UNTIF 2018 Starter Pack 2 NEG

Case

Solvency

1NC Frontline

1. Ending detention causes a shift to disciplinary techniques like ankle bracelets and house arrest – the aff can’t solveHernandez, 15 [Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia, End Immigration Detention, But Don’t Create a Back Door to Confinement, http://crimmigration.com/2015/05/21/end-immigration-detention-but-dont-create-a-back-door-to-confinement/]Where the Times went wrong, however, is in calling for replacing immigration detention “with something better.” It points to the existing alternatives to detention program that ICE runs as an example of what the editorial board has in mind. “Supervised or conditional release, ankle bracelets and other monitoring technologies, plus community-based support with intensive case management, can work together to make the system more humane,” the Times wrote.There is no denying that it’s much better to walk around town with an electronic bracelet slapped to your ankle than sitting behind barbed wire locked inside an immigration prison. The bracelet at the very least lets you sleep in your own bed alongside family and friends.As a matter of public policy, ATDs are also cost effective. At a low of 17 cents per day for telephonic monitoring and a high of $8.37 for telephonic, GPS, and in-person case management, the current ATD regime sometimes literally represents pennies to the dollar of immigration detention (which averages about $158 per day). Despite the low cost, ATDs are very successful when measured by the two justifications traditionally given: ensuring appearance at court dates and not endangering the public. Of the 40,452 people enrolled in an ATD program in fiscal year 2012, for example, only 851 absconded and 705 were arrested by another law enforcement agency.Despite these successes, alternatives to detention that rely on high-tech surveillance are no panacea for the many problems of over enforcing immigration law. In some ways, the electronic ATDs currently in ICE’s toolbox might even exacerbate the vitriolic rhetoric that demonizes migrants.Under the guise of detention alternatives, ICE has expanded its reach into migrants’ lives even when it has no sound basis to do so. It would be one thing if ICE imposed supervision requirements only on migrants who it had reason to believe were dangerous or posed a flight risk. That’s not what it does.Instead, ICE uses ATDs to expand the net of carceral control. Rather than release people outright, alternative sanctions are often handed out to people who would typically have been allowed to go about their lives free of government intrusion. As an investigation by the Center for American Progress recently disclosed, ICE regularly detains individuals who its own risk assessment system recommends for release. If it keeps people locked up who it has no reason to think pose a public safety threat or flight risk, then it’s reasonable to assume that they’re doing the same with ATDs: people are being subjected to supervision requirements when there’s no reason to do so. The likelihood is that they’re going to show up for court dates and live a peaceable life without electronic intrusiveness.Imposing supervision orders on people who don’t merit them wouldn’t be unheard of for immigration law enforcement agencies. ICE’s predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, did just that with a pilot ATD initiative that the Vera Institute for Justice operated on its behalf in the mid-1990s.There are multiple problems with subjecting people to supervision unnecessarily. First, it’s demeaning. Walking around with an ankle bracelet, having to visit a reporting site

periodically, or checking in by phone suggests that being suspected of violating immigration law isn’t just impermissible as a matter of law, but that it’s morally deviant. To be caught in ICE’s crosshairs is to be marked as dangerous—even when no indicia of dangerousness are to be found. At bottom, government supervision implies that the person being watched isn’t worthy of being trusted. It strips migrants subjected to this persistent governmental gaze of the dignity of personal autonomy.Second, ICE’s ATD practice is troubling because it sets up migrants to get locked up for failure to comply with supervision requirements. State and federal criminal law enforcement authorities have long used probation, parole, and other alternatives to criminal incarceration as what Anil Kalhan referred to as “‘alternatives to release’ rather than true ‘alternatives to detention’.” People who would’ve been let free were instead placed under some type of supervision that required that they comply with strict orders. This is fine so long as everything goes well. But such is not life. Instead, people ordered to comply with some kind of non-confinement form of supervision frequently fail to do so for a host of reasons—appointments with parole officers are missed because of transportation obstacles, meeting supervision requirements makes it difficult to find or keep a job, new minor offenses result in substantial confinement for the old offense, and more.

2. Respectability politics DA – you only care about asylum seekers, pertuating the dichotomy between “safe” and “criminal” that the aff seeks to solveSharpless, 16 [Rebecca, Clinical Professor and Roger Schindler Fellow at the University of Miami School of Law, “Immigrants are not criminals”: respectability, immigration reform, and hyperincarceration, Houston Law Review, 53 Hous. L. Rev. 691, Lexis]When immigration reformers focus solely on immigrants without criminal records (or just minor ones), they perpetuate the respectable immigrant narrative. They reduce noncitizens with significant criminal records to irredeemable others - legitimate targets for enforcement. The focus on respectability makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to argue that immigrants with a significant criminal record should be given an opportunity to remain in the United States. But the harms extend beyond the effect on excluded individuals. The respectable immigrant narrative deepens the link between crime control and immigration enforcement, reifies our carceral state, and endorses extant societal inequalities that foster criminal activity. The failure to challenge overly punitive practices directed at immigrants with significant criminal convictions perpetuates the individual, familial, community, monetary, and structural harms of our massive criminal and immigration enforcement systems. Because immigrants with criminal records lie at the intersection of our criminal and immigration enforcement systems, they experience the individual and collective harms of both regimes.

3. No solvency – State-based attempts to reform immigration law are futile because any attempt at change within the law only plays into the hands of globalization and makes the problem worse. Yegenoglu, 3 [Meyda, Department of Sociology at the Middle East Technical University, "Liberal Multiculturalism and the Ethics of Hospitality in the Age of Globalization," Postmodern Culture 13.2] To answer this question--to understand the dynamic by which the "right to have rights" or the "right to have politics" of minorities and foreigners is regulated and hence limited through institutionalized multiculturalism and through the granting of a set of rights guaranteed by

law--it is useful to turn to (and to revise) Antonio Negri's conception of constituent and constitutive power as articulated in Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State. I have already suggested, following Zizek, that it is through liberal multiculturalist institutional and juridical regulations that the post-national global order renders its global universalizing tendency indiscernible and thereby forecloses the possibility for a right to have politics or democratic politics. But does the current global management of the conditional and legal hosting of immigrants mean that any change in the law or any attempt to modify the law will by definition play into the hands of the forces of globalization? Can the legal conditions of hospitality or laws on immigration be improved? The analysis that Negri offers regarding the relation between constitutive and constituent power seems to imply that any attempt to improve or challenge the law is a vain effort; that it's futile to attempt to replace existining laws with better ones. For any politics that remains within the purview of law is doomed to fail as it implies suffocation of democratic politics through constitutional arrangements. After a brief discussion of the analysis Negri offers and its limitations, I will discuss Derrida's deconstructive reading of the relation between law and justice on the one hand and conditional and unconditional hospitality on the other hand and suggest that the latter offers a radically different opening ofpolitics.7

4. The affirmation of vulnerability is politically disastrous – it becomes the grounds for paternalism over powerless victims. This proves that people won’t all embrace their shared vulnerability – most folks will use it to dominate others. Code, 6 [Lorraine, Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy/Social & Political Thought at York University, February 2006, online: http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/gradschool/psafem/pdf/VulnerabilityParticularity.pdf]Yet bringing women’s vulnerability into political discourses of social transformation has its own risks: vulnerability carries a certain shame, a product of the ontological effects of an autonomy veneration for which human beings are dispassionate creatures, moved neither by vulnerabilities nor by pleasures and desires. Hence, there is a danger of pathologising women’s bodies and their lives, in the ways feminists know - and distrust - so completely; a danger of making space for a new paternalism. Shame attaches, in part, to the fact that vulnerability declared can involve asking for help, advocating help for vulnerable others, recognizing how little is possible without advocacy - knowledge, reciprocity, listening, negotiation, justice in a social order where, allegedly, everyone can and should achieve self-sufficiency. Thus, to enter these deliberations well, the discussion has to distance itself, from the outset, from any sense that vulnerability is either essential (i.e. to women or other Others) or merely incidental. It is a pervasive mode of human complexity, integral - if variously - to living in a fragmented, multiply signifying world. “We” are at once remarkably alike and radically different in our vulnerabilities. But the point cannot be to work toward a regulative discourse of vulnerability to eradicate autonomy talk, in a simplistic reversal. The task is to infuse deliberation/negotiation/advocacy with acknowledgement of human vulnerabilities, and of capacities for autonomy, and for joy and desire. There are precedents: for feminists the discourse of care, despite its shortcomings, is perhaps the closest analogy of a line of debate that grew out of developmental psychology to travel into ontology, morality, ethics, politics, critical legal theory, and further. As the discourse of care has struggled - if not with complete success - to make space for what was best in it, by defusing the subservient connotations that so readily colour it, so vulnerability assumed (in

Beauvoir’s sense) has to develop strategies for defusing the threat of shame, abjection, and the attendant pathologies. Nor can it fail to addresses a still greater risk in an epistemology of vulnerability and the politics of knowledge it enlists: for knowing (an) other(s) vulnerability is as dangerous as it is affirmative. Hence the conundrum: No politics of the vulnerable body can claim attention or effect social transformation without bringing vulnerabilities in their specificity before the public eye - neither papering them over nor otherwise concealing them - if neither in the sensationalism the media often favours, nor indeed “merely anecdotally”. Somehow, in renewed consciousness-raising practices, the process requires narrating vulnerability into being; and, paradoxically, making it no longer exceptional, while showing the outrageousness of its particularity. But the negotiations that would make something like this possible are delicate indeed; not least because vulnerabilities exposed - known - can have the ironic effect of making the vulnerable more vulnerable still: their weaknesses are exposed, their ‘soft spots’ available for damage. So the conundrum, which I have done little more than introduce for debate in this paper, is how to initiate social transformations that come out of thinking well about and within ecologies of vulnerability held in trust, with the responsibilities such thoughtful practices must also assume. How to work toward an instituting social imaginary that pivots upon human vulnerability and hierarchies of intelligibility, while abandoning the (illusory) security promised by autonomy assumptions; and thereby potentially exposing vulnerabilities to greater abuse.

XTN – Circumvention

Alternatives to detention are worse – the aff puts a smiley face on ICE while they continue to confine and control migrantsFlynn, 12 [Michael, On the Unintended consequences of human rights promotion on immigration detention, https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/12788/files/Flynn_Discussion_Paper_v4.pdf]This discussion about the potential unintended consequences of human rights promotion is important to consider when devising advocacy strategies on this issue. The key question to ask is: How can advocates pressure governments to improve their treatment of detainees while at the same time encouraging them to limit their reliance on detention as a tool of immigration control?Let’s consider “alternatives to detention.” What are the indicators we should use to measure whether this campaign has been successful? A cornerstone of this campaign is to convince states to adopt measures—such as increased use of parole, reporting schemes, and use of residential housing—in order to limit “unnecessary detentions.” If many detention cases are in fact disproportionate to the limited aims of immigration policy, then the most important indicator of success for this campaign would be an observable decline in the numbers of people being detained in states that have implemented alternatives. If, on the other hand, we do not see measurable decreases, then we must consider the possibility that alternatives have simply provided the state with additional means to keep increasing numbers of people under surveillance or in custody. Officials can also point to these alternatives as a sign of their progressive immigration control measures, even as they persist in detaining large numbers of people.This discussion paper argues that any campaign aimed at reforming a state’s custodial arrangements for immigration detainees must have as an integral component working to constrict that country’s detention activities. Absent such a component, immigration detention regimes may become kinder and gentler, but they will likely also continue to grow, in part as a result of efforts to reform.

XTN – Vulnerability Bad

The politics of respecting the Other’s fundamental vulnerability is the foundation of today’s biopolitics – Others are valorized only insofar as they maintain a safe distance and do not harass our vulnerability. This turns politics into nothing more than the administration of weak, vulnerable lives, enabling the ultimate reduction of everyone to bare life. Zizek, 3 [Slavoj, Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University, September 25, 2003, Homo Sacer as the Object of the Discourse of the University, online: http://www.lacan.com/hsacer.htmIn the University discourse, is not the upper level ($ — a) that of biopolitics (in the sense deployed from Foucault to Agamben)? Of the expert knowledge dealing with its object which is a - not subjects, but individuals reduced to bare life? And does the lower not designate what Eric Santner called the "crisis of investiture," i.e., the impossibility of the subject to relate to S1, to identify with a Master-Signifier, to assume the imposed symbolic mandate?1 The key point is here that the expert rule of " biopolitics" is grounded in and conditioned by the crisis of investiture; this crisis generated the "post-metaphysical" survivalist stance of the Last Men, which ends up in an anemic spectacle of life dragging on as its own shadow. It is within this horizon that one should appreciate today's growing rejection of death penalty: what one should be able to discern is the hidden "biopolitics" which sustains this rejection. Those who assert the "sacredness of life," defending it against the threat of transcendent powers which parasitize on it, end up in a world in which, on behalf of its very official goal — long pleasurable life — all effective pleasures are prohibited or strictly controlled (smoking, drugs, food…). Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan is the latest example of this survivalist attitude towards dying, with its "demystifying" presentation of war as a meaningless slaughter which nothing can really justify - as such, it provides the best possible justification for the Colin Powell's "no-casualties-on-our-side" military doctrine. On today's market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol... And the list goes on: what about virtual sex as sex without sex, the Colin Powell doctrine of warfare with no casualties (on our side, of course) as warfare without warfare, the contemporary redefinition of politics as the art of expert administration as politics without politics, up to today's tolerant liberal multiculturalism as an experience of Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while features like wife beating remain out of sight…)? Virtual Reality simply generalizes this procedure of offering a product deprived of its substance: it provides reality itself deprived of its substance, of the resisting hard kernel of the Real - in the same way decaffeinated coffee smells and tastes like the real coffee without being the real one, Virtual Reality is experienced as reality without being one. Is this not the attitude of the hedonistic Last Man? Everything is permitted, you can enjoy everything, BUT deprived of its substance which makes it dangerous. (This is also Last Man's revolution — "revolution without revolution.") Is this not one of the two versions of Lacan's anti-Dostoyevski motto "If God doesn't exist, everything is prohibited"? (1) God is dead, we live in a permissive universe, you should strive for pleasures and happiness — but, in order to have a life full of happiness and pleasures, you should avoid dangerous excesses, so everything is prohibited if it is not deprived of its substance; (2) If God is dead, superego enjoins you to enjoy, but every determinate enjoyment is already a betrayal of the unconditional one, so it should be prohibited. The nutritive version of this is to enjoy directly the Thing Itself: why bother with coffee? Inject caffeine directly into your blood! Why bother with sensual perceptions and excitations by external reality? Take drugs which directly affect your brain! - And if there is God, then everything is permitted — to those who claim to act directly on behalf of God, as the instruments of His will; clearly, a direct link to God justifies our violation of any "merely human" constraints and considerations (as in Stalinism, where the reference to the big Other of historical Necessity justifies absolute ruthlessness). Today's hedonism combines pleasure with constraint — it is no longer the old notion of the "right measure" between pleasure and constraint, but a kind of pseudo-Hegelian immediate coincidence of the opposites: action and reaction should coincide, the very thing which causes damage should already be the medicine. The ultimate example of it is arguably a chocolate laxative, available in the US, with the paradoxical injunction "Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate!", i.e., of the very thing which causes constipation. Do we not find here a weird version of Wagner's famous "Only the spear which caused the wound can heal it" from Parsifal? And is not a negative proof of the hegemony of this stance the fact that true unconstrained consumption (in all its main forms: drugs, free sex, smoking…) is emerging as the main danger? The fight against these dangers is one of the main investments of today's "biopolitics." Solutions are here desperately sought which would reproduce the paradox of the chocolate laxative. The main contender is "safe sex" — a term which makes one appreciative of

the truth of the old saying "Is having sex with a condom not like taking a shower with a raincoat on?". The ultimate goal would be here, along the lines of decaf coffee, to invent "opium without opium": no wonder marijuana is so popular among liberals who want to legalize it — it already IS a kind of "opium without opium." The structure of the "chocolate laxative," of a product containing the agent of its own containment, can be discerned throughout today's ideological landscape. There are two topics which determine today's liberal tolerant attitude towards Others: the respect of Otherness , openness towards it, AND the obsessive fear of harassment — in short, the Other is OK insofar as its presence is not intrusive, insofar as the Other is not really Other… A similar structure is clearly present in how we relate to capitalist profiteering: it is OK IF it is counteracted with charitable activities — first you amass billions, then you return (part of) them to the needy… And the same goes for war, for the emergent logic of humanitarian or pacifist militarism: war is OK insofar as it really serves to bring about peace, democracy, or to create conditions for distributing humanitarian help. And does the same not hold more and more even for democracy: it is OK if it is "rethought" to include torture and a permanent emergency state, if it is cleansed of its populist "excesses," and if the people are "mature" enough to live by it… However, what we were describing what cannot but appear as two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to bare life, to homo sacer as the dispensable object of the expert caretaking knowledge; and that of the respect for the vulnerable Other brought to extreme , of the attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences itself as vulnerable , constantly exposed to a multitude of potential "harassments." Is there a stronger contrast than the one between the respect for the Other's vulnerability and the reduction of the Other to "mere life" regulated by the administrative knowledge? But what if these two stances nonetheless rely on the same root, what if they are the two aspects of one and the same underlying attitude, what if they coincide in what one is tempted to designate as the contemporary case of the Hegelian "infinite judgement" which asserts the identity of opposites? What the two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher Causes, the notion that the ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. Nowhere is the complicity of these two levels clearer as in the case of the opposition to death penalty — no wonder, since (violently putting another human being to) death is, quite logically, the ultimate traumatic point of biopolitics, the politics of the administration of life. To put it in Foucauldian terms, is the abolition of death penalty not part of a certain "biopolitics" which considers crime as the result of social, psychological, ideological, etc., circumstances: the notion of the morally/legally responsible subject is an ideological fiction whose function is to cover up the network of power relations, individuals are not responsible for the crimes they commit, so they should not be punished? Is, however, the obverse of this thesis not that those who control the circumstances control the people? No wonder the two strongest industrial complexes are today the military and the medical, that of destroying and that of prolonging life.

Mourning requires the assimilation and cannibalism of the Other – memory and mourning of the Other instrumentalize and incorporate the Other within the self. Instead, we should refuse to mourn the Other as a testament to absolute alterity. Reynolds, 4 [Jack, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tasmania, Possible and Impossible, Self and Other, and the Reversibility of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, Spring 2004, Philosophy Today, Vol. 48, No. 1]Moreover, in his essay "Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok," Derrida again considers two models of the type of encroachment between self and other that is regularly associated with mourning . Borrowing from post-Freudian theories of mourning, he posits (although later undermines) a difference between introjection, which is love for the other person in me, and incorporation, which involves retaining the other person as a pocket, or a foreign body within one's own body. For Freud, as well as for the psychologists Abraham and Torok whose work Derrida considers, successful mourning is primarily about the introjection of the other person, and where they are consumed within us. The preservation of a discrete and separate other inside the self, as is the case in incorporation, is considered to be where

mourning ceases to be a "normal" response and instead becomes pathological. Typically, Derrida reverses this hierarchy and order of Subordination by highlighting that there is a sense in which the supposedly pathological condition of incorporation is actually more respectful of the other's alterity. After all, incorporation means that one has not totally assimilated or digested the other, as there is still a difference and heterogeneity (EO 57). On the other hand, Abraham and Torok's "normal" mourning can be accused of interiorizing the other to such a degree that they have become assimilated and even metaphorically cannibalized .16 Derrida considers this introjection to be an infidelity to the other, although it will be argued that this type of mourning has more to recommend it than he allows. Indeed, it will be shown that Merleau-Ponty's notion of responsibility towards alterity is more "digestive" and appropriative, and it will also be argued that this is not necessarily a bad thing. Before we get ahead of ourselves, however, it is worth recognizing that Derrida's account is not so simple as to unreservedly valorize the incorporation of the other, even if he consistently emphasizes this paradigm in an effort to refute the canonical interpretation of successful mourning. he also acknowledges that the more the self "keeps the foreign element inside itself, the more it excludes it" (Fors xvii). Refusing to engage with the other, we exclude their foreignness from ourselves and hence prevent any transformative interaction with it. When fetishized in their externality in such a manner, the dead other really is lifeless and it is significant that Derrida describes the death of de Man in terms of the loss of exchange and of the transformational opportunities that he presented (MDM xvi).17 Derrida's point hence seems to be that in mourning we must oscillate between introjection and incorporation, but the "otherness of the other" nevertheless resists both the process of incorporation as well as the process of introjection. The other can neither be preserved as a foreign entity, nor introjected fully within. Instead, the other must always resist my memory and interiorization of them, and remains outside the grasp of subjectivity-that is, wholly other (tout autre). Towards the end of Memoires: for Paul de Man, Derrida suggests that responsibility towards alterity is precisely about respecting and even emphasizing this resistance of the other, as well as the concomitant impossibility of mourning (MDM 160, 238). It is on this point that he parts company with Merleau-Ponty, and there are again two main responses that Merleau-Ponty's work can help us furnish.

Framing

1NC Frontline

1. Evaluate extinction level scenarios first— it’s the only irreversible impactBostrom, 2 [Nick, Swedish philosopher at the University of Oxford known for his work on existential risk, the anthropic principle, human enhancement ethics, superintelligence risks, the reversal test, and consequentialism. “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards; Published in the Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, No. 1. 2002. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html]In this paper we shall discuss risks of the sixth category, the one marked with an X. This is the category of global, terminal risks. I shall call these existential risks.Existential risks are distinct from global endurable risks. Examples of the latter kind include: threats to the biodiversity of Earth’s ecosphere, moderate global warming, global economic recessions (even major ones), and possibly stifling cultural or religious eras such as the “dark ages”, even if they encompass the whole global community, provided they are transitory (though see the section on “Shrieks” below). To say that a particular global risk is endurable is evidently not to say that it is acceptable or not very serious. A world war fought with conventional weapons or a Nazi−style Reich lasting for a decade would be extremely horrible events even though they would fall under the rubric of endurable global risks since humanity could eventually recover. (On the other hand, they could be a local terminal risk for many individuals and for persecuted ethnic groups.) I shall use the following definition of existential risks: Existential risk – One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth−originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.An existential risk is one where humankind as a whole is imperiled. Existential disasters have

major adverse consequences for the course of human civilization for all time to come.The unique challenge of existential risksRisks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial−and−error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long−term fate of our species.With the exception of a species−destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid−twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about.The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain−reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance

of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then its risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3]A much greater existential risk emerged with the build−up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all−out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following

points: Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial−and−error. There is no

opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages,

and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This

requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive

preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions.

2. “No value to life” doesn’t outweigh---prioritize existence because value is subjective Tännsjö, 11 [Torbjörn, Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf]I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that

utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may

avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living , they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better . They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not

answer the question what we should do, each one of us . My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular

perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning , if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

3. Evaluate consequences for your decision—any other framing opens up the possibility for worse forms of violence Isaac, 2 [Jeffrey C.. James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Spring 2002, Dissent, Vol. 49, No. 2]As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility . The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

4. Even if predictions are not perfect we should use foresight to take action to prevent crisis precisely because the future is uncertain. Prefer this evidence – it assumes their critique of prediction and is conclusive on what to do about it. Kurasawa, 4 [Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology at York University, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight.” 2004, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 4]When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the

aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute

certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the

horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

XTN – Extinction First

Evaluating extinction first is the most ethical framework for decision-makingBurke et al., 16 [Anthony, Associate Professor of International and Political Studies @ UNSW, Australia, Stefanie Fishel is Assistant Professor, Department of Gender and Race Studies at the University of Alabama, Audra Mitchell is CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and, Daniel J. Levine is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, “Planet Politics: Manifesto from the End of IR,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1–25) 8. Global ethics must respond to mass extinction. In late 2014, the Worldwide Fund for Nature reported a startling statistic: according to their global study, 52% of species had gone extinct between 1970 and 2010.60 This is not news: for three decades, conservation biologists have been warning of a ‘sixth mass extinction’, which, by definition, could eliminate more than three quarters of currently existing life forms in just a few centuries.61 In other words, it could threaten the practical possibility of the survival of earthly life. Mass extinction is not simply extinction (or death) writ large: it is a qualitatively different phenomena that demands its own ethical categories. It cannot be grasped by

aggregating species extinctions, let alone the deaths of individual organisms. Not only does it erase diverse, irreplaceable life forms, their unique histories and open-ended possibilities, but it threatens the ontological conditions of Earthly life. IR is one of few disciplines that is explicitly devoted to the pursuit of survival, yet it has almost nothing to say in the face of a possible mass extinction event.62 It utterly lacks the conceptual and ethical frameworks necessary to foster diverse, meaningful responses to this phenomenon. As mentioned above, Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their scale and moral horror. However, they are asymptotic: they imagine nightmares of a severely denuded planet, yet they do not contemplate the comprehensive negation that a mass extinction event entails. In contemporary IR discourses, where it appears at all, extinction is treated as a problem of scientific management and biopolitical control aimed at securing existing human lifestyles.63 Once again, this approach fails to recognise the reality of extinction, which is a matter of being and nonbeing, not one of life and death processes. Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is ‘lost’ in extinction has, since the inception of the concept of ‘conservation’, been addressed in terms of financial cost and economic liabilities.64 Beyond reducing life to forms to capital, currencies and financial instruments, the dominant neoliberal political economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon. Yet the enormity, complexity, and scale of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to draw on every possible resource in order to find ways of responding. This means that they need to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways – including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies. Above all, it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a matter of global ethics. It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular visions of the good life. Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change. 9. An Earth-worldly politics. Humans are worldly – that is, we are fundamentally worldforming and embedded in multiple worlds that traverse the Earth. However, the Earth is not ‘our’ world, as the grand theories of IR, and some accounts of the Anthropocene have it – an object and possession to be appropriated, circumnavigated, instrumentalised and englobed.65 Rather, it is a complex of worlds that we share, co-constitute, create, destroy and inhabit with countless other life forms and beings. The formation of the Anthropocene reflects a particular type of worlding, one in which the Earth is treated as raw material for the creation of a world tailored to human needs. Heidegger famously framed ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as two countervailing, conflicting forces that constrain and shape one another. We contend that existing political, economic and social conditions have pushed human worlding so far to one extreme that it has become almost entirely detached from the conditions of the Earth. Planet Politics calls, instead, for a mode of worlding that is responsive to, and grounded in, the Earth. One of these ways of being Earth-worldly is to embrace the condition of being entangled. We can interpret this term in the way that Heidegger66 did, as the condition of being mired in everyday human concerns, worries, and anxiety, to prolong existence. But, in contrast, we can and should reframe it as authors like Karen Barad67 and Donna Haraway68 have done. To them and many others, ‘entanglement’ is a radical, indeed fundamental condition of being-with, or, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, ‘being singular plural’.69 This means that no being is truly autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum physics. World itself is singular plural: what humans tend to refer to as ‘the’ world is actually a multiplicity of worlds at various scales that intersect, overlap, conflict, emerge as they surge across the Earth. World emerges from the poetics of existence, the collision of energy and matter, the tumult of agencies, the fusion and diffusion of bonds. Worlds erupt from, and consist in, the intersection of diverse forms of being – material and intangible, organic and inorganic, ‘living’ and ‘nonliving’. Because of the tumultuousness of the Earth with which they are entangled, ‘worlds’ are not static, rigid or

permanent. They are permeable and fluid. They can be created, modified – and, of course, destroyed. Concepts of violence, harm and (in)security that focus only on humans ignore at their peril the destruction and severance of worlds,70 which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life on Earth to thrive.

XTN – Consequences First

Governments must act to preserve the survival of their populations – the ethics of individual interactions do not apply to states Kennan, 86 [George, Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, Ambassador to the USSR and Yugoslavia, Professor at the Institute of Advanced Studies 1986, Foreign Affairs Winter 85-86]Certain distinctions should be made before one wanders farther into this thicket of problems.First of all, the conduct of diplomacy is the responsibility of governments. For purely practical reasons, this is unavoidable and inalterable. This responsibility is not diminished by the fact that government, in formulating foreign policy, may choose to be influenced by private opinion. What we are talking about, therefore, when we attempt to relate moral considerations to foreign policy, is the behavior of governments, not of individuals or entire peoples.Second, let us recognize that the functions, commitments and moral obligations of governments are not the same as those of the individual. Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience. No more than the attorney vis-à-vis the client, nor the doctor vis-à-vis the patient, can government attempt to insert itself into the consciences of those whose interests it represents.Let me explain. The interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality. They arise from the very existence of the national state in question and from the status of national sovereignty it enjoys. They are the unavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either "good" or "bad." They may be questioned from a detached philosophic point of view. But the government of the sovereign state cannot make such judgments. When it accepts the responsibilities of governing, implicit in that acceptance is the assumption that it is right that the state should be sovereign, that the integrity of its political life should be assured, that its people should enjoy the blessings of military security, material prosperity and a reasonable opportunity for, as the Declaration of Independence put it, the pursuit of happiness. For these assumptions the government needs no moral justification, nor need it accept any moral reproach for acting on the basis of them.

Weighing consequences is ethical – maximizing the value of all lives only way to affirm unconditional human dignityCummiskey, 96 [David, Department Chair of Philosophy at Bates College, Kantian Consequentialism, p 145-146]We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."12 But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other

separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that "rational nature exists as an end in itself" (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). [end p.145] In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant's normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have "dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth" that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

Ethical policymaking requires calculation of feasibility and time-sensitive consequences—refusing consequentialism allows atrocity in the name of ethical purity Gvosdev, 5 [Nikolas, Executive editor of The National Interest, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, p.17-25]What unites them all is adherence to a set of shared principles enunciated by thinkers such as Morgenthau and Walter Lippmann. The first of these is a healthy skepticism about utopian projects, no matter how noble in inspiration. The second is an appreciation for the limits as well as the uses of power; lacking unlimited energy or resources, power must be used selectively. In keeping with this realization, a country’s interests must beprioritized, with the greatest effort reserved for averting threats that affect ta country’s very survival.As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that areachievable and sustainable.In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreignpolicymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, “This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded.”9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that “there can be no political morality without prudence.”10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identifiedas the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency.Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one’s commitments than to make “empty” promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded:Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference topolitical ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharpdistinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country’s first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the UnitedStates and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and

treasurethat would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it thewherewithal to function.Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the “wrong side” of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart oft he concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions.When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia’s political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called “faux Wilsonianism,” the belief that “high-flown words matter more than rational calculation” in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of “balancing commitments and resources.”12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia “with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative.” The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creatinga multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not atall, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were notmatched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the “most moral” outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds. In assessing U.S. attempts to spread liberty and promote human rights, Owen Harries cautioned: Americans of all political persuasions believe profoundly it is their right and duty—indeed their destiny—to promote freedom and democracy in the world. It is a noble and powerful impulse—one not casually to be ridiculed or dismissed. But acting on it—if one is concerned to be effective and not merely to feel virtuous—is a complicated and delicate business, and the dangers are many. Success requires that this impulse be balanced against, and where necessary circumscribed by, other interests that the United States must necessarily pursue, more mundane ones like security, order and prosperity.13 And here Harries put his finger on the real problem about the questionof morality in foreign policy—advocating an untenable and unrealistic policy in order to “feel virtuous” rather than to bring about a successful outcome.U.S. realists of all stripes understand that there is a tension betweenthe need for prudent strategies to secure vital interests and the desire topromote liberty and human rights around the world. This is why, in an exchange of letters with William F. Schulz, the executive director of Amnesty International USA, John Bolton, after his appointment to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, pointed out: . . . our interests and our preferences may or may not be the same thing at the same time; no U.S. policy can succeed that does not comprehend and analyze these variables distinctly and dispassionately. To put it bluntly, the unswerving pursuit of preferences over interests may compromise the advancement and protection of both. . . . [M]aking policy involves tradeoffs between interests and values that often speak in absolute terms. . . . The choices we face are among individually valuable but often competing interests, and it is precisely my point that there is no magic formula to know in advance how to behave in each diverse case.14 This brings us to the discussion of villainy in world affairs. Realists are not insensitive to questions of suffering or injustice. Rather, their perceived apathy has more in common with the original Greek meaning of the word: passionlessness. Realists favor rational assessment as opposed to an emotional, knee-jerk response that could bring greater evil in its wake. They are prepared to face up to the truth that the United States, even as the world’s sole superpower, “cannot accomplish everything alone” and that “some of the problems that shape the modern international scene cannot be resolved, no matter how hard we try.”The United States does not possess unlimited power to neutralize allthreats or to compel other actors in the international system to bend toits will.American idealists, for example, routinely criticize those who suggest engagement with totalitarian despots in North Korea and Iran, with China’s quasi-communist regime, or with a Russia increasingly moving to a form of state-directed “managed pluralism.” Many espouse simplistic, black-and-white “solutions”—military intervention, regime change, sanctions— with a devil-may-care attitude about negative repercussions.Realists are not opposed to the use of U.S. economic and militarypower or even the preemptive use of that power to accomplish U.S. foreignpolicy objectives.But, as Simes qualifies, What is different about realists is their tendency to insist that U.S. foreign policy be based on a hierarchy of American priorities rather than a long and therefore meaningless laundry list incorporating objectives, preferences and hopes.. . . Because doing what is right in international politics often comes at a high price, as it is in Iraq, realists tend to insist not only that proposed actions be sound on their merits, but also that their benefits outweigh their costs, including potential unintended consequences.

Our arguments don’t forsake ethics – they demand an ethics that accepts the reality of compromise and the inevitability of sacrifices in the modern world, which is more than we can say for your framework. Nye, 86 [Joseph, Professor of IR – JFK School of Government – Harvard Joseph S. Nye Jr. 1986 “Nuclear Ethics”, The Free Press, a division of Macmillan]Whether one accepts the broad consequentialist approach or chooses some other, more eclectic way to include and reconcile the three dimensions of complex moral issues, there will often be a sense of uneasiness about the answers, not just because of the complexity of the problems “but simply that there is no satisfactory solution to these issues – at least none that appears to avoid in practice what most men would still regard as an intolerable sacrifice of value.” When value is sacrificed, there is often the problem of “dirty hands.” Not all ethical decisions are pure ones. The absolutist may avoid the problem of dirty hands, but often at the cost of having no hands at all. Moral theory cannot be “rounded off and made complete and tidy.” That is part of the modern human condition. But that does not exempt us from making difficult moral choices.

XTN – Risk Analysis Good

Even if predictions aren’t perfect, the alternative is worse – their refusal to engage in risk analysis cedes the politicalFitzsimmons, 6 [Michael, Defense analyst “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Ebsco]But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challenging. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decisionmakers.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of risk, variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, the personal beliefs of decision-makers fill the void. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic surprise, in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.’16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves. Moreover, this style of decision-making is self-reinforcing. A strategist dismissive of explicit models of prediction or cause and effect is likely to have a much higher threshold of resistance to adjusting strategy in the face of changing circumstances. It is much harder to be proven wrong if changing or emerging information is systematically discounted on the grounds that the strategic environment is inherently unpredictable. The result may be a bias toward momentum in the current direction, toward the status quo. This is the antithesis of flexibility. Facts on the ground change faster than belief systems, so the extent to which a strategy is based on the latter rather than the former may be a reasonable measure of strategic

rigidity. In this way, undue emphasis in planning on uncertainty creates an intellectual temptation to cognitive dissonance on the one hand, and confirmatory bias on the other. And the effect, both insidious and ironic, is that the appreciation for uncertainty subverts exactly the value that it professes to serve: flexibility.

Evaluate high magnitude predictions first - best way to communicate threats and facilitate effective responseCover, 14 [Avidan Y., Assistant Professor of Law at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law, and the Director at the Institute for Global Security Law and Policy, (Avidan Y., “Presumed Imminence: Judicial Risk Assessment in the Post-9/11 World”, http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1561&context=faculty_publications]Consider the following study’s findings: “[W]hen people are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance for losses resulting from ‘terrorism,’ they will pay more than if they are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance from all causes.”56 The specter of terrorism and the emotional wallop it entails leads people to make significant judgments in error regarding the likelihood of certain harms.57 Moreover, a psychological study further determined that just the discussion of a low-probability risk, even one in which trustworthy sources elaborate on the minimal risk, increases perceptions of the risk’s probability.58 What are termed “dread risks,” “worst-case scenarios,” or “low-probability, high-consequence events,” powerfully impact human behavior.59 Consider that in the three months after the 9/11 attacks occurred, numerous Americans stopped flying and a good proportion of those people chose to drive instead.60 Flying remains, even with the specter of terrorism, a far less risky endeavor than driving.61 Yet, people disregarded this fact. The increase in road traffic led to 353 more fatalities nationwide “in the last [three] months of 2001” when compared to the last quarter of the preceding five years, 1996–2000.62 Also at work here may be an alarmist bias. When differing accounts of risk are presented, people are more likely to favor the more “alarming” version, crediting the accounts that describe more dangers as more informative. W. Kip Viscusi characterizes this outcome as one of “‘irrational asymmetry: respondents overweigh[] the value of a high risk judgement.’”63 In fact, there may even be reason to believe that the fear engendered by the 9/11 attacks has contagion effects, leading people to fear increased risks from sources well beyond terrorism. For example, a study of ninth graders in California found that adolescents surveyed prior to 9/11 perceived a lesser risk of dying than those surveyed a few weeks after the attacks.64 Specifically, respondents believed there was a 34.62% chance of dying by a tornado before 9/11, but the perception of such a risk increased to 64.33% after the attacks.65 The perceived risk of dying by earthquake increased from 24.64% to 41.94%.66 When seized by fear, people make probability determinations that they would otherwise not make. Moreover, these decisions do not track the variations in probability. One study asked participants what they would pay to avoid participating in an experiment in which there was a chance they would be subjected to a painful electric shock or to a $20 penalty.67 Faced with a 1%, 99%, or 100% risk of shock, participants’ median willingness to pay ranged from $7 to avoid the 1% risk to $10 to avoid the 99% risk.68 In contrast, the willingness to pay to avoid the $20 penalty ranged from $1 to avoid the 1% chance to $18 to avoid the 99% chance.69 The results demonstrate that people are willing to pay a lot to avoid the low probability of an “affect-rich outcome,” but that their willingness to pay does not vary greatly with the probability of the occurrence of the event.70 Similarly, even when the risks of a high outrage occurrence such as nuclear waste radiation, and a low outrage event, like radon exposure, were the same, people perceived the high outrage threat as a higher risk and expressed a greater intention to limit that threat.71 Another study found that people perceived a greater risk from a terrorist event causing the same number of casualties as a non-terrorist propane tank explosion or release of an infectious disease.72

Risk analysis creates reflexivity – key to deconstruct cognitive bias and motivate alternative futuresBarma et al., 16 [May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf]Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and

policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric. Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas. This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world. What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward

Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for

the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

Topicality

1NC ShellInterpretation: restrictions on immigration are Congressional provisions that prohibit a group from being eligible for visasHarvard Law Review, 83 [Developments in the law immigration: policy and the rights of aliens, Lexis]Instrumental Provisions. -- Instrumental provisions are designed either to restrict immigration flows or to encourage immigration of certain aliens. The provisions that restrict immigration are expressed in quantitative and qualitative terms. Quantitative restrictions set ceilings on the number of aliens to be admitted. Qualitative restrictions segregate, from among the vast pool of prospective immigrants, the aliens with characteristics deemed "undesirable" by the legislature. The provisions that encourage immigration award preferences and grant exemptions from restrictive provisions; aliens with American relatives or, to a far lesser extent, with needed occupational skills, are the beneficiaries.(a) Quantitative Restrictions on Immigration: Quotas and [*1337] Preferences. -- The Immigration and Nationality Act currently contains two independent numerical ceilings. First, a worldwide quota permits 270,000 aliens -- exclusive of refugees, "special" immigrants, and "immediate relatives" of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens -- to come to the United States each year. Second, aliens seeking to enter under the worldwide quota are limited by a ceiling of 20,000 immigrants per country. A seven-tier preference system governs selection of immigrants under these numerical limits. The first, second, fourth, and fifth preference categories are allotted to relatives of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens and serve to reunite families. The third and sixth preference categories are allotted to immigrant workers whose labor is needed in the domestic economy. All other potential immigrants are placed in a seventh category and receive no preference: visas are available only to the extent that visas in preference categories are not used, a circumstance that last occurred in 1978. The existing allocation of visas among preference categories gives priority to family unification over recruitment of skilled labor for the domestic economy. Eighty percent of visas are allocated to family reunification preferences; twenty percent to occupational preference categories. Unallocated visas in higher preference categories "drop down" and become available [*1338] only to lower family reunification categories (and the nonpreference category). Of the two numerical limits, the worldwide quota generates the most controversy, reflecting public concern over high unemployment and the perceived negative effects of immigration. Although virtually all experts concede the necessity of setting some limits on immigration, evaluating proposed immigration levels is complicated because the effects of immigration are imperfectly understood, occur far in the future, and depend on factors unrelated to immigration flows. Irreconcilable differences exist between expert estimates of the impact of immigration on the size of the American population, on the vitality of the American economy, and on the assimilative capacity of American culture. Consequently, proposed numerical [*1339] ceilings range from less than zero (that is, net emigration) to levels above the current worldwide ceiling. (b) Qualitative Restrictions on Immigration: Exclusions. -- Congress first passed legislation excluding "undesirable" aliens in 1875.Over the following century, Congress has repeatedly reaffirmed existing exclusions and added new ones; ultimately, thirty-three classes of excludable aliens have accumulated. These classes may be grouped into seven broad categories: immoral aliens, subversive aliens, alien workers possessing skills already available domestically, criminal aliens, physically or mentally ill aliens, aliens who would be dependent on social welfare services, and aliens who have violated admissions regulations. Exclusion of these aliens, however, depends not only on legislation by Congress, but also on judicial construction and executive branch administration.

Violation – the aff removes an implicit restriction, not an explicit one – eliminating detention does not make new groups eligible for visas

Prefer our interpretation:A. Limits – our interpretation provides a clear bright-line of what is and is not topical. This

allows a range of affirmatives such as employment based visas and TPS – there are already hundreds of visa categories, the aff explodes these categories by allowing removal of any kind of deterrent practice topical.

B. Ground – we can’t win links to core generics unless the aff provides new eligibility to new people – DA’s like wages and resource tradeoffs wouldn’t compete against tiny implicit restriction affs

C. Effects Topicality – at best the aff is effects topical – this produces bad, probabilistic debates about solvency questions while eliminating neg ground – this is an independent reason to vote negative

Vote neg on topicality – competing interpretations is the only non-arbitrary way to evaluate T

DefinitionsRestriction = official ruleCollins Dictionary, no date [https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/restriction]A restriction is an official rule that limits what you can do or that limits the amount or size of something.

2NC – LimitsThe best literature is already aff biased --- so err negSchuck, 7 [Peter H.; Baldwin Professor of Law – Yale University, “Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously,” 2007 U Chi Legal F 57, Lexis]n3 In a polity in which only 7 percent of the public think that immigration levels should be higher while 55 percent think they should be lower, see <http://www.galluppoll.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1660> (last visited June 9, 2007) (poll taken in mid-January 2007), one would expect that at least some legal scholars who write about immigration issues would favor restriction. But one would be wrong. In over two decades of immersion in immigration scholarship, I have not encountered a single academic specialist on immigration law who favors reducing the number of legal immigrants admitted each year. (I myself favor higher admissions, albeit with a greater emphasis on skills than in the existing system.) This virtual unanimity among academics in favor of expanded immigration is a striking element of the political disconnect that I have discussed elsewhere. See Peter H. Schuck, The Disconnect between Public Attitudes and Policy Outcomes in Immigration, in Carol M. Swain, ed, The Politics of Immigration Reform 41 (Cambridge 2007).In earlier works, I defined restrictionism and expansionism in terms not only of attitudes about legal admissions but also of attitudes about how rigorous enforcement against the undocumented should be. Here too, immigration law scholars tend to be expansionist. While they acknowledge the large and steadily growing number of undocumented aliens in the U.S. (after all, only willful blindness could miss this elephant in the room), few if any favor either an intensive campaign to apprehend and remove the undocumented or an enhancement of ICE's effective power to do so. (This is not a question of legal authority, which is already ample.)With very few exceptions who are footnoted in The Disconnect between Public Attitudes and Policy Outcomes in Immigration, I cannot recall any immigration law scholar expressing support recently for increasing workplace raids, beefing up the Border Patrol, building a wall on the border, encouraging public officials or private individuals to identify illegal immigrants to ICE, penalizing those who provide sanctuary to them, using state and local police to augment ICE, limiting the procedural rights available to asylum claimants at the border or immigrants in enforcement proceedings, increasing penalties for illegal entry or visa violations, sanctioning lawyers who seek to delay proceedings to remove their clients, extending the period during which aliens can be detained either before or after a final removal order is issued, denying amnesty to undocumented workers, or limiting automatic birthright citizenship for their children.Many immigration law scholars, of course, do favor using ICE's existing authority and resources more effectively to reduce illegal migration. They correctly note, for example, that the agency seldom imposes serious penalties on employers who rely on facially valid but frequently forged identification documents in hiring foreign workers, that ICE's actual follow-up on final removal orders is notoriously haphazard and feckless, that its management and information systems remain obsolete and chaotic, and that it exhibits many other chronic deficiencies and injustices.This is not the place to debate the merits of expansion, much less of the numerous specific reform measures about which reasonable people can and do differ. Rather, my point here is simply that in sharp contrast to the American public generally, virtually all immigration law scholars, like all immigrant advocacy groups and all lawyers who represent immigrants, strongly support an immigration policy that is expansive in almost every sense. That is, they favor high and higher levels of legal admissions, generous amnesties for undocumented workers, reduced detention of the undocumented, more liberal grants of asylum, and more extensive procedural rights for the undocumented that make it harder for the government to remove them. I cannot recall a single academic presenter at any program in the more than twenty years of the Immigration Law Section of the American Association of Law Schools who did not take these positions. More speculatively, but based on my participation in many academic conversations and conferences, I imagine that the vast majority of immigration law scholars also support substantive entitlements (economic and welfare rights and even some voting rights) to equalize the status of citizens and noncitizens . It is here, presumably, that the political disconnect over immigration policy becomes most stark. See id.

AT: We Meet – Detention Deters MigrationYou don’t even meet your own interpretation – Detention doesn’t deter migration – studies proveSampson, 11 [Robyn, International Detention Coalition and La Trobe Refugee Research Center, School of Social Sciences, La Trobe University, There Are Alternatives, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/Events/IDC.pdf]Firstly, existing evidence and government statements11 suggest a policy of detention is not effective in deterring asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants. Despite increasingly tough detention policies being introduced over the past 20 years, the number of irregular arrivals has not reduced.12 Several studies have been undertaken to establish which factors most impact the choice of destination of asylum seekers and irregular migrants.13 According to this research, the principal aim of asylum seekers and refugees is to reach a place of safety.14 Asylum seekers have very limited understanding of the migration policies of destination countries before arrival and are often reliant on people smugglers to choose their destination. Those who are aware of the prospect of detention before arrival believe it is an unavoidable part of the journey, that they will still be treated humanely despite being detained, and that it is a legitimate right of states if undertaken for identity and health checks.15 Rather than being influenced primarily by immigration policies such as detention, most refugees choose destinations where they will be reunited with family or friends; where they believe they will be in a safe, tolerant and democratic society; where there are historical links between their country and the destination country; or where they can already speak the language of the destination country.16One study also found that the majority of refugees who had experienced detention did not pass on a message of deterrence to people overseas as the relief of escaping persecution and reaching a place of safety overrode the trauma and sense of rejection they had experienced as a result of detention.17 This evidence shows detention has little impact on destination choices.

Wall DA

1NC ShellTrump won’t get his Wall – Democrats will win the midterms and make it impossibleFrantes, 18 [Charles, April 26, Office of Rep. Will Hurd Texas 23, A border security and dreamer protection deal is Trump’s best chance to build a wall, https://hurd.house.gov/media-center/in-the-news/border-security-and-dreamer-protection-deal-trumps-best-chance-build-wall]This overwhelming percentage of Republicans and Trump’s base voters supporting a simple DACA and Border security immigration deal should be motivation and encouragement for the President to get behind Republicans in leading the way on passing legislation. Not only that, but at this point it looks like deal in which Dreamers receive a path to earn legal status might be the only chance for The president to hold true to his promise of building a wall at the US-Mexico border.Over the past weeks, a bi-partisan coalition of representatives led by Jeff Denham(R-CA) and Will Hurd (R-TX) have joined together to try to force a vote on four different immigration proposals through a resolution that would invoke the Queen of The Hill rule, allowing the bill that received the most and at least 218 votes to be adopted by the House. If 218 out of the 236 Republican representatives listen to their constituents and vote for a simple bill that provides funding for border security and a wall and protection for Dreamers like Hurd’s USA act, it will have a real chance of becoming law. This would be a great look for Republicans and the president in the eyes of voters, not only because they would hold true to the president’s promise of building a wall, but because they would show great leadership in finally legislating a permanent solution for the dreamers- something Obama and the Democrats were unable to do, even when they held majority in the house and senate.If Republicans lose their majority position in the House in the upcoming mid-terms like many people speculate they will, they will no longer be in a position to unite in passing an immigration bill of their choice through the House with the Queen of the Hill rule. If that happens before Congress passes legislation to secure the border and protect Dreamers, then border security will continue to remain underfunded, the wall will not be built any time soon, and we will continue to have unmonitored people and things entering our country at a higher rate than if we had adequate border security.

Passing the plan now necessitates horse-trading for border security – it’s the only way it would passScott and Golshan, 18 [Dylan Scott and Tara Golshan, Vox.com, Feb 15, The Senate’s failed votes on DACA and immigration: what we know, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/12/17003552/senate-immigration-bill-floor-debate]First up was a plan by Sens. Chris Coons (D-DE) and John McCain (R-AZ). The Coons-McCain bill would: Provide a path to citizenship for 1.8 million undocumented immigrants who came to the country as childrenOffer no money for Trump’s border wall , though it does include some border security measures

It failed 52 to 47, with Democrats almost united in favor and Republicans mostly voting against it.What it means: The failure of the Coons-McCain plan underlined that, with the Republicans controlling every lever of power in Washington, a bill without any funding for Trump’s infamous border wall is a nonstarter.

Building the wall increases the likelihood of maritime terrorismGuidos, 18 [Rhina, Jan 22, CruxNow, Catholic News Service, Security expert says wall would be costly symbol of exclusion, https://cruxnow.com/church-in-the-usa/2018/01/22/security-expert-says-wall-costly-symbol-exclusion-bigotry/]As a candidate, Trump spoke of building a “great, great wall on our southern border, and I will make Mexico pay for that wall.” As president, he is said to be asking Congress for $18 billion in taxpayer money for the initial phase of building it.“While it will fail at great expense … it comes with other problems, such as hurting the lives of U.S. border communities, Native American communities, as well as damaging the environment,” said Felbab-Brown.The existence of the structure will increase crime in ports and bodies of water, where smugglers will redirect some of their trade, and it will take away attention and money from the country’s 52 points of entry that deal with the movement of millions of people, cars, trucks and goods, she said.Budgetary trade-offs taking place to get the initial funding for the wall will shortchange the U.S. Coast Guard, making less money available to fend off real threats to ports far from the Mexico border, Felbab-Brown said.“The threat of some major terrorist activity in a port in a place like Boston or New York or Baltimore is far more significant than the land dry crossings or even crossings of immigrants across the border,” she said. “My take is that we are taking the least effective element of border counterterrorism, security, U.S. homeland security and giving it a tremendous amount of money that amounts often to a waste of money.”

Terrorists will use ports to carry out WMD attacksTaylor and Kaufman, 9 [Bruce Taylor – PhD director of research at the Police Executive Research Forum, Pat Kaufman – Attorney, Protecting America’s Ports, https://www.nij.gov/journals/262/pages/protecting-americas-ports.aspx]The recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, brought to the forefront longstanding concerns about the vulnerability of our ports. After Sept. 11, for example, U.S. seaports were closed for several days, an acknowledgment that ships, like airplanes, could also serve as deadly weapons. Coast Guard vessels were immediately dispatched to provide security at all major American ports.[1]Few would dispute that, if terrorists used a cargo container to conceal a weapon of mass destruction and detonated it on arrival at a U.S. port, the impact on global trade and the world economy could be immediate and devastating.Protecting America's ports against a terrorist threat is daunting because of the sheer size and sprawling nature of the U.S. maritime system and because the United States has no central port authority to oversee security. Approximately 8,000 ships with foreign flags make 51,000 calls on U.S. ports each year. Fully 95 percent of overseas commerce (and 100 percent of foreign oil) comes by ship.[2] In addition, more than 6.5 million passengers from cruise ships pass

through the nation's ports each year, along with approximately 9 million cargo containers — about 26,000 cargo containers a day.[3] The complex structure of ports and the port authorities that govern them — including the variation in public and private ownership, the involvement of multiple governmental and private agencies, and the differences in levels and scopes of authority — makes securing U.S. ports a tremendously difficult task.

Nuclear terrorism causes extinctionHellman, 8 [Martin E., Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering at Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf]The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily

on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a

million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.”

[Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20

percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not

inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale

nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important . The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas

MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO

strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the

horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as-

sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their

resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war.

Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India

and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism

that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

UniquenessNo risk of Trump getting his wall now – getting a concession on immigration before the midterms is was only chanceKim, 18 [Seung Min, Washington Post, ‘Trump blew it’: the president missed his best change yet to get funding for his border wall, Lexis]Doing so prompted backlash from some immigration advocates who believe Democrats too readily gave in on a wall. But for their part, Democratic lawmakers say permanent protections for dreamers facing imminent limbo - not to mention the political makeup of Washington - made them more willing to accept what was once anathema to them."Elections have consequences. Right?" Menendez said. "When Republicans control everything and you have a White House that is the most anti-immigrant White House I've ever seen that at the end of the day, you have to take some tough choices."Sensing an opening in the final days of haggling over the spending bill, the influential network of conservative groups funded by billionaire industrialists Charles and David Koch made a last-minute push to persuade the White House and congressional Republicans to take what the Democrats had initially offered. A leader of one of the Koch-affiliated groups, Daniel Garza of the LIBRE Initiative, said the organizations made the push because the omnibus was the "last train leaving the station." But when the legislation was ultimately released, there would be no dreamer protections, no dramatic boost in wall funding and no major changes to immigration policy. It would be unclear the next time Trump would get a shot at fulfilling a campaign pledge. "Trump blew it; he got greedy and now he probably will not get his wall," said Kevin Appleby , senior director of international migration policy at the Center for Migration Studies. "Thank goodness."

Independent of the possible immigration trade, Trump has no hope of getting a wallSinger, 17 [Paul, USA Today, Exclusive: Less than 25% of Republicans in Congress endorse border wall funding in USA today survey, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/09/20/trump-border-wall-survey-congress-republicans-billions/640196001/]President Trump has been adamant that he needs Congress to approve funding to start building his border wall, but Republicans on Capitol Hill are far less adamant about supporting it. When asked by the USA TODAY Network whether they support the president’s initial $1.6 billion budget request to begin construction, only 69 of the 292 Republicans on Capitol Hill said "yes." Among the rest, three Republicans said they oppose the money, several evaded a direct answer, and the rest simply refused to respond to the question.The USA TODAY Network asked the 534 members of the House and Senate whether they support the $1.6 billion down payment approved by the House and found fewer than 25% of Republicans willing to stand up for the plan.The House approved $1.6 billion in startup funding as part of a broad national security spending package in July that included billions $658 billion for the Defense Department and $78 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs. The wall funding was tacked on to the bill at the last

minute, and the legislation passed the House with the support of only five Democrats. Five Republicans voted against the bill.The Senate has not yet taken up the measure, and Congress has since passed a temporary spending bill to keep the government running for the next few months. That puts off until December a battle over the wall and other Trump spending priorities. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., indicated last week that they had struck a deal with Trump to move legislation offering safe harbor for undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children, and that the bill would not include funding for Trump's wall. Trump suggested the next day that there was no deal, and that he is insistent on funding for the wall, though he acknowledged it may come later. "If the Democrats aren't going to approve it [money for the wall], then we're not going to do what they want," Trump said. "The wall will happen."

AT: Wall Inevitable

Status quo Trump can’t get funding for the wall because Dems can filibuster – only scenario they cooperate on border security is with an immigration concession like the planDate, 18 [S. V., 3/21, Huffington Post, Forget Mexico, Trump can’t even get Congress to pay for his wall, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-congress-wall_us_5ab31622e4b008c9e5f3ffd6]WASHINGTON ― President Donald Trump hasn’t been able to make Mexicans pay for his long- promised wall along the southern border, and now it appears that Americans won’t be paying for it, either.Absent from the $1.3 trillion spending plan for the budget year that runs through Sept. 30 is any money for the construction of a border wall. At one point, Trump and his advisers had been pushing for $25 billion for the project.House Speaker Paul Ryan’s office Wednesday evening touted $1.6 billion in the bill that would pay for “physical barriers and infrastructure, and funding for related technology and personnel” along 95 miles. And Trump himself tweeted later that night: “Got $1.6 Billion to start Wall on Southern Border, rest will be forthcoming.”But Democrats pointed out that only $641 million of that money is designated for 33 miles of “new fencing or levees” ― specifically not a concrete wall. The rest of the money is for repairing or replacing existing fencing or border security technology.The White House press office did not respond to a HuffPost query regarding the lack of wall money in the omnibus bill. Earlier Wednesday, White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders released a statement generally praising the spending plan that had still not been finalized.Trump promised from the day he began his campaign in June 2015 that he would build a “great wall” to keep out illegal immigrants from Mexico.“I would build a great wall, and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me, and I’ll build them very inexpensively,” Trump boasted during his Trump Tower announcement speech. “I will build a great, great wall on our southern border. And I will have Mexico pay for that wall. Mark my words.”Over the next 17 months, he promised hundreds of times that he would build the wall quickly, and at no cost to U.S. taxpayers. Trump explained that his wall would be at least 30 feet tall and extend deep underground to prevent tunneling. At a December 2015 visit to Manassas, Virginia, Trump even went into construction details.“It’s going to be made of hardened concrete, and it’s going to be made out of rebar. That’s steel,” Trump said in response to a boy’s question. “And we’re going to set (the rebar) in nice, heavy foundations.”But having Mexico pay for a wall that that country does not even support was never a realistic possibility. A planned meeting between Trump and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto was recently canceled because Peña Nieto would not back away from his refusal to pay.Getting Congress to appropriate as much as $25 billion of American taxpayer money for Trump’s project has also proved difficult. Democrats hold enough votes to block a spending bill, and they have refused to go along with Trump’s wall unless he agrees to a bill that protects undocumented immigrants brought into the country as children. They have been allowed to work in the United States under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program created by

former President Barack Obama. Trump canceled DACA last year, a decision that is now tied up in the courts.Trump’s budget director, Mick Mulvaney, predicted during a February White House briefing that the border wall money was essentially contingent on Trump and Congress agreeing on a DACA fix. Without such a deal, he said, “Congress will never give us the money.”

LinksThe plan requires commensurate border security upgrades – it’s the only way to get legislation passed and is demanded by public sentimentKrikorian, 18 [Mark, Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies, January 5, DACA, DACA, Bo-Baca, https://cis.org/Oped/DACA-DACA-BoBacaHow to Balance the Amnesty? Which brings us to the final question — what measures would be packaged with a DACA amnesty? This is where most of the attention has been focused, but it's been framed inaccurately as a simple matter of legislative horse-trading: Each party has things it desires, so let's make a deal. The Dreamer activists see it this way too, objecting to being used as "bargaining chips."But this isn't mere legislative horse-trading. The measures being discussed are necessary to limit the fallout of any deal. All amnesties have two effects: They incentivize additional illegal immigration (as prospective illegals abroad see that their predecessors managed to get away with it) and they create downstream chain migration (when the legalized aliens eventually sponsor their relatives). Thus the need for any DACA deal to include enforcement measures (like E-Verify and/or the wall), to blunt the surge of illegal immigration caused by amnesty, and the abolition of the family-immigration categories that lead to chain migration (i.e., limit family immigration to the core nuclear family of spouses and minor children).The polling on this is strong. Most of the advocacy groups and their media mouthpieces point to surveys showing broad support for the idea of letting DACA people stay, and I'm sure that's correct. But any survey that has Luis Gutierrez and me giving the same answer is asking the wrong question. That's why it's good that Numbers USA released polling this week that assumed a DACA amnesty, but asked what measures should be packaged with it. By about two to one, respondents supported an E-Verify mandate and ending chain migration (and ending the visa lottery as well).

Democrats’ seat deficit in Congress forces compromise with Republicans – will give them border security in exchange for the planDiaz, 17 [Norisa, World Socialist Website, Democrats push for deal with Trump on DACA as ICE threatens mass raids, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2017/10/07/daca-j10.html]Republicans are making a number of additional proposals to which the Democrats may agree. For example, a new measure introduced Thursday by Sen. Jeff Flake, a veteran of comprehensive immigration reform efforts, includes Trump’s 2018 budget request to start building a wall and permanent protections only for people who had DACA.There is no telling to what the Democrats will agree. The Times quotes Durbin, “It is naive for us to believe that we will get 12 Republicans to vote for DACA or the Dream Act without putting something on the table. There’s always going to be a group that wants more. There are some people who want all or nothing,” he said, disparagingly referencing those who oppose the Democrats’ efforts to horse trade the lives of a few hundred thousand immigrants here in exchange for a few million there.

Getting the plan past necessitates concessions on border securityCarney, 17 [Jordain, 9/19, The Hill, key democrat: ‘naïve’ to think DACA will pass without border security, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/351479-key-democrat-naive-to-think-daca-will-pass-without-border-security]Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) predicted on Tuesday that a fix for some undocumented immigrants would have to be attached to increased border security despite frustration from some House Democrats and outside groups about linking the two. "It is naive for us to believe we would get 12 Republicans to vote for DACA or DREAM Act without putting something on the table," he told reporters when asked about frustration among some activists. Democrats have 48 seats, including Independent Sens. Bernie Sanders(Vt.) and Angus King (Maine), who caucus with them. To get legislation over a 60-vote procedural threshold they would need the support of at least 12 Republicans.

No wall = no plan – past bills prove that any immigration reform without border security is a non-starterScott and Golshan, 18 [Dylan Scott and Tara Golshan, Vox.com, Feb 15, The Senate’s failed votes on DACA and immigration: what we know, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/12/17003552/senate-immigration-bill-floor-debate]First up was a plan by Sens. Chris Coons (D-DE) and John McCain (R-AZ). The Coons-McCain bill would: Provide a path to citizenship for 1.8 million undocumented immigrants who came to the country as childrenOffer no money for Trump’s border wall , though it does include some border security measuresIt failed 52 to 47, with Democrats almost united in favor and Republicans mostly voting against it.What it means: The failure of the Coons-McCain plan underlined that, with the Republicans controlling every lever of power in Washington, a bill without any funding for Trump’s infamous border wall is a nonstarter.

Our evidence is conclusive on this question – no immigration reform will get through without The WallFerrechio, 18 [Susan, Washington Examiner, January 23, Immigration deal in jeopardy after democrats retract border wall funding, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/immigration-deal-in-jeopardy-after-democrats-retract-border-wall-funding]But it wasn't clear, and when asked later what Schumer and other Democrats might be willing to accept when it comes to border wall funding, Schumer's office simply replied, "No."That led Republican leaders to warn that if Democrats completely oppose new border wall funding, there won’t be an immigration deal. Majority Whip John Cornyn, R-Texas, said Schumer’s retraction has already “set back” the talks “a long way” and could stall them permanently if wall funding now becomes non-negotiable for Democrats.“If it is, we won’t get a deal,” Cornyn said. “That is a core requirement of any deal.”

Cornyn said Schumer’s $25 billion offer was “a substantial number and is probably in the realm of reality in terms of what border security improvements are going to cost.”Cornyn said Trump is seeking a border wall system that is comprised of some physical infrastructure, but also technology and personnel aimed at stopping illegal immigration along the southern border.

AT: Link = DACA

Empirics prove – democrats always concede border security for immigrant protectionRennix, 17 [Brianna, Immigration attorney and writer/editor at Current Affairs, How the left can think constructively about immigration…, https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/11/can-we-have-humane-immigration-policy]This dreary pantomime has repeated itself over and over throughout the Clinton, Bush, and Obama years. Time after time, Democrats have agreed to more border security and gotten virtually no concessions in return. We see it happening again now: Trump has proposed to build a gigantic, impenetrable border wall, slash refugee admissions, and revoke protections for the Dreamers, the single-most sympathetic and least controversial group of immigrants in the country. A more absurd and gratuitously cruel set of immigration proposals is hard to imagine. So the Democratic congressional leadership sat down with Trump, schmoozed him a bit over Chinese food, and, in exchange for a vague promise to “enshrine DACA protections in law”—which, taken literally, could well leave the Dreamers still vulnerable to deportation and without any path to citizenship, as is the case under the current DACA executive orders—agreed to more goddamn border security for the billionth time. They say they won’t allow “the wall” to be built, of course, but what they will end up agreeing to is likely to be even worse: aerial drones and motion sensors, a more heavily-armed Border Patrol, more and more immigration jails along the border. Hearing Schumer and Pelosi crow about this “deal” as a “major victory”—assuming Trump even follows through with it—is infuriating. To put it in biblical terms, the Democrats are constantly selling their birthright for messes of pottage, and then shamelessly standing in front of reporters in their pottage-smeared bibs, bragging about how they finished all of their supper.

Impacts

Wall Turns Case

The Wall is more than a physical barrier to migration – it represents the consolidation of national identityYang, 17 [Mimi, Ph.D. is Professor of Modern Languages at Carthage College, The Trump Wall: a Cultural Wall and a Cultural War, http://csalateral.org/issue/6-2/trump-wall-cultural-war-yang/]In “Crossing between the Great Wall of China and the ‘Great’ Trump Wall,” I compare Trump with the first Chinese Emperor Qingshi Huang who builds the Great Wall of China to fence off northern “barbarians” and invaders so that the Chinese (the Hans’) culture would be “pure,” and the commencing emperor would keep the flags on the newly expanded frontiers of the Empire.13 Nonetheless, as examined above, the Trump Wall intends to preserve the “purity” of American culture and appeals to the economic and political interests of a significant segment of the population inside the wall. With a horizon blocked and a space confined by the wall, the egocentrism and the ethnocentrism of Trump attempts to make America great again, just like Qingshi Huang whose egocentrism and ethnocentrism attempted to make the newly unified Chinese Empire glorious for the ten-thousand generations to come. The Trump Wall proves nothing but a continuation of the Mexican-American war that cut Mexico apart and took away its territory for the up-and-coming American empire’s expansionism.Lacking a sense of the past and with a distorted view on the present, the Trump Wall deters and is detrimental to a growing and evolving American cultural identity. From the racial and cultural hierarchy, Trump has inherited a closed, exclusive, and static framework in dealing with the crisis, the challenges, the possibilities, and the fluidity that pertain to the globalization of the twenty-first century. His wall mentality is not inconsistent with those of the wall-builders in history and particularly in the past a dozen of years. On December 16, 2005, the House of Representatives passed Congressman Duncan Hunter’s (R-CA) amendment to the border Protection, Antiterriorism, and Illegal Control Act of 2005. This called for mandatory fencing along 698 miles of the almost 2000-mile border, that is, building “un muro” (a wall) to cut through again the dismembered territories that used to be part of the Mexican body.14 To deter, cut, and block Mexican and other Central Americans’ crossing has become a widely endorsed call, because it has “fittingly” become a synonym for defending American interests and American values in the north of the fencing. Self evidently, the border fencing or the muro/wall building between the two countries intensifies the cultural war. The reinforced fence along the entire US-Mexico border in general, and around the area of the Rio Grande Valley in particular—a major battle ground in the Mexican-American War—is crudely evocative of a historic wound and makes it bleed again. Hunter’s amendment does not really have any regard to history. President George W. Bush signed the Secure Fence Act of 2006 on Oct 26, 2006. Subsequently, triple-layered fencing and sometimes a vehicle fence are frequent sights along the border. For more than a decade, ironically, the US lawmakers have been reopening the wound or the scar (in Anzaldúa’s term) culturally while doing their jobs to secure the border. Trump is now determined to make this cut even deeper. One can only imagine the pain and hurt that the US administration’s approach would have brought to Gloria Anzaldúa if she were still living among us.The wall with its steal and concrete, its miles of barbed wire, check points, border patrol, array of flood lights to maximize visibility, cameras, and sensors for permanent and constant supervision, mirror many of the techniques of the prison and migration detention center,

which again mirror the increased security, supervision, and prison-like workplace conditions that often employ undocumented workers. It is thus no coincidence that the Secure Fence Act,Operation Catch and Detain, and Immigration Workplace Enforcement were all proposed to Congress at the same time. They are three prongs of the border wall itself: sovereignty, discipline, and biopower.39 Build a wall, discipline the bodies of those who cross, and make a profit from deporting the rest.

The wall is a vital part of the production of a “dangerous” migrant – much like detention centers are important because of what they represent, the Wall presents the ultimate consolidation of national identiyty Nail, 13 [Thomas, University of Denver, The Crossroads of Power: Michel Foucault and the US/Mexico Border Wall, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3c7a/664f85c79ec035aabe1d52ebcff1d0664440.pdf]Several common features can also characterize the second group of political strategies I want to distinguish: detention, surveillance, and the training of migratory life. The common features of these strategies are the features Foucault uses to define the concept of disciplinary power. Let us thus continue examining this next set of strategies in action.The border wall is not merely a physical barrier on a territory that kills migrants, although it does do this. The border wall is also part of a series of behavioral technologies within a wall–prison–workplace system designed to create an obedient, docile, permanently surveilled, and “criminalized” body. Despite the fact that being in the US without authorization is a civil infraction and not a criminal one, migrants are surveilled, arrested, processed, and detained for long periods of time “as if” they were criminals and through this are actually criminalized.36 Legally unauthorized migrants are not criminals, but become so as an effect of disciplinary strategies. This is one of the differences between sovereign strategies and disciplinary ones. The multiple attempts made by migrants to cross the wall are also part of a process of disciplinary training. The success rate of illegal migration, on the second or third try, is upwards of 95 percent, according to immigration scholar Wayne Cornelius.37 The wall thus continues to exist precisely because it is a vital part of the production of the model migrant: persistent, obedient, quiet, and able to endure hardship and danger. As George W. Bush put it “family values do not stop at the Rio Grande. Latinos enrich our country with faith in God, a strong ethic of work, community, and responsibility... Immigration is not a problem to be solved, it is the sign of a successful nation.”38 Immigration is not a problem for disciplinary strategies it is an opportunity for disciplinary strategies! It is an opportunity to train a nation of docile and obedient bodies.

AT: No Risk of Port Attack

Maritime terrorism is likely – groups have the means and opportunityNincic, 12 [Donna, Professor Emerita at California Maritime Academy, Maritime terrorism: how real is the threat? https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/maritime-terrorism-how-real-threat/]Despite these threats, given the relative recent quiet on the maritime front, how concerned should we be about maritime terrorism? The answer, unfortunately, is that we should continue to be very concerned. A former UK First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff deemed maritime terrorism “a clear and present danger” that may “potentially cripple global trade and have grave knock-on effects on developed economies.” USN Captain Jim Pelkofski (Ret.) has noted that “indications point to an acceleration of the pace of maritime terrorism, heralding a coming campaign.”The real concern however is not so much that a maritime terrorist attack might or might not be imminent; rather the threat is the potential for harm were even one minor maritime terrorist event to occur in a major port or maritime facility. Hijacking and using a ship as a weapon or to sink and close a major shallow chokepoint such as the Strait of Malacca or the Suez Canal could have significant economic implications for the global economy. Similarly, an improvised explosive device (IED), chemical or biological weapon, or other weapon of mass destruction discovered in a container could have dramatic economic repercussions. A 2003 OECD report described a port security war game simulating the discovery of several radiological devices in shipping containers throughout ports in the United States. Despite the fact that these devices were not detonated in the scenario, the estimated economic costs totaled $58bn for the United States alone, with US ports affected for over three months.Depending on the measure, between 80% and 90% of global trade moves by sea, with the majority of non-bulk cargo carried in shipping containers. Over 15,000,000 containers are currently in circulation, making over 200,000,000 port visits annually. The world’s top ten container ports handled 178,000 thousand TEU (twenty foot equivalents) in 2010, nearly as much as the next 40 ports together (179,070 thousand TEU). With trade concentrated in so few ports in today’s global economy, even a single maritime terrorist incident has the potential for significant economic disruptions with considerable financial and human implications. Given these potential impacts, the threat of maritime terrorism must continue to be taken very seriously.

2NC Port Terrorism – Economy Impact

Any disruption in our maritime commerce would severely damage the economyBouchard, 5 [Joseph F., Joseph F., Former Navy Captain and Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science from Stanford University, 6/15/05, Center for American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2005/06/b815195.html, “New Strategies to Protect America: Safer Ports for a More Secure Economy,”]The United States is a maritime nation. We rely upon and profit from global commerce worth trillions of dollars. Any major disruption of these worldwide supply chains will instantly create billions of dollars in economic loss and create cascading effects in every corner of the world. Against this backdrop of risk, the Bush administration and its Department of Homeland Security have failed to dedicate sufficient resources to adequately protect the maritime transportation system that is vital to our society, economy and way of life. Port security is currently an unfunded mandate and that situation will deteriorate because the Bush administration plans to eliminate the specific grant program - poorly funded as it is - that supports municipal, state and private sector owners and operators as they attempt to implement security plans required by the MTSA. The Center for American Progress proposes a four-point strategy that will lead to safer ports and make our people and economy more secure. The optimum strategy for protecting maritime transportation requires a risk-based approach to integrating security, consequence reduction, and emergency preparedness and continuity of business into comprehensive plans and programs for enhancing the resilience of the maritime transportation system. Its major features include: Revising Coast Guard maritime facility security regulations and, if necessary, amending MTSA to emphasize risk assessments focused on the threat and consequences of a terrorist attack rather than vulnerability; Increasing attention to risk mitigation, preparedness and continuity of operations to enable the maritime transportation security system to recover quickly in the event of a terrorist attack, reducing the economic consequences of a severe disruption, thereby denying attackers their central strategic goal; Maintaining the existing Port Security Grant Program, creating greater program flexibility for an improved return on investment and increasing annual funding to a minimum of $500 million per year in order to eliminate the current mismatch between strategy and resources and make port security a funded federal mandate; and Establishing a national port security trust fund by dedicating a specific percentage of customs revenue collected on goods flowing through our nation's ports in order to ensure long-term sustainability of our maritime transportation system security. This report focuses on security measures at or near U.S. shores. It is limited in scope to policies and issues directly related to MTSA implementation and its impact on the 361 commercial ports in the United States; roughly 3,700 maritime facilities, including cargo and passenger terminals, in those ports; and approximately 60,000 ships that arrive in U.S. ports annually, including about 8,100 foreign flag vessels. Although cargo, container and supply chain security are mentioned in MTSA, these very important issues will only be tangentially covered. Port security also encompasses what is termed "maritime domain awareness," which includes security on the high seas and abroad. The emphasis is on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the agencies within it, particularly the U.S. Coast Guard, not other federal departments and agencies that play important but supporting roles.

Decline causes global nuclear war Tønnesson, 15 [Stein, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311]Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four

conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and

drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or

unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this

context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities.

If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline

then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and

ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities.

Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly , i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a

third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the

US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present

circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon ,

and unreliably so . Deterrence could lose its credibility : one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

Port Terrorism – Economy Impacts

Economic decline causes Trump to start diversionary warFoster, 16 [Dennis, Professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military Institute, “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?” The Washington Post, 19 Dec, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-might-well-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?utm_term=.fd514cf55315]If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war ? Since the

age of Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home. By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy.¶ One often-cited

example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all)

political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy.¶ In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends in part on their psychological traits — how they frame the world, process information and develop

plans of action. Certain traits predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior .¶ Do words translate into foreign

policy action?¶ One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the

more likely they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force.¶ For one, conceptually simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats.

Distrustful leaders typically favor military action and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively.¶ Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering economy

— leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention

from the problem, utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident ( military force ).¶ Based on our

analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do so.¶ What about Donald Trump?¶ Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s agenda, especially his

promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to his side via military action.¶ I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across

24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The graph below

shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents.¶ These results are startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself, his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous high. The data suggest that Americans have

elected a leader who, if his campaign rhetoric is any indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern

presidents in his active suspicion of those unlike himself and his inner circle, and those who disagree with his goals.¶ As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.”¶ A possible implication for military action¶ I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force.¶ But

the model would predict that a president with Trump ’s numbers would respond to even a

minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force . For example, were the misery index

(aggregate inflation and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.

Economic decline causes conflictPamlin and Armstrong, 15 [Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager, Global Challenges Foundation, Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 2015 (“Global Challenges: 12 Risks that Threaten Human Civilization,” Global Challenges Foundation, February 2015, http://www.astro.sunysb.edu/fwalter/HON301/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact-full-report-1.pdf]Often economic collapse is accompanied by social chaos, civil unrest and sometimes a breakdown of law and order. Societal collapse usually refers to the fall or disintegration of human societies, often along with their life support systems. It broadly includes both quite abrupt societal failures typified by collapses, and more extended gradual declines of superpowers. Here only the former is included. The world economic and political system is made up of many actors with many objectives and many links between them. Such intricate, interconnected systems are subject to unexpected system-wide failures due to the structure of the network311 – even if each component of the network is reliable. This gives rise to systemic risk: systemic risk occurs when parts that individually may function well become vulnerable when connected as a system to a self-reinforcing joint risk that can spread from part to part (contagion), potentially affecting the entire system and possibly spilling over to related outside systems.312 Such effects have been observed in such diverse areas as ecology,313 finance314 and critical infrastructure315 (such as power grids). They are characterised by the possibility that a small internal or external disruption could cause a highly non-linear effect,316 including a cascading failure that infects the whole system,317 as in the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The possibility of collapse becomes more acute when several independent networks depend on each other, as is increasingly the case (water supply, transport, fuel and power stations are strongly coupled, for instance).318 This dependence links social and technological systems as well.319 This trend is likely to be intensified by continuing globalisation,320 while global governance and regulatory mechanisms seem inadequate to address the issue.321 This is possibly because the tension between resilience and efficiency322 can even exacerbate the problem.323 Many triggers could start such a failure cascade, such as the infrastructure damage wrought by a coronal mass ejection,324 an ongoing cyber conflict, or a milder form of some of the risks presented in the rest of the paper. Indeed the main risk factor with global systems collapse is as something which may exacerbate some of the other risks in this paper, or as a trigger. But a simple global systems collapse still poses risks on its own. The productivity of modern societies is largely dependent on the careful matching of different types of capital325 (social, technological, natural...) with each other. If this matching is disrupted, this could trigger a “social collapse” far out of proportion to the initial disruption.326 States and institutions have collapsed in the past for seemingly minor systemic reasons.327 And institutional collapses can create knock-on effects, such as the descent of formerly prosperous states to much more impoverished and destabilising entities.328 Such processes could trigger damage on a large scale if they weaken global political and economic systems to such an extent that secondary effects (such as conflict or starvation) could cause great death and suffering.

Terrorism Turns Case

Terrorism causes the U.S. to seal the border and crack down on immigrantsIgnatieff, 4 [Michael, Professor of Human Rights – Harvard University, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, p. 153-154]It is a commonplace of presidential and prime ministerial rhetoric to insist that their democracies cannot lose in a war on terror. My own analysis thus far has confirmed that no democracy has ever been toppled by a terrorist campaign, unless other factors, like economic collapse or military defeat, were present too. But faced with terrorism that deploys weapons of mass destruction, we cannot be as certain that the historical pattern, argued for in this book, would prevail in the future.In other words, we could lose.What would defeat look like? It would not be like invasion, conquest, or occupation, of course, but rather would entail the disintegration of our institutions and way of life. A succession of mass casualty attacks, using weapons of mass destruction, would leave behind zones of devastation sealed off for years and a pall of mourning, anger, and fear hanging over our public and private lives. Such attacks would destroy the existential security on which democracy depends. Recurrent attacks with weapons of mass destruction might not just kill hundreds of thousands of people. We might find our selves living with a national security state on permanent alert, with sealed borders, constant identity checks, and permanent detention camps for suspicious aliens and recalcitrant citizens. A successful attack would poison the wellsprings of trust among strangers that make the relative liberty of liberal democracy possible. Our police forces might descend to torturing suspects in order to prevent future attacks, and our secret security forces might engage in direct assassination of perpetrators or mere suspects as well. Our military might itself use weapons of mass destruction against terrorist enemies. If our institutions were unable to stop the attacks, the state's monopoly of force might even break down, as citizens took the law into their own hands seeking to defend themselves against would-be perpetrators. Vigilantes would patrol blighted and deserted streets.This is what the face of defeat might look like. We would survive, but we would no longer recognize ourselves or our institutions. We would exist but lose our identity as free people.

Wall Bad – Structural Violence Impact

Building the wall would result in violence and death against migrant populationsForan, 15 [Clare, Former associate at The Atlantic, Donald Trump’s Border Wall Could Have Deadly Consequences, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/donald-trumps-border-wall-could-have-deadly-consequences/445548/]Donald Trump wants America to build a permanent wall at the U.S.-Mexico border. "We'll have a great wall. We'll call it the Great Wall of Trump," the real estate mogul told Fox Business recently. If that ever happens, the consequences could be deadly for the hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants who attempt to cross the border each year, many of whom are unlikely to be deterred by even the greatest of walls. Tightening security at America's southern border will inevitably make it more difficult to illegally traverse. But immigration and security experts warn that any effort to seal off the border will also make conditions more dangerous for the unauthorized immigrants who still try to make it over. On top of that, the more difficult it becomes to cross the border, the more likely undocumented migrants are to turn to smugglers for help getting across, a cycle that fuels illegal activity and props up networks of organized crime."All of this would have unintended consequences," said Rey Koslowski, an expert on border control and homeland security, and a political science professor at the State University of New York at Albany. "As the border becomes increasingly difficult to get over, routes become more dangerous, and if people have money, they will pay even more for someone to get them to the other side."Trump promises that his immigration agenda "will make America great again." And the platform has won praise in conservative circles. Scott Walker and Ted Cruz, two of Trump's challengers in the 2016 GOP field, have applauded the agenda, with Walker rushing to point out that he also supports a U.S.-Mexico border wall.The real estate mogul's pledge to overhaul immigration policy devotes a lot of time to talking about how illegal immigration harms American citizens. It does not, however, wade into the impact that Trump's platform is likely to have on undocumented immigrants—a potentially unintended, but very real, consequence of strict border security.Consider the numbers: Research shows an uptick in migrant deaths at the border in the years following efforts by the U.S. to tighten security and construct fences to keep undocumented immigrants out.In 2006, the federal Government Accountability Office found that border-crossing deaths doubled after the U.S. ramped up border security in the mid-1990s—even though there did not appear to be a corresponding uptick in undocumented migration during that time.The University of Arizona published a 2013 report similarly showing that a rise in migrant deaths at the border coincided with stepped up border enforcement and security.For now, much of the fencing at the U.S.-Mexico border can be found in and around urban areas. That has pushed unauthorized immigrants to traverse the border in far more remote and dangerous places, such as stretches of borderland made up of vast and unforgiving desert. "With increased enforcement at the border, we have seen a spike of migrants dying in the heat, in the mountains, in the rivers," said Fernando Garcia, the founding director of the

Border Network for Human Rights, a nonprofit based in El Paso, Texas and southern New Mexico. "This is a human rights crisis. Hundreds of people are dying at the border." A permanent wall would ensure that crossing anywhere along the dividing line between the U.S. and Mexico would carry heightened risk. The question then is: What would happen to anyone attempting to cross illegally who does not turn back as a result? Advocates for strict border security insist that fencing and U.S. Customs and Border Protection patrols have proven effective. And if a wall were to be built along the entire border, some say that might lessen the incentive that people now have to traverse the most dangerous borderlands. "If there is no end to the fence then arguably it might be less likely that people would cross in remote desert areas. The reason people cross in places like that is because it's easier to cross, but if you had a fence everywhere that would no longer be true," said Mark Krikorian, the executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, a think tank that supporters tighter controls on immigration.Collecting—and drawing precise conclusions from—border crossing statistics is notoriously difficult. But there has been a decline in apprehensions of undocumented immigrants at the southern border in the years since America's border security buildup. Advocates of stricter security point to that statistic as evidence that border controls work. And last year, the number of deaths at the southern border was estimated by the U.S. government at 307, a 15-year record low. Still, no barrier will ever be high enough or secure enough to completely halt attempts to cross the border illegally. And the more obstacles that stand in the way, the more perilous it will be to cross. "A wall can slow someone down. It can compel them to change the route they take. But when people want to cross, whatever the motivation is, they will find a way to cross," said Marc Pierini, the former European Union ambassador to Turkey and a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe.Available statistics also point to a rise in smuggling as enforcement along the border has tightened, a trend that might intensify if the U.S. builds a permanent border wall. Data from the Mexican Migration Project, a yearly survey of Mexicans on both sides of the border carried out by Princeton University and the University of Guadalajara, shows a sharp uptick in the share of undocumented immigrants from Mexico that made use of smugglers over the period from 1975 to 2006.

AT: Terror Talk/Threat Construction

Targeted anti-terror policies are key --- the alternative is broader, more repressive policiesLeiken, 4 [Robert S., Director of the Immigration and National Security Program at the Nixon Center, non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, 2004, “Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11,” online: http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/Leiken_Bearers_of_Global_Jihad.pdf]Public opinion has backed government measures to monitor immigrants in connection with 9/11. But these steps have aroused widespread complaints from civil rights organizations, immigration watchdogs, Arab- and Muslim- American organizations and editorialists. The main burden of these complaints has been that these policies violated civil liberties and discriminated against Muslims. A seemingly opposing line of complaint has been that post 9/11 immigration policies have failed to enforce laws pertaining to the large number of illegal aliens and criminal aliens who are at the same time illegal.It is true that some of our post-9/11 policies appear to have been motivated as much by politics and opinion polls as by national security. Moreover, under extraordinary circumstances, law enforcement officials have made their share of mistakes in implementing those policies. But both sets of complaints (ethnic or religious profiling and ignoring illegals) miss the mark. The criticisms lose sight of the central goal of aligning immigration/national security policy to the challenge posed by Islamic terrorism. Both sorts of criticism divert attention from the main danger to the country and from our very limited capacity to confront that danger at our borders and within our immigrant communities.With little information on what was being hatched, or by whom, the Bush administration occasionally resorted to blanket measures, most notably the INS “special registration” which we analyze in Chapter VIII and Appendix A. But if we found ourselves groping in the dark at a nebulous enemy, the remedy is not inaction but light. To the extent that our intelligence improves, our policies can become more targeted. But improving intelligence after a long downward slide during which a fanatical and diligent conspiracy developed will not happen overnight. What do we do meanwhile?Our endeavor is to focus the national security lens on immigration policy and to conceptualize the post-9/11 nexus between counterterrorism and immigration policies. That entails identifying threats and then fashioning policies to meet them. The sharper the identification, the more targeted the policy. We shall evaluate individual policies in accordance with this maxim.

The state is a rational actor and can accurately predict threats- especially in the context of terror studiesRavenal, 9 [Earl C, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies @ Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget. Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1 (2009) 21-75, A.H]The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for

Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:¶ In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)¶ Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:¶ Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.¶ There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.¶ This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal

2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I

have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases

nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived

or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short , state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of

foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-

promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for

national defense.¶ Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation

—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.¶ My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and

generic treatment of role.¶ Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually

every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of

the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”;

rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the

treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power

and capabilities of other nations .¶ Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national

interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence.

They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not

“socially constructed ” (even though, of course, some values are).¶ A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend

to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to

operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement

in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national

interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

Their alternative breeds more terrorismPeters, 11 [Ralph, Former Military Officer and Author of Parameters, Lines of Fire, p. 242]And we shall hear that killing terrorists only creates more terrorists. This is sophomoric nonsense.

The surest way to swell the ranks of terror is to follow the approach we did in the decade before 9/11 and do nothing of substance. Success breeds success. Everybody loves a winner. The clichés exist because they’re true. Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups metastasized because they were viewed in the Muslim world as standing up to the West successfully and handing the Great Satan America embarrassing defeats with impunity. Some fanatics will flock to the standard of terror, no matter

what we do. But it’s far easier for Islamic societies to purge themselves of terrorists if the terrorists are on the losing end of the global struggle than if they’re al-lowed to become triumphant heroes to every jobless, unstable teenager in the Middle East and beyond. Far worse than fighting such a war of attrition aggressively is to pretend you’re not in one while your enemy keeps on killing you. Even the occupation of Iraq is a war of attrition. We’re doing remarkably well, given the restrictions under which our forces operate. But no grand maneuvers, no gestures of humanity, no offers of conciliation, and no compromises will persuade the terrorists to halt their efforts to disrupt the development of a democratic, rule-of-law Iraq. On the contrary, anything less than relentless pursuit, with both preemptive and retaliatory action, only encourages the terrorists and remaining Baathist gangsters.

There is no root cause of terrorismWeiner, 88 [Justus R. Weiner, Director of the Division of American Law and former Assistant Professor of International Relations and Law at Boston University School of Law, “Terrorism: Israel’s Legal Responses”, 14 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 184, 1988]

Political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and others theorize why terrorist acts are committed against Israeli targets. One popular theory is the “root cause .” This thesis claims that were not for the frustration, deprivation, and misery of the Palestinian people, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would not commit acts of terrorism. A typical intellectual argument excusing PLO terror reasons: “Shying away from analyzing the motives for terror, or the political, economic and historical environments that breed it, overlooks the often symbiotic relationship between a terrorist and the governments and policies he fights against.” Others go one step further and turn an explanation into a justification. Yassir Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committtee, argued: “The use of the pro-Israeli media of the word ‘terrorism’ does not intimidate us, especially when it is used by forces that have colonialized peoples for hundreds of years, and accused freedom fighters of being ‘terrorists’ when they fought against occupation, terrorism and racial discrimination until they won their independence….” Regrettably, this justification has gained considerable support at the United Nations. Benzion Netanyahu, the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, has written in response: The typical stratagem at the United Nations, for example, has been to justify terrorism by calling it a struggle for national liberation. This is perverse enough in itself, because terrorism is always unjustifiable, regardless of professed or real goals. But it is perverse in another way. For the real goals of terrorists are in practice related to their methods. History has repeatedly given us advance warning. Those who deliberately butcher women and children do not have liberation in mind. It is not only that the ends of terrorists do not justify the means that they chose. It is that the choice of means indicates what the true ends are. Far from being fighters for freedom, the terrorists are the forerunners of a new tyranny. It is instructive to note that the French Resistance did not resort to the systematic killing of German women and children, well within reach in occupied France. A few years later, in Algeria, the FLN showed no such restraint against French occupation. France, of course, is today a democracy. Algeria is mearly another of the despotisms where terrorists have come to power. Realistically, the “root cause” theory should be recognized as the “ root cause fallacy .” This is because, on a global basis, there is scant evidence to support any direct correlation between those who have suffered and those who commit acts of terrorism. Indeed on both an individual and group level, many of those who have suffered most scrupulously avoid such acts. The PLO, by contrast, purports to represent the Palestinian people, a group with options for non-violent political action and resources including wealth and education. Yet the PLO deliberately engages in terrorist acts while eschewing all other means of political redress. Any Arab leader showing the slightest inclination towards accommodation with Israel has risked assassination. Thus, PLO terror should be recognized as a cause for, not the result of, Palestinian frustration, desperation, and misery.

CounterplanCounterplan Text: The United States Executive Branch should reform its detention of asylum seekers and create oversight mechanisms, including:

-establishing an independent review board that enforces legally binding standards for detention practices and facilities,

-improving human rights and legal training for immigration enforcement officials,

-eliminating the use of privately contracted detention facilities and personnel,

-minimizing the use of discretionary detention and prolonged detention times.

Oversight is needed in the detention system to minimize extreme cases of abuse – these mechanisms send a clear signal to detention centers that they must improve treatment of detaineesSthanki, 13 [Monica, Clinical Instructor at the University of District Columbia School of Law, Deconstructing Detention: Structural Impunity and the Need for Intervention, Lexis]III. Two Pronged Approach: Establishing Strong Accountability and OversightThis Article argues that the reform of the New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD") should be used as an instructive model to reform the U.S. immigration detention system. Similar to the NOPD, the U.S. immigration detention system has reached a moment of crisis where abuse occurs with impunity, individual detainees have no recourse for abuse, and the DHS as an agency has failed to take effective actions towards internal reform. The reform of the NOPD has created a strong accountability mechanism to deter abuses, and oversight to prevent them. The same two-pronged approach is necessary in the U.S. immigration detention system.A. The Civil Rights Reform of the NOPDThe New Orleans Police Department has historically been plagued by accusations of official misconduct, violent police brutality, and extensive corruption. Steeped in legacies of Jim Crow and one of the highest per capita incarceration rates in the world, the NOPD is a notorious civil rights abuser. In August 2005, the destruction [*491] of New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina thrust New Orleans (and its police department) into the national spotlight. Thousands of New Orleans residents were stranded in flooded homes without food or water and a sense of lawlessness overtook the city. News media and local citizens reported killings of unarmed civilians by members of the NOPD. In one well-known incident, a NOPD officer, David Warren, shot an unarmed man, Henry Glover, in the chest for allegedly stealing goods from a local strip mall on September 4, 2005. Accompanying NOPD officers refused to transport Mr. Glover to a local hospital for medical assistance, and he died from the wound. NOPD officers burned Mr. Glover's body in an attempt to destroy the evidence. Supervising NOPD officers then drafted false police reports and lied to

federal agents investigating the crime. DOJ investigated and prosecuted the officers involved in the Glover incident and on December 9, 2010, three NOPD officers were found guilty. In another incident, several NOPD officers opened fire on unarmed civilians on Danziger Bridge, injuring several and killing two: James Brissette and Ronald Madison. Ronald Madison, a forty-year-old mentally ill man, was shot several times in the back as he attempted to run away from the gunfire. NOPD officers arrested Lance Madison, Ronald's brother, and accused him of firing at the police officers. After a local investigation into the incident, the New Orleans district attorney declined to pursue criminal charges against the NOPD officers. Shortly afterward, DOJ intervened and used federal civil rights statutes to launch investigations and prosecutions, and eventually obtained several convictions. [*492] Stories of horrific abuse by the NOPD in the aftermath of Katrina covered front pages of newspapers worldwide, and it became clear that these incidents were not isolated but rather were indicative of a systemic problem within the department. In 2010, after several DOJ investigations and prosecutions, the newly elected mayor of New Orleans, Mitchell Landrieu, invited the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ to investigate abuses within the NOPD. DOJ drafted an extensive report detailing the nature of abuses in the department. The report found that the NOPD was engaging in patterns of using excessive force, unconstitutional stops, searches and arrests, biased policing, and other civil rights violations. The report recommended an overhaul of the NOPD, and in July 2012, the city of New Orleans entered into a consent decree with DOJ to reform the NOPD. The agreement is the United States' most expansive consent decree and consists of a 492 point court-enforced action plan to reform the NOPD. The reform is currently overseen by an [*493] appointed court monitor and a U.S. District Judge. The consent decree establishes a two-pronged approach of accountability and oversight. First, the decree requires the NOPD to establish internal mechanisms such as use of force policies, investigations, and weapons usage. The 140-page consent decree outlines in explicit detail the specific reform efforts the NOPD must undertake in order to build accountability from within the department. If officers do not comply, the threat (or existence) of criminal prosecution for civil rights abuses remains a possibility. Second, the decree creates an oversight mechanism as it establishes clear timelines by which tasks must be undertaken and appoints a special monitor to oversee and ensure that the NOPD complies with the decree. At all times, the NOPD is subject to oversight by DOJ, the monitor, and a federal judge - thus ensuring compliance with the decree. While the long-term success of the NOPD consent decree remains to be seen, in the short term, it creates mechanisms of oversight and accountability that were not in place prior to the consent decree. This Article argues a similar model providing oversight and accountability should be used in the immigration detention context. The factual circumstances surrounding NOPD abuse and immigration detention abuse are not identical; however, the structural impunity embedded in both institutions have historically created an environment that shields (and sometimes promotes) abuse.

Improved oversight solves detention reformSthanki, 13 [Monica, Clinical Instructor at the University of District Columbia School of Law, Deconstructing Detention: Structural Impunity and the Need for Intervention, Lexis]The key to establishing accountability and oversight of civil rights abuses is externalization . In the context of the NOPD reform, the externalization of investigation, prosecution, and ultimately the judicial consent decree were key factors leading to reform. Although the NOPD had a notorious reputation for abuse, local New Orleans officials had not demonstrated the

political will to truly reform the system prior to Hurricane Katrina. After the storm, the local New Orleans district attorney failed to prosecute officers for misconduct and the extent of officer malfeasance was only exposed after a federal investigation and prosecution.The externalization of oversight is crucial because an agency is less likely to prosecute its own agents or give an unbiased opinion of a potential act of wrongdoing. This conflict of interest is a common occurrence in police brutality cases where local law enforcement agencies are unwilling to investigate abuse within their own agency (or in some cases engage in attempts to cover up allegations of abuse). For example, the district attorney in Screws "blamed his inability to prosecute" the police officers "on the fact that he had no substantial independent investigative facilities, and had to rely upon local sheriffs and policemen to conduct investigations." He explained that the local sheriffs and policemen would not investigate abuse because they were either involved in the incident or [*498] sympathized with the individuals accused of abuse. In the prosecutions of police officers in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, several supervising NOPD officers were convicted of covering up the abusive acts of other officers. The culture of the NOPD in the aftermath of Katrina was one that celebrated abuse and the misuse of power. In 2007 when the NOPD officers involved in the shooting turned themselves in, they were patted on the back and called heroes by their fellow officers. A similar culture exists within DHS and immigration detention facilities. DHS cannot be relied upon to investigate and/or prosecute its own agency. ICE officials have repeatedly engaged in attempts to cover up misconduct, and a culture of abuse within detention centers celebrates and even condones detainee abuse. The structure of oversight and accountability within DHS only fosters the culture of abuse.

Solvency – Oversight

Oversight and training has the ultimate goal of minimizing detention – the counterplan removes the capability for ICE to detain indiscriminatelyGryll, 11 [Sarah, JD Candidate – Emory University School of Law, Immigration Detention Reform: No Band-Aid Desired, 60 Emory L. J. 1211, Lexis]ICE should take two interconnected steps to reduce discretionary detainee determinations. First, it should focus on making more individualized determinations of detention. This requires that ICE issue clear standards to all units regarding the factors to consider when ICE officers encounter aliens. These factors should include humanitarian issues such as the need for medical care and sole-caregiver status, as well as the alien's risk of flight and danger to the community. Currently ICE agents are prone to err on the side of detention because of uncertainties in the law, which is resulting in inconsistencies in its application by ICE across all its units. If ICE officers could make discretionary detention determinations based on clearer standards, they would feel more comfortable making individualized determinations.While standardized regulations will alleviate a great deal of the arbitrariness inherent in the current exercise of discretion, discretion in and of itself connotes some degree of personal judgment. Thus, different ICE officers will still vary in the ways they make discretionary detention determinations. But, giving them a set of factors to consider in their determinations will dramatically reduce this arbitrariness. This Comment does not propose bright-line rules; ICE officers are supposed to have discretion in those cases where [*1254] the alien does not fall into a mandatory detention category. Rather, this Comment suggests providing a list of standards on which ICE officers can depend in these situations. These standards will ensure each alien individual consideration because ICE officers will look at the specifics of an alien's circumstances by taking account of such factors as medical needs and danger to the community. This in turn will allow for more uniformity across ICE units; ICE officers everywhere will be employing the same criteria in their detention determinations. Thus, ICE officers would make an individualized assessment of the alien and her circumstances, and then based on the ICE standards, the officers would make a detention determination.Second, ICE should create more and continuing training opportunities for its officers and require that they be informed of all legal developments that could potentially affect their detention decisions. This will ensure that the officers are making decisions in line with current law and ICE regulations. In conjunction with training, ICE should effectively communicate the objective criteria ICE officers must use in detention determinations and all legal developments to ICE officers by memorializing them in manuals. Better training, in combination with comprehensive manuals, will help ensure uniformity in ICE officers' exercises of discretion by clarifying what criteria ICE officers should consider when making detention decisions. In particular, training based on these new standards will impose greater uniformity throughout the agency by guaranteeing that ICE officers across the country are following the same guidelines and rules when exercising discretionary detention determinations. [*1255] These steps will help guarantee the end goal, which is to ensure greater uniformity in the exercise of discretion across all ICE units. Uniform regulations throughout the agency combined with training to educate officers on how to exercise their discretion, as well as consistent updates on new legal developments, will guarantee that ICE officers are employing discretion uniformly across the country. Properly implemented, these measures will reduce arbitrariness by creating and communicating consistent, clear standards regarding

discretionary detention determinations. And, ultimately, they will reduce costs and relieve pressures on the immigration detention system by lowering the number of detained immigrants.

Oversight and training will minimize the risk of abuse in detention facilitiesHamilton, 11 [Kimberly R., JD from University of Tennessee College of Law, Immigrant Detention Centers in the United States and International Human Rights Law, Lexis]VI. RecommendationsA. Enforceable StandardsThe most crucial and urgent recommendation for the improvement of the detention system is to make ICE standards enforceable and legally binding. This will [*129] increase the legitimacy of the detention system by improving accountability and allowing detainees recourse, if and when they suffer human rights abuses. While ICE may contend that it is capable of policing itself, none of their actions up through the present supports this contention. Until ICE's internal reports begin to show effective monitoring, oversight, and compliance, questions regarding ICE's ability to carry out this task will remain. Furthermore, enforceable standards will assist in identifying ICE officers, as well as local law enforcement officers who enforce federal immigration laws, who are not in compliance with the standards and correct such behavior patterns or permanently remove such individuals from office.As an alternative to making ICE's PBNDS legally enforceable, ICE could provide legally enforceable standards such as medical care and leave other standards as discretionary. This provides ICE the flexibility that it wants, yet still protects crucial areas where discretion is dangerous by providing legally enforceable standards. Until the current ICE standards are converted into enforceable regulations, the current ICE standards should be monitored more effectively. ICE has begun to do this and it is reflected in its annual reports. This is an important measure because ICE sets forth what it asserts is an honest assessment of the current state of its standards enforcement. Nevertheless, non-ICE groups should have access to detention facilities to monitor the implementation of the new standards as a way to check against ICE's standards enforcement.B. TrainingAnother extremely important aspect of these new standards is to ensure that the subcontracted and private-prison-contracted facilities are clear on what the new standards entail, and that ICE train them regarding the implementation of such standards. This is especially important given that the majority of detainees are held in non-ICE facilities. ICE could station employees at these facilities to have more direct oversight and to decrease the distance existing between ICE and non-ICE facilities.In addition to making sure that the subcontracted facilities and private prison officers receive the necessary training, it is crucial that ICE officers receive adequate training. This includes expanded cultural sensitivity and international human rights law trainings. Even though ultimately ICE is responsible for violations of international human rights law, it is important that ICE employees or subcontracted employees are aware of such international norms, and it is equally important that these norms are included in ICE's standards and policies.Another area where training is imperative is in the implementation of the 287(g) agreements. As a report from the Congressional Research Services noted, "since federal immigration law is a complex body of law, it requires extensive training and expertise to adequately enforce." The need for training is particularly important in the context of local law enforcement officials taking on the enforcement of immigration laws. Moreover, improved standards' implementation

monitoring will create an ongoing process by revealing information about other areas that need improved training.

Solvency – Ending Private Detention

Ending private detention solves the worst forms of abuseTrueman, 12 [Grace, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, JD, 89 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 339, Pocketing a pretty penny: sexual victimization, human rights, and private contractors in the U.S. immigration detention system, Lexis]The similarities play a role, in the minds of some ICE authorities and critics, in the exacerbation of misconduct within the U.S. immigration detention system. The evidence also points to contract detention facilities as perpetrators of sexual victimization. As such, private contract detention facilities should be eliminated as a means of detention. The use of private contractors is incongruous with the purpose of U.S. immigration detention . Private contractors, as publically-traded business entities, are concerned primarily with the bottom line. However, the U.S. immigration detention system seeks to provide "safe, secure and humane conditions for all detainees." Thus, problems will continue because private contractors advocate expanded use of their own detention facilities and are concerned with increasing their profit margin. For example, CCA's "most recently updated contract is worth a total of about $ 700 million over several years, or about $ 197 million annually." This profit-driven prerogative of private detention contractors hinders ICE from achieving its reform objectives and harms detainees.Female detainees are especially at risk by the government's continued use of private contracting companies. Females are more likely than men to be housed in Contract Detention Facilities ("CDFs") and Intergovernmental Services Agreements facilities ("IGSAs"). Approximately sixty-eight percent of females are held in IGSAs and approximately twenty-five [*365] percent in CDFs. Women currently make up nine percent of the entire detained population. 204 Specific needs of women detainees, such as medical concerns, dependent children, and needs as previous victims of sexual abuse, make female immigration detainees targets for sexual victimization within the U.S. immigration detention system. The U.S. government grants private contractors broad discretion in meeting the new reform measures, allowing contractors to retain their government contracts despite poor performance. Even when performance is consistently poor, with numerous human rights violations and incidents of noncompliance with U.S. detention standards, private contractors are still permitted to run facilities. ICE's Director, John Morton, has even acknowledged that the outside contracting facilities have "little supervision or oversight." This persistent problem will not vanish with unenforceable standards and vapid paper statements. The U.S. will continue to violate numerous international human rights laws unless it recognizes the need to eliminate the source of the problem and take action to end detainee abuse. A practical resolution is required.VII. Penny PinchingA. A Practical Resolution to Persistent Problems in U.S. Immigration DetentionElimination of contract detention facilities presents ICE with the opportunity to improve costs, oversight, and compliance within the U.S. immigration detention system. First, costs could be drastically reduced. With more than 300 facilities and a 2.6 billion annual budget, ICE has plenty of resources at its disposal to effectuate these changes. The table below represents the growth in ICE's Detention Removal Operations office and the large increase in ICE's budget over the past few years. From these figures, the potential costs that could be recouped make eliminating contract facilities a first priority for taxpayer relief and the possibility of improving the national deficit. For instance, at the notorious T. Don Hutto [*366] facility, mentioned previously and run through an agreement with CCA, ICE paid $ 2.8 million per month for the private contractor to violate detainee rights, and the facility was not even utilized to its fullest capacity. ICE estimated that approximately $ 900,000 a month could be saved by switching to a female-only facility with maximum capacity. This reform effort is applauded for the positive results it will create, such as reducing the number of facilities to enable better oversight and the increase in female-centric care in the gender specific facility. However, ICE should not have renegotiated with the private contractor whose facilities have been the location of many abusive incidents.One of the new reform principles directly contradicts a continued relationship. For example, ICE stated that it plans to "review contracts for all detention facilities to identify opportunities for improvement and [will] move forward with renegotiation and termination of contracts as warranted." Continued relations with the T. Don Hutto contractor undermines this statement, fails to meet the new reform efforts declaring "zero tolerance" for sexual abuse in detention facilities, and enables further female sexual victimization. Congress has, in fact, created requirements in an effort to improve the quality of the U.S. detention system. One such requirement is that ICE is to discontinue use of any facility with less than satisfactory ratings for two consecutive years." Therefore, when ICE maintains contracts like its agreement with T. Don Hutto, ICE has not only failed to meet its own standards, but Congressional mandates as well. In addition to the per month costs of contract facilities, ICE pays out over $ 200,000 per facility for contractors to monitor conditions. On the other hand, a federal employee's salary, benefits, and training equates to around $ 160,000. The rational choice would be to eliminate the contractors and save about $ 40,000 per facility.Second, oversight and compliance can be improved by the elimination of contract facilities , both IGSAs and CDFs. Currently, critics state that the reform process will be greatly hindered if the sprawling immigration detention system is not reined in. Alternatives to detention are proposed as valid substitutes for those immigration detainees who do not pose a security threat. Implementing more detention alternatives would

help reduce costs. For instance, $ 1.77 billion was spent on custody operations in 2010, while alternative detention programs spent $ 69.9 million. Further, numbers from Detention Watch Network show that alternative detention programs average about $ 12 per day, while the current cost for detention is about $ 122 per person a day, and switching to alternatives to detention would effectively reduce the spread-out immigration detention population currently in holding facilities. Increasing alternative detention methods would improve oversight and compliance with U.S. standards and human rights laws.Eliminating contract facilities must be done with sensitivity to legal obligations and consideration of the entire immigration detention system. Due to the widespread role that contract detention facilities play in the U.S. detention system, and because they hold a large number of detainees, elimination of contract facilities must be done gradually to reduce the strain on other facilities.ConclusionThe U.S. immigration detention system holds approximately 380,000 individuals a year, each with a unique story. Unfortunately, some of those stories involve detainees experiencing sexual abuse and other forms [*368] of misconduct at the hands of fellow detainees and the guards employed to provide them with a safe environment.Sexual victimization in immigration detention facilities deprives detainees of their inherent human dignity, leaving them with scars and a bitter taste of what the United States really has to offer those in need. The detainees are vulnerable and find themselves in a veritable prison system claiming to be a "truly civil detention system." Incidents of sexual victimization violate numerous international human rights laws, including articles within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. In addition, while new efforts to reform the immigration detention system are being implemented, there are some serious deficiencies. Those problems include the lack of enforceable detention standards, the continued penal-like nature of the system, and the continued use of contract detention facilities in the face of misconduct and mismanagement. Contract facilities are lacking in oversight, accountability, and compliance. These contractors appear to be after the bottom line and making a pretty penny, which does not align with ICE's objective to provide "safe, secure and humane conditions for all detainees." The elimination of contract detention facilities is a practical solution to the United States' detainee abuse problem. Doing so will benefit not only the immigration detainees, but also the United States' status as an exemplary nation, showing other nations the right way to detain.

Solvency – Administrative Solutions/AT: Links to Wall DA

Discretionary detention makes the majority of detention cases – administrative changes solves without the need of Congressional involvementNoferi, 14 [Mark, JD Stanford Law School, American Immigration Council, Making Civil Immigration Detention “Civil,” and examining the emerging U.S. civil detention program, 27 J. Civ. Rts. & Econ. Dev. 533]To better tailor detention to its goals, Congress (and DHS, where administratively possible) could first eliminate mandatory detention provisions. Yet discretionary detention still comprises the bulk of detention decisions . Shifting the burden on these decisions to DHS, rather than the noncitizen, would likely reduce incidences of discretionary detention. S. 744 provided an example, but DHS could also implement solutions administratively. Additionally, ICE nationally deployed a risk assessment tool in 2013, which assesses flight and public safety risk and recommends detention and release. Theoretically, the tool has potential to reduce incidence of detention, as it has in some criminal justice jurisdictions . That said, ICE has not made public data on the risk assessment tool, and it is unclear if the [*579] tool has reduced incidence of detention in practice. Duration: Moreover, when detention is imposed, it is often imposed for prolonged periods, sometimes years. At some point, prolonged detention ceases to be proportional to its aims. Even shorter periods of detention of days, weeks or months can be extremely impactful on a detainee's life. For example, those seeking asylum through reinstatement of removal proceedings are detained on average for 111 days until receiving a "reasonable fear" interview, which can cause serious trauma to one whom has been persecuted.The U.S. could impose time limits as European countries have. France, for example, which receives the third-most asylum seekers after the US and Canada, limits short-term detention to 48 hours and longer-term detention to 32 days. Time limits could be achieved through legislation or administrative action. S. 744, for example, required a detention decision within 72 hours, and similar legislation could amend expedited removal and reinstatement provisions. That said, DHS could also self-impose limits through regulation.Nature of Detention: More broadly, ICE could change the nature of its detention facilities, to not require constant incapacitation. Notably, nonsecure (a.k.a. "open") and semi-secure facilities, as used in Europe, would change the physical nature of U.S. detention , to more narrowly tailor a liberty deprivation to the government's goals and the individual's circumstances. This would be part of a genuine spectrum of restrictions, ranging from detention on the most restrictive end to nonsecure or semi-secure facilities, home arrest, electronic tracking, supervision, and at the other end [*580] release on recognizance. Michael Flynn's helpful typology of immigration custody environments defines a "nonsecure" facility as one that does not physically restrain a person from leaving at will, but imposes redetention for violations. Indeed, Flynn calls a "nonsecure" facility "by definition not a detention facility." That is precisely the point, regarding the arguments here. A truly civil detention system, more tailored to its goals, should detain less.Flynn thus distinguishes "secure" facilities which deprive liberty - even where detainees are allowed to move about the facility once inside - from "non-secure" facilities, such as immigration reception centers, which do not physically restrain a person from leaving by guards, barbed-wire fences, or locked doors. Id. Italy, for example, uses nonsecure facilities for asylum seekers, and Belgium uses nonsecure residences for families.

A "semi-secure" facility is one with physical attributes that prevent leaving (i.e. locked doors, guards, or barbed wire), but only partially restricts freedom (for example, allowing individuals to leave during the day but imposing a curfew at night). "Semi-secure" facilities are not much different than U.S. facilities that allow furloughs, depending on the level of restriction. For example, Ireland has a semi-secure facility that encourages application for furloughs of a week or more - not substantially different than the ABA's recommendation for US facilities housing detainees with families. That said, the difference between a "nonsecure" and "semi-secure" facility is whether the default presumption is detention or not, depending on the individual's behavior.It is not clear why nonsecure and semi-secure facilities have not been used in the US, except perhaps tradition. Nor did the ABA or USCIRF recommend non-secure or semi-secure facilities, perhaps for the same reason. Nonsecure and semi-secure facilities would be a marked departure [*581] from current practices . Currently, ICE operates a fairly binary incarceration-or-not system, with nearly half a million detained each year, all in secure facilities, and only about 22,000 supervised in alternatives to detention. Under current law , ICE could build nonsecure and semi-secure facilities and employ them to house most of its current detainees, with the potential exception of detainees in expedited removal, which might require regulatory reinterpretation. Doing so would dramatically change the nature of the US detention system, and likely tailor liberty restrictions better to actual risks.Were such a system of civil custody and supervision implemented - with less, shorter, and a different nature of detention, when used - it might engender differing procedural due process analyses for differing deprivations of liberty. To date, procedural due process doctrine has essentially defined incarceration as a brightline, equivalent to "confinement," with incarceration triggering greater protection than lesser deprivations of liberty. The US does not particularly use nonsecure or semi-secure facilities. And courts have little considered whether lesser restrictive forms of custody than confinement, such as electronic monitoring or supervised release, might trigger lesser procedural protections. In this sense, procedural due process analysis of civil detention might come to reflect Fourth Amendment [*582] case law, which has judicially developed so as to apply a spectrum of differing standards to differing deprivations of liberty. More broadly, it may be necessary to more precisely define terms such as "incarceration," "detention," "custody," and "supervision" to more accurately reflect the spectrum of deprivations of liberty that are increasingly employed.

Normal Means = Congress

Normal means is CongressHong, 17 [Kari, Assistant Professor at Boston College Law School, There is One Clear Way to End Trump’s Immigration Ban: An Act of Congress, http://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2017/02/02/immigration-ban-act-of-congress-kari-hong]But this is where the circus can end. If it is true there is a national interest in banning the people on the administration’s list, Congress simply has to pass a law today stating as such. If it does, courts will defer to the acts of Congress and presume its policy is indeed in the national interest. Equally true, Congress can end the executive order with a simple act saying it is against the law. Within days of the ban, a number of Senators, including Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA), and Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) announced plans to introduce such legislation as soon as possible.This is significant because the act of Congress, not an executive order, is the proper means of resolving refugee and asylum admissions. The Supreme Court essentially ruled as such in 1952 , when it struck down Harry Truman's executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate the nation’s steel mills, that "...[t]he President's power, if any, to issue the [executive] order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."The founders envisioned that Congress would be the most powerful branch, a role that it abdicated over the past eight years by passing legislation at about half the rate  it did during prior presidential terms. Congressional action could and should end a White House and judiciary showdown. Wouldn’t it be something if it is President Trump who makes Congress great again?

Congress makes determinations of who can immigrate and under what circumstances – Normal means is Supreme Court deferenceJulius, 17 [Derek C., Assistant Director, US Department of Justice, Land of the Free? Immigration Detention in the United States, http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-Lawyer-Magazine/2017/May/Land-of-the-Free-Immigration-Detention-in-the-United-States.aspx?FT=.pdf]The Supreme Court held that “the government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”7 As most recently recognized by the Court, that authority rests, in part, on the government’s constitutional power to “establish an [sic] uniform Rule of Naturalization” and its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations.8The Supreme Court has routinely declared that immigration falls within Congress’ and the executive branch’s “plenary power.”9 And without exception, the Supreme Court has upheld Congress’ “plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.”10Under this authority, over the last 200-plus years, Congress has enacted numerous pieces of legislation addressing which aliens should be allowed into the United States, who should be deported, and who should be detained pending resolution of those questions.11In turn, the executive branch has implemented policies and procedures to effectuate these legislative mandates.

Only Congress controls immigrationRosenblum, 2 [Marc R., Assistant Professor of Political Science University of New Orleans, “Congress, the President, and the INS: Who’s in Charge of U.S. Immigration Policy?” http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/Rosenblum%20ISA%202002.pdf]Second, each of these institutional actors also has a wealth of potential resources available to do so. That Congress is a player in immigration policy-making is not in question. Following some early executive-legislative and federal-state turf battles, Congress established its jurisdiction with the Immigration Act of 1882 which imposed a national ban on various “undesirable” migrants. Congress’s authority over immigration was confirmed seven years later when the Supreme Court ruled in the so-called Chinese Exclusion Case that Congress had plenary power to regulate immigration, even when doing so involved overriding international treaties. Since that time, Congress has passed eight separate major immigration laws, amended the basic INA another half-dozen times, and held regular oversight and investigative hearings on a range of immigration issues. Thus, as Loescher and Scanlan (1986: 56) explain, it has been “universally understood that Congress—and not the president—possesse[s] the constitutional authority to set conditions for entry and to fix quota numbers” (emphasis added).3

Cap K

Links

A focus on universal vulnerability directly excludes analysis of capital – the aff’s approach overemphasizes the “shared human condition” while leaving intact the economic bases for exclusionNeilson and Rossiter, 6 [Brett Neilson, senior lecturer in the School of Humanities at the University of Western Sydney and a member of the Centre for Cultural Research, and Ned Rossiter, senior lecturer at the Centre for Media Research, University of Ulster and adjuct research fellow at the Centre for Cultural Research, University of Western Sydney, September 2005, Fiberculture, Issue 5, online: http://www.journal.fibreculture.org/issue5/neilson_rossiter.html, accessed October 1, 2006] Undoubtedly, current perceptions of insecurity are complex and cannot be traced to a single source such as global terrorism, precarity at work, environmental risk, or exposure to the volatility of financial markets (say through pension investments and/or interest rates). At the existential level, these experiences mix or work in concert to create a general feeling of unease. And the conviction that the state (whether conceived on the national scale or in terms of some more extensive sovereign entity like the E.U.) can provide stability in any one of these spheres is not necessarily separable from the notion that it can eliminate risk and contingency in another. Not only does this imply that the struggle against precarity, if not carefully conceived, may bolster and/or feed off state-fueled security politics, but also it suggests that there is something deeper about precarity than its articulation to labour alone would suggest - some more fundamental, but never foundational, human vulnerability, that neither the act nor potential of

labour can exhaust. This is certainly the sense in which Judith Butler, in Precarious Life (2004), confronts what she calls precariousness (which should be distinguished from precarity intended in the labour market sense). For Butler, precariousness is an ontological and existential category that describes the common, but unevenly distributed, fragility of human corporeal existence. A condition made manifest in the U.S. by the events of 911, this fundamental and pre-individual vulnerability is subject to radical denial in the discourses and practices of global security. For instance, Butler understands President George W. Bush's 921 declaration that 'our grief has turned to anger and our anger to resolution' to constitute a repudiation of precariousness and mourning in the name of an action that purports to restore order and to promote the fantasy that the world formerly was orderly. And she seeks in the recognition of this precariousness an ethical encounter that is essential to the

constitution of vulnerability and interdependence as preconditions for the "human". Key to Butler's argument is the proposition that recognition of precariousness entails not simply an extrapolation from an understanding of one's own precariousness to an understanding of another's precarious life but an understanding of 'the precariousness of the Other'. Her emphasis is on the relationality of human lives and she sees this not only as a question of political community but also as the basis for theorising dependency and ethical responsibility. Rather than seeking to describe the features of a universal human condition (something that she claims does not exist or yet exist), she asks who counts as human. And with this reference to humans not regarded as humans, she seeks not a simple entry of the 'excluded into an established ontology, but an insurrection at the level of ontology, a critical opening up of the questions, What is real? Whose lives are real? How might reality be remade?' (2004: 33). At this level, the theorisation of precariousness impinges on fundamental ontological questions and, to this extent, it suggests a means of joining some of the actions and arguments surrounding precarity to a more philosophically engaged encounter with notions such as creativity, contingency, and relation. As noted above, Butler's argument, while claiming to affect an ontological insurrection, takes shape above all in the post-911 United States. A

passionate appeal for the necessity of critique under circumstances where popular energies have rallied around the executive branch of government, Precarious Life understandly focuses on the progress of global war and the transformations of life within the U.S. polity. But it also presents precariousness as a general principle of the human (and who counts as such). And while it emphasises the uneven distribution of this basic human fragility, it does not analyse the workings of this unevenness in detail (as if they were merely given, coincidental and outside the realm of fundamental ontology). In other words, Butler does not explore the whole problematic of global capitalism and its relations to the current conflict.[4] Certainly these relations are of a complex order and cannot be reduced to the simple formula ("no blood for oil") that would have war working always in the service of capital and vice versa. In a world where the operations of the global market (by which any object, regardless of location, can be valued and ordered) do not necessarily accord with the logic of strategy (by which spatially fixed resources, subject to calculation and command in the aggregate, are brought under control by state actors), there are likely discrepancies to exploit

between the workings of capital and the enterprise of security (Neilson, forthcoming). For instance, the effort to block the flow of laundered money that funds terror networks requires a tightening of regulation on that very institution that lies at the heart of global neoliberal enterprise, the deregulated financial market (Napoleoni, 2003). Indeed, it may be in these gaps, where security and capital come into conflict, that the motif of precarious life receives its most radical articulation, where precariousness meets precarity, and the struggle against neoliberal capitalism that dominated the global movement from Seattle might finally work in tandem with the struggle against war. Such a realisation must be central to any politics that seeks to reach beyond the limits of precarity as a strategy of organisation.

The recognition of vulnerability as the fundamental human condition detaches political focus and energy from the material circumstances of contemporary capitalism Neilson and Rossiter, 6 [Brett Neilson, senior lecturer in the School of Humanities at the University of Western Sydney and a member of the Centre for Cultural Research, and Ned Rossiter, senior lecturer at the Centre for Media Research, University of Ulster and adjuct research fellow at the Centre for Cultural Research, University of Western Sydney, September 2005, Fiberculture, Issue 5, online: http://www.journal.fibreculture.org/issue5/neilson_rossiter.html, accessed October 1, 2006] Butler's recognition of precariousness as a fundamental condition of human relation is not without its relevance for the debates surrounding current networked economies and labour market trends. Far from asserting some foundational base of human nature, she focuses attention on the never-stable relations that invest human patterns of interdependence and cooperation. To this extent her understanding of the human veers, on the one hand, from the cognitivism of say Noam Chomsky (1988), who asserts that the human is possessed of an innate creativity due to the innovative capacity of language, and, on the other, from the anthropologism of Arnold Gehlen (1988), who contends that the human propensity for flexible adaption to the environment is the font of restless creativity not shared by animals. Importantly, the emphasis on vulnerability and injury that invests Butler's account of the politics of relation challenges the social philosophies that follow from these lines of thought: the need for human society to foster innate creative capabilities under the sign of social justice (Chomsky) and the need for authoritarian social institutions to control and direct the human capacity for flexibility (Gehlen). But if her thought is to be adapted to suit the conditions of a labour market that values flexibility and communicational-linguistic relations, it is necessary to add the element of innovation to the ontological mix. Otherwise, her valuable ethical and political insights risk detachment from the organisational and biological circumstances of contemporary capitalist relations.

AT: Permutation

In order to solve our criticism, you’ve got to be willing to make some divisive condemnations of capitalism – Butler’s ethics of inclusive discourse means the permutation can’t resolutely condemn anything. The perm’s compromise is devastating for radical politics and makes it impossible to challenge market fundamentalism. Dean, 5 [Jodi, Professor of Political Theory at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Summer 2005, The Hedgehog Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 55-56]Grand narratives and strong ontologies have a remarkable hold on contemporary life. Fundamentalist positions are ever more pervasive and intractable. In the United States, religious and market fundamentalisms impress themselves on global and domestic practices of knowledge, law, governance, mobility, personhood, hospitality, and justice. Add to this the current reorganization of the post-World War Two economic consensus around social welfare, as well as recent challenges to the rule of law and international legal conventions (such that Howard Dean, for example, is chastised for suggesting that Osama bin Laden should receive a fair trial, and U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales calls the Geneva conventions "quaint") and it becomes clear that strong ontologies or fundamentalisms raise moral and political questions that cannot, must not, be avoided. The stakes are high. Without exaggeration we can say that engagement with religious and market fundamentalisms will shape the twenty-first century much as anti-fascism made its marks upon the twentieth. Some political theorists argue that the proper response to fundamentalism is generosity. (2) They elaborate ontologies and ethics that eschew fundamentals and urge an awareness of the contestability of one's own fundaments or a responsiveness to the limits and vulnerabilities that necessarily condition the contexts in which we give an account of ourselves. I consider here work by Stephen White and Judith Butler. White offers the notion of a weak ontology as a contextually attuned and politically minded response to this moment of fundamentalist vitality. (3) I argue that it is the wrong response, one that turns to acceptance and affirmation at a juncture when the future of hopes for equality, democracy, and a sustainable, common being-together demand a more critical, political response. Critical, as opposed to affirmative, theory is necessary today. White's approach, one that finds common ground among disparate thinkers, divests critical theories of their oppositional political edge. He makes them congenial to current power relations at a moment when they need to be sharpened and wielded as critically and antagonistically as possible. Butler, one of the thinkers White tames and assimilates, can be read as responding to White's project for weak ontology. I argue that her Spinoza lectures do this and more as they develop a notion of ethical accountability that highlights the necessity of critique. But even as Butler's critical ethics improve upon White's ontology, in these times of fundamentalist vigor, they remain too passive, too acquiescent and compliant. They offer critique, yet avoid the risky political work of condemnation and division, of specifically and decisively rejecting those religious, nationalist, militarist, and market fundamentalisms that are today actively rewriting the very terms of personhood, the very possibility of sustainable living, to benefit the wealthy, privileged few while the majority are rendered criminal, illegal, diseased, and/or disposable.

Sequencing DA – ethics emanate from the material conditions of the proletariat – the alt is a prerequisite to the affYenigun, 13 [Halil Ibrahim, Professor of IR at Istanbul Commerce University, Marx’s justice? Tracing the “ethical” in Marx’s Thought, Human & Society, EBSCO Host] It is, therefore, useless to fantasize about justice in the upcoming revolution because history will work itself out. The explanatory dimension of this vision could also enable the theorist to account for the moral progress from slavery toward its abolition without succumbing to moral relativism. In another sense, this understanding establishes that the materialism of the base/superstructure metaphor can be conceived of in a sense that would not preclude moral realism for several reasons: First, Marx cannot be portrayed as categorically denying to the superstructure any determinative role. Indeed, Peffer points to three forms of this metaphor: crude determinism, determinism in the last instance, and mutual determination (Peffer, 1990, p. 25).19 Therefore, there is no reason to explain morality away as an illusion. Second, even if we did not take mutual determination seriously, being determined would not necessarily mean lacking reality because it would only underline the primacy of the material dimension and the alterable character of morals. In this regard, Husami’s argument that moral standards emanate from the proletariat’s material experiences promises to be an important resource upon which a current theorist can draw. If the ruling class cannot completely contain the circulation of ideas during the transition stage, the moral standards of the subjugated classes could provide the ground for a radical critique. Perhaps the only condition Marx would stipulate would be that the ethical level should not be placed at center of the critique, for capitalism cannot be overthrown by an ethical challenge; only the material and the real will bring it down.In short, materialism does not necessarily render morals unreal; in fact, moral realism can cohere with the Marxist notion of materialism.20 In this case, the philosopher’s task may be either to make the implicit explicit, as Peffer sought to do, or to wait for history to work itself out, as West and Shandro suggested. Alternatively, one might have to work on how the unacknowledged ethical sources centered upon the notions of human dignity and actualization, freedom, equality, and community can be configured for an adequately normative ethical theory.