Are Videos a New Counter-Terrorism Mechanism?

The recent rise of non-traditional warfare in the Middle East, whether between regional powers or with

international powers involved in regional conflicts as well as a number of terrorist groups, appears to

have led to the advent of a new form of warfare. This new form of warfare, formed over the last few

years, is related to psychological and media wars. Although the mode of warfare itself may be new, it

depends on a traditional medium, namely video clips. These videos are posted online to achieve a

number of goals, including proving ground control, exaggerating strength, and attracting

sympathizers.

Al Qaeda can be credited for starting the trend of spreading over the internet then over television networks.

ISIS took on the strategy and started using it much more widely, showing unprecedented vulgarity in killing its

victims, and using the latest audiovisual technology to produce its videos. ISIS also went on to own its own

media operations specializing in audiovisual technology to produce highly technical and professional videos.

Varying Opinions:

Videos produced and broadcast by ISIS have raised wide speculation of their authenticity. The clear editing of

these videos, which allows them to reach the professional quality of mainstream movies, has raised questions

as to whether or not they are staged, or at least half-true.

Because of that, there has been a lot of controversy around the videos broadcast by ISIS, especially the killing

of Egyptians in Libya and the burning of Jordanian pilot Muath Al-Kasasbeh. This is in contrast to the reaction

to videos broadcast by Al Qaeda on its website, which had low video and audio quality, were filmed mostly in

caves and mountainous areas, and often showed Al Qaeda leaders clearly addressing the camera.

The controversy surrounding the authenticity of ISIS videos, as well as videos broadcast by other terrorist

groups, resurfaced when multiple reports were published showing that the US Department of Defense (the

Pentagon) had contracted in 2003 – after the invasion of Iraq – with public relations and production firms to

produce and disseminate fake Al Qaeda videos. This clearly shows the importance of this tool for terrorist

groups on one hand and for the forces engaging in anti-terrorism warfare on the other.

Two Main Goals:

The reports that uncovered the above information pointed to two main goals the Pentagon was trying to

achieve by producing these videos. First, it aimed to track individuals who watch the videos, which could be

done since watching them required logging into certain websites, allowing the tracking of devices and

therefore the tracking of users.

There is no doubt that this raises an important point that the war on terror is now taking on methods that are

unprecedented. This so-called “video weapon” is no longer the forte of terrorist organizations, which usually

use it to spread their message, whether for recruitment or proving ground presence and influence.

The second goal was to justify the war on terror and provide additional rationale and urgency for the US

military presence in Iraq. This was done by focusing the videos on Al Qaeda’s continued activities and its

attacks on vital targets in Iraq. With that focus, the videos would attract more regional and international support

for the war on terror, especially on Al Qaeda at the time, or stem the flow of anti-military-intervention

arguments in the US.

It is worth mentioning that the reports of the Pentagon videos elicited strong reactions on social media, with

many raising the question of how the object of the war – namely terrorism – can be promoted by these videos,

even with the goal of tracking confirmed or suspected terrorists, or even terrorist sympathizers.

Effective Tool

The videos that showed the execution of terrorist attacks or even threats of attacks proved to be very effective.

This is mainly attributed to the strong impact they have on the receiving public, be it supporters or detractors of

the terrorist groups disseminating the videos online.

According to experts, the most effective video was the ISIS video showing the surrender of Iraqi military

personnel to ISIS members, abandoning their vehicles on the side of the road leading to Mosul. This video had

a large impact on the fall of Mosul with little to no resistance from its residence after the video increased their

fears of standing up to an enemy military personnel had surrendered to.

There now seems to be interest in the same strategy from a number of different groups, aiming to decrease

the negative effects of terrorist group videos on public perception. For example, the US has followed this

strategy to respond to Al Qaeda attacks by filming its most prominent military activities against the group.

Multiple Motives:

In addition to the above, a number of other factors can be said to have pushed various groups to increasingly

use the video strategy. These factors include:

1-    Limiting terrorist groups’ recruitment activities: In order to address the restrictions and pressure they

are under, terrorist groups have moved towards strengthening their capabilities to communicate with their

audience and the general public. This is done through owning specialized and highly professional media

apparatuses able to spread their ideas in creative ways, showcase their activities professionally, and use them

as part of the psychological warfare against the military groups fighting them.

2-    The absence of neutral parties: The lack of neutral parties covering events in conflict zones, thanks to

the difficulty of reaching them and the high risk associated with it especially in Syria and Iraq, as well as the

absence of media correspondents, is an opportunity to increase the credibility of such videos since they are

the only source showing scenarios on the ground and cannot be easily verified.

3-    Ease of spreading: New media has helped the spread of such videos, with social media websites

becoming one of the most important battle grounds between terrorist groups and the powers fighting them.

Both parties use social media extensively to reach the largest swaths of the public due to their prevalence and

their ability to influence the audience.

Finally, it can be said that the effectiveness of videos spread across traditional and social media

makes them the tool most likely to be used in the near future. This is especially true if there is a noted

improvement in broadcasting technologies to match the current developments in media technologies.

25 october2016

From Authoritarianism to Democracy? The Future of Political Regimes

Photo:REUTERS/Alexander Demianchuk

Authoritarianism vs. democracy has long been established as part of modern Western discourse, with political transitions supposed to move linearly from one to the other. The problem is that authoritarian regimes proper – rationally organized secular autocracies – are increasingly scarce and giving way to crisis-ridden governments or fundamentalist regimes. The “bench” of countries capable of instituting a democratic transition is dwindling rapidly. The “old democracies” are facing mounting dilemmas, and prospects for regimes in major powers like China or Russia are vague.

Democracy is an inalienable attribute of every modern westerner’s identity. You will hardly find another notion that more clearly divides the modern Western political system and non-Western political systems. Democracy is an important marker separating the West from the rest. Democratic transition, in turn, has become an important component of joining the community of Western states. Democratization is an inalienable attribute of modernization and its success is closely associated with the success of the market transition.

 These postulates are continuously debated in political science. But at the level of practical politics, their Golden Age came during the third wave of democratization, mostly understood to mean the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in Central and East European post-communist countries which began during perestroika in the USSR and became irreversible after its collapse. But the third wave later froze in the post-Soviet space. Attempts to democratize the Greater Middle East were a separate trend in democratic transitions. But here they were accompanied by grave crises of statehood. In the Western

world itself, political regimes, while being spared institutional transformations, are facing serious challenges that will have to be addressed. 

World Order Or World Anarchy?   A Look at the Modern System of   International Relations

Unlike in the early 1990s, democracy today can hardly be regarded as the coveted final destination on the way to freedom and progress. The non-linear nature of politics necessitates a pragmatic vision of any political regime: democracy is increasingly approached as a means of achieving specific results rather than a goal and a value in itself. The future of democracy is vague, as is the future of the state as such. 

This vagueness breeds two temptations: first, to exonerate authoritarianism and favor order over freedom for the sake of coveted stability; second, to fight for democracy to the bitter end, destroying all opponents for the sake of the idea. Clearly, both options lead to a dead end. Democracy will stay alive and desirable as long as it remains flexible, adaptive and open. Upsetting this balance will set off a process of its degeneration, a quite real prospect both in the West and elsewhere. 

But before we speculate on the future of democracy, it is necessary to define the term itself. In the first place, democracy is a set of institutions and rules of the game. In theory, these institutions make domestic politics competitive and accountable to the public via elections, separation of powers, free media and civil society institutions. Modern democracy hinges on the nation state idea. In this state, the people are the source of sovereignty, with the democratic institutions implementing this right to the best of their ability. At the time of their inception in the late 18th and 19th century, the notions of nation state and democracy were interpreted as opposites of absolute monarchy, despotism, theocracy and any other forms of rule barring the people from participating in politics.  Properly speaking, the notion of a people or a nation as groups of politically equal citizens was also implied by the nation state concept. 

REUTERS/Yves Herman The Inevitable, Weird World

In terms of values, the nation state and democracy were products of the Enlightenment and later became the political system of modern society. Based on the values of freedom and progress, this was essentially a society of the masses, what with its mass production and consumption, mass culture and, of course, mass politics. But Enlightenment thinking is linear and holds that it is both possible and necessary to achieve the ideal state of institutions that are maximally rational and enable a rational individual to achieve maximum freedom and emancipation from traditional and religious prejudices. 

But the 20th-century record shows clearly that mass politics and institutional rationalization are far from synonymous with democracy. Highly efficient, rational and mass-scale institutions of suppression were created on behalf of the people and purportedly for its liberation. But they enslaved the individual even to a greater extent than any previously existing form of despotism. Properly speaking, the terms “authoritarianism” and “totalitarianism” mean precisely the modern forms of autocracy. As such, they are massive, rationally built mechanisms, where the role of the individual is that of a cog in the machine. At the same time, there is hardly any authoritarian or totalitarian regime that would reject the values of freedom and progress, lack formal representative institutions, or fail to advertise its popular legitimacy. 

Paradoxically, it was the constraints of rationality and the limits of rational planning and organization of complex and non-linear economic and social systems that were behind the collapse of many of these regimes, primarily the Soviet Union. At the end of the 20th century, Western democracies proved more efficient not because they were more rationally organized than the USSR. To the contrary, they avoided super-centralized rationality, wittingly or unwittingly, by distributing it to independent non-state institutions. More chaotic and distributed systems proved more efficient. Their rational surveillance of individuals was as advanced as that in authoritarian societies, but it was outside of the state monopoly as well. But their victory in the rivalry with the Soviet Union ended up playing a nasty trick on Western democracy. The Western countries themselves started regarding democracy as an immutable paragon. This belief was confirmed by the East European countries that were rather successful in making the political and economic transition and managed to integrate into Western political structures. In the final analysis, transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy came to be viewed as the world political mainstream. 

Abdulnasser Gharem, Men At Work, 2010

The Middle East: Postmodernism Is Over

But the 21st-century realities were different. An unexpected problem was that a large number of authoritarian and even totalitarian states proved that they were not what they seemed. The notion of authoritarianism turned into a banal stereotype regarded in the West as absolute evil, a category that could include a lot of totally different regimes and systems. The West’s problem was that there remained few truly authoritarian regimes based on rationality, secularism and progressive ideals. By contrast, there were increasingly more despotic regimes based on other forms of legitimacy such as religious faith, ethnicity or tribalism. This difference cannot be measured by standard methodologies like Polity IV or Freedom House indices. 

During the last two decades, the West has been enthusiastically dispatching modern autocracies with color revolutions and open invasions, thus unwittingly spawning fundamentalist autocracies of a different stripe. These autocracies can be convenient allies at some stage but in terms of values they are much farther removed from the Western principles of democracy than any of the toppled authoritarian regimes.

In this way, the West has deprived itself of its “bench” of countries capable of managing a competent transition to democracy. Rejection of democracy is emerging as a long-term trend in the non-Western and particularly Islamic world. 

Difficult dilemmas are cropping up in the Western countries themselves. On the one hand, democracy is good at absorbing shocks. Various social protests are on the rise in North America and Europe but democratic institutions are coping well in their role as safety valve. Brexit, the Trump phenomenon, the growing popularity of extreme left and extreme right movements are well within the ambit of existing formal institutions. At the same time, a number of problems are emerging, which will exert pressure on democratic regimes. 

First, the influx of migrants and refugees and growing terrorist threat are factors calling for security measures, which means stricter government control and surveillance. As a consequence, individuals will lose their autonomy and privacy and be subjected to government interference. This interference is justified by security considerations but with time these may grow increasingly vague. Protecting citizens from government arbitrariness may emerge as an issue. 

Graffiti by Banksy

Conserve and Rule: Conservatism   in the 22nd Century

Second, the concept of sovereignty will evolve as major supranational organizations develop. This refers primarily to the European Union. The erasing of borders and removal of trade barriers offered a lot of business opportunities. But this has led to imbalances inside the EU. Nation states are unable to prevent capital flight, population drain or the decay of industries whose output can be replaced by manufacturers in other countries. But they bear full responsibility before their citizens for the consequences. The same is true of European policies. Brussels may implement ambitious projects but if they fail, it is the national governments that will pay the political price. They are caught in a vice between the European bureaucracy, transnational companies, international financial institutions and their own citizens who are losing their jobs and prospects. The Greek crisis has laid bare these contradictions. The European democracies will have to adapt to the EU’s growing role. 

Third, there are political crises in the European periphery. For example, a military coup attempt in Turkey and the government’s subsequent harsh clampdown called into question the claim that NATO is a commonwealth of democratic states. The Ukrainian crisis is forcing the old democracies to support a government that is not averse to harsh and extraordinary measures either. All of this is reason enough to denounce their double standards and serves to erode the legitimacy of democracy as a project for other countries. 

Fourth, the new generation of voters with its standoffish attitude to traditional ideologies and parties and fundamentally new media environment is a puzzle in its own right. The new generation is unlikely to opt for any form of autocracy. But it won’t buy the old institutions and ideologies either. 

There are quite a few questions with regard to the future of the political regime in major non-Western countries. How will the political regime change in the People’s Republic of China? Will it become democratized to promote further economic growth? How will democracy fare in India, which until recently was almost an example for non-Western societies? Will political regimes in Latin America remain stable? 

The big question is the future of the political regime in Russia. The West has continually dismissed the Russian regime as an autocracy. But this explains neither its nature, nor its possible transformation. The historical point of bifurcation that Russia will face is much more difficult than choosing between democracy and autocracy. Primarily this is about solving the paradox of globalization that forces countries to choose between sovereignty and security, on the one hand, and integration into a global world, on the other. In Russia’s case, these two agendas are clearly contradictory. We are consolidating our statehood and sovereignty to the detriment of our prospects in the global world (in the 1990s, we were enthusiastically doing the opposite). 

The issue of democracy in Russia’s case is closely connected with this dilemma. There is demand for democracy in Russian society. And it is intimately related to a similar demand for openness to the outside world. But there is a no less powerful demand to keep a distance from it, particularly from the West, demand for a “strong hand,” “stability and order.” It’s clearly too early to say which of these competing demands will prevail in the end. Russia’s short-term objective is to institutionalize this dispute and prevent it from reaching the stage of revolutions, social upheavals and repressions. It doesn’t matter what this process will be called by foreign observers – democratization, authoritarian modernization or anything else. The important thing is to have efficient mechanisms for competition, transfer of power and feedback. All other scenarios will come at a heavy price.

Ivan Timofeev leads the program “Contemporary State” at Valdai Discussion Club. Also he has been a Director of Programs at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) since 2011.

First in published in Valdai Discussion Club.

24 october2016

Lebanese People Awaiting Breakthrough Solutions

Photo:REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir Christian politician and FPM founder MichelAoun talks during a news conference next to Lebanon's former prime minister Saad al-Haririafter he said he will back Aoun to becomepresident in Beirut, Lebanon October 20, 2016

The Lebanese political field does not seem to show any signs of a transition to a phased solution of the key problems facing the country – that is, the crisis of the legislative and executive branches, social security issues, economic hardship, unemployment, refugees, etc. Yet serious shifts are under way beneath the surface that seem to promise an early change of the landscape.

Lebanon’s Bipolar Sructure is Melting Down

It is time to admit that the habitual division of Lebanon’s leading political forces into two camps that appear to be on opposite sides of the barricades is not helpful when trying to sort out the events in this small country that is the key to understanding the Middle East. The parties within the March 14 and 8 March 8 alliances are increasingly seen to have more businesslike and trusting relations with their formal political opponents than within the alliance (as highlighted by the relations between Almustaqbal and El Marada). And, of course, the artificial principle of political affiliation on confessinal grounds does not work, at least not for Christians: the Maronites have long been members of both alliances and the Lebanese Orthodox believers are members of different parties on both sides of the ephemeral “March barrier.” The same is true (with some reservations) of Armenians. The key divisive factor – the memory of Syria’s presence in Lebanon – has long receded into the past. The relationship with one of the virtual regional blocs (pro-Saudi and pro-Iranian) is now more relevant, but it too does not correlate with the interests, for example, of Lebanese Christians and hardly corresponds to the internal Sunni–Shia relations.

The key divisive factor – the memory of Syria’s presence in Lebanon – has long receded into the past. The relationship with one of the virtual regional blocs (pro-Saudi and pro-Iranian) is now more relevant.

Political life in Lebanon became noticeably more lively at the end of summer and autumn of 2016. In early October, the political world was shaken by the proposal of the Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to make the election of the country’s president conditional on the prior agreement on the distribution of seats in the future government and on the principles of a new electoral law. The proposal of a “package deal” coming from a champion of electing a president early was met with protest in various Maronite circles.

APParliament Speaker Nabih Berri

The sharpest reaction came from the camp of Michel Aoun, which characterized the proposal as Nabih Berri’s attempt to block the election of General Aoun to the top post. Indeed, a row broke out in the government between the representatives of the Amal Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) – Ministers Ghazi Zeaiter and Elias Bou Saab respectively. Incidentally, in September, the latter, together with FPM’s young leader, Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil (and apparently with the support of Dashnaktsutyun party) boycotted a cabinet meeting in response to the extension of the powers of Army Commander Jean Qahwagi, a decision the Movement opposed.

The protest against Nabih Berri’s proposal was joined by the head of the Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea who declared at a meeting in Bkirki that the initiative ran counter to the constitution and noted that Michel Aoun had not approached Saad al-Hariri with any kind of offer.

The Maronite Church was also outraged by the offer of a “comprehensive deal.” The Pontifical Council headed by Patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rahi also assessed the Speaker’s proposal as unconstitutional and probably politically illegitimate.

There is no doubt that Russia would like to see a speedy resolution to Lebanon’s main domestic political problems, since they are closely linked with the Syria problem.

However, Nabih Berri’s arguments were simple: the long-drawn-out political crisis was crying for an early solution, and agreement among the main forces on the presidential candidate was obviously linked with other key issues – the distirbution of portfolios in the future cabinet, compromise on the parliamentary election law and the appointment of key army and security ministers. Thus, the Speaker proposed to “settle the issue amicably” without waiting for a spate of further rows after the election of the president.

What prompted the long-time Amal leader, an experienced politician, to play so openly? Is there reason to expect early changes in Lebanon?

New Decisions on Old Initiatives

Michel Aoun’s controversial, overly independent and even unpredictable figure may, in the eyes of his enemies, including those abroad, have a negative impact on the country’s future if he is elected.

It is true that the main political parties and movements inside Lebanon have been more active recently. The Kataeb Party came up with a high-profile programme and its leader Samy Gemayel visited Moscow in late summer. The project of sweeping decentralization proposed by the falangists would divide the country into cantons along confessional lines and cover all the spheres of governance, as well as the system itself. Kataeb activists tried to score political points for their party by various means, including such unorthodox methods as picketing landfills and rubbish dumps in some parts of Beirut, apparently hoping to focus the attention of residents of central districts on the problem of the pollution of mountainous areas, which are traditionally inhabited by Christians.

Suleiman Frangieh, the leader of the Marada Movement and a representative of the Maronite dynasty who was nominated as a compromise presidential candidate in late autumn of 2015, has not given up his presidential ambitions. He says he would never yield to his powerful rival, Michel Aoun; incidentally, both candidates officially belong to the March 8 Alliance.

EPA / NABIL MOUNZERLebanon: A New Dead End or a Way Forward?

By contrast, another prominent Maronite leader who had his eyes on the presidency, Samir Geagea (of the March 14 Alliance), has practically withdrawn from the race in favour of General Michel Aoun. A year-and-a-half of intense rivalry ended in January 2016 with the Lebanese Forces party declaring that Michel Aoun should be president. The main intrigue thus revolves around the possible election of Michel Aoun to the top post, which is still reserved for the Maronites. All signs point to the fact that he has the support of the respected Sunni politician Saad Hariri.

The leader of Almustaqbal party continues to insist on the need for an early agreement on the presidential candidate, and Hariri’s idea now sounds in absolute unison with the wishes of Michel Aoun (who was to blame for the disruption of all 40 or so parliamentary sessions that were convened to elect a president). If it is true that these politicians from different camps have indeed made some kind of deal, then the following statement by Ibrahim Kanaan, member of parliament and part of the inner circle of the FPM’s founder, would not come as a surprise: “We are witnessing a very positive initiative by Hariri to solve the presidential vacuum... thus we call on rival political factions to allow his efforts to succeed.”

There is no doubt that Russia would like to see a speedy resolution to Lebanon’s main domestic political problems, since they are closely linked with the Syria problem.

Incidentally, in early October Saad Hariri met with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov behind closed doors in Moscow, where he probably discussed the internal Lebanese agenda. There is no doubt that Russia would like to see a speedy resolution to Lebanon’s main domestic political problems, since they are closely linked with the Syria problem. This is borne out by other close contacts of Lebanese circles (including those linked to the FPM) with special representative of the President of the Russian Federation to the Middle East and Africa, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov.

“Lebanese Syrians:” Let Them Stay or Send Them Back?

Meanwhile, the focus remains on the Syrian crisis and its immense impact on the neighbouring Lebanon. First, Islamists continue their attempts to undermine the fragile equilibrium in Lebanon. This includes individual militant groups crossing the border – groups that the Lebanese army is fighting with effective help from Hezbollah units. Second, isolated incidents involving members of large terrorist groups fighting in Iraq and Syria are taking place in the interior regions of Lebanon. Increasingly, these people target Palestinian camps (especially the Ain al-Hilweh camp, where a mutiny broke out in the summer of 2007). Third, there is the problem of refugees from Syria, Iraq and Palestine. Only around 1.1 million of them have been registered, but their total number, according to the most conservatie estimates, is over 1.7 million. An high-profile French statistical agency put the total population of Lebanon at 6.2 million in 2015.

REUTERS/Mohamed AzakirThe Lebanese Front

One might have expected the sharp growth of the number of refugees in the country to provoke widesread protests among the local population. But this has not been the case, as the people have sympathy for them. However, discontent is expressed over the inaction of politicians in ensuring that the refugees return to their home countries. The Lebanese people legitimately fear that the stay of the refugees, who make up more than a third of the population, will be prolonged, a burden the country’s economy would be unable to sustain. In addition, this would complicate social relations and make the country more financially dependent on international institutions.

Still, plans for the phased return of refugees to their home countries are being announced, provoking, the usual storm of criticism. The plans are advocated above all by Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil (the head of FPM) and Labour Minister Sejaan Azzi (Vice President of Kataeb). The latter is the author of a two-year programme to return refugees to their places of residence as hostilities there come to an end. The leaders think that any suggestions of naturalizing refugees and giving them permanent jobs, allegedly coming from various international organizations, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, should be rejected. Characteristically, local representatives of the UNHCR and Human Rights Watch are the main critics of the initiative put forward by Maronite politicians.

Meanwhile, clashes beween the locals and refugees are already taking place (for example, the incident on September 20, 2016 at Dawhat Aramoun, 22 kilometres south of the capital). Unless coordinated decisions are taken, further politicization of the Syrian refugees issue can be expected. The overwhelming majority of the refugees are Sunni Muslims and, of course, Christian leaders cannot be indifferent to the dramatic fall of the share of Christians in the country due to the influx of Muslims from abroad.

For the Good of Lebanon?

REUTERS/Mohamed AzakirA general view shows tents of Syrian refugeeson the outskirts of the Lebanese town of Arsal,near the border with Syria, LebanonSeptember 21, 2016

The question remains as to whether presidential candidate Michel Aoun, who has garnered a lot of support, has a coherent political programme. At first glance the answer has to be yes, he has. For example, he is advocating his own version of the electoral law reformproposed in its time by the Orthodox Assembly, which now boils down to this: the country is a single constituency and elections are held according to confessional quotas. Equally drastic measures are proposed with regard to the refugee problem, social reforms and other high-priority matters. However, many of these proposals have prevented him from being approved as s candidate, including by “foreign partners.” Therefore, Michel Aoun’s controversial, overly independent and even unpredictable figure may, in the eyes of his enemies, including those abroad, have a negative impact on the country’s future if he is elected.

The people of Lebanon have been waiting far too long for its rulers to make decisions on the pressing issues in the life of the country in the extremely complicated regional conditions. Let us hope that the exit from the drawn-out political impasse will not be contradictory, that it will not exacerbate social relations in the country, and that it will not affect Lebanon’s position in the world. Perhaps the signs of a commitment to finding a consensus within the country owes something to fact that outside pressure has eased somewhat. Could it be that it is somehow connected with the ambiguous position in which Saudi Arabia (the main ally of March 14) found itself as a result of the fighting in Yemen? Or perhaps it is an indirect reflection of the West’s attempt to get political mileage out of the contraditions between Iran and Saudi Arabia? This is borne out by the rumblings of discontent among pro-Sunni analysts, notably from Alsharq Al-Awsat. In any case, the important thing is that the dynamic intercommunal equilibrium in Lebanon remains stable in the face of external challenges and that the geopolitical factor mixed with religious implications does not exert a destructive influence on this sturdy state.

26 october2016

Electoral Battles in Moldova

Photo:REUTERS/Gleb Garanich

On October 30, Moldova will for the first time since 1996 elect its president in a nationwide vote. Previously, until 2000, the president was elected by a qualified parliamentary majority, three-fifths of the total number of deputies. However, on 4 of March, 2016 the Republic’s Constitutional Court annulled the amendment to the country’s main law. In June the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission) approved the bill on changing the Electoral Code thus reverting to the former mechanism of electing the head of state through direct nationwide vote. Although they formally espouse European values, Moldovan deputies did not agree with all the Venice Commission recommendations. For example, they rejected the Commission’s proposal to cut the age qualification (to 35 years) for presidential candidates. Under the current Electoral Code the head of state has to be a person not younger than 40 years of age who has lived in the country for at least ten last years and has command of the official language. The parliament deputies also rejected the Venice Commission recommendation on increasing the number of polling stations abroad. This, according to expert Valery Ostalep, a prioriputs Moldavan citizens living abroad at a disadvantage. An estimated million Moldovan citizens work outside the country, with about 60—70% of them working in Russia.

The duration of the presidential campaign has been reduced from two months to one which objectively plays into the hands of the oligarchs who have a lot more resources, including the media, to organize large-scale campaigning for their candidates. Those who do not have such resources are unlikely to be able to do anything within a month. Moldova has four TV channels and three radio stations owned by the Vice Chairman of the ruling Democratic Party who is the “shadow” boss of Moldova, V. Plakhotnyuk.

It has to be noted that the course of the election campaign in Moldova is being closely watched not only in the EU, but also in Washington, which, as usual, is trying to orchestrate it.

Although officially 12 candidates take part in the electoral campaign (A. Nastase and I. Popenko have for various reasons dropped out of the presidential race), realistically there are only three credible candidates: Igor Dodon, leader of the Socialist Party; Marian Lupu, the head of the Democratic Party; and Maia Sandu, who leads the Action and Solidarity Party. Andrei Nastase, leader of the Dignity and Truth Platform, one of the realistic contenders for the presidential post on the right side of the political spectrum backed the candidacy of Maia Sandu at the eleventh hour.

The European People’s Party led by I. Leanca, should have been an alternative pro-European political project. However, by August of 2016 there was no trace left of the imagined opposition leanings of the European People’s Party. On 29 of July Iurie Leanca signed an agreement on “National Partnership” with the ruling coalition and was given the symbolic post of chairman of the Parliamentary Council for European Integration. Iurie Leanca faces two tasks in the electoral race, according to Bogdan Tirdea. First, he has to pull all the plugs out to criticize the leader of the left political segment, Igor Dodon. Secondly, he has to “snatch votes from the leader of DA Platform Andrei Nastase so that he could campaign for the establishment candidate Marian Lupu in the second round”. This will also be the job of the majority of candidates of the political right.

a-tv.mdIgor Dodon

For example, this role will be played by the leader of the Liberal Party M. Ghimpu, he is to deliver information attacks on Igor Dodon and Maia Sandu. Because an information attack against opponents will be launched not by the representatives of the Democratic Party the latter would not be open to charges of abusing media resources. I. Leanca and M. Ghimpu for their part will labour in favour of V. Plakhotnyuk’s regime because this is the only guarantee that after the opposition comes to power they would not be charged with abuses and damaging the state during the rule of Euro-integrators.

Although M. Sandu belongs to “right-wing opposition” and demands the removal of the oligarchy regime, she supports the Euro-integration course of the Republic’s development. It has to be noted that the course of the election campaign in Moldova is being closely watched not only in the EU, but also in Washington, which, as usual, is trying to orchestrate it. One notes the statement by American Ambassador J. Pettit in which he effectively ruled out the possibility of Moldova uniting with Romania. The statement had great resonance, but it is controversial. It is true that Washington is not anxious to confront the far-reaching consequences for the geopolitical situation in the region that this process may trigger. On the other hand, the American Ambassador’s statement can be seen as a tactical move aimed at not scaring away voters with the unionist views of pro-European candidates (notably M. Sandu).

Along with other leaders of the pro-European coalition he is responsible for the systemic crisis in the country, which objectively weakens his electoral chances.

It has to be said that the Constitutional Court decision to reintroduce direct elections of the President was passed on 4th March in the wake of the March 2 visit to Chisinau by assistant US Secretary of State B. Brink; just like the government of Pavel Filip was hastily approved on 20 January 2016 after the visit to Romania by assistant US Secretary of State V. Nuland. The fact that Maia Sandu has strong support from the USA and the European Union shows that she is the second (stand-by) candidate after Marian Lupu if the latter fails to make it to the second round because Euro-integrators are extremely unpopular in Moldova.

M. Lupu embodies the current corrupt political regime being the protégé of the odious oligarch V. Plakhotnyuk. Along with other leaders of the pro-European coalition he is responsible for the systemic crisis in the country, which objectively weakens his electoral chances. One important miscalculation of the ruling class on the eve of elections was that after the high-profile scandal with the disappearance of a billion euros from three state-owned banks, the government of Moldova recently passed a package of laws one of which would make the ordinary people bear the brunt of repaying the state debt resulting from the “robbery of the century”. This unpopular measure will certainly be held against M. Lupu as the formal representative of the ruling regime. So, M. Lupu has little chance of winning in an honest duel. However, it has to be remembered that today the Democratic Party has the most powerful administrative and media resource among all the participants in the electoral rate. The party has over 50,000 members and 43 territorial organizations. Democrats or their appointees head up 20 regions and 384 cities across the country which provides them with a powerful administrative resource.

gagauzinfo.mdMarian Lupu

That puts into question the chances of an outright victory for I. Dodon although the latest polls confirm that I. Dodon whose personal approval rating exceeds the combined ratings of all the other main candidates, is a clear favourite in the electoral race. The reason for the popularity of I. Dodon in the Republic is not his alleged “pro-Russian” attitude, but the steadfastness with which he upholds the priorities of his programme: Moldova’s statehood; its neutrality; diversified foreign policy which implies restored relations with Russia; the strengthening of Moldovan identity; a robust economy, etc. At the same time the West, viewing I. Dodon as a “pro-Russian” politician will go out of its way to prevent his victory in the elections which lends a distinct geopolitical character to the election campaign.

Another feature of the campaign is that it is even less democratic than the November 2014 elections for parliament, which means that there will be large-scale vote-rigging. The problem of “dead souls” has become a time bomb. The results of the 2014 census have still not been published. From the results of the first Academy of Sciences’ demographic barometer unveiled in the summer of 2015 the country’s population stands at 2.9 million. However, the number of registered eligible voters on the CEC lists is 3.2 million.

Although the latest polls confirm that I. Dodon whose personal approval rating exceeds the combined ratings of all the other main candidates, is a clear favourite in the electoral race.

The second problem is the distribution of polling stations. The authorities, knowing that more than half of the total number of Moldavan émigrés (700,000) work in Russia, have decided to open there just 8 polling stations. Meanwhile about a hundred stations will be opened in the Western countries where Moldovans are in favour of rapprochement with the EU. The decision was passed in spite of numerous protests over the results of the parliamentary elections in November 2014 when only 15,000 Moldovans were able to vote in Russia. By way of comparison, in Romania where the number of Moldovans at the time was twelve times less than in Russia, eleven polling stations were opened.

This situation, which challenges universally accepted democratic norms persists although the PACE mission (a sympathizer of the current authorities) which recently visited the Republic flagged many problems in the course of the election campaign. They include the opaque system of financing parties and election campaigns, including from abroad; monopolization of the media market and lack of transparency in financing the media; the role of oligarchic structures in the country’s political life, especially in the electoral process. The mission was told about abuses and the use of administrative resources in collecting signatures in support of Democratic Party candidate, M. Lupu. The staff of a number of government enterprises were forced to sign in support of his candidacy.

canal3.mdMaia Sandu

Another feature of the election campaign was that it was boycotted by some political parties and movements, notably the Communist Party. The reason for this is that according to forecasts, V. Voronin, former President and permanent head of the Communist Party, can hope to garner 5—6% of the votes. For V. Voronin, such a result, after his poor performance in the parliamentary elections in November 2016 would be not just a humiliation, but a political catastrophe. It has to be noted that after the 2014 parliamentary elections the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova has practically withdrawn from the protest movement against the pro-European oligarchic regime. Indeed the Communist Party has lately drawn closer to the Democratic Party and launched a vigorous propaganda campaign against the largest and most influential left-wing opposition party, the Socialist Party and against Igor Dodon personally.

Yet another feature of the election campaign was that the left-wing opposition has failed to unite and rally behind a single candidate, Igor Dodon. If the Our Party candidate D. Chubashenko whose latest approval rating is about 7%, withdrew his candidacy, I. Dodon would almost certainly win in the first round.

The outcome of the second round will largely depend on the mood in the outskirts of large cities and in rural areas where the majority of the population lives.

If this does not happen in the remaining time, then in the opinion of the majority of experts a second round would be inevitable. The candidates most likely to make it to the second round are: I. Dodon on one side and M. Lupu or M. Sandu on the other side. To prevent I. Dodon from winning the ruling regime has pressed into service a powerful media and administrative resource. The outcome of the second round will largely depend on the mood in the outskirts of large cities and in rural areas where the majority of the population lives. One should also bear in mind that in the local elections of 2015 most of the winners in the Republic’s regions represent the parties of the ruling coalition.

Should I. Dodon win in the second round, events may follow the scenario of 2009 when the losing pro-European side resorted to mass protests and demanded a revote. In this way it effectively stole victory from V. Voronin bringing off another “colour” revolution scenario.

The situation of the shadow “boss” of Moldova, V. Plakhotnyuk is determined by the fact that on 28 September a resolution was introduced at the US Congress condemning corruption in Moldova and proposing sanctions against the country’s leadership including V. Plakhotnyuk. In this situation V. Plakhotnyuk would settle for nothing less than the victory of his own man, M. Lupu. It may happen that V. Plakhotnyuk, under external pressure would have to agree to the candidacy of M. Sandu for whom he has little liking. All these circumstances make the electoral battles in Moldova quite a tense period.

U.S. Diplomacy in the Shackles of Election Politics

Photo:REUTERS/Rick Wilking

In just two weeks the United States of America will elect its new president. According to many politicians and observers, the campaign is unprecedentedly vicious, while the confrontation with Russia emerges perhaps as one of the key issues. However, no matter who wins the race – either Democrat Hillary Clinton or Republican Donald Trump – Washington and Moscow will have to construct a pragmatic dialogue since it affects both their own wellbeing and global security, comments former Russian Foreign Minister and RIAC President Igor Ivanov in a recent interview to RIA Novosti News Agency.

— In a few days Americans will elect their new president. Which of the two candidates do you see as the likely winner?

— I would not risk answering this question. The campaign is exceptionally ferocious, practically no holds barred. Hence, either of them still might spring a surprise that would turn the tables.

— Do you have a preference as far as Mr. Trump and Ms. Clinton are concerned?

— Whether you like it or not, the United States is still the world’s leading power. No matter who wins the presidency, that person will immediately take over the immense responsibility both for the future of the country and the entire world. I've always thought we must be able to work with any U.S. administration. I do still think so.

— It takes two to build a constructive bilateral relationship. Judging by the way the Russian card is being played during the campaign, does it seem timely to prepare for the worst-case scenario?

— Any election campaign is targeted only to win. Regrettably, it so happens that long-term foreign interests frequently fall victim to the immediate interests of the domestic politics. And this is something we are seeing in the U.S. right now. During recent months American diplomacy appears to have been shackled by the election campaign and has to keep the November 8 outcome in mind, which is especially evident in Washington's approach to the Syria conflict. I do hope things change for the better after the vote.

REUTERSRussian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov talks toU.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell as they hold a press conference after their meeting atthe Russian ambassador's residence in Paris,April 12, 2001

— In what way is it going to affect the Russia-US relations?

— Any campaign boils down to voting, with the winner facing a harsh reality after. And the reality dictates that unless Russia and the United States are getting ready for self-destruction, they have to build a pragmatic dialogue as it determines both their own wellbeing and global security.

— Do you think a dialogue is still possible after all that has been said in the recent months?

— To prove my point, let's take up my own foreign-ministerial experiences. George W. Bush officially became the 43rd president of the USA on January 20, 2001. In less than two months Russian Ambassador Yuri Ushakov was invited to the US Department of State and was familiarized with Washington's decision to expel over 50 Russian diplomats. Through such actions the new administration meant to test Moscow's strength and show its place in the new world order that Washington was going to establish.

— And what was Moscow's response?

— As soon as the news reached Moscow, President Putin immediately gathered his security chiefs for a meeting that decided to take reciprocal measures without any delay. The US Ambassador James Collins was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and handed a list of U.S. diplomats chosen to leave Russia.

The next day I was informed that Secretary of State Colin Powell was willing to urgently discuss something by phone. As a matter of fact, we had never met before. As soon as the call began, Mr. Powell in a military style (he had a long military career as JCS Chairman) asked: "How shall we handle the matter?" I answered that we did not have many options. We either keep expelling diplomats and our embassies will soon be deserted, or we launch a serious dialogue on building a relationship taking into account each other’s legitimate interests. In the long run, we agreed to meet, wasting no time.

REUTERSU.S. President George W. Bush shares a laughwith Russian President Vladimir Putin as the twoanswer questions at the Crawford High School inCrawford, Texas November 15, 2001

We met in Paris in early April, and had a very sincere and constructive talk, just in the manner for all further encounters with Colin Powell, an outstanding politician and remarkable man with whom I still maintain a very cordial relationship.

We came to the conclusion that the small-steps tactics would not defuse the crisis in our relationship, and the negative dynamics could be reversed only by a powerful political impulse emanating from the two presidents. We agreed to offer our presidents a meeting as soon as possible on a neutral territory without a fixed agenda. The aim was not to solve any sort of current bilateral problems but to show that the two great powers would not return to the Cold War practices and were ready for a serious equal dialogue on a broad range of bilateral and international matters. Presidents Putin and Bush Jr. approved our initiative, and on June 17, 2011 the two leaders met in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The media reported that they "got the sense of each other's soul", opening an important page in the history of the bilateral relations.

— And what was the conclusion?

— After the Ljubljana summit it became clear that personal relations between the two presidents were going to play a serious role in the bilateral relationship. And the world could see that on September 11, 2001, when President Putin turned out to be the first world leader to call President Bush and harshly condemn the unprecedented act of international terrorism on American territory. Addressing the people of the United States on behalf of Russia, President Putin said: "We entirely and fully share and experience your pain. We support you."

REUTERS/Whitney CurtisU.S.-Russia Relations and the U.S. PresidentialElection

Two months later President Putin came to the U.S. on his first state visit there. In his turn, President Bush visited Moscow to take part in celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, giving credit to the enormous heroism of the Soviet people.

The two presidents regularly met, held talks, spoke by phone and exchanged messages. The two states did have quite a few differences, some of them very sharp, suffice it to remember the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty or the Iraq war. Nevertheless, the presidential relations formed a stabilizing factor that prevented confrontation.

— Historical analogies are really entertaining. But could they be reproduced now?

— Providing an example from the recent past, I mean to say that the political will and clear vision of long-term national interests may tackle any conundrum. As for Russia-US relations, one should add the special mission of the two presidents. This factor has always worked before, and will remain sizeable in the future.

First published at RIA Novosti website.