approach to thePhilippines ; Morison, Leyte ; RAdm WorrallReed Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil :The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in thePacific during World War II (Washington :GPO, 1952), hereafter, Carter, Beans, Bullets,and Black Oil ; Craven and Cate, The Pacific.


watchers and trading ships' captains,often available in earlier campaigns,were totally lacking. Until the Ameri-cans actually landed in the Palaus, anyterrain studies of the islands wouldhave to be made solely from aerial orsubmarine reconnaissance .Operation STALEMATE was for-

mally launched on 10 May, when Ad-miral Nimitz issued the Joint StaffStudy for the Palau Operation . Thisstudy contained the general organiza-tion of the forces to be employed, theallocation of ground, air, and navalunits, the scheme of maneuver, and thelogistic support plan. The date for thelanding was tentatively set for 15 Sep-tember 1944. As copies came into thehands of the assault and support eche-lons concerned, detailed planning beganimmediately. The planning for the Mari-anas campaign was minutely scrutin-ized, with a view of profiting fromprevious errors and of eliminating allunnecessary detail from the plans ofeach subordinate command .

This flurry of activity among thestaffs of the various Pacific command-ers accelerated appreciably on 29 May,when CinCPOA promulgated a warningorder envisioning the capture of theentire Palau Group with a target dateof 8 September. This ambitious under-taking, larger in scale than any previ-ous Pacific operation, would employfour assault divisions, organized intotwo corps .

MajGen Oliver P . Smith, "Personal Narra-tive," p. 62, being a typed copy of Smith's per-sonal journal with the inclusive dates, 28Jan44-1Nov44, hereafter cited as Smith, Narrative.

STRATEGIC SITUATION

Earlier, on 7 April, while in PearlHarbor in connection with the planningfor the Marianas Operation (FOR-AGER), Major General Roy S . Geiger,Commanding General, III AmphibiousCorps (ILIAC), had been forewarnedby Nimitz that his corps would partic-ipate in the coming Palau campaign .Immediately upon his return to Guadal-canal and in spite of the scarcity ofavailable information, General Geigerhad his staff institute a study of thePalaus, concurrent with its planning forthe close-at-hand Guam assault .

Just prior to embarking for the Mari-anas, Geiger detached a provisionalplanning staff from ILIAC and sent itto Pearl Harbor, where it became opera-tive on 12 June . Initially headed by Col-onel Dudley S . Brown and charged withthe planning for the seizure of thePalaus, this group was later redesig-nated X-Ray Provisional AmphibiousCorps, and Major General Julian C .Smith, who possessed sufficient rank andseniority to sustain Marine Corps viewsin subsequent planning conferences,was placed in command. At this time,General Smith was stationed in PearlHarbor as Deputy Commander, V Am-phibious Corps, and he was to fill bothpositions for some time .

Because so many echelons had staffslocated in the Pearl Harbor area, plan-ning for the Palau campaign benefitedfrom a closer coordination between thevarious assault and support commandsthan was customary in similar opera-tions. Right from the start, however,complications arose to plague the plan-ners and high echelon commanders. Un-beknown to them, STALEMATE plans

61

were to wend an involved and tortuouspath and undergo numerous revisionsbefore actual consummation .

The troop basis for the Palau Opera-tion had been predicated upon the useof units already slated for the Marianas,a campaign that proved more difficultand time-consuming than originally es-timated. As a result, units earmarkedfor STALEMATE had become deeplyinvolved in the Marianas fighting. Un-less the landing was delayed, it wouldbe impossible to re-equip and ready theseforces in sufficient time to meet thedeadline of 8 September . Accordingly,CinCPOA directed, on 29 June, thatsuch substitutions or improvisations bemade as necessary for the execution ofthe Palau campaign.

Such last minute shifts of troop as-signments, however, did not resolve theproblem of insufficient forces . By earlyJuly, planners were becoming disturbedby reports that alarming increases inthe enemy forces garrisoning Babel-thuap and the other islands were occur-ring. Doubts were voiced about the ade-quacy of a two-division landing forcefor the large island . After all, it hadtaken three divisions 25 days to securethe smaller and less rugged Saipan .

Questions were raised also about thesuitability of Babelthuap's terrain forairfield construction, hitherto a con-tributory reason for its being a target .Peleliu, on the other hand, already hada fine airfield and an auxiliary fighterstrip under construction on offshoreNgesebus. Their seizure and rapid de-velopment as a base for Americanplanes would permit neutralization ofthe remaining Japanese-held Palau Is-

62

lands without the need of actually in-vading them. In addition, the smallisland of Yap, Palaus' nearest neighbor,already possessed a good airbase andwas a much easier target than Babel-thuap .

Although its anchorage facilities wasanother reason for Babelthuap's cap-ture, the excellent and spacious fleetanchorage at Ulithi Atoll was availableat little cost, as the Japanese had onlya handful of soldiers outposting it . Thesubstitution of Yap and Ulithi for Ba-belthuap, with its unfinished airfieldsand fair anchorage, would provide in-stead a good operative airbase and asuperb fleet anchorage .

Other factors added complications tothe STALEMATE planners . Shippingallocated to the Palau Operation washeavily committed to the slow-movingMarianas campaign, as were the avail-able fire support ships . Then in mid-June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff queriedthe top Pacific commanders as to thepossibility of bypassing the WesternCarolines completely in exchange for aspeedup of the Pacific timetable and anearlier strike at Formosa, or even Japanitself. Only one answer was in the af-firmative, that of Admiral William F .Halsey, but the changed strategic pic-ture in the Central Pacific at this timedid bring about a radical revision of theproposed Palau Operation .

After a re-examination of the situa-tion, Nimitz cancelled the original Palauconcept in favor of a much less ambi-tious venture . The southern islands ofPeleliu and Angaur would still be seized,but the atolls of Ulithi and Yap, knownto be easier targets, would be substi-tuted for Babelthuap.


On 7 July, a new warning order wasforwarded to all subordinate commands,replacing the earlier one of 29 May . Theoverall operation, under the new desig-nation of STALEMATE II, was to be atwo-phase assault carried out by twoseparate landing forces . Phase I wouldconsist of the capture of the SouthernPalaus and the neutralization of theBabelthuap and Koror areas, whilePhase II would involve the seizure ofYap and the Ulithi Atoll. The targetdate for Phase I was postponed to 15September 1944, thus coinciding withthe assault on Morotai, and the date forthe initiation of Phase II was estab-lished tentatively as 5 October .

Overall command for the operationresided in Admiral Halsey as Com-mander, Western Pacific Task Forces .The combat ships of his Third Fleetwere to cover the approach of the JointExpeditionary Forces to their objec-tives. In addition, he was expected tofurnish naval support for the SouthwestPacific Forces simultaneously assault-ing Morotai while, in return, GeneralMacArthur's air would aid in the pre-invasion softening up of the Palaus andother air support missions .

Incidentally, out of this planning byCentral and Southwest Pacific air liai-son officers for STALEMATE II camea most closely coordinated, integrated,and far-reaching series of strategic airsupport missions . The major objectiveof the combined operation-gaining con-trol over the eastern approaches of theLuzon - Formosa - China coast area-caused the air planners to widen thescope of the proposed air activities to adegree not encountered in any previousPacific amphibious undertakings .

STRATEGIC SITUATION

The magnitude of Halsey's task isstill difficult to imagine . Upon his ThirdFleet fell the duty of transporting andprotecting the landing forces en routeto the target, furnishing the necessarynaval gunfire and air support, plus suchrelated support missions as supplyingthe troops ashore after a beachhead wassecured. Before STALEMATE II wasover, every major command in the Pa-cific participated in it, and it eventuallyinvolved 800 vessels, 1,600 aircraft, andan estimated 250,000 Navy, Army, andMarine personnel . As the largest navalamphibious venture thus far in thePacific, the attacking force alone in-cluded 14 battleships, 16 carriers, 20escort carriers, 22 cruisers, 136 de-stroyers, and 31 destroyer escorts, notcounting the numerous types of landingcraft or service ships, nor the supportships for the Morotai landing . Supply-ing such a vast and complicated assort-ment of men and ships taxed the logis-tic support of all available Allied com-mands .

In order to handle adequately the jobof shepherding the troop transportsand attached vessels to their destina-tion, plus fulfilling related support mis-sions, Admiral Halsey was forced todivide his powerful Third Fleet intotwo parts. He retained direct control ofthe Covering Forces and Special Groups(TF 30), and Vice Admiral Theodore S .Wilkinson commanded the Third Am-phibious Force (TF 31) . For directsupport of the landings, TF 31 was fur-ther divided into the Eastern AttackForce (TF 33), scheduled for the Yap-Ulithi assaults, and the Western AttackForce (TF 32), which would cover thePeleliu and Angaur operations . Admiral

63

Wilkinson retained direct control ofTF 33, but delegated control of TF 32to Rear Admiral George H . Fort. Thislatter force was again divided into thePeleliu Attack Group (TG 32 .1, underFort's tactical control), the Angaur At-tack Group (TG 32 .2, Rear AdmiralWilliam H. P. Blandy), and the KossolPassage Detachment (TG 32.9, Com-mander Wayne R . Loud), which had themission of sweeping the area free ofmines and organizing it as a temporaryfleet anchorage and seaplane base .

Although the U. S. Navy had the taskof transporting, protecting, and land-ing the assault troops, the man desig-nated to control all ground action forOperation STALEMATE was MajorGeneral Julian C . Smith in his role asCommanding General, ExpeditionaryTroops. Immediate control would be ex-ercised by his subordinate Western andEastern Landing Forces . The WesternLanding Force and Troops, Major Gen-eral Geiger's ILIAC, would seize Peleliuusing the 1st Marine Division (MajorGeneral William H. Rupertus) and com-plete Phase I by capturing Angaur withthe 81st Infantry Division (Major Gen-eral Paul J . Mueller, USA) . Phase II,the seizure of Yap and Ulithi, was as-signed to the Eastern Landing Force andTroops, commanded by Major GeneralJohn R. Hodge, USA. He had the XXIVCorps, consisting of two infantry divi-sions and, upon release by the WesternLanding Force and Troops, units of the81st .For backup, General Smith had as

floating reserve the 77th Infantry Divi-sion, which would be embarked at Guam .He also could call upon the newly-

64

formed 5th Marine Division in area re-serve, should the need arise .

With the successful securing of theobjectives, General Smith's duties asoverall ground commander for STALE-MATE II would cease . At this time, thedefense and subsequent development ofthe newly-acquired bases as major air-fields and fleet anchorages would be-come the sole responsibility of AdmiralJohn H. Hoover, Commander, ForwardArea, Central Pacific Command .

Except for a few minor redesigna-tions in units and commanders, Phase Iplans remained unchanged until D-Day.Upon his return from Guam on 15 Au-gust, General Geiger assumed commandof X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corpswhich was then redesignated ILIAC,and took over command of WesternLanding Forces and Troops from Gen-eral Smith, who then reverted to hishigher role as Commanding General,Expeditionary Troops, Third Fleet.Phase II, on the other hand, was des-tined to undergo still another radicalrevision due to startling developmentsarising out of the far-sweeping supportactions of the U . S . Navy.

One portion of the Third Fleet's mis-sion was to "Seek out and destroy hos-tile air and naval forces which threateninterference with the STALEMATE IIoperations, in order to inflict maximumdamage on the enemy and to protect ourown forces ."7 This provision for blunt-ing the enemy's potential to counteracta landing was by this time standardoperating procedure in any amphibiousundertaking . This time, however, Hal-

ComWesPac TFs OPlan No. 14-44, dtd1Aug44, p . 3.


sey had ordered his naval officers toseek out every opportunity for engagingthe Japanese major naval forces in adecisive sea battle .

In his eagerness to close with theenemy's surface fleet, Halsey made thismission the primary one, overriding thecustomary one of protecting the landingforce. His operation order clearly di-rected this radical departure from ac-cepted amphibious doctrine by stating,"In case opportunity for the destructionof a major portion of the enemy fleetoffers itself or can be created, suchdestruction will become the primarytask."" Subordinate naval echelons, ofcourse, reflected this viewpoint . AdmiralWilkinson directed his heavier warshipsin the Fire Support Group to "Concen-trate and engage enemy task forces en-countered. Supoort the Covering Forceor provide striking groups if so direct-ed."9 As in the recent Marianas cam-paign, the covering naval forces forSTALEMATE II were on the lookoutfor a decisive sea battle with the Im-perial Fleet rather than being primarilyconcerned with the protection of theamphibious landing forces .

In hopes of being in on just such adecisive naval engagement, AdmiralHalsey personally led the strongest com-bat component of the Covering Forcesand Special Groups, Vice Admiral MarcA. Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force(TF 38), out of Eniwetok Atoll on 28August 1944 for strikes against theBonins, Palaus, Yap, and Mindanao .Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima were struckby carrier-launched aircraft on 31 Au-

Ibid.a TF 31 OPlan A302-44, dtd 4Aug44, p . 3 .

STRATEGIC SITUATION

gust-2 September, the Palaus on 6-8September, and Mindanao on 9-10 Sep-tember. Everywhere the enemy's airresistance proved surprisingly weak,and the great success of the last strikepersuaded Halsey to shift his intendedfollow-up attack on Mindanao insteadto the Central Philippines.

Exploiting the enemy's weakness bypressing in close to the coast, the car-riers of TF 38 actually stationed them-selves within sight of the Samar Moun-tains from 12-14 September, duringwhich time 2,400 sorties were launchedagainst the Visayas bases of the Japa-nese. The phenomenal success of this airattack, which had achieved tactical sur-prise, proved dazzling. American pilotsclaimed the destruction of some 200enemy planes, the sinking or damagingof many ships, and the infliction of tre-mendous damage upon Japanese instal-lations. American losses in comparisonwere minute : 8 planes in combat, 1operationally, and 10 men .

Halsey could report to his superiorthat the "Enemy's non-aggressive atti-tude [was] unbelievable and fantas-tic ."10 Later he would recall that "Wehad found the central Philippines a hol-low shell with weak defenses and skim-py facilities . In my opinion, this wasthe vulnerable belly of the Imperialdragon.""

This astonishing victory, coupled withthe lack of serious Japanese reaction,

1U CinCPac WarD, dtd 14Sep44, p . 1, here-after CinCPac WarD, with appropriate date .u FAdm William F . Halsey and LCdr Julian

Bryan, III, Admiral Halsey's Story (NewYork : McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc ., 1947),p. 199, hereafter Halsey and Bryan, AdmiralHalsey's Story .

65

prompted Halsey to send a dispatch toNimitz stating his belief that "the Pal-au and Yap-Ulithi operations wereunnecessary to support the seizure ofthe Philippines" 12 and that an invasionof the Leyte-Samar area be undertakenat the earliest possible date using thetroops slated for STALEMATE II . Ad-miral Nimitz passed on the recommen-dation concerning Phase II to the JointChiefs of Staff, but due to commitmentsalready made, he decided Phase I wouldhave to go through as planned .

From then on, events on the strategicstage moved rapidly. In answer to aJoint Chiefs of Staff inquiry about Gen-eral MacArthur's willingness to advanceLeyte's target date if given the troopsof XXIV Corps, his staff officers, tookit upon themselves-MacArthur wasmaintaining radio silence on board acruiser off Morotai-to radio an affir-mative reply on 15 September . 13

Word to this effect was immediatelyrelayed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thenin Quebec with President Roosevelt forthe OCTAGON conference. So im-pressed were they by this dramaticagreement between the top PacificTheater commanders that 90 minutesafter the dispatch was received theywere able to flash their approval . Thusthe XXIV Corps departed the CentralPacific to play its important part inthe dramatic `Liberation' campaign . 14

To further compound the difficulties,Halsey on the following day, the second

12 ThirdFlt AR, p . 4 .18 George C. Kenney, General Kenney Re-

ports : A Personal History of the Pacific War(New York : Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949),p. 432, hereafter Kenney, Reports, used withpermission .

14 Hough, Assault on Peleliu, p. 191 .

66

day of the Peleliu fighting, directed theseizure of Ulithi "as early as practical. . . with resources at hand ."15 The onlyuncommitted force was the corps re-serve, a single regimental combat team(RCT), and its removal from the im-mediate area would leave the Marinesstill battling desperately ashore to se-cure Peleliu without any reinforce-ments should they be needed. 16 Whatresulted, however, when this happened,will be narrated later in its proper se-quence .

THE JAPANESE BOLSTERDEFENSES17

The thick veil of secrecy with whichthe Japanese cloaked their prewar ac-

''III PhibFor, STALEMATE II Rpt, p . 8 .19 "In explanation of Halsey's decision,

3dPhibFor's serial 00314 of 11 Nov 1944 (p . 8)notes that Halsey acted after receiving a reportof the local situation. Further, the RCT wasnot expected to depart until 21 September andHalsey provided for the use of the RCT inPeleliu prior to that date if the situation re-quired." RAdm E. M. Eller ltr to Hd, HistBr,G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 18Ju166, in Peleliu Com-ment File, hereafter Eller ltr ." Unless otherwise noted, the material in this

section is derived from : ExTrps SAR ; ILIACPalaus Rpt ; 1stMarDiv, SAR, PalauOp, dtd16Nov44, hereafter 1st MarDiv SAR; PeleliuComment File; CinCPac-CinCPOA BulletinNo. 173-45, Japanese Military Caves onPeleliu : `Know Your Enemy!', dtd 23Jul45 ;JICPOA Bulletin No . 17-44 ; JICPOA BulletinNo. 87T-44, Target Analysis : Palau Islands,dtd 20Jun44, hereafter JICPOA Bulletin No .87T-44 ; USSBS(Pac), Interrogations, II,VAdm Shigeru Fukudome, Cdr ChikatakaNakajima ; HistSec, G-2, GHQ, FEC, JapaneseStudies in World War II, Japanese MonographNo . 48, Operations in the Central Pacific, here-after Japanese Ops in the CenPac ; JapaneseResearch Div, MilHistSec, GHQ, FEC, Japa-nese Monograph No. 49, Central Pacific Opera-


tivities in the mandated Palaus revealedan early awareness of the military po-tentialities of the islands . Under theLeague of Nations' terms, none could befortified, but Japan's extreme sensitiv-ity concerning them aroused suspicions .As one American visitor stated, "Offi-cials and officers swarm here in suchnumbers that the visitor does not drawa breath without an appropriate notebeing made in the archives ." 18 Here, itwas, also, that a Marine colonel diedunder very mysterious circumstancesin 1923, while traveling in the disguiseof a commercial trader . 19

On the other hand, there was no con-crete evidence of any extensive fortifi-cation of the Palaus prior to World WarII. Harbors had been dredged, somenaval facilities erected, and an airfieldbuilt, but the Peleliu airfield, while pos-

tions Record, Volume II, April-November 1944,hereafter Japanese CenPac Ops ; Gen Mac-Arthur's Staff, Historical Report of Operationsin the Southwest Pacific Area, 2 vols. (Tokyo,1951), hereafter MacArthur's History, withappropriate volume ; Saburo Hayashi, in collab-oration with Alvin D . Coox, Kogun : The Japa-nese Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, Va . :The Marine Corps Association, 1959) hereafterHayashi and Coox, Kogun ; Hough, Assault onPeleliu ; Smith, Approach to the Philippines ;Morison, Leyte.

"Willard Price, "Hidden Key to the Pacific,"The National Geographic Magazine, v. LXXXI,No. 6 (Jun42), p . 784 .

10 For those interested in the mysterious dis-appearance of Lieutenant Colonel Earl H . Ellis,see : LtCol Philip N. Pierce, USMC, "TheUnsolved Mystery of Pete Ellis," Marine CorpsGazette, v . 46, No. 2 (Feb62), pp . 34-40, whichincorporated the findings of LtCol Waite W .Worden, USMC, who visited Koror in 1950 andinterviewed its residents concerning Ellis'death. Copies of Worden's findings are also inthe possession of RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC.

STRATEGIC SITUATION

sessing great military value, was equallyuseful for peaceful civilian pursuits .

Immediately following Pearl Harbor,however, the islands served as a jump-ing-off point for Japan's attack againstthe Philippines . Out of its naval basehad sortied the small carrier task forcewhich launched the first air raidsagainst American forces in the Philip-pines, while troops staged at the Palausfor the later Philippines land campaign .Afterwards, the islands came to be usedprimarily as an intermediate stagingbase and supply point for offensivesalong the outer perimeter of the Japan-ese advance . During the struggle for theSolomons, thousands of Imperial sol-diers staged through the Palaus, utiliz-ing them as training and practice areas,on their way to the front .The Japanese high command, during

the early stages of the Pacific War, paidslight attention to the ability of thePalaus to defend themselves . The fullvigor of Japan's war effort was thenconcentrated upon the outer fringes ofnewly conquered territories, wheremounting Allied counterattacks ab-sorbed available Japanese troops andwar material in ever increasingamounts. Any development of a strate-gic inner defense line was deferreduntil dramatic reversals in New Guinea,the Solomons, and other points forcedthe Imperial war planners to reassessthe hopeless battle on the outer per-imeter .

Finding herself unable to match thesuperior Allied air and naval strength,Japan began concentrating her energiesupon the creation of a powerful defen-sive bastion which would halt the Alliedadvance and hurl it back. Accordingly,

67

in September 1943, the Imperial GeneralHeadquarters (IGHQ) at Tokyo createda second line of defense which embracedthe areas west of the Marianas-Caro-lines-Western New Guinea line . It wasthen decreed that this was the zone ofabsolute defense where each Japanesesoldier would fight to the death .

Initial steps in girding this decisivebattle area for the eventual assaultcalled for bolstering the garrisons withfirst-string combat troops . For the firsttime in the Pacific War, IGHQ plannerswere forced to draw upon the battle-ready divisions of the Kwantung Armyin Manchuria . Maintained at peak com-bat readiness, this unit served the pur-pose of immobilizing the large numberof Russian troops in nearby Siberia,thereby preventing their redeploymentto the European front for use againstJapan's ally, Germany . The needs of thecrucial Pacific sector, however, sent the35th Division, among others of theKwantung units, hurrying southward .The 35th arrived during March 1944 inthe Palaus, until then garrisoned onlyby rear-echelon troops, but it was almostimmediately dispatched farther west-ward to a more critical front, leavingonly one understrength regiment to de-fend the island group .

Earlier in 1944, the American seizureof the Admiralties and Marshalls hadbrought all of the Carolines within ef-fective striking range of Allied land-based bombers . In the face of this newthreat, the Combined Fleet transferredits headquarters from the now highlyvulnerable Truk to the Palaus, whichwould be used as a temporary forwardnaval base until a permanent one couldbe constructed in the Philippines. No

68

sooner had the Japanese settled down intheir new location, than a successfulcarrier raid by the U. S . Fifth Fleet inlate March denied them the use of thePalaus even temporarily .

This large scale air strike also spurredthe defensive efforts of the JapaneseArmy and caused some drastic reshuf-fling of troop assignments. Since anAmerican attack was believed imminent,the 14th Division, already en route fromManchuria, was dispatched with all pos-sible speed to the Palaus . Landing thereon 24 April, the 14th took over the re-sponsibility for the islands' defenses,releasing the regiment of the 35th torejoin its parent organization alreadycommitted to the fighting farther west-ward .

To handle the overall task of defend-ing the Central Pacific area, IGHQ hadestablished the Thirty-first Army withheadquarters in the Marianas . Its zoneof responsibility stretched along the Bo-nins-Marianas-Carolines line of the stra-tegic area of absolute defense. The com-manding general was to have controlover all army units in the theater andbe directly responsible to the CentralPacific Fleet, but his displeasure in beingsubordinated to a naval officer precipi-tated a furious interservice squabblewhich was smoothed over only when theNavy and Army commanders orallypledged each other not to assume com-plete responsibility .

With the arrival of the hardened vet-erans of the 14th Division on Babel-thuap, after a delay while their trans-ports evaded would-be American at-tackers, an effective defense of theislands approached reality. The 14thwas one of the oldest and best military


units in the Japanese Army, and its in-fantry regiments, the 2d, 15th, and59th, all had excellent reputations. Itscommanding officer, Lieutenant GeneralSadae Inoue, was made Commander,Palau Sector Group, the organizationresponsible to the Thirty-first Army forthe defense of all the Palaus, Yap, andnearby islands . Military units alreadybased in the Palaus, such as the SeaTransport Units (landing craft andcrews) of the 1st Amphibious Brigade,and the service and support troops forthe Japanese forces in New Guinea,passed to the control of General Inoueas group commander, who later reor-ganized them into the 53d IndependentMixed Brigade (IMB) . Inoue's ordersfrom the superior headquarters wereconcise

The Palau Sector Group Commanderwill secure the Palau Islands (includingAngaur) and the Yap Island area . . . .The islands must be held to the very lastas the final position barring the enemyfrom penetrating into the Pacific . Peleliuand Angaur must be fortified as an impor-tant air base. 20

Within a matter of weeks after hisarrival, General Inoue successfully de-ployed his units in scattered defensivepositions. Headquarters of both the divi-sion and group, naturally, were locatedon Koror, the administrative center ofthe islands, and the major part of thetroops were deployed on nearby Babel-thuap where Inoue planned to make hisfinal fight .

As the main infantry force on Pele-liu, Inoue allocated the 2d Infantry . Itscommander, Colonel Kunio Nakagawa,was designated Commander, Peleliu

"Japanese Ops in the CenPac, p. 24.

STRATEGIC SITUATION

Sector Unit, which also had artillery,mortar, signal, and light tank units at-tached to it . The 346th Independent In-fantry Battalion of the 53d IMB and the3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, were alsoassigned to Nakagawa's command tobolster his combat strength . In addition,the Navy had the 144th and 126th Anti-aircraft units, and the 45th GuardForce Detachment, plus constructionunits and the airbase personnel . In all,Nakagawa had approximately 6,500combat troops available for the defenseof Peleliu, and the service troops andnon-combatants brought his garrisontotal up to about 10,500 .

The Peleliu Sector Unit commanderconfidently expected his troops to mantheir assigned positions until death, forthe Imperial Japanese infantryman,schooled in the strict Bushido code ofthe warrior, prided himself on his tena-cious fighting ability without regard forpersonal safety . The esprit de corps ofthe 15th Infantry, whose 2d and 3d Bat-talions were destined to be wiped outduring the fighting on Peleliu, was typi-cal of the Japanese fighting units . Firstorganized in 1884, the regiment waspresented its colors the following yearand covered them with great honor inseveral hard-fought battles . More re-cently, it had received a citation for abattle in North China . As the regimen-tal commander reported

All the officers and men carried in mindthe meaning of our sacred war, and theleaders, burning with the will to be 'Break-water of the Pacific,' and feeling the obli-gation of this important duty, and being apicked Manchukuoan regiment that doesnot expect to return alive and will followto the death an imperial order, devotedthemselves to the endeavor of being the

69

type of soldier who can fight hundreds ofmen . . . .

Using all wisdom especially whileacquiring our antilanding training we willovercome the hardships of warfare andunder the battle flag which displays ourbattle glory we vow with our unbreakablesolidarity we will complete our gloriousduty and establish the `Breakwater of thePacific.'

Such was the caliber of the menslated to fight to the last in a hopelessstruggle on Peleliu. About the only Jap-anese lacking this fanatical viewpointwere those portions of the naval garri-son consisting of the labor troops andthe Korean labor force. Most of thesenoncombatants, however, were forcedby the combat troops to resist aggres-sively the American attacks ; only a fewever succeeded in surrendering .

On Angaur, Inoue stationed the 59thInfantry, less one battalion . Late inJuly, however, most of these infantry-men were withdrawn to strengthenBabelthuap where the main attack wasexpected, leaving only the 1st Battalionas garrison. Its commander, MajorUshio Goto, was then assigned as Com-mander, Angaur Sector Unit. His re-maining garrison forces totaled some1,400 men, including supporting artil-lery, antiaircraft, mortar, engineer, andservice units .

Within easy reinforcing distance ofboth Peleliu and Angaur were some25,000 troops on the other Palau Is-lands, many specially trained in am-phibious operations . Among the otherplaces under General Inoue's command,only Yap was heavily garrisoned . As

21 CinCPac-CinCPOA Item No . 9764, "Reporton the 15th Infantry Regiment," dtd 16May44 .

70

late as 27 August 1944, American intel-ligence officers reported its defendingforces as 8,000 to 10,000 men 22

Immediately upon assuming responsi-bility for the defense of the Palau Sec-tor Group, General Inoue became boggeddown in that long-standing rivalry be-tween the Japanese Army and Navy .The naval officers had regarded thePalaus as their own private domain forso long that the sudden arrival of alieutenant general, senior to their owncommander, aroused their excessive sen-sitivity and displeasure .

The Army commander, right from thestart, was made to feel the Navy's re-sentment over the new state of affairs .Inoue found it practically impossible toobtain civilian help in erecting fortifi-cations, for the Navy had already mo-nopolized all available labor and organ-ized the workers into pools to be usedfor naval projects only . Nor would thenaval officers allow any Army person-nel to utilize their caves or installations.As a result, Inoue had to drive his mennight and day in a frantic effort to pre-pare adequate defensive positionsquickly. The situation became unusuallysevere on Peleliu, where the Navy gar-rison was commanded by a flag officer-who was, of course, senior to ColonelNakagawa . Finally, in desperation,Inoue assigned his next senior officer,Major General Kenjiro Murai, in nom-inal command of the Peleliu garrison inorder to make any progress at all infortifying the island .

There was also another reason forGeneral Murai's presence on Peleliu .

"96th InfDiv, STALEMATE II FO No . 14,dtd 27Aug44, Anx B, p. 1 .


Since the group commander consideredthe island's airfields of prime impor-tance, he had selected his most able offi-cer, Colonel Nakagawa, to direct its de-fense. As Inoue explained in a postwarinterview, he had assigned Murai toPeleliu while leaving Nakagawa in ac-tual command for two reasons . First,Inoue wanted to remove the pressure ofnaval animosity from Nakagawa'sshoulders and second, as a form of in-surance, "to see that Colonel Nakagawadidn't make any mistakes ."23 This unu-sual arrangement proved unnecessary,as later events indicated that all ordersright up to the bitter end of the fightingwere issued in Nakagawa's name .

Actually, the Palaus' defenses activelyentered into the strategic defense plansof IGHQ only for the relatively briefperiod from April to July 1944. Duringthis time, men and supplies were rushedto the islands to hasten their prepara-tions for an expected imminent assault .With the successful American attackupon the Marianas, however, the greaterstrategic value of the Philippines neces-sitated the writing off of the Palaus andtheir garrisons and the concentration ofall available strength in the Philippinesarea .

The overshadowing importance of thePhilippines also caused a lack of Japan-ese air support for the Palaus, a seriousflaw in their defense preparations .Most, if not all, of the planes alreadyin the Palaus were destroyed in theFifth Fleet's carrier raid of late March,when jubilant American fliers claimeda total of 168 aircraft destroyed . At any

LtCol Waite W. Worden ltr to CMC, dtd4Apr50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterWorden ltr,

STRATEGIC SITUATION

rate, none of the Peleliu-based Japaneseairplanes survived the pre-invasionbombardment ; only a few float planesat Koror escaped intact. Nor could re-placements be spared. By this time,Japan's aircraft reserves were becom-ing limited . Besides, all available planeswere being hoarded for the planned de-cisive battle to be forced with the Amer-icans in the Philippines .

Even though written off by IGHQstrategists, the doomed Palaus garri-sons were expected to conduct a tena-cious defense in the event of Americanattack, thereby delaying utilization ofthe coveted airfields by the invaders .Besides, combat losses to the assaultingunits would delay their reemploymentin future campaigns . Time, a most pre-cious commodity in war, would begained by the Japanese for perfectingdefenses in more strategic areas .

By July 1944, also, the point hadfinally been driven home to the Japan-ese high command that a blind adher-ence to the usual doctrine of attemptingto annihilate the invaders on the beachwas futile. Recent battles involvingAmerican amphibious assaults againstwell-fortified beaches revealed that theAmericans' ability to unleash a devas-tating preparatory bombardment madetotal reliance upon beach defense use-less .

Only one limited success stood out.Instead of uselessly expending his forcesin suicidal Banzai counterattacks, theJapanese commander at Biak had pro-longed the fighting substantially by hav-ing his men dig in, thus forcing theAmericans to rout out each defenderin a long, bloody, mopping-up campaign .This successful innovation, the pro-

71

tracted resistance on Saipan, and thelong list of failures of Japanese com-manders in attempting to hold thebeachline, undoubtedly spurred theIGHQ planners to undertake a detailedstudy of the problem.As a result, IGHQ decided in July

1944 on a new approach, and orders toemploy new tactics in protracted groundbattles were circulated to all Japanesecommands in the Pacific. Briefly, thesetactics involved the preparation of amain line of resistance far enough in-land from the beach to minimize theeffects of the pre-invasion bombard-ment, the organization of a defense indepth designed to wear down the at-tacking forces, and the hoarding of suf-ficient reserves to mount successfulcounterattacks at the appropriate times .

On 11 July 1944, General Inoue issued"Palau Sector Group Training for Vic-tory," a document incorporating thenew defensive concepts of IGHQ. Hisinstructions revealed a departure fromJapanese tactics employed earlier in thePacific war and a unique attempt by theJapanese to profit from past errors .Inoue's instructions emphasized thatvictory would depend upon "our thor-ough application of recent battle les-sons, especially those of Saipan," 24 andthat the "ultimate goal of this trainingis to minimize our losses in the severeenemy pre-landing naval and aerialbombardment." Among other things,Inoue urged the holding back of suffi-cient reserves in prepared defensivepositions inland to permit a massive

' All quotes from this document were takenfrom CinCPac-CinCPOA Item No . 11,190,"Palau Sector Group Headquarters : Palau Sec-tor Group Training for Victory," dtd 11Jul44,

72

counterattack and the destruction of theinvaders in one fell swoop before theirbeachhead became secure . In deployingthese reserve troops for the attack,careful attention was to be given so thatthere "will be no rapid exhaustion ofbattle strength," and the soldiers wereto advance "at a crawl, utilizing ter-rain, natural objects and shell holes ."As a last resort, he instructed the "con-struction of strong points from whichwe can cover our airfields up to the lastmoment, regardless of the situation,"and it was Inoue's contention that "ifwe repay the Americans (who relysolely upon material power) with ma-terial power it will shock them beyondimagination."

As it turned out, Peleliu was wherethe battle was joined and the wisdomof Inoue's defensive tactics tested. Bas-ically, the Japanese planned their troopand weapon dispositions on the islandfor a defense in depth . The resultingdefense system was well organized andcarefully integrated, and it possessedgreat inherent strength and flexibility .The enemy utilized the rugged terrainto construct mutually supporting defen-sive positions, and Peleliu was dividedinto four sectors, each manned by areinforced battalion, with another onein reserve .Regardless of which beaches the

Americans chose to land on, they wouldbe resisted by the major portion of Col-onel Nakagawa's available forces . Swiftredeployment of his troops would bepossible, since the Japanese commanderhad the advantage of interior lines tooperate over. Nor would naval or airattempts at interdiction prevent thisconcentration, for the earlier American


air raids had been utilized by the Jap-anese to provide actual troop trainingin advancing under fire. Detailed plansdealing with proposed counterattackswere prepared and rehearsed . A few in-fantry companies were even reorganizedinto special counterattack units, ratherthan in the conventional platoons . Mostcompanies also had several teams oftwo to three men prepared to infiltrateand to knock out attacking tanks .

To forestall an invasion of Peleliu, allpotential landing beaches were heavilymined with mine belts often extending100 yards or so inland. Offshore obsta-cles were erected, anti-tank barriersconstructed, and barbed wire strung .Everywhere, the dominating terrainwas utilized for the placement of artil-lery, previously zeroed-in on thebeaches, to wreak havoc among the as-saulting troops . All defensive positionstook full advantage of man-made andnatural cover and concealment, whileyet dominating all invasion approaches(See Map 3) .Peleliu's southwestern beaches, where

the American assault actually came, weretypical of the Japanese beach defensepreparations . The natural offshore ob-stacles there were augmented by theeffective positioning of tetrahedron-shaped tank obstacles, strung barbedwire, and over 300 single and double-horned anti-invasion mines . The beachesthemselves and all routes leading inlandwere strewn with tangled barbed wireand land mines, as well as with hugeaerial bombs adapted to serve as mines .To prevent advancing infantrymenfrom working their way through theobstacles on the beaches under the cov-ering fire of their tanks, long antitank

STRATEGIC SITUATION

trenches running roughly parallel to thebeaches were dug.

These antitank ditches, as well as thebeaches, were covered by fields of firefrom pillboxes and gun casemates, lo-cated in dominating positions and alllinked together in a system of mutualcover and support. The casematesmounted 37mm or 47mm antiboat andantitank guns, and were made of rein-forced concrete with coral packedagainst the sides and over the top .

Just to the north of the beaches, anatural fortress formed by a prominentcoral hill was riddled with covered riflepits and pillboxes, each large enoughfor two or three infantrymen armedwith rifles or automatic weapons. Nearthe base of the cliff was a reinforcedconcrete casemate housing a 47mm gunwhich could provide enfilade fire on ap-proaching amphibious waves or inter-dictory fire on the beaches. Peleliu'ssouthwestern promontory and a smallisland, a few hundred yards offshore,were used for the location of anti-boatguns and machine guns to furnish en-filade fire .

On the flat terrain farther inlandfrom the beaches, the defense consistedof direct fire against advancing troopsfrom well-camouflaged pillboxes andother defensive positions, while ob-served artillery and mortar fire couldbe laid down from the dominating ridgesto the north of the airfield. Dug intothese ridges were pillboxes and a case-mate for a 75mm mountain gun, whichcommanded the entire southern portionof the island . At least one steel-rein-forced concrete blockhouse had as manyas 16 mutually supporting automaticweapons .

If the invaders survived the landingand were able to consolidate the beach-head, the Japanese planned to fall backto previously prepared defensive posi-tions that commanded the ground be-tween them and the attacking forces .If all else failed and the secondary lineof defense was overrun and the com-manding ground seized, last ditch re-sistance would center around the ex-tensive cave fortifications that literallyhoneycombed the rugged terrain ofnorthern Peleliu . Below is a descriptionof the area by a former Marine, whowas wounded in the fighting

It was this high ground which madePeleliu so perfectly adaptable to defense-in-depth, for it was neither ridge normountain but an undersea coral reefthrown above the surface by a subterran-ean volcano. Sparse vegetation growing inthe thin topsoil atop the bedrock had con-cealed the Umurbrogol's crazy contoursfrom the aerial camera's eye. It was aplace that might have been designed by amaniacal artist given to painting mathe-matical abstractions-all slants, jaggeds,straights, steeps, and sheers with no curveto soften or relieve. Its highest elevationwas 300 feet in the extreme north over-looking the airfield-islet of Ngesebus 1,000yards offcoast there . But no height rosemore than 50 feet before splitting apart ina maze of peaks and defiles cluttered withboulders and machicolated with caves . Forthe Umurbrogol was also a monster Swisscheese of hard coral limestone pocked be-yond imagining with caves and crevices.They were to be found at every level, inevery size-crevices small enough for alonely sniper, eerie caverns big enough tostation a battalion among its stalactitesand stalagmites ."

Robert Leckie, Strong Men Armed: TheUnited States Marines Against Japan (NewYork : Random House, 1962), p . 391, used withpermission .

73

STRATEGIC SITUATION

The Umurbrogol ridges were, ofcourse, the key to a successful defenseof Peleliu, and the Japanese made theutmost use of its rugged terrain. Theydeveloped the natural caves that existedpractically everywhere or blasted othersinto the almost perpendicular cliffs inorder to deploy their troops and locatetheir weapons for a last-ditch stand. Ifdriven from prepared positions, enemysoldiers could take refuge in the abun-dant natural cavities in the ridges, andby sniping from and defending everycave, crack, or crevice large enoughfor a man to squeeze into, could tena-ciously prolong the resistance .

Due to bitter inter-service rivalry,both the Army and the Navy independ-ently developed their own caves. TheNavy, with the help of the 214th NavalConstruction Battalion and a tunnelconstruction unit, was able to buildsome rather elaborate underground in-stallations. These were located mainlyin the north of Peleliu and consistedfor the most part of tunnels, rangingfrom single ones up to networks of 10or more. The hollowed-out chambersusually measured 10 feet across and 6feet high, often with separate roomsfor food and ammunition storage, liv-ing quarters, and medical facilities .Some even had the benefits of electriclights, ventilation systems, and woodenfloors. Designed primarily as sheltersagainst air and naval bombardment,these underground positions had no pre-pared defenses against the onslaughtsof attacking infantry/tank teams .

The Army's caves, on the other hand,while not so large, elaborate, nor in-geniously constructed as those of theNavy, were built and prepared for pro-

75

longed land combat. Whenever prac-ticable, two or more staggered levelswere constructed, and the multiple en-trances led to tortuous passagewayswithin a single huge tunnel system,where any number of safe refuges wouldprotect the occupants from the concus-sive effect of bombing and shelling andprovide cover from direct fire. Everyeffort, of course, was taken to camou-flage skillfully all cave openings, whilestill preserving protection and clearfields of fire. Siege defense preparationsconsisted of jamming every nook andcrevice with food and ammunition andbuilding troughs to collect the waterdripping from overhead stalactites .

Tactical reasons alone determined thelocation of the Army's caves. Fortifi-cations were built, weapons sited, andsoldiers deployed in order to providea mutually interlocking system of con-crete pillboxes, entrenchments, gun em-placements, and riflemen's positionsdominating the strategic areas. Nearevery important artillery or mortar em-placement were other undergrounddwellings housing automatic weaponsto provide protective fire . Communica-tion trenches or tunnels connected thesemutually supporting locations, whileobservation posts often were placed ontop of the ridge in a natural limestonecavity or crevice . The approaches tovital installations, such as commandposts, were covered from all angles byfire from cleverly located caves half wayup the surrounding ridges. At moststrategic points and in the final de-fensive area were numerous smaller un-derground positions designed to provideinterlocking support fire from smallarms. These were intended to be held

76

to the death, and no escape routes hadbeen provided for their occupants .

With their final defensive positionsprepared, the Japanese garrison on Pel-eliu could view the future only gloom-ily. After July, when the Palaus werewritten off by the Imperial high com-mand, whose attention was centered onthe approaching decisive battle in thePhilippines, even the receipt of the moreessential supplies dwindled to a meretrickle due to shipping losses by attacksfrom American submarines and air-craft. The future prospects seemed dimindeed .

The Americans had the choice of ei-ther assaulting the islands or bypassingthem, thereby allowing the Japanesegarrison to degenerate into a state ofcombat ineffectiveness through lack ofsupplies and food . If the invasion came,then the enemy soldier faced the di-lemma of either surrendering or waginga bitter fight to the death . No hope ofrelief or reinforcements could be ex-pected .

After communications with theThirty-first Army's headquarters onSaipan ceased in August, the Palau Sec-tor Group was reassigned by IGHQ, foradministrative purposes, to the South-ern Army which controlled operationsin the Philippines, and operationally toHeadquarters, Combined Fleet . Whenadvance intelligence indicated an immi-nent American assault, it was theSouthern Army that notified General


Inoue on 3 September as to the prob-able time and place of the landing. Afew days later, Japanese intelligenceofficers estimated the size of the attack-ing force to be probably a division . Justbefore the actual invasion, the Japaneselearned that the assault force com-mander was Major General Julian C .Smith .

General Inoue immediately notifiedall of the forces under his commandthat the long awaited opportunity toannihilate the Americans was near athand. But as late as 8 September, PalauSector Group Headquarters thoughtthe carrier strikes might be just feint-ing actions, with the main assault com-ing elsewhere. When the heavy caliberedshells of the American battleships be-gan falling on 12 September, how-ever, Inoue knew, without doubt, thatthe decisive moment had arrived. Withgreat eloquence, he informed his com-mand of the approaching battle

This battle may have a part in the deci-sive turn of tide in breaking the deadlockof the `Great Asiatic War .' The entireArmy and people of Japan are expectingus to win this battle . There will never beanother chance as these few existing daysfor the people living in the empire to repaythe emperor's benevolence again. Rouseyourselves for the sake of your country!Officers and men, you will devote your lifeto the winning of this battle, and attainingyour long cherished desire of annihilatingthe enemy .'

ro Japanese Ops in the CenPac, p . 75 .

Pre-Assault Preparations'

THE BEACH AND THE PLAN2Detailed planning by the assault unit

scheduled for the Peleliu landing began'Unless otherwise noted, the information for

this chapter has been derived from : ComWes-Pac TF OPlan No. 14-44, dtd 1Aug44 ; Third-Flt AR; III PhibFor STALEMATE II Rpt ;TF 31 OPlan A302-44, dtd 4Aug44 ; ExTrpsSAR; ExTrps OPlan No. 1-44, dtd 9Jul44 ; TF32 Rpt of Amph Op to Capture P?leliu andAngaur, dtd 160ct44, hereafter TF 32 Peleliuand Angaur Rpt ; TF 32 OPlan A501-44, dtd15Aug44 ; ILIAC Palaus Rpt ; 1st MarDivSAR; 1st MarDiv WarDs, Jun-Sep44, hereafter1st MarDiv WarD, with appropriate date ; 1stMarDiv OPlan 1-44, dtd 15Aug44 ; PeleliuComment File ; Smith, Narrative ; Hough,Assault on Peleliu ; George McMillan, The OldBreed : A History of the First Marine Divisionin World War II (Washington : Infantry Jour-nal Press, 1949), hereafter McMillan, The OldBreed ; Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation inWorld War II ; Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marinesand Amphibious War ; Morison, Leyte ; Smith,Approach to the Philippines ; Craven and Cate,The Pacific ; The 81st Wildcat Division Histori-cal Committee, The 81st Infantry Wildcat Divi-sion in World War II (Washington : InfantryJournal Press, 1948), hereafter Historical Com-mittee, 81st Infantry Division .

2 Additional sources used for this section are :WesLandFor, STALEMATE II, OPlan No .1-44, dtd 23Jul44; 7th Mar OPlan No . 1-44, dtd1Aug44 ; Theodore Roscoe, United States Sub-marine Operations in World War II (Annapo-lis, Maryland : United States Naval Institute,1949), hereafter Roscoe, Submarine ; Cdr Fran-cis Douglas Fane, USNR, and Don Moore, TheNaked Warriors (New York: Appleton-Cen-tury-Crofts, Inc ., 1956), hereafter Fane andMoore, The Naked Warriors.

CHAPTER 2

on 2 June 1944, when CinCPOA's warn-ing order of 29- May was received bythe 1st Marine Division. It was nowresting and reorganizing on Pavuvu inthe Russells, a small island group about65 miles northwest of Guadalcanal, hav-ing arrived there in April following thestrenuous New Britain campaign .Although Major General Rupertus

was absent in Washington arrangingfor replacements, Brigadier GeneralOliver P. Smith, the Assistant DivisionCommander, immediately initiated astaff study of the proposed assault. Assoon as the G-2 officer assembled allavailable maps and aerial photographsof Peleliu and adjacent islands, the staffmembers began a careful examinationof the beaches . In spite of the fact thathigher echelons provided very littleguidance during this early phase of theplanning or that little intelligence ofthe island was available, the divisionmanaged to have a workable plan bythe time of the commanding general'sreturn .

Knowledge of Peleliu's beaches andterrain came almost solely from photo-graphs, for it was nearly impossible toland a reconnaissance patrol and expectit to scout successfully the interior ofthe small, strongly-held island . TheFifth Fleet's carrier strike in Marchhad made the first systematic aerialsurveillance of the Palaus, and subse-quent flights by carrier planes and the

77

78

land-based aircraft of the Fifth AirForce obtained up-to-date vertical andoblique shots of the island chain. Inaddition, photographic profiles of allpotential beaches were taken by thesubmarine, USS Seawolf, during theperiod 23-28 June .A month later, another submarine

surfaced off Peleliu with the intentionof landing small underwater demolitionteams (UDTs) by rubber boats. Brightmoonlit nights, coupled with active Jap-anese radar and constant air and seapatrols, however, kept the USS Burrfcshsubmerged for two weeks, during whichtime it could only take periscope photo-graphs of the island's shore lines . Fi-nally, on a dark night, a five-man land-ing party succeeded in paddling ashoreon a beach later used in the assault .Much valuable data was obtained, butvital beach information, such as depthof water, nature of shoals, and type ofbottom, had to wait upon the explora-tions of the UDTs working under theprotective cover of naval gunfire justprior to the landing .

The intelligence officers of X-RayProvisional Amphibious Corps regularlypassed on to the 1st Marine Divisionand other assault units the latest mapsand photographs as well as the currentestimate of the enemy's strength . Thestandard map of Peleliu for the opera-tion was compiled by CinCPOA cartog-raphers and drawn on a scale of 1 :-20,000. Although the map containedsome errors, it was workable and accu-rate for most of the island . Front lineunits received blown-up sections on thelarger scale of 1 :10,000 and 1 :5,000 .Following the fortuitous capture on Sai-pan of certain 31st Army Headquarters


files, Americans knew almost to a manthe size of the Japanese garrisons inthe Palaus. Although modified by laterfindings, this estimate served as thebasis for tactical planning by the as-sault forces .

Right from the start, the Marineplanners noted that the Peleliu landingwould be different from any of the 1stMarine Division's earlier operations . Tocross the 600-700-yard reef all along theprospective beachhead-similar to thesituation encountered at Tarawa-would necessitate transporting thetroops, equipment, and supplies acrossthe coral obstacles solely by amphibiantractors. In addition, while the south-ern part of the island was flat and low,like an atoll, the parallel ridges just tothe north of the airfield possessed someof the most rugged and easily defendedterrain yet encountered by Americanforces in the Pacific . Peleliu, therefore,would repeat many of the difficulties en-countered at Tarawa, as well as somewhich were met on Saipan . 3

Although Peleliu abounded withbeaches suitable in size for a divisionlanding, the Marine staff quickly se-lected the western ones as being mostpreferable. The eastern beaches, backedby sprawling swamps that would hin-der movement inland, had been dis-carded early, as were the extreme north-ern ones which were too far from the

3 "The 1st Marine Division, while experiencedin other amphibious operations, had not previ-ously landed over a coral reef. They were shortof amtracs and very deficient in mine detectionand disposal." Vice Admiral George H . Fort,USN (Ret) ltr to Head, HistBr, G-3 Div,HQMC dtd 18May66 in Peleliu Comment File,hereafter Fort ltr.

PRE-ASSAULT PREPARATIONS

prime objective of the assault, the air-field.

The division planners finally nar-rowed the choice down to three coursesof action : (1) to land on the beachesoverlapping the airfield ; (2) to land onthe beaches overlapping the airfield,while at the same time landing on thetwo promontories at the southern end ofthe island ; or (3) to land on the beachesnorth of the airfield .At first, the Marine officers had

leaned toward the idea of making atwo-pronged assault, with one regimentlanding on the southern promontorieswhile another one attacked across thebeaches overlapping the airfield . Later,however, a more complete photographiccoverage revealed that the promonto-ries were strongly fortified and that thereef between them was covered withconcrete tetrahedrons and was heavilysown with mines . An expert in UDTtechniques warned, also, that the pill-boxes ringing the coves could prohibitdemolition work on the reef . The thirdpossibility, landing in the north, wasdiscarded because the ground roseabruptly into jungle-covered cliffs whichwould deprive the division of maneuverspace .By the time General Rupertus re-

turned on 21 June, his staff membersfelt that an attack over the westernbeaches overlapping the airfield bestfavored success ; after making his ownestimate, the division commanderagreed. The code name of White andOrange were given to the selectedbeaches .

Although the 1st Marine Division'sstaff inaugurated the detailed planningfor the Peleliu landing, the amphibious

79

corps slated for the assault (X-Ray-redesignated ILIAC on 15 August 1944)passed on the proposed plan before giv-ing it a stamp of approval . For instance,when Rupertus wanted to assault theobjective with two regiments, holdingthe other afloat as reserve, General Ju-lian C. Smith recommended a simulta-neous landing by three infantry regi-ments, with a RCT of the 81st InfantryDivision as division reserve . After re-turning from Guam and assumingcharge of X-Ray, General Geiger ruledthat the Marine division would landwith three regiments abreast, less onebattalion landing team as the division'ssole reserve .The reserve's small size was not

considered risky, for the embarkedtroops of the 81st Infantry Divisionwere not to be committed to the Angaurlanding until the situation on Peleliuhad passed the critical assault phase .In addition, one RCT of the 81st wasto be held afloat as corps reserve . Dis-turbing for the future, however, wasRupertus' apparent unwillingness tomake use of available Army troops . Thisearly reluctance foreshadowed the di-vision commander's marked refusal,later, to employ Army units as rein-forcements during the critical firstweek ashore on Peleliu .

General Smith, as the Marine Corpsspokesman during the inter-serviceplanning, took exception to the Navy'sproposal for Angaur's seizure beforethe Peleliu landing. This course of ac-tion, the general explained, would per-mit the Japanese to rush reinforcementsfrom Babelthuap down the island chainonto Angaur, thus prolonging the fight-ing there. To seize Peleliu first, he ar-

80

gued, would make it impossible foradditional enemy troops to reach An-gaur. Eventually, the naval planningstaff was brought around to Smith'sway of thinking "but, desiring Angaurfor construction of a second airfield,continued throughout to press for theearliest possible landing on that is-land."4

As finally approved, the scheme ofmaneuver for the Peleliu assault calledfor the landing of three RCTs abreaston a 2,200-yard-wide beachhead, fol-lowed by a drive straight across theisland to seize the airfield and to dividethe enemy forces . On order, a reinforcedbattalion would make a shore-to-shoreassault against Ngesebus Island andcapture its fighter strip .

On the left (north) flank of the beach-head, over the White Beaches, the 1stMarines would land two of its battal-ions abreast, with the remaining one inregimental reserve. After driving in-land and helping to secure the airfield,the regiment was to pivot left and at-tack toward the high ground north ofthe airfield .

Landing in the center over BeachesOrange 1 and 2, the 5th Marines woulduse two battalions in assault and onein support . While the left battalion tiedin with elements of the 1st Marines, theother assaulting battalion would pushstraight across the island to the eastern

LtGen Julian C. Smith intvw by Maj FrankO . Hough, dtd 23Nov49, as cited in Hough,Assault on Peleliu, p . 11 . In rebuttal of theabove, the Naval Histories Division has com-mented : "We are unable to locate documenta-tion in our records supporting General Smith'sstatement that the Navy proposed to seizeAngaur prior to Peleliu ." Eller ltr .


shore. The support battalion, to belanded at H plus 1, would attack acrossthe airfield and then participate in awheeling • movement northward. Oncethe airfield was captured, the missionof the 5th Marines would be to seizethe northeastern peninsula and itsnearby islets .

Only one beach, Orange 3, was as-signed to the 7th Marines, for it wasto land in a column of battalions, withits 2d Battalion remaining afloat asdivision reserve . The first battalionashore was to attack eastward in con-junction with the 5th Marines, whilethe following battalion was to swingright and attack southward. After theopposite shore had been reached, all ofthe might of the 7th would be throwninto a push to the southern promon-tories, wiping out any Japanese hold-outs in that area .

The 11th Marines, reinforced by the8th 155mm Gun Battalion and the 3d155mm Howitzer Battalion, both fromcorps artillery, was to land on orderafter H plus 1 over the Orange Beaches .Once ashore, the regiment would setup so that its 1st and 2d Battalionswould be in direct support of the 1stand 5th Marines, respectively, while its3d and 4th Battalions, together withthe corps artillery, would be in supportof the division . Four hours after the11th Marines was ashore, all battalionswere to be prepared to mass their fireson the ridges north of the airfield. Inaddition, the 8th 155mm Gun Battalionhad the assignment of locating its ar-tillery pieces so as to provide support-ing fire for the Army division's laterassault on Angaur .


The scheme of maneuver selected bythe division commander contained thebest features of the two discardedcourses of action . The approach to theWhite and Orange beaches avoided theenemy-emplaced hazards on the reef offthe southern beach . Once ashore, themassed division could attack inlandswiftly over the low flat ground thatwas well-suited for the employment oftanks. Such a rapid advance wouldquickly gain the island's airfield, un-cover maneuver room for the division,and strike the main enemy beach de-fenses on the east coast from the rear .With the early seizure of the oppositeshore, the division could operate mul-tiple unloading points in order to speedup the disgorging of the thousands oftons of cargo needed to sustain theoffensive .

The scheme did have one real dan-ger, however. The Marines would beforced to attack across the low flatground while the dominating ridgesremained in enemy hands. The Japa-nese were sure to have guns of largecaliber emplaced on those commandingheights. Nevertheless, the division offi-cers willingly accepted this risk, be-cause of the scheme's other obvious ad-vantages. They also figured that the7th Marines would easily mop up thesouthern portion of Peleliu on thefirst day, after which it could help the1st Marines take the key ridges northof the airfield . Until such time as thecombined striking power of the twoRCTs could be massed against the de-fenders on the ridges, the 1st Marineswould be supported by the concentrated

81

fire of planes, gunfire ships, artillery,and tanks.

Even with the benefit of hindsight,it still is difficult to challenge the Ma-rine officers' reasoning. After the war,however, some criticism was raised asto whether there would have been fewerMarine dead, if the landing had takenplace on the north beaches at the footof the commanding ridges . 5 Grantedthat a successful assault at this pointcould have given the division controlof the key terrain early in the campaign,anything less than 100 percent execu-tion would have been fatal . If the mo-mentum of the initial assault failed toseize the ridgeline, then the Marineswould have been stranded on a narrowlow beachhead, without room to maneu-ver or emplace supporting artillery,while the enemy would be literally look-ing down their throats .The unanimity of opinion among

Marines who participated in the opera-tion and later had a chance to examinethe island's terrain and Japanese de-fenses in great detail is that the cor-rect course of action was taken . Typicalof their attitude is the following com-ment

None of the remaining beaches whichmight permit a landing in force wouldallow the rapid development of an ade-quate beachhead which is so essential in alanding operation . The Division Commandwas confronted with the problem of select-

See McMillan, The Old Breed, p . 262, andFletcher Pratt, The Marines' War : An Accountof the Struggle for the Pacific from BothAmerican and Japanese Sources (New York :William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), p . 345,hereafter Pratt, The Marines' War .

82

ing the least undesirable of several beaches .In the light of those factors as well as thelater developments, the correctness of thedecision to land on the White and Orangebeaches is hardly open to questiona

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS?

While the assault Marines receivedmore newspaper coverage than did thelogistic commands, the latter are, ofcourse, just as essential to victory onthe battlefield . The service units, per-forming the unquoted tasks of tendingthe wounded, furnishing tactical andlogistical transport, providing all com-bat equipment and supplies, and repair-ing troop weapons, vehicles and otherequipment, were a decisive factor be-hind every successful amphibious land-ing in the Pacific War . STALEMATEII was no exception .

To supply the vast and complex as-sortment of ships, equipment, andtroops required for the Palau Opera-tion, all the major Pacific commands hadto be called upon for support . Only theclosest liaison among these various eche-lons made it possible for logisitic prepa-rations to proceed smoothly . "Overall

9 BGen Walter A. Wachtler ltr to CMC, dtd1Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterWachtler ltr.

Additional sources used for this section are :ExTrps AdminO No . 1-44, dtd 22Jul44 ; 1stMarDiv AdminO No. 1-44, dtd 7Aug44 ; USA-For.MidPac and Predecessor Commands duringWorld War II, 7Dec4l-2Sep45, History of G-4Section, n.d ., hereafter USAFor MidPac G-4Hist ; Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil ;Kenneth W. Condit, Gerald Diamond, andEdwin T. Turnbladh, Marine Corps GroundTraining in World War II (Washington : Hist-Br, G-3, HQMC, 1956), hereafter Condit, Dia-mond, and Turnbladh, Marine Corps GroundTraining .


requirements for supplies, materials,and service personnel needed for thePalau operations were ascertained byjoint study. Policies affecting the Army,Navy, and Marines were implementedby interservice and intra-staff plan-ning."" Available shipping, always alimiting factor in amphibious undertak-ings, had to be tightly scheduled, whilethe estimated arrival dates of the cargovessels bringing the heavier base devel-opment equipment directly from theUnited States had to be carefully cal-culated .The basic guidelines for STALE-

MATE H's logistic planning were setforth on 1 August 1944 by Admiral Hal-sey's Operation Plan 14-44, which alsoinstructed all combatant and auxiliaryships to make a special effort to ensurethey sailed from the mounting pointsfor the target with the maximum au-thorized loads of ammunition, fuel, andfresh provisions . Now began an intenseperiod of activity as all the major basesof the Pacific commands pitched in toprovide the necessary logistic support,and a 24-hour workday with 12-hourshifts became the norm .

While the various warships and cargoships took on dry provisions, the fleettankers loaded to half capacity withDiesel oil and aviation gasoline andtopped to maximum draft with fuel oil .Fresh and frozen foods, however, wereavailable only in limited quantities, andbattleships, cruisers, and carriers wereprovisioned to serve at least one com-pletely dry ration every sixth day . Bythe last part of August, the stocks hadbeen exhausted, and a Marine unit re-

8 USAFor MidPac G-4 Hist, p . 408 .


questing fresh meat and vegetables forits troops was forced to sail for Pele-liu with only a supply of emergencyrations instead .

All types of vessels, from the 90,000-ton floating dry-dock to the hospitalships, steamed toward the designatedstaging areas . In the Tulagi-Purvis Bayregion of the Solomons alone, there weregathered at one time 255 vessels, withship movements averaging 122 dailyduring the last week of August . Fromthe far reaches of the Pacific, the vari-ous vessels began to rendezvous at themounting areas of Manus, in the Ad-miralty Islands, about 1,000 miles in asouthwesterly direction from the ob-jective, and Eniwetok Atoll, some 1,500miles northeast of Peleliu .

The ILIAC assault elements and ac-companying garrison forces were di-rected by Headquarters, ExpeditionaryTroops, to carry with them sufficientrations for 32 days, water enough for5 days when pro-rated at 2 gallons perman per day, medical supplies to last30 days, and a 20-day supply of cloth-ing, fuel, lubricants, and miscellaneousequipment. For the assault phase, allweapons would be allowed five unitsof fire-a unit of fire being that amountof ammunition which CinCPOA had de-termined from previous campaignswould last for one day of heavy fight-ing . 9 In addition, the 105mm howitzers

9 1st MarDiv SAR, Part III to Anx C, liststhe number of rounds in the CinCPOA unit offire for the various weapons in the Marinedivision . The unit of fire for the M-1 rifle, forexample was 100 rounds ; .30 caliber carbine,45 ; .45 caliber pistol, 14 ; .30 caliber machinegun, 1,500 ; .50 caliber machine gun, 600 ; 60mmand 81 mm mortars, 100 ; 105mm howitzers,

83

would be issued another two units, andthe 57mm antitank guns supplied withfive more. The 1st Marine Division,moreover, arranged to carry an addi-tional 10 units of flamethrower fillersand explosives, since it expected to en-counter numerous fortified positions onPeleliu .

Detailed planning for Marine and na-val cooperation during the Peleliu as-sault began 8 August, when a joint con-ference at Pavuvu was attended by thestaffs of General Rupertus and AdmiralFort, commander of the Western AttackForce. At this time, the division's pro-posed scheme of maneuver was pre-sented, thus permitting Admiral Fortto determine what support would berequired of his force . Naval gunfire andair support plans were worked onjointly by the respective staff membersconcerned with these matters, and theuse of UDTs for clearing away under-water obstacles and the selection ofpotential landing beaches for the vari-ous amphibious craft were discussedin detail .Two days later, the Commander of

Transport Group 3, the division's as-signed lift, arrived with members of hisstaff. This time, the regimental com-manders and their staffs joined the con-ferences planning the combat loadingof the assault forces for the Peleliuoperation . 10 During this phase of jointplanning, the details of boat allocation,

200 ; 155mm howitzers, 145 ; and 155mm gun,100 .

10 By combat loading is meant the method ofembarking troops and loading their equipmentand supplies in such a manner that they can berapidly unloaded at the objective in the desiredpriority for sustaining the attack,

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landing plans, and control of the land-ing waves were ironed out . LieutenantColonel Robert G. Ballance, command-ing the 1st Pioneer Battalion, was in-volved frequently in these conferences,for he was to be the division shore partycommander.By the time of STALEMATE II, the

Marine Corps' amphibious techniquesfor an assault landing over a fringingreef had been battle-tested, modifiedwhere necessary, and molded into asmooth working ship-to-shore opera-tion. Since previous Pacific campaignshad revealed that the LVT (LandingVehicle, Tracked) was indispensable tothe uninterrupted flow of assault troopspast the coral barriers guarding theenemy's shores, every man in the as-sault forces at Peleliu was transportedto the beach in an amphibian tractor .

These vehicles and their infantry pas-sengers, as well as the LVT (A) s (ar-mored amphibian tractors), were car-ried to the target by LSTs (LandingShips, Tank) . At a distance safe fromenemy shore batteries, the LSTs openedtheir massive doors and disgorged theamphibians loaded with the assault Ma-rines. The LVTs then proceeded towithin roughly 4,000 yards of the beach .Here, along the line of departure, thevehicles were reformed into waves andheaded in succession toward thebeaches. Patrol craft and submarinechasers were stationed at this and othercontrol lines to regulate movement .These vessels served also to facilitatecommunications between the variouselements of this complex amphibiousoperation .Upon reaching the reef, the amphib-

ian tractors would crawl over and con-


tinue landward . At a point several hun-dred yards offshore, the LVT (A) s,which made up the initial assault wave,would begin firing their cannon for thelast minute support of the assaulttroops in the following waves of LVTs .Once ashore, the Marines could getprompt artillery support from 75mmpack howitzers landed, ready for action,from the rear ramps on the most recentversion of the LVT. Additional supportwas to be furnished by 105mm how-itzers, brought onto the beach byDUKWs (21/2-ton amphibious cargotrucks) which had been speciallyequipped with an A-frame unloadingdevice to land the completely-assembled105 .

The division's tanks would be pre-loaded in LCTs (Landing Craft, Tank)which, in turn, were loaded unto thewell decks of LSDs (Landing Ships,Dock) . Once in the unloading zone, thedecks of these floating drydocks wereflooded with water. After the huge sterngates of the LSDs had swung open, theLCTs emerged for a run to the reef,where the tanks, specially waterproofedbeforehand, debarked and continuedashore under their own power .

An innovation first tested at Peleliuwas the use of LVTs to guide thesetanks onto the beaches. Evolved to pre-vent delays and casualties such as thoseexperienced during the Marianas cam-paign, this successful technique wasdescribed by a Marine tank officer inthe following account

An LVT was placed on each LCT to leadthe tanks ashore . These LVTs were usedto test the depth of the water, and as longas they propelled themselves along the bot-tom the tanks would follow, but if the


LVTs became waterborne the tanks wouldstop until the LVTs could reconnoiter asafe passage. . . . Fuel, ammunition andmaintenance supplies were loaded on these'LVTs which enabled the tank units tohave a mobile supply dump available tothem upon reaching the beach.'

For the rest of the troops, equipment,and supplies, the passage to the targetarea was made in assault cargo andpersonnel transports. The Marines weremoved from their transports to the lineof departure by LCVPs (LandingCraft, Vehicle, Personnel), where theywere formed into waves and dispatchedto a transfer line just seaward of thecoral. For the remainder of the trip tothe beachhead, the troops and theirequipment were transferred into emptyLVTs and DUKWs which had returnedfrom the beach to shuttle the rest ofthe Marines and their gear to shore.Since the LVTs had a waterborne

speed of about 4 .5 miles per hour, thetrip from the line of departure to thebeach was estimated as 30 minutes andfrom the transfer line, 15 minutes. Pre-ceding the first wave of troops andscheduled to hit the beaches at H-Hourwere the armored amphibians . A min-ute later, the initial assault troops wouldland, with the following waves sched-uled to land at five-minute intervals .Within the first 20 minutes, five assaultbattalions, comprising some 4,500 men,were to be on their assigned beaches,and tanks would begin landing over theedge of the reef . Four minutes later,the regimental weapons companies wereto begin landing and, by H plus 85minutes, with the coming ashore of

' Capt George E. Jerue ltr to CMC, dtd2Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File .

85

three more infantry battalions, therewould be 8,000 combat Marines on thebeachhead .

To follow, of course, would be theremaining 17,000 men of the reinforceddivision, their equipment, and the some34,500 tons of initial supply support .The division logisticians planned toleave practically all the bulk cargo ei-ther in the cargo nets or on the palletsloaded on board the ships at the em-barkation points in order to expediteunloading at the target ." When thesepre-packaged loads made the trip fromship to the supply dump on land, theywould be moved intact at each neces-sary transfer point by crane instead ofbeing unloaded and reloaded, piece bypiece, by manpower . If necessary, thepallets could be dumped on the edgeof the reef and hauled to the beach bybulldozer. In all, the division utilizedsome 2,200 pallets, attempting to pal-letize a representative portion of thebulk cargo. As it turned out, however,the items found most suitable for pal-letizing were ammunition, barbed wire,and pickets .

In charge of all unloading activitiesto the seaward of the beaches was thetransport group beachmaster. Underhim were three transport divisionbeachmasters, each responsible for theunloading in front of a regimentalbeach. Each of these beaches was as-signed a reef beach party and a shore

13 The pallet, an Army innovation first usedin the Marshalls, was simply a sled, four by sixfeet, with wooden runners, which could beloaded to a height of about three feet and witha weight of approximately 3,000 pounds, theload being fastened securely on the pallet bymeans of flat metal strappings .

86

beach party. The reef beach party wasresponsible for the amphibian vehiclesand boats when afloat and had the taskof marking approaches over the reefand points on it where craft unable tonegotiate the coral barrier could bebeached . The shore beach party becamethe naval platoon of the regimentalshore party and, as such, performed itsnormal functions in connection withmarking of the beaches, salvage, andevacuation .As the division shore party com-

mander at Peleliu, Lieutenant ColonelBallance supervised the handling ofsupplies on and in the rear of thebeaches, as well as the casualties arriv-ing from the battalion aid stations . Hehad the further responsibility of pro-viding for the close-in defenses of thebeach areas .

Initially, the division shore party wasto be decentralized with a detachmentof the subordinate regimental shoreparty going in with each assault battal-ion . Each regiment had been furnisheda company of pioneers from LieutenantColonel Ballance's 1st Pioneer Battalionas the framework for its shore party .

As soon as possible, the regimentalshore party commander was to take overand consolidate the unloading operationson his beach . In turn, Lieutenant ColonelBallance, upon landing, was to assumecontrol of all shore party activities andto select the best beaches over whichsupplies would continue to be unloaded .To insure that the vital stream of sup-plies continued to flow into the supplydumps on the beaches, the colonelplanned to maintain the closest of co-ordination with the various beach par-ties .


Later, when all assault shipping wasashore, the beach dumps were to betaken over by the 16th Field Depot,a Marine supply agency designated aspart of the Island Command but at-tached to the 1st Marine Division forthe assault phase . This innovationworked extremely well from the Ma-rines' standpoint, for it made the fielddepot subject to the direct orders ofthe division's commanding general . Ac-cording to the commanding officer ofthe 1st Service Battalion, this arrange-ment made all "the difference betweenordering and asking .""

Another technique, first improvisedduring the Marianas campaign, was in-cluded in the original plans for thePeleliu assault. Two provisional com-panies of infantry replacements wereattached to the shore party, until suchtime as they would be needed to fill de-pleted ranks in the rifle regiments . Theshore party could make good use ofthese extra men during the critical un-loading phase, and they would be read-ily available for deployment as riflemenon the front lines when needed . Theheavy losses of the 1st Marines duringthe first week of the Peleliu campaignaccentuated the wisdom of planning forcombat replacements and, in the laterIwo Jima operation, each Marine divi-sion had two replacement drafts at-tached to its shore party .

Logistic support on D-Day was ex-pected to be hectic and difficult . Theassault battalions would be able to takein with them only limited quantities of

73 Col John Kaluf ltr to CMC, dtd 7Mar50, inPeleliu Comment File, hereafter Kaluf ltr,


rations, water, and ammunition, andthe anticipated heavy fighting wouldmake it particularly important to assurean adequate resupply of ammunitionand water. To safeguard this vital flowof supplies reaching the embattled Ma-rines ashore, certain improvisationswere made and precautions taken by thelogistic planners .

Until such time as a pontoon . cause-way could be constructed over the reefto the Peleliu beaches, the creation ofan artificial, waterborne supply beachseaward of the reef was imperative. Forthis purpose, 24 pontoon barges werelashed to the sides of LSTs for the jour-ney from the Solomons to the target .These barges had been formed by fas-tening pontoon cells, seven cells longand three wide, into a single unit . Whenan outboard motor was attached, theybecame self-propelled. Once in the un-loading area, only the lines holding thebarges to the sides of the LSTs had tobe loosened and the barges would belaunched into the water, ready to pro-ceed under their own power .

Nine of these barges, which had beenmodified to allow the mounting of craneson them, would be dropped into thesea early on D-Day . After having swingcranes lowered onto them and secured,the barges would proceed to a pointapproximately 1,000 yards seaward ofthe reef . Their job was to facilitate thetransfer of bulk supplies from the boatsbringing them from the cargo ships tothe amphibians for transportationacross the reef and onto the beach . Ifshore-based enemy fire proved too dan-gerous, the barges could move undertheir own power to a safer spot fartherout .

87

Three other barges were to providefuel and lubricating oil for the LVTs .After being launched from the LSTs,these self-propelled barges were to beloaded with 80-octane gasoline and lu-bricating oil and dispatched to a pointjust off the reef. One was assigned toeach regimental beach, and they all wereordered to erect a large banner, marked"Gas," so that the LVTs could easilyrecognize them.The remaining 12 barges would be

used to establish floating dumps . Sincethe transports and cargo ships were ex-pected to retire to safer waters out tosea at nightfall, provision had to bemade for an accessible supply of criticalitems which would be needed by theassault battalions during the hours ofdarkness. Upon being launched, thesebarges would proceed to designatedcargo ships, where they would take onpredetermined loads of infantry andtank ammunition, flamethrower fuel,motor fuel, lubricants, emergency ra-tions, and water in drums, before con-tinuing on to report to their assignedtransport division beachmasters formooring off the reef. Large paintednumbers on the sides of the bargeswould aid the drivers of the LVTs andDUKWs in identifying the type of loadcontained in each . The amphibianscould come alongside the barge and loadby hand, or the barge might be placednext to a crane for speedier loading .The problem of how to insure an im-

mediately accessible supply of high ex-penditure rate items, such as mortarand machine gun ammunition and flame-thrower fuel, for the assaulting troopsduring the afternoon of D-Day was alsoresolved. At Peleliu, the amphibian

88

cargo trailer would be utilized in quan-tity for the first time . This Marine-designed vehicle had an axle and twopneumatic tires on the bottom while itstop could be bolted into place, makingit waterproof. Pre-loaded in the Rus-sells, the trailers could be lowered intothe sea by cranes at the transport areaand towed by LCVPs to the reef, whereamphibians would hook onto them,drag them across the jagged coral bar-rier, and finish towing them the restof the way to the beach. Each rifleregiment was allotted 13 of these trail-ers and the artillery regiment 20 .

Another method of handling prioritycargo was by means of specially loadedLCVPs. Certain of the assault shipswould set aside eight LCVPs, preloadedwith infantry ammunition, flame-thrower fuel, and water. On D-Day,these LCVPs would be dispatched tothe reef off their assigned regimentalbeaches . The respective regimentalshore parties would be briefed on thecontents of the different type loads andcould send out LVTs or DUKWs to lo-cate the correct LCVP and take on aload. In a similar manner, LCMs (Land-ing Craft, Mechanized) were to beloaded with artillery ammunition inorder to meet urgent requests for re-supply of the Marine batteries ashore .

Since Peleliu lacked surface waterand its enervating climate would ac-celerate consumption, preparationswere made to insure an adequate supplyfor the attacking infantrymen . Everyavailable 5-gallon can was pre-filled tothe brim and scheduled for an earlytrip to shore, while scoured-out 55-gallon oil drums would hold a reservesupply. After the engineers managed to


set up distillation apparatus and drillnew wells, the water problem was ex-pected to vanish .

Throughout the logistic planning forSTALEMATE II, the short supply ofshipping in the Pacific was always alimiting factor . An unfortunate exam-ple of this situation was the fact thatonly four LSDs were available andthese were equally divided by ILIACplanners between the Peleliu and An-gaur assault units . The division founditself able to lift only 30 tanks and hadto leave 16 behind . This decision arousedcriticism, for Peleliu was more heavilydefended and more suitable for tankoperations than Angaur, where, as itturned out, only one company of tankswas ever employed at one time . Asthe commanding officer of the 1st TankBattalion later stated

. . . it is my belief that a serious error,indefensible from the tank viewpoint, wasmade in splitting the available tank ship-ping . . . as events proved it was extremelyunsound in view of the desperate need foradditional tanks throughout the first five(5) days of the operation . . . our Corpsstaff at that time did not include a tanksection, greatly handicapping tank plan .ning at Corps level ."

The lack of shipping space, coupledwith the planners' belief that Peleliu'slimited land area would not cause aserious transportation problem, re-sulted in the breaking up of the 1stMotor Transport Battalion as an in-tegral unit. Only Company A was al-lowed to lift its organic equipment,including repair facilities, and, even

14 LtCol Arthur J . Stuart ltr to CMC, dtd25Apr50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterStuart ltr.


then, its platoons were distributedamong the infantry regiments to ex-pedite the movement of supplies fromthe beach to the forward areas duringthe initial advance inland. Company Cwas detached during the operation andits men utilized as amphibian tractordrivers, and Headquarters and ServiceCompany was assigned the responsibil-ity for the division's maintenance andfuel supply, while Marines of CompanyB were to serve as stretcher bearers,relief drivers, and reserve troopsthroughout the campaign . Since eachindividual unit of the division downto company level was allowed to liftup to five vehicles, depending upon itsmission, the total number of trucks car-ried to the target approximated thenumber that would have been organicto the 1st Motor Transport Battalion,but the lack of centralized control provedfar from satisfactory . In the battalioncommander's view

This proved to be a serious handicap inthe direct supply of troops. With few ex-ceptions, there were no trucks availablefor the movement of troops even thoughthe tactical situation of then [during thePeleliu campaign] called for the expedi-tious movement of troops by vehiculartransportation'"

PAV UV U, TROOP TRAINING,AND SHORTAGES16

Following the Cape Gloucester cam-paign in the debilitating rain forests

'y Mai Robert B . McBroom ltr to CMC, dtd13Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File.

"" Additional sources used for this sectionare : History of the 1st Marine Regiment,26Aug-100ct44, n.d ., hereafter 1st Mar Hist ;LtCol Kimber H. Boyer, USMC, "Formationand Employment of an Armored Amphibian

89

of New Britain, the Marines of the1st Division were badly in need of restand rehabilitation . A suitable camp wasalready available on Guadalcanal but,instead, General Geiger chose the smallisland of Pavuvu, in hopes of sparinghis exhausted men the distasteful taskof furnishing large working partieseach day to the Island Command aswas customary on the larger island .He had made the selection following areconnaissance of Pavuvu by air andwith the expectation that a battalionof Seabees would be there preparingfacilities .Upon the Marines' arrival in April

1944, they discovered to their dismaythat the 10-mile long piece of coral wasvirtually a jungle, with the abandonedplantation long overgrown and rats androtting coconuts practically everywhere .The 15th Naval Construction Battalion,having completed a 1,300 bed hospitalon nearby Banika Island on 26 March,had little time to work on the camp onPavuvu before the Marines arrived .Typical of the Marines' bitterness wasthat of the officer who barged into Gen-eral Smith's tent and shouted, "GreatGod! Who picked this dump? More likea hog lot than a rest camp ."17

Instead of getting a chance to relax,the battle-weary Marines found them-

Battalion, Palau Operation, 15 September 1944-20 October 1944 : A Study of the Use of SpecialEquipment," (Quantico, Va . : Marine CorpsSchools, Amphibious Warfare School, SeniorCourse 1946-1947), hereafter Boyer, ArmdAmphibianBn ; Condit, Diamond, and Turn-bladh, Marine Corps Ground Training .

17 Burke Davis, Marine! The Life of LtGenLewis B. (Chesty) Puller, USMC (Ret), (Boston :Little, Brown and Company, 1962), p . 202, here-after Davis, Marine!, used with permission .

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selves turned to constructing a livablecamp area. Disposing of the rottingcoconuts alone took over a month ; wellsfor drinking water had to be dug ; 18and for weeks, the men were forced tolive, work, and sleep in mud until theyhad laboriously bucket-hauled enoughcoral to surface the access roads andliving area.

Not surprisingly, the morale of thedivision hit an all-time low. The major-ity of the veterans had been in thePacific for over two years, and theirexertions in two strenuous jungle cam-paigns had sapped their reserves ofenergy. Alternately racked by malarialchills or burning up with its fever-which the tropical climate of Pavuvudid nothing to alleviate-weakened bypoor rations, and rotten with a varietyof fungus growths in various parts oftheir bodies, these Marines were bothphysically and mentally exhausted .

The number answering sick call in-creased alarmingly, averaging "200 to250 cases daily . . . . Hospitalizationwould not have been required in manyof these cases had water, clean sur-roundings and clean clothing and ofcourse good food been available to allunits on the Island ."19 Because of the

. ". . . and when that water was reached, itwas the most god-awful stuff you can imagine .Its unique flavor was not enhanced by the rot-ting coconuts which had seeped through thecoral-streaked mud to the water supply and onewas forced to spike it with the lemonade com-ponent of K-rations which, in itself, was morelike battery acid and more suitable for burnish-ing canteen cups and mess gear than for drink-ing." Mr. -Benis M. Frank comments on draftMS, dtd 29Mar63 .

79 Cdr Emil E. Napp ltr to CMC, dtd 9Mar50,in Peleliu Comment File .


Marines' weakened condition, their let-down following the recent tensions andstresses of combat, and the countlessfrustrations encountered on Pavuvu,they tended to behave in a manner thatpeople back home might consider ec-centric and to give credulity to wildrumors that ordinarily would have beenlaughed down .20

Adding to their woes, the food onPavuvu, while adequate, was monoto-nous, unappetizing, and limited-forexample, fresh meat appeared on themess tables only once a week-the mov-ies were usually second-run features orworse, and beer was limited to only afew cans a week . 21 Contributing to themen's dissatisfaction with their lot wasthe widespread belief that service troopson Banika and Guadalcanal were eat-ing and drinking much better than thecombat-returned Marines .

Welding these dispirited, malady-ridden, and exhausted men once againinto a keenly-edged fighting team wasthe first task faced by the division'sofficers, who set about immediatelypreparing the Marines physically and

" "Less eccentric by Pavuvu standards wasthe man who ran out of his tent at dusk andbegan to pound his fists against a coconut tree,sobbing angrily : "'I hate you, goddammit, Ihate you!' `Hit it once for me,' came a cry froma nearby tent, the only comment that was madethen or later by the man's buddies ." McMillan,The Old Breed, p . 231 ."'The only USO show to reach this miser-

able hole was not scheduled to come at all ; itarrived only by dint of the personal efforts ofBob Hope and at considerable inconvenience tohis troupe, who managed to sandwich in amorning performance between rear echelonengagements shortly before the division shovedoff for Peleliu." Hough, Assault on Peleliu,p. 27 .


psychologically for their role in theforthcoming assault . Training, however,had to be conducted under the severelimitations of space, equipment short-ages, and the detailing of men andequipment for the construction of campfacilities. In addition, the division ex-perienced an influx of some 260 officersand 4,600 enlisted men replacing thoseMarines being rotated home. All of thenewcomers had to be broken in on theirnew jobs for the imminent battle .

The amount of terrain on Pavuvusuitable for training purposes provedto be small even for a platoon to ma-neuver about, let alone a whole division .As a result, Marines on field problemsfound themselves slipping between thetents and messhalls of their bivouacarea .22 With large-scale maneuvers outof the question, the only recourse wasto place a much greater emphasis uponsmall unit exercises, practicing withrifles, automatic weapons, grenades, ba-zookas, and portable flamethrowers .Meticulous attention was paid to thedetails of each unit's proposed schemeof maneuver ashore at the target . Overand over again, the movements of thescheme were rehearsed until each rifle-man, specialist, and leader knew exactlywhere he was to be and what he wasto do throughout the different phases ofthe assault .

I One story, perhaps apocryphal, has it that"one Saturday morning a battalion of the FifthMarines was holding inspection while a bat-talion of the First Marines was conducting afield problem . The result was that during theinspection, fire groups of the latter were infil-trating through the statue-like ranks of theformer." Maj Robert W . Burnette ltr to CMC,dtd 9Mar49, in Peleliu Comment File .

91

Stressed also was instruction inclose-in fighting with the bayonet, knife,club, hip-level snap shooting, and judo .The use of hikes, excellent in hardeningmen for the rigors of combat, was han-dicapped by the lack of space ; themarching units kept bumping into eachother .

Unfortunately, practical experiencein tank/infantry coordination, destinedto be of inestimable value in the comingbattle, was limited to one day for eachrifle regiment. Each squad, however,did actually coach the movements andfiring of a tank by visual signals andthe external telephone in the rear ofthe tank .

Wherever suitable terrain could befound, firing ranges and combat areaswere set up, and their use was rigidlycontrolled by a tight scheduling . In thecombat areas, platoon-sized groups em-ployed flamethrowers, bazookas, demo-litions, antitank guns, machine guns,and rifles while practicing simulatedassaults against log bunkers . On theinfiltration course, Marines negotiatedbarbed wire and other obstacles, whilelive ammunition forced them to keepdown. Other subjects covered were thetechniques of night defense, chemicalwarfare, patrolling with war dogs, andcoordination of fire teams using all or-ganic weapons. The ground phase of, thetraining closed in the middle of Augustwith combat firing by all units .

Even more difficult and nightmarishthan the infantry's efforts were the at-tempts of the division's supporting armsto train with their bulkier equipmenton Pavuvu. The 11th Marines rehearsedmassing fires with time, impact, andricochet bursts, but due to lack of space,

92

the artillery "was reduced to the pitifulexpedient of firing into the water withthe observers out in a boat or DUKW."23Without room to maneuver, tank train-ing had to stress gunnery, flamethroweroperations, fording, night security, all-around defense, and textbook study oftactics . On the whole, organic supportunits spent the majority of their train-ing period breaking in replacements,repairing battered equipment, andshaking down new vehicles .

During the division's training period,two newly developed weapons were re-ceived. The Navy Mark I flamethrowerwas capable of throwing a flame of blaz-ing napalm 24 to a distance of 150 yardsand sustaining it for 80 seconds . Threeof the flamethrowers were mounted onLVTs, while another LVT was equippedto serve as a supply carrier for thenapalm mixture. Although slated foremployment primarily against beachpillboxes during the assault landings,the new weapon was to prove its greatvalue in reducing dug-in fortificationsfarther inland .

The other new weapon was the 60mmshoulder mortar, adapted to fire froma light machine gun mount and designedfor flat trajectory fire against pillboxand cave openings. Some of its parts,however, proved too weak to stand therough wear and tear of combat, andMarines who had to lug the weaponaround complained of its heaviness .Even more serious was the recoil, which

' LtCol Leonard F. Chapman, Jr ., ltr to CMC,dtd 9Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File ." The gelled fuel resulting from combining

napalm powder with gasoline for use in incen-diary bombs and flamethrowers .


was so severe that the gunner had tobe relieved after firing only two to fourrounds. Since this new weapon's func-tion duplicated that of the bazooka,which gave a good performance oncoral-surfaced Peleliu, Marines were in-clined to hold the shoulder mortar inless regard than the older and morefamiliar weapon .

Hindering the whole training sched-ule of the division, but especially theamphibious phases, were critical short-ages of equipment . These embraced sucha wide array of items that about theonly things in adequate supply werethe basic arms of the individual infan-trymen. Shortages in armored amphib-ians, amphibian tractors, flamethrow-ers, demolitions, automatic weapons,bazookas, engineering equipment, andwaterproofing material existed right upto the last stages of training, whilefinal allotments in some categories ar-rived barely in time to be combat-loadedwith the troops . In addition, some ofthe supplies furnished with the divisionwere not of A-1 quality

Belts of machine gun ammunition hadrotted . . . powder rings on mortar ammu-nition were disintegrating and bourreletsrusted, shotgun shells swollen or, if brass,corroded. All ammunition had to be un-stowed, inspected and in large part re-placed and restowed at the last minute.'

To complicate matters further, thedivision had been ordered early in Julyto form two provisional amphibian trac-tor battalions, "utilizing personnel of the1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, aug-mented by personnel from units of the

I LtCol Spencer S. Berger ltr to CMC, dtd19Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterBerger ltr.


division."26 These Marine elements pre-paring for imminent combat, however,objected strenuously to parting with anyof their skilled men, and often did notwithout a fight . In addition, those Ma-rines reassigned to the amphibian trac-tor battalions had to be retrained inthe operation of the unfamiliar equip-ment. Often, due to lack of time to prac-tice, these inexperienced drivers wouldbe performing on-the-job training withtractors filled with Marines practicingassault landings .

Further complications arose for thenewly formed 3d Armored AmphibianBattalion (Provisional), because it wasscheduled to receive the recently devel-oped LVT(A), or armored amphibiantractor, which would form the initialassault wave at Peleliu and furnish firesupport for the following troop waves .Lacking any of the new vehicles fordemonstration purposes, the battalion'sMarines, completely unfamiliar withthe LVT (A) or its armament, wereforced to rely solely upon blueprints foracquaintance with the tractor theywould be handling in combat . Althoughthe first delivery of the armored amphib-ians arrived early in August, difficultiesstill persisted . After feverishly practic-ing with the new vehicles, the crewswere dumbfounded to find that the nextshipments were of a later model, mount-ing 75mm howitzers instead of the37mm's with which the crews had pre-viously familiarized themselves. Ap-proximately two-thirds of the battalionhad to be retrained as a result .

"That the battalion should turn in anoutstanding performance after such un-

1 1st MarDiv SAR, Phase I, p . 5 .

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propitious beginnings might well rankas one of the minor miracles of the cam-paign."27 The man responsible for thebattalion's good showing on the Peleliubeaches was Lieutenant Colonel KimberH. Boyer. He "did one of the greatesttraining jobs I ever saw or heard of," 2 Ssaid a fellow officer . Although beset byoverwhelming problems and forced toobtain his men in driblets from whateversource he could find, Lieutenant ColonelBoyer managed to train and shape hiscrews into a finely tuned combat team bythe time of the assault . The commandingofficer of the newly formed 6th Amphib-ian Tractor Battalion, Captain John I .Fitzgerald, Jr., "faced with almostthe same problems and circumstances[as Boyer], performed as admirably ."29The amphibious training, not only of

the amphibian battalions but also ofthe entire division, was retarded seri-ously by the insufficiency of amphibiousvehicles and the lack of repair parts forthem. Upon its arrival at Pavuvu, thedivision had only 48 of the 248 LVTsauthorized for the Peleliu campaign . Ofthese 48, more than half were inopera-tive, awaiting vital parts. When the firstshipment did arrive, there remainedless than a month in which to preparethe vehicles, train the crews, and fa-miliarize the several thousand assaulttroops in LVT ship-to-shore techniques .

As a result, the division was forcedto substitute the DUKWs as personnelcarriers and to use them in the amphib-

Hough, Assault on Peleliu, p. 31 .29 LtCol Joseph E . Buckley Itr to CMC, dtd

10Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File .Maj Robert F . Reutlinger ltr to CMC, dtd

10Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterReutlinger ltr.

94

ious exercises with the infantry regi-ments. It was during such a landing drillthat General Rupertus fell from an am-phibian tractor and severely fracturedhis ankle, an injury that might havecaused a less determined man to missthe Peleliu campaign . The amphibioustrucks used by the infantry, however,had to be taken away from the artilleryunits, which had been practicing theirown assault techniques of loading andunloading howitzers and radio jeeps inthe LVTs and DUKWs . Consequently,the training time available to the 11thMarines was drastically reduced .

Training for the 1st Marine Divisionculminated in large-scale landing re-hearsals at the Cape Esperance areaon Guadalcanal. By this time, 27 and29 August, the assault units were al-ready embarked on board the vesselswhich would carry them to the target,and the warships scheduled to providenaval gunfire support for the operationwere also on hand .The first rehearsal was designed

solely to test communications. After thenew radio equipment, which had beenrushed by air from Pearl Harbor tosupply the division's minimum require-ments, was accurately calibrated, therehearsal went off smoothly. On the29th, the naval guns and planes blastedat the beaches prior to the landing andcontinued deep supporting fires afterthe Marines debarked and moved in-land. Spreading out, the assault unitswent through the motions of their as-signed missions, and everything wentoff smoothly.

At a critique held the next day, andattended by all of the ranking com-manders of both naval and ground


forces, not a single serious criticism wasraised ; in fact, nothing in the way ofconstructive revisions was even dis-cussed. The two practice landings, how-ever, had served their purpose of fa-miliarizing the troops with their de-barkation and transfer stations, snap-ping in the new crews of the amphibianvehicles, coordinating the preliminarygunfire and bombardment plans, andironing out any possible kinks in thecomplicated ship-to-shore maneuver,which depended upon split-second tim-ing and scheduling for success .

On 3 September, a shore party exer-cise was held at Tetere Beach on Guad-alcanal, but no supplies were unloaded .The next landing performed by Ma-rines of the division would be over Pele-liu's coral reef and onto the enemy-heldbeaches .

Despite its frustrations with Pavuvu'sshortcomings, the equipment shortages,and the training difficulties, the 1st Ma-rine Division had done an admirablejob of fusing the new replacements withthe older veterans of Guadalcanal andCape Gloucester into a recharged, com-bat-ready fighting unit . When the 1stDivision's Marines stormed ashore atPeleliu, they were once again a top-notch assault outfit .MOUNTING THE ATTACK

The logistical problem confrontingthe 1st Marine Division in mountingout from Pavuvu for the Peleliu cam-paign and the many heartbreaking diffi-

3o Additional sources used for this sectionare : TF 32 MovO No . A503-44, dtd 20Aug44 ;ComLSTF1ot 13 Trng MovO No. 3-44, dtd24Aug44; 1st MarDiv AdminO No . 1-44, dtd7Aug44 .


culties encountered in solving it cannotbe overemphasized. What the situationwould have been if the division had notbeen lifted by an experienced transportgroup is hard to imagine, because theloading of the naval vessels had to beclosely coordinated with the final plansfor the beach assault .

Fortunately, the transport groupcommander, his staff, and the vessels'crews were veterans in complicatedship-to-shore movements and experts inworking with Marines to solve relatedproblems. The group staff, according toone Marine officer

. . . worked in the closest liaison, notonly with the Division's Operations andPlanning Officers, but with the command-ers and staff officers of subordinate units,together with the Navy Control Officersdesignated for each beach . The consolidatedscheme was a product of close and effec-tive joint planning ."

The embarkation warning orderreached the Marine division on 5 Au-gust, only 10 days before the actualassault loading was to begin . Planningby staff officers started immediately but,without any idea of the number, type,or characteristics of the allotted ships,only the most general plans could bemade. Although the transport groupcommander and his staff arrived at Pa-vuvu on 10 August, the necessary, de-tailed information was not obtaineduntil two days later . Even after theships finally appeared, it was discoveredthat several had reserved holds forship's stores or carried extra equipmentwhich was not shown on the ship's char-

31 Col Harold 0. Deakin ltr to CMC, dtd1,0Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File .

95

acteristics. As a result, confusion andmisunderstanding marked the loadingarrangements of the division, causingnumerous changes, compromises, andimprovisations right up until the last .

To complicate the Marines' logisticproblem even further, loading opera-tions would have to be conducted at thewidely separated staging areas of Pa-vuvu, Banika, Guadalcanal, and Tulagi,as well as in the New Hebrides, wherethe transports would pick up the groundechelons and equipment of the Marineair units slated to be based on the Pele-liu airfield as soon as it was seized andoperative. If the principle of combatloading was to be adhered to, a prodi-gious amount of load planning and closecoordination of ships' routes would benecessary to prevent wasted effort orback-tracking . Compounding the diffi-culties were the limits to dockage andlighterage at certain of these stagingareas, which necessitated a tight sched-uling of the ships' movements to forestallany needless delays .

The first units of the LST flotilla as-sembled from scattered Pacific bases,arrived off Pavuvu on 11 August, andthe Marine division began loading thenext day. Since the flotilla commander,Captain Armand Robertson, had beentoo busy readying his ships for sea tocome to Pavuvu during the planningphase, the Marines had requested himto delegate a liaison officer with theauthority to make decisions in his name,but none was ever furnished . AdmiralFort, who was Captain Robertson's su-perior, held daily conferences with theMarines on Pavuvu after 8 August, thusto some extent offsetting the. gap cre-ated by the absence of a liaison officer,

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Nevertheless, shortly after his arrival,Captain Robertson ordered the loadingplans for eight LSTs to be changed . TheMarines knew from past experience thatunderstowing23 was indispensable inkeeping within allotted load limits andyet lifting all the required tonnage . Itwas only with the greatest reluctance,however, that the flotilla commanderpermitted his LSTs to be so loaded .

Even after the Marines were finallyembarked, they discovered to theiramazement that certain vessels trans-porting two regiments would be inlaunching areas different from thoseplanned by the division. If not rectified,this drastic change would force the am-phibians and craft, carrying the 5thand 7th Marines ashore, to crisscrossin order to get these regiments to theproper beaches . Such a maneuver, diffi-cult to execute and contrary to the ac-cepted doctrine for ship-to-shore pro-cedures, could not be tolerated and, asa result, troops already embarked onboard nine vessels had to be shifted .

Actually, the last of the LST flotilladid not put in an appearance at Pavuvuuntil 25 August, at which time thetroops were already embarked on boardthe transports in preparation for theirfinal training rehearsals . In spite of allthese last-minute complications, how-ever, the 30 LSTs, 17 transports, and2 LSDs allotted to the division for thePeleliu operation were fully combat-loaded by 31 August .

I Understowing consisted simply of the load-ing of the tank deck of an LST with flat orwell-packaged cargo, such as rations, barbedwire, or ammunition, next covering the wholewith a layer of dunnage, and then storing~,VTs on top of the dunnage .


After their final landing exercises atGuadalcanal, the Marines had a chanceto go ashore before departing for thePeleliu assault . These last few days werespent in conditioning hikes, small-unitmaneuvers, and recreation . The otherassault unit of the ILIAC, the 81stInfantry Division, meanwhile, hadmounted out in Hawaii and rendezvousedoff Guadalcanal for its final rehearsalsand movement to the target.

Unlike the Marine division with itstwo major campaigns under its belt,the newly activated Army division wasstill untested in battle . Neither duringtheir training nor mounting out had thesoldiers endured any of the difficultiesexperienced by the Marines on Pavuvu .According to the 81st's history, "theloading worked out well," and after"its long stateside training, its intensiverefresher courses, the rehearsal, and therelaxation in the [Hawaiian] Islands,the Division was a bronzed, tough crew,ready for action ."33

On 4 September, LSTs carrying theinitial assault elements of both the 1stDivision and the 81st lifted anchor anddeparted with their naval escort shipsfor the Palaus. Four days later, thefaster-moving transports and LSDs fol-lowed with their screening forces . Thetwo convoys were expected to rendez-vous in the target area early on D-Day .Prior to the departure of the transportechelon, the Peleliu Fire Support Unitand Escort Carrier Group had left inorder to arrive at the target on 12 Sep-tember to begin the bombardment andbombing of the objective, as well as to

I Historical Committee, 81st Infantry Divi-sion, pp . 45, 59 .


start the underwater demolition of arti-ficial obstacles .

The approach route lay northwest-ward through the Solomons and thenalong a course generally parallel to thenorthern coast of New Guinea. For theembarked troops, the 2,100-mile tripover smooth seas was uneventful, themonotony being broken only by the pe-riodic antiaircraft exercises which usedthe naval planes flying from the escortcarriers as tracking targets . On 14 Sep-tember, D minus 1, the transports madecontact with the slower-moving LSTs,and they proceeded together to theirrespective stations off the Palaus .

On the same day, the Marine troopcommanders and the civilian news cor-respondents opened General Rupertus'sealed letter, which had been given toeach of them just prior to the departurefrom Guadalcanal with instructions notto open it until D minus 1 . Apparently,the division's commanding general hadnot consulted with anyone, "with thepossible exception of" 34 his chief of staff,before issuing the letter. In it, Rupertusexpressed his opinion that the fightingon Peleliu would be extremely toughbut short, lasting not more than fourdays. This viewpoint, according to theofficial Marine Corps monograph on thecampaign was

. . . perhaps the most striking manifesta-tion of that preoccupation with speedy con-quest at the highest division level whichwas to color tactical thinking ashore for amonth to follow.'

" LtCol William E . Benedict ltr to CMC, dtd27Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File .

31 Hough, Assault on Peleliu, p . 35. "Mostofficers believed this unusual document [was]intended in the nature of a pep talk . This was

97

MARINE AIR PREPARES36Since the Western Carolines lay too

far distant from any Allied base forland-based aircraft to provide coverduring STALEMATE II, naval planesoperating off carriers would furnish theneeded air support until such time asthe airfield on Peleliu had been capturedand readied for use by American avia-tion units. Destined to be the majorcomponent of this garrison air forcewas the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (2dMAW) which, in mid-1944, was locatedin the Solomons and functioned primar-

not its effect on news correspondents, however :many of the 36 accredited to the division didnot come ashore at all, and only six (one ofwhom was killed) chose to stay through thecritical early phases . Hence, news coverage ofthe operation was sketchy, often misleading,and, when quick conquest failed to materialize,tinged with biting criticism ." Ibid .

Additional sources used for this sectionare : Garrison AF Western Carolines WarDs,30May-Sep44, n.d ., hereafter Garrison AFWarD, with appropriate date ; Island Comd,Peleliu WarDs, Jul-Sep44, hereafter PeleliuIsland Comd WarD, with appropriate date ; 2dMAW WarDs, June-Sep44, hereafter 2d MAWWarD, with appropriate date ; 2d MAW UHist,7Dec41-20Feb46, dtd 12Mar46, hereafter 2dMAW UHist; HqSq-2, 2d MAW WarD, Jul-Sep44, hereafter HqSq-2, 2d MAW WarD, withappropriate date ; MAG-11 WarD, Jun-Sep44,hereafter MAG-11 WarD, with appropriatedate ; MAG-11 UHist, 1Aug41-1Jul44, dtd19Jun45, hereafter MAG-11 UHist ; MAG-11Rpt on Palau Ops with 4th MAW comments,dtd 22Dec44, hereafter MAG-11 Palau Rpt ;VMF-114 WarD, Jun-Sep44, hereafter VMF-114 WarD, with appropriate date ; VMF-114UHist, 1Jul43-1Jan45, dtd 10May45, hereafterVMF-114 UHist ; VMF(N)-541 WarD, Jun-Sep44, hereafter VMF(N)-541 WarD, withappropriate date ; VMF(N)-541 UHist, 15Feb44-30Apr46, dtd 30Apr46, hereafter VMF(N)-541 UHist .

98

ily as a training command for squad-rons flying combat missions in moreactive zones . Assignment to the wing,whose headquarters was on Efate Is-land in the New Hebrides, meant thata squadron's pilots could receive addi-tional training as well as enjoy a wel-come break from the rigors of dailyflights over enemy-held territory, beforereturning to combat .

The 2d Wing first suspected it wasslated for a more active war role whenit received a dispatch on 14 June order-ing it to become an "independent andself sustaining unit" 37 as rapidly as pos-sible. Eleven days later, the wing wasdirected to move to Espiritu Santo Is-land, a staging area farther north inthe same island chain, for possible de-ployment to an active combat zone .

A forward echelon moved to the newbase to pave the way for the rest ofthe command, and the 2d MAW officiallybegan operating from there on 3 July .During the remainder of the month,the wing busied itself with completingthe move, bringing itself up to author-ized strength, gathering and readyingits own lower echelons, and streamlin-ing its staff organization for efficientfunctioning under any possible combatcontingency.

This tailoring of the air unit to fitthe requirement of its assigned missionresulted in the 2d MAW reverting backto a one-group wing. Only the monthpreviously, it had been brought up toa two-group wing in anticipation of anactive combat role. Since Marine Air-craft Group 11 (MAG-11) was expectedto furnish sufficient tactical air support

"2d MAW WarD, Jun44, p . 1 .


for STALEMATE II once it was basedon the captured and repaired Peleliuairfield, the unneeded MAG-25 was de-tached from the 2d MAW on 25 July . 38

In preparation for basing on Peleliu,MAG-11 was authorized a new provi-sional table of organization on 26 July.All elements, except group and squad-ron headquarters, and operations andintelligence sections, were to be trans-ferred to the service squadron, whichwould then be placed under the opera-tional control of the Air Base Com-mander, a subordinate of the IslandCommander. Although these changesmade the service squadron large andunwieldy, besides complicating the com-mand structure, this arrangement wasto remain in effect throughout the Palaucampaign .

Earlier, on 6 July, the 2d MAW hadlost its commander, when CinCPOAsummoned Brigadier General HaroldD. Campbell to Pearl Harbor to organ-ize a headquarters for his forthcomingrole as Island Commander, Peleliu . Thisjoint Army-Navy-Marine Corps com-mand, known as the Third Island BaseHeadquarters until 16 November 1944,was to have the mission of defendingthe captured base from all possible en-emy attacks and improving the island'sfacilities in accordance with the basedevelopment plan .No sooner had the new wing com-

mander, Major General James T . Moore,assumed command, than a dispatchfrom Admiral Nimitz on 9 July desig-

" The 2d MAW became a two-group wingagain on 8 October 1944, the date that MarineBase Defense Air Group 45 (redesignatedMAG-45 on 15 November) arrived at UlithiAtoll .


nated the Marine officer as CommanderGarrison Air Force, Western Carolines .As was common in the intricate amphib-ious air-sea-land operations of the Pa-cific War, General Moore was to heada staff composed of Army, Navy, andMarine Corps officers whose missionwas to "defend the Western Carolinesarea by employing in mutual supportagainst hostile air threats all air de-fense units based in that area ." 30Once his squadrons began operatingfrom the captured Peleliu airfield, theMarine general would have three majortasks : defending all ground troops andconvoys in the Western Carolines fromenemy air attacks, providing close airsupport for the infantry units still fight-ing on Peleliu, and neutralizing the re-maining enemy bases in the WesternCarolines .

Although still the 2d Wing's com-mander, General Moore found it neces-sary to locate at Pearl Harbor near theheadquarters of Marine Aircraft Wings,Pacific, because the planning and or-ganizing of his new command necessi-tated frequent conferences with thestaffs of higher and subordinate eche-lons. Finally, on 22 August, the Marinegeneral flew to Espiritu Santo and as-sumed personal command of the wingduring final preparations for the Pele-liu campaign .

Scheduled to land with the assaultunits at Peleliu were the ground eche-lons of Marine Fighter Squadron 114(VMF-114), VMF-121, VMF-122, andMarine Night Fighter Squadron 541(VMF(N)-541) of MAG-11. Theirflight echelons were to remain at Es-

'Garrison AF WarD, 30May-3OSep44, p . 3 .

99

piritu until such time as they could beflown by stages to the repaired andoperative airfield . As soon as possible,other units of MAG-11 would be flownin, to be followed later by wing head-quarters .

With combat imminent, the group'ssquadrons underwent intensified train-ing . 40 The typical day's flight schedulewas designed to improve the skills andabilities of the pilots, as well as to de-termine the condition of the aircraftand equipment. The final weeks priorto mounting out found the fighter squad-rons stressing dive and glide bombingexercises, for which their assigned air-craft, the F4U (Corsair), was admi-rably suited. In addition to this in-creased emphasis upon tactics whichcould be used in close support of groundtroops, the basics of squadron air workwere practiced in instruments, inter-cepts, and division tactics .

The Marine air units, not unlike theground troops, were experiencing theirown difficulties with shortages, as MAG-11 reported

The first major difficulty encounteredwas in obtaining the proper quantities andtypes of aviation ordnance . Allowanceswere specifically laid down by ComAirPac[Commander Air Forces, Pacific Fleet]who then made ComSoPac [Commander,South Pacific] responsible for their deliv-ery. ComSoPac passed this task to the 16thField Depot, a Marine unit, at Guadal-canal. Due to shortages, lack of knowledgeof aviation ordnance and lack of beltingequipment, the specified allowances werenever obtained . The Group went on theoperation short of certain bombs, fuses,

40 During July and August, training acci-dents resulted in 2 pilots killed, 1 missing, 1wounded, and 4 aircraft lost .

100

etc., and had to take all unbelted ammuni-tion . Belting and handling a million and aquarter rounds of .50 caliber ammunitionwas done after landing and proved to bea major problem ."

Since the Peleliu landing would bethe first time that ground echelons ofMarine squadrons would accompany theassault troops ashore, the aviators pre-paring for their role in STALEMATEII found themselves confronted bysome unique problems. The question ofthe composition of the parties to accom-pany the general assault units and theamount and type of gear the partiesshould take with them was a difficultone to resolve, according to MAG-11,which noted

At present, there is no table of allow-ances which prescribes the kind andamount of aviation materiel, Marine Corpsequipment, transportation and personnelthat should be taken in with the assaultechelons. As a result of this, every Groupand Squadron Commander had to make hisown decision in the matter, with the resultthat the amount and kind of material andnumber of personnel taken in during theearly stages of an operation variesgreatly ."

Adding to the Marine aviators' woeswas the fact that, because shippingspace was at a premium, equipment hadto be reduced to the barest necessities .Liaison officers had been sent to Pavuvufor coordination of loading plans withthe 1st Marine Division, but the limita-tion of pace on the ships transportingthe assault elements and the staging ofSTALEMATE II at five widely sepa-rated points complicated the situation .The S. S . Mormacport, for example, af-

'1 MAG-11 Palau Rpt, p . 1 .42 MAG-11 Palau Rpt, 1st End, p. 1 .


ter loading the ground echelons andequipment of MAG-11 and Marine Tor-pedo Bombing Squadron 134 (VMTB-134) in the New Hebrides, would stopat the Russells and embark another taskforce unit "on top of the Group andsquadron gear ."43 As a result, VMTB-134 would be flying antisubmarine pa-trols long before its equipment or spareparts were ashore at Peleliu .The newly organized VMF(N)-541,

which arrived at the Espiritu Santostaging area from the United States justin time for its ground echelons to beloaded on board the assault ships, hadits own unique problem . Commissioned15 February 1944 at Cherry Point,North Carolina, this night fighter squad-ron had been equipped and trained forits mission of providing protectionagainst enemy air attacks during thehours of darkness . Its assigned aircraft,a modified version of the Navy's stand-ard fighter, the F6F (Hellcat) con-tained very complicated precision radarto aid in the night interception of ene-my bombers. Although excellent in op-erating aspects and accurate at times fordistances up to 60 miles, this radar re-quired a great deal of maintenance tokeep it in acceptable working condition .

The misfortunes of VMF (N) -541 be-gan when it travelled some 10,000 milesfrom its staging area at Cherry Pointand continued until its planes toucheddown on the repaired Peleliu airfield. Atno time in this two-month period wasthere ever any testing or maintenanceof the delicate radar equipment installedin the Hellcats, even though the flightechelon had flown over 5,000 miles . The

"MAG-11 Palau Rpt, p . 2 .


not unexpected result was that "everyone required almost a major overhaul ata time when top performance was re-quired ."44

Loading out at Espiritu Santo began25 August, when the ground echelonsof VMF-114, VMF-121, VMF-122, andVMF(N)-541 went on board the USSTryon and Centaurus . These vesselssailed on the 25th and 27th, respective-ly, to rendezvous with the main navaltask force at Guadalcanal. On 30 Au-gust, the ground echelons of VMTB-134and the Headquarters and ServiceSquadrons of MAG-11 embarked in theS. S. Mormacport for their journey toPeleliu. Remaining behind at EspirituSanto were the flight echelons and therear echelon which would service theaircraft prior to departure for the Pa-laus and supervise the loading of theremaining gear .SOFTENING THE ENEMY'SDEFENSES45

Owing to the detailed planning bySWPA and CinCPOA air liaison offi-cers, STALEMATE II's plans called fora wide-sweeping series of closely-meshed air support missions by both

"VMF (N)-541 Rpt (Night Fighter Squad-ron, plane, personnel, and material require-ments), dtd25Nov44, hereafter VMF (N)-541Rpt ."Additional sources used for this section

are : TG 38.3 OpO No. 1-44, dtd 25Aug44 ; TF32 MovO No. A503-44, dtd 20Aug44 ; TG 32 .1AtkO No. A502-44, dtd 20Aug 44 ; TG 32.15AtkO No. 8-44, dtd 30Aug44 ; TU 32.7.1 Op0No. 1-44, dtd 5Sep44 ; VMF-314 Rpt of Observ-ers aboard Aircraft Carriers during STALE-MATE, dtd 17Nov44, hereafter VMF-314 RPtof Observers ; Fane and Moore, The NakedWarriors ; Roscoe, Submarine .

101

carrier- and land-based aircraft embrac-ing the period prior to, during, and af-ter the amphibious landing . As early asMarch 1944, the Palaus had been struckby fast carrier forces of the Fifth Fleet,and further carrier-based attacks wereagain launched during July and August .SWPA's long-range planes, meanwhile,had flown reconnaissance and bombingruns over the target area and, in Au-gust, the Fifth Air Force's B-24s (Lib-erators) began a concentrated effort toknock out enemy defenses throughoutthe island chain .

A series of night flights from 8 Au-gust through 14 September dumped 91 .2tons of fragmentation, demolition, andincendiary bombs over the Palaus and,beginning 25 August, the heavy bomb-ers braved Japanese fighters and heavyantiaircraft fire to make daylight bomb-ing runs over the objective . In a total of394 sorties, the Liberators dropped 793 .6tons of high explosives on the enemydefenses. In Koror Town alone, some507 buildings were completely demol-ished, and major Japanese installationsthroughout the island chain were de-stroyed. By 5 September, photo recon-naissance revealed only 12 Japanesefighters, 12 floatplanes, and 3 observa-tion aircraft still based in the Palaus .The enemy's airstrips, moreover, werebadly cratered, and only the most ex-tensive repairs would ever make themfully operative again .

Although the Palaus were beyond therange of CinCPOA's shore-based planes,other Japanese-held islands in the Caro-lines were not . Yap, Woleai, and Truk,for example, were hit repeatedly bynaval bombers operating from recentlycaptured Allied bases, while the Libera-

102

tors of SWPA flew coordinated, rein-forcing strikes against the same objec-tives . In addition, the B-24s struck atenemy airdromes on Celebes and in thesouthern Philippines in preparation forthe later-scheduled carrier strikes bythe Third Fleet .

To prevent confusion and to coordi-nate strategic air support missions, theheavy bombers of SWPA were to shiftto night bombing runs as soon as Amer-ican carriers began operations in thevicinity of the Palaus . In late August,one group of Admiral Mitscher's fastcarriers made a diversionary raidagainst the enemy-held Volcano-BoninIslands, while the other three proceed-ed to the Palaus and initiated a three-day aerial bombardment with a fightersweep on the afternoon of 6 September .During the next two days, as the war-planes ranged over the islands, bomb-ing and strafing, the cruisers and de-stroyers of the covering screen blastedaway at the Japanese defenses ashore .These fast carrier groups then contin-ued on to their additional mission of in-terdictory strikes against the enemyairbases in the southern Philippines .

After completing its diversionary raidin the Volcano-Bonins, the remainingfast carrier group struck at Yap and,on 10 September, its planes hit the Pa-laus. Notwithstanding the target's pre-vious bombardment by both aircraft andwarships, the naval pilots could lamentthat so many Japanese antiaircraft bat-teries were still active that "Much timeand many bombs were expended beforereturn fire was sufficiently reduced tolet us get down low for close observa-tion and detection of small but impor-tant enemy positions, bivouac areas,


etc."46 This carrier group remained nearthe Palaus, for it was scheduled to aug-ment the striking power of the escortcarriers during the prelanding bombard-ment and to provide additional fire-power on D-Day, if needed .

Land-based planes of both the South-west and Central Pacific commands,meanwhile, flew search and reconnais-sance missions screening the approachto the target by transports and supportships of the Western Attack Force . Thepilots, flying daylight patrols some 50to 100 miles in advance of the mainnaval forces, had orders to attack anddestroy any enemy planes encountered .

A unique addition to the screeningforces was the Submarine Offensive Re-connaissance Group, which was utilizedby Halsey during the Palau operationonly. Composed of three wolf packs ofthree submarines each, the group wasstrung out in attack formation over a300-mile front . The submarines, uponsighting any enemy forces, were to radioa warning of danger to the Western At-tack Force and then attack to inflict themaximum damage. In addition, theywere to provide rescue service fordowned aviators and furnish on-the-spot weather information .Before dawn on 12 September, the

first echelon of the Escort Carrier Groupand the warships of the Fire SupportGroup were off Peleliu ready to beginpreliminary bombardment operations.The four escort carriers, soon to be

- Air IntelGru, CNO, "Comments on 'soften-ing up' strikes in preparation for landing oper-ations, taken from the report of R . L. Kibbe,Cdr, USN, Commander of Air Group Thirteenfor the period 6-16 September 1944," dtd25Nov44 .


joined by another six, had the task ofsafeguarding the approach of the West-ern Attack Force to the target, assist-ing in the softening up of the island'sdefenses prior to the landing, and pro-viding close air support once the Marineswere ashore on Peleliu. In addition, fourseaplane tenders were to arrive in Kos-sol Passage one day before the landingand, after their squadrons had joinedthem, were to provide air-sea rescue andlifeguard, weather, and reconnaissancemissions .

The activity of all planes in the targetarea was closely coordinated with thenaval gunfire and minesweeping opera-tions by Admiral Wilkinson's Com-mander Support Aircraft . Control ofthe close fire support furnished to theinfantry would be handled by the JointAssault Signal Company (JASCO)teams. Each Marine battalion was as-signed such a team, consisting of anaval gunfire officer, an aviation liaisonofficer, and a shore party officer, withthe required communications personneland equipment. Once ashore, the bat-talion commander had only to turn toan officer at his side and heavy gunsfiring shells up to 16-inch or planescapable of bombing, strafing, or launch-ing rockets were at his disposal. TheCommander, Support Aircraft, could, athis discretion, relinquish control of allplanes in the area to the ground com-mander once the expeditionary troopswere firmly established on the beach-head.

First to venture in close to the targetwere the vessels of the Kossol PassageDetachment, which began minesweep-ing operations along the approaches tothe designated transport and fire sup-

103

port areas. Later, these minesweeperswould clear the Kossol Passage, whichwould be utilized as a roadstead whereships might await call to Peleliu for un-loading and in which replenishment offuel, stores, and ammunition could beaccomplished.

At 0530 on the 12th, the large caliberguns of Rear Admiral Jesse B . Olden-dorf's Fire Support Group, consistingof 5 old battleships, 4 heavy cruisers,4 light cruisers, and 14 destroyers, be-gan blasting away at Peleliu's defenses .For two hours, the warships steamedin a zigzag pattern off the island andfired at preselected targets . When thisnaval barrage ceased temporarily, car-rier planes appeared over Peleliu's in-terior and began flying strikes againstthe defenses there. Following this two-hour aerial bombardment, the heavynaval guns resumed their deliberate fire .This alternating of naval gunfire andaerial bombardment was the procedurefollowed during the three days prior tothe assault . During this time, the war-ships expended some 519 rounds of 16-inch shells, 1,845 rounds of 14-inch,1,427 rounds of 8-inch, 1,020 rounds of6-inch, and 12,937 rounds of 5-inch, fora total of 2,255 tons of ammunition .

Special UDTs, meanwhile, had beenlanded on the reef, where they begantheir important tasks of removing un-derwater obstacles, blasting ramps forLSTs and pathways for DUKWs in thecoral, clearing boulders from roadways,and placing buoys and markers . Cladonly in swimming trunks, these under-water experts were constantly fired atby Japanese with rifles and machineguns during the dangerous process ofdestroying the underwater obstructions,

104

which an American admiral describedas "the most formidable which we en-countered in the entire Pacific ."47

Originally, the gunfire support plancalled for only two days of preparatorybombardment prior to D-Day, but thestrong protests of General Geiger hadpersuaded Admiral Wilkinson to addanother day. This extra time, however,did not mean that a larger number ofshells were fired ; instead, the extra daymerely allowed the same amount of am-munition to be expended with greaterdeliberation over a longer period oftime. Since the Japanese had skillfullycamouflaged their artillery positionsand refused to be goaded into return-ing fire, Admiral Oldendorf was of theopinion that the "best that can be doneis to blast away at suspected positionsand hope for the best ." 48 As a result, heended the bombardment early, explain-ing that all targets on Peleliu worthyof naval gunfire had been destroyed .Although the awesome weight, explo-

sive power, and armor-piercing qualityof the shells expended had transformedPeleliu's exterior "into a barren waste-land," 49 neither the enemy nor his pre-pared defenses had been obliterated . Ar-tillery had been hidden carefully in un-derground caves, some of which hadsteel doors to protect their interiors,while the troops had been placed in shel-tered areas, from which they couldemerge, unscathed and combat-ready,

47 Adm Jesse B. Oldendorf ltr to DirMCHist,dtd 25Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File, here-after Oldendorf ltr .

'8 Oldendorf ltr.4B CinCPac-CinCPOA Translations Item No.

12,190, "Extracts taken from the diary of anunidentified man," 15May-15Sep44 .


after the American barrage lifted. Frus-trating as it was for one Japanese sol-dier in a machine cannon company toremain huddled in his shelter while thewarships shelled Peleliu with impunity-the sight so infuriated him that he"could feel the blood pounding in myveins throughout my body" 50-the factremains that only one man in his outfitwas injured by the prelanding bombard-ment, and then only slightly. As Olden-dorf later admitted, "My surprise andchagrin when concealed batteries openedup on the LVTs can be imagined ." 51In addition, one huge Japanese block-house, which the assaulting Marinesconfidently believed would be demolishedsince it was pinpointed on their maps,was later found to have escaped damagecompletely from any of the navalshells52

Oldendorf's decision to break off firehas been described as being "entirelycorrect," by Admiral Fort, who waspresent at the bombardment of Peleliu .The "idea which some people seem tohave of just firing at an island is," saidthe admiral, "an inexcusable waste ofammunition ."53 Colonel William H . Har-

60 Ibid.`lOldendorf ltr.° Admiral Oldendorf commented that this

blockhouse was not shown on the maps fur-nished him and that during "the preliminarybombardment and until several days afterthe landing, my entire staff was on the sicklist, only my flag lieutenant remaining on hisfeet. This threw a heavy load on me, as I notonly had to supervise the details of the daytimeoperations but also operate tactically at nightduring withdrawals ." Ibid .' RAdm George H. Fort ltr to DirMCHist,

dtd 20Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File, here-after Fort ltr.


rison, commanding the 11th Marines atPeleliu, held somewhat similar views,for he doubted "whether 10 times thegunfire would have helped . 1154

Among the Marines actually storm-ing the shelled and bombed beaches atPeleliu and assaulting the still intactJapanese defenses and fortifications,however, there grew a belief, verginglater on a feeling of bitterness, that-thepreparatory naval gunfire left some-

"Comments on the Palau (Peleliu) Mono-graph by Col William H . Harrison, n.d ., here-after Harrison cmts .

105

thing to be desired . After the war, thisbelief was shared by two historians ofamphibious warfare, Isely and Crowl,who wrote-that :

. . . the conclusion cannot be avoided thatpreliminary naval gunfire on Peleliu wasinadequate, and that the lessons learned atGuam were overlooked . . . . Peleliu, likeTarawa and to a lesser extent Saipan,demonstrated that the only substitute forsuch prolonged bombardment was costlyexpenditure of the lives of the assaulttroops

I Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphi-bious War, p . 403 .

D-Day on Peleliu 1

FIRST WAVES ASHORE 2

Dawn on 15 September 1944 brokecalm and clear at 0552 . Sharply silhou-etted against the first rays of sunlightwere the American warships whichfilled the waters off White and OrangeBeaches at Peleliu as far as the eye

'Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis chapter is derived from : III PhibForSTALEMATE II Rpt ; ExTrps SAR ; ILIACPalaus Rpt ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 1st MarDivWarD, 15Sep44 ; 1st MarDiv D-2 Jnl, dtd15Sep44, hereafter 1st MarDiv D-2 Jnl, withappropriate date ; 1st MarDiv D-3 Jnl, dtd15Sep44, hereafter 1st MarDiv D-3 Jnl, withappropriate date ; 1st MarDiv D-3 PeriodicRpt, dtd 15Sep44, hereafter 1st MarDiv D-3Periodic Rpt, with appropriate date; 4th WarDog Platoon, ILIAC, Peleliu OpRpt, 15-30Sep44, dtd 20Nov44, hereafter 4th' War DogPlat Peleliu OpRpt ; Peleliu Comment File ;Japanese CenPac Ops ; Smith, Narrative ;Hough, Assault on Peleliu ; Morison, Leyte ;Smith, Approach to the Philippines ; Isely andCrowl, U.S . Marines and Amphibious War ;McMillan, The Old Breed ; Historical Com-mittee, 81st Infantry Division .

'Additional sources used for this sectionare : TF 32 Peleliu and Angaur Rpt ; TF 32OPlan A501-44, dtd 15Aug44 ; "1st Mar Hist" ;5th Mar OpRpt, 17Aug-160ct44, n.d., here-after 5th Mar OpRpt, with appropriate date ;3/1 Rec of Events, 26Aug-100ct44, n .d ., here-after 3/1 Rec of Events, with appropriatedate ; 3/7 WarD, 24Aug-300ct44, dtd 18Nov44,hereafter 3/7 WarD, with appropriate date ;Boyer, ArmdAmphibianBn ; Cdr. C. M. Black-ford, USCG, "They were all Giants atPeleliu," USNI Proceedings, v. 76, no. 10(Oct50), pp. 1114-1117, hereafter Blackford,"Giants at Peleliu ."

106

CHAPTER 3

could see. Fortunately for the Marinedivision scheduled to assault the strong-ly held enemy island, the weather wasideal for amphibious operations. Onlya slight surf was running, and visibilitywas unlimited in practically every di-rection .3

With his fire support ships already inposition, Admiral Oldendorf in the U . S .heavy cruiser Louisville gave the com-mand and, about 0530, shells beganslamming into the target areas . By thistime, the green-clad Marines slated tocomprise the assault waves already wereloaded in their assigned LVTs and werebeing dispatched toward the line of de-parture. As the amphibian tractorsformed into waves behind the LVT (A) sand began their approach to the beaches,the steady stream of naval shells over-head increased in fury.

On board their amphibious commandships, USS Mount Olympus and MountMcKinley, the ranking Navy and Marinecommanders observed the complicatedlanding operation, while the staff of the1st Marine Division functioned from the

'Flying conditions, in fact, were so phenom-enally good, not only on D-Day but through-out the period of carrier air support, thaton "no occasion was it necessary to denya mission request from an air liaison partybecause of adverse weather, and on only afew occasions was it necessary to postponetemporarily the granting of a mission becauseof local weather conditions ." TF 32 Peleliuand Angaur Rpt, Encl F, p . 4 .

D-DAY ON PELELIU

MARINES boarding landing craft off Peleliu . (USMC A94889)

ASSAULT FORCE under enemy fire at Orange Beach 3 . Note burning amtracs inbackground. (USMC 94937)

107

108

U. S . assault transport DuPage. Al-though this vessel had been equippedas a command ship, the Marines stillhad to furnish much of their own equip-ment for communication purposes whileafloat .

Beginning at 0750, 50 carrier planesbombed enemy gun positions and instal-lations on the beaches . Not once duringthis 15-minute aerial strike did the roarof the ships' guns cease, since the plancalled for the pilots to remain above theflat trajectory of the naval shells . Whilethe Commander, Support Aircraft, wasbusy coordinating air operations withnaval gunfire, the Advance Commander,Support Aircraft, who had handled thistask during the preliminary bombard-ment, prepared to go ashore, where hewould be able to assume control in theevent the Mount Olympus became dis-abled. Destroyers, meanwhile, had placedwhite phosphorus shells on the ridgesof the Umurbrogol to blanket observa-tion by the Japanese artillerymen there,while the heavier warships had shiftedto close fire support and begun firinghigh explosives on the beaches to pul-verize their defenses .

The initial assault wave of LVT (A) scrossed the line of departure at 0800and churned toward White and OrangeBeaches, closely followed by the LVTsfilled with infantry. Preceding were the18 LCIs (Landing Craft, Infantry),which had been equipped with 4 .5-inchrocket launchers . After approachingwithin 1,000 yards of the shore, thesevessels took up positions and began un-leashing salvos of 22 rockets each . Whenthe third assault wave passed the LCIs,they moved to the flanks of the landing


beaches, ready to deliver "on call" fire .Four other LCIs, mounting 4 .2-inchmortars, were stationed on the left(north) flank just off the reef to keepup a continuous fire on the rugged ter-rain in back of White Beach 1 .

No sooner had the sound of the rocketsalvos ceased, than 48 fighter-bombersflown by naval fliers appeared in theskies overhead . Peeling off, these planesstruck at the landing beaches in a finelycoordinated maneuver which kept atleast eight of them in attack at any onetime. Employing bombs, rockets, andmachine guns, they poured down an ef-fective neutralizing fire after the sup-port ships had shifted their targets in-land and to the flanks of the beaches andduring the amphibian tractors' final runto the shore . As the foremost wave ap-proached the water's edge, the fire ofthe planes gradually moved inland, atno time coming closer to the LVT (A) sthan 200 yards .At 0832, the armored amphibians

clambered out of the water onto land,their 37mm and 75mm cannon placingfire upon the beach defenses. A minutelater, the first troop wave touched theshoreline, whereupon the assault Ma-rines hurriedly departed their LVTsand fanned out over the coral sands .Succeeding waves continued to land atone-minute intervals . The sight greet-ing these early arrivals on the beach-head has been aptly described by one ofthe participants

Our amtrac [LVT] was among the firstassault waves, yet the beach was alreadya litter of burning, blackened amphibiantractors, of dead and wounded, a mortalgarden of exploding mortar shells . Holes

D-DAY ON PELELIU

had been scooped in the white sand or hadbeen blasted out by the shells, the beachwas pocked with holes-all filled withgreen-clad helmeted Marines

Only the few scattered Japanese thatsomehow had survived the bombard-ment opposed the landing, but as theLVT (A) s led the attack inland off thebeach, a steadily increasing volume ofenemy artillery, mortar, machine gun,and rifle fire hampered the advance .Strewn over the beaches and reachingabout 100 yards inland were numerousland mines, many of them naval typeswhose "horns (lead covered bottles ofacid) had not been maintained properlyand practically all of these mines failedto detonate. Had these mines been ef-fective the results would have been dis-astrous ." 5 For reasons unknown, manyof the mines had been set on "safe," apossible indication that the Japanesemay have expected the landing on theeastern shore, where the mines werefully armed and fused . 6

The Marines advanced inland beyondthe beaches, maintaining their initialmomentum despite increasing resistanceand heavy losses . As a chaplain with

'Robert Leckie, Helmet for My Pillow (NewYork : Random House, 1957), p . 286, hereafterLeckie, Helmet, used with permission .

' LtCol William E . Benedict ltr to CMC, dtd27Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterBenedict ltr . "The two types most frequentlyencountered were 50 kg. aerial bombs buriedwith the tail assembly down and a pressuredetonating fuse extending some three inchesabove the ground, and the two-horn navalanti-invasion mine. Regarding the latter, itis of interest to note that a great majoritywere not armed." 1st MarDiv SAR, Phase II,Part I to Anx C, p . 6 .

1 Fort ltr.

109

the assault waves marvelled later, "howwe got through the murderous mortarfire which the Japs were laying downon the reef we'll never know. The burstswere everywhere and our men werebeing hit, left and right ."' Carefullysited Japanese high velocity weaponsalso wreaked havoc on the advancingtractors . A 47mm cannon hidden in acoral point jutting into the sea justnorth of White Beach 1 and antiboatguns located on the southwestern pro-montory and on a nearby small islandkept up a devastating enfilading fireupon the approaches to the beaches, aswell as upon the beach flanks them-selves .As more and more LVTs were de-

stroyed, and their burning hulls clut-tered up the beaches, a shortage of theseall-important vehicles was soon felt .The division's action report gave theofficial number of LVTs destroyed thatday as 26, but "unofficial estimates byassault unit commanders bring the totalknocked out at least temporarily in ex-cess of 60 ." 8 This discrepancy in figuresprobably arose because of the observers'inability to differentiate between theblazing LVTs and DUKWs, as well asthe Marines' great skill and ingenuityin repairing crippled LVTs and thus re-storing them to usefulness .

Despite the heavy losses in amphibiantractors, subsequent waves continued to

' Chaplain Edgar E. Siskin ltr, reproducedin Hebrew Union College Bulletin (Apr45),pp. 7-8 .

8 Hough, Assault on Peleliu, p . 37. Oddlyenough, this was the same number that theJapanese claimed to have destroyed on D-Day .Japanese CenPac Ops, p . 84 .

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move shoreward. Landing simultaneous-ly with the fourth wave were the divi-sion's tanks (M-4 Shermans) . Becauseof their excellent waterproofing for theoperation, they successfully negotiatedthe reef, where the worst of the under-water obstacles had been removed byUDTs, and continued toward land insix parallel columns led by their respec-tive LVT guides . The enemy fire, how-ever, proved so intense that over halfof 30 tanks organic to the division suf-fered from one to four hits during the10 minutes necessary to cross the reef .In the 1st Marines' zone, for example,only one of the assigned tanks escapedbeing hit during the trip ashore . Onlythree, however, were completely knockedout of action. "Thus within a half hourafter the initial landing the infantry hadfull tank support-a record unsurpassedin any previous Marine landing in theCentral Pacific, except for the Mar-shalls ." 9

TROUBLE ON THE LEFT10

Colonel Lewis B . Puller's 1st Marinescame in over the White Beaches onschedule . Its 3d Battalion (3/1) 11 landed

° Isely and Crowl, U.S . Marines and Am-phibious War, p . 404 .

10 Additional sources consulted for this sec-tion are : 1stMarHist; 1/1 UHist, dtd 23Nov44,hereafter 1/1 UHist; 3/1 Rec of Events,15Sep44 ; George P. Hunt, Coral Comes High(New York : Harper & Brothers, 1946), here-after Hunt, Coral Comes High .

'For ease of reference, this numerical ab-breviation will be used throughout the volume .For example, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marineswill be referred to sometimes simply as 2/5 .This designation should be understood to in-clude the reinforcing troops that make a bat-talion a BLT .


on White Beach 1, the 2d on WhiteBeach 2, with the 1st landing overWhite Beach 1 at 0945 as regimentalreserve. Colonel Puller rode in with thefirst troop wave and, as his LVTgrounded :

. . . . went up and over that side as fastas I could scramble and ran like hell atleast twenty-five yards before I hit thebeach, flat down . . . . Every platoon leaderwas trying to form a line of his own, justas I was. . . . That big promontory on myleft hadn't been touched by the ship's gunsand planes, and we got a whirlwind ofmachine gun and anti-tank fire ."

Landing with Companies K and I inassault, 3/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Ste-phen V. Sabol) ran into the most de-termined resistance, which, coupledwith the severe enemy shelling and un-expected obstacles, hindered its progresstoward phase line 0-1 (See Map 4) . Asthe left assault unit, Company K was toact as the pivot when the regimentturned north . Its immediate objectivewas the Point-a jagged coral outcrop-ping jutting into the sea and rising some30 feet above the water's edge-fromwhich Japanese gunners were placinga dangerous enfilading fire upon the di-vision's flank. Company K, led by Cap-tain George P. Hunt, was destined toexecute a classic example of a small-unitattack on a fortified position .

The assault rifle platoons climbed outof their LVTs onto the white coral sandonly to find themselves about 100 yardsto the right of their assigned area . Com-pany K immediately attacked inland,nevertheless, and initiated its turningmovement northward with two platoonsin assault. The 3d Platoon on the left

"Quoted in Davis, Marine!, pp . 217-218.

112

close to the shore fought its way to with-in 50 yards of The Point before itsattack stalled. The 2d Platoon pushedstraight ahead some 75 yards beforestumbling into a tank trap and becom-ing pinned down by heavy fire comingfrom the northern end of a long coralridge that loomed up some 30-40 feetto the right front of the startled Ma-rines. The precipitous face of this ob-stacle, shown on none of the photo-graphs or maps supplied to the 1st Ma-rines, was honeycombed with caves anddug-in positions swarming with Jap-anese soldiers. By this time, the heavyfighting against stiff enemy resistancehad reduced the effective strength ofeach of the assault platoons to approx-imately a squad, and contact betweenthe two units had been severed .

Ignoring the gap between his assaultunits, Captain Hunt sent his reserveplatoon forward to press the attackagainst the assigned objective, ThePoint . 13 Before this formidable strong-hold could be seized, Company K wouldhave to overcome five reinforced-con-crete pillboxes, one of which housed a47mm cannon, and the others, heavy ma-chine guns . Each pillbox had from 6 to12 occupants, while other Japanese in-fantrymen, some with light machineguns, had been placed in nearby dug-inpositions and coral depressions toprovide protective fire. All of thesecarefully prepared defenses were stillintact at the time of the Marine as-

""If any portion of my plan was to breakdown, the seizure of the Point must not .Should we fail to capture and hold the Pointthe entire regimental beach would be exposedto heavy fire from the flank ." Hunt, CoralComes High, p. 17.


sault, despite Colonel Puller's having in-sisted upon, and received, assurancesfrom naval officers that this strategicarea enfilading his flank would be prop-erly blanketed with fire during thepreliminary bombardment. 14

Since The Point's fires were orientedprimarily towards the landing beacharea, the Marines decided to assault thebastion from the rear (east) . Gatheringup the remnants of the 3d Platoon, Sec-ond Lieutenant William A. Willis andhis 1st Platoon began slugging their waytoward the top of the objective in theface of concentrated enemy fire . Afterkilling off its protecting infantrymen,the Marines approached each pillboxfrom its blind spot to blast the occupantswith grenades. Finally, the attackersbroke through the maze of infantrypositions and pillboxes to storm thecrest of The Point, but beneath them atthe water's edge could be heard the roarof the 47mm cannon that had wreakedhavoc among the Marines all morning.

Stealthily easing down toward the re-inforced-concrete casemate from above,Lieutenant Willis managed to lob asmoke grenade right in front of the em-brasure, temporarily blinding the gun-ners inside. Mere seconds later, anotherMarine fired a rifle grenade through the

14 Davis, Marine!, p . 214. "At a conferenceon the flagship sometime prior to D-DayCol Puller requested that naval gunfire be putdown on this point even though no enemy gunemplacements could be detected from photo-graphs." Col Richard P. Ross, Jr., memoto DirMCHist, dtd 7Nov49 . 3/1 Rec of Events,15Sep44, states that "The entire point andits defenses were untouched by naval gun-fire ; in fact, the entire length of Beach WhiteOne was only moderately damaged by ourpreparatory firings and bombings ."

D-DAY ON PELELIU

gun port. This bursting grenade prob-ably ignited some stacked ammunition,for the whole interior almost immedi-ately became seared with white-hotflames. When the fleeing Japanese, theirclothes aflame and their cartridge beltsexploding from the intense heat, dashedout, pre-positioned Marine riflemen cutthem down .

By 1015, Company K had fulfilled itsmission, killing a counted 110 enemysoldiers in the process . As a result, theenfilading fire from the left flank hadbeen silenced, but the cost to the Ma-rines had been high. Out of the two-platoon assault force, Captain Huntcould find only 32 survivors with whomto set up a hasty perimeter defense, forhis other platoon was still pinned downin the antitank trap near the coral ridge .Hurriedly a captured Japanese machinegun was rushed into use, for this hand-ful of men soon found themselves iso-lated on the extreme left flank of thedivision and the object of determinedcounterattacks by small enemy groups .

By this time, the 3d Battalion's 81mmmortar platoon, which had suffered 11casualties and lost a base plate soonafter landing, was working its waysouthward on the crowded beach, seek-ing room to set up firing positions. Theearly confusion of the landing was se-verely intensified by heavy enemy fire,for mortars and artillery continued toshell the shallow beachhead, while Jap-anese on the coral ridge some 70 yardsinland swept the area with light andheavy machine gun and rifle fire . Fromtime to time, the ammunition in a shat-tered, blazing tractor would explode,scattering burning debris over the beachand its scurrying occupants. To avoid

113

certain destruction, succeeding waves ofamphibian vehicles merely dumpedtheir contents in the midst of supportplatoons engaged in clearing out smallpockets of enemy resistance and hurriedback to the reef for another load .

Efforts of 3/1 to expand the beach-head area proved disappointing. Notonly had a gap been opened betweenelements of Company K, but its contactwith Company I, attacking on the rightthrough swampy terrain near the 2dBattalion, had been severed . Within 15minutes of The Point's seizure, Lieu-tenant Colonel Sabol ordered two pla-toons from his reserve (the recentlylanded Company L) to fill the gap be-tween the two assault companies . Be-fore these riflemen could complete themission, they too were stopped by heavyfires from the southern portion of thesame ridge that had kept the right as-sault platoon of Company K pinneddown. Despite repeated attempts at bothflanking and frontal assaults, the re-serve group failed to dislodge the en-trenched foe. Thus there was no resump-tion of the advance to establish contact .The battalion commander, meanwhile,had thrown in his last reserve platoonto plug the undesirable gap in CompanyK's lines between The Point and the longcoral ridge.

While 3/1 attempted to remedy itsfrontline problems, the Japanese hadbecome aware of this opening betweenCompany K's assault platoon and hadthrust massed troops into the area .When the reserve platoon arrived on thescene, these enemy soldiers aggressivelyresisted all attempts by the small Ma-rine force to expel them. Since he hadexhausted all the battalion's reserves,

114

Lieutenant Colonel Sabol requested regi-mental assistance to deal with this dan-gerous enemy-held salient in the Marineline .The Marines of 1/1's Company A

hurled themselves into the breach be-tween The Point and the ridge, but su-perior and concentrated Japanese firefrom the coral ridge to their right frontcaused the attack to bog down by inflict-ing severe casualties . For several hours,the Marines pressed determined at-tacks, including tank/infantry assaults,against both the enemy salient and thedug-in foe on the ridge . Finally, ele-ments of Company A succeeded instorming the southern slopes of theridge where some Marines secured afoothold and made contact with Com-pany I on their right. Late in the after-noon, Company B of 1/1 passed throughthe depleted ranks of Company A topress the attack, but enemy fire fromthe ridge halted the advance for the day .

After commitment, the regiment's re-serve battalion established contact be-tween the assaulting rifle companies andnarrowed the gap between The Pointand the ridge, but the opening still wasthere and the danger to the division'sleft flank remained . Had the Japaneselaunched a major counterattack downthe corridor between the ridge and thesea, they might have succeeded in pene-trating to the beaches, which were clut-tered with the men, gear, and suppliesbrought in by later waves . The effectupon the beachhead could have been dis-astrous ; in fact, the possibility existedthat the Marines might have been driveninto the sea .

To counter this threat, Colonel Pullerused the remainder of the regimental


reserve, as well as headquarters person-nel and 100 men of the 1st EngineerBattalion, to form a secondary line ofdefense blocking the route down thecorridor . The feared counterattack inforce did not come, either because theJapanese failed to capitalize upon thistactical opportunity or because the Ma-rines' fire support overwhelmed enemyattempts at massing the troops neces-sary to exploit the gap .

1n contrast to the opposition encoun-tered by 3/1, the 2d Battalion (Lieu-tenant Colonel Russell E . Honsowetz)found relatively less resistance . Uponhitting White Beach 2, the assault com-panies of 2/1 spread out and drove in-land, as a corporal later recorded in hisdiary

I rushed forward with the others-dashing, dodging and jumping over logsand bushes. We must have moved in ahundred yards or so when we came to aswamp . . . . I fell flat on my face andpushed my nose deep into the moist junglefloor, waiting for more fire from the Japs ;maybe I could spot them . . . started towade into the swamp, the Nips againopened fire-burst after burst, and somedid find the mark. . . :s

Advancing inland against resistancedescribed as moderate, the Marines,making use of all their organic weaponsand paced by surviving LVT (A) s,pushed on through the heavy woods andswamps, bypassing well-organized ene-my strongholds or eliminating themwith flamethrowers and demolitions, un-til they reached the 0-1 phase line-about 350 yards inland-by 0945 . Here,in the wooded area facing the airfield,the battalion made a firm contact with

" Quoted in McMillan, The Old Breed, p . 283 .

D-DAY ON PELELIU

elements of the 5th Marines, thus secur-ing the right flank of the regiment, andheld up, awaiting orders to proceedto the next phase line . The 2d Battalionremained here, however, until the fol-lowing morning because of the precari-ous situation on the left .CENTRAL DRIVETO THE AIRFIELD16

The 5th Marines, commanded by Col-onel Harold D . Harris, landed in thecenter with two battalions abreast, theother as reserve following closely. Asthe left flank unit, the 1st Battalioncame in over Orange Beach 1 with tworifle companies in assault, while the 3dBattalion landed in the same formationover Orange 2. The enemy had made ex-tensive use of double-horned mines onboth beaches . Altogether, there werethree rows of them, laid in a checker-board pattern and emplaced at aboutone-meter intervals . Rough weatherprior to D-Day had deposited almost afoot of sand on these mines and sub-stantially decreased their effectiveness .A number of LVTs and DUKWs weredisabled by them, however, and becameeasy targets for the enemy artillery .

"Additional sources used for this sectionare : 5th Mar OpRpt, 15Sep44 ; B-3 Jnl,15Sep-160ct44, hereafter 1/5 B-3 Jnl, withappropriate date ; 2/5 OpRpt, 17Aug44-1Jan-45, n.d ., hereafter 2/5 OpRpt, with appropri-ate date ; 3/5 Rpt of Opns, 26Aug-7Nov44,n.d ., hereafter 3/5 Rpt of Ops, with appro-priate date ; 3/7 WarD, 15Sep44 ; 2/11 SAR,24Aug-29Sep44, n.d ., hereafter 2/11 SAR ;LtCol Robert W . Boyd, "1st Battalion, FifthMarines, 1st Marine Division in the PalauOperation : A Summary of Offensive Action,"(Quantico, Va .: Marine Corps Schools, Am-phibious Warfare School, Senior Course 1948-1949), hereafter Boyd, 1/5 PalauOp .

115

Another period of rough weather soonafter D-Day washed the sand from atopthese mines and made their location andremoval easier . 17

The assault troops of 1/5 (Lieuten-ant Colonel Robert W. Boyd) disem-barked from their LVTs about 25 yardsinland and began a rapid advance east-ward through the coconut palms . En-countering only scattered Japaneseriflemen and an occasional machine gun,the infantrymen pushed on until theyreached the open area on the west edgeof the airfield at 0900 . Shortly afterreaching the phase line 0-1, they tiedin with Marine elements on both flanks .

Across the airfield lay phase line 0-2,but when orders did not come for theadvance to continue, the battalion read-ied its riflemen and automatic weaponsalong a defensive line. Other Marineswith grenade launchers and bazookastook up positions to provide cover bothalong the front and in depth ; four 37mmantitank guns were placed in defiladein shell craters across the front ; andmachine guns were set up to serve asbreakthrough guns in the event the Jap-anese counterattacked . When threetanks of Company B, 1st Tank Battal-ion, arrived, they were spaced out andplaced in hull defilade among the bombcraters.

The caution exercised by the battalionduring this phase of the operation de-rived from the preparatory phase .Shortly before the division left the Rus-sell Islands, a careful study of aerialphotographs had unearthed something

17 BGen Harold D. Harris ltr to HistBr, dtd12Jun66, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterHarris ltr.

116

that bore a very marked resemblanceto tank tracks . A tank-supported coun-terattack debouching from the areanorth of the airfield seemed highly prob-able, since this area offered both coverand concealment . Based on this conclu-sion, the bulk of the anti-tank weaponsand the limited number of tanks avail-able to the 5th Marines were assignedto back up 1/5 . 18

By early afternoon, a battery of 2/11's75mm pack howitzers was ashore anddigging firing positions just to the rightrear of 1/5. All of the artillery batteries'guns, ammunition, and equipment hadto be manhandled to this position fromthe beach, since antitank obstacles pre-vented the use of LVTs. The mission of2/11 was to support the attack of the5th Marines, as well as to supply rein-forcing fires in the zone of the 1st Ma-rines . By 1510, the battalion's Fire Di-rection Center (FDC) was functioningand, 55 minutes later, the first artillerymission was fired at a Japanese gunemplacement. As these howitzers wentinto action, they replaced the LVT (A) sin providing supporting fire for infan-try units .

Although 1/5 was to remain poisedon phase line 0-1 because of the 1stMarines' failure to advance, the 5thMarines' 3d Battalion (LieutenantColonel Austin C . Shofner) was to surgedeep into the interior of Peleliu . It camein over Beach Orange 2 with CompanyI on the left, K on the right, and L inreserve. After the assault troops ori-ented themselves, they immediatelycleared the beach and attacked directlyeast. Company I soon tied in with ele-

38Harris ltr.


ments of 1/5 and gained the first ob-jective, phase line 0-1, within an hourof landing .

Company K, meanwhile, had run intotrouble. In fact, for at least 15 minutesafter H-Hour, it was the right flankunit of the entire division landing . TheLVTs carrying 3/7, scheduled to landon Beach Orange 3, encountered someserious underwater obstacles, which,coupled with the heavy enfilading firefrom the right, caused the drivers toveer to the left. Accordingly, about halfof 3/7's assault units actually landedon Beach Orange 2, where they becameintermingled with 3/5's elemer_ts . 19

No sooner had 3/5's Company K ex-tricated itself from the predicament onthe beach and begun its advance, thana heavy enemy mortar barrage on thesouthern part of Beach Orange 2 andjust inland halted its forward progress .When the barrage lifted a half hourlater, and after elements of 3/7 took uptheir positions on the right flank ofCompany K, the delayed movement to-ward phase line 0-1 began . Upon reach-ing the edge of the airfield, the attack-ing company ran into several mutually-supporting concrete and log pillboxes,which had to be reduced before the firstobjective could be reached . About 1000,however, the company tied in with Com-pany I on the first phase line .

When the push to the east was re-sumed some 30 minutes later, CompanyK retained contact with the advancing

1° "It was noted in this connection that havingthe third battalions of two regiments as adja-cent units added to the difficulty of reorganiza-tion on the beach since there were two `I'Companies, two `K' Companies, and two `L'Companies involved ." 3/7 WarD, 15Sep44.

D-DAY ON PELELIU

elements of 3/7 on the right flank, butquickly lost touch with Company I onthe left, for this unit had the responsi-bility of remaining tied in with 1/5 .As Company K continued to pushthrough the scrub forest, the command-ing officer had trouble maintaining con-tact between his platoons . Not only didthe thick undergrowth limit visibilityto a few feet, but enemy snipers keptup a heavy harassing fire . Company L,which had been sent up to plug the gapbetween Companies I and K, found thegoing much easier through the lightunderbrush in its zone . Shortly afternoon, the two assaulting companieswere stalled by a series of mutually sup-porting pillboxes and trenches mannedby Japanese with automatic weapons .Only after a platoon of tanks could bebrought up was this obstruction re-duced, but by this time, contact betweenCompany K and elements of 3/7 on theright had been severed .

The 2d Battalion (regimental re-serve), meanwhile, had finished landingover Beach Orange 2 by 1015. Quicklyclearing the beach, 2/5 pushed on tothe front, where it relieved CompanyI. This unit then passed around the rearof Company L and assumed a positionbetween the other assaulting companiesof 3/5, thereby reducing Company K'sfrontage. Following its relief of Com-pany I, the 2d Battalion launched a vig-orous drive eastward. Later that after-noon, 2/5 shifted the direction of itsattack northward . Upon the completionof this turning movement, during whichtime the battalion's left flank was keptanchored to 1/5's static defensive posi-tions, the assault elements of the 2dBattalion were deployed around the en-

117

tire southern edge of the airfield . Onthe battalion's right and still retainingcontact was Company L of 3/5, whichwas attacking straight across the islandin coordination with the other rifle com-panies of 3/5 .

After the reduction of the nest ofpillboxes that had pinned 3/5 down, thebattalion's advance resumed . Control ofthat afternoon's attack, however, provedextremely difficult and, even today,what actually happened is not com-pletely known. In advancing throughthe thick scrub jungle that was devoidof any easily recognizable landmark, theriflemen were guided by maps that onlysketchily portrayed the terrain . Difficul-ties in maintaining direction, control,and contact were compounded by steadyenemy resistance. Flank elements hadto take but a few extra steps to the sideand contact became lost with neighbor-ing units. The battalion's control prob-lem was further complicated because ofthe earlier loss of the LVT carryingpractically all of the wire and equip-ment of 3/5's communication platoon .Although most of these Marines man-aged to wade ashore and join the bat-talion early in the afternoon, they hadbeen able to salvage for future use littleof the vital equipment .

During the delay caused by the Jap-anese pillboxes, 3/5 had lost contact onits right flank with elements of 3/7 .Shortly after resuming the advance,Lieutenant Colonel Shofner received aradio message from 3/7's command post(CP) stating that its left flank unitwas on a north-south trail about 200yards ahead of 3/5's right flank ele-ment. Shofner ordered Companies I andK to push rapidly forward . The left

118

flank unit of 3/7, meanwhile, was tohold up waiting for Company K tocome abreast. The two 5th Marinescompanies pressed on across the island,almost reaching the eastern beaches,but never did contact any of 3/7's ele-ments. About 1500, another radio mes-sage from 3/7's CP informed Shofnerthat the position of 3/7's left flank unithad been given incorrectly . Actually, atthe time Company K began its push in-land, 3/7's left flank was some 200yards in the rear of that 5th Marinescompany. The attack of Company K,while 3/7's left flank elements held up,served to widen the existing gap .

When the true location of 3/7's leftflank became known, Shofner orderedCompany K to bend its right flank backin an effort to tie in with the adjoiningregiment. Because its rifle platoons werealready committed, the company had topress headquarters personnel into serv-ice in order to extend the line farenough, but even then the flanking 3/7'selements were not sighted by dark . Dur-ing this late afternoon attack, moreover,Shofner's unit was experiencing troublein retaining contact between its riflecompanies. Only 3/5's left flank unit,Company L, managed to press its ad-vance eastward, all the while remainingtied in with elements of 2/5 on the left .Company L was to have the distinctionof being the only Marine unit to cutcompletely across the island and reachthe opposite beach on D-Day .

All cohesion as a battalion ceasedabout 1700 when 3/5's CP was struckby a well-placed enemy mortar barragewhich wounded the battalion com-mander. Following Shofner's evacua-tion, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W . Walt,


executive officer of the 5th Marines,assumed command, on:y to be faced withthe problem of regaining control overthe scattered units . Setting out on apersonal reconnaissance, Walt first lo-cated Company L, one platoon of whichwas still tied in with 2/5 on the airfieldwhile the other two were preparing aperimeter defense for the night some100 yards farther south in the jungle .After ordering the two isolated platoonsback to the airfield to set up a lineardefense in conjunction with 2/5, thebattalion commander next discoveredthe long-lost left flank of 3/7, whichwas already digging in for the nighton the edge of the airfield some 400yards in from the beach .

Not until 2100, however, did Waltand his runner find Company I, andthen only after a difficult passagethrough the jungle in the dark . TheMarines, isolated from all other friendlytroops and in a perimeter defense, weresome 200 yards south of the airfieldand about 300 yards short of the east-ern shore. Walt dispatched the companytoward the airfield with orders to tiein on the right flank of Company L .Some 100 yards farther southwest fromCompany I, the battalion commanderlocated the last of his units, CompanyK. It was sent back to the airfield to tiein between Company I and the left flankcompany of 3/7, thereby finishing theforming of a defensive line along theedge of the airfield .

The new line was never fully com-pleted, however, for Company I failedto locate its assigned position on theedge of the airfield due to the darkness .The unit finally deployed in the woodsin front of the gap in the 5th Marines'

D-DAY ON PELELIU

lines, thereby minimizing the danger .That night, as the commanding officeradmitted. "No Japanese counterattackas such hit our lines, which was, ofcourse, fortunate ."20

PROGRESS TO THE SOUTH21

The 7th Marines, commanded byColonel Herman H. Hanneken, landedover Beach Orange 3 in column of bat-talions. The 3d Battalion (Major E .Hunter Hurst) landed at H-Hour, withthe 1st following immediately, whilethe 2d was to remain afloat as divisionreserve. To carry out their mission moreefficiently, the two assaulting battalionsmade use of an unusual command struc-ture :

During the landing and initial opera-tions ashore, Company A was attached to3/7 ; to revert to control of CO 1/7 uponhis landing. Company A had the missionof advancing south in the left half of 1/7zone of action. This maneuver was toprovide initial flank protection for 3/7 asit was advancing eastward . The supportcompany of 3/7 was attached to CO 1/7for the landing and reverted to CO 3/7upon landing . 22

2° Maj John A. Crown ltr to CMC, dtd 13Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterCrown it,.

"Additional sources consulted for this sec-tion are : 7th Mar R-2 Jnl, 15Sep-170ct44,n.d ., hereafter 7th Mar R-2 Jnl, with appro-priate date ; 1/7 Combined Bn 2-3 Jnls, 15Sep-170ct44, n.d ., hereafter 1/7 Bn 2-3 Jnls,with appropriate date ; 1/7 HistRpt, 15Sep-300ct44, n.d ., hereafter 1/7 HistRpt, withappropriate date ; 2/7 WarD, 25Aug-260ct44,n.d ., hereafter 2/7 WarD, with appropriatedate; 3/7 WarD, 24Aug-300ct44, dtd 18Nov44, hereafter 3/7 WarD, with appropriatedate ; 3/5 Rpt of Ops, 15Sep44 .

22 LtCol John J . Gormley ltr to CMC, dtd3Nov49, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterGormley ltr I. "It is believed that the decision

119

Exposed as it was on the extremeright flank, the 7th Marines was sub-jected to heavy antiboat, mortar, andmachine gun fire from Japanese weap-ons sited on the southwest promontoryand the small unnamed islet nearby '23as well as to the artillery and mortarfire that was falling along the entirelanding front . Both "natural and man-made obstacles on the reef necessitated[an] approach to the beach in columnrather than normal wave formation" 24

and, as explained earlier, approximatelyhalf of the lead battalion landed to theleft of its assigned beach in 3/5's land-ing area .

Despite the resultant confusion anddispersion, 3/7 quickly reunited andattacked inland with Company I on theleft and K on the right . Fortunately, thebattalion had encountered fewer than30 live Japanese still on the beach, andthese were so dazed from the prepara-tory fires that they were disposed ofquickly by the assault troops as theypushed inland. Although mines, barbed

made during the planning phase to have LT[Landing Team] 1/7 and LT 3/7 swap a com-pany was a wise one and that much time wassaved during the early part of the attack sinceLT 1/7, landing in column behind LT 3/7, didnot have to pass through the beachhead lineof another unit." 3/7 WarD, 15Sep44 .

"While the Naval Gunfire Support planwas under discussion, I strongly urged heavycaliber fire on the unnamed island just southof Orange 3, both in the prelanding andassault phases. This island was a `natural'for enfilading the reef and Orange Beaches .During the ship-to-shore move I did not see asingle indication of friendly fire on this tar-get." Harris ltr .

24 LtCol John J . Gormley ltr to CMC, dtd27Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereaftercited as Gormley ltr II.

120

wire entanglements, and spotty resist-ance from enemy soldiers in mutuallysupporting pillboxes and trenches hin-dered the advance, the Marines obtainedunexpected help from one enemy ob-stacle, a large antitank trench just in-land of Beach Orange 3. Spotted earlythat morning by an air observer, itsexistence was radioed to the staff of3/7 just prior to landing . Accordingto Major Hurst, the trench simplifiedthe reorganization problem

Once officers were able to orient them-selves, it (the antitank ditch) proved anexcellent artery for moving troops intothe proper position for deployment andadvance inland since it crossed the entirewidth of our zone of action approximatelyparallel to the beach . With respect to thebattalion CP, I am convinced that it en-abled us to join the two principal echelonsof CP personnel and commence function-ing as a complete unit at least an hourearlier than would otherwise have beenpossible."

By 0925, 3/7 had seized its beachheadat a cost of 40 Marine casualties and,with two companies in assault, the bat-talion was moving rapidly inlandagainst resistance described as mod-erate. In little over an hour, the fronthad advanced some 500 yards farthereast into the island's interior, and Com-pany K reported the capture of an enemyradio direction tower . Early in the after-noon, however, Company I came upagainst a well organized defense "builtaround a large blockhouse, the concreteruins of a barracks area, several pill-boxes, concrete gun emplacements andmutually supporting gun positions ."2s

I LtCol E. Hunter Hurst ltr to DirMCHist,dtd 23Nov49, in Peleliu Comment File, here-after Hurst ltr. I .

2° 3/7 WarD, 15Sep44 .


To prevent needless casualties, the Ma-rines were halted pending the arrival ofthe landing team's tanks which hadbeen briefed for this particular mission .As the Shermans moved up, making

a wide sweep around the antitanktrench, they chanced upon some Ma-rines working their way along the south-ern fringe of the airfield. When thetroops identified themselves as being ofCompany I, the tank commander at-tached his Shermans to this group ofMarines and operated with them forsome time before discovering that theywere from 3/5's Company I instead of3/7's Company I . All this time, ofcourse, Hurst's battalion had been heldup, awaiting the arrival of the tanks .Accordingly, 3/7's "time schedule,which had worked perfectly up to thatpoint," explained the commanding offi-cer, "was thrown completely off by thedelay entailed, and I believe that to beprincipally responsible for our notreaching the east beach on the firstday."27

While waiting for the Shermans toarrive and reduce the obstructions toits advance, Company I of 3/7 lost allcontact with 3/5's Company K on theleft flank. Accordingly, Major Hurstplaced Company L, which had landedwith 1/7, in a reserve position behindCompany I and echeloned it toward theleft rear to safeguard that flank andto allow the attack to continue . Patrolsfrom Company L were dispatched to

27 Hurst ltr I . "Incidentally, this incident isone of many which reflect on the lack of train-ing prior to Peleliu. With adequate tank-infantry training behind us, the tank person-nel would have known to which I Co they hadattached themselves ." Ibid .

D-DAY ON PELELIU

the north in search of the adjoiningregiment's right flank unit, but the fore-most patrol emerged upon the airfieldshundreds of yards in the rear of theunit it was attempting to locate .

The 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colo-nel John J. Gormley), meanwhile, hadlanded but suffered from the same anti-boat fire and underwater obstacles thathad scattered the lead battalion . As aresult, some of 1/7's men ended up onOrange 2. Once ashore, the 1st quicklyregrouped and began clearing the beach .Its zone of action was on the extremeright of the division landing, that por-tion of the beach which Company A of1/7 had seized earlier when landingattached to 3/7 . This company, afterrejoining its parent unit, attacked di-rectly east on the left, while CompanyC advanced southward on the right,and Company B remained in reserve .Until about noon, the resistance to thebattalion's advance was described aslight, although heavy mortar fire wasreceived .

Immediately after moving off thebeach, the Marines ran into a thickmangrove swamp which extended acrossa large portion of 1/7's front. WhenMarines of Company C tried to maketheir way along the only path skirtingthe western (right) edge of the wateryobstacle, they received heavy machinegun and rifle fire from Japanese en-trenched in pillboxes constructed outof large pieces of coral . As a result,their progress was seriously hindered .Company A, on the other hand, hadworked its way around the easternfringe of the swamp only to find itselfsome 250 yards within 3/7's zone ofaction. Lieutenant Colonel Gormley or-

121

dered the reserve company up to tie inbetween the assaulting companies, asthe heavy fighting which had begunabout noon continued .

Since the 7th Marines had failed tokeep on schedule, all of its elementspushed on as rapidly as possible in thegathering dusk. Not until 1715 did thefrontline units receive orders to dig infor the night . No sooner did the Marinesattempt to tie in their lines, than theenemy began executing a forward move-ment by means of light machine gunteams operating in mutual support. Lat-eral movement along the front becamedifficult and the Marines were forcedto organize only hasty defensive posi-tions .

Although several localized counter-attacks were launched against the 7thMarines' lines during the hours of dark-ness, only one posed any real danger .Company C was hit at approximately0200, when a strong Japanese forceswarmed out of the swamp and attackedthe Marines' night defenses . Some en-emy troops even succeeded in penetrat-ing the forward positions, whereupona number of beach party personnel werepressed into service as a mobile reserve .During the four hours of fighting, theMarines inflicted some 50 casualtiesupon the attackers before the Japanesebroke off the action .28

' Gormley ltr I . "It is my recollection thatthe Reconnaissance Co . was deployed just be-hind 1/7 on the night of D Day . . . . Duringthe night a runner supposedly from 1/7 CPcontacted men with orders to move forwardand plug up the lines which were beingbreached by the enemy. . . . The Second Pla-toon then moved forward under fire and tookits place in a gap about 40 yards . . . [and]

122

JAPANESE COUNTERATTACKS 29

It was not until late afternoon ofD-Day that the Japanese, whose failureto seize tactical advantage from thefluid situation was puzzling, made theirmajor bid to drive the invaders intothe sea, but by then it was too late . TheMarines had already established abeachhead and had made preparationsto frustrate any bold attempt by theenemy to smash through to the vitalsupply dumps and unloading areas .

First warning of the Japanese inten-tions came about 1625, when partic-ularly heavy enemy artillery and mor-tar fire began falling on Marine posi-tions. Then, at 1650, Japanese infantryin estimated company-strength ap-peared on the northern edge of the air-field and began advancing across it. ToMarines hoping for a massive banzaicharge to facilitate their task of wipingout enemy resistance, the cool profes-sional way in which these enemy soldiersnegotiated the open area, taking maxi-mum advantage of every dip and shellhole in the terrain over which theypassed, was disappointing .

A large number of Japanese tanks,meanwhile, was forming up behind theprotective shield of the ridges to thenorth of the airfield. They debouchedin two columns upon the open terrainabout 600 yards to the left front of1/5 in full view of the Marines . After

accounted for at least 30 of the enemy killedduring the night." 1stLt Robert L. Powell, Jr .,ltr to CMC, n.d ., in Peleliu Comment File,hereafter Powell ltr.

'Additional sources used for this sectionare : 5th Mar OpRpt, 15Sep44 ; 1/5 B-3 Jnl,15Sep44 ; 2/5 OpRpt; 3/5 Rpt of Ops, 15Sep44 ; 2/11 SAR ; Boyd, 1/5 PalauOp .


skirting the northern fringe where thejungle growth gave some scant cover,the enemy tanks swung out "in whatcan best be described as two echelonformation [and] headed for the centerof the 1st Battalion . About half of theenemy tanks had from eight to a dozenJapanese soldiers riding (tied) on theoutside of the tanks ."30

These light tanks, really tankettes byAmerican standards, 31 soon cameabreast the infantry advancing in dis-persed formation across the open air-field and quickly left them far behind .The Japanese tank commander em-ployed his only sound tactic, which wasracing straight ahead at full throttlefor the Marine lines . If the tank officershad attempted to coordinate their attackwith the slower moving infantry, notone of the enemy tanks would havegained the Marine lines, for many ofthe organic weapons of a rifle batttalioncould have knocked them out.

Fortunately for the Marines, the placewhere this tank/infantry attack wasaimed, the junction between the 1st and5th Marines in the woods southwest ofthe airfield, was held by the units bestorganized to withstand a determinedthrust of this type . Colonel Harris,knowing that the forward elements ofhis 5th Marines would end up facingthe level terrain where conditions wereideal for tank maneuvers, had ordered

3D Boyd, 1 /5 PalauOp, p. 16 .si The Marine tank commander on Peleliu

described the Japanese light tanks as merely"light reconnaissance vehicles" possessing"only 74" to 3/s" armor," and stated that these"tankettes were not worthy of the name tankand were doomed to certain destruction in anyheavy action." Stuart ltr.

D-DAY ON PELELIU

that heavy machine guns and 37mmantitank guns be unloaded with theassault troops and set up on phase line0-1 as soon as this initial objective wasseized. It was for this reason that Lieu-tenant Colonel Boyd had placed thethree Shermans attached to his 1st Bat-talion in hull defilade when further ad-vance did not seem likely . Although theAmericans had exact intelligence as tothe number of enemy tanks and expectedsome form of violent reaction from theJapanese during the day, the suddenappearance of the tanks on the airfieldand the speed of their charge towardsthe Marine lines caused some surprise .

The course of the enemy tank attackran diagonally across the front of 2/1,whose men opened up with everyweapon they had . Two of the tankssuddenly veered right and crashed intothe battalion's lines . Some 50 yards in-side, the tanks hurled over an embank-ment and landed in a bog. When theJapanese attempted to escape theirmired vehicles, nearby infantrymenquickly dispatched them .

Although all except one of 2/1's at-tached Shermans had returned to thebeach to rearm, they only had to movesome 50 yards to gain a clear field offire and to engage the enemy tanks . 32Once the Marines opened fire, the dustbecame so dense that sighting by theShermans was possible only betweenthe dust clouds, which slowed down theirrate of fire . The first few rounds hadbeen armor-piercing, but these shells,

" Capt Robert E. Brant ltr to CMC, dtd9Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterBrant ltr. " . . . the tank commanders wereadjusting fires from their turrets just as ifthey were on a gunnery range ." Ibid .

123

to the Marines' dismay, passed com-pletely through the thin hulls of theJapanese light tanks to detonate harm-lessly on the ground . After the gunnersswitched to high explosive ammunition,however, the effect of the Shermans'fire was devastating .

Other Marine tanks working throughthe woods on the southern side of theairfield with advance elements of 2/5,meanwhile, spotted the enemy armorearly and "moved out on the airstripand were shooting as soon as the firstJap tank touched the other side of theairport." 33 The part that these Sher-mans played in the following action waswitnessed by Lieutenant Colonel Waltfrom an advantageous position justright of the 1/5 lines

. . . four Sherman tanks came onto thefield in the 2/5' zone of action on the southend of the airfield and opened fire imme-diately on the enemy tanks . These fourtanks played an important role in stop-ping the enemy tanks and also stoppingthe supporting infantry, the majority ofwhich started beating a hasty retreatwhen these Shermans came charging downfrom the south. They fought a runningbattle and ended up in the midst of theenemy tanks .'

Men of 1/5, meanwhile, opened upwith their 37mm's and heavy machineguns, while their immobile Shermansadded cannon fire . Just inside the bat-talion's front lines were set up the onlyartillery pieces ready to function at thistime. Battery E of 2/11 began firing

'' Maj Jack R. Munday Itr to CMC, dtd13Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterMunday ltr.

34 LtCol Lewis W. Walt ltr to CMC, dtd25Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafterWalt ltr.

124

at maximum rate as soon as the Jap-anese tanks appeared on the airfield .Once the enemy vehicles came withinrange, Marines employing bazookas andgrenade launchers took them under fire .Overhead, a Navy dive bomber swoopeddown to plant a 500-pound bomb rightin the midst of the onrushing enemytanks, adding air power's destructivecapability to the holocaust already en-gulfing the counterattack from everyavailable Marine weapon in range .

Under the weight of this combinedfire, the tank-infantry charge quicklybegan melting away . Some of the tanksexploded, spreading flaming fragmentsfar and wide, while the hitchhikingsoldiers just seemed to disintegrate. Notall of the Japanese tanks were knockedout, however, and these survivorssmashed into the front lines of 1/5 .Penetrating far to the rear past star-tled Marines, these tanks created con-fusion and dismay among the beachheaddefenders .As the commanding officer of 1/5

described the scene, these tanks "wererunning around wildly, apparently with-out coordination, within our lines firingtheir 37mm guns with the riders onthose tanks carrying external passen-gers yelling and firing rifles ."35 OneJapanese vehicle headed straight forthe firing howitzers in an attempt tooverrun them. A Battery E gunner hitthe tank with the first round of directfire, stopping it in its tracks, and abazooka team finished the job. Anothertank nearly reached the beach beforefirepower from rear area troops knockedit out. Marines in frontline positions,

Boyd, 1/5 PalauOp, p . 16 .


however, did not panic . Once the enemyvehicles passed them, they remained inplace, ready to engage the followingJapanese infantrymen.

When the smoke of battle cleared,no enemy riflemen were in sight . Theyhad either been destroyed by the over-whelming firepower brought to bearupon them or preferred to retreat inthe face of it. Two Marines were foundcrushed to death by enemy tanks and afew other men had been wounded byflying fragments of exploding tanks .One Sherman had even suffered threehits by bazookas, indicative of the con-fusion caused by the counterattack . Thecommanding officer of the 1st TankBattalion, however, thought that theswift collapse of the tank-infantrycounterattack was "no grounds forsmugness in regard to our antitankprowess. Had the Japanese possessedmodern tanks instead of tankettes andhad they attacked in greater numbersthe situation would have been criti-cal." 36

What actually happened during thosefew brief minutes of furious combat hasremained cloudy and unclarified downto the present . For example, if all theclaims of individual Marines were ac-cepted, the total of Japanese tanks de-stroyed that day would be several timeshigher than what the enemy garrisonhad on Peleliu. Even the number oftanks engaged in the charge is in doubt,and those destroyed were so fragment-ized and riddled by marks of variousMarine weapons that no accurate countcould be made or credit definitelygranted to the weapon responsible for

' Stuart ltr.

D-DAY ON PELELIU

AFTERMATH of enemy tank attack on Peleliu airfield . (USMC 95921)

.30 CALIBER MACHINE GUN in action on Peleliu. (USMC 95248)

125

126

the vehicle's demise. Apparently, twoof the Japanese light tanks escaped,leaving 11 as the number destroyed .37

Although foiled in their major at-tempt to annihilate the invaders, theJapanese did not lose heart . Duringthe rest of the day and night, theypressed against the Marine lines, at-tempted to infiltrate these positions, andlaunched numerous localized counterat-tacks. The next major threat cameabout 1750, when two Japanese lighttanks, this time coordinating theirmovement with supporting infantry,started across the northern runway,aimed as before at the junction betweenthe 1st and 5th Marines. The heavierweapons of the Marine division quicklydispatched the two tanks, while the ap-proaching soldiers were cut down orscattered well forward of the front linesby the hurricane of automatic fire un-leashed by nearby units . About a halfhour later, the enemy engaged the Ma-rines at the junction of 1/5 and 2/5 ina fire fight which soon faded out . Thenext morning in a pre-dawn attack, twomore Japanese light tanks accompaniedby a group of soldiers attempted anattack upon 1/5's lines, but without anysuccess .

Throughout the hours of darkness,the use of star shells and 60mm mortarilluminating ammunition precluded anysurprise movements by the Japanese,while those artillery pieces alreadyashore kept up harassing fires to pre-vent regrouping of the enemy's forces .Probably because of this, no majorcounterattack developed on the extremeleft flank of the division to exploit the

1 5th Mar OpRpt, 15Sep44 ; 1/5 B-3 Jnl,15Sep44 ; Walt ltr .


precarious situation there . The smallband of Marines isolated on the Point,however, was reduced through attritionby numerous small, but determined,enemy thrusts until only 18 men, rely-ing on a single captured machine gun,remained to resist a counterattack .

Farther south, Marine units were sub-jected to infiltration tactics and minorcounterattacks by a determined foethroughout the night, but 2/1 and 1/5were tied in on phase line 0-1 . Ex-cept for the difficulties of 3/5 and thetwo assault battalions of the 7th Ma-rines in locating each other and estab-lishing contact, the situation appearedto be in good shape. Before halting forthe night, 2/5 had surged half wayacross the open airfield to make thebiggest gain of any Marine battalionfor the day. The advance in the south-ern portion of the island, although no-where near the optimistic goals set bythe division commander, had opened upmuch-needed space for the emplacingof artillery and the locating of inlandsupply dumps to relieve some of thebeach congestion .SUPPORT OPERATIONS38While assault Marines aggressively

expanded the shallow beachhead, other

"Additional sources consulted for this sec-tion are : 2d MAW UHist; MAG-11 UHist ;MAG-11 Palau Rpt ; 11th Mar OpRpt, dtd10Nov44, hereafter 11th Mar OpRpt ; 5th MarOpRpt; 5th Mar Rpt on Sup and Evac, n.d .,hereafter 5th Mar Sup-Evac-Rpt ; QM, 5th MarRpt on Sup, PeleliuOp, dtd 4/Oct44, hereafter5th Mar SupRpt ; 3/5 Rpt of Ops ; 8th Am-phibian TractorBn, ILIAC, OpRpt, dtd 300ct44, hereafter 8th Amphibian TractorBnOpRpt; LtCol W. A. Bean, Canadian Army,Observer's Report-Palau, dtd 310ct44, here-after Bean, Observer's Rpt-Palau .

D-DAY ON PELELIU

members of the task force laboredstrenuously to organize the beach areaand to maintain a steady stream of vitalsupplies moving shoreward and inland .On the whole, this essential job wasperformed well, despite the enemy'sheavy artillery, mortar, and machinegun fire upon the beaches . Although theshore party suffered twice the numberof casualties on Peleliu than had beenthe case in any previous 1st MarineDivision operation, such losses "did notaffect the constant unloading of sup-plies."39

The decision to create a waterbornesupply dump by means of floatingbarges proved to be "an excellent solu-tion to an extremely important prob-lem . . . and enabled the force ashoreto get along on a minimum margin ofsupply and also avoided congesting thebeach with large quantities of suppliesbefore it was prepared for their recep-tion."40 Another example of good fore-sight was the use of large numbers ofamphibian trailers, which succeeded instaving "off a threatened shortage ofartillery and machine gun ammunitionuntil unloading could be resumed atdawn on Dog plus One ."41

The unloading of mechanized equip-ment proceeded on schedule so that bylate afternoon, most of the cranes andbulldozers were in operation . Some ofthe shore party's labor forces, however,did not arrive at their assigned locationsuntil the morning after D-Day owingto the lack of LVTs and DUKWs to

'° 1st MarDiv SAR, Phase II, Part I to AnxC, p. 2 .

"0 Bean, Observer's Rpt-Palau, p . 13 .' ist MarDiv SAR, Phase II, Part I to Anx

C, p. 3 .

127

transport them. The intense enemy firetook its toll of the advancing amphib-ian waves and "resulted in a continuousshortage of amphibious vehicles intowhich to transfer boat waves, and thesewaves hit the beach further and fur-ther behind schedule ."42

This unfortunate situation was in-tensified by the fact that damaged LVTswere being dispatched to a repair shipwhich was already loaded to capacitywith other amphibians in need of re-pair, thereby forcing these LVTs tomill about until they could be takenaboard. "Unnecessary wear and tear ondamaged tractors resulted . In addition,as many as four (4) LVTs were towingother LVTs, thereby taking out of serv-ice from the beach badly needed trac-tors ."43 When it was discovered that itwas possible to bring LCVPs over thereef to the beach at high tide, the situ-ation was alleviated somewhat .

Participating actively in the logisticeffort were the forward ground echelonsof MAG-11's squadrons . Previously or-ganized working parties operated smallboat platoons for the unloading of equip-ment and evacuating of the wounded,while other Marines served as stretcherbearers, ammunition carriers, and evenriflemen and grenade throwers on thefront lines. Moreover, some 50 menfrom VMF(N)-541 landed in a groupand manned a, second line of defenseagainst Japanese infiltration of the 7thMarines' mortar positions .

° Bean, Observer's Rpt-Palau, p . 11 ."8th Amphibian TractorBn, OpRpt. "In one

case, an LVT with a damaged hull came along-side the repair ship, and not being able to getaboard, sank alongside ." Ibid .

128

Ashore, the assault forces were en-countering and solving their own logis-tic headaches . The trials of the 5thMarines, in particular, revealed thatcomplications arise even in the best laidplans. By afternoon, the heavy fightingexperienced by 3/5 during its advanceacross the island had resulted in a criti-cal supply shortage, for almost all theassault companies' rifle and machine gunammunition had been expended . Re-placement of these essential items tothe assaulting battalion, however, washampered seriously by the LVT short-age and the heavy enemy shelling . Jap-anese observers kept the entire regi-mental beach under strict surveillanceand continually called down artilleryand mortar fire whenever amphibianvehicles reached the shore. Even the5th Marines' assigned amphibian trail-ers, which were being employed atPeleliu specifically to provide timely re-placement of high expenditure-rate am-munition, did not help to alleviate theshortage. These trailers were not re-ceived by the regiment until after theinitial supply problem had been solved,and even then, all except two weredelivered in damaged condition .

Complicating the whole supply situ-ation for the 5th Marines was the earlyloss of its assigned beach party com-mander. This naval officer had beenwounded almost immediately upon ar-rival ashore, and his successor fell to asniper bullet soon after. As a result, theregimental quartermaster was forced tostep in and assume this additional re-sponsibility, an unwanted command ofwhich he was not relieved until late inthe afternoon. Just one of the many


problems connected with this new taskwas the mounting number of casualties .Because of the shortage of amphibianvehicles, a. speedy evacuation of thewounded was impossible, and the firstaid stations on the beaches soon reachedthe overflowing stage. Too late, theMarine commander learned that thebeach party had not marked the regi-mental beach properly, and when theevacuation LVTs finally arrived, theyencountered difficulties in locating theirassigned landing points .

The need on the front lines for water,rations, and ammunition, meanwhile,was so great that every available ve-hicle of the 5th Marines was kept busyhauling these critical items up to theembattled infantrymen . Accordingly,the work of clearing the rest of theregiment's equipment off the beach washindered, and the unloading areas stead-ily became further congested . Despitethese handicaps, however, the Marinesof the 5th managed to surmount theselogistic stumbling blocks by one meansor another, and the regiment's driveacross the enemy-infested island pressedon .

Like the other assault units of thedivision, the 5th Marines quickly dis-covered that the water supply containedin the 55-gallon drums, while drinkable,was extremly unpalatable. The oildrums had been improperly steam-scoured and, as a result, the water inthem became fouled. Marines also foundthat those drums which had not beenfilled flush with the top had rusted inthe tropical heat, polluting the water .

At any rate, the lack of a readilyavailable water supply on the coral

D-DAY ON PELELIU

island was "one of the most criticalitems in this operation ."44 One tankofficer jotted down in his notebook thatthe infantrymen in the front lines onD-Day were begging for water "likedying men."45 The enervating heat ofPeleliu, when coupled with the island'slack of surface water, caused numerouscases of heat prostration among theattacking troops . Although these menbounced back to full combat effective-ness after a few days aboard ship wherewater was plentiful, their much-neededpresence during the critical assaultphase was lost 4 6

By nightfall, most of the 11th Ma-rines' artillery was ashore and itsbatteries had completed registrationfiring, 47 but not before encounteringvarious complications . Some artilleryunits, finding their assigned firing posi-tions still in enemy hands, had to searchfor new sites on the crowded beachhead ;others, discovering their designatedlanding beaches too congested and theenemy fire too intense, had to divert

Q4 Worden ltr . "Lack of water during thefirst three days ashore caused scores of menin my battalion (1/7) to become real casual-ties-unfit to fight, unable to continue . . . asmany casualties as enemy fire ." I bid ." Munday ltr.'Fortunately, this water situation was alle-

viated somewhat when potable water was dis-covered by digging shallow holes in the sandnear the shore, and the problem vanished com-pletely once the engineers got their distillationunits operating on the island.

' 7 "By 1800 the artillery had one and a halfBns [Battalions] of 75mm pack howitzers andone and a third Bns of 105mm howitzers inposition, registered and ready to furnish sup-porting fires ." 1st MarDiv D-3 Periodic Rpt,15Sep44 .

129

their Marines and equipment to areasmore appropriate for getting ashoreand setting up to engage the Japanese .Two 105mm howitzer batteries of 3/11were actually ashore, but still aboardtheir D,UKWs, when ordered back to theLSTs for the night. During the returntrip to the ships across the jagged coralreef, the already damaged hulls of threeof the DUKWs were further holed, caus-ing them to sink with the loss of allhowitzers and equipment aboard . Thesurviving 105mm's were landed againearly the following morning, as was thecorps artillery, which had been pre-vented from landing on D-Day becauseof the shallow width of the beachhead .

TWENTY-FOUR HOUR TOE HOLD 48Although General Rupertus remained

on board ship during D-Day, his assist-ant, Brigadier General Oliver P . Smith,went ashore with a skeleton staff assoon as confirmation came that the as-sault battalions of the 5th Marines helda firm foothold on the beach . Smitharrived on Peleliu about 1130 and setup an advance command post in anantitank ditch a short distance inlandfrom Beach Orange 2. Almost immedi-ately, he made contact with the CPs ofthe 5th and 7th Marines, as well as withthe command ship, but even attemptsby radio failed to bring a response fromPuller's regiment .4s

"Additional sources used for this sectionare : lstMarHist; 11th Mar OpRpt ; 7th MarR-2 Jnl, 15Sep44 ; 2/7 WarD, 15Sep44 ."To facilitate communications ashore, the

division had been allotted an experimentalLVT (A) that had been extensively modified asa mobile radio station . "This vehicle, while not

130

Earlier, the 1st Marines had sufferedthe loss of many skilled radio operatorsand much communications equipmentwhen enemy fire had scored direct hitsupon the five LVTs carrying the regi-mental headquarters ashore . To makematters worse, the CP was no soonerset up ashore when it was hit by amortar shell that caused further dam-age and disorganization . Accordingly,neither Puller nor the division had aclear picture of the tactical situationconfronting the 1st's assault platoons orof the units' casualties. It was not untillate afternoon that Smith was able totalk to Puller by radio, and even thenno inkling of the true precariousness ofthe situation on the division's left flankwas gained .

When reports began trickling out tothe command ship about the heavyfighting developing ashore, Rupertus'natural concern was over the loss of theinitial momentum of the assault . Hisattention was drawn early to the plightof the 7th Marines, for just aftermidmorning the division commanderlearned of the loss by that regiment of18 LVTs, and shortly before noon hereceived the 7th Marines' report of"Heavy casualties. Need ammo, rein-forcements ."50 It was, therefore, thefailure of the 7th to achieve the speedyconquest of the south rather than thebitter dug-in enemy resistance to thenorth, which worried the division com-

completely successful, performed a highly use-ful service for General Smith's Advance CP onD-Day." LtCol Frederick A . Ramsey, Jr., Itr toCMC, dtd 28Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File,hereafter Ramsey ltr.' 7th Mar R-2 Jnl, 15Sep44 .


mander. He knew, moreover, that the7th Marines had suffered heavy losses .

By noon, Rupertus had ordered thatthe Division Reconnaissance Company,part of the floating reserve, go ashorefor commitment with the 7th Marines 51

That afternoon, when the situation inthe south still had not remedied itself,and after requesting General Smith'sand Colonel Hanneken's opinions,Rupertus committed 2/7, the remainingdivision reserve. Before the BLT couldbe landed, however, the approach ofdarkness and the shortage of amphibianvehicles resulted in its being orderedback to the ships . Some of the returningboats failed to locate the Marines' shipin the darkness and spent the entirenight searching, while the troops inthem remained in cramped quarters .The Marines in two other boats, becauseof the "confusion caused by conflictingorders,"52 were landed by LVTs laterin the night. Since neither Smith norHanneken really desired the additionalcombat troops because their arrivalwould only further congest the alreadyovercrowded beaches, 2/7's inability toland had no decisive effect upon the firstday's fighting.As the day wore on the situation

ashore worsened-"it was a pretty grim

' "When he committed the ReconnaissanceCompany it was not, in the CG's [CommandingGeneral] mind, (in my opinion) that it was aunit but that it was a group of individualinfantry replacements." Fields ltr . "This wasan improper use of the Reconnaissance Com-pany, as there later developed several oppor-tunities for employment of this company in themanner for which it had been trained ." Smith,Narrative, p. 30 .

2/7 WarD, 15Sep44 .

D-DAY ON PELELIU

outlook at that time," 53 recalled Ruper-tus' chief of staff, Colonel John T .Selden-the Marine commander beganto express anxiety to be on the scenehimself, a desire which was intensifiedwhen he learned that General Geiger,corps commander, was already ashore .Colonel Selden and other staff members,fearful that a single enemy round mightwipe out the entire top echelon duringthe perilous journey to the beach, finallyprevailed upon Rupertus to remainafloat. Selden insisted, however, thatthe bulk of the command echelon goashore .

Upon reaching the transfer line, thecommand group discovered 2/7's Ma-rines still waiting for amphibian vehi-cles to transport . them across the reef .Because he "decided that superimposinga second staff on General Smith was use-less and ridiculous,"' and that whatwas needed ashore was more combattroops and artillery, Colonel Selden ar-ranged for his party to lie off the trans-fer line until elements of 2/7 cleared it .When LVTs or DiUKWs still had notarrived by darkness, Selden sent off amessage to Rupertus stating his inten-tion of returning to the command ship,and then brought his party back .55On D-Day, Rupertus had expected

that his assault troops would seize Ob-jective 0-1, which included a 300-yard

"BGen John T. Selden ltr to HistDiv,HQMC, dtd 260ct49, in Peleliu Comment File,hereafter Selden ltr .

Ibid .' "During this period, we had to shift posi-

tion on more than one occasion due to highvelocity guns that were beginning to registertoo close for comfort ." Selden ltr .

131

penetration behind the northern beachesand all of Peleliu south of the airfield .Then he had hoped to attack across theopen runways to capture Objective 0-2,which embraced all of the island southof the ridges behind the airfield . Actual-ly, at day's end the Marines had pene-trated approximately 300 yards behindthe northern beaches, but held only anarrow wedge of terrain across theisland behind Beach Orange 3 . Thisshallow beachhead "had cost the division210 dead (killed in action, died ofwounds, missing presumed dead), and901 wounded in action ; total casualtiesof 1,111, not including combat fatigueand heat prostration cases ." 56

In contrast to the Marine command-er's concern over the progress of hisassault troops ashore on Peleliu, theJapanese commander's report on theday's fighting glowed with optimism

. . . by 1000 hours, our forces success-fully put the enemy to rout . . . . At 1420hours, the enemy again attempted to makethe perilous landing on the southwesternpart of our coastline. The unit in thatsector repulsed the daring counter-attack,and put the enemy to rout once more .However in another sector of the coastlinenear AYAME [Beach Orange 3] the enemywith the aid of several tanks were suc-cessful in landing, although they wereencountering heavy losses inflicted by ourforces. . . . Our tank unit attacked theenemy with such a cat-like spring at dusk,that they were able to inflict heavy dam-ages on the enemy. . . "

00 Hough, Assault on Peleliu, p . 75 . "Thesewere very heavy losses and could not have beensustained for very many days in successionwithout destroying the combat efficiency of thedivision ." Smith, Narrative, p . 34 ."Japanese CenPacOps, p . 85 .

The Drive Inland: 16-22 September'

THE MORNING AFTER2The "whiskery, red-eyed, dirty Ma-

rines," observed a civilian combat artiston the morning of 16 September, "hadspent the night fighting in foxholes filledwith stinking swamp water ; they wereslimy, wet and mean now ."3 The inter-vening hours of darkness had beenfilled with the roar of artillery and therattle of automatic weapons as theinfantrymen beat back localized coun-terattacks. From time to time, starshells and flares from the U .S. cruiserHonolulu, the six destroyers, and fourLCI gunboats remaining in support casta greenish pallor over the embattledisland. Small groups of Japanese, somewearing helmets of dead Marines, infil-trated behind the frontline positions,and furious hand-to-hand struggles oc-

' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thischapter is derived from ILIAC Palaus Rpt ;1st MarDiv SAR ; 1st MarDiv WarD, 15-23Sep44 ; 1st MarDiv D-2 Jnl, 15-23Sep44 ; 1stMarDiv D-3 Periodic Rpt, 15-23Sep44 ; PeleliuComment File; Japanese CenPac Ops ; Smith,Narrative ; Boyer, Armd Amphibian Bn ;Hough, Assault on Peleliu.; Morison, Leyte ;Smith, Approach to the Philippines ; Isely andCrowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War ;McMillan, The Old Breed .

2 Additional sources consulted for this sec-tion are : 1st MarDiv POW Interrogation RptsPeleliu, 16Sep-160ct44, hereafter 1st MarDivPOW Interrogation Rpts Peleliu ; Richard,U.S. Naval Administration .'Tom Lea, Peleliu Landing (El Paso : Carl

Hertzog, 1945), p. 22 .

132

curred in the rear. Three enemy soldierseven made a brief appearance near thedivision CP before a burst of fire froman alert sentry cut them down .

Under the cover of darkness, shoreparty and support troops made use ofavailable LVTs and DUKWs to rushammunition and water up to the frontand to evacuate the wounded. In somecases, vital supplies had to be labori-ously hand-carried forward so that themorning attack could start on schedule .No new orders were needed. All regi-ments were to resume the assault andbend every effort to seize the objectivespreviously assigned (See Map 5) .

Following a half-hour air and navalgunfire bombardment, the divisionjumped off along the entire line at 0800 .Two hours later, General Rupertus cameashore to assume direct control of theadvance. The day turned extremely hot-105 degrees in the shade-and themen, already enervated by their previ-ous day's exertions and their night-longvigil, suffered greatly as they foughtexposed to the merciless sun. Canteensquickly emptied, and a rapid resupplyproved impossible. As panting menslumped to the ground, often with"tongues so swollen as to make it im-possible for them to talk or to swal-low,"' the strength of the attackingunits deteriorated rapidly .

' Worden ltr.

CHAPTER 4

134

The majority of the riflemen, how-ever, continued to advance in swiftrushes through a steady rain of enemyartillery, mortar, and machine gun fireto reach the Japanese entrenched inblockhouses, pillboxes, and other forti-fied positions. Paced by Shermans, theMarines employed flamethrower anddemolition charges to eliminate theseenemy strongholds or called down sup-porting arms fire upon particularly dif-ficult fortifications .

On the coral ridges to the north,Puller's 1st Marines ran into bitterdug-in resistance that held down theday's gains. In the center, the 5th Ma-rines cooperated with 2/1 to seize theairfield and to expand east and north-east, while the 7th Marines drove eastand south to overrun all of the southernportion of Peleliu except the promon-tories. Within a few days, both the 5thand 7th Marines accomplished theirinitial missions and turned their atten-tion northward to aid the hard-pressed1st, which was finding the going slowover the central ridges .

The second day of the assault, inaddition, witnessed two events of somesignificance : the capture of the firstprisoner of war and the official estab-lishment of military government onPeleliu . Members of the naval unit re-sponsible for handling the native popu-lation posted the first of ten scheduledproclamations in the name of CinCPOA.To their chagrin, however, not a singlePalauan made an appearance, for theJapanese had evacuated them all fromthe island prior to the landing . Accord-ingly, the ten men of the military gov-ernment unit were utilized in variouscapacities by the Marine division until


their transfer to the Island Commandon 7 October. Eventually, 15 nativesturned up, but they were promptly dis-patched to Angaur where a refugeecamp already existed .

The prisoner of war taken on 16September responded freely to ques-tions. A former fisherman from Koror,this second class private had been in-ducted in July 1944 and trained alongwith 500 other men as part of a specialcounterlanding force ; 200 of these sol-diers were assigned to Peleliu aftercompletion of the course . Their missionwas to swim out and destroy the Ameri-can landing vehicles and tanks withgrenades and mines. The men of thisspecially-trained force remained holedup in their caves, however-to escapethe bombs and shells of naval planesand warships-until the arrival of rifle-men of the 1st Marines . Although theprisoner's information proved to bevague and of little military value, he didmake one extremely accurate predic-tion. When asked about the morale ofthe Peleliu garrison, the Japanese re-plied, "Though they die, they willdefend."5

SWEEP TO THE SOUTH'

As soon as the scheduled D plus onepreparatory fires to its front werelifted, the 7th Marines attacked vigor-ously. On the left, the 3d Battalionpushed rapidly across the island, while

s Preliminary Interrogation Rpt No . 1, dtd16Sep44, G-2 See, 1st MarDiv, in 1st MarDivPOW Interrogation Rpts Peleliu.

'Additional sources used for this sectionare : 7th Mar R-2 Jnl, 16-18Sep44 ; 1/7 Bn 2-3Jnls, 16-18Sep44 ; 1/4 HistRpt, 16-18Sep44 ;3/7 WarD, 16-18Sep44 .

THE DRIVE INLAND

the 1st drove south toward the promon-tories. Bitterly resisting this two-pronged assault was the 3d Battalion,15th Infantry, whose veteran troopstenaciously defended their fortified po-sitions till death in true Bushido spirit .

Companies K and I advanced directlyeast, with L following in reserve. Firsttask of the left flank unit, Company K,was to reduce the fortifications that hadheld up the unit on the previous day .Aided by point-blank fire from the tanksthat paced their advance, the infantry-men quickly seized the barracks areaand the three gun positions, but theblockhouse proved to be a more difficultproblem. Its five-foot thick reinforcedconcrete walls withstood direct hitsfrom naval gunfire, 75mm tank cannon,and bazookas ; even flamethrowersfailed, for one-inch armor platesshielded the blockhouse's gun ports andits two underground entrances. Onlyafter demolition teams worked theirway forward under the cover of smoketo lay their charges directly against itsmassive walls and breached this fortifi-cation was forward movement resumed .

The 3d Battalion gained the easternshore by 0925 ; then, while Company Iorganized beach positions to defendagainst any possible enemy reaction andto support the advance by fire, the bat-talion shifted its assault south towardthe promontories. Company K led theway, followed closely by L in reserve .Free use of flamethrowers and bazookaswas made, for numerous pillboxes andconcrete gun emplacements were en-countered. By noon, however, the fore-most elements had eliminated the lasttwo pillboxes barring the way to thesandpit leading out to the southeast

135

promontory. The rifle company, unfor-tunately, was "unable to continue itsadvance until a resupply of water couldbe effected ."7 The battalion waited invain until 1500 before the necessarywater arrived . By this time, only a fewhours of daylight remained, so the bat-talion was ordered to dig in, postponingthe final assault until the followingmorning.

What daylight remained was used tobring up tanks that destroyed withpointblank fire one blockhouse, two pill-boxes, and several machine gun posi-tions guarding the approach to thepromontory. Under the cover of thisprotective fire, a detail of combat engi-neers ventured forth onto the sandspitto remove or disarm the numerousenemy mines there, paving the way forthe scheduled attack the next morning .The Marines manned positions facingtheir objective during the hours of dark-ness, but the only enemy oppositionconsisted of sniper fire in the rear areas .

The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, hadbeen supported in its southward driveby artillery, naval gunfire, and airstrikes, as well as by rocket concentra-tions from the LCIs that paced theMarines' advance along the westernshore. The riflemen succeeded in over-running numerous enemy-held pillboxesand bunkers, in addition to four 5-inchguns and three lighter dual-purposeantiaircraft guns. By noon, the Marineshad reached the shore opposite Ngar-moked Island, but their strenuous ex-

3/7 WarD, 16Sep44. Colonel Hanneken re-ceived the following message at 1324 : "3/7 outof water. Troops having dry heaves ." 7th MarR-2 Jnl, 16Sep44.

136

ertions in the blazing sun had sodehydrated them that a halt was calleduntil water could be brought up to re-store the troops' strength. Sufficientwater did not arrive until late after-noon, however, and the order was givento dig in for the night .

During the lull, the battalion re-grouped and prepared to resume the at-tack. Additional engineers were rushedup to clear away Japanese mines on thebeaches to the Marines' front, and a75mm self-propelled half-track and four37mm antitank guns had been broughtup to the battalion by 1530 . Later, underthe cover of darkness, demolition ex-perts searched the narrow strip of landlinking Ngarmoked Island to Peleliuand dug up the enemy mines that couldbar the employment of tanks in themorning attack.8At 0730 on 17 September, the 3d

Battalion's objective, the southeastpromontory, was hit by an air strike,but a scheduled mortar preparation wascalled off when combat engineers,ranging far in advance of the infantry-men, discovered another extensive mine-field in their path . For an hour and ahalf, Shermans and riflemen providedcovering fire while the engineers per-formed their dangerous task of disarm-ing or removing the deadly Japanese

"'During the night of D plus 1 many Japswere annihilated while attempting to crossfrom the southwestern promontory to the un-named island during low tide. Mortar illumi-nating shells provided excellent observation ofthis movement by our troops and the Japs wereeasy targets for our machine gun and riflefire ." Gormley ltr I.


mines. Then, at 1000, a platoon fromCompany L, the reserve of the previousday, began working its way across thesandspit in coordination with twotanks. Twenty-six minutes later, a foot-hold had been seized on the objective,whereupon the remainder of the com-pany was transported over the openstretch of ground in LVTs that pro-vided protection from small arms fire .

After regrouping, Company L imme-diately attacked . Opposing the advancewere Japanese soldiers manning auto-matic weapon and rifle positions amongthe coral crevices or entrenched in pill-boxes with mutually supporting lanes offire. The Marines, slowly battling theirway forward, recognized that blazingnapalm was the most effective methodof rooting out the diehard defenders,and a hurried call went throughout thebattalion for additional flamethrowers .Once they reached the front and beganburning the enemy out, the advancequickened. By 1215, the rifle companyhad seized enough ground for the sitingof weapons to provide supporting firesfor 1/7's assault of Ngarmoked Island ;an hour later, the 3d Battalion reportedthe capture of the entire southeasternpromontory .

The two-day struggle southward costthe Marine battalion 7 dead and 20wounded. In contrast, the last-ditchstand by the isolated Japanese resultedin 441 enemy killed . The startling dis-crepancy between these two casualtyfigures clearly demonstrated the out-standing success and superb skill withwhich the highly-trained Marines em-ployed small unit assault tactics againststubbornly-defended fortified positions .

THE DRIVE INLAND

Success, however, did not come soquickly for the 1st Battalion in its finalassault on Ngarmoked Island, the south-western promontory . Early on the 17th,a platoon from Company B, the battalionreserve of the previous day that nowheld assault positions opposite the ob-jective, moved out in the wake of navalgunfire and mortar fire to gain the farend of the causeway. Here, the onrush-ing riflemen and their supporting tanksran head-on into heavily-fortified posi-tions, and the attack ground to anabrupt halt. After an hour of stubbornfighting failed to expand the bridge-head, Colonel Hanneken approved awithdrawal to give the supporting armsa chance to pulverize the enemy forti-fications holding up the advance .

While naval gunfire, artillery, andmortars hammered the objective, prepa-rations to resume the attack were made .All available tanks, LVT (A) s, half-tracks, and 37mm guns were dispatchedforward. By early afternoon, the suc-cessful completion of 3/7's mission per-mitted Major E . Hunter Hurst to releasehis tank and weapons support for useby Lieutenant Colonel John J . Gormley's1st Battalion. Company B, which hadbeen badly mauled by enemy fire thatraked the causeway, was replaced in thefrontlines by Company A, which jumpedoff at 1430 following a 10-minute airstrike.

In short order, the Marines, nowsupported by three tanks, broke throughthe battered Japanese positions andbegan fighting their way southward .An hour later, Company I moved intoreserve behind 1/7, releasing CompanyC, which crossed over to the promon-

137

tory and joined the attack on A's right .Shortly thereafter, Company B alsomoved to Ngarmoked Island and tookup reserve positions immediately be-hind the two assault units that werepressing the attack with vigor . A mea-sure of revenge was granted the fastmoving Marines, for they finally suc-ceeded in knocking out the high velocityguns that had enfiladed the Orangebeaches for so long. When darknesshalted the day's advance, the two riflecompanies had a firm hold on both theeastern and western shores and a defen-sive line running almost halfway acrossthe promontory .

The next day, 18 September, the re-sumption of the attack was delayed un-til 1000 to permit a more thoroughpreparation. Marine artillery blanketedthe enemy-held part of NgarmokedIsland, while riflemen, with their armorand supporting weapons, carefully de-ployed into the most advantageousjump-off positions . Just to the frontloomed a sizeable swamp, approximatelyin the center of the promontory . Com-pany A attacked to the left of this im-passable terrain, Company C to theright, with both units reestablishingcontact on the opposite side. CompanyB had the task of seizing a piece ofland that protruded from the easternshore just in front of the line of de-parture .

Attacking units were instructed toleave bypassed Japanese for later de-struction by demolition teams, but Com-pany C was early treated to an exampleof the enemy's tactics of passive infil-tration, i .e ., allowing positions to beoverrun in order to be in the rear of the

138

American attacking force . During theadvance south around the swamp, 15riflemen were detailed to remain behindto guard suspected cave openings andpillboxes where Japanese might still belurking. No sooner had the front linessurged forward than a large number ofenemy soldiers suddenly emerged fromtheir concealed holes and took the smallMarine detachment under fire . The situ-ation became so critical that both theDivision Reconnaissance Company, at-tached to the regiment since D-Day, andmost of Company I had to be committedto maintain control of the bypassedareas .

By 1344, the two attacking rifle com-panies of the 1st Battalion had seizedthe southern shore of Ngarmoked Is-land . Company B, on the other hand,had experienced tougher going ; its as-sault squads, attacking towards theeastern shore, ran squarely into theextensive fortifications that the Japa-nese had prepared to prevent any pene-tration into the cove between the twopromontories. The advancing Marinescontinued a yard by yard conquest ofthe dug-in positions, which seemed to becrowded literally on top of each other.At 1354 the attack stalled, after theShermans had withdrawn to rearm andthe half-tracks had become boggeddown in the miry ground . By this time,the company had killed an estimated350 enemy soldiers and had restrictedthe pocket of resistance to an area ofsome 50 square yards .

While waiting for a bulldozer to ar-rive, Marines in the frontlines couldhear the sound of shots, as some of theiropponents, faced with the inevitablechoice of death or surrender, chose to


commit suicide . Other Japanese leapedinto the sea and attempted to escapeacross the tetrahedrons to the southeast-ern promontory, only to run into 3/7'sriflemen, who promptly slew some 60 ofthem. After the bulldozer extricated thehalf-tracks, Company B resumed theassault and quickly overran the last re-maining defenders, bringing the unit'sestimated total of enemy killed that dayto 425 .

The 7th Marines informed division at1525 on 18 September that its initialmission on Peleliu was completed . Inseizing the southern part of the island,the regiment uncovered much-neededmaneuver area and destroyed to the lastman an excellently trained and well-equipped Japanese infantry battalion .During its first four days of fighting,the 7th Marines, less its 2d Battalion,accounted for an estimated 2,609 enemydead. The fierce determination of theJapanese was reflected by the fact thatnot a single one was taken prisoner. Inaccomplishing its mission, the regimentsuffered 47 killed, 414 wounded, and 36missing in action. The disproportionatenumber of Marine casualties to enemydead was surprising, for the four-daylong assault had constantly pitted ex-posed Marines against entrenched Japa-nese in strongly fortified positions .Using proven small-unit assault tacticsand making full utilization of all sup-porting arms, especially demolitions andflamethrowers, the Marines succeededin annihilating the enemy garrison . Onlya unit like the 1st Division, containinga sizable number of veteran troops whohad been tested in battle, could haveexecuted such a mission with a mini-mum of casualties .

THE DRIVE INLAND

ACROSS THE AIRFIELD ANDUP THE PENINSULAS

The first task confronting the 5thMarines as 16 September dawned wasseizure of the airfield, the primary ob-jective on Peleliu . Fortunately for thebattalions, their night positions placedthem in an advantageous location forthat day's advance which was to be aturning movement northward, using theextreme left flank of the division as apivot point. On the left was the 1stBattalion strung out along the woods'edge. The 2d was deployed in the middleabout halfway across the open terrain,and the 3d was on the right at thesouthern fringe of the airfield .With the coming of daylight, the

enemy laid down an intense shellingupon these frontlines. One Japaneseshell landed directly on the regimentalCP, and another one destroyed vitalcommunications equipment. Severalstaff officers became casualties, andColonel Harris' knee was severely in-jured, making it extremely difficult forhim to move about. Division rushedreplacements to staff the 5th's CP ade-quately, which allowed the regiment tojump off on schedule .

At 080O,the 1st Battalion moved outof the woods onto the open runwayswith two companies in assault, the otherin reserve and echeloned to the leftrear. Although a few riflemen benefitedsomewhat from the cover provided by

° Additional sources used for this sectionare : 5th Mar OpRpt, 16-23Sep44 ; 1/5 B-3 Jnl,16-23Sep44 ; 2/5 OpRpt, 16-23Sep44 ; 3/5 Rptof Ops, 16-23Sep44 ; 5th War Dog Plat ILIAC,Peleliu OpRpt, 16Sep-180ct44, dtd 17Nov44,hereafter 5th War Dog Plat Peleliu OpRpt ;Boyd, 1/5 PalauOp .

the scrub growth and rubble along thenorthern fringe of the airfield, most hadto brave the open runways in an openorder formation with intervals of about20 yards. "The advance of the assaultcompanies across the fireswept airfield,"reminisced the battalion commander,"was an inspiring and never to be for-gotten sight ."10 Despite heavy casual-ties, the Marines surged across the ex-posed runways to reach the main hangararea on the northeast side of the airfieldin little more than an hour .

Here, the leading troops encounteredstiff resistance from enemy soldiersentrenched among the ruins of thebuildings, a large V-shaped antitankditch, and two stone revetments thathoused 20mm guns. As large numbersof the attackers became casualties, theadvance faltered, for the Marines'strength had been severely weakened bynumerous heat exhaustion cases . WhenLVTs attempted to evacuate thewounded, they attracted such a deadlyrain of fire from Japanese guns em-placed in the commanding groundnorth of the airfield that Shermans hadto run interference for the thin-skinnedamphibian vehicles .A platoon moving in defilade of a

Marine tank finally managed to outflankthe enemy positions holding up theattack, and, once the reserve companywas committed, a vigorous assault over-ran the Japanese defenders in the han-gar area after some furious hand-to-hand fighting. Pushing on, the 1stBattalion gained phase line 0-2 beforedark, but Japanese gunners on nearbyridges unleashed such an intense and

70 Boyd, 1/3 Palau.Op, p . 19 .

139

140 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

75MM GUN in firing position on Peleliu. (USMC 95050)

1st MARINE DIVISION tanks at Peleliu airfield. (USMC 94876)

THE DRIVE INLAND

accurate fire upon the exposed infantry-men that the decision was made to with-draw to the antitank ditch to set upnight defenses.

The 2d Battalion spent the day fight-ing its way up the east side of the air-field through an almost impassablescrub jungle that degenerated into athick mangrove swamp along the easternshore. Supporting Shermans could op-erate only along the fringe of the woods,and the riflemen had to plunge aloneinto the thicket infested by enemy sol-diers, who often had to be ousted inclose combat. When darkness beganclosing in, the Marines tied in with1/5 on the left flank and fell back ashort distance on the open airfield inorder to have clear fields of fire to theirfront.

On the extreme right, the 3d Bat-talion soon found itself in an unusualpredicament as the attack progressed .Company I started the day in reserve,but was shifted northward about noonand used to cover a threatening gap thatdeveloped between assault units of the1st Marines. Company L, meanwhile,remained tied in with 2/5's drive north-eastward, while Company K renewedits eastern advance on the left flank of3/7. As a result, the 3d Battalion's tworifle companies had to overextend them-selves to retain contact as they assaultedin different directions . About 1500,Major John H . Gustafson, formerly ex-ecutive officer of 2/5, replaced Lieu-tenant Colonel Walt as battalion com-mander. Walt promptly returned to the5th's CP and resumed his duties asregimental executive officer, therebytaking some of the load off the injuredColonel Harris. Shortly after this

change in command, the 3d Battalionwas ordered to displace forward inpreparation for relieving the 1st Bat-talion the following morning.

Before passing into reserve on 17September, however, the 1st drove for-ward against light resistance to regainthe previous day's positions on phaseline 0-2. During this advance, one of therifle platoons was subjected to a rocketstrike from a carrier plane. This un-fortunate incident occurred when theman responsible for removing the pan-els signalling an earlier air strike "hadbeen evacuated as a casualty and provi-sions had not been made for someoneelse to take over his responsibilities .""After taking over 1/5's zone, the 3dBattalion moved out in coordinationwith elements of 2/5 on its right, butthe heavy flanking fire from the Japa-nese on the central ridges with theirclear fields of fire and excellent observa-tion effectively prevented any real gainsthat day .

On the right, the 2d Battalion re-sumed its slow advance through thedense jungle between the airfield andthe mangrove swamp . When a Shermanattempted to assist infantrymen work-ing their way through the undergrowthat the edge of the airfield, Japaneseobservers on the ridges called down sucha concentration of artillery and mortarfire upon the tank that it departed tospare the nearby Marines . As the menattempted to maintain a skirmish linewhile moving through the jungle againstthe sporadic fire of scattered snipers,the enervating heat caused greatercasualties than did the Japanese. Pla-

"Boyd, 1/5 PalauOp . p. 25

141

142

toon leaders halted their men fre-quently for rest periods, but the num-ber dropping from heat prostrationcontinued to mount. Day's end, never-theless, found the battalion some 600yards beyond phase line 0-2, with oneflank anchored on the swamp and theother firmly tied in with 3/5's rightflank .

On this day, the Japanese fired a fewrockets, possibly of the spin stabilizedtype, although they had a very erraticcorkscrew type of trajectory . Theserockets appeared to be about the size of5-inch shells and were loaded with pic-ric acid. The bright, yellow burst causedbrief excitement when a few cries of"Mustard Gas" were raised. Promptreassurance by radio that it was onlyexplosion of picric acid quelled theexcitement . 12

The next day, 18 September, the 5thMarines' attack on the left ground to ahalt by noon, when the 3d Battalion raninto an increasing volume of fire fromthe same towering central ridges thathad prevented any gains the previousday. On the right, in the 2/5 sector,Japanese machine gun and rifle firefrom the mangrove swamp on the bat-talion's east flank made any advancevery costly. Artillery and mortar firehad little effect until a call was made forair bursts about 30 feet above theswamp. This proved highly effectiveand permitted a rapid advance . Jump-ing off at 0700, 2/5 moved forward rap-idly in the face of only scattered re-sistance, protected from enemy artilleryobservation by the canopy of tree topsand reached the road leading to the

11 Harris ltr.


village of Ngardololok and the north-eastern peninsula .The mangrove-choked waters sepa-

rating this peninsula from the main-land, however, pressed in so close to theroad on both sides as to make the ap-proach virtually a causeway . About1040, a small patrol ventured across totest enemy reaction . When it returnedsafely without drawing any fire, an airstrike was requested to pave the wayfor a crossing in force . To the Marines'disappointment, the carrier-based planesmissed their target completely, and ar-tillery concentrations had to be calleddown instead to soften up the Ngardolo-lok area .

At 1335, a reinforced rifle companybegan crossing over the narrow ap-proach route . Unknown to the battalioncommander, the 5th Marines' CP hadalready ordered a second air strike torectify the earlier abortive attempt . Asthe company negotiated the open cause-way, U. S . Navy planes suddenlyswooped down out of the skies to strafethe exposed troops. The Marines pushedon, despite heavy casualties, and estab-lished a firm bridgehead .

As if to compound the 2d Battalion'smisfortunes that day, the unit was sub-jected twice more to misplaced Ameri-can fire. An artillery concentration hitthe battalion in the process of dis-placing forward, and later, mortar firestruck some elements as they crossedthe causeway. Of the 34 casualties suf-fered by 2/5 on 18 September, almostall resulted from friendly fire .

The 3d Battalion's front, on the 18th,had been pinched down between theridges and the sea to a size manageableby a single company . Accordingly, the

THE DRIVE INLAND

other two companies displaced to posi-tions on the right (south) flank of 2/5 .By nightfall, the two battalions weredug in facing the Japanese installationsat Ngardololok. The reserve 1st Bat-talion, which had been flushing outsnipers in the rear, now moved up tosupport the next day's drive .

After dive bombers blasted the ob-jective, the 2d Battalion attacked theremains of Ngardololok during themorning of 19 September. Only sporadicfire from scattered holdouts opposedthe advance. As the 2d continued itspush forward past the ruins, the 3dBattalion drove southward in the wakeof artillery and mortar fire against ex-tremely light resistance. In the follow-ing days, the 5th Marines systematicallymopped up isolated enemy holdouts onthe peninsula, which was secured on 21September, and the off-shore islands,the last of which was seized on the 23d .

During this period of extensive pa-trolling, war dogs had about their onlyopportunity for effective use on Peleliu .Brought ashore on D-Day and sent upto the front lines, the dogs became ex-tremely nervous under the constantshelling. Many even attacked theirhandlers and had to be destroyed . As aresult, the dogs were brought back tothe rear areas for night security dutyat CPs, while their handlers served asstretcher bearers . When the war dogsoperated with patrols of the 5th Ma-rines, however, in a role for which theyhad been trained, their keen scent savedmany Marine lives . On 20 September,for example, a Doberman-Pinscherscouting ahead of Company I's pointdetected an enemy ambush some 75 to100 yards away. Once the dog alerted

143

the Marines to their imminent danger,they were able to escape the trap laidby 20-odd Japanese armed with machineguns and other automatic weapons .The fruitful activities of the war dogplatoon came to an untimely end whenthe 5th Marines reached northern Pele-liu. An erratic salvo of white phos-phorus shells landed in the area occupiedby the platoon, and this unfortunateaccident marked the end of its activityon the island .13

ASSAULT OF THE RIDGES 14

Puller's 1st Marines jumped off in thegeneral. attack on the morning of 16September and began a turning move-ment northward in coordination withthe 5th Marines . The first problem of the3d Battalion, on the left, was the longcoral ridge that had blocked any suc-cessful advance on the previous day . Itwas not until noon, after the last freshcompany of the regimental reserve, 1/1,was thrown into the struggle, that theriflemen, supported by two Shermans,were able to surge up the slopes andwrest a large portion of the high groundfrom the entrenched enemy .With control of the commanding

heights in their hands, the Marineswere soon linked up with the survivorsof Company K on the Point . These menhad been isolated for some 30 hours,although reinforcements, consisting ofshore party personnel and stragglers

"Harris ltr.14 Additional sources used for this section

are : 1st Mar Hist; 1/1 UHist ; 3/1 Rec ofEvents, 16-18Sep44 ; 2/7 WarD, 15-18Sep44 ;Capt George P. Hunt, "Point Secured," MarineCorps Gazette, v. 29, no . 1 (Jan45), pp . 39-42,hereafter Hunt, "Point Secured ."

144

on the beach, weapons, and supplies hadbeen brought in over the water by anLVT early on the 16th. By nightfall,even though the mission of reachingphase line 0-1 had not been accom-plished by 3/1, the worst features of thetactical situation confronting the bat-talion-a frontline dotted with enemy-created wedges, and gaps between itsown units-had been rectified .

Coordinating its attack on the rightflank with that of 1/5, Honsowetz' 2dBattalion, 1st Marines, moved out in thewake of the preparatory fires across thenorthwestern portion of the airfield .When the advancing riflemen reachedthe building area, stiffening resistancefrom Japanese hiding among the ruins,plus a brief loss of contact with neigh-boring units, slowed the attack momen-tarily. Despite heavy casualties, how-ever, the battalion overran the enemydefenders in savage hand-to-hand com-bat and began fanning out toward phaseline 0-2 . The onrushing troops madegood progress at first, but the Japanesebitterly resisted all efforts by the Ma-rines to advance toward the importantroad junction linking the East andWest Roads . Despite a substantial gain,the men halted for the night some dis-tance short of phase line 0-2, the WestRoad.

That night, the enemy made a deter-mined effort to retake the Point regard-less of cost. With this strategic eleva-tion once again in their hands, theJapanese could set up their weaponsand play havoc with the men, sup-plies, and vehicles crowded on the WhiteBeaches. The counterattack came at2200, when an estimated 500 enemy sol-diers, following preparatory mortar


and grenade fire, suddenly rushed Com-pany K's positions on the coral outcrop-ping. The defenders opened up withautomatic weapons and hurled gren-ades, while supporting artillery andmortars blasted the terrain to the front .

In spite of this concentrated hail offire, some 30 Japanese still managedto penetrate the frontlines. These at-tackers were dispatched in fierce fight-ing, while other enemy troops, attempt-ing to flank the Point along the water'sedge, were rooted out of the coral crev-ices by Marines employing thermitegrenades and automatic weapons. By0200, the counterattack subsided asswiftly as it had begun. The overwhelm-ing fire superiority of the Marines haddecided the issue . The light of dawn,remembered Captain Hunt, revealed 350"more Japanese dead sprawled beforeour lines . Their rear units, horribly mu-tilated by our artillery and mortars, hadbeen lugging a 40mm gun, for it lay intheir midst, scarred by shrapnel, anabandoned symbol of their efforts to re-capture the Point ."15 That morning,Company K was finally relieved, but itmustered only 78 men out of the 235that the captain had led ashore on D-Day .

On 17 September, Colonel Puller hadto put all three battalions in the line topress the attack, for his regiment hadsuffered over 1,000 casualties in justtwo days of battle. The 3d Battalion wason the left, the 1st in the center, andthe 2d on the right, while 2/7 was in re-serve. The last-mentioned battalion hadfinally landed the previous day to sup-port its parent unit's drive south, but

"Hunt, "Point Secured," p . 42.

THE DRIVE INLAND

had been diverted north instead to sup-port the more hard-pressed 1st Ma-rines in their assault on the ridges .

Lieutenant Colonel Sabol's 3d Battal-ion pushed steadily ahead against lightsniper fire for a gain of 700 yards, andonly the danger of overextending itselfprevented the battalion from advanc-ing farther up the west coast that day .In the middle, the 1st Battalion's attackran squarely into a heavily fortifiedgroup of mutually-supporting positionsconsisting of a huge reinforced-con-crete blockhouse with four-foot thickwalls and 12 pillboxes emplaced nearby .A hurried call to the battleship Pennsyl-vania brought 14-inch armor-piercingand high explosive shells slamming intothis unmarred fortification that hadsomehow escaped the preparatory bom-bardment of the island . The shellsbreached the walls, and concussionkilled the 20 enemy soldiers inside .Other supporting arms, meanwhile, hadeliminated the surrounding pillboxes .Resuming the advance, Major Ray-

mond G. Davis' 1st Battalion surged for-ward across the road marking phase lineO-2. Here, the terrain began sloping up-ward as the riflemen approached thefoothills of the Umurbrogol Mountains .Since the entrenched foe to its front waspouring down a very heavy volume of firethat inflicted severe casualties, the battal-ion quickly regrouped and drove straightup the slopes. Aided by tanks, the infan-trymen made good use of their bazookasto knock out 35 separate Japanese-in-fested caves before digging in for thenight. Marine positions had been firmlyestablished on the forward slopes ofthe first series of hills, notwithstandingthe enemy commander's claim that this

145

assault had been "repulsed by ourtimely firing ."16

During its rapid advance to the righton 17 September, the 2d Battaliongained the distinction of being the firstto encounter the Umurbrogol ridges, amisshapen conglomeration of soaringspires, sheer cliffs, and impassable prec-ipices that was to become infamous inthe weeks ahead . Some of the problemsconfronting the 1st Marines in its as-sault of this high ground were recordedby the regiment's history

Along its center, the rocky spine washeaved up in a contorted morass of de-cayed coral, strewn with rubble, crags,ridges and gulches thrown together in aconfusing maze. There were no roads,scarcely any trails. The pock-marked sur-face offered no secure footing even in thefew level places . It was impossible to digin : the best the men could do was pile alittle coral or wood debris around theirpositions. The jagged rock slashed theirshoes and clothes, and tore their bodiesevery time they hit the deck for safety.Casualties were higher for the simplereason it was impossible to get under theground away from the Japanese mortarbarrages. Each blast hurled chunks ofcoral in all directions, multiplying manytimes the fragmentation effect of everyshell. Into this the enemy dug and tun-nelled like moles ; and there they stayed tofight to the death ."

Early in the morning, the 2d Battal-ion surged forward to overrun the im-portant road junction that the Japan-ese had defended so bitterly the previ-ous day. Continuing up the East Roadthat ran along the base of the ridges,the exposed infantrymen came under in-creasing fire from enemy soldiers en-

19 Japanese CenPacOps, p . 86 .17 lat Mar Hist, pp. 11-12.

146

trenched on a 200-foot ridge to the leftflank. This high ground, called Hill 200,paralleled the road and formed a threat-ening salient into the battalion's center .From these commanding heights, ob-servers called down accurate artilleryand mortar concentrations not only onthe 2d Battalion, but also on the troopsof the 5th Marines moving across levelground on the extreme right .

Orders came down from regiment forthe troops advancing up the East Roadto wheel left and take the ridge underassault. As the Marines attacked up thesteep slopes, the Japanese unleasheda devastating fire of mortars and ma-chine guns, while mountain guns anddual-purpose artillery pieces suddenlyemerged from hidden positions to blastaway at pointblank range before dis-appearing again into caves. Casualtiesmounted alarmingly, and many of thetanks and LVT (A) s brought up to sup-port the infantry were knocked out bythe accurate enemy fire . The Marinesgrimly continued climbing upward,however, and succeeded in clearing thecrest of all defenders by nightfall . Themen dug in quickly, for a slightly higherridge to the west, Hill 210, still re-mained in the possession of the Japan-ese, who now brought a heavy and con-centrated fire to bear on the newly-wonMarine positions .

As this sustained enemy fire contin-ued throughout the night, casualties be-came so heavy that a company from 2/7,the 1st Marines' reserve battalion, hadto be rushed up the hill to bolster thedepleted strength of the defenders . Anoverwhelming Japanese counterattackto retake this vital terrain probablywas prevented only by the well-placed


naval salvos on the enemy-held ap-proaches to Hill 200 . Elsewhere, how-ever, the alert foe spotted the gap thatdeveloped between the 1st and 2d Bat-talions as they tied in their lines afterdark. Infiltrating in force, the Japanesebegan exploiting their opportunity . Notuntil another reserve company from2/7 fought its way forward into posi-tions covering this void in the 1st Ma-rines' line was the enemy finally con-tained .

During this same night, Colonel Nak-agawa displaced his CP farther inlandto a cave deep within his prepared finaldefensive perimeter in the Umurbrogolridges. Such a move by the enemy com-mander underscored the tactical impor-tance of the Marines' seizure of Hill200 . This accomplishment of the 2dBattalion removed a dangerous Japan-ese salient and replaced it with anAmerican one jutting into the enemy-held terrain ; the feat also eliminatedthe heavy flanking fire that had beenhampering the progress of 2/1 and the5th Marines. All that Colonel Nakagawaadmitted to his superiors that night,though, was that "under protection ofheavy naval gunfire, an enemy unit com-posed of two tanks and approximatelytwo companies of infantry successfullyadvanced up to a high spot on the eastside of Nakayama (Hill 200) ."18

On 18 September, the same day thatthe 7th Marines finished its seizure ofthe promontories and the 5th Marinesbegan its sweep up the northeasternpeninsula, the 1st Marines returned toits bitterly-contested, yard-by-yard as-sault on the central ridges . Some of the

1e Japanese CenPacOps, p . 87 .

THE DRIVE INLAND

difficulties involved in fighting over thisterrain, according to Lieutenant Col-onel Spencer S. Berger, whose 2/7joined the struggle on the Umurbrogolsthat day, were

. . . there was no such thing as a con-tinuous attacking line . Elements of thesame company, even platoon, were attack-ing in every direction of the compass, withlarge gaps in between. When companieswere asked for front lines they were aptto give points where the Company Com-mander knew or thought he had some men.It did not mean that he held a continuousunbroken line across his front . There werecountless little salients and countersali-ents existing."

Three days of continuous assault onfortified positions had so depleted Col-onel Puller's rifle battalions-the 1stRegiment had suffered 1,236 casualties-that frontline replacements were ab-solutely essential, if the attack was tocontinue. To remedy the situation, Pul-ler ordered the supporting units strip-ped of personnel to fill the gaps in hisrifle platoons. Out of the 473 men jump-ing off in the 3d Battalion's zone on the18th, for example, 200 were fresh fromregimental headquarters. The 1st Pio-neer Battalion also sent up 115 men tostrengthen the assaults units. Just priorto the morning's attack, the 2d Battal-ion, 7th Marines relieved 1/1, whichthen passed into reserve .

The 3d Battalion moved forward onthe left between the central ridges andthe western coast against only scatteredrifle fire, but was held to a day's gainof merely a few hundred yards becauseof the necessity of remaining tied inwith 2/7. This battalion found the going

1° $erger ltr .

147

slow in the center over the rugged coralridges, where it cooperated with 2/1 inpinching out the enemy-held Hill 210that jutted into the Marines' lines . Theattackers stormed up both sides of thisthreatening salient, and their deter-mined rushes finally carried the crest .

In 2/1's zone, the Japanese had beensubjecting the riflemen on the northernslopes of Hill 200 to severe artillery andmortar fire in addition to savage coun-terattacks . By 1400, the battalion hadwithdrawn its men a short distancefrom its hard-won conquest of the previ-ous day after reporting that its situa-tion was desperate. Puller's reactionwas typical. He instructed LieutenantColonel Honsowetz to hold at all costs.Marine mortars immediately placed asmoke screen on the hill to obscure Jap-anese vision, while Company B of 1/1was ordered forward from its reservearea to assist .

This rifle unit aggressively assaultedthe nearby enemy-held ridges in an at-tempt to divert fire from the sorely-pressed Marines on Hill 200 . The closestridge, Hill 205, was seized with lightcasualties, but when the riflemen at-tempted to press the attack toward thenext row of commanding heights, theyran into the precipitous coral rampartthat marked the perimeter of ColonelNakagawa's final defensive positions .Unable to scale the almost sheer cliffsin the face of withering fire from Japa-nese entrenched on high ground both tothe front and flanks, Company B wasstopped cold. This failure terminatedthe day's action . On the extreme rightof 2/1, meanwhile, some Marines hadsucceeded in moving along the base ofHill 200 to reach the ruined village of

148

Asias and to tie in with the 5th Marinesbefore halting for the night .

This day's assault pushed the 1st Ma-rines' total casualties over the 1,500mark, but the regiment had straightenedits frontline, located the Japanese weak-ness along the western shore, and dis-covered the strongpoint of enemy resist-ance within the Umurbrogols . Pullerwould order an all-out attack the fol-lowing morning in hopes of breachingColonel Nakagawa's defensive positionsamong the ridges, but the high tidemark of the southern assault had beenreached. Henceforth, the Marines werecommitted to a bitter war of attritionwith a fanatical and tenacious foe, whohad converted the jumbled coral cliffs,ravines, and precipices of the Umur-brogols into a nearly impregnable fort-ress .

CASUALTIES, CORPSMEN,AND CLIMATE20

To speed evacuation of the woundedduring the assault, medical plannersarranged for the empty amphibian ve-hicles to carry casualties on the returntrip from the beach to the transfer line .Here, waiting boats finished transport-ing the injured Marines the rest of theway to the ships. Those LVTs andDUKWs evacuating men to whom min-utes meant the difference between lifeand death made a beeline for the near-est transport still flying the signal flagthat indicated empty beds, and thenhurried back to the line of transfer to

'Sources of medical data particularly con-sulted for this section include : ILIAC PalausRpt, Encl J, "Medical Report of Palaus Oper-ation" ; 1st MarDiv SAR, Phase II, Anx D,"Medical."


resume their primary task. So success-fully did this humane plan work thatwounded Marines were being treated onships within an hour of the initial land-ing. An unfortunate drawback, how-ever, was that the unexpectedly largenumber of casualties right from thestart tied up an excessive number ofamphibian tractors. As a result, theshortage of LVTs and DUKWs was in-tensified, and later waves of troops andsupplies were delayed in being trans-ported across the reef and onto thebeach .For support of the combat teams,

Company A of the 1st Medical Battalionwas attached to the 1st Marines, Com-pany B to the 5th, and Company C tothe 7th, while a surgical team fromCompany D was especially assigned to3/5 for its later Ngesebus operation .These medical companies had comeashore early, but their equipment hadbeen delayed in landing . Not until 21September were any of them set up andoperating with adequate hospital facili-ties. Prior to this date, the units aidedthe shore party in collecting and evacu-ating the wounded, and provided re-placements for the RCTs' organic med-ical personnel, who had suffered severelosses .

Although 40 hospital corpsmen and96 stretcher bearers accompanied eachcombat team, the high initial casualtyrate quickly revealed a need for more .The stretcher bearers, fortunately, hadreceived actual practice in first aid dur-ing the staging period, and they formeda nucleus of trained personnel whenrear echelon troops were pressed intoservice. These men came from all sup-porting and garrison units for, as the

THE DRIVE INLAND

149

CLOSE FIGHTING at edge of Peleliu airfield. (USMC 95260)

CASUALTY is hoisted aboard amtrac en route to hospital ship off Peleliu. (USMC 9.4940)

150

G-1 officer remarked, "I had no diffi-culty in obtaining volunteers for thisimportant task, so anxious were the`rear area' men to aid their infantry`brothers .' "21

Over and above the toll exacted bythe seemingly ubiquitous enemy fire,there were the many victims of thetropical island itself. "Peleliu is a hor-rible place," 22 remarked a civilian cor-respondent, and Marines echoed hissentiments. The blazing sun, stiflingheat, jagged coral, rugged terrain, andlack of readily available water all com-bined to make the island a living hell .

Heat exhaustion cases increasedalarmingly as the fighting progressed,and stocks of salt tablets ashore quicklydisappeared. Since they "were worththeir weight in gold in preventing heatexhaustion," 23 all salt tablets that thesupport ships could spare were sentashore. Although several combat com-manders believed that they lost as manymen to the enervating heat as to enemyfire, no definite count of such casualtiesexisted .24 The high incidence of heatprostration cases, nevertheless, severelyoverloaded the limited medical facilities

"Col Harold 0 . Deakin ltr to CMC, dtd10Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File . Negro Ma-rines from the 16th Field Depot "were mostproficient in this type of activity. All UnitCommanders praised their efficiency, zeal andcheerfulness in performing their duties ." 1stMarDiv SAR, Phase II, Anx D, p . 3 .

22 Robert Martin in Time, 160ct44, p . 38 .' Col Richard P. Ross, Jr., memo to Maj

Frank 0. Hough, dtd 7Nov49, hereafter Rossmemo ."Most heat prostration cases were usually

treated at the medical aid stations close to thefront, where no records were kept .


and incapacitated valuable, trained Ma-rines during the critical assault phase .

Compounding the unpleasantness ofPeleliu was the unforgettable "sicken-ing stench of decaying bodies whichadded to the difficulties under which thetroops fought ."21 Not enough men couldbe spared during the first few days tocollect and bury the dead whose bodieslay where they fell, exposed to the ele-ments and insects. To prevent thespreading of disease by flies, three 15-men sanitary squads, equipped withknapsack sprayers, came ashore onD-Day and followed the combat teams,carefully spraying the newly-developedinsecticide, DDT, on opened enemy sup-ply dumps, bodies, uncovered humanfeces, and other fly-feeding and breed-ing places. Twelve days later when thetactical situation permitted, low-flyingaircraft dusted all of Peleliu with DDT,while the malaria control unit operateda truck-mounted power sprayer in theswamps and other suspected areas .

Peleliu was the scene of the firstlarge-scale combat testing of DDT asa sanitation control agent . All mosquitonets and jungle hammocks were treatedwith a combination of DDT and kero-sene, as were tents and other personnelshelters that came into use later. Sani-tation experts soon made the discovery,however, that while the new insecticideworked excellently against adult fliesand mosquitoes, it proved ineffective inkilling the larvae . As a result, fliescontinued to breed, despite the com-bined efforts of planes, trucks, and port-able DDT sprayers. In fact, the swarms

=' Ross memo .

THE DRIVE INLAND

of flies exceeded anything that Ameri-can troops had seen to date. During thesecond week in October, a gradual de-cline in the fly population set in . Appar-ently, the exertions of the DDT spray-ers had not been in vain . "Probably forthe first time in the history of militaryoperations," stated the corps after-action report, "there had been a negli-gible number of casualties that couldbe attributed to flies or mosquitoes . 1121

SUPPORTING THEDRIVE INLAND27

For the first few days on Peleliu,conditions for rendering effective logis-tic support to the assault units left muchto be desired. The inadequate beachspace for receiving the mountains ofmateriel required to keep the advancealive permitted little organization ofthe support area . Supply dumps, biv-ouac areas, artillery emplacements, andequipment were located helter-skelteron the first piece of unoccupied land .This random location of logistical ac-tivities made more difficult the tasksof coordinating and controlling resupplymissions, undertakings which were fre-

20 IIIAC Palaus Rpt, Encl J, "Medical Re-port of Palaus Operation," p . 5 . One chaplain,however, clearly remembered "the havoc dys-entery worked with the troops-almost equalto the heat and shells-and how everyone fromthe top down blamed it on the flies ." LCdr,ByronE . Allender ltr to CMC, dtd U650, in PeleliuComment File ."Additional sources used for this section

are : 5th Mar Sup-EvacRpt ; Blackford, "Giantsat Peleliu ;" BuDocks, Building the Navy'sBases in World War II : History of the Bureauof Yards and Docks and the Civil EngineerCorps 1940-1946, 2 vols. (Washington : GPO,1947), hereafter BuDocks, World War II Hist .

151

quently delayed because motor vehicleshad severed vital telephone lines . Ma-rines under enemy fire soon discoveredthat it was much faster to lay a newline than to search for a broken one .Adding to the cluttered appearance ofthe beachhead were the countless fox-holes and shell craters that pockmarkedthe entire area .When Rear Admiral John W. Reeves,

Jr., responsible for the future base de-velopment of the Western CarolinesArea, visited Peleliu shortly afterD-Day, he was appalled by what hesaw. The admiral at once requestedthrough higher channels that certainartillery batteries be displaced imme-diately to allow supply dumps to occupytheir permanent locations in accordancewith the base development plan . Gen-eral Rupertus, however, countered withthe argument that these batteries firingfrom their present positions were es-sential in order to support the infantryand that it would be folly to tamperwith an already critical tactical situa-tion just to simplify some future gar-rison function . Since the recommenda-tions of the ground commander are usu-ally accepted during the combat phase,nothing ever came of Admiral Reeves'complaint .

As the assault troops pushed inland,regimental dumps displaced forward tosupport the attack. The Marines werefortunate in that the island's roads werecapable, at least temporarily, of han-dling the division's transportationneeds. For hauling supplies up to thefront, each regiment had four LVTs,augmented by six 21/2-ton cargo trucksonce they became available.

152

To facilitate unloading at the beach,a detachment of the 1054th Naval Con-struction Battalion (Seabees) began in-stalling a pontoon causeway fromOrange Beach 3 to the outer reef on18 September, and the first LST un-loaded over it on the following day .When additional pontoon causewayswere added at the reef, the simultaneousunloading of three LSTs became pos-sible. By 21 September, when the needfor more unloading points became press-ing, elements of the 1st Engineer Bat-talion and the 73d Seabees began workon access roads leading to the easternand southern beaches . Two days later,both these beach areas were receivingLSTs for unloading .

On 19 September, the 33d Seabeesstarted clearing the Peleliu airfield ofall land mines, duds, debris, and shellfragments . Once the heavy engineeringequipment began coming ashore, workon the repair of the existing fighterstrip was immediately begun. Within72 hours after having received the con-struction equipment on 20 September,the Seabees had cleared and leveled anoperative strip, 260 feet by 3,875 feet,complete with runway lights .

The 1st Pioneer Battalion continuedits shore party function, often unload-ing around the clock, until 28 Septem-ber, when stevedores of the Island Com-mand took over the beaches and supplydumps. While engaged in performingtheir assigned mission, the pioneers op-erated bulldozers on two different oc-casions to knock out enemy-held pill-boxes ; they supplied frontline troopsdirectly from the shore dumps, oftengoing to great lengths to locate vitallyneeded items ; and once they even re-


linquished their own machine guns tofill an urgent infantry request .

Although during the initial phases ofthe landing no infantryman or artillery-man suffered from lack of ammunition-thanks to the acuity of the logisticplanners and their innovations such asthe waterborne supply beach-Marinesfound it difficult to build up desirablelevels of 105mm and 81mm ammunition,as well as 60mm illuminating shells .Selective discharge of these neededitems took place the day after the firstammunition resupply ship dropped an-chor at Kossol Roads on 21 September .The high rate of ammunition expendi-ture continued, however, because of thestrength of the enemy's defenses . Theheavy fighting also resulted in manyweapons being either damaged in com-bat or lost through carelessness . The5th Marines, for example, had lost ordamaged over 70 percent of its flame-throwers and bazookas by 17 Septem-ber. In spite of the heavy fighting, whichdemanded large amounts of ammuni-tion, weapons, and supplies, and theunforeseen beach congestion, which se-riously hindered resupply operations,no real shortages of shells, weapons,or supplies developed during the firstcouple of weeks .TACTICAL SUPPORT28

Until Marine artillery was emplacedashore on Peleliu and could assume re-sponsibility for providing direct firesupport to the infantry battalions, car-rier-based aircraft had to fill part ofthe gap. As early as 17 September, how-

An additional source used for this sectionwas 11th MarOpRpt .

THE DRIVE INLAND

ever, the reduction of all targets, ex-cept those in defilade or on reverseslopes, became the exclusive provinceof the artillery, and, by the 21st, almostall air missions were of the deep sup-port type. On the whole, Marines weresatisfied with the kind of air supportgiven them by the naval pilots, but feltthat their attempts to strafe were "oflittle value, due to the fact that thestrafing runs were begun and completedat too high an altitude ; pullouts fromsuch never were made under 1,800feet."29

One other vexation was that somenaval officers, prior to the landing, hadled the Marines to expect too much fromthe use of napalm, considered at thattime somewhat of a miracle weaponfollowing its limited employment dur-ing the Marianas campaign . One brief-ing officer ever assured 1/7 that itsassault to the south on Peleliu wouldencounter the infantryman's dream,"an objective stripped of concealingvegetation and devoid of live enemysoldiers."30 The disappointment experi-enced by these Marines when they raninto some 1,500 elite Japanese troopswho tenaciously resisted the southwardadvance can be imagined . Later, afterthe results of the first extensive useof napalm had been analyzed, the divi-sion recommended that the new weapon"should be used either on pinpoint tar-gets or in such quantities that completesaturation of an area can be achieved .It is wasted when used in small quanti-ties in area bombing."31

1st MarDiv SAR, Phase I, Anx L, pp . 4-5 .~° Worden ltr .'list MarDiv SAR, Phase II, Anx L, p . 6.

153

Carrier-based planes also providedaerial observation until Marine Obser-vation Squadron-3 (VMO-3), whosefirst planes touched down on the par-tially repaired airstrip on 18 Septem-ber, began operating ashore . The 11thMarines' battalions, in addition, hadforward observers up with the advanceinfantry units . Since the officers coordi-nating the missions of air, naval gun-fire, and artillery were all located atthe division CP, each prospective targetwas assigned to the supporting armbest suited to reduce it .

For the first two weeks ashore, Ma-rine artillery performed according tothe operation plan, delivering prepara-tory, harassing, and interdicting firesas requested. When corps artillery cameashore on the second day, it was placedunder control of the 11th Marines andtied in with the regimental fire direc-tion center. Most artillery units massedtheir fires northward to support theassault on the ridges, but the 3d Bat-talion and a battery of the 3d 155mmHowitzer Battalion faced south to as-sist the 7th Marines' drive to the pro-montories. On 18 September, theseunits also shifted their fires northwardagainst the entrenched Japanese amidstthe central ridges. One battery of the8th 155mm Gun Battalion, meanwhile,had taken up firing positions in antici-pation of providing supporting fires forthe 81st Infantry Division's landing on17 September, but the expected callnever came and this unit also facedabout on the following day.

As a close support weapon on Peleliu,armor ranked just behind artillery, andfar ahead of air or naval gunfire ."Tanks were so invaluable during the

154

first few days that tank units enrouteto support designated units were re-peatedly intercepted by other units indire straits which would beg for tankassistance."32 Whenever possible, thisaid was given by the tankers beforecontinuing on to their assigned destina-tions. Until the 155mm guns cameashore, the Shermans provided the onlyflat-trajectory, high-powered weaponthat proved effective in sealing caves,blasting pillboxes, and reducing otherfortifications. In fact, the tanks servedas mobile artillery .

Because of the elaborate enemy un-derground defenses and the high valuethat Marines placed upon tank support,the Peleliu operation resulted in thelongest continuous commitment in ac-tion experienced by any Marine tankbattalion up to that time . The Shermanswere seldom in reserve, even in thelater stages, and often had to rearmseveral times daily. Their ammunitionexpenditure on D-Day, for example, wasso high that an advance on the follow-ing day was possible only after shellswere salvaged from damaged vehicles .

Throughout the campaign, support-ing armor fought together with theassault troops as a team ; only on threeminor occasions did tanks ever advancewithout accompanying infantry. Be-cause of the Shermans' better commu-nication system and their constantpresence near rifle units, division fre-quently made use of the tank radiosto locate infantry elements or to passon instructions to them .

Owing to mutual respect and admi-ration, the teamwork between the rifle-

3' Stuart ltr,


men and the tankers was superb, andeach went to heroic lengths to supportthe other. On one occasion, a rifle squadprotecting the advance of a tank pla-toon melted away under enemy mortarfire until only two survivors remained,but these infantrymen doggedly kept onwith their task of shepherding theShermans. As if in an attempt to matchthe undaunted courage of their support-ing infantrymen, the tankers recipro-cated by risking both their bodies andtheir vehicles to aid hard-pressed Ma-rines . Whenever the job could not bedone any other way, the Shermansmaneuvered into the most vulnerablepositions, and crew members foughtwith part of their bodies protrudingfrom the tanks' interiors to gain betterobservation. Indicative of the dangerinherent in this practice was the highcasualty rate among the tank battalion'sofficers . Eight out of the total 31 werekilled, and only eight emerged from thelong harrowing campaign unscathed .No Sherman was ever lost to close-inenemy assaults, however, for not evensuicidal-minded Japanese, lugging ban-galore torpedoes or demolition charges,ever succeeded in breaking through theprotective screen of Marine riflemen .

The Marines especially valued thetanks for their ability to quickly andsafely reduce enemy fortifications thatproved impervious to either infantryweapons or assaults. With their heavyarmored plates warding off the hail ofdeadly automatic fire from Japanesefortifications, the Shermans could moveup to pointblank range . After firingthree or four rounds of high explosives,the gunner would shift to white phos-phorus shells, a few of which usually

THE DRIVE INLAND

silenced all enemy resistance. One tankcrew .actually destroyed 30 pillboxesand fortified positions within a singleday's action .

Often, two Shermans would work incoordination with the thin-skinned LVTflamethrower to remove a particularlydifficult position. After moving up andblasting the enemy fortification, thetanks would lay down covering fire whilethe flamethrower placed itself in be-tween the protective hulls of the Sher-mans and burned out the target .

As an experiment, a small capacityflamethrower was installed in a Sher-man, but the short range of the burstnecessitated the tank's moving in atsuch close range that it became vulner-able to close-in enemy assaults, againstwhich it was helpless since its bowmachine gun had been removed to per-mit installation of the flamethrower .Primarily because of its lack of successin combat, this specially-equipped tankdestroyed only a few enemy fortifica-tions, and its assigned missions weremore like battlefield experiments thananything else .

Another innovation tried by the 1stTank Battalion on Peleliu was spacedarmor. While still in the staging area,the tankers welded spare track over theturret and front slope plate of eachSherman, since earlier tests had demon-strated that this technique would in-crease the vehicle's resistance to botharmor-piercing and large high-explosiveprojectiles . This unique use of sparetrack proved extremely effective andwas officially credited with preventingthe destruction of three tanks fromdirect hits by 75mm armor-piercingprojectiles .

155

Without question, however, the mostsignificant armored innovation on Pele-liu was the flexible basis of tank em-ployment. Previously, ,a tank companywas attached to a rifle regiment andremained with it throughout the cam-paign regardless of whether the unitwas in reserve or fighting over terrainunsuitable for tank employment . Forthe initial assault, Company A of the1st Tank Battalion was attached to the1st Marines, Company B to the 5th,and Company C to the 7th, but evenafter control reverted to the battalioncommander on 16 September, the tankunits still remained in direct supportof the regiments . The radical departurefrom previous tank employment doc-trine came when the insufficient numberof Shermans within the division resultedin a widespread shifting of tanks andcrews . Although the tank company com-manders and liaison personnel remainedpermanently attached to the variousregiments to insure continuity of liai-son, the tank platoons were freelyshifted from one rifle unit to anotherto replace battle losses, support a majoreffort, or take advantage of terrain suit-able for tracked vehicle operations . Thenew policy proved its worth, since themaximum utilization of the limited num-ber of tanks was realized .

The 1st Tank Battalion also experi-enced certain difficulties on Peleliu, foran "overoptimistic logistic concept ofthe Palau Operation resulted in an en-tirely inadequate amount of spare partsand maintenance equipment being takenforward."33 Only by the salvaging ofparts from damaged vehicles was the

3' 1st MarDiv SAR, Phase II, Anx J, p . 9 .

156

average of 20 operative tanks main-tained throughout the campaign . More-over, the repair crews suffered consid-erable casualties while stripping theimmobile tanks under the identicalenemy fire that had knocked them out ."Additional spare parts," the tank bat-talion reported, "would have savedboth men and time."34 Just three tanksequipped with bulldozer blades and onetank retriever were landed, but theyquickly proved invaluable . Besides serv-ing to clear away debris and to fill anti-tank ditches, the tank-dozers werefound to be quite useful in sealing upapertures of Japanese bunkers whilethe occupants were still active andfiring .

Like the tankers, the combat engi-neers, including Headquarters andService Company of the 1st EngineerBattalion, landed with the infantry regi-ments to which they were attached .Even after reverting to battalion con-trol on 26 September, the engineers stillworked closely with the assault troops .Often, details of combat engineers wentforward of front lines to hack out trails,clear away mines and boobytraps, orblast enemy-held caves and fortifica-tions. As the official report stated,demolitions proved to be "the greatestengineer problem ."35 One demolitionteam attached to 3/1 was credited withkilling over 200 Japanese during a five-day period of neutralization of enemypillboxes and caves. These demolitionexperts also cleared away coral headsthat impeded the landing of amphibianvehicles, blasted water wells in the coral

" Ibid.'1st MarDiv SAR, Phase II, Anx I, p . 3 .


subsurface, deactivated duds and booby-traps, and cleared the beaches and ac-cess roads of all mines .DEADLOCK AMIDSTTHE RIDGES36

By the fifth day of the assault, prac-tically all those Japanese who were ableto withdraw before the swift onslaughtof the Marines had rejoined ColonelNakagawa's main forces in the Umur-brogols. Here, according to GeneralInoue's master plan, the decisive strug-gle for Peleliu would be waged . In con-trast to earlier Pacific campaigns, nolarge-scale banzai charge was contem-plated. General Inoue had specificallywarned the Peleliu Island Commanderagainst wasting his battle strength infutile attacks ; instead, Colonel Naka-gawa was instructed to defend his holdon the high ground to the last man inan attempt to deny, or at least delay,the use of the airfield to the invadingAmericans. As long as some of the Jap-anese remained in their fortified posi-tions, hidden high-velocity guns couldbombard the airstrip, or suicide squadsarmed with high explosives could sallyforth to wreak havoc on the runways .As a result, the advancing Marines wereforced to assault each enemy emplace-ment individually, while Japanese ar-tillery and mortar fire continued its rainof death and destruction along the frontand to the rear .

At 0700 on 19 September, the attackwas resumed along the entire 1st Ma-

I Additional sources used for this sectionare : 1st Mar Hist; 1/1 UHist ; 3/1 Rec ofEvents, 19-23Sep44 ; 7th Mar R-2 Jnl, 19-22Sep44 ; 1/7 HistRpt, 19-22Sep44 ; 2/7 WarD,19-22Sep44 ; 3/7 WarD, 19-22Sep44 .

THE DRIVE INLAND

rines' front. Colonel Puller had receivedno new directives ; his regiment stillhad the assigned mission of seizing thehigh terrain up to phase line 0-2 . The3d Battalion, unmolested except bysnipers, moved up the western coastalflats for some 400 yards before haltingin order to retain contact with neigh-boring units advancing more slowlyover the ridges . Here, 2/7, still underoperational control of the 1st Marines,overcame stiff resistance to seize theforward slopes of Hills 200 and 260, fora day's gain of 300 yards . Company Aof 1/1 passed through to press the at-tack, but it ran headlong into a sheer150-foot cliff which, coupled with heavyenemy fire, stopped the assault cold .Only six men out of the entire rifle com-pany managed to regain 2/7's lines with-out either being killed or wounded .

It was the 2d Battalion, however,that first tested the strength of ColonelNakagawa's final bastion. After a 500-yard advance in the face of increasingenemy resistance, the foremost assaultunits encountered the same forebodinghill mass that had blunted the attackof Company B the previous day . Thisdominating piece of terrain becameknown as the Five Sisters, because itcontained five peaks ; they averaged250 feet in height and were separatedfrom each other by steep cliffs . Thesouthern face was at first dubbed"Bloody Nose Ridge" by the Marines .No sooner had the battalion consolidatedits forward positions than it launched afull-scale assault directly at the forbid-ding height.

Preparatory air and artillery strikesthoroughly plastered both the forwardand reverse slopes of the hill mass, while

157

all tanks and mortars attached to 2/7were brought over to support the all-outeffort of Honsowetz' battalion . Rushingforward in small groups to minimizecasualties from the terrific enemy fire,the Marines grimly fought their wayahead, and their Shermans, mortars,and LVT flamethrowers ventured as farforward as possible to provide directfire support . Despite the vigor and de-termination with which the riflemenpressed the assault, it collapsed com-pletely by noon . Even the most pessi-mistic Marine present there that daydid not dream that the defenders of theFive Sisters would frustrate all at-tempts to storm them for over twomonths .

Later in the afternoon, the attack wasresumed. This time, the battalion com-mander committed all three of his riflecompanies in a frontal assault, mean-while attempting an enveloping move-ment from the east with Company Cof 1/1, fresh from regimental reserve .If this force could seize Hill 100 (laterto be christened Walt Ridge) whosesummit dominated the East Road andadjoining swampy terrain, a spring-board would be gained for an attackon the hill mass from the rear .

Captain Everett P . Pope led the 90men of Company C through a swampon the right flank of 2/1 to emerge onthe East Road. No sooner had the groupbegun assault operations against twolarge pillboxes discovered near the baseof Walt Ridge, than a Japanese machinegun opened up from the right flankacross a small pond some 50 yards away .Pinned down without any hopes ofreaching the enemy gunner, whose ac-curacy inflicted numerous casualties,

158

Captain Pope finally withdrew his menfor another try along a different ap-proach .The concentrated Japanese fire,

meanwhile, was exacting a stiff tollamong the exposed men of the 2d Bat-talion as they struggled toward thetowering Five Sisters. The losses with-in two of the rifle companies that after-noon became so great that they werecombined in the field into a still-under-strength company, even though a squadof men from the 4th War Dog Platoonhad been thrown in as a reinforcement .

It was late afternoon before Com-pany C, now supported by the divisionreconnaissance company, was in posi-tion to renew its assault on Walt Ridge .This time, Captain Pope planned toapproach by way of a causeway overa large sinkhole and to continue up theEast Road to the base of the objective .Armor was scheduled to spearhead theadvance, but the first Sherman to ven-ture onto the narrow causeway slippedoff to one side, while a following tankalso lost its traction and slid off theother side .

Since the partially-blocked routebarred the approach of additional tanks,Captain Pope's men did the only thingleft to them. Crossing the exposedcauseway in squad rushes, the riflemenraced on to the base of the ridge, pausedbriefly to catch their breaths, and thenassaulted directly up the slopes . Withonly machine gun and mortar fire sup-porting them, the climbers clawed andpulled their way up the rugged slides,and the swiftness of their attack tookthe enemy by surprise. The Marinescarried the crest, but, to their disap-


pointment, they immediately receivedextremely heavy fire from positionsabout 50 yards up the ridgeline, wherethe Japanese held a knoll that com-pletely dominated the newly-won ter-rain .

Reluctant to abandon the summit thathad cost them so many dead andwounded, the men of Company C heldout in their isolated and exposed posi-tions throughout the night, while theenraged foe hurled everything he hadinto the struggle in a desperate bid tooust the Marines from the vital crest .Machine gun bullets crisscrossed theentire ridgetop, and large-caliber shellsand mortar rounds plummeted downfrom above with devastating effect .Using the darkness as a shield, Japa-nese infantry moved forward to launchone savage counterattack after another .Before dawn arrived to bring surceaseto the besieged Marines, they had ex-pended all of their ammunition and wereforced to use their fists, broken ammu-nition boxes, and chunks of coral tohurl their assailants back down theslopes. Only Captain Pope and 15 menremained when the first light of morn-ing revealed to the weary survivors thatthe enemy had moved up machine guns,which now opened with deadly effect .Since the Marines' positions wereclearly untenable in the face of thisnew threat, permission was granted towithdraw .

That morning, 20 September, the 1stand 2d Battalions of Puller's regimentcombined in a final all-out effort toretake Walt Ridge . Every available sup-porting arm, from LVT (A) s to 37mmguns, was brought up as far as possible,

THE DRIVE INLAND

while regimental headquarters wasstripped of personnel to bolster the de-pleted ranks of the assault units. Evena provisional company was formed ofcooks, wiremen, and supply handlers,who manned 12 machine guns in sup-port of the attack .

Somehow the weary Marines, alreadyexhausted physically and mentally byfive days of constant assault over ruggedterrain and against fanatical resistance,summoned up enough reserve energyand courage to make another valiantattempt. One private remembered theensuing assault that sixth day, whenhe and his comrades were waved for-ward toward the towering ridges bytheir sergeant :

`Let's get killed up on that high groundthere,' he said. 'It ain't no good to get itdown here.' As the men stumbled out forhim, he said, `That's the good lads .'

The whole motley lot-a fighting outfitonly in the minds of a few officers in theFirst Regiment and in the First Division-started up the hill . I have never under-stood why. Not one of them refused . Theywere the hard core-the men who couldn'tor wouldn't quit . They would go up athousand blazing hills and through a hun-dred blasted valleys, as long as their legswould carry them . They were Marineriflemen .'

Their bold rushes that day carriedsome of them to positions so advancedthat the Marines killed in the fightingcould not be removed for many moredays. Their heroic sacrifice was in vain,however, for the seized ground proveduntenable in the face of the concen-

°7 Russell Davis, Marine at War (Boston :Little, Brown and Company, 1961), pp . 113,114, used with permission .

159

trated and sustained enemy fire, whichhad already knocked out so many tanksand other supporting arms . "Despitethe intense barrage, weapons whichwere not hit continued firing . The mor-tars glowed red, and machine guns blewup, but those that could, continued tofire." 38

An accurate, if terse, account of theday's furious struggle was containedin Colonel Nakawaga's report to Gen-eral Inoue that night :

Since dawn, the enemy has been con-centrating their forces . . . vainly tryingto approach Higashiyama [Walt Ridge]and Kansokuyama [Hill 300] with 14 tanksand one infantry battalion under the pow-erful aid of air and artillery fire . How-ever, they were again put to rout receivingheavy losses.'

That afternoon, the battered Marinesof the 1st and 2d Battalions were re-lieved in their frontline positions by1/7, while 3/7 replaced 2/7 . The 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, still remainedin its zone along the western coast fortwo more days, but the rest of the regi-ment had sustained too many losses andbeen strained too often to the breakingpoint during the battle of the ridges tobe effective in any further assaulteffort.

On 21 September, two companies ofthe relatively fresh 1/7 moved up theEast Road in column to attempt recap-ture of Walt Ridge. The lead unit, Com-pany C, which was scheduled to makethe assault, passed over the causeway,still partially blocked by the immobilizedShermans, and continued up the road

1 1st Mar Hist, p. 15 .°°Japanese CenPacOps, p . 88 .

160

to the point where it skirted the base ofthe objective . Here, supporting tanks,which had to bypass the causeway sink-hole, joined the advance .

As the leading elements of CompanyC came abreast of the ridge, enemy fireincreased, and when the assault up theeastern slope began, the Japanesegreeted the Marines with a mortar bar-rage that completely blanketed them .Soldiers in the caves above sprayed thescrambling Marines with automatic fireand lobbed grenades down on them,while artillery pieces, cunningly con-cealed on nearby high ground and im-possible to spot, blasted the attackers .Weakened by excessive losses and un-able even to hold the ground gained, theMarines evacuated the hillside and re-turned with their support unit, Com-pany A, to the battalion lines, whereCompany B had remained poised all day .On the same day, 3/7 assaulted over

the ridges in the center . After a faststart, the progress, "for the rest of theday was slow and tedious and measuredin yards . 1140 Since it was evident thatthe only real gains would be made overthe level ground, the battalions' zoneswere shifted, which narrowed 3/1'sfront and permitted this left flank unitto exploit the enemy's weakness in thearea without breaking contact . Before3/1 was relieved two days later, it suc-ceeded in pushing a tank-infantry pa-trol forward 1,000 yards to reach thevillage of Garekoru without encounter-ing serious opposition .

The next day, 22 September, the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, attacked acrossthe left portion of the ridges over ter-

40 3/7 WarD, 21Sep44 .


rain that steadily grew more difficult .The day's gain was a mere 80 yards, forskillfully concealed Japanese machineguns pinned the lead units down timeand time again. In the center of theridges, the 2d Battalion, whose ex-hausted troops had been brought out ofreserve, remained on the defensive anddid not attempt any offensive action. Onthe right, however, the 1st Battalionspent most of the day making carefulpreparation to seize the Five Sisters .At 1445, after Marine artillery

blasted the enemy front with heavyconcentrations, Company B of 1/7moved out in attack, followed by Com-pany A in close support . Riflemen andsupporting tanks made their approachto the objective under a screen of smokelaid down by Marine mortars, whileWeapons Company blazed away at WaltRidge in an attempt to confuse the enemyas to the direction of the attack. Forthe first 250 yards, the riflemen re-ceived only sniper fire ; then hiddenmachine guns on the nearby ridgesopened up with a murderous stream offire .

By this time, the foremost Marineshad begun venturing into the mouth ofa draw, soon to be known as "DeathValley." Its steep walls on both sideswere dotted with mutually-supportingenemy gun emplacements and rifle pits .The accompanying Shermans werebarred from entering, for the floor ofthe declivity proved to be mined, butthey fired white phosphorus and high-explosive shells into the caves lining thecanyon's cliffs as the Marine riflemenpushed on. The Japanese gunners, how-ever, with their clear fields of fire, ex-acted such a heavy toll that a platoon

THE DRIVE INLAND

from Company A was rushed up tobolster the depleted ranks of the as-sault unit .The Marines did not venture much

farther into the funnel-like canyon be-fore running into a sheer cliff thatbarred the way. At this point, the leadriflemen were actually within 100 yardsof Colonel Nakagawa's CP and the lastenemy stronghold to be reduced duringthe long campaign. Since the precipi-tous walls on all three sides made anyinfantry assault of the Japanese cavepositions impossible, a withdrawal wasordered to prevent any additional lossesfrom the deadly rain of fire that rakedthe Marines. The supporting companyand its Shermans moved up under acover of smoke to support the evacua-tion, and, by 1830, the entire force hadwithdrawn.

When darkness settled over the bat-tlefield on 22 September, one phase ofthe Peleliu campaign had ended andanother had begun . No longer wouldMarines, soon to be reinforced by Armytroops from Angaur, suffer prohibitivecasualties in fruitless frontal assaultson the ridges from the south . Instead,an end run around Colonel Nakagawa'sdevilishly-designed last-ditch positionswould be made up the western coast in

161

search of a better attack route to thefinal pocket of Japanese resistance .

Although the campaign was to dragon for another two months of bitterfighting, the 1st Marine Division in aweek of constant assault had seized thevital airfield, the commanding terrainbehind it, and all of the island south ofthe Umurbrogols . Ample room for theproper deployment of both division andcorps artillery had been gained, andall hindrances to unloading over thebeaches had been removed, leaving onlythe weather as an unknown factor .

All of Peleliu containing strategicvalue had been captured by the Marines,but the cost had been high . Casualtiestotaled 3,946. These heavy losses elimi-nated one regiment as an effectiveassault unit and severely depleted thestrength of the other two . The 1st Ma-rines, for instance, suffered 56 percentcasualties and, among the nine rifleplatoons of its 1st Battalion, not one ofthe original platoon leaders, and only 74of the riflemen, remained. As a sergeantremarked upon relief, "This ain't aregiment. We're just survivors."41

41 George McMillan et al, Uncommon Valor :Marine Divisions in Action (Washington : In-fantry Journal Press, 1946), p . 58 .

Angaur and Ulithi '

ANGA UR: THE MENAND THE PLAN

On D-Day, while the Marines foughttenaciously to secure a beachhead onPeleliu, the ILIAC landing force sched-uled to seize Angaur participated in afeinting movement northward againstBabelthuap. The convoy of transportsand LSTs carrying the 81st InfantryDivision, accompanied by a protectivescreen of destroyers, hove to off thecoast of the huge enemy-held islandabout noon and began to engage in pre-landing activities . Besides serving toconfuse the Japanese as to the realtarget of the American attack, the forceafloat provided a handy source ofcombat-ready troops in the eventualitythat the Peleliu landing ran intotrouble .

Though still untested in combat, theArmy division had been training andpreparing for this role for over twoyears. The insignia of the 81st was anangry wildcat, its nickname was theWildcat Division, and the men referredto themselves as Wildcats .

Slated for the Pacific Theater andparticipation in Operation STALE-

' Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis section is derived from : 81st InfDiv OpRpt, The Capture of Angaur Island, 17Sep-220ct44, dtd 26Dec44, hereafter 81st InfDivOpRpt-Angaur ; Historical Committee, 81stInfantry Division ; Smith, Approach to thePhilippines ; Morison, Leyte ; Hough, Assaulton Peleliu .

162

CHAPTER 5

MATE, the Army division debarked inJuly 1944 at the Hawaiian Islands, itsstaging area. While the men topped offtheir stateside training with amphibiousexercises, the staff planners busiedthemselves with the essential tacticaland logistical preparations, coordinat-ing them whenever necessary. The as-signed target was Angaur Island, situ-ated just south. of Peleliu and possess-ing extensive low level areas whichwere considered ideal for the construc-tion of a heavy bomber field .Like the 1st Marine Division, the

81st found its planning complicated bythe changing concept of OperationSTALEMATE . The Navy plan for theinvasion of the Palaus had called forseizure of Angaur first, to be followedalmost immediately by the capture ofPeleliu. General Julian Smith, in hisdual capacity as Commanding General,Administrative Command, V Amphibi-ous Corps, and Commanding General,Expeditionary Troops, took issue withthis concept. He maintained that whileAngaur was being attacked, the Japa-nese would have ample opportunity toreinforce Peleliu from Babelthuap,which was garrisoned by a force esti-mated at upwards of 25,000 troops.Initial seizure of Peleliu, on the otherhand, would cut off Angaur from thatsource of reinforcement. The Navy ac-cepted this revision of concept, butdesiring Angaur for construction of asecond airfield, continued throughout to

ANGAUR AND ULITHI

press for the earliest possible landing onthat island .2The plan continued to be revised

through 16 September, at which timethe last change became effective . Onthat date, RCT 323, then serving asILIAC floating reserve, was designatedthe Ulithi assault force with orders toproceed immediately on its new mission .The Army officers responsible for plan-ning the Angaur operation were at firsthandicapped by the lack of intelligenceabout the terrain and the enemy garri-son. Fortunately, recently taken aerialphotographs, as well as enemy docu-ments captured on Saipan, reached thestaff officers in time to help clarify thesituation .

As finally evolved, the Angaur land-ing became a two-pronged assault uti-lizing two RCTs attacking over separatebeaches. Red Beach was located on thenortheastern coast of the island ; BlueBeach was situated near the center ofthe east coast (See Map 6) . Two thou-sand yards of rocky shoreline separatedthe two landing points . Single lines ofadvance from both beaches to the in-terior of the island led straight into thethick, tangled undergrowth of the rainforest. Even though these beaches werethe least desirable of any on Angaurthe decision of Army planners to landat the two widely separated points wasbased on sound tactical reasons . Thesewere the absence of a fringing reef atthe proposed landing sites and the pres-ence of weaker enemy defenses thanexisted elsewhere on the island .

Major Ushio Goto, the Japanese com-mander on Angaur, did not have suffi-

'Smith interview .

163

cient troops to defend all possible land-ing points. Even by concentrating hisforces to cover only those beachesoffering most advantages to an invader,he still had to spread his troops danger-ously thin. To thwart the Americanassault, the major had only his 1stBattalion, 59th Infantry, for GeneralInoue had withdrawn the remainder ofthe Angaur garrison to Babelthuap dur-ing the latter part of July in the beliefthat the larger island was the mostlikely objective of any Allied attack .Subsequent reinforcements from Babel-thuap had brought the total Japanesestrength on Angaur to 1,400 men .American intelligence overestimatedenemy strength, and planners of the 81stInfantry Division expected to encoun-ter no less than two Japanese battalionstotalling 2,500 men . The decision toland two regiments in the initial assaultwas the direct result of this faultyintelligence .

The Japanese commander decided torely upon the natural barrier providedby the rain forest and the distance be-tween vital areas of the island to deterany Allied landing over Red and BlueBeaches. If the Americans chose tostrike there, Major Goto expected tohave ample time to concentrate and de-ploy his forces for a successful coun-terattack. The landing beaches selectedfor the assault were lightly fortified ;the more favorable landing sites onAngaur featured elaborate defenses .These consisted of reinforced concretepillboxes, supporting arms designed toprovide clear fields of fire across thebeaches, as well as mines, tetrahedrons,and barbed wire barricades . Major Gotohad positioned the bulk of the island

ANGAUR AND ULITHI

garrison within close supporting dis-tance of the southern, western, andeastern beaches .

Upon completion of last-minute train-ing, the 81st Division sailed from Ha-waii on 12 August for Guadalcanal,where it arrived 12 days later . At CapeEsperance the infantrymen made twopractice landings, attempting to simu-late battlefield conditions on Angaur . Inearly September the Western AttackForce departed from Guadalcanal forthe Palaus . Confidence prevailed amongthe infantrymen as they neared theirfirst action. "The troops," commentedthe Army division history, "were asphysically fit as any that ever set forthto war."3 On the coral beaches ofAngaur, in the crucible of combat, thetruth of this statement was soon to betested .

On the morning of 12 September, theWestern Attack Force moved into posi-tion off the Palaus . While other shipsproceeded with the task of softeningPeleliu's defenses, the two battleships,four light cruisers, and five destroyersof the Angaur Attack Group, com-manded by Rear Admiral William H. P .Blandy, began a deliberate and syste-matic bombardment of their objective .Every known or suspected enemy for-tification on the small island was thor-oughly blasted by the heavy naval guns,or bombed and strafed by carrier planesflying numerous strikes . Minesweepersand UDT teams, meanwhile, executedtheir prelanding missions off Red, Blue,and Green Beaches, the latter an alter-nate landing site .

'Historical Committee, 81st Infantry Divi-sion, p . 65 .

Early on 15 September, the 1st Ma-rine Division landed on Peleliu andembarked upon its task of wresting asecure beachhead from the defendingforce. Throughout the day, GeneralMueller and his men anxiously followedthe progress of the assault, for its out-come would determine when the Wild-cats would be released from their re-serve mission for the Angaur landing .So confident was the Navy that FoxDay, the invasion of Angaur, would beon 16 September that, on the previousevening, in accordance with Navy cus-tom, they fed the soldiers the best eve-ning meal possible, including steak,chicken, frozen strawberries, and otherdelicacies . 4 The 15th passed, however,without the arrival of the expectedorder .The next morning, 16 September,

Marines advanced across the runwaysof the Peleliu airfield, prime objectiveof the assault. When General Rupertusfailed to request reinforcements for hisdivision by noon, higher commandersconcluded that the need for the largeArmy reserve had passed . Moreover,Admiral Blandy had reported thatthe preliminary bombardments, hydro-graphic conditions, and UDT prepara-tions all favored a successful landingon Angaur. During the afternoon of16 September, the commanders of theWestern Attack Force (Admiral Fort)and ILIAC (General Geiger) conferredand decided to release the 81st InfantryDivision for a landing the followingday. This order was issued at 1432, andthe division command on board theAPA Fremont immediately made last

'Ibid ., p . 66 .

165

166

minute preparations for the Angaurassault, then only 18 hours away .

THE WILDCATS SEIZETHEIR OBJECTIVES

Before dawn on Fox Day, 17 Septem-ber, the warships of the task groupunder Rear Admiral Blandy sent shellsscreaming towards Angaur. The firesupport plan employed by the Navy pro-vided for fire from 2 battleships, 4cruisers, 5 destroyers, 9 LCI (G) s, and4 LCI (M) s, the latter firing 20mm and40mm guns, rockets, and mortars .'Heavy explosions soon rocked the is-land . Shortly after 0740, 40 fighter-bombers swept down out of the skies tobomb and strafe enemy positions be-hind the beaches . At 0810, precisely onschedule, the approach to the shorebegan. LCIs led the way, blazing awaywith guns, mortars, and rocket concen-trations . The initial assault waves madethe journey in LVTs, but followingwaves were boated in LCVPs and LCMs,for even LSTs could beach with dryramps on the reef-free shores .

RCT 321 landed with two battalionsabreast in columns of companies overBlue Beach at 0830, while RCT 322 did

'Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from : 81st InfDiv OpRpt-Angaur ; RCT 321 OpRpt, The Capture ofAngaur Island, 1Jul-30Sep44, dtd 26Nov44,hereafter R'CT 321 OpRept-Angaur ; RCT 322OpRpt, Angaur Island-Palaus Group, 1Jul-230ct44, dtd 1Dec33, hereafter RCT 322 OpRpt-Angaur ; Japanese CenPac Ops ; PeleliuComment File ; Historical Committee, 81st In-fantry Division ; Smith, Approach to the Philip-pines ; Morison, Leyte ; Hough, Assault onPeleliu.

e Anx C, 81st InfDiv FO No. 7, dtd 5Aug44 .


likewise over Red Beach six minuteslater. No entrenched Japanese infantryopposed the landing ; the only enemyresistance consisted of sporadic mortar,machine gun, and rifle fire, whichcaused neither casualties nor damage .

As viewed through the eyes of theJapanese Army commander on Babel-thuap, the American invasion of An-gaur appeared to be fraught withdisaster for the invasion force, and thesituation at that island on 17 Septemberwas described as follows

Under the protection of bombing, straf-ing, and naval gunfire enemy craft, in-cluding battleships, approached as close as100 meters off the coast and commencedfiring. This has been going on since dawn .The enemy launched a landing party of 30barges at 0800 along our northeasterncoast line. However, the Angaur Unit wasable to put the enemy to rout and start astate of confusion with the aid of the gunswhich had been planted there :

Shortly thereafter the Japanese con-ceded that a second landing attempt wasmore successful and that by 0900 Amer-ican forces in a strength of about 2,000men had taken up positions on land,accompanied by a large group of tanks .The American losses for the first dayof operations on Angaur were listed as30 barges blown up and sunk, 20 bargesdestroyed, and 15 tanks destroyed, asomewhat unreasonable figure in viewof the lack of initial Japanese opposi-tion at the beaches .

The men of the invasion force re-mained blissfully unaware of the routand disaster to which the Japaneseheadquarters staff at Koror had rele-

Japanese CenPacOps, p . 87 .

ANGAUR AND ULITHI

167

U.S. ARMY 81st Infantry Division invades Angaur Island . (USA SC 196034)

"WILDCATS" closing in on enemy pocket, Angaur. (USA SC 196033)

168

gated them on paper. Rushing acrosssome 20 yards of slightly inclined,rubble-strewn strips of sand to thecrest of a low embankment at the edgeof the jungle, the Army troops estab-lished a firing line . Then, with thebeachheads secure, the men plungedheadlong into the semi-dark, almostimpenetrable undergrowth . Their im-mediate objective was Phase Line 0-1,some 300 yards inland. On the oppositeside of Angaur, meanwhile, the trans-ports carrying RCT 323, the ILIACfloating reserve, were feinting a land-ing off Saipan Town in hopes of con-fusing the enemy .

This ruse apparently succeeded . WhenMajor Goto learned of the Americanlandings, he dispatched a rifle companytowards the eastern beaches to attackthe Americans, but made no move toorganize a large-scale counterattack .The Japanese commander's belief thatthe main assault would come over thesouthern beaches, where he had de-ployed the bulk of his troops, may havebeen further strengthened by the feintlanding. At any rate, he did not attemptto shift any of his forces northward .To forestall any such move, Americannaval gunfire, as well as aerial bombingand strafing, repeatedly hit every po-tential assembly area on the islandthroughout the day. These interdictoryfires might well have made any re-grouping of the forces of Major Goto adisaster and prevented any sizeablecounterattack from materializing . Whilethe Japanese defense units preparedfor combat, scouts were dispatched toobserve the movements of the invasionforce. In case the defense was unsuc-


cessful in the daytime, a counterattackwas planned for the coming night .'

The American assault regiments ad-vanced slowly at first from Red andBlue Beaches. No roads penetrated thealmost trackless jungle, whose floor wasmatted and choked with fallen trees,broken branches, and snarled vines .The sweat-drenched soldiers of the322d, hacking and groping their waythrough the undergrowth, found theterrain a much more formidable ob-stacle than the intermittent mortar,machine gun, and sniper fire from anenemy hidden by the dense foliage. Onthe beaches, meanwhile, the buildup ofmen and materiel continued . Upon com-ing ashore, the medium tanks immedi-ately headed for the frontlines overtrails cleared for them by bulldozers . Bynoon it was apparent that despite theWildcat's lack of familiarity with com-bat conditions, they had made a suc-cessful amphibious assault . They werenow in a position to extend their gripon the island .Although the advance of RCT 322

was progressing on schedule, the 321sthad rough going from the very outset .The regiment encountered strongly heldenemy fortifications on its southernflank near Rocky Point, on its northernflank near Cape Ngatpokul, and to itsfront as well . Expansion of the beach-head proved extremely difficult andtime-consuming .By late afternoon of Fox Day the

accomplishments of his regiments failedto measure up to General Mueller's ex-

11 IIIAC C-2 Rpt No . 7, dtd 21Sep44.

ANGAUR AND ULITHI

pectations. Not all of Phase Line 0-1,which extended from the northern shoreof Angaur about 500 yards southwest ofCape Gallatin to a point roughly 250yards southwest of Rocky Point hadbeen seized. Furthermore, a 700-yardgap still separated the two regiments .Orders issued for the attack that after-noon were intended to rectify this situ-ation. Before nightfall, General Muellerhoped to occupy more favorable posi-tions and ordered his regiments toprobe for a possible weak spot in theenemy defenses, particularly in the areaseparating the two beachheads. The322d Infantry Regiment was to pushforward to Phase Line 0-2, extendinggenerally southward from a point about400 yards west of 0-1 on the northshore to Green Beach on the easternshore, with emphasis on achieving ajuncture with RCT 321 as soon aspossible .

By 1430 the general attack had beenresumed, and the soldiers of both regi-ments pushed forward all along theline. In the vicinity of Blue Beach acombination of naval gunfire and bomb-ing and strafing by supporting aircraftfailed to eliminate the Japanese pill-boxes impeding the advance of the 321stInfantry Regiment . The task of re-ducing them fell to the foot soldier .Gingerly picking their way over therubble-strewn sand, riflemen gained po-sitions from which they furnished pro-tective fire until a portable flamethrowercould be brought into action . Once theflaming tongue of napalm started lick-ing at the gunport of a pillbox, demoli-tion teams rushed forward to place theircharges. No sooner had the walls of the

169

fortification been breached than theriflemen began crawling towards thenext pillbox. Though painfully slow,this method was effective . Dusk foundsome men of RCT 321 beyond PhaseLine 0-1, but both flanks still laggedshort of the first objective .The advance of RCT 322 was pro-

gressing smoothly enough in the north,despite the failure of the two assaultregiments to effect a juncture. ThoughRCT 322 managed to establish defen-sive perimeters along most of PhaseLine 0-2 in its zone, it still had not beenable to push patrols south far enoughto join up with the adjacent unit. Outof necessity, both regiments bent theirlines to form separate beachheads .

After a day of incessant pounding byAmerican warships and planes, dark-ness came as a welcome relief to MajorGoto and his men . This respite from thepunishing interdiction fires gave theJapanese a chance to recuperate and tomove to new defensive positions with-out fear of American interference . LikeColonel Nakagawa on Peleliu, theAngaur Sector Unit commander had re-ceived specific orders from GeneralInoue not to waste his men in any sav-age but short-lived banzai charges.Instead, Major Goto was to delay thecapture of Angaur as long as possible.Once it had become clear beyond anydoubt that the Americans were makingtheir major drive over the northeasternbeaches, Major Goto planned to with-draw his garrison forces from the south-ern part of the island and concentratethem in the hills that dotted the north-west portion of Angaur . Here, amidstthe highest and most rugged coral ridges

170

on the island, the Japanese garrisoncommander would make his final stand .

The Wildcats, weary both physicallyand emotionally from their first tasteof combat, found little relief during thehours of darkness. Not only did smallenemy patrols probe and jab at theperimeters of both regiments, but Japa-nese infiltrators continually attemptedto penetrate the frontlines . To add to theconfusion of the first night, the soldiersof the 81st, like all untried troops,engaged in indiscriminate firing atimagined targets .9

The next morning, in a predawn at-tack, a reinforced Japanese companysmashed into the extreme southern flankof 1/321, forcing the Wildcats backsome 50 to 75 yards . Nevertheless, thefaltering lines soon rallied, and by 0618division received word that the Japa-nese counterattack had been stopped .Any premature hope that the attackcould now be resumed was doomedwhen it became apparent that the Japa-nese had broken off their initial counter-attack only in order to regroup . Beforelong they struck again with renewedvigor and the men of the 1st Battalionwere quickly initiated into the ferocityof close combat with a fanatical anddetermined opponent . The arrival offriendly aircraft and reinforcementsafter daybreak quickly turned the tideof battle for the beleaguered infantryand slowly the enemy attack subsided .This action marked the first time the81st Infantry Division found itself in adefensive situation since going ashore .

"'Stern measures were instituted to sup-press the tendency toward trigger-happiness ."Historical Committee, 81st Infantry Division,p. 78.


While RCT 321 had been fully en-gaged in holding the ground it had takenthe previous day, the 322d was not idle .At dawn a Japanese counterattack hitits lines, but on a somewhat smallerscale and with much less effect than theone that had hit the adjacent regiment .In launching these attacks Major Gotowas complying without deviation withhis orders from General Inoue "to carryout strong counterattacks, from previ-ously planned and prepared positionsin order to destroy the enemy that haslanded, by dawn of the next day ." 10

Fortunately for the Wildcats, onlyone small group of enemy troops hadmoved into the gap separating the tworegiments during the night, and theywithdrew at daybreak without havingfired a shot . This again represented aradical departure from previous Japa-nese tactics, which had required theJapanese to expend themselves as soonas possible after an American landing,often in a futile banzai charge. In fact,had the Japanese exploited their advan-tage and rushed men in force into thisunprotected area, much damage mighthave been caused to the exposed beach-heads, which by this time were crowdedwith supporting troops, supplies, andmateriel. Such an attack would havebeen in keeping with the theory ofGeneral Inoue "that if we repay theAmericans (who rely solely upon ma-terial power) with material power it willshock them beyond imagination . . . . 11

"Palau Sector Group Headquarters ; PalauSector Group training order entitled "Train-ing for Victory," dtd 11Jul44, Item No . 11,190in CinCPac-CinCPOA Translations No . 3, dtd7Nov44.u Ibid.

ANGAUR AND ULITHI

Major Goto, however, had already takensteps to assure the success of his mis-sion. According to his plans, the finaland decisive battle for Angaur wouldbe fought elsewhere on the island, interrain of his choosing . Thus, for themoment, he had no intention of weak-ening his force unduly despite the con-fusion that could be created at theexposed beachheads by a well-timed andexecuted Japanese counterattack .

General Mueller's orders for the sec-ond day of operations on Angaur calledfor the attack to jump off at 0900 . It sohappened that neither regiment movedout on schedule . RCT 322 lagged behindmainly because of the confusion result-ing from indiscriminate firing in therear by nervous and inexperienced serv-ice troops that saw a Japanese lurkingbehind every bush and reacted accord-ingly. The 321st Infantry Regiment, onthe other hand, was delayed by newcounterattacks . At 0905 an attack hitthe right flank of that regiment, butstrafing and bombing runs called downby the air liaison officer quickly brokeup the enemy effort . Half an hour lateranother counterattack struck the south-ern flank of the regiment . Well-timedand expertly delivered supporting firesfrom mortars, tanks, and an LCI lyingoff the beach permitted the Wildcats tohold their ground .

At 1045, RCT 321 finally jumped offwith two battalions in assault . To thesouth, the 1st Battalion assaulted south-westward in the wake of the last abor-tive Japanese counterattack, only to behalted almost immediately by concen-trated fire from enemy fortificationsnear Rocky Point . Here, to forestall anyadvance into the interior, the Japanese

171

had constructed a near-perfect defen-sive system. It consisted of pillboxes,dugouts, rifle pits, and interconnectingtrenches, all mutually supporting andcapable of delivering fires both to thefront and to the flanks . A frontal assaultfrom the beachhead would be prohibitiveboth in time and in casualties, and so aflanking maneuver was set into motion .

The battalion started inland over theSouthern Railroad ' 12 and followed thetracks for some distance before swerv-ing through the jungle to approach theheavily fortified beach positions fromthe vulnerable rear. Dense jungle,sniper fire, and a large number of anti-tank mines all combined to hamper theprogress of the battalion. When dark-ness closed in, the advance elements,still attempting to negotiate the track-less wilderness, were pulled back alongthe rail embankment to establish a de-fensive perimeter.

In the north that day, 3/322 attackedon the left, the 2d on the right ; the 1stwent into reserve . Elements of the 3dBattalion were delayed somewhat bysniper fire and wild shooting to the rearby support troops . Finally, one com-pany, preceded by a platoon of mediumtanks, moved out along the roadbed ofthe Pacific Railroad against stiffeningenemy resistance. Supporting armor,blasting every suspicious patch of ter-rain that might have hidden a Japaneseposition, knocked out several reinforcedbunkers in the process. Within twohours, the riflemen had advanced some

12 For the sake of simplicity, the variousnarrow-gauge railroad spurs on Angaur werenamed after railroad lines in the UnitedStates, but with the nomenclature all resem-blance between the two ended .

172

500 yards to the junction of the South-ern and the Pacific Railroads . By thistime, supporting fires were falling dan-gerously close, so the soldiers pulledback along the railroad some 75 yards,and were there joined by Company L,which had advanced behind the leadunit .

At this point occurred one of thesetragic events that only too often inWorld War II marred a campaign thatwas otherwise going well. Six Navyfighter planes suddenly swept out of theskies and subjected the exposed men toheavy bombing and strafing. The fullbrunt of the attack fell on 3/322 . Beforethe men could take cover or the airstrike could be called off, friendly air-craft had killed 7 and wounded 46 . Aninvestigation later determined that theincident resulted from an impropermarking of the target area and was notthe fault of the pilots. Upon learning ofthe extent of the damage, GeneralMueller requested all air attacks againstAngaur be discontinued until furthernotice, but this measure, aside fromassuring . the nonrecurrence of such ablunder for several days, could not undothe damage that had been wrought . Itshould be noted that on Angaur theenemy may at times have instigated andexploited such incidents .

Japanese machine gunners and snipersan Angaur used the sound of low-flyingaircraft to mask their firing positions byfiring only when planes passed close over-head. This led to reports from jitterytroops that friendly planes were strafingthem. The situation got so bad that eventhe air observer had to be ordered clear ofthe area73

" Col Arthur T . Mason ltr to CMC, dtd28Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File .


Despite the disorganization resultingfrom such severe casualties as thoseinflicted by the ill-timed air strike, theriflemen resumed their advance withinhalf an hour. Pushing forward rapidlythe men seized the Japanese phosphateplant north of Saipan by 1400, and dur-ing the remainder of the afternoonadvanced to within 300 yards of thewest coast of Angaur. Infantry-tankpatrols, operating in generally openterrain, reached the northern limits ofSaipan Town.

To the north of the RCT 322 zone,the 2d Battalion passed through thelines of the 1st, which then revertedto regimental reserve . Orders called forthe battalion to outflank the ruggedhills in the northwestern portion of theisland and then to move southwardalong the western coast until it joinedup with the 3d Battalion . The advancingWildcats encountered only light resist-ance, but the terrain grew progressivelymore rugged. Before long the support-ing armor had to be withdrawn, for thebroken nature of the ground precludedthe use of tanks . The infantrymen dog-gedly plodded onward, despite intenseheat. One platoon, meeting no opposi-tion, continued to Cape Pkulangelul,which formed the northwest tip ofAngaur. The regimental commander,aware of the logistical problems in-volved in supporting such an advancedforce, and the tactical difficulties re-sulting from having a weak unit occupyan exposed and vulnerable position,ordered a withdrawal to Phase Line0-2 .

The 18th of September featured theunloading of necessary supplies on alarge scale. The previous day, during the

ANGAUR AND ULITHI

confusion of the initial assault landing,beach congestion had resulted whenfollowing waves continued to dumptheir loads upon the already crowdedbeaches. As a result, a temporary halthad been called to the unloading andno attempt was made to land artilleryuntil afternoon, when two field artillerybattalions were put ashore. By morningof the 18th, all supporting artillery wasin position and ready to fire .From the intelligence reports re-

ceived during the second day, GeneralMueller gathered that the main Japa-nese strength was still concentrated onsouthern Angaur . This belief, coupledwith orders to seize the vital level areain the south to facilitate constructionof the airfield, impelled the divisioncommander to issue orders calling fora drive southward by both regimentson 19 September to overrun SaipanTown and to divide the enemy forces .At 0730 on the 19th, following heavy

preparatory fires, the two rifle regimentsjumped off in a determined bid to splitthe island and its defending force. Tothe south, RCT 321 attacked with the3d Battalion on the left, the 2d on theright, and the 1st in reserve . To thenorth, RCT 322 moved out with threebattalions abreast, from left to rightthe 3d, the 1st, and the 2d . The twobattalions on the right advanced south-westward in an attempt to seize allground south of Phase Line 0-4, exceptfor the rugged hills, which would bemopped up later by the 2d . Phase Line0-4 extended eastward from the westcoast about 600 yards north of SaipanTown to a point northeast of Saipanwhere it formed a juncture with PhaseLine 0-3 . The 2d Battalion also had the

173

mission of preventing any escape by theJapanese along the northern coast. The3d Battalion was to strike directlythrough Saipan Town and then occupythe area between Phase Lines 0-4 and0-5, the latter extending southeastwardfrom Saipan Town to Beach Green IIon the southeastern shore of Angaur .

Supported by medium tanks, the twoassault companies of 3/322 advancedrapidly from their nighttime positionsnear the phosphate plant. Only sporadicmortar, machine gun, and rifle fireopposed the advance into Saipan Town .The riflemen encountered a number ofenemy pillboxes, bunkers, and otherfortifications, but these defenses hadbeen designed to prevent an attack bysea only. Since the Wildcats approachedthem from the rear, their reductionposed no great problem .

Following capture of the town, Gen-eral Mueller conducted a personal re-connaissance of the front and orderedthe drive to the south continued asrapidly as possible. Leaving small de-tails to mop up any Japanese still lurk-ing among the shattered buildings orhiding in caves along the edge of thewater, the 3d Battalion started south-wards along a railroad that paralleledthe shore some 30 yards inland . Thefast-moving soldiers encountered onlysmall groups of enemy troops that werequickly bypassed and, by 1600, they hadset up night positions on Cape Ngara-mudel and the north shore of GarangaoiCove.

The other two battalions of RCT 322met little difficulty in advancing southto the phosphate plant. Here, the 1stBattalion found its zone already occu-pied by elements of the 2d and 3d Bat-

174

talions and received orders to assembleas a regimental reserve. Subsequently,its mission was to guard the rear areaagainst possible enemy infiltration . The2d Battalion, on the other hand, rein-forced with Company B of the 1st,launched an assault against the north-west hills . A rifle company quickly oc-cupied Palomas Hill, also known asLighthouse Hill, in the face of onlynegligible opposition and dispatched apatrol to reconnoiter to the front .

This patrol failed to make any head-way, for devastating fire from cleverlyconcealed enemy positions on highground poured down upon the advancingmen. A flanking attempt by CompanyG, using the Western Railroad to ad-vance from the east, was pinned downby heavy fire from Japanese entrenchedin the Lake Salome area. Blocked inevery forward movement and with day-light fading rapidly, the battalionpulled back to the phosphate plant toset up night positions .

To the south that day, in the RCT321 zone, tank-infantry teams of the 2dBattalion overcame very light opposi-tion and by 0900 had overrun MiddleVillage. Seizure of this settlement, some400 yards east of Saipan Town, wascontested only by occasional groups ofJapanese infantrymen . Such weak re-sistance to the advance of the Wildcatsencouraged the commanding officer ofthe 710th Tank Battalion to recommendan armored reconnaissance of southernAngaur .When higher commanders concurred

in his proposal, a company of mediumtanks, each mounting six or more men,started rolling southward, skirting thewestern edge of a mangrove swamp in


the southeast portion of the island . Theremaining riflemen of the 2d Battalionfollowed more slowly on foot. Beforethe day ended, this tank-infantry recon-naissance force had completely circledthe swamp area-even passing throughthe fortified eastern beach defenses thatwere still holding up the advance of the3d Battalion. Surprisingly enough, thisforce did not at any time encounter seri-ous opposition . Having reached theirobjective, the tanks took up positionsbehind the lines of the 2d Battalion,which extended across the island belowthe swamp to tie in with 3/322 nearGarangaoi Cove .

While the above action was in prog-ress, the 3d Battalion of RCT 321 passedthrough the lines of the 1st Battalionin the eastern part of Angaur to strikesouthward from the Southern Rail-road. In the course of the morning, onecolumn pushed forward along the coast,while the other, attempting a flankingmovement inland, soon ran into themangrove swamp. Negotiating this nat-ural obstacle prove so difficult and time-consuming that the column turned east-ward to rejoin the force assaultingalong the beach .

Here, the same extensive fortifica-tions that had blunted the previousattack barred the way to the south . Nosooner had the Wildcats methodicallyreduced one group of the mutually sup-porting positions than they drew firefrom additional defenses farther downthe coast. By early afternoon, the attackhad stalled. Even a substantial increasein mortar and artillery support failed toget the advance going again .

By this time, a gap had opened be-tween the two assault battalions of

ANGAUR AND ULITHI

RCT 321. To fill this void, the 1st Bat-talion, previously held in reserve,plunged into the morass separating thetwo assault units . Somehow these menmanaged to move far enough ahead be-fore nightfall to set up perimeter de-fenses some 600 yards inland from the3d Battalion.

That night, as General Mueller sur-veyed the tactical situation confrontinghis troops, he had every reason to feelconfident. Gains for the day had sur-passed his expectations, a fact also rec-ognized by General Geiger, who dashedoff the following message upon his re-turn from a visit to the frontlines onAngaur : "The advance of your Divisiontoday reflects a commendable aggressivespirit. Well done to all hands ."14 The dayhad also brought capture of the firstJapanese prisoner, who identified hisunit as the 1st Battalion, 59th InfantryRegiment, 14th Division . According tothis source, in June all Japanese troops,except for a garrison of more than athousand, had departed for Babelthuap .If true, this intelligence was welcomenews for the 81st Infantry Division,since the enemy strength was appar-ently less than had been anticipated . Aheavy fight still lay ahead, however, be-fore the entire island of Angaur couldbe secured .

There were, nevertheless, bright spotson the horizon . Already seized was thelevel terrain for the bomber strip, themain objective of the entire operation .It appeared unlikely that the Japanesewould make any serious attempt to re-

'Historical Committee, 81st Infantry Divi-sion, p . 93 .

175

inforce the Angaur garrison in viewof the situation on Peleliu . There nolonger could be any doubt of the issueon Angaur .

The first Marines to arrive on Angaurwere members of a reconnaissance partyof the 7th AAA Battalion, which landedon 19 September . Upon the arrival ofthe remainder of the battalion, theMarine unit was closely integrated inthe Angaur Island defense plans, oper-ating observation posts along the coastfor waterborne targets in addition tobeing responsible for antiaircraftdefense .

Still unaware of recent changes inJapanese defensive tactics, GeneralMueller, as a precautionary measure,alerted all his units to take the neces-sary steps to fend off any last-ditch ban-zai charges. The admonition of the divi-sion commander was to prove unneces-sary. For the Japanese the time hadnow arrived to withdraw the major por-tion of their troops into the rugged, coral-ridged hills of northwest Angaur . Herethe Japanese commander planned toexploit the natural terrain features tothe utmost, forcing the Wildcats to rootevery last defending Japanese out ofcaves and dugouts while inflicting theheaviest casualties possible on the at-tacking force .

On the whole, the night of 19-20 Sep-tember passed without any major inci-dent. Division artillery blasted away atenemy positions ; the ships offshorecould fire only illuminating shells be-cause of the proximity of friendly andopposing lines . Towards dawn, small,scattered remnants of the Angaur gar-rison began filtering through the Amer-ican positions . These Japanese seemed

176

intent solely upon escaping from thedoomed southern portion of the island,however, and gaining the northwesternhills where Major Goto still retainedcontrol .

Early on 20 September all three bat-talions of RCT 321 resumed the finaldrive south to wipe out the two isolatedpockets of enemy resistance still remain-ing there, while RCT 322 continued itsassault against the Japanese-held hillsto the north. The 322d was forced todivert one battalion northward to as-sume defensive positions along the sec-ond phase line between Lake Aztec andthe north coast . This force had the mis-sion of blocking any possible Japanesecounterattack against Red Beach, whichat the time was still congested with sup-plies and materiel. Since another of hisbattalions was stationed below SaipanTown, the regimental commander, Col-onel Benjamin W . Venable, had only his2d Battalion available for the assault .

The soldiers moved out and soon re-occupied Palomas Hill . Upon resumingthe advance, the Wildcats found them-selves attacking uphill over terrain thatgreatly favored the defenders, who wereentrenched on the commanding heightsto the front of the battalion . Every at-tempt by men of the 2d Battalion to pushforward drew such heavy enemy mor-tar and machine gun fire that it had tobe abandoned. Even a flanking maneu-ver to the east, making use of the West-ern Railroad, whose tracks cut throughthe ridges surrounding Lake Salome,failed when three self-propelled 75mmguns which were supporting the riflecompany, emerged from the 50-yard-long railroad cut only to be knocked outby enemy action . Except for the recap-


tured ground at Palomas Hill no addi-tional gains were made, and the men ofthe 2d Battalion dug in for the night insubstantially the same positions theyhad held on the previous day.

Further south that morning, 2/321with two additional rifle companies andtwo tank companies, quickly overranthe heavily fortified southern beaches .Fortunately for the attackers, these po-sitions, previously held in strength,were now defended by a mere handfulof Japanese survivors . The only stiffopposition came from some pillboxesclustered near a tank barrier at thesoutheastern tip of Angaur . A flame-thrower-satchel charge team soon elim-inated this threat. By 1100, after detail-ing one company to mop up any enemypersonnel that had been overlooked, thereinforced battalion was able to throwits weight against the southeastbeaches, where Japanese diehards hadfor some time delayed the advance of the3d Battalion .

In the center, the 1st Battalion, nowreduced to just one reinforced rifle com-pany, resumed its attack through themangrove swamp to take the southeastbeach fortifications from the rear. Thedifficulties of maneuvering through theseemingly impenetrable terrain soonforced these men to abandon their ef-forts and rejoin the 3d Battalion in itsassault along the coast . This drive southencountered only isolated stubborn re-sistance, for most of the beach defenseswere found to be unmanned . The Japan-ese had evacuated their positions andfled north under cover of darkness .When the 2d Battalion completed re-grouping and struck at the enemy pock-et from the south, the last phase of the

ANGAUR AND ULITHI

battle for Angaur began and the end ofJapanese resistance was in sight . Onlythe inevitable mopping up by small de-tails remained to be accomplished onsouthern Angaur. This was done the fol-lowing day .Earlier on 20 September, General

Mueller had forwarded the followingmessage to ILIAC : "All organized resis-tance ceased on Angaur at 1034 . Islandsecure." 15 General Mueller made thisstatement because Major Goto no longerhad the capability of posing a seriousthreat to the hold of the Army on An-gaur. All necessary ground for the con-struction of the airfield and base instal-lations had already been seized ; an es-timated 850 Japanese had been killed ;16

and the approximately 350 enemy troopsthat division intelligence figured wereleft had been compressed into the north-western hills which were completelysealed off. What none of the Wildcatscould visualize at this time, any morethan the Marines on Peleliu, was thatthe elimination of such a relativelysmall and isolated pocket of enemy re-sistance would require an all-out effortby an entire infantry regiment, and thatsuch an operation would drag on foryet another month .

The final Japanese defensive posi-tions were located in the highest andmost rugged portion of Angaur amidstthe northwestern hill mass . Here the

"Historical Committee, 81st Infantry Divi-sion, p . 98 .

1e "This casualty figure was an overestima-tion. Probably fewer than 600 Japanese hadbeen killed through the 20th, and Major Gotostill had possibly 750 men with which to con-duct an organized defense in the northwest ."Smith, Approach to the Philippines, p . 518 .

177

Japanese set up a well-conceived andconstructed defensive system, utilizingthe broken nature of the terrain to theutmost. Caves were dug, fire lanescleared, and the artillery, mortars, anti-tank weapons, and machine guns sitedin mutually supporting positions to ex-ploit the defensive quality of the ter-rain and to thwart any infantry assault .Since practically every emplacementwas hidden underground, the Japanesewere for all practical purposes immuneto naval gunfire, artillery, or air strikes .The attackers, on the other hand, couldmake little use of supporting armor, forthe jumbled configuration of the ridgesprohibited any closely coordinated tank-infantry assault . Only the most deter-mined rushes by American riflemencould displace the entrenched enemyfrom his last-ditch positions .

Once again the enemy deploymentand his complete knowledge of the for-bidding terrain met every attack thatthe Wildcats could muster . The Japan-ese made effective use of machine guns,rifles, antitank guns, and mortars fromconcealed positions on commandingground. These weapons were fired onlywhen the chances that the shots wouldfind their mark were good and when itappeared that the weapons and theircrews would not be seen by the attack-ing infantrymen . Since the Japaneseused smokeless and flashless powder, thelocating of a weapon by even the mostalert observer was practically impossi-ble. In short, the northwest hills of An-gaur had been transformed into a vir-tual fortress, a miniature version ofUmurbrogol Mountain on Peleliu, whosereduction was also to prove difficult,costly, and time-consuming .

178

Reduction of the enemy redoubt fellto RCT 322, because on 21 Septemberthe tactical situation on Peleliu madenecessary the transfer of RCT 321 tothat island . Further, because of the re-stricted area of the pocket, there wasroom for only one rifle regiment to ma-neuver. Subsequently, for over a month,the men of RCT 322 were forced tofight, live, and die among the jumbled,jungle-cloaked coral ridges, spires, andcliffs of northwestern Angaur beforethe last enemy holdout had been eitherkilled or captured .Repeated attempts were made to

avoid unnecessary bloodshed by induc-ing the Japanese to surrender . Such in-centives were offered in the form ofleaflets and broadcasts in the Japaneselanguage over a public address system .The wording of these was approximate-ly as follows

Japanese Soldiers : This island is sur-rounded by the American forces, and thereis no reason for you to continue fightingagainst us . Further resistance is hopeless .Your communication and supply lines arecut. The Japanese Navy is far away . If youresist further, you will surely die by star-vation and bombardment .If you cease fighting and come to us

immediately, one by one, unarmed and withyour hands up, you will receive food, cloth-ing, and medical care.

To die when encountered by a hopelesssituation is neither heroic nor brave, andis only a useless death. Come over to ussingly, unarmed, and with your hands up .We give you (time allotted) to come to us ;otherwise we will be forced to take theonly alternative action .'

Only a sprinkling of Japanese sur-rendered, one of them after the first

"Historical Committee, 81st Infantry Divi-sion, p. 111.


broadcast, and another immediately fol-lowing the second. On the whole, theresults obtained were disappointing andit seemed that the Japanese requiredmore demonstration of the power of theattacking force.

This was furnished in abundance, asday after day the Wildcats doggedlyreturned to the assault. Frequently theysuffered minor reverses and losses .Progress at times could be measured inyards and remained agonizingly slow .Still, with each passing day and hourvictory came ever closer within thereach of the tired, dirty but determinedassault troops . First portents of successcame towards the end of the first weekin October when 183 natives emergedfrom the pocket, many of them in de-plorable physical condition and in direneed of medical attention which waspromptly furnished . By this time theprotracted conflict had degenerated intominor patrol action with sniping, am-bushing, and extensive boobytrappingemployed by both sides . The true situa-tion did not deter the Japanese fromreporting as late as 10 October that"judging from the flarebombs and otherindications, it is certain that our garri-son units in the northwestern hills (ofAngaur) are annihilating the enemy inclose quarter combat ."18

Four days later, however, the assaultphase on Angaur came to an end, andthe occupation period began for the is-land . For practical purposes, tacticaloperations were to continue long beyondthis date. The 81st Infantry Divisionwas to retain responsibility for elimi-nating the remaining isolated pockets of

'Japanese CenPac Ops, p. 132.

ANGAUR AND ULITHI

enemy resistance . All other controlconcerning Angaur was passed on 14October from General Mueller to theisland commander, Colonel Ray A . Dunn,USA, whose mission it was to de-velop the island as a forward airbase .On the same date the Marine 7th AAABattalion was relieved from attachmentto the 81st Infantry Division and as-signed to the Angaur Garrison Force,while still remaining under operationalcontrol of the division .

The indomitable Major Goto survivedevery American attack right up to thenight of 19 October, when his luck final-ly ran out and he was killed. A fewother Japanese, determined to escapefrom an untenable situation, decided toswim to Peleliu . One actually covered theseven-mile stretch before he was ob-served. The fate of those Japanese re-maining on Angaur was now sealed,and on 21 October triumphant Wildcatsoverran the last remaining organizedenemy position. This action terminatedthe tactical phase of the operation, eventhough a few Japanese stragglers in-evitably remained . RCT 322 was with-drawn to the southern part of Angaurfor rest and recuperation, leaving onlya couple of supporting units in the areato seek out and annihilate whateverJapanese still lurked there .

It is interesting to note that followingthe break in Japanese communicationsbetween Angaur and Peleliu on 22 Sep-tember, Colonel Nakagawa continued toreport the heroic deeds of the Angaurgarrison even after the men of RCT 322had relinquished their combat dutiesfor the less strenuous atmosphere ofgarrison life. It was not until mid-No-vember that Nakagawa admitted that

this continued resistance was just "hissurmise ."9

The Wildcats had accomplished theseizure of Angaur, killing an estimated1,338 Japanese and capturing 59 .20Losses sustained were 260 killed ordead of wounds and 1,354 wounded orinjured as of 30 October 1944 . An addi-tional 940 Americans were temporarilyincapacitated by battle fatigue, illness,or disease .21

The capture of Angaur was of primeimportance because it eliminated athreat to Allied lines of communicationthat stretched across the western Paci-fic towards the Philippines. Angaurprovided the Allies with another badlyneeded air base in a forward area . Con-struction of an airfield on Angaur hadbegun as early as 20 September, and thefirst aircraft touched down on the fieldon 15 October. It should be noted thatsince the island had not previously har-bored any Japanese air installation thework had to start from scratch . Firsttasks were cutting back the jungle, fill-ing swamps, and levelling very roughterrain .

From the Japanese point of view, theloss of Angaur and sacrifice of MajorGoto's reinforced infantry battalionwere more than offset by the advantagesderived from this delaying action. Thereis evidence that General Inoue neverconsidered Angaur as anything morethan an outpost ; hence his instructionsto the garrison were to prolong the con-flict as long as possible if attacked by asuperior force . Goto's isolated battalion,

"Japanese Ops in the CenPac, p . 192 .=0 81st InfDiv OpRpt, See IX, p . 69 .21 I bid., p. 112 .

179

180

without the benefit of or any hope ofobtaining air support or reinforcements,was able to deny the prime objective onthe island, the projected site for theairfield, for several days in the face ofa determined assault by two Americanregiments receiving all the support fromthe air and sea that could be mustered .When deterioration of the situationforced the inevitable Japanese with-drawal, Major Goto's skillful and tena-cious defense of the hills in the north-western portion of the island tied up anentire American infantry regiment foran additional month . The reward of theJapanese garrison for its tenacity wasdeath, but death held little terror formany fatalistic Japanese .22

The men of the 81st Infantry Divisionemerged from the Angaur operationmore combatwise and more certain oftheir ability to deal with a fanaticalenemy. The lessons they had learnedduring the first combat action on An-gaur were soon to serve the Wildcatswell during the even more difficult andchallenging mission awaiting them onPeleliu .ON TO ULITHI23

The original concept of the STALE-MATE II Operation envisioned the em-ployment of a regimental combat team

2 "To die is lighter than the birds' feathers,"and "to die is like the blossoms of the cherrytree falling down ." LtGen Sadae Inoue inWorden ltr.

Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : 81st InfDiv OpRpt-Angaur; 81st InfDiv OpRpt-Ulithi Atoll andother Western Caroline Islands ; Marine AirBase Ulithi-Rpts and Correspondence reBase Development Plans, dtd Oct44-Ju145 ;MAG-45, Rpt of Op, dtd 23Jan45, hereafterMA'G-45, Rpt of Op ; Historical Committee,


of the 81st Infantry Division to seizeAngaur Island before the invasion ofPeleliu got under way . Following thesuccessful completion of this mission,it was planned that the division was tobe further employed in operationsagainst Yap, an island 258 miles north-east of the Palaus, with one RCT to beengaged in independent action underNavy control against Ulithi, an atollabout halfway between the Palaus andYap.

Preliminary planning by the divisionfor the consummation of this conceptprovided for the employment of RCT322 on Angaur Island and RCT 321 onUlithi Atoll. When revised estimates ofenemy strength made it necessary toplan for the commitment of two RCTson Angaur, RCT 321 was removed fromconsideration as the landing force toseize Ulithi and was reassigned to theAngaur assault . RCT 323 then was as-signed the Ulithi operation ; planningfor it was begun on 1 August 1944 .

As additional information about ene-my strength in the Southern Palaus be-came available, it was apparent thatthe continued presence of elements ofthe 81st Infantry Division would berequired in that area . As a consequence,on 22 August the division was relievedfrom participation in operations againstYap and Ulithi, and the mission of seiz-ing the latter was assigned to a combatteam of the 96th Infantry Division .Planning by the 81st Infantry Divisionfor the Ulithi Operation ceased on thatdate. Further developments in the con-cept of the STALEMATE II Operation

81st Infantry Division ; Hough, Assault onPeleliu ; Morison, Leyte ; Smith, Approach tothe Philippines .

ANGAUR AND ULITHI

involved abandoning the plan to capturethe Yap Island Group and assigning themission of seizing Ulithi to a combatteam of the 77th Infantry Division .

On 15 September the Joint Chiefs ofStaff decided to speed up the Pacifictimetable of operations . Although theassault on the strongly-held Yap Islandremained shelved, the seizure of Ulithiwas to take place as scheduled. Ameri-can planners particularly desired thisatoll, since it possessed a spacious shel-tered anchorage that was to serve as aforward base during the imminent inva-sion of the Philippines. On 16 Septem-ber Admiral Halsey ordered AdmiralWilkinson to seize Ulithi "with resourceson hand" . 24

The 77th and 96th Infantry Divisions,initially scheduled for the Yap-Ulithiassault, had been transferred to GeneralMacArthur to form part of his invasionforce for the Leyte landing . Only oneuncommitted regiment, RCT 323, re-mained under Wilkinson's control .

On 16 September General Mueller wasadvised that one combat team of thedivision would constitute the landingforce to capture Ulithi . RCT 323 wasdesignated as the landing force .

This infantry unit was then servingas ILIAC floating reserve, the solesource of combat-ready troops in theevent that the Marines ran into troubleon Peleliu or the Army required assist-ance on Angaur. Although the command-er of the Expeditionary Troops, Gen-eral Julian C . Smith, recommended toWilkinson that the rifle regiment wouldbe needed to ensure an early seizure ofthe hotly contested island, the admiraldid not share this conviction .25

"Smith interview,

181

During the night following receipt ofHalsey's directive, Wilkinson instructedGeneral Mueller to ready RCT 323 foran immediate departure to assault Uli-thi Atoll. The specific mission of theregiment was "to capture, occupy, anddefend Ulithi Atoll in order to establisha fleet anchorage, seaplane base, andairbase thereat to support further oper-ations against the enemy, and to com-mence development of the base untilrelieved." 26

The Ulithi Attack Group was com-manded by Rear Admiral Blandy andconsisted of a cruiser, 9 destroyers, 3patrol vessels, 12 landing craft, gun-boats, 2 high-speed troop transports,and 5 attack transports and cargovessels .

The final plan of operations presentedto the Navy and approved by it pro-vided for the landing of the reconnais-sance detachment of RCT 323 onAMAZEMENT Island 27 prior to dawn ofJig Day minus 1 . There the detachmentwas to establish a minor defense postin order to protect the Mugai Channelentrance into the Ulithi Lagoon, whichwas to serve as the transport area forthe attack force (See Map 7) . Duringthe same day, a reconnaissance detach-

"Navy officers sometimes have difficulty inunderstanding how idle troops can serve anyuseful purpose aboard ship while fighting isgoing on ashore ." Smith interview .

Attack Order No. A268-44, ComGroupOne,PhibsPac, dtd 15Sep44 .' Islands in Ulithi Atoll have been men-

tioned in the text by code name only . Codedesignations (in capital letters) were as fol-lows : AMAZEMENT-Mangejang; KEEN-SET-Sorlen ; LITHARGE-Mogmog; AME-LIORATE-Falalop ; ACETYLENE-Potan-geras ; AGGRAVATE-Fassarai ; IDENTI-CAL-Asor.

ANGAUR AND ULITHI

ment was to be landed on one of thesouthern islands of the atoll to removea few natives for intelligence purposes .

On Jig Day a reinforced rifle com-pany was to capture KEENSET Islandto permit the emplacement of the com-bat team artillery in support of subse-quent ship to shore operations againstthe northern islands of the atoll . Theremainder of the BLT furnishing troopsfor the capture of KEENSET was tobe prepared to capture LITHARGEIsland. Upon completion of artillery reg-istration firing and on order, a secondBLT was to capture and defend IDEN-TICAL Island . During these operations,reconnaissance detachments were toreconnoiter and mop-up the small islandsin the west central portion of the atoll .

On Jig Day plus 1, artillery and can-non-supported shore-to-shore operationswere to be carried out against AMEL-IORATE and ACETYLENE Islands .Reconnaissance detachments were to beprepared to assist, on order, in recon-noitering and mopping up AGGRA-VATE, LOSSAU, the remaining smallislands to the south, and the islets east-ward of the main atoll.

The Ulithi Attack Force proceededas planned . Troops, equipment, and sup-plies had been combat loaded at Oahu,Hawaii in anticipation that RCT 323would be employed as reserve in thePalau Operation or in an assault land-ing on Ulithi . Movement to the objectivearea was made in two echelons. Thereconnaissance detachment, consistingof the Intelligence & ReconnaissancePlatoon, 323d Infantry Regiment, rein-forced with 24 enlisted men from one ofthe rifle companies, departed from thePalau area at 1330, 19 September . It

183

arrived off Ulithi during the early morn-ing of 21 September awaiting ordersfrom the Commander, Ulithi Fire Sup-port Group, under whose command thereconnaissance was to be effected . Theremainder of the force departed at 1000,21 September. Both echelons made themovement without incident .

The afternoon of 21 September sawthe completion of final plans for thelanding of a reconnaissance detachmenton AMAZEMENT Island. Mission ofthis unit was to secure Mugai Channelfor minesweeping and underwater dem-olition operations which were to be con-ducted in the lagoon on that date . It wasdecided that a preliminary offshore re-connaissance of the island was to beconducted that afternoon to determinethe best beach for a landing. In theevent that the reconnaissance was madewithout interference, troops would landthat afternoon to seize the island .

The reconnaissance was carried outas planned and subsequently the recon-naissance detachment landed unopposedat 1515. A thorough search revealed nosign of recent habitation . Thirteen menstayed on the island, and the remainderreturned to the ship .

During the early morning of 22 Sep-tember, orders were issued to carry outa landing on AGGRAVATE Island forthe purpose of removing a few nativesfor questioning . A detachment debarkedin two rubber boats and proceeded to-wards the island . The entire shore wasfringed with a coral reef extending outfrom the beach for about 150 yards .When the troops went ashore, they en-countered two natives, who approachedin a friendly fashion and agreed to ac-company the troops back to the ship .

184

Their interrogation revealed that theJapanese garrison force had departed afew months earlier and that there wereno Japanese on the atoll except for acrippled one on AMELIORATE Island .A thorough search of KEENSET Is-land failed to reveal any sign of recentoccupation, though several Japanesegraves were found . A search of LITH-ARGE Island likewise showed negativeresults .

During the morning of 23 September,elements of RCT 323 landed unopposedon AMELIORATE, which was officiallydeclared secure at 1315 . Once again noJapanese were found on the island, noteven the reported cripple . A consider-able number of inhabitants had takenrefuge in a shallow cave in the north-western part of AMELIORATE . Aftermuch coaxing about 30 natives were per-suaded to return to their homes in thevillage. For the remainder of the dayand throughout the next natives con-tinued to leave their hiding places. Inall, about 100 returned to the village . 28Occupation of IDENTICAL Island

commenced at 1300, 23 September, whenassault waves came ashore and foundneither enemy nor natives on the island,though the bodies of two Japanese, ap-parently dead for several days, werediscovered floating in shallow water .The seizure of LITHARGE and ACET-YLENE Islands rounded out the opera-tion, which was to become prominentfor the absence of enemy resistance .

Ulithi Atoll contained a 300-berthanchorage and a seaplane base . Occupa-

81st InfDiv OpRpt, Ulithi, p . 17. Accordingto Historical Committee, 81st Infantry Divi-sion, no Japanese or natives were encounteredon AMELIORATE .


tion of these Western Caroline islandsprovided still another base from whichfuture operations against the enemycould be supported. The construction ofan airstrip on AMELIORATE Islandmade possible fighter plane protectionfor the anchorage and afforded a basefrom which U. S. aircraft could continueneutralization of the nearby Japanesebases on Yap .

Together with Angaur and Peleliu Is-lands to the southwest and Guam, Tin-ian, and Saipan to the northeast, thecapture of Ulithi Atoll completed a lineof American bases that isolated Japa-nese holdings in the Central and SouthPacific. The occupation of Ulithi Atollfurther denied it to the enemy as a fleetanchorage, weather and radio station,and possible air and submarine base, inaddition to precluding its use by theenemy to observe and report the activi-ties of American forces in the sector .

By 25 September the unloading of allthe support ships had been completedand Vice Admiral John H. Hoover,Commander, Forward Areas WesternPacific, took over the task of developingUlithi Atoll into an advanced fleet base .Within a month after the capture ofUlithi, more than a hundred Navy craftfrom self-propelled types to lighters,floating drydocks, barges, landing craft,and seaplane wrecking derricks were enroute to the island . During subsequentoperations in the Philippines, the U . S .Pacific Fleet found Ulithi to be an ex .tremely valuable base. Prior to the in-vasion of Okinawa, the island servedas a staging area for fleet and amphibi-ous forces. The atoll thus fulfilled a vitalstrategic role in the final phase of WorldWar II .