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Ukraine’s Future Ascension into the
European Union
Travis Clark
Introduction:
For centuries, Ukraine has existed at the border between the East and the
West. The young nation declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991
and for the first time in centuries has existed as an independent political entity. The
country has existed briefly throughout the hallmarks of European history, beginning
its existence with the formation of Kievan Rus until its destruction by the Mongol
Hordes. Centuries later, Austria-Hungary, Poland, the Commonwealth, and Russia
would claim Ukrainian lands, subjugating and suppressing the nation in the name of
Empires. Now in the post-Soviet era, Ukraine has finally achieved independence
after millennia of foreign ownership, only to be torn between the Kremlin in the
East and Brussels in the West. Ukraine has found anything but economic stability in
the past twenty-five years, racked by systematic corruption, the worst in Europe,
and political turmoil, the nation’s living standards have fallen far below the average
European. Yet the Ukrainian people have shown a strong intolerance to any injustice
threatening their newborn republic. Beginning in 2004, pro-Russian candidate
Victor Yanukovych was determined to have won the 2004 presidential election, yet
his election was plagued by mass protests over allegations of wide spread fraud,
voter intimidation, and corruption among election officials. Outraged, the Ukrainian
people took to the streets in what became known as the Orange Revolution. As
millions peacefully took to the streets, a run-off election was held and Yanukovych
was defeated decidedly. Following the Orange Revolution little changed both in
terms of government corruption or economic growth. In 2010 Victor Yanukovych
returns to the presidential office following a successful campaign, promising closer
ties to Russia and winning over the Eastern and majority Russian population
centers, particularly in Donbass, Ukraine’s industrial base. Victor Yanukovych,
despite winning in a landslide, must still appeal to western-oriented ethnic
Ukrainians in the center and western sections of the country. Yanukovych begins
negotiating a European Free Trade Agreement, widely viewed as the first step in
European integration, while negotiating outside the public view for economic
integration with Russia. The deadline in November 2013 comes and passes for
Yanukovych to sign the European trade agreement, sparking mass student protests
that would quickly grow into the nationwide Euromaiden Revolution, named for the
central square in Kiev (Maiden) in which the revolution began and was based. Over
the following months, Yanukovych lost control over most of the Western section of
the country, with the nation’s most prosperous city of Lviv declaring independence.
Crimea had been annexed by Russia, Russian separatists were operating in the
Donbass, and Kiev had become a warzone. Finally, in February of 2014, Ukraine’s
parliament ousted Yanukovych only after he had fled from the country. Snap
elections were held in the following months, leading to the election of a pro-western
government and the signing of the European Free Trade Agreement.
This paper will seek to address how the Ukrainian populace feels regarding
Ukraine’s further integration into Europe, the West, and eventually the European
Union. The EU has a very rigorous and clearly defined set of criteria for a nation to
advance in ascension talks; requiring a host of news laws that the more conservative
Russian sections of the country may find intolerable. As Ukraine attempts to find its
footing as it treads into European society, I conducted research in the capital city of
Kiev to gain a greater understanding concerning the sentiments on the future of the
nation. The research presented was conducted by questionnaires presented to any
denizen willing to participate. The questionnaires were presented only in Russian,
but should not confound the results as the ethnic Ukrainians populace is considered
fluent in the language. Additionally, ethnic Russians were present in smaller
numbers in the Kiev than in their total composite of the country and due to the
ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, their results may be skewed or
underrepresented in the data.
Brief Historical Summary:
To understand their current political and ethnic climate in Ukraine it is
necessary to discuss the historical background of the Ukrainian state. Beginning
around 880 A.D. the city-state of Kiev was founded by the Rus people emigrating
from Scandinavia. Kiev quickly grew into a regional power, assimilating the local
Slavic tribes and forming the basic national identities of modern Ukrainians and
Russians. Kievan Rus would quickly grow to expand to encompass much of the
modern territory that encompasses modern Ukraine and European Russian.
Vladimir the Great (980-1015) signified Kievan Rus’ golden age and converted the
pseudo-empire to Byzantine Christianity. Upon his death, Kievan Rus fragmented
into several principalities, greatly decentralizing power and weakening Kiev. Finally,
the Mongol Invasions of the 13th century saw the total destruction of Kievan Rus.
The principalities of European Russian would become vassals of the Mongol Empire,
where as the historic Ukrainian territories came under European occupation. The
fall of Kievan Rus marked the beginning of a sharp divide between the Rus people.
In the east (Russia), the identity of Russian and the Russian language evolved, while
in the west the cultures retained much of the Rus’ former idenitity, eventually
molding into the modern Ukrainian language and culture. An important distinction
to note during this time period, however, is that the territories of Crimea, the
Donbass, and land along the Black Sea were never settled or controlled by Kiev. This
land would only come to be conquered by the Russian Empire nearly a thousand
years after Kievan Rus’ formation.3
The following centuries came with nothing but foreign domination over
Ukrainian lands. After the collapse of Kievan Rus, the western Rus territories
consolidated into a nation-state known as Galicia-Volhynia. The lifespan of this
country lasted a mere eighty-seven years (1253-1340) before being invaded by both
Poland and Lithuania. This last portion of Galicia-Volhynia would fall to Lithuania in
1366, marking the end of self-Ukrainian rule until Ukraine’s reemergence as a
sovereign state under the USSR. Ukrainian territories would remain under
Poland/the Commonwealth’s control until the 1700s as the Russian and Ottoman
Empires began competing for Ukrainian lands. By 1783, the formal annexation of
Crimea by Russia, Ukrainian lands had fallen entirely under Russian control with
small portions having been seceded to the Austrian Empire. Upon the annexation of
Crimea, Russia began the colonization of “New Russia,” or the formally Muslim
territories in Crimea, the Donbass, and the southern territories in modern Ukraine.
Thus the ethnic divide brewing in modern Ukraine traces its origins back nearly
three hundred years to Russian colonization attempts of former Muslim Tatar
lands.3
Ukrainian lands existed in relative peace throughout the next few centuries
until WW1 brought about the destruction of the Russian Empire and created a brief
Ukrainian nation-state. However, the Ukrainian Republic lasted less than four years
(1917-1921) before being reabsorbed by Russia (USSR) or portioned into Poland
and Belarus. Ukraine would finally be granted an official state under the USSR but
could flex very little political or ethnic free will. Excluding the brief Republic that
existed from 1917 to 1921, Ukraine had existed under foreign domination for over
four hundred years until its declaration of independence form the Soviet Union in
1990. Ukraine has long existed as a stateless people, marked by division and foreign
invasion. Russian colonization attempts further destabilized the country as a
modern Ukraine seeks to govern itself for the first time in centuries.3
European Integration and Law:
Following the Euromaiden Revolution, Ukraine’s government has firmly
expressed their interest into European ascension and EU law adoption. The
adoption of European law is perhaps the most crucial step concerning Ukraine’s
reorientation towards the West. The adoption of European law is a long and
complex set of procedures that is bound to produce pushback from the populace of
Ukraine. The aim of this research project is to assess to the level of pushback or
favoritism the populace of Ukraine currently feels towards the laws that concern
western integration. The process of integration is complex and usually spans years,
if not decades. However, the process of European integration can generally
summarized into three basic steps.
1. Candidate for Membership – The European Union has identified a
country that has expressed interest into joining the bloc, but formal negotiations
may or not have officially begun. Examples of this include the ratification of the free
trade agreement between the European Union and Ukraine, as well as the opening
of visa free travel between Ukraine and Union members. All EU governments must
agree in the form of a vote in the European Union Council to begin the formal
negotiations step as outlined in step 2.
2. Accession Criteria – The stage begins with formal membership
negotiations and the implementation of EU law by the target country. This step of
the process is the most arduous and often can span over a decade. The laws the
target country must adopt include a variety of a criterion, including judicial,
economic, and administrative reforms, as well as meeting certain sociological
standards the European Union finds acceptable. For example, Ukraine hosted its
first LGBT rally in 2016, the first in over seven years, due to EU law calling for equal
treatment of disenfranchised and marginalized groups.
3. Ascension – The final stage of the process, the target country and the EU
conclude their formal negotiations and the target country is formally invited to
become a member. It is also important to note that the various states of the Western
Balkans follow a different set of ascension criteria and may or may not be subjected
to current process concerning Ukraine.
The European Union has classified the following countries as in the process
of joining as displayed in Table 1.
Table 1:
Country Name Official Status
Montenegro The country was declared an official
candidate country in 2008 and began the
formal ascension process in late 2011.
The country is currently still in the
process of adopting European Law.
Additionally, Montenegro joined NATO
in 2016, increasing its relations with the
west and European Union in general.
Turkey In 1997 the European Council declared
Turkey eligible to begin the ascension
process. However, the political situation
in Turkey has deteriorated over the past
two decades and the ascension process
has stalled. The majority of EU states,
most notably France, are actively
blocking Turkish ascension talks due the
increasingly anti-democratic legislation
and actions of Turkey’s head of state.
Turkey is still classified as belonging to
the ascension process.
Serbia In 2012 Serbia was granted official
candidate status and in 2013 Serbia
began official membership association
negations. Serbia’s progress, despite
adopting EU appropriate legislation, is
currently being stalled by several EU
governments over Serbia’s relationship
with the Russian government. Serbia’s
government is still discussing ascension
negations.
Iceland Iceland has requested not to be formally
listed as a candidate country following
the 2009 financial crisis and legal issues
concerning international fishing rights.
Ukraine Ukraine has ratified the European Free
Trade Agreement and begun ascension
talks but has not been listed as an official
candidate country. The EU has officially
recognized their potential, however.
Currently, Ukraine is classified alongside a Georgia and Moldova that have
had official recognition by the EU Council to begin the ascension talks. An important
distinction of all three recognized states includes ongoing international disputes
with Russia. In Ukraine, Russian rebels are currently contesting the sovereignty of
the Donbass region and the international community is disputing the legal
ownership of Crimea. In Georgia, Russia has been accused of “creeping annexation,”
walling of significant portions of the country in breakaway republics known as
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In Moldova, the political situation is kept tense by the
Russian minority in the breakaway region known as Transnistria.3
Ukraine, in addition to Georgia and Moldova, is in a tense domestic and
international political situation concerning their relationship with Russia and the
European Union. Russia works to ensure neither country can make significant
progress with ascension talks without ethnic tensions confounding the process and
working to unnerve EU Council states.3
Literature Review
Several studies have been conducted studying the changes in Eastern
European mindsets concerning the process of “Europeanization” after the fall of the
Iron Curtain and Soviet Union. The term Europeanization has come to fall under
many different meanings in modern political terms, but at its core refers to, “diverse
changes in core domestic institutions of politics and for governance, undertaken in
the process for adaption for European Integration. By implication therefore
Europeanization implies a degree of internalization of European policy and values
paradigms at the domestic level (Kataryna). Europeanization, therefore, has become
the main foreign policy effort by the European Union at large and by individual EU
states. The policy of Europeanization has governed the European continent and
surrounding countries since the break up of the Soviet Union, most notably in
countries such as Morocco or Turkey, whom technically lie outside of Europe’s
boundaries, but have had domestic policy adaptions in accordance to the European
Union. As a result, the European Union’s process of Europeanization has largely
come as a result of the post-communist political and economic transformation
process that has been equated with the preparation for membership.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s leaders have not made it a secret
about their intentions of integration into the European Union. However, Ukraine has
repeatedly and systemically failed to adopt the necessary domestic policy changes
necessary to be considered for integration or even fit the vague definition of
“Europeanization.” Despite Ukraine’s tumultuous economic times during the 1990s,
the country has managed to achieve economic growth over the early parts of the
twenty first century. Yet a fundamental flaw in Kiev’s logic concerning European
Integration has concerned the matter that economic growth does not equal
Europeanization, has stated by Kataryna, “Ukraine’s political leaders have
sometimes acted as if they could achieve integration by declaration, or simply by
joining and participating in international organizational clubs rather than by
undertaking concrete structural changes.” Ukraine followed a similar path of that of
Russia following the collapse of the USSR, in that a select few ruling elites
maintained de facto control over the country. Specific to Ukraine, the Communist
Party still maintained a large portion of control following the collapse of Ukrainian
Soviet State, not losing its majority in Ukraine’s governing body until 1998. Many
reasons affected this slow transition of power and suppression of democratic
reforms, including the threat of a red scare and true communists recapturing
control over the state, Crimean separatists and other border disputes, and the
desperate attempt to build the concrete notion of a Ukrainian national identity by
the executive branch. Ukraine’s transition of power was flawed largely in part due
its true lack of national identity, in addition to the concentration of power in the
hands of a few post-communist elites, and severely delayed the formation of
democratic institutions that formed more rapidly in other post-communist states.
Czechia, for example, had a strong sense of national identity, national past, and
history of democratic institutions, allowing for the country to peacefully separate
from Slovakia and sail through the process of Europeanization. Following the 2002
Ukrainian parliament elections, displayed below, which saw the left lose its hold on
parliament by pro-reform parties, the post-communist elites still maintained control
over the executive and continued to suppress the process of Europeanization.
Historically, Ukraine’s population has remained steeply divided between the
counterbalance between Russia and the rest of Europe. Following the collapse of the
USSR in 1991, roughly 1/3 of Ukraine’s population was in favor of Europeanization,
mostly centered in the Western territories of the country, and 1/3 strongly favored
integration with Russia and the CIS, favored largely in the south and east. However,
surveys of this type can be misleading as Ukrainians, when given the option,
overwhelmingly support the idea of both strengthening ties with the European
Union and Russia. Yet in Ukrainian society there still exists a blind ambivalence as to
what the benefits of Europeanization are or what the process of European ascension
may entail, as stated, “According to a 2003 survey, 93 percent of those surveyed
assume that entering the EU would be useful for Ukraine, but only half of them were
able to explain what the benefit might be (Kataryna). This survey moves to indicate
that general idea of Europeanization as being the correct path forward for the
Ukrainian state, but the actual process of domestic policy changes are lost on the
general population. So while a supermajority of the population may favor the idea of
European integration, the populace is widely unaware of the necessary policy
changes that will need to be implemented to move their country towards the
European Union.
In stark contrast to the other post-communist states following the collapse of
the USSR, the Ukrainian state also followed a different path in terms of government
rhetoric. After 1991, states such as Serbia and Slovakia saw their presidencies
center around the call for ethno-nationalism and the return to European civilization.
The presidential figures were not promoting EU integration, but rather the return to
their pre-communist way of life. The process of Europeanization was largely
conducted through their legislative branches, rather than direct promotion by heads
of state. In Ukraine, the exact opposite occurred. The presidents of the 1990s and
early 2000s promoted the idea of the “return to European civilization” and rejected
ethno-cultural homogenization. While this may have been necessary for Ukraine to
remain united as a country instead of splintering along ethnic lines, another
significant factor included Ukraine’s balancing act between the European Union and
Russia. Other post communist states were capable of fully capable of adopting pro-
EU policy through their legislative branches, meanwhile the Ukrainian legislature
was torn between western-oriented Ukrainians and Russia-oriented Russians.
Excluding Belarus, Ukraine was forced to navigate through a unique dynamic of
executive Europeanization rhetoric, while the legislative and representative branch
of the Ukrainian government maneuvered through appealing to all ethnic groups
that resided within the fragile country. As the 21st century progressed, the country
gradually adopted more pro-EU mindsets, but Ukraine’s significant delay following
the collapse of the USSR in the process of Europeanization still plagues the countries
economy and foreign relations today.
In terms of past surveys and research polls conducted on public opinion
concerning Ukraine’s future, the division directly follows the ethnic divisions in the
country. In 2003 it was found that 58% of the public supported integration with the
EU while 16% opposed and 26% remained undecided. The native language of any
specific individual is a strong indicator towards their sentiments of
Europeanization, such as that only 47% of Russophones approve of European
integration, while 26% disapprove. Ukrainian speakers, however, large centered in
the west of the country, approve of Europeanization by over 75% with only 9% of
respondents not being in favor. Given the sharp divides within the country before
the Euromaiden Revolution, the Ukrainian state chose a balancing act between the
two opposing viewpoints of European integration. Ukraine has signed numerous
economic agreements with Russia, including becoming solely dependent on Russia
for gas imports, as well as becoming a member of the Commonwealth of
Independent States. Additionally, Ukraine pursued pro-European legislation only to
the point of satisfying European demands at a bare minimal, including the European
Free Trade Association agreement that eventually kicked off the Euromaiden
Revolution in 2013.
The literature review moves to reinstate the belief of a vast difference in
public opinion concerning Ukraine’s foreign policy divided along ethnic lines.
However, a closer look demonstrates that for the majority of Ukraine’s post-soviet
history has included a populace that has overwhelmingly wished to pursue a future
that included both the European Union and Russian Federation. These sentiments
were further propagated by the Ukrainian state, which sought to grow too close to
neither for fear of losing their grip on power, namely through various forms of
corruption they employed. Yet this review fails to account for more recent changes
in Ukrainian society, including the increased awareness of systematic corruption of
the Ukrainian state and the perception of freedom that the idea of Europeanization
propagates. Ultimately, Ukrainians of either ethnic group wish to better their lives
and obtain a higher standard of living, a prospect that the old model of governance
could not produce and lead to civil unrest and changes in public opinion. After the
Ukrainian government failed to pass the European Free Trade Agreement in 2013,
public opinion has largely switched from maintaining the EU/Russian balancing act
towards a greater likening to the process of Europeanization.
Methodology
The research presented in this paper was conducted in the format of survey
presented in the Russian language. The survey consisted of ten questions
concerning EU policy, domestic governance, and Russian sentiments ranked from 1
(lowest) to 10 (highest) in terms of personal conviction towards any given question.
In addition to these questions, several other questions were included that allowed
the survey participants to indicate various aspects on the current state of their
country. Survey participants were asked to indicate their age and self-described
ethnicity in an effort to understand the differences between ethnic and age
demographics. The surveys were distributed through the academic network at the
NovaMova Institute in Kiev, Ukraine as well through associates of a selected host
family. It should be strongly noted that Ukrainian political activism is not on par
with the standards presented in other western countries; political sentiments
following the revolution are tense and the majority of Ukrainians are not open to the
idea of sharing political opinions. In addition, the state of Ukraine is currently at war
with Russian backed separatists in the Donbass region with a travel warning in
place for foreigners in the country. Traveling outside of the capital or in the
eastern/Russian direction was strongly discouraged. Thus the survey was
distributed only among associates of the NovaMova Institute as these participants
were the only individuals comfortable with sharing political sentiments. A sample
survey has been attached to the end of this report.
Results and Discussion
Graph 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Question1: Is Ukraine a European Country?
1: Strong Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree
Number of Responses
Graph 1 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 1 on the survey: Is Ukraine a European Country?
The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.
The data collected as a result of the survey has displayed a microcosm of
ideas surrounding the political sentiments of the general populace surrounding Kiev
and central Ukraine. Beginning with the first question, displayed in Graph 1: Is
Ukraine a European country, the responses were largely positive and in congruence
with general Ukrainian sentiments following the Euromaiden Revolution. However,
given Ukraine’s geographic positioning and the country’s status as the largest
European country not split between two continents, the results were slightly
surprising. Responses range from 5 (neutral) to 10 (strongly agree) to form a bell
curve with the majority of answers lying between these two points. This may be a
reflection of the Ukrainian sentiment to remain balanced between two great states:
the European Union and Russia. Russians sentiments towards their country are not
always reflected as being European but a distinct cultural identity simply
considered as Russian. While Ukrainians still overwhelmingly identify as European,
their past and current geopolitical setting may lead them to identify less as
“Europeans” and more of a bridge between the European continent and the Russian
federation.
Graph 2
1 2 3 4 5 60
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Question 2: Is Russia an Ally?
1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree
Number of Responses
Graph 2 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 2 on the survey: Is Russia an Ally? The lower the
value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.
Question 2 addressed the topic of Russia as an ally to Ukraine as displayed in
Graph 2. Non-surprisingly, the majority of responses were negative (strongly to
moderately disagreeing). However, sentiments were not as negative as anticipated,
given Russia’s active involvement in the seizure of Crimea and support for rebels in
Donbass. Again, this may be a historical reflection of the Ukrainian mindset of
bridging the gap between the east and west across the European continent.
Ukrainians certainly do not maintain positive views of Russia, at least at the
moment, but there remains an underlying sense of brotherhood and connectedness
that continues to permeate Ukrainian society.
Graph 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
1
2
3
4
5
6
Question 3: Is the European Union a Ally?
1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree
Number of Responses
Graph 3 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 3 on the survey: Is the European Union an Ally? The
lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.
The information obtained from the third survey question presents an
interesting set of data. The graph does not follow a bell curve (normal distribution)
concerning sentiments towards the European Union. It is possible the survey
participants felt the wording of the question including possible European
intervention in the Ukrainian state, in contrast to viewing the EU as purely a
strategic partner. Ukrainians as voting block typically favor less federal powers
allocated to the government than other states and thus view the encroachment of
pro EU legislation as strengthen the central presidential powers. Overall, however,
the sentiments are overwhelming positive, as only two survey responses fall into
the possible standard deviation range for a negative/neutral view of the European
Union.
Graph 4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
1
2
3
4
5
6
Question 4: I support NATO
1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree
Number of Responses
Graph 5 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 4 on the survey: I Support NATO. The lower the
value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.
Underwhelming Ukrainian support for NATO was an anticipated result. As
with support for the EU becoming an ally, Ukrainians have a mixed, but overall
positive view of the military alliance. The negative summations about the military
alliance may stem from the older participants who may still recall the tensions
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO during the Cold War. Yet Ukraine is a country
at war whether the international culprit is recognized as Russia or simply Russian
backed rebels. The critical military advantage of NATO stems from the protective
ideology, “an attack on one is an attack on all.” NATO exists first and foremost to
protect its member states in times of war, namely the USSR and its successor state,
the Russian Federation. Ukraine is already struggling with the threat of Russian
aggression and may view NATO with lukewarm feelings due to the conflicting
nature of sharing an extensive border with Russia should a formal declaration of
war come from Moscow and the effects of dealing with Russian-backed rebels alone.
The data from the question lacks a normal distribution, displaying a mixed bag of
polar feelings towards fierce support for NATO and neutral passiveness to the
military alliance.
Graph 5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1001234567
Question 5: Ukraine Should Become a Member of NATO
1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree
Number of Responses
Graph 5 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 5 on the survey: Ukraine Should Become a Member
of NATO. The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are
included.
In direct contrast to the previous survey question, the sentiments among
Ukrainians that express interest in joining NATO follows a normal distribution. The
data suggests that while public opinion on supporting the alliance is mixed,
becoming a military member has different implications, at least in the public
perception. NATO’s perceived vision is protection among on client states, including
the call to war if any such member were to be attacked. Ukrainians already have a
pessimistic view on warfare, given their current history of Crimea and the ongoing
conflict in Donbass. Joining a staunchly western military alliance is implicated more
in the perception of future military conflicts Ukraine maybe called into, verses the
immediate benefit of joining NATO. Ukrainians perceive the alliance as a means to
protect the nation from outside threats, namely Russia, but are wary off future
military engagements the country may be obliged to participate in. Additionally,
there is the ever looming threat of direct warfare with Russia and many Ukrainians
are wary of a full on military engagement with Russia. A stated goal of the Russian
Federation is to prevent the spread of NATO and the option of Ukraine joining may
lead to further conflict in the future for the Ukrainian state, despite the benefits of
western-oriented military integration.
Graph 6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
1
2
3
4
5
Question 6: I Support Changes the EU Wants in Ukraine
1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree
Number of Responses
Graph 6 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 6 on the survey: I support changes the EU wants in
Ukraine. The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are
included.
The concern of foreign intervention in Ukraine is strong given the current
military conflict and divided populace. To continue with Europeanization, the
Ukrainian state is required to continue implementing reforms of different measures,
including judicial and social reforms targeting Ukraine’s lackluster human rights
record. In addition, Ukrainians as a people are naturally wary of strong, centralized
government establishing the rule of law, a potential major turn of considering the
majority of these edicts originate from Brussels in the foreign but democratically
elected European Council. The mixed sentiments expressed in the data, largely
centered on low enthusiasm (both positive and negative) for EU legislation
integration is justifiably slow. After all, Ukraine has struggled for centuries to obtain
independence from foreign bodies and the concept of a foreign European capital
dictating policy changes in the Ukrainian state may produce a hesitant populace.
The data obtained from this survey question does not follow a standard distribution
and displays the complex and mixed sentiments felt by the post Euromaiden
revolution population. Indeed, the hard fought battle for westernization and
democracy has shifted in the support for European intervention in Ukrainian
governance in comparison to pre-revolution public opinion polls and this survey.
Consequently, while enthusiasm is low for foreign policy intervention in Ukraine,
certain policy edicts are more attractive than others to the general populace.
Graph 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
2
4
6
Question 7: It Would Be Better to Allow Donbass to Join Russia in
Return for Faster EU Integration
1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree
Number of Responses
Graph 7 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 7 on the survey: It would be better to allow
Donbass to join Russia in return for faster EU integration. The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the
stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.
The current situation in the Donbass region of Ukraine has produced an
interesting flux among public opinion in the Ukrainian populace. Donbass, which
constitutes the oblasts of Luhansk and Donetsk, is among Ukraine’s most developed
regions and responsible for much of the coal and power production for the state of
Ukraine. The region is also overwhelmingly Russian. As of April 2017, more than
10,000 and civilians have died in the conflict. While Ukrainians value their
territorial integrity, it is important to stress the main focus of the stated survey
question: European integration. Ukrainians are more likely to secede rebel territory
if the immediate outlook for the rest of the country is guaranteed. Living standards
and conditions have failed to improve following the revolution, although policy
initiatives are beginning to take place. Ukrainians, overall, appear willing to sacrifice
a war torn section of the country if it is understood the rest of the nation will
benefit, namely through Europeanization.
Graph 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
1
2
3
4
5
Question 8: Foreigners are Better at Eliminating Corruption
1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree
Number of Responses
Graph 8 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 8 on the survey: Foreigners are better at
eliminating corruption. The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation
bars are included.
The concept of foreign intervention in Ukraine is held with suspicion.
Ukrainians as a populace are overall very suspicious of strong governments and the
concept of foreign government intervention is even more undesirable among the
public. However, Ukrainians overwhelming feel corruption is the main threat to
their country and should be the main focus of any government in Kiev. Ukraine is
ranked among the most corrupt nations globally and is considered the most corrupt
on the European continent. Other European nations, namely Romania, have
benefited tremendously from EU sponsored anti-corruption measures, as seen in
the level of economic growth and perception of government between Romania and
Bulgaria; two states that entered the EU at the same time but pursued the fight on
corruption at different extremes. Ukrainians, according to the survey, are at least
somewhat willing to allow EU intervention in their fight against corruption. The
hindrance that the level of corruption among Ukrainian officials has inflicted among
the prosperity of the nation has warranted a change in Ukrainian public opinion, at
least among this specific policy area.
Question 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
1
2
3
4
5
Question 9: Ukraine Should Split Between Russians and Ukrainians
1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree
Number ofResponses
Graph 9 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 5 on the survey: Ukraine should split between
Russians and Ukrainians. The lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard
deviation bars are included.
The responses to Question 9 portray the alarming sense of division among
the Ukrainian public. The majority of respondents either had a neutral or positive
view corresponding to the division and subsequent dissolvent of the Ukrainian state
among ethnic lines. However, in correspondence to Question 7 in correspondence to
the seceding of Donbass, the two questions may have been too similar in focus.
Ukraine’s Russian populations are largely concentrated in the south and in the east,
yet the division isn’t concrete in terms of separation. There is a blend of both ethnic
groups concentrated in any given territory, excluding the Donbass, which is
overwhelmingly Russian. Therefore, the participants of this survey may have
viewed the secession of Donbass as the separation of ethnic groups, as other
Russian dominant territories share fairer pro-EU views and support of the modern
Ukrainian state.
Question 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
1
2
3
4
5
6
Questtion 10: Europe is too Liberal for Me
1 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree
Number ofResponses
Graph 10 demonstrates the indicated responses corresponding to Question 10 on the survey: Europe is too liberal for me. The
lower the value the more each participant disagreed with the stated question. Standard deviation bars are included.
Finally, for the actual process of Europeanization to occur the Ukrainian
populace must support the measures. Ukraine is largely considered to be one of the
most socially conservative countries in Europe and the agenda of the European
Union has the potential to trigger a culture clash between these two societies.
However, while the participants of this survey had a wide range of responses and
sentiments, mostly associated with age, Ukrainians are willing to tolerate social
changes within their country even if the populace as a whole is not supportive of the
measure. As an example, Ukraine hosted its first gay pride parade in several years in
Kiev of June 2016. Despite the bombardments of violent threats the parade was held
without issues and no reported violence to the participants or spectators. The
parade and the subsequent tolerance of the government was entirely driven by the
promise of EU funds for the betterment of Ukraine as a whole, even at the sacrifice
of a long standing social taboo in Ukraine. While Ukrainians may view the European
Union as a liberal society interfering with their social viewpoints, the potential
quality of life improvements from EU policy initiatives are worth the social changes
to Ukrainian society.
Conclusion
The process of state building and legislative reform for the Ukrainian
government will almost certainly continue the country on its path towards EU
ascension. The Euromaiden revolution effects still ring loudly in the ears of
Ukrainian voters who desire a freer and more prosperous nation for their
countrymen. Even as Russia is funds separatist movements in the far east,
Ukrainians still cling to the notion of brotherhood with their Slavic brothers and
western sisters. Ukraine for the longest time has been a nation of uncertainty:
uncertain of its borders, uncertain of its sovereignty, and uncertain of its
governments; but finally the will to have a democratic say in the process of
government has permeated the mass populace. The research collected from
Ukrainians living in Kiev confirms the EU-orientated goals, but not a path of total
westernization. While Ukrainians undoubtedly view themselves as western and
European in the geographic sense, the revolution does not signify a significant
cultural shift in the Ukrainian population. Ukrainians still overwhelmingly view
themselves as the bridge between the east and the west; a connect between Europe
and Russia and beyond. Ukrainians still maintain their conservative view of the
world, despite their support for liberal EU legislation affecting their domestic policy
making process. The entire purpose of the revolution was to bring about prosperity
to the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian state, regardless of Russian, Ukrainian, or
Tartar ethnicity and an end to corruption. Ukrainians view western institutions,
such as NATO, not with a particular passion to uphold but as a means guarantee the
safety and future prosperity of their state.
Ukraine undoubtedly has a great deal of legislative reform to continue
implanting to reach EU levels of prosperity and freedom. As the current government
continues to falter in the single digits of public approval, Ukrainians separate from
the elite will have to take up the challenge of reforming their corrupt state. EU
reforms continue to capture the public’s interest and will continue to propel Ukraine
strongly into the sphere of EU and western influence. In the future, as Poroshenko’s
government transitions out power, further research analyzing the election results of
elected officials is crucial to understand the future state of Ukrainian affairs. The
Ukrainian government must become detached from the elite to eliminate corruption
and join the ranks of Western Europe, otherwise their nation will falter and become
more vulnerable to foreign intervention. Future research targeting the mindset of
new Ukrainian politicians and the public’s opinion will provide an effective roadmap
for Ukraine’s navigation into the European Union.
References
1. European Union. Europea.eu European Union, n.d. Web. 30 Apr. 2017.
2. Hrushevs’kyi, Mykhaylo. “History of Ukraine.” History of Ukraine. Toronto
Ukrainian Geneaology Group, n.d. Web. 03 May 2017.
3. Joyce, Stephanie. “Frozen Conflicts and Disputed Borders Create Uncertainty In
Russia’s Shadow.” NPR, 13 Mar. 2017. Web. 03 May 2017.
Literature Review
Wolczuk, Kataryna. “Integration Without Europeanisation: Ukraine and Its Policy
Towards the European Union.” By Kataryna Wolczuk :: SSRN. University of
Birmingham, 26 Oct. 2013. Web. 30 Apr. 2017.