Tom Mullenix

PHL 301

Massie

Reviving Happiness: Epicurus’s Remedies as a Way of Modern Life

The word hedonism is met with a certain amount of stigma, both by the theological and

the irreligious. We may think of the concept as seeking constant overwhelming pleasure; a basis

for selfish action that certainly isn’t prudent, and even more so shouldn’t be considered as a

value system for our daily lives. This is not the hedonism of Epicurus. Epicureanism as a

lifestyle is one of rational prudence to determine how to get the most pleasure in life. The

followers of such a school would not be participating in the drunken revelries of a follower of

Bacchus, nor striving for power or wealth. Epicureanism, rather, is a method of adjusting our

self-perception, so that we can live a happy life, not from what we can gain, but from what we

can know. It is a system of philosophy as a therapy for life, and one that can still be used today.

Not only is Epicureanism compatible with the modern individual, but rather extremely beneficial

to the people residing in material driven society such as ours. I will show that Epicurus’s ideas

can still work today by explaining his four remedies, not only as mantras, but as a lens through

which he can view his whole philosophical system.

The four remedies (don’t fear the gods, don’t fear death, pleasure is easy to acquire, and

pain is easy to endure) are the focal point from which we view Epicurus if we are to follow his

teachings as a prudent way to live are lives. I will explain each, how they apply to life now, and

respond to the objection that the Epicurean argument against fear of death and fear of the gods is

outdated. My trajectory will be one of exposition, objection, then response, but applied to each

remedy individually.

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Don’t Fear the Gods

When told not to fear the gods, which is the first of the four remedies, this may seem a

moot point to the atheist or agnostic, or even contradictory to the religious. However, this point,

when explained by Epicurus, doesn’t necessarily necessitate a faith to a God, nor a forsaking of

your own faith. The gods of Epicurus, and he did in fact believe in the gods, “for gods do exist,

since we have clear knowledge of them,” (p. 28)1 were not the sort of deity that was known to the

Greeks at the time, or even to monotheistic congregations today. These were not gods with their

own ambitions, with wants, needs, ambitions, and plans. This god is what is defined by Epicurus

as “an indestructible and blessed animal, in accordance with the general conception of god

commonly held, and do not ascribe to god anything foreign to his indestructability or repugnant

to his blessedness.” (p. 28). This is not the kind of god that we are used to, but a perfect being

capable of preserving their own perfection, wanting for nothing. They don’t need to punish man,

or to bless man for that matter, because they are already perfect, and action towards other forces

would mean that they want for something, which means that they aren’t perfect. These gods by

definition are not to be feared, because they want nothing from you.

To the modern individual, this is quite reassuring. We don’t need to worry about some

sort of cosmic divine force intervening in our lives and making things worse. If you believe in a

god, you can be assured that they aren’t watching your sins and tallying up every wrongdoing

against you. In fact, the opposite is true. They want nothing from man, but will accept those

who are like themselves (p. 32). We can strive on then, and make our own plans, and do good

1 Note that in text citations without a stated author originate in the Epicurus Reader, Inwood and Gerson, 1994.

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deeds, not because of reward, but the promise of learning from a perfect and indestructible being

(p. 29).

The objections to this sort of attitude in the modern day are palpable and valid. For the

religious, the Christian, Jew, Muslim, or Hindu, they are taught to fear God (or the gods) out of

respect and observance of their laws.2 How then can Epicurus’ view of the gods be applicable?

Furthermore, the atheist believes in no god at all, and so they wouldn’t fear the gods anyway.

They don’t believe in a perfect and indestructible being, so why would they fear it to begin with?

How is this a remedy, rather than a relic?

The key in applying Epicureanism is not necessarily in the exact semantics contained

within his extant letters, but rather to discern the primary intent of a maxim, and the expected

consequences that follow. Here Epicurus is telling us not to fear the gods, yes, but what about

the gods would we fear? We would fear the prospect of external harm; what brings us anxiety

are things happening to us that are entirely external, that which we cannot control. What we gain

by not fearing the gods is a bravery in the face of external chaos and misfortune. At the time of

Epicurus, and throughout much of history, the fate of people, and the external events happening

to them, were thought of as the plan of the gods. To Epicurus, in writing this idea, the

machinations of the gods represent all that can happen to us beyond our control. When we truly

ponder this concept, we realize that Epicurus’s claim, “don’t fear the gods,” can truly be seen as,

“don’t fear events that you cannot control.” Here lies irrational thought. Why would you fear

that which you can’t control? What happens to you, if you cannot control it, will happen to your

regardless, so there is no merit in fearing these things, but rather, we can be mindful of them, and

plan accordingly.

2 Proverbs 1:7 and 8:13.

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We don’t have to fear a bad storm, or whether our house will be broken into, or if we’re

destined for hell, or even future events, such as finding a good career, or falling in love.

Elemental forces and the future are things that are, for the moment, external to us, so while we

don’t have to fear them, we can work our agendas and plans around them, using rationality to

guide our actions, and facilitate prudent pleasure in the face of these events. This school of

thought is just as true now as it was for the Epicureans, and can be used to counter our irrational

thoughts and anxiety.

Don’t Fear Death

Next to the famous Trilemma, this may be the most well-known argument to stem from

Epicurus, the idea that we need not fear death, because in no way should it be bad for us. This

remedy of Epicurus’s is perhaps the most useful for us, as it transcends the present, and can help

us manage common anxiety that we have about death, the greatest equalizer.

According to Epicurus, all of our fears about death being this unpleasant, terrifying void

are unfounded, due to the fact that we won’t be around to experience death. “For all good and

bad consists in self-experience, and death is the privation of self-experience.” (p. 29). We may

think of death as some sort of ultimate bad, but this idea is unfounded in the very idea of death

itself, which is the annihilation of the self, the very thing that experiences. If death is bad, then it

can’t be bad to us, because we won’t exist for that bad to happen to us. We have to begin to

believe that death is nothing to us, (p. 29) and focus on the here and now. In the present, we

aren’t dead, so death is nothing to us. Furthermore, when we are in fact dead, we don’t exist, and

nothing can be of importance to a thing that does not exist.

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We are just as mortal now as we were when Epicurus walked, albeit with a longer

lifespan. Nobody that I know of is immortal, walking around without aging. This remedy then

is still of the utmost importance and relevance to us, and must necessarily be so, because, though

much has changed in two millennia, the certainty of death has remained the same.

I can personally attest that this argument for death’s irrelevance to the mortal,

experiencing individual has the capability of being rather assuring. When truly staring down the

prospect of our permanent nonexistence, if that is in fact what death is, we begin to despair and

fret over the amount of time we have left. However, when realizing that there will be nothing in

death to harm us, and then continually meditating on this, whenever you think of death, you will

begin cut past the pandemonium, and find a calm that comes with knowing the something that is

impending in its certainty and externality is not something to live in fear of, but rather something

to live in spite of.

The immediate objection here is that, while we may not exist in death, this isn’t exactly

reassuring, because our own nonexistence, the permanent end to our sensory perceptions and our

emotions, is the very thing that we fear. There are those that do not fear harm befalling them

after death, but the very concept of annihilation, which is such a daunting thought that it begins

to consume us in a hyperventilating tailspin. Another concern regarding death’s negativity is one

held by philosopher Steven Luper, which is, when you make life to life comparisons, longer lives

are nearly always in the best interest of the individual, and a shorter life is marked worse by the

thing that cuts it short, namely death. (Luper, p. 104). According to this argumentation, we

should indeed fear death, because it is the catalyst of our sensory deprivation, which in no way

can be good, as the philosopher of death, Thomas Nagel, argues. (Nagel, p. 74-75).

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The Epicurean response to this reservation is multi-faceted. Firstly, Epicurus concedes

that, while death itself cannot be bad, the process of dying can still be bad, since it often entails

suffering, and therefore should be avoided, and (perhaps rightly) feared. Secondly, the idea of

death, the prospect of death itself can still be something unpleasant to us. (p. 39). Just as we can

fear things that don’t necessarily exists, like the Boogey-man or Darth Vader, and fear things that

will never happen to us, such as witnessing the heat death of the universe, so too can we fear the

concept of death. Epicurus is talking about being dead, annihilated, to no longer exist. While we

may still fear the concept, there is no rational basis for this fear, as nothing that we classify as

being bad can happen to us when we are dead, because there is no “us.” There is no example

where death’s badness holds up for the dead.

Take for example, my friend who fears death, and the concepts of the void. Loneliness,

the cold, experiencing nothing, drifting without anything to see, do, or experience for all of

eternity. These are the things that frighten my friend about death, and because of this, he (an

atheist) made the claim that he would rather choose the worst hell than nonexistence. However,

those negative things that he has attributed to death are by no means going to affect him when

he’s dead. Despair, fear, loneliness, the cold, and even insanity, these are afflictions that can

only harm the living, those that exist. You won’t be scared or alone in death, because there

won’t be a “you”. There is no conceivable way for death to be bad for us, because there is

nothing that we can equate to “bad” that doesn’t coincide with our experiences. (p. 32).

Lastly, we can see that Epicurus does not say that death is preferable to life. Life is

certainly better than death, because it is only in life that you can experience pleasure (p. 29).

Epicurus is merely saying that death is not bad, he is making no assumption that death is good.

Death cannot be good for us due to the same reason why death cannot be bad for us, because

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misfortune and goodness are null to the annihilated. From here we can begin to see that the fear

of death is completely irrational, though we all experience it at some points or another. Only

when using reason to guide us through this anxiety can we begin to disarm it. Otherwise, “you

delay your opportunity to rejoice. Life is ruined by delay and each and every one of us dies

without enjoying leisure.” (p. 36). By fearing, we delay the possibility of enjoying what life has

for us, and everyone dies with some of this leisure being forsaken for worry.

What is Pleasant is Easy to Attain

Even within the distinguishing of “pleasure” and “pleasant” we begin to see what sets

Epicureanism apart from some base hedonistic principle. Pleasure seems to be a sort of euphoric

feeling, a state to be reached. Meanwhile, what is pleasant seems much more innocuous, if not

noble. Indeed, for Epicurus, what is pleasant is not merely one sort of experience, but a type of

life, or a process of living that cultivates happiness. (O’Keefe, p. 2). This is not a foundationless

excuse for the lazy or the inebriated, rather finding pleasure requires an analysis of not only what

is pleasant, but also what man needs.

Epicurus qualifies types of pleasure as necessary and unnecessary, natural and unnatural

(p. 34), in accordance with what humans need. There are then three types of appetites under

Epicureanism: those that are necessary and natural, those that are natural and unnecessary, as

well as pleasure that are unnecessary and unnatural. Natural and necessary appetites are things

like food, water, and shelter. They are necessary in their value to human survival; without them

we would surely perish. Unnecessary and natural appetites are those cravings we have for

pleasures that we don’t need to survive, but are inherent within our nature, such as fancier food

or sex. The desire for these things can be tempered, as well they should. The last appetite is a

frivolous one, desiring things unnecessary and unnatural. (p. 34). Epicurus encourages that

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these kind of pleasures be avoided, as they are never truly attainable, and therefore cannot help in

the avoidance of pain, but merely in an illusory chase for pleasure that you don’t receive. These

pleasures are things like wealth, power, and fame. Indeed, the appetites are grouped in such a

way that we should always maintain the necessary and natural, allow for the unnecessary and

natural when prudent, and avoid the frivolous and “lofty” aspirations entirely (p. 35).

This remedy is the most easily supported (in its usefulness today), and the hardest to

refute, because its wisdom can be felt to such an extent that we may have heard the words of its

teachings already. We have heard things like, “live within your means,” and growing up, my

parents encouraged me to only buy things that I had the allowance for. This is only one step off

from true Epicureanism (O’Keefe, p. 7).

Truly, the only feasible objection to the applicability of a prudent sense of pleasure, that

is easy to attain, would be one based on our society’s emphasis on materialism and careers. This

crumbles just as sand; the predicament being best explained by Alan Watts. We are told, from a

young age, that finding the right college is important. Why? So you can get a good job. Why?

So you can make enough money. Why would we want to make money? So we can continue this

cycle that we have put ourselves into. Epicurus may have conceded that we are avoiding pain,

but we are doing it all as a means to achieve wealth, or power, or fame, or perhaps none of them,

rather we are doing that which we have been told we should do. Perhaps our society does in fact

encourage overindulgence, but this isn’t a necessary value to support.

How then do we remain modest in our living? Epicurus will say that a way we can

temper our frivolous appetites is to spend time with friends. (Epicurus, p. 36). In an Epicurean

system, who we are doing things with matters more than what we are doing. Eating in the

fanciest restaurant, drinking the finest wines, but doing so alone, this pales in comparison to the

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true, worthwhile happiness that you can have eating a cheap meal, laughing with your friends.

Just as the good is measured in utils for a Utilitarian, what is pleasant can be measured in the

time you spend with friends for the Epicurean.

This is especially important to remember in cases of myself and my peers. As we move

into the world, we may not be getting the job we want immediately, or we may not be living in a

nice house, but rather a Spartan apartment as we start at the bottom of the corporate food chain.

We can ourselves choose to acknowledge that setting upon the path of trying to further your

career, or trying to be the best, or attempting to make the most money, will never satisfy us. If

you want money, there will never be a point where you concede that you have enough. Someone

such as Donald Trump or Kanye West will never be satisfied with their current level of fame.

Corporations want to expand, and they never want to stop. By definition, these people and

entities cannot be happy, because if they were, they would be like the gods, complacent in what

they have, wanting of nothing. (Epicurus, p. 29). As Porphyry, an Epicurean, puts it, “many

men attain wealth, but do not find therein an escape from their problems, rather, they exchange

them for greater problems.” (p. 102). Pleasure, then, is a satisfaction in being able to live

modestly, and contentment with what you have.

We too then can achieve a level of pleasure, by having a prudent system of discerning

what is and is not good for us; what we do and don’t need. “It is impossible to live pleasantly

without living prudently... and whoever lacks this cannot live pleasantly.” (p. 32). How many

pairs of shoes do you need? Doesn’t all beer sort of taste the same? Perhaps most importantly,

aren’t we doing pretty darn well if at the very least we aren’t in pain?

Pain is Easy to Endure

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This last remedy is tied tightly with the previous one, as oftentimes the pleasure that we

find in life comes in the moments that we aren’t enduring pain. Epicurus will argue that pain, if

intense, is usually brief, and will not impede on future pleasures, as the pain you are feeling now

will subside. Chronic pain, however, is usually mild, he argues, and it does not have to impede

upon your feeling of pleasures. Therefore, you should live in fear of neither, as both are easy to

endure when put into the perspective of the kind of pleasures that you can have in spite of them.

However, the prospect of pain being easy to endure is not one that can work for everyone.

Epicurus expands that pain is either, “mild or intense, brief or chronic,” (p. VIII). However, he

does in fact acknowledge that there is chronic, intense pain, but his only treatment of this is that

it is quite uncommon. As someone with a chronic illness that does cause intense pain when it

flairs up, how can Epicureanism help me here? Should I be comforted that this pain is

temporary, and the only recompense is the annihilation of death? This then seems to be the

largest structural weakness in Epicureanism. Even if you can accept the first three remedies, as

most can, and you don’t have intense, chronic pain, as some do, how can you apply this ideology

to your life, if it can’t work for those that arguably need it most?

Here I will remain steadfast in Epicureanism’s utility, even in the face of such chronic

pain. I have had Crohn’s Disease since I was twelve or so, though it went undiagnosed and

untreated for seven years. That meant, for all of my middle school and high school years, I

would often wake up vomiting, with awful stomach aches, and not know why. These weren’t the

kind that you could shake off with some Tums. I would go days without eating, because I had no

appetite.

I mention this, not as a plea for sympathy, but to provide myself as an example of

Epicureanism, the kind that still works in spite of the worst kind of pain. I did in fact have bad

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days growing up, days where it was all I could do not to leave class and vomit in the bathroom.

This did not, however, mean that my life was defined by pain. The opposite is true in fact. The

moments where I was not in pain, the days where I felt good enough to hike or run, those days

were better for me than they are now, where I am in a time of recovery, with no pain. The good

days are even better when you face years of pain, because the state of not being in pain becomes

an intrinsic pleasure in of itself, which is something that the Epicurean Cicero acknowledges (p.

58). You cannot have pain in a time of pleasure, and you cannot have pleasure in a time of pain.

If there is no pain present, that becomes a new pleasure, and one that provides cathartic renewal.

This is something that I remember now in my time of remission, and it improves my day

immediately. The memory of the pain, juxtaposed to my life right now, with no stomach pain,

no abdominal tear from surgery, no tube in my nose and throat, immediately improves the day I

am having, regardless of the circumstances. The absence of pain is a blessing that allows me to

remember how easy it is to attain what is good, because in that moment, I have it. Even if

tomorrow I felt the pain again, it has lost its former sting, because I can live knowing it is

impermanent, and pales in the light of the simple pleasures, those of peace and companionship.

Conclusion

To what end do we use these four remedies, the focal point of Epicurean thought? Each

one, individually, can allow us to improve ourselves and improve our lives, merely by the

adjustment of our own self-perceptions. We can embolden yourself when you don’t fear the

gods or the necessary, external forces. We can live life fuller in the knowledge that we don’t

have to cheat death, as it is nothing to us. Both the young and the old can live well and die well,

knowing that the good things in life are easy to find, and are even easier to enjoy in the company

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of good friends. This companionship and simplification of what is pleasant can help us, even in

the times of pain, long or short.

These are as true now as they were for Epicurus, because these are problems we still face

today. We still fear gods, both man made and elemental, and we all still fear death, and live to

forget that fact. We all want the pleasures that are bottomless and arguably unattainable, and

perhaps worst of all, each of us feel pain. Perhaps this can lead us to the maxim that Epicurus

tells us of justice, that what is just is to do no harm and have no harm done to you. How hard

can this be, this small justice, when all each of us want is this four sided remedy? Whether or

not Epicureanism makes a revival, it can still work for the individual who seeks it. In this world,

even this nation of “truth and justice”, where there are daily mass shootings, an increasing wealth

gap, and those that lie in hospital beds suffering, I can change my perceptions of what is good,

and begin to be just to my fellow man, just as I believe others can learn to do. I have to believe

that. We have to believe that.

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Works Cited

Inwood, Brad. The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia. Indianapolis:

Hackett, 1994. Print.

O'Keefe, Tim. "The Epicureans on Happiness, Wealth, and the Deviant Craft of Property

Management." Economics and the Virtues. Print.

Luper, Steven. "Exhausting Life." (2012). Springer Science and Business Media. Print.

Nagel, Thomas. "Sixth Symposium: Death." Blackwell Publishing (1970). Print.

"Zen Pencils: Alan Watts: What If Money Was No Object?" ZEN PENCILS. 8 Jan. 2013.

Web. 7 Dec. 2015.

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