Wehling, E. Et Al. (2015). Populism and Its Moral Siblings. Demos, London

7/24/2019 Wehling, E. Et Al. (2015). Populism and Its Moral Siblings. Demos, London.

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Using moral politicaltheory to understandpopulist politics

POPULISM AND ITS

MORAL SIBLINGS

Elisabeth WehlingJamie BartlettRichard Norrie


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Demos is Britains leading cross-party t

We produce original research, publish

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have spent 20 years at the centre of th

debate, with an overarching mission to

politics closer to people.

Demos is now exploring some of the m

persistent frictions within modern polit

especially in those areas where there is

significant gap between the intuitions oordinary voter and political leaders. Ca

politics also be a popular politics? How

address widespread anxieties over soc

such as welfare, diversity and family life

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employ: we recognise that the public oinsights that the experts do not. We pr

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First published in 2015 Demos. Some rights reservedMagdalen House, 136 Tooley Street,London, SE1 2TU, UK

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POPULISM AND ITSMORAL SIBLINGS

Elisabeth WehlingJamie BartlettRichard Norrie


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Open access. Some rights reserved.

As the publisher of this work, Demos wants to encouracirculation of our work as widely as possible while retathe copyright. We therefore have an open access policyenables anyone to access our content online without ch

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Contents

Acknowledgements

Executive summary

1 Introduction

2 Results and analyses

3 General discussion

Appendix

Notes

References


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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Heather Grabbe anOpen Society European Policy Institute fosupport with this work. We would also likemembers at Demos who contributed to theincluding Louis Reynolds, Carl Miller, Ale

Charlie Cadywould.

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Executive summary

9

Populism is on the rise across Europe. Recopinion polls bear testimony to the rapidlyof populist anti-establishment groups. Whidentity of populists can loosely be categorleftist based on their endorsement of trador progressive policy stances, their exact naideological pull among the electorate rem

To better understand the nature of Euthis study moves beyond policy stances and

moral worldviews of populist followers by politics questionnaires, which measure endconservative Strict Father and progressive worldview.1

By taking this approach, the study pr

fundamental insights about how one mighand politically respond to populist movemof rightist and leftist populist groups tenprimarily Strict Father and Nurturant PareH h i hi l


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one political spectrum (or movement type) ovthus largely depend on who succeeds in addrepolitical concerns.

Executive summary


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1 Introduction

11

While being concerned with different sociosolutions, anti-establishment groups acrossspectrum tend to share what might be coinnarrative. This narrative pits the ordinary of-touch political elite, with populist groupformer against the latter as the only authenspin and self-interest.2

Until the last three years or so, much the subject was related to what is often call

populism groups endorsing positions sucimmigration and multiculturalism (mostly preservation of national culture in the face the EU. The growth of such right-wing pop(including both political parties and broad

the past ten years has been remarkable. Thsignificant political weight in the parliamenBulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, the Nand Latvia, and in the European Parliamen

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endorsing policy stances such as citizens and antagonism to global capitalism, and oppositmeasures and spending cuts. Rabble-rousing candidate Jean-Luc Mlenchon secured 11 perround vote in the 2013 French presidential ele

in Greece beat the New Democrats in the 20152013 Italian elections, Beppe Grillos Five Stabecame the largest single party in the Italian pran a vehement anti-establishment campaign,candidates online, refusing interviews with Itacommunicating almost exclusively via blog). also performed well in the 2014 European parelections. The previously unknown Podemos for instance, won 8 per cent of the domestic vcurrently polling even higher.

While populist movements can generall

leftist or rightist, their willingness to mix tradconservative and progressive issue stances cangrasp their political and ideological identity. Tcommonly leaves mainstream movements at aformulating coherent responses and political

To better understand what motivates folgroups, this study goes beyond listing policy indicator of peoples political beliefs and turnconcerns as the basis of political action and id

d k d

Introduction


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groups, including nations or nation commuThus, people map their beliefs about ideal preferable traits in children onto ideal govetraits in citizens (consider metaphoric exprGerman fatherland, mother Russia and

the American founding fathers).The theory was developed by Professhis 1997 bookMoral Politics,5 which distingStrict Father and a Nurturant Parent worldtheory, conservatives tend to endorse Strictprogressives tend to endorse Nurturant PaIndividuals whose positions situate them inmiddle, such as centrist or moderates, are biconceptual, endorsing both worldviews awith regard to different social domains or i

The Strict Father model is grounded i

world is a competitive and dangerous placeself-disciplined, self-reliant, obedient and mto do well. Self-indulgence and indulgence as immoral, as it fosters weakness and depenset strict rules of right and wrong, and their

questioned within the family or by outsiderhierarchical, and rules are enforced throughand punishment. Punishment is seen as an love (tough love), as it makes children strod l l

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fostered, and that this is best done through leand showing empathy and nurturance. Childrindividual and social responsibility to care band others. They must learn empathy, which ifor cooperation, respect and tolerance. Comm

children and parents is respectful. Parents havrules and decisions, and children are encouragown ideas and question parental decisions. Mshould never be physically or psychologicallymust learn never to harm others. In this modeparenting is to empower children to live a haplife, and to follow their individual dreams. Finchildren fairly means giving them what they nthey deserve.

When applied to politics, the Nurturantbrings about a range of traditionally progress

such as support of welfare, opposition to a flament and protection of marginalised groups, military force.

MethodMeasuring morality

Endorsement of the Strict Father and Nurturaworldviews can be measured through the Mo

h h

Introduction


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1 Parents shouldnt handicap their children too easy. (Strict Father)

2 Siblings should receive parental support inindividual needs. (Nurturant Parent)

Moral Politics Societal Scale:

1 The government shouldnt handicap citizelives too easy. (Strict Father)

2 Citizens should receive governmental assisto their individual needs. (Nurturant Pare

15

Individuals who endorse the Strict Fathe median and the Nurturant Parent subsare classified as morally strict. Likewise, paendorse the Nurturant Parent subscale abo

subscale below the median are considered Finally, those who score above the median categorised as biconceptual.8

Survey designTwo surveys were administered as part of thadministered to followers of populist moveEuropean countries: the UK, France, Germ


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questions, and open-ended questions designelengthy responses about moral reasoning, thistargeting the family domain as a conceptual treasoning in the socio-political domain. The gto obtain a detailed understanding of individu

as a source of their societal reasoning, to gainrelationship between such values and policy scompare the worldviews held by populists andacross the political spectrum.

Data collection

Data collection involved a survey recruitmentby Demos that uses Facebook to target suppogroups.9 Using the same techniques as inNewPopulism andNew Political Actors in Europe,10 su

conducted via Facebook. In survey 1, we targepopulist groups from both left and right in thGermany, Greece, Hungary and Italy. In survsurveys at populist groups in the UK, France well as a number of mainstream parties to off

Adverts and surveys were administered inative language. Facebook was selected becauwidespread and popular social media site in Epopulist parties have a sizeable presence on th

b k ll d b d

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Data collection caveats

This recruitment technique allows collectinfrom a largely unexplored group of individrecruit via traditional recruitment approachare caveats to keep in mind.11

First, the population is self-selected. I

control for what groups partaking individuhow many individuals from a given group survey is advertised to a broad population affiliate with political groups on Facebookover which individuals ultimately completeit is only possible to target groups and pagpresence on Facebook, which is not a comp

In this study, this left us with somewhfor surveys 1 and 2. For instance, we gainednumbers of responses from left- and right-wfollowers as well as mainstream followers in

Second, this study targets individualsand mainstream groups on Facebook, and activists themselves. Therefore, one ought drawing generalisations about the parties aquestion, as survey participants must not n

the populist (and mainstream) groups in thThird, Facebooks advertisement optitargeting of specific groups, but rather a cogroups. Therefore, it is not possible to disa

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19

Surveys 1 and 2 were largely conducted andalthough some cross-survey analyses were mmainstream groups were placed on a left-to

on policy stances as well as a common pubwhere each group lands (such as being labpopulist-right in public discourse).

We recognise that there is considerabthe extent to which populist is an accurat

parties which are in some respects quite difGolden Dawn, which is neo-Nazi party, andanti-European libertarian and pro-democratherefore use the term populist as a very loreferring to those parties that share a very b

pitting themselves as defenders of ordinaryof-touch establishment elites, from either aposition. It is not to suggest they are all aliany value-based judgement on any of the p

2 Results and ana

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Data collection details

In total, 5,171 people completed survey 1 (tablnumber were removed because they had answof the survey questions. (In order to construcdetermining where individual respondents felonly used respondents who had answered eve

hence the discrepancy between figures in tabl

Table 1 The country and movements supporte

of survey 1

Country Affiliation Fina

France Front National 206Germany Alternative fr Deutschland 191Greece Golden Dawn 44Hungary 4K! 160

Hungary Jobbik 3,02Italy Five Star Movement 182UK UKIP 1,038UK BNP 111UK EDL 217Total 5,171

Final dataset details

Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of basic dstatistics of those participants who completed

Results and analyses

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Table 3

Statistics relating to the scale by wsurvey 1 were classified

Scale n Range Mean Me

Strict Father Scale 4,831 1575 47.4 47Nurturant Parent Scale 4,703 1470 49.8 50

Morality types

Using their scores on the Moral Politics Soparticipants were classified as Strict Fatherendorse a strict model of morality), Nurturprimarily endorse a nurturant model of mobiconceptual (those who endorse both mod

judgement and reasoning). Statistical cut-o

detailed above (see Methodology, MeasurTable 4 presents the results of this cla

followers of the populist movements acrossdivided by left and right.

Table 4 Left and right affiliation of particip

morality type

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Table 5

Movements supported by participants of and morality type

Movement Country Strict Nurturant Father Parent

Alternative frDeutschland (right) Germany 23.1% 24.4%Syriza (left) Greece 9.5% 55.6%Golden Dawn (right) Greece 50.0% 6.2%Front National (right) France 73.5% 3.4%4K! (left) Hungary 2.2% 73.1%Jobbik (right) Hungary 24.4% 23.6%Five Star Movement(left) Italy 12.9% 46.2%British National Party(right) UK 33.3% 13.6%English DefenceLeague (right) UK 42.9% 9.8%UKIP (right) UK 34.5% 15.7%


Discussion

As the data show, followers of movements thaperceived as politically leftist are most likely t

Nurturant Parent ideals: 58.7 per cent of left-endorse a Nurturant Parent worldview, and onendorse a Strict Father worldview. Interestingmorally biconceptual, seeing validity in both Lik l h i di id l b i

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groups followers spread so evenly across thPossible reasons for this are discussed belodiscussion).

A look at followers of specific groupsfurther insight into the ways in which popupolitical spectrum in Europe are distinct orsocietal moral beliefs.

The rightist French Front National haof Strict Fathers (73.5 per cent) and lowestParents (3.4 per cent) by far. The leftist Huhighest proportion of Nurturant Parents (7

almost no cases of Strict Fathers (2.2 per ceNext, there are a number of groups w

tilt towards one worldview over the other.Among the rightist groups, this is par

among followers of Greek Golden Dawn (5

Father and 6.2 per cent Nurturant Parent) Defence League (42.9 per cent Strict FatheNurturant Parent). On the left side of the sclear moral pattern emerges for followers o(55.6 per cent Nurturant Parent and 9.5 pe

and the Italian Five Star Movement (46.2 pParent and 12.9 per cent Strict Father).Followers of the remaining populist m

much more diverse moral pattern, althoughb dl d b h bl

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biconceptuals are Italys Five Star Movement Syriza; both groups are considered leftist).

Survey 2 Populist and mainstream foll

France, and Hungary, their policy stan

alignment of values across social dom

Survey 2 consisted of the Moral Politics Famidemographic questions, a number of hot-buttquestions, and a set of open-ended questions moral reasoning within the family domain. Th

and drew sufficient responses from followers populist and mainstream groups in three Eurthe UK, France and Hungary.

The central objective of this second survdeeper, more profound understanding of pop

within the family domain as a source for theirabout society and governance, to relate such bto policy attitudes, and to compare the moral populist and mainstream followers.

Data collection details

The groups below were targeted on Facebook1,161 completing the survey (table 6). A small

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Table 6

The country and movements suppoof survey 2

Country Affiliation

UK BNPUK UKIPUK Labour PartyUK Conservatives PartyFrance Front NationalFrance Union pour un mouvement populaFrance Parti SocialisteHungary EgyttHungary Demokratikus Koalci (DK)Hungary JobbikHungary Magyar Szocialista Prt (MSZP)Hungary JobbikHungary Lehet Ms a Politika (LMP)Total

Tables 7 and 8 give an overview of bastatistics of those participants who comple

Table 7 The age of participants of survey 2

Age UK France

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Morality types

Using their scores on the Moral Politics Famiparticipants were categorised as Strict Father,Parent, or biconceptual. The same selection psurvey 1 were applied. Table 9 presents the rescategorisation for what is commonly considerleft and right across countries, with populisgroups combined.

Table 9 Left and right affiliation of participant

morality type

Strict Nurturant BFather Parent

Left 15.8% 50.3% 1Right 49.5% 11.9% 2

Table 10 shows the morality patterns forand right across European countries, dividedand populist groups.

Table 10 Mainstream and populist left and righ

participants in survey 2, by morality ty

esu ts a d a a yses

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Table 11

Movements supported by participantscountry and morality type

Movement Country Strict NurturantFather Parent

Parti Socialiste(left; mainstream) France 21.4% 42.9%Front National(right; populist) France 68.8% 3.6%UMP (right;mainstream) France 37.3% 13.7%DK (left; mainstream) Hungary 13.8% 49.8%Egytt (left; populist) Hungary 3.1% 62.5%MSZP (left;mainstream) Hungary 23.9% 50.0%LMP (left; populist) Hungary 28.6% 39.3%Jobbik (right; populist) Hungary 35.3% 17.6%Labour (left;mainstream) UK 29.7% 37.8%

Conservative (right;mainstream) UK 39.4% 18.2%UKIP (right; populist) UK 50.5% 11.0%British National Party(right; populist) UK 60% 5.0%

Discussion

Examining the populist and mainstream dashows that groups on the political left tendP ( ) S i F h (



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for populists (53.2 per cent) and mainstreamewhile strict ideals play a more peripheral role per cent) and mainstreamers (16.1 per cent). Mgroups show a low percentage of biconceptuaper cent; mainstreamers: 11 per cent). This is wpolitics model would predict.

When it comes to the right end of the spdifferent picture emerges. Here, populists tensided in their moral outlook than mainstreamwing mainstreamers are quite evenly distributmoral types (strict: 37.4 per cent; nurturant: 2

biconceptual: 23.2 per cent), populist right wendorse strict (52.8 per cent) over nurturant ((while still holding 23.9 per cent biconceptua

Table 12

Morality types, by movement supported bsurvey 2

Movement Country Strict Nurturant Father Parent

Parti Socialiste (left;mainstream) France 21.4% 42.9%Front National (right;populist) France 68.8% 3.6%

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A moral close-up of each of the targetsheds further light onto the ways in which mainstream followers are unified or sepatheir moral beliefs.

For those on the left, the Hungarian Egytt is the party most likely to endorse nper cent) over strict (3.1 per cent). The Huconsidered a leftist populist party, is more across moral types, with 39.3 per cent nurtustricts, and 10.7 per cent biconceptuals. Ofparties, the Hungarian DK and MSZP sho

proportions of nurturants (49.8 per cent anrespectively) compared with stricts (13.8 pecent) and biconceptuals (11 per cent and 2.comparison, the French Parti Socialiste hanurturants, 21.4 per cent stricts, and 21.4 p

Other leftist mainstream parties, such as thParty, distribute even more evenly across th

The picture that emerges for rightist different. The French populist movement Fhighest proportion who endorse strict (66.

nurturant (3.6 per cent) ideals. Followers oParty show 60 per cent strict and 5 per cenfollowers of UKIP show 50.5 per cent stricnurturant ideals (as well as a rather large pb l ) h l



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Jobbik are similar to those in survey 1. While investigation would be necessary to establish we can sketch out a tentative and caveated expdata show that not just Jobbik followers but Has a whole are more prone to endorse Nurturaand/or be biconceptual. In survey 1, followerspopulist group 4K! consisted of a far higher pNurturant Parents (73.1 per cent) than any othin the six targeted countries. Moreover, survethe Hungarian left-wing populist group Egylist of those who endorse nurturant but not st

possible factor in this tendency is that HungaSoviet country in the study. While communismreasons, should not be understood as rooted imorality per se, it does pull on a number of covalues. Moreover, over a third of Hungarians

survey were 35 years old, and thus experienceat least ten years.

Moral alignment across domains

As surveys 1 and 2 were administered to similaidentical) individuals across Europe, it is possthe degree to which individuals family and sowith each other among populism followers.12

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principles in either domain (around 4 per cfollowers spread similarly evenly across strand biconceptualism in both domains. Pop

UKIP and the British National Party showalthough they display more strictness in thfamily life (50.5 per cent and 60 per cent, rtheir societal reasoning (34.5 per cent and

i l )

Table 13 Moral alignment across family and soc

Societal Scale

Country Strict Father Nurturant Pa

Front National France 73.5% 3.4%Jobbik Hungary 24.4% 23.6%BNP UK 33.3% 13.6%UKIP UK 34.5% 15.7%

Family Scale

Front National France 68.8% 3.6%Jobbik Hungary 35.3% 3.6%BNP UK 60.0% 5.0%UKIP UK 50.5% 11.0%



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referendum on EU membership (see appendiquestionnaire). Answers were given on a five-

Figure 1 Policy support by morality type14

0

1

2

3

4

5

R

Increasem

ilitarysp

Minimise

EU

Taxtherich

Privatisehe

althcare

Strict

Support

Nurturant Bioconceptual

TaxcorporateCO

2

Makeg

aymarria

gelegal

Supp

ortm

ilitaryactio

nin

Iran

Criminalise

abo

rtion

Restric

twelfa

reforjob

seekers

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principles tend to be against welfare, for mfor a minimisation of EU parliament poweendorse nurturant ideals show the oppositepositioning. This pattern is in line with the

Welfare

In the Strict Father model, welfare is seen agovernance. For one, it indulges those whoweak (those who are not economically succtakes away their chance to develop strengththe consequences of their weakness and dis

necessary willpower to succeed in life. Thuworldview, providing job seekers with (tooimmoral use of authority. In the Nurturantcontrast, welfare is seen as a moral form as provides people with what they need.

Military

The Strict Father model implies a goodevare good and evil forces in the world, and imoral mandate to defend its citizens agains

so, one needs a strong military. In the Nurtin contrast, it is the mandate of authorities against harm. Warfare is seen as a form of hthe form of killing civilians), and a minimi



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While the above provides an interestingfurther in-depth investigations are needed to ways in which moral worldviews and policy stpopulism groups followers across Europe int

Open-ended questions responses to sAs part of surveys 1 and 2, a number of open-designed to draw out lengthy descriptions abowere administered. These questions tackled ei(survey 1) or family (survey 2) domain.

One goal of administering these questioa corpus of written language data on the moratargeted groups (available from the Voices of website). Responses were analysed manually twhether the answers mirrored reasoning in lin

Father or Nurturant Parent models, or indicatboth (were biconceptualist). Open-ended quewere as follows:

1 How should a good child behave?2 In your opinion what makes a bad child?3 What moral principles should children be rais

the attributes of right and wrong ways to ru

Lik i d d i i

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categorise them into one of four categoriesNurturant Parent, biconceptual, or neitherlicensed only if at least two annotators prod

Because of the relatively small numbepopulists who answered this question, we hthe supporters of right-wing populist moveexercise should be considered as a useful atext answers, which can offer some additioresults above.

Survey 1 data (case study 1)There were 234 participants who answeredquestions in survey 1 from France (populis141 answers as right-wing populist, which wanalysis. The following cases exemplify the

participants responded:

1 What are the actions or characteristics thatmoral or immoral?

Not respecting French laws; when you know [thpunished by the justice system, youll do anythin

They dont respect others. (Nurturant Parent)



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Survey 2 data (case study 2)There were 219 participants who answered thequestions in survey 2 (both mainstream and pwe identified 125 answers as politically right, 3neither. As above, since the majority of partic

this initial analysis of since the collected data right-wing populists. The following cases exewhich participants responded:

Table 14 The morality types of participants in s

Righ(n =

Strict Father 57Nurturant Parent 8Biconceptual 8Neither 64No inter-coder agreement

1 How should a good child behave?

[Be] respectful of others and obey the rules. (Strict

With kindness, and sensitivity and love. (Nurturan

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3

What moral principles should children be attributes of right and wrong ways to ru

Consideration and empathy for others are paramalso be encouraged to develop tolerance of differconscience. (Nurturant Parent)

Table 15 The morality types of participants

R

(

Strict Father 7Nurturant Parent 2Biconceptual 2Neither 8No inter-coder agreement

Participants responses to open-endedmoral reasoning somewhat mirror the resufar. Followers of right-wing groups tended statements in line with Strict Father (73) th

(21) beliefs (table 15).


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3 General discuss

There has been an upsurge in populism in years, and while populist groups can be caprincipally left-leaning or right-leaning, nature and, thus, their ideological appea

remains difficult to grasp.This study moved beyond policy stan

indicators of the identity of populist groupinstead on the moral worldviews at the foumovements, investigating the values of pop

across six European countries. To this end,survey studies were administered using thequestionnaires,16 which measure individualmoral Strict Father or Nurturant Parent wo

Results show that, overall, followers ogroups tend to endorse a Strict Father modwing populist groups tend to endorse a NuMoreover, a notable tendency towards bicoendorsement of both worldviews) was obse

General discussion


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have low numbers of Nurturant Parents). Amleftist groups, followers of the Hungarian 4Kproportion of Nurturant Parents (73.1 per centhe Greek Syriza holds 55.6 per cent and the IMovement 46.2 per cent Nurturant Parents (anumbers of Strict Fathers).

While the pairing of rightist groups wigroups with nurturant beliefs generally held tinteresting exceptions to this pattern surfacedquestion the classification of these groups as pright or left when considering their overarc

political outlook or ideology.British National Party and UKIP follow

held about a third of Strict Fathers, but in addsomewhat large numbers of Nurturant Parent15.7 per cent, respectively). Moreover, the Ger

fr Deutschland and the Hungarian Jobbik, bgenerally considered part of a European popmore Nurturant Parents (24.4 per cent and 23respectively) than Strict Fathers (23.1 per centrespectively), and biconceptuals formed the la

Jobbik followers (30.2 per cent).The study also found some interesting c

differences between populist and mainstreamshowed that (as predicated) left-leaning main

l d l

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suggest that they are drawing on populatiooverarching moral worldviews within theirgroups that communicate their moral idealeffectively will generate the stronger cognitcitizens who share their moral worldview. Tthose populism followers who are biconcep

moral worldviews); depending on what moin their minds as a template for political remaking, they might support more conservaprogressive, morally nurturant policies.


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Appendix

1 Demographic questions, Survey 1

1 What is your gender? (M/F)2 How old are you?

3 What is your religion? (Christian, MuslimBuddhist, None, Other)

4 What is your highest qualification level? (school or less, secondary school, higher edtraining)

5

What is your employment status? (Emploemployed part time, unemployed, studenteducation, retired, other)

6 With which of these groups do you most i7 What is wrong with politics in your count8 Generally speaking, would you say that m

trusted or that you cant be too careful in d

2 M l P liti S i t l S l

Appendix


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3 When the government speaks, Americans orespectfully.

4 The government shouldnt handicap its cititheir lives too easy.

5 Unlawful behaviour must be punished suff6 Government authorities should not allow c

to them.7 People must always be on time.8 Sometimes the government needs to practi

ensure its citizens follow the right path.9 Citizens need to be disciplined in order to

10 People must understand that people get wh11 Citizens must be disciplined through strict12 Its fine for citizens to have secret dealings

from the government. (Reverse item.)13 When in doubt, the government should err

lenience rather than strictness. (Reverse ite14 At times its okay for citizens to disobey thlaws. (Reverse item.)

15 Sometimes its okay to let bad behaviour inunpunished. (Reverse item.)

Nurturant Parent Subscale

ll b h f h

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8 The government should empower its peopso that they may follow their dreams.

9 Caring for others is not a central aspect of(Reverse item.)

10 Americans shouldnt feel obligated to careof citizens from other nations. (Reverse ite

11 Tending to the needs of those in other natresponsibility of Americans. (Reverse item

12 Its not critical for people to learn to take others into account. (Reverse item.)

13 Learning to understand others and accept

are is not an important part of being Amer14 Its not important for the government to e

why it set certain rules and laws. (Reverse

3 Moral Politics Family ScaleTo what extent do you agree or disagree wstatements?

(Disagree/somewhat disagree/neither agresomewhat agree/agree)

Strict Father Subscale

Appendix


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11 Children must be disciplined through strict r12 Its fine for children to have secrets and hide

parents. (Reverse item.)13 When in doubt, parents should err on the sid

than strictness. (Reverse item.)14 At times its okay for children to disobey thei

item.)15 Sometimes its okay to let bad behaviour in c

unpunished. (Reverse item.)

Nurturant Parent Subscale

1 Children will grow up to be happy adults if pthem to follow their curiosity.

2 Children should learn to understand others

them.3 Children must learn to see the world througheyes.

4 I rather see my child play cooperatively than In order to truly nurture children one needParenting means nurturing the childs true

5 Siblings should receive parental support in aindividual needs.

6 Parents should empower children as much ash ll h d

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4 Open-ended questions

Societal domain (survey 1):

1 How must one act in order to be a good a2 What actions or characteristics turn peopl

citizens?3 Whats the right way to govern a society (w

should guide the policy making of a natio

Family domain (survey 1):

1 How should a good child behave?2

In your opinion what makes a good child?3 What moral principles should children bethe attributes of right and wrong ways t

5 Policy items

To what extent do you agree or disagree wstatements?

(Disagree/somewhat disagree/neither agresomewhat agree/agree)

1 Increase income taxes for wealthier citizen2 Privatise health care.3 Pass legislation that taxes corporations for

Appendix


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OLS regression analysis of policy attit

Table 16 OLS regression analysis of policy attit

Dependent variable

Tax rich Privatise Tax health CO2

Strict 0.183 0.21 0.06Nurturant 0.237 0.207 0.34Biconceptual 0.093 0.288 0.36

Populist -0.284 -0.001 0.102Right-wing -1.115 0.382 -0.4Male -0.057 -0.166 -0.17Employed -0.091 -0.099 -0.0Other activity 0.04 -0.209 0.00Age 2635 0.021 -0.325 -0.39Age 3645 0.278 -0.207 0.45Age 4655 0.277 -0.348 0.24

Age 5665 0.071 -0.002 0.06Age 6675 0.12 0.1 0.04Age 76 plus 0.025 -0.394 -0.12Vocational education 0.088 0.0001 0.141Higher education -0.177 0.162 -0.13Christian -0.035 -0.226 0.06Other religion -0.131 -0.182 -0.4

Hungary 0.5 0.647 0.02UK 0.316 -0.526 -0.4Strict*populist 0.642 -0.044 -0.0Nurture*populist 0.129 -0.514 -0.39Bicon*populist 1.099 -0.484 0.15

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Iran Abortion Restrict Military Emarriage illegal welfare spending p

0.434 0.407 0.868 0.613 00.028 -0.245 -0.206 -0.277 00.311 -0.105 0.428 0.406 0

0.331 -0.092 0.105 0.148 00.031 0.615 1.558 0.811 0-0.229 0.168 0.186 0.077 0-0.145 0.16 0.066 0.387 --0.398 0.037 0.148 0.446 -0.445 0.354 0.013 -0.132 0-0.409 -0.037 0.044 -0.081 0-0.357 -0.171 -0.003 -0.094 0

-0.026 -0.08 0.224 -0.186 00.177 -0.162 0.373 -0.027 00.433 0.27 -0.142 -0.274 0-0.173 -0.055 0.281 0.199 --0.102 -0.075 -0.131 -0.083 -0.35 0.353 0.21 0.178 --0.048 0.148 0.074 -0.135 -

-0.164 0.748 0.159 -0.104 0-0.118 0.154 -0.747 0.926 1.-0.273 0.177 -0.296 0.016 0-0.576 0.377 -0.303 0.03 --0.673 0.484 -0.106 0.037 0


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51


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Notes

1 G Lakoff, Moral Politics: How conservativChicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1E Wehling, The Little Blue Book: The esseand talking democratic, New York: Simon E Wehling, A nation under joint custody:

models divide US politics, doctoral thesis,of California at Berkeley, 2013; E Wehling divided, in preparation.

2 See T Bale, Keep off UKIPs territory EuTories, Guardian, 4 Mar 2013, www.guardi

commentisfree/2013/mar/04/keep-off-ukiptories#ixzz2UgqKxQ00 (accessed 27 Jan 2

3 Lakoff, Moral Politics.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

Notes


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9 J Bartlett, J Birdwell and M Littler, The New Populism, London: Demos, 2012.

10 Bartlett et al, New Face of Digital Populism; JPolitical Actors in Europe: Beppe Grillo and tDemos, 2013.

11 For an in-depth discussion of the methods strweaknesses, see Bartlett et al, The New Face o

12 We merely report correlational observations.

13 Variables were analysed using multivariate regorder to see how they varied by the different mpolicy in question was regressed on moral typinteraction term between moral type and popwas added to allow testing such an interaction

significance was not tested for effects, since thapplied where there is random probability samsignificance seeks to test the likelihood the effhave been caused by chance, which is not posif there is probability sampling, because effec

to biased samples).

14 Controlling for age, gender, education, emploand religion. Effects are those for someone wh

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References

Bale T, Keep off UKIPs territory EuropTories, Guardian, 4 Mar 2013, www.guardicommentisfree/2013/mar/04/keep-off-ukiptories#ixzz2UgqKxQ00 (accessed 27 Jan 2

Bartlett J, Birdwell J and Littler M, The NewPopulism, London: Demos, 2012.

Bartlett et al,New Political Actors in Europe: M5S, London: Demos, 2013

Lakoff G,Moral Politics: How conservatives aChicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1

Lakoff G and Wehling E, The Little Blue Booguide to thinking and talking democratic, New

Schuster, 2012.

Wehling E, A nation under joint custody: d l di id US li i d l h i

Licence to Publish


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Supported by a grant from the

Open Society Foundations


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Anti-establishment populist parties and movements, both leftand right, have become a force to be reckoned with in manyEuropean countries. From Syriza in Greece to the FrontNational in France, there is growing support for parties which


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offer an alternative vision from the mainstream parties.This report offers a new way to analyse anti-establishment

populist parties and movements: by analysing the underlyingmoral frames and attitudes of populist supporters throughMoral Politics Theory based on the work of the US academicGeorge Lakoff. By conducting Moral Politics Questionnaireswith over 5,000 online supporters of populist parties acrossEurope, the respondents' worldviews are gauged andexamined in relationship to policy stances, family values, andmoral beliefs.

The research finds that the moral beliefs and attitudes ofsupporters of anti-establishment populist often have the samemodel of morality as supporters of mainstream parties,despite showing differences in rhetoric. Thus the question ofwhether conservative or professive voters supports a populistor mainstream party might depend on these moral beliefs arecommunicated.Populism and its Moral Siblings sets out newways to understand and engage these voters.

Dr. Elisabeth Wehling leads neuroscience, behavioural andcognitive-linguistic research on ideology, politics andlanguage at the International Computer Science Institute,Berkeley. Jamie Bartlett is Director of the Centre for the

Analysis of Social Media at Demos. Dr Richard Norrie is aresearcher at Demos.

ISBN 978-1-909037-82-310

Demos 2015

Documents

Wehling, E. Et Al. (2015). Populism and Its Moral Siblings. Demos, London