GOVERNMENT NEWS MANAGEMENT, BIAS AND DISTORTION IN AMERICAN PRESS COVERAGE OF THE BRAZILIAN COUP OF 1964By: Weis, W. Michael, Social Science Journal, 03623319, 1997, Vol. 34, Issue 1

Using content analysis, this article analyzes American newspaper and magazine coverage of the Brazilian Coup of 1964. One of the most decisive events in Brazilian history, the coup instituted a repressive military regime that ruled Brazil for twenty years. The dominant press view, that the coup occurred to thwart an imminent Communist takeover, is at odds with historical scholarship, as well as with contemporary accounts in the alternative and foreign press. Looking at the evidence for bias and distortion in news coverage, the article concludes that this was not merely the result of incompetence, but in United States officials' ability to "manage the news" and make the press complicit in a campaign to hide the substantial United States involvement. The evidence suggests that complaints against government control of news and information in the Gulf War, as well as the issues of biased and distorted reporting, and even the notion of a free press providing necessary information for the electorate is not a recent phenomenon, but the norm in post- 1945 American history. A free press is often perceived as the watchdog of democracy since it supposedly provides access to the information needed by the electorate to make informed decisions. Yet, in fact, media manipulation is quite prevalent and demonstrates that U.S. foreign policy making is often shaped by elite, rather than pluralist factors. While this is true today, it was perhaps even more during the early cold war when the government was able to use the press to maintain the cold war consensus and advance its own policy. This was true of policy toward Brazil in the early 1960s. On April 1, 1964 the American people woke up, fixed their morning coffee and discovered in their newspapers that Brazil's Armed Forces had revolted against president Joao Goulart. Only a few newspapers and magazines had reported the growing crisis, giving the rebellion an aura of suddenness and surprise. The American people did not read that day that their government had been trying to destabilize Goulart for nearly two years. Nor did the American people hear of their government's participation in the rebellion through "Operation Brother Sam" and had already formed an economic task force to prepare emergency and long term assistance to the rebels. "Brother Sam," proved unnecessary, and was aborted before reaching Santos. Brazil's Army completed its task quickly and bloodlessly, although not before President Lyndon B. Johnson wired his "warmest wishes" to the conspirators for their "constitutional" change on April 2. Goulart, however, did not leave for exile until April 4 (Black, 1983; Parker, 1982; Leacock, 1990; Weis, 1993). Despite its ease and rapidity, the 1964 coup was one of the most decisive events in Brazilian history. The coup marked the beginning of a twenty-year military dictatorship. The military instituted economic growth policies that led to the so-called "Brazilian miracle" of 1968-1973, but also left a legacy of a widening income gap, staggering external debt and atrophied political development. Moreover, after a brief period of closeness, United States-Brazilian relations steadily worsened. Although subsequent events in Brazil lead one to criticize the U.S. officials in charge of policy in 1964, perhaps even more tragic was that the American people could not judge or even understand the crisis

because the information the American press provided was distorted, biased, and factually incorrect. This was not merely incompetence by the press, but was also a result of U.S. officials' ability to "manage the news" and make the press complicit in a campaign to hide the truth. While much has been written on the adversarial relationship between government and the press (particularly during the last stages of Vietnam), recent events, such as the 1991 Persian Gulf War, call into question the role of the press in informing the public and disseminating news during foreign crises. The evidence from the Brazilian coup of 1964 indicates that the issues of government news management, press compliance and the very notion of a free press, as well as distorted and biased reporting is not a recent phenomenon, but the norm in recent American history (Mowlana, Gerbner, & Schiller, 1992; Bennett & Paletz, 1994; Swords and Ploughshares, 1991). The dominant press view was that the military overthrew Joao Goulart because he had (purposefully or ineptly) led the nation toward Communism and that he desired a personal dictatorship modeled after Juan Peron of Argentina or Getulio Vargas, his mentor. This simplistic and one dimensional view either distorted or ignored the complexities of the Brazilian political system, the economic crisis, the politicized military, and the basic inequities in Brazilian society. The simplistic explanation for the causes of the coup also left the American public and possibly United States policy makers unprepared for the events which followed the coup. This article will analyze U.S. press coverage of the Brazilian coup of 1964, looking at evidence of bias and distortion, the reasons for and the consequences of this distorted picture.

POSTWAR BRAZILIAN-AMERICAN ESTRANGEMENTAs with most of Latin America, by the early 1960s Brazil was a nation in crisis. Although Brazil had experienced a generation of enormous economic growth and industrialization through import substitution and creation of state-owned corporations, by 1961 it was beset by a multitude of problems. Economically, Brazil had high inflation, and increased foreign debt, and balance of payment difficulties resulting from stagnating export earnings. A population explosion and rural to urban migration glutted major cities and outpaced job creation. Politically, the nation was polarized, as peasants and the urban working class began organizing and demanding access to power and services, thus challenging the patrimonial basis of society. The political system was also highly fragmented with three major parties and a dozen minor parties contesting for voter allegiance. Moreover, an uneducated and inexperienced electorate (Brazil became a democracy only in 1945), made the system vulnerable to personalism and demagoguery. Adding to instability was the fact that in 1961, Brazil's elected president, Janio Quadros, resigned suddenly, provoking a constitutional crisis. Vice-president Joao Goulart, of the Center-Left Brazilian Worker's Party (PTB) was in China on a trade mission. Long distrusted by the Brazilian military and U.S. officials as unprincipled for his control of unions and willingness to deal with Communists, Goulart was cautious, indecisive, conciliatory and prone to postpone crucial decisions. He cared little for ideology or foreign policy, but was skilled in the labyrinth of Brazilian politics as former Labor Minister, head of the PTB and two-time vice-president. Elements in the military moved to prevent his return. Civil War appeared imminent until a compromise was reached that created a parliamentary system that allowed Goulart to assume the presidency, but reduced his powers substantially. Goulart accepted the compromise, but immediately worked to restore his powers. Although the United States and Brazil had a long-established "special relationship," by 1961 relations were strained severely (Burns, 1966; McCann, 1973; Hilton, 1981, pp. 599-624; Weis 1993, pp. 1-139). While generally supportive of the U.S. in the cold war and generally accommodating U.S. corporate investment, differences between the two nations emerged on the levels and terms of American assistance, the pace of Brazilian industrialization, and Brazil's insistence on creating state-owned corporations in key sectors, such as steel and petroleum. By the end of the 1950s, the unwillingness of the United States to fund Brazil's ambitious development program, caused relations to deteriorate. Brazil began to initiate moves toward greater trade with the newly independent nations in Africa and Asia, as well as the Soviet bloc. American policy makers viewed this "independent foreign policy" as neutralist and an alarming precedent. Compounding American fears was that Brazil's initiatives occurred in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolution. Recent scholarship has shown that the administration of John F. Kennedy was obsessed with Cuba and Communism in the hemisphere. The region became a priority and it received greater attention, evidenced by Kennedy's ballyhooed Alliance for Progress, which resulted in large increases in military and economic assistance, a bureaucratic overhaul (creation of Agency for International Development and InterAmerican Development Bank) and increased CIA operations.The Kennedy Administration wanted to win the "race between revolution and evolution" through the Alliance for Progress' "controlled revolution" of reform and support for the "democratic left" to isolate Castro and thwart his appeal to the masses (Rabe, 1989, pp. 105-122; Paterson, 1989, pp. 123-55; Walker, 1994, pp. 42-79).

Brazil opposed United States goals. While desirous of increased American economic aid, Brazilians viewed the cold war as detrimental to Latin American economic development and Kennedy's obsession with Cuba as contrary to the spirit of Pan Americanism, which stressed juridical equality and non-intervention. At a meeting of hemispheric foreign ministers in February 1962 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, Brazil strenuously fought United States efforts to break diplomatic relations, impose economic sanctions, or expel Cuba from the Organization of American States. Instead, Brazil sought to "Finlandize" Cuba by securing a pledge to refrain from military alliances with outside powers and from internal subversion in the region in return for a no intervention pledge from the U.S. In October, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Brazil voted to support the American blockade and the call for the withdrawal of missiles, but also offered to mediate the dispute. Brazil's support for Cuba caused Brazilian-American relations to deteriorate rapidly. U.S. officials and corporations began channeling millions of dollars into pro-U.S. and anti-Goulart politicians. USIA expenditures increased dramatically and the U.S. began a more arduous courtship of the Brazilian military by naming Colonel Vernon Walters as defense attache. As U.S. liaison to Brazil's Expeditionary Force in Italy during World War II, Walters had close ties with most of the 1964 coup leaders. By 1963 the U.S. eliminated all assistance to the central government and began to aid friendly state governors, particularly Guanabara's (Greater Rio de Janeiro) Carlos Lacerda, a prominent coup leader. This "islands of sanity" policy indicated that the U.S. had become committed to overthrowing Goulart. In January 1963, a plebiscite restored Goulart's full presidential powers. After the plebiscite, Goulart became more desperate in his call for "basic reforms" beneficial to the lower classes, using the Alliance for Progress as a justification. Among the reforms Goulart proposed were measures promoted by Alliance for Progress that challenged oligarchic control, including land distribution to landless peasants, the enfranchisement of illiterates (50% of the adult population), the legalization of the Communist party, allowing noncommissioned officers to participate in politics, and limiting profit remittances by foreign corporations. Goulart's enemies viewed these proposed reforms as a thinly-disguised ploy to seize dictatorial power. Both leftists and conservatives staged mass demonstrations in support of their positions. At the end of one rally in March 1964, the president signed decrees nationalizing petroleum refineries and seizing idle farmland along federal highways and railroads. The military, which had long hated Goulart, viewed his reform proposals as evidence that he intended to destroy military discipline. On March 31 the military revolted against the president. Goulart failed to mobilize resistance. The troops he dispatched in Rio de Janeiro to quash the rebellion promptly switched sides. Goulart then flew to Brasilia, but found rio support in Congress and learned of an approaching force. The president fled to his home state of Rio Grande do Sul to organize his defenses. After Goulart left Brasilia, the Senate declared the presidency vacant and named Ranieri Mazzilli, leader of the Chamber of Deputies as interim president. Goulart denied that he had resigned and announced he would fight to retain his office. Two days later, Goulart determined the situation to be hopeless and fled into exile in Uruguay. In addition to immediate recognition, the United States aided the military rulers extensively after the coup, by suspending debt payments, rescheduling loan arrangements, and assisting the new regime in multilateral negotiations. Brazil was preserved as an area of U.S. corporate investment and Castro was isolated temporarily, at the cost of democracy and reform--the stated goals of the Alliance for Progress (Skidmore, 1967, pp. 205-302; Leacock, pp. 1990; Weis, 1993, pp. 141-169).

THE PRESS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICYA great deal of scholarship has been devoted to the relationship between the press and U.S. foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s--the Vietnam era--but most studies have focused on presidential instead of State Department or foreign embassy activities (Hallin, 1989; Turner, 1985; Kern, Levering, & Levering, 1983; Hildebrand, 1981; Cornwell, 1968; Grossman & Kumar, 1981; Juergens, 1981). Yet, for routine foreign policy matters or events that do not become classified as a "crisis" by the absence of sensational or "newsworthy" activity or successful news management, the State Department and embassies are often more important than the White House. For the past half-century news agencies and the U.S. government have generally worked together closely to disseminate information and form opinion. With few exceptions (the last years of the Vietnam War), the press has tended to report American foreign policy uncritically (Baughman, 1988, p. 104; Almond, 1963, p. 138; Cohen, 1963, pp. 7-39; Cohen, 1973, pp. 48-50, 106, 178-179; Hero, 1959, pp. 1-5; Wicker 1978, pp. 1-12, 67). U.S. officials have used the press to sell or promote policy, test opinion, and to divert the public to keep sensitive information secret, as well as to educate the public. For the most part, the press accepted these roles (Cohen, 1963, pp. 184-202, 206-207, 278; Cohen, 1973, p. 170). After U.S. foreign policy globalized during World War II, the zeal to get "news" led to increasing willingness of the press to be used by the U.S. government, which in turn increased the latter's ability to "manage the news," through public relations--the Bureau of Public Affairs with the Department of State (Schudson, 1978, pp. 136-167; Cohen, 1973, pp. 44). The director of the Bureau is often the "State Department spokesman" referred to in newspapers. The State Department manages the news through the use of "handouts" (formal statements or preferred explanations), by omitting items considered sensitive or unimportant, and by the use of "pseudo events," which are planned or contrived events designed to present evidence of a desired image (Cohen, 1963, pp. 170-176; Boorstin, 1972, pp. 10-11; Wicker, 1978, pp. 84-94, 143). In the pre-Vietnam era other factors existed that enhanced the U.S. government's ability to manage the news. Reporters and editors generally accepted the cold war consensus created by the national security state that dominated American society. By the early 1960s, fear of Communism, embodied by Fidel Castro, dominated American thought about Latin America. U.S. policy makers and reporters equated antiAmericanism and ultra-nationalists with Communism (Cohen, 1963, pp. 144-149; Schudson, 1978, pp. 169172; Johnson, 1980, pp. 311-312; Whitaker, 1969, pp. 16-19). In addition to shared values, the ethos of professional "responsibility" and the "objective" presentation of "facts" also served to make reporters willing collaborators of American foreign policy (Baughman, 1988, p. 108; Hallin, 1984, pp. 2-24; Wicker, 1978, pp. 216-269). Foreign affairs reporters and policy makers speak the same "language" and often interact socially. This is especially true overseas, where reporters and officials often reside and work in American ghettos (Chittick, 1970, pp. 182-199). This is not to say that the press and the U.S. government in the early 1960s were always willing collaborators. Indeed, the relationship was ambiguous, and neither side completely trusted the other, partly because of their antithetical roles. Policy makers sometimes withhold information from the press, which results in superficial, oversimplified and impressionistic reporting (Cohen, 1963, pp. 148-173, 267-278;

Cohen, 1973, p. 61). In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, press complaints of government news management and the public's right to information led to Congressional hearings on the relationship and a determined effort by the State Department for a "partnership" between the government and the fourth estate. The Moss Committee received testimony by noted journalists, such as James Reston and officials in the various public relations departments, such as Robert J. Manning of the State Department and Arthur Sylvester of the Defense Department.Sylvester created a controversy by stating, "I think the inherent right of the government to lie--to lie to save itself when faced with nuclear disaster is basic."[ 1] Despite these complaints, by 1964 the relationship between the press and the U.S. government was symbiotic and collaborative rather than adversarial. Lyndon B. Johnson, a master at news management, pseudo events, and image politics occupied the White House and enjoyed unparalleled support from the press and the American people (Baughman, 1988, p. 104; Wicker, 1978, p.142).

THE PRESS AND THE COUPTo determine the evidence of bias and press distortion a number of factors were analyzed through content analysis (Holsti 1969; Berleson & Janowitz, 1966, pp. 261262). These include the degree of importance attached to the coup, the information printed and omitted regarding the situation in Brazil and U.S. actions during the coup, and the terms (pro, anti, neutral) of the reporting. Stories that characterized Goulart as a leftist or Communist, the new regime as constitutional or democratic, and the excesses of the new regime as necessary to fight Communism, received a pro-coup listing. Stories characterizing the new regime as dictatorial and condemning the wave of terror by the military, received an anti-coup rating. Stories receiving a neutral rating avoided partisan terminology. Newspaper analysis was limited to the period from April 1 to April 10, 1964. The issuance of the First Institutional Act on April 9 was a notable departure from previous involvement by the military in Brazilian politics and proved that the coup was an extraordinary event. The Act provided an opportunity for a newspaper to reassess previous coverage. Magazine analysis will be limited to the period from April 1 to June 30, 1964. By June 30, former President Juscelino Kubitschek, the frontrunner for the 1965 Presidential elections, had been stripped of his citizenship rights by the military regime, once again providing clear evidence of the brutal and dictatorial nature of the new regime. The sample consists of those publications identified as having dominant influence in foreign affairs information. The publications within the "prestige press" (Hero, 1959, pp. 52-78; Cohen, 1963, pp.60-62, 124, 134-139; Emery, 1972, pp. 653-676) selected include seven newspapers: The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, the Wall Street Journal, the Chicago Tribune, the Miami Herald, and the Los Angeles Times. The eleven magazines selected break down into three categories: informative magazines (Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report); opinion press (Nation, New Republic, National Review, Reporter, and New Leader); and business press (Business Week, Fortune, and Forbes). In addition, other newspapers not constituting the prestige press were analyzed to provide regional balance. American press coverage and reaction to the events in Brazil in April varied greatly. Depending on the source, the coup was either an event of major significance, or one of little importance for American readers. In both The New York Times and the Washington Post the coup made headlines for three consecutive days and continued to merit front page coverage a week afterward. In contrast, the midwestern papers featured the coup as the headline only two days and by April 3, local concerns replaced Brazil as the dominant story.[ 2] By April 4, the coup was off the front page of most newspapers in the United States due to a succession of events judged more newsworthy including an earthquake in Alaska, the surprising showing of George Wallace in the Democratic primary in Wisconsin, and the death of General Douglas MacArthur. Newspaper coverage of the coup differed considerably. In emphasizing the coup, the editors of The New York Times, Washington Post, Miami Herald, and Los Angeles Times provided extensive pictures, background information and analysis. The Wall Street Journal, Christian Science Monitor, and Chicago Tribune, however, covered the coup with much less detail. The editors of the Wall Street Journal seemed

more concerned about coffee and sugar prices than the coup itself, and Journal coverage dropped substantially after the army consolidated power and commodity prices returned to normal. Publications that did not emphasize the coup also quickly reduced their coverage after the army was firmly in control. The extent of magazine coverage of the coup varied even more than that of newspapers. Over the three month period, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report provided coverage of roughly equal length. While not ignoring the coup, opinion press magazines focused on the war in Vietnam and the 1964 Presidential election. The lone exception, the Nation, condemned both the Johnson Administration policy and newspaper coverage. Along with anti-coup editorials, the editors of the Nation also published an indepth article by noted dependency theorist Andre Gunder Frank.The following week, the Nation published an article on the implications of the change in U.S. recognition policy. The editors of the New Republic limited their coverage of Brazilian events to three short editorials. The National Review also limited its coverage to two editorials, both more concerned with the impact of "victory over Communism" would have on Johnson's Presidential campaign (they considered it would help LBJ immensely), than with the impact the coup would have on Brazil or Brazilian-American relations. The New Leader published a single article analyzing the events leading to the coup and the consequences the coup would have for Brazil. The Reporter published articles analyzing the impact of U.S. aid on the Brazilian crisis and one by former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Adolf A. Bede, the bete noire of the anti-coup forces within Brazil. Not surprisingly, Bede praised the coup as a victory for democracy. Like the opinion press, the business press gave unequal coverage to the coup. Forbes ignored the coup entirely. Business Week covered events in Brazil consistently, printing five articles in the three months following the coup. Fortune printed one extensive and important article, entitled "When Executives Turned Revolutionaries," about the activities of two CIA-funded business organizations that led the conspiracy against Goulart (Siekman 1964, pp. 147-149, 219-221; Black, 1983; Dreifuss, 1981).

SOURCES OF DISTORTIONThe sources of information used by the reporters explain the variation in news coverage. Many of the journalists only interviewed, or at least only quoted State Department officials and the victors of the revolution. A partial explanation of this is that most of the losers were under arrest, in hiding, or in exile after the coup, but reporters who made an effort to report both sides of the conflict had significantly different stories. Reporters sympathetic to the coup relied almost exclusively on State Department and Brazilian military sources. The Brazilian most frequently quoted by the American press was Guanabara Governor Carlos Lacerda, Goulart's most bitter enemy. Although respected by U.S. reporters, a reporter of the conservative Times of London called Lacerda a "savage" and a Times editorial stated that all of the conspirators but Lacerda had carried themselves nobly (The Times, 2 April 1964, p. 13). Despite Lacerda's obvious bias as one of the principal civilian conspirators and a long-time enemy of Goulart, reporters for the Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, and U.S. News and Worm Report quoted no other Brazilians. Articles quoting State Department sources did not list the name of the official, but only listed vague titles like "officials" or "spokesman," presumably embassy press officer Jack Wyant or Bureau of Public Affairs officials, although Ambassador Lincoln Gordon did meet with several reporters.3 The only high State Department official quoted in the aftermath of the coup was Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who had the task of explaining why the U.S. immediately recognized the rebels. An indication of how tied the press was to official sources was the almost total absence of an attempt to report both sides of the controversy. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the victors were more newsworthy, or that some reporters had difficulty conversing in Portuguese. A more plausible explanation is that most of the reporters personally favored the coup and thus readily accepted State Department and Brazilian conspirator's explanations. Also, with daily deadlines to meet, most reporters did not have adequate time to search for "truth," but rather needed to be credible. Only The New York Times and the Washington Post attempted to report both sides of the crisis. Although quoting the rebels much more extensively than the government, The New York Times did quote Goulart. The New York Times also printed a variety of quotes by several conspirators including governors Ademar de Barros of Sao Paulo and Magalhaes Pinto of Minas Gerais, as well as Marshall Arthur Costa e Silva and Generals Olimpio Mourao Filho and Amaury Kruel (The New York Times, 1 April 1964, p. 1). Washington Post editors appeared to have been genuinely concerned with "objective reporting." Although Post editorials denounced the coup, Post stories quoted both rebels and government officials. Part of the reason for the more balanced and thorough coverage of the Post and New York Times was the number of reporters and variety of coverage provided. Ten reporters wrote stories for the Post between April 1 and April 10. Like other newspapers, the editors of the Post used a major wire service, but they also employed several reporters covering the coup for other publications, including the Times (London), the Manchester Guardian, and sister publication Newsweek. The New York Times also used several reporters and relied extensively on Reuters wire service. In contrast, most of the other publications relied totally on the wire services or one reporter. After April 3, James Nelson Goodsell wrote every story concerning Brazil in the Christian Science Monitor (Goodsell, 1964). Likewise, the Chicago Tribune relied exclusively on Jules Dubois, the Miami Herald on Lee Winfrey, and the Los Angeles Times on Julian Hartt (Rio de Janeiro) and

Richard Reston (Washington).In all of these cases, the limited number of reporters restricted the viewpoints presented by the publication and resulted in unbalanced reporting. Most newspapers did not have correspondents in either Brazil or Washington and relied on wire service reports or reprints from the major newspapers. Those publications which relied on the wire services presented the most distorted picture of events in Brazil. Although the AP/UPI reporters presented the troop movements of March 31-April 2 reasonably well, their analysis of the causes of the revolt and of the political jostling the week after the coup contained much factually incorrect information. On April 1, the UPI claimed Goulart had resigned, which he never did (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1 April 1964, p. 1). On April 2, the AP reported that the revolt came with great suddenness, although conspiracies existed for two years prior to the coup (San Francisco Chronicle, 2 April 1964, p. 1). On April 3, the AP announced that Leonel Brizola had taken control of the 3rd Army in Rio Grande do Sul, when in fact he had removed the elected state governor (Atlanta Constitution, 2 April 1964, p. 1). In the days following the coup, wire service reports placed Goulart in three different Latin American nations, while he was still in Rio Grande do Sul. The wire services even incorrectly judged who had the real power in Brazil, announcing that governors would decide the next president (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 5 April 1964, p. 2A).

PRO-COUP AND ANTI-COUP PRESSAlthough very little of the coverage favored the person or performance of Goulart, the reporting disagreed considerably over whether to blame Goulart or the military for the rebellion. Two major viewpoints emerged in the reporting of the coup: one group praised the coup for eliminating a Communist threat; the other feared the coup would eliminate another constitutional democracy in the Western Hemisphere. The only major exception was the Wall Street Journal. While reporters for every other publication seemed vitally concerned with Communism and democracy, WSJ writers virtually ignored these terms. The editors of the WSJ condemned Goulart and applauded the coup, not because he was a Communist, but rather because they perceived his policies to be detrimental to U.S. business interests. WSJ writers were alone in criticizing U.S. policy for the crisis leading to the coup, incorrectly claiming that the U.S. encouraged the economic excesses of the Goulart regime and helped feed Brazilian inflation by continuous bailouts (Wall Street Journal, 3 April 1964, p. 1). The dominant picture created by the American press was that the coup had eliminated a major Communist threat, or another Cuba. This theme dominated coverage in Time, Fortune, Business Week, National Review, the Reporter, the New Leader, the Miami Herald, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, and can be seen clearly in the titles of U.S. News Stories: "Now With Castro Turned Back--A New Start in Brazil" and "How Close the Reds Came to Taking Over Brazil" (U.S. News and World Report 21 April 1964 & 27 May 1964). The New York Times and Christian Science Monitor also subscribed to this view to a slightly lesser degree. According to this variant, Goulart was not a Communist, but his ineptitude provided an environment in which Communism could thrive. The pro-coup press thought Communism or Cubanization had been imminent in Brazil and several of the publications listed May 1 (Worker's International) as the day of the planned Communist takeover (Chicago Tribune, 3 April 1964, p. 14; Atlanta Constitution, 2 April 1964, p. 2; U.S. News and World Report, 27 April 1964, p. 65). Accepting the idea that all anti-American manifestations were Communist-inspired, these reporters viewed Goulart's attempts to diminish United States influence with alarm. Reporters favoring the coup ignored the fact that the Brazilian Communist Party was the only leftist organization that urged Goulart to conciliate his opponents (Skidmore, 1967, p. 279). The military stated that it revolted because Goulart was trying to subvert or destroy the constitution, that he sought either a totalitarian or Communist state, and that he desired to continue in power after his term in office. Virtually every pro-coup publication agreed, stating that Goulart sought either a Communist, a syndicalist-socialist state, or a Peron-style dictatorship (New York Times, 2 April 1964, 1; Business Week, 4 April 1964, p. 27; Boston Globe, 2 April 1964, p. 12; Miami Herald, 2 April 1964, p. 6A). Even when reporting evidence contradicting this thesis (Goulart ordered the destruction of 100,000 "Jango '65" campaign leaflets his supporters produced to pass out at the March mass rallies), the pro-coup press claimed Goulart desired to destroy the constitution and increase his term in office (Goodsell, 1964, p. 1). The image presented of Goulart by the pro-coup press was not entirely consistent. According to a Tribune editorial, he was a "leftist and a charlatan" (Chicago Tribune, 3 April 1964, p. 14). The editors of the New York Times saw him as a "parlor pink Socialist" (New York Times, 2 April 1964, p. 32). Many writers admitted Goulart was not a Communist and had tried to use them for his own ends, but such commentators claimed that they had in fact used him. Still others saw Goulart as a very adroit politician who contrived the crisis by fomenting economic chaos in order to set the stage for proclaiming a state of siege (Cahn, 1964,

pp. 13-15). These fine distinctions were of little concern to the pro-coup press, which tended to lump all leftists together (Siekman, 1964, p. 210; U.S. News and World Report, 27 April 1964, p, 65; also see Hall, 1964, p. 137). The pro-coup press agreed that Goulart was not a genuine reformer, exemplified by an editorial entitled "A Reformer Who Didn't Reform" (San Francisco Chronicle, 5 April 1964, p. 2). According to the pro-coup press, Communists and other leftists had infiltrated the Brazilian government, some placed by Goulart, others planted by the Russians many years prior to the coup. Pro-coup publications printed claims that by the 1960s, the "plants" finally reached positions of influence. U.S. officials and the pro-coup press claimed that Communists controlled Petrobras, the state-owned oil company; the Department of Education; the Social Security System; the CGT labor union; and the National Student Union. In addition, this line of belief continued, Congress contained several "secret Communists." The editors of the pro-coup press accepted the suspension of the constitution as necessary to fight Communism but expected the restoration of the constitution once the evil was destroyed. In the weeks after the coup, when the army had destroyed the constitution it had preserved through rebellion, when massive repression continued, and the army had stripped the political rights of over forty members of Congress, three expresidents, two Supreme Court justices and several of the original conspirators, several publications still accepted the anti-Communist rhetoric of the military regime and downplayed the importance of the repression. As one reporter from U.S. News put it, "An idea of the magnitude of the Communist threat is that the Brazilian security forces have seized more the 20,000 persons" (Hall, 1964, pp. 140; U.S. News and World Report, 27 April 1964, p. 65; Leacock, 1990, pp. 136138; John F. Kennedy Papers, 17 March 1963). Reporters of these publications continued to call the government "civilian-military," and pointed to a civilian vice-president and Minister of Planning to prove their case (Sickman, 1964, p.147). The anti-coup press was much smaller than the pro-coup press. It had the same major concerns and many of the same opinions as the pro-coup press, including a low regard for Goulart. Milan Kubik, writing for Newsweek, stated that Goulart was devious and had outmanipulated himself (Kubik, 1964a). As a writer for the Post, Kubik called Goulart an oligarch, whose contempt for the middle-class (where a large majority of the Brazilian military came from), proved his undoing (Kubik, 1964b, p. 17). A Post editorial made little effort to defend the "erratic opportunist," despite a general anti-coup message (Washington Post, 3 April 1964, p. 18). Andre Gunder Frank, writing for the Nation, claimed that Goulart was not progressive and stated: "He was felled by domestic and American conservatives, not because he moved to the left, which he did not, but because he clung to the Right and thus was unable to confront the fundamental economic crisis" (Frank, 1964, p. 411). Only the editor of the New Republic defended Goulart's attempts at reform. The anti-coup press, like the pro-coup press, was concerned with the preservation of constitutional democracy, but interpreted the military, not Goulart, as the threat to democracy. Anti-coup writers viewed military intervention as a betrayal of American ideals. Although the Post refused to defend Goulart and praised U.S. recognition policy toward the new regime as realistic, the breakdown of constitutional methods concerned it. Declaring the manner of the ouster a tragedy, the editor stated: "While it is premature to say the revolt means the end of civilian supremacy, the danger is there and will be a source of apprehension. . . . We have only experienced the beginning of the Brazilian drama" (Washington Post, 3 April 1964, p. 18). In other stories, the editors expressed concern about dictatorship, something ignored by the pro-coup press. The editors of the New Republic thought the chances for reform slight: "American opinion criticizes Latin America for lagging behind the reforms, but when one does, we cry leftist" (New Republic, 11 April 1964, p. 18). The Nation called the coup a "gorilla" revolution, designed to prevent any

meaningful reform, a charge leveled by other anti-coup writers (Nation, 13 April 1964, p. 357). The editors of Newsweek belittled the stated reasons for rebellion: "But U.S. intelligence officers refuse to believe that the Communists were that close to seizing power in Brazil" (Newsweek, 15 June 1964, p. 58). The arbitrary and violent repression by the military resulted in continued denunciation by the anti-coup press. The First Institutional Act, promulgated ten days after the rebellion, destroyed the constitution the rebels stated they wanted to protect. The Act enabled the continued purging of undesirable elements in Brazilian society. Measures of repression included destruction of leftist organizations, jailing of 20,000 "Communists," suspension of trials or appeals for those arrested, and the imposition of censorship. The editors of Newsweek condemned the measures as a betrayal of the revolution: "The generals seem to think that what the U.S. wants to hear is that every one of those thousands still in jail was Communist" (Newsweek, 15 June 1964, p. 58). The editors of the New Republic noted: "Brazil may have been thrust into the fire of a rightwing police state under the pretext of being saved from Communist infiltration" (New Republic, 2 May 1964, p. 4). The Nation not only attacked the Brazilian military's brutality, but also the U.S. Government's support, claiming that U.S. policy showed a laissez-faire attitude toward repression and displayed a double-standard in conducting foreign relations (Nation, 4 May 1964, p. 460). The promulgation of the Institutional Act on April 9 and massive arrests by the military led some publications to moderate their stand toward the coup. After the purging of Kubitschek, a writer for Time announced: "The real loser is Brazil," (Time, 19 June 1964, p. 38) while the editor of Business Week observed the revolution had lost much of its middle class support (Business Week, 13 June 1964, p. 31). Still, the only publication that substantially altered the orientation of coverage the week after the coup was the New York Times, although the report that the military had imposed censorship on all dispatches leaving Brazil evoked negative reactions from all the publications that bothered to report the incident. Widespread failure to note even this breach of liberty was a further indication of slanted and biased reporting. Not surprisingly, the Johnson Administration policy toward Brazil in March and April of 1964 provoked little controversy. Generally, reporters who favored the coup also favored the quick and unconditional support given the new regime, although there were some exceptions. Syndicated columnist Arthur Krock at first praised the coup as a defeat for "Cuban and Russian Communist and fellow-travelers." A few days later, after General Humberto Castelo Branco emerged as the frontrunner to be the new president, Krock argued that President Johnson had acted too quickly and had ignored seasoned State Department officials who argued that constitutionalism was in jeopardy (Krock, 1964a, p. 12; Krock, 1964b, p. 4). Most of the procoup press praised the recognition policy as sensible and claimed that civil war would have been more likely without the message (Zausman, 1964, p. 34). The anti-coup press condemned U.S. policy as interventionists and undemocratic. These writers also attacked U.S. policy for emboldening the rebels and promoting excesses. The Daily Worker attacked the new "Mann Doctrine," which reversed U.S. opposition to military coups, reported in the New York Times on March 19, 1964, and the hypocrisy of calling a military dictatorship a constitutional change. The Daily Worker's influence, however, was such that a condemnation from it would lead many to conclude that the U.S. had followed the correct policy. In fact, many of the pro-coup publications did note Communists' condemnation of the coup (Daily Worker, 7 April 1964, p. 3; see Frank, 1964, p. 412).

Except for the debate on the wisdom (not motive) of the enthusiastic endorsement of the coup by Johnson, no journalist questioned U.S. policy toward Brazil. No one questioned Secretary of State Dean Rusk's emphatic denial of Cuban charges that the coup was executed with U.S. complicity. Those who bothered to comment on the Cuban charges denounced them as Communist rhetoric and pointed to the widespread support in Brazil for Goulart's ouster as proof of United States non-involvement (Atlanta Constitution, 2 April 1964, p. 4). Columnist William S. White claimed that the only encouragement the United States gave Brazilians was that of a role model of good democracy (White, 1964, p. 7). Nor did the decision that the coup was constitutional and recognition was thus unnecessary raise questions on the U.S. role. Yet, the Manchester Guardian questioned U.S. involvement and reported the United States gave $800 million in the previous year to conspiring state governors, a fact ignored by the American press (Hopcraft, 1964, p. 7). The conservative Times (London) also questioned U.S. complicity and observed that the U.S. hoped the coup could be made to appear legal to avoid controversy for supporting a right-wing coup (Times, 3 April 1964, p. 12). American reporters thus missed a crucial aspect of the story, leading to distorted and inaccurate portrayal of events. In fact, some anti-coup publications attacked the press coverage. The editor of New Republic wrote: "It is naive to regard Goulart as a Red threat pure and simple. With distressing near-unanimity, U.S. press and television last week described President Goulart of Brazil as a leftist" (New Republic, 11 April 1964, p. 5). Daniel Mason of the Daily Worker observed: "Peculiarly enough, U.S. reporters in Brazil have been silent on this (mass arrests), and the news has come from correspondents of British and other foreign newspapers. The question arises as to whether the U.S. reporters have been gagged, to give credence to the phony claim of a 'peaceful' revolt" (Mason, 1964, p. 2). The editor of the Nation noted bitterly: There must be something radically wrong with the news gathering services when supposed experts are so easily fooled. . . . The result is a melange on the journalistic level of the Hearst-Pulitzer wars at the turn of the century. It projects a fantasy world made up of good guys and bad guys, with ready-made labels automatically applied by American readers, who know little about actual conditions in Latin America and care less (Nation, 27 April 1964, p. 406). One must conclude that the American press did not question U.S. involvement in the coup because the Johnson administration, especially Embassy officials in Rio de Janeiro, succeeded brilliantly in managing the news. There were approximately fifteen correspondents in Brazil and even more in Washington at the time of the coup.4 Most of those in Rio were full-time Latin American correspondents confronted with the most important story in Brazil in several years. The increase in anti-coup stories after April 5 and the arrest of an American correspondent for refusing to comply with the military's censorship of outgoing dispatches (Hartt, 1964b, p. 1), indicates American correspondents probably would have been unwilling to suppress such a good story and were not apathetic. In the confusion of mass arrests and requests for asylum and conflicting rumors, correspondents turned to embassy officials to make sense of a complex situation, and these officials succeeded in selling their story and hiding their involvement. The blind acceptance of State Department officials and Brazilian victors explains the distorted reporting.

PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE CONSEQUENCESThe speculations on the consequences of the coup is another indication of the biases of the reporters and the filters used by reporters to distort reality. One may even argue that predictions indicate more clearly the biases and filters of the reporters, for in speculation, the greatest hopes and fears come to light. The pro-coup press focused predictions on U.S. business interests and future United States-Brazilian relations. The perceived benefits of the new regime, or the perceived hostility of the Goulart regime toward business and U.S. foreign policy goals, were the major reason for favoring the coup. Increased investment opportunity was the foreseen consequence most often cited by pro-coup journalists. Not only did reporters writing for the business publications mention increased investment as a real possibility, but also other procoup writers in U.S. News and World Report, the Miami Herald, and the Los Angeles Times also anticipated American business expansion in Brazil. The editors of U.S. News speculated extensively. Among their predictions, the repeal of a recently enacted law that restricted foreign profit remittances figured most prominently. The editors claimed the repeal was the key for increased investment, which they portrayed as the economic salvation of Brazil. The editors also cited that tough control of inflation should be a major priority in order to induce U.S. business to expand. Large increases in foreign aid, particularly U.S., the editors anticipated, would be forthcoming. The editors printed a statement attributed to a U.S. manufacturer:"Down at my shop, we just dusted off all expansion plans today" (U.S. News and World Report, 20 April 1964, p. 74). Pro-coup writers predicted the new regime would back business and would invite the U.S. corporations to help build the mined economy. In Fortune, Philip Siekman made frequent references to Brazil's desperate need for foreign investment and the safe climate the new regime had provided for investments. Siekman wrote: "Most U.S. investors, conditioned to expect Brazilian promises to evaporate like morning fog, are cautiously waiting and watching. Their skepticism is partly explained by the fact that the story of Brazil's revolution, with all of its encouraging aspects, has not, up to now, been fully told in the American press." The article contained several encouraging statements attributed to unnamed American businessmen and concluded the article with a promise: "Next year, the managers of a U.S. corporation will be hard put to explain to their stockholders why they invested in Brazil in 1964. Ten years from now, they may find it even more difficult to explain why they did not" (Siekman, 1964, pp. 147, 121). The lone exception to the rosy future painted by pro-coup journalists appeared in the Wall Street Journal. Although in the initial coverage of the coup, the editors quoted "a top executive of a U.S. corporation" as saying: "This (the coup) could be a real plus; the greatest thing that could happen to U.S. interests," the WSJ maintained a wait-and-see attitude. WSJ editors said that U.S. business would hold back until assured that Brazilians would institute anti-inflationary measures. And the editors of the WSJ were alone among the pro-coup journalists who predicted land reform would be scrapped (Wall Street Journal, 9 April 1964, p. 6, 2 April 1964, p. 16). Pro-coup writers assumed better United States-Brazilian relations and increased aid would result from the coup, an assumption that proved correct only in the immediate aftermath. No journalist predicted worsening relations. Moreover, writers in Business Week, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the

Chicago Tribune, and the Washington Post mentioned the U.S. expected help from the new regime in isolating Cuba. The editors of the Miami Herald published seven different articles pertaining to the impact the coup would have on Cuba and claimed that the hemisphere would be united to free the socialist island from Castro, that the OAS would be strengthened in its anti-Communist resolve, and that Brazil would break the ties which enabled Castro to remain in power (Miami Herald, 2 April 1964, p. 6A; 3 April 1964, p. 6A; 4 April 1964, p. 6A; 9 April 1964, p. 6A; 10 April 1964, p. 2; 10 April 1964, p. 1B). The editors of Business Week, the Miami Herald, and the Los Angeles Times predicted that projected leftist gains in Chile would be stopped (Business Week, 11 April 1964, p. 74; Miami Herald, 10 April 1964, p. 2; Fleming 1964, p. 6). Business Week editors also expected the new regime to abandon plans to recognize Red China (Business Week, 4 April 1964, p. 64). Journalists writing for Business Week, U.S. News, the Reporter, the Miami Herald, and the Los Angeles Times also suggested the Alliance for Progress would attain new popularity and support in Latin America, a prediction that did not occur. Pro-coup writers were optimistic about the chances for reform and democracy after the "defeat for Communism." Many of the writers expected the new regime to tackle the problems of land reform and the elimination of poverty in Brazil's Northeast. These writers felt the army would take advantage of the spirit of reform (used by Goulart in his try for a dictatorship) to make Brazil a truly democratic nation, thus echoing the military's claim that the purpose of the revolt was to preserve the constitution. Although some journalists saw no alternative to military rule (Goodsell of CSM and Herbert Cahn of the New Leader), most pro-coup publications reported that the military would relinquish power quickly and elections would be held shortly, and as scheduled, in 1965. Most anti-coup writers did not make any predictions outside of the area of civil rights and political freedom for the Brazilian people. During the month of April, anti-coup editors expressed concern that political freedom and constitutional democracy would end and that widespread repression would follow. As these fears became reality, the editors of these publications assumed an "I told you so" position and became more vehement in their opposition to the military regime. Newsweek wrote of a "revolution of cannibals" that devoured respected ex-president Juscelino Kubitschek and leading conspirator and Sao Paulo governor Ademar de Burros (Newsweek 15 June 1964, 57). The editors of the Nation wrote of a joint U.S.-Brazilian witch hunt aimed at suppressing Brazilian intellectuals and youth (Nation 12 October 1964).

A NEW IMAGE OF BRAZILAmerican press coverage of Brazil was more favorable in May of 1964 than in March. The American people received a better image of Brazil after the coup than before, despite the fact that the military had solved none of the nation's problems (inflation was still at 60% two years after the coup and remained over 80% throughout 1964), had destroyed the constitution, and had arrested thousands of Brazilians. The press portrayed Brazil as a prosperous, mature, and responsible nation, almost as if Brazil had conducted a public relations campaign to improve its image.5 Before the coup, many stories published in the United States conveyed an image of Brazil as a sick and chaotic nation that was irresponsible, Communist-infiltrated, strike-ridden, plagued by runaway inflation and an enormous poor class.6 The American press blamed both the elite and Joao Goulart for the many and possibly insurmountable problems facing Brazil. Brazil's negative images reached its apex during the coup. Writers generally claimed that Brazil's leaders had squandered the generous aid the United States had given, that rational policies by "notable" statesmen, such as Carlos Lacerda, could not compete with the demagogic appeals of Quadros and Goulart because of the immaturity of the Brazilian electorate. The editor of the Chicago Tribune in discussing the political and economic crisis of Brazil and the "foreign interests" that had forced three presidents to leave office prematurely within the previous decade, attributed those foreign interests in the case of Quadros to be Haig & Haig, Teacher's, and Johnny Walker (Chicago Tribune, 3 April 1964, p. 14). U.S. News editors claimed Brazil was near collapse, in the middle of a severe depression, and facing the impending civil war (U.S. News and Worm Report, 13 April 1964, p. 31). The New York Times editor called Brazil a desperate and sick nation (New York Times, 2 April 1964, p. 32). The coup however, was also the beginning of a more favorable image for Brazil. Many of the editorials printed in pro-coup publications echoed the Miami Herald's "Brazil Headed in Right Direction," and the Denver Post's "Brazil Has Chance to Rebuild." A week after declaring that Brazil was in the middle of a severe depression, the editor of U.S. News downgraded the economic crisis to a recession (U.S. News and World Report, 20 April 1964, p. 74). Americans now received an image of a nation struggling to put the house back in order, a nation that had eliminated Communism, one that was an important ally to the United States, and useful role model for Latin America. The pro-coup press characterized the new regime as democratic and reformist. In contrast to Goulart, the pro-coup press portrayed new president General Castelo Branco as brilliant, dedicated, patriotic, and moderate. This "new and improved" image was not unanimous, for anti-coup writers still criticized the new regime and reminded the American people that Brazil's massive social problems and need for reform remained. These stories were a minority however. The attempt to improve the reputation of the new government resulted in more distorted reporting. On April 4, the Times (London) reported that the coup was less popular than expected and that widespread apprehension over the probability of a right-wing military government existed (Times, 4 April 1964, p. 10). The American press virtually ignored discontent, although Los Angeles Times correspondent Julian Hartt observed that "the overwhelming pro-Goulart bureaucracy met democracy's return in a sullen mood" (Hartt, 1964a, p. B-2). The pro-coup press portrayed the massive arrests as being popularly supported and until June, even the anti-coup press failed to observe signs of widespread discontent. Most of the stories relating to Brazilian opinion were similar to the Los Angeles Times, "Million Brazilians March in Rio Rain to

Celebrate Goulart Ouster," and "Brazil Banks Open Amid Signs of New Confidence" (Hartt, 1964c, p. 1; 1964c, p. 3) Philip Siekman quoted an unnamed Brazilian as saying the revolution was "so beautiful, everyone wants to be the father" (Siekman 1964, p. 148). There also existed an image of Brazil that remained consistent throughout 1964. The American press recognized Brazil as a very important nation in the Western Hemisphere. As part of the consistent image, Brazil was a rich nation, with enormous potential, and a happy people. A writer in Time characterized Brazil as "that gentle giant of music, coffee, and sunny beaches" (Time 17 April 1964, p.49). A Wall Street Journal writer claimed: "Brazil is so rich, its difficulties so synthetic, no more than ordinary sanity is required to put the country on its feet." (Wall Street Journal, 2 April 1964, p. 16) The editor of the Washington Post recognized Brazil's importance, calling the coup "a drama of continental proportions," and claiming: "Brazil's current trouble is an interruption of a success story." (Washington Post 2 April 1964, p. 20)

CONCLUSION: NEWS MANAGEMENT AND THE COUPThe majority of Americans, with little knowledge of the actual conditions in Brazil, probably believed that democracy had triumphed over Communism and that the coup represented a major victory for the United States in the cold war. An analysis of stories in this sample shows that the dominant coverage was procoup. Moreover, while there were a substantial number of neutral stories, these had a smaller impact than one might expect. A large number of hard news stories appeared on April 1, when the results were still in doubt and when the U.S. government's attitude toward the events was less concrete. After April 1, much of the hard news reports, such as Dean Rusk's press conference, had a distinct pro-coup flavor despite its seeming neutrality. With the exception of the Communist Daily Worker and the Washington Post, most of the anti-coup stories appeared after the military began consolidating control and arresting thousands of people.Yet by April 4, Brazil was no longer a front page story, and these anti-coup stories had far less impact than initial coverage favorable to the coup. Thus, even though publications, such as the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times altered coverage in relation to the coup, the change to a more neutral or unfavorable stance did not affect the dominant coverage. Close examination of American press coverage of Brazil in 1964 shows that the U.S. government was able to manage the news to hide U.S. involvement in the coup and to present a skewed version of reality. American intervention in the events in Brazil in 1964 and the management of the press was standard practice in the early cold war. The result was distorted reporting, which may have served short-term United States interests, but at the cost of misleading the public and perpetuating the cold war mentality. This in turn, prevented a rational assessment of American foreign policy goals and perceptions, and may have resulted in further misconceptions concerning proper U.S. policies in the Third World, which resulted in a far greater blunder later in the decade that had disastrous consequences for the United States. Acknowledgment: The author wishes to thank the following people for their helpful comments and assistance: John C. Burnham; Paul Robichaud; David L Weis; Robert Ubriaco; and David Priess. The author also thanks Patra Noonan for her help through the many drafts of the article.

NOTES1

U.S. Government, House, Subcommittee on Government Information, Hearings, 88th Congress, 1st session. On the State Department campaign to promote press-government partnership, see:Robert J. Manning, "Journalism and Foreign Affairs," Department of State Bulletin, 50, April 6, 1964, pp. 541-549.2

The headline of the Denver Post on April 3 was "Snow Eases Water Crises," while the headline of the Columbus Citizen-Journal was "Major Shakeup at Nationwide."3

Letter from James Nelson Goodsell to author, October 19, 1982. Letter from Lincoln Gordon to author, October 10, 1982. Unpublished letters in possession of the author.4

Letter from James Nelson Goodsell to author, October 19, 1982.

5

Brazil may have conducted such a campaign, although I have not seen anything definite. Certainly, Sickman's "When Executives Turned Revolutionaries" in Fortune and Clarence Hall's "The Country that Saved Itself," in the Reader's Digest have all the earmarks of public relations pieces.6

See: "Brazil: How to Lose Investments," Time, 31 January 1964; "American Capital and Brazilian Nationalists," Yale Review, December 1963; "Quickstep to the Left," Newsweek, 23 March 1964.

APPENDIXTable 1. Newspaper Reporting of Brazil/Related Stories, April 1-10, 1964Legend for Chart: A B C D E F G H A New York Times Washington Post Christian Science Monitor Wall Street Journal Chicago Tribune Miami Herald Los Angeles Times St. Louis Post-Dispatch Boston Globe Atlanta Constitution Dallas News San Francisco Chronicle Denver Post Columbus Citizen-Journal Daily Worker Total Newspaper Stories Front Page UPI/AP Editorial Columnist Pro Coup Anti Coup Neutral B 37 29 C 9 7 D 5 6 E 5 3 F 9 5 G 7 11 H 21 13

12 8 15 32[*] 31

7 4 6 14 10

1 0 6 19 12

0 0 1 4 1

7 3 15 21 16

1 0 0 0 5

4 5 0 11 10

17 19 17 13

10 5 4 6

11 11 3 9

2 2 5 1

8 8 10 7

1 2 3 3

7 7 4 3

18 15

7 2

5 11

3 2

3 10

5 1

10 4

11 6 279

2 2 105

6 0 105

3 2 33

11 0 137

0 6 46

0 0 97

* Miami Herald totals include stories from April 1-4, 1964 and April 9-10, 1964 only, but also includes stories printed from the Latin American Edition, as well as the City Edition.

Table 2. Magazine Reporting of Brazil/Related Stories, April-June, 1964Magazine Time Newsweek U.S. News & World Report Nation New Republic National Review Reporter New Leader Business Week Fortune Nation's Business Issues 12 12 Stories 7 6 Pro Coup 4 1 Anti Coup 0 3 Neutral 3 2

12 12 12

4 6 3

4 0 0

0 5 3

0 1 0

12 6 6

2 2 1

2 2 1

0 0 0

0 0 0

12 6

5 1[*]

3 1

1 0

1 0

3

0

0

0

0

* Fortune--"When Executives Turned Revolutionaries," appeared in September 1964.

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