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Not completely edited or corrected for spelling, grammar, etc.Superior Court
District Columbia500 Indiana Ave N.W
Washington, D.C.20001
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CASE # 2013 CF2 009225District of Columbia
Foreign Plaintiff
Vs Administrative Law JudgeNASH, STUART G
Rodney-Dale; Class Private Attorney General Street address redacted in this versionHigh Shoals, North Carolina America National Citizen Declarant
TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE: ADDENDUM
JUST CAUSE FOR RETURN OF ALL PROPERTY & MOTION TO DISMISS
MEMORANDUM IN LAW: CONGRESSIONAL STATUTES, CODES, TREATIES AND COURT DECISIONS
WITH EXBIBITS
- This Case is in the Public Interest -- Definitions of Firearms are under “Color of Law” -
Vindication of civil rights
1
Now Comes, Rodney-Dale; Class, (hereinafter “Declarant or Private Attorney
General “PAG”), by Congressional Legislation, under the Statutes at Large and by United
States Codes created by the United States Congress within the District of Columbia
Territory, in the position of Private Attorney General and Bounty Hunter, and sets forth
this document. This PAG is putting this motion before this court to be entered on the
hearing scheduled for July 19, 2013 for return of all property and Motion to Dismiss on
the following “Grounds” listed in this document for just cause.
This PAG will point to various codebooks definitions as defined by the United
States Congress and the Senate and other Higher Court Rulings to why all property
should be returned and this case dismissed with prejudice. TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE:
ADDENDUM JUST CAUSE FOR MOTION FOR RETURN OF ALL PROPERTY
& MOTION TO DISMISS is placed before the Superior Court Judge NASH, STUART
G on the grounds of Procedural Errors, Federal Statutes Definitions being misquoted and
taken out of context to the true definition, Violation of the Rules of Professional Ethics,
and Willful Intent To Mislead the court and legislative definitions as created under the
National Firearms Act of 1934 public number 474 volume 48 statute at large page 1236.
This PAG will point out in a memorandum in law": congressional statutes, codes,
treaties and court decisions as this is the case in public interest defining the word firearm
under color of law and the vindication of civil rights of the people of the United States to
the Right to Carry.
Bill: H.R. 822 (112th): National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011House Passes Right-to-Carry Bill
Washington, D.C. – The House of Representatives today passed a bill that recognizes the
importance of the Second Amendment and makes it easier for individuals with concealed
2
carry permits to carry a firearm in other states. H.R. 822, the National Right-to-Carry
Reciprocity Act of 2011, allows law-abiding gun owners with valid state-issued con-
cealed firearm permits to carry a concealed firearm in other states that also allow con-
cealed carry. The bill passed by a vote of 272-154.
Similar to how states recognize drivers’ licenses issued by other states, H.R. 822 requires
states that currently allow people to carry concealed firearms to recognize other states’
valid concealed carry permits.
I. Declarant Standing By Congressional Mandate As A Private Attorney General
All issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 3 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
1.) Congressional mandate of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, enacted April 9,
1866, (and sometimes referred to as The Private Attorney General Act) 39th Congress,
Sess. 1, Ch 31 (1866), CHAP. XXXL, An Act to protect all Person in the United States in
their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication, April 9, 1866; Public Law
104-317, Oct 19, 1996, 110 Stat 3853; 93 stat 1284; and Public Law 96-170, 96th
Congress, Dec 9th 1979.
2.) Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. (1973).
It is the manner of enforcement which gives Title 42 1983 its unique importance, for
enforcement is placed in the hands of the people. Each citizen acts as a Private Attorney
General who takes on the mantel of the sovereign,’ guarding for all of us the individual
liberties enunciated in the Constitution”
3
3.) Frank in Associated Industries of New York State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.
1943).
“Judge Frank wrote that instead of designating the Attorney General, or some other
public officer, to bring an action, Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring
on any non-official persons, or on a designated group of non-official persons, authority to
bring a suit ...even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so
authorized, are, so to speak, Private Attorney Generals.”
II. Declarant's Standing By Congressional Act As A Bounty Hunter
All issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 5 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
4.) Congressional authority under BOUNTY HUNTER RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF
1999 and BOUNTY HUNTER RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 2005 and the 14th
Amendment of the Federal Constitution hold lawful position as a 14th Amendment
"Constitutional Bounty Hunter" under Title 42, Public Health and Welfare, sec. 1983,
1988 and under USC Title 10, UCMJ and USC Title 18, section 241 and 242.
5.) This Act may be cited as the `Bounty Hunter Responsibility Act of 2005'.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Bounty Hunter Responsibility Act of 2005'.
SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF APPLICATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS.
In General- For purposes of section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), section 242 of title 18, United States Code, and other Acts of Congress providing civil or criminal liability for the deprivation of federally protected rights under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of a State—
III. Choice Of Law
4
All issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 14 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
6.) United States Attorney Manual, Choice of Law, 210
Federal statutory law, enacted pursuant to constitutional authority, is clearly controlling
over state statutory and decisional law. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Frequently, the federal
law applicable in government litigation is decisional rather than statutory. See, e.g.,
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra; United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.,
412 U.S. 580, 590-94 (1973); United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268
F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959). Thus, the rights of parties to
government contracts and negotiable instruments are to be determined by federal rather
than state law. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra; United States v. Allegheny
County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); United States v. First National Bank of Atlanta, Ga., supra;
cf. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962). The rationale for this rule is found in the necessity
for uniform construction and application of such contracts and instruments throughout the
United States. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra; T.H. Rogers Lumber Co.
v. Apel, 468 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1972).
The relationship between federal and state law was significantly affected by the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra. See Commercial
Litigation Branch Monograph "Choice of Laws Decisions in Federal Courts after Kimbell
Foods" (November 1983).
7.) 28 USC, section 1652
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.
8.) 28 USC, 1343 (b) For purposes of this section—(1) the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a State; and
(2) any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
5
9.) 28 USC, section 1442
(5)The term “State” includes the District of Columbia, United States territories
and insular possessions, and Indian country (as defined in section 1151 of title
18).
(6)The term “State court” includes the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, a court of a United States territory or insular possession, and a tribal
court.
10.) 18 USC § 2340 – DEFINITIONS
3)“United States” means the several States of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States.
11.) Title 26 section 6331 IRS CODES
(a) Authority of Secretary
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days af-
ter notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax (and such
further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all prop-
erty and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under section 6334) be-
longing to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the pay-
ment of such tax. Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer,
employee, or elected official, of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any
agency or instrumentality of the United States or the District of Columbia, by serving a
notice of levy on the employer (as defined in section 3401(d)) of such officer, employee,
or elected official. If the Secretary makes a finding that the collection of such tax is in
jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate payment of such tax may be made by the
Secretary and, upon failure or refusal to pay such tax, collection thereof by levy shall be
lawful without regard to the 10-day period provided in this section.
12.) 18 U.S.C. § 31 : US Code - Section 31: Definitions
(9) State. - The term "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Colum-
bia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
6
13.) Public No 33 Dick Act of 1902 That the militia shall consist of every able-bodied
male citizen of the respective States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, and every
able; bodied male of foreign birth who has declared his intention to become a citizen,
who is more than eighteen and less than forty-five years of age, and shall be divided into
two classes-the organized militia, to be known as the National Guard of the State,
Territory, or . District of Columbia, or by such other designations as may be given
them by the laws of the respective States or Territories, and the remainder to be known as
the Reserve Militia .
14.) H.R. 822 (112th): National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011
H.R. 822, the National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011, allows law-abiding gun
owners with valid state-issued concealed firearm permits to carry a concealed firearm in
other states that also allow concealed carry.
IV. Professional Rules Of Ethics
All issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 18 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
15.) Title 36 USC, PATRIOTIC AND NATIONAL OBSERVANCES,
CEREMONIES, AND, ORGANIZATIONS, Chapter 705, Federal Bar
16.) Title 36 USC, Chapter 705, section 70503
(c) Grounds for Disqualification.— An individual may not be a member, director,
or officer of the corporation if the individual—
7
(1)is a member of, or advocates the principles of, an organization believing in, or
working for, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence;
or
(2) refuses to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States.
17.) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(e) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or
assist a client to make a good-faith effort to determine the validity, scope,
meaning, or application of the law.
18.) Code of Judicial Conduct for the District of Columbia
A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD AND PROMOTE THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY,
AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY, AND SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY
AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY.
V. Supreme Court Decisions
All issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 31 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
19.) The Fruit of the Poison Tree doctrine.
20.) Declarant's Miranda Warning was give by the “Judge HOWZE, KAREN “ on Friday
Morning, at the Declarant's FIRST hearing while the Declarant was handcuffed and
shackled.
8
21`.) The Declarant was interrogated by the Capitol Police, U.S. Marshals, F.B.I. and
other unknown government agents for hours, and the Declarant's Jeep was searched ALL
before the Declarant was informed he was arrested and then was read his Miranda rights
after the fact.
22.) The Defendant’s/Declarant's right to carry and to protect himself comes under court
decisions known as the “Castle Doctrine” (also known as a Castle Law or a Defense of
Habitation Law or “Stand-Your-Ground”). All of these decisions were created by the
court system for one to be able to protect oneself or one's loved ones in one's home, in
one's automobile, place of business, motel or hotel room.
23.) Parker v. District of Columbia 850 F.2d 708 271 U.S. App. D.C. 15
Appeals Court Ruling On March 9, 2007, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Appeals Court
for the District of Colombia Circuit voted two-to-one to strike down parts of the law as
unconstitutional (Shelly Parker, et al. v. District of Columbia, 478 F3d 370, D.C. Cir.
2007). The Court ruled that the Second Amendment “protects an individual right to keep
and bear arms” and that “once it is determined—as we have done—that handguns are
'Arms' referred to in the Second Amendment, it is not open to the District to ban them.”
24.) District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008),On June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
in Heller v. District of Columbia. The Supreme Court struck down provisions of the
Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975 as unconstitutional, determined that handguns
are "arms" for the purposes of the Second Amendment, found that the District of
Columbia's regulations act was an unconstitutional banning, and struck down the portion
of the regulations act that requires all firearms including rifles and shotguns be kept
"unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock."
9
25.) McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025 (2010),
is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that determined whether
the Second Amendment applies to the individual states. The Court held that the right of
an individual to "keep and bear arms" protected by the Second Amendment is
incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and applies to the
states. The decision cleared up the uncertainty left in the wake of District of Columbia v.
Heller as to the scope of gun rights in regard to the states.
26.) United States v. Alfonso Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
The Court reasoned that if Congress could regulate something so far removed from
commerce, then it could regulate anything, and since the Constitution clearly creates
Congress as a body with enumerated powers, this could not be so. Rehnquist concluded:
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we have to pile inference upon inference in
a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of
our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to
congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility
of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would
require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose
something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do
27.) CASE LAW ON STANDING UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES AND TREATY
BOND v. UNITED STATES ( No. 09-1227 ) 581 F. 3d 128,
The Court held that petitioner had standing to challenge the federal statute where there
was no basis in precedent or principle to deny petitioner's standing to raise her claims.
The ultimate issue of the statute's validity turned in part on whether the law could be
deemed "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the President's Article II,
section 2 Treaty Power. Accordingly, the Court expressed no view on the merits of the
10
argument and noted that it could be addressed by the Court of Appeals on remand.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for
further proceedings.
28.) Code is "not the law" (In Re Self v Rhay, 61 Wn (2d) 261) defined by Black's
Law Dictionary as prima facie, which is color of law. Color is "counterfeit or feigned".
29.) Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply
to State Court Cases
30.) ." Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U. S. 377, 279 U. S. 387-389. An ex-
cuse that is inconsistent with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse: the Supremacy
Clause forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from federal law because of disagree-
ment with its content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its source.
31.) An 1896 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct.
1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886), held that the unequal application of a law violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
A law that is racially neutral on its face may be deliberately administered in a
discriminatory way, or it may have been enacted in order to disadvantage a racial
minority. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court stated for the first time that a state or
municipal law that appears to be fair on its face will be declared unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment because of its discriminatory purpose.
VI. The Dick Act Of 1902
All issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 35 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
32.) The Declarant will point to the Dick Act of 1902 as Affirmative Defense as the
District of Columbia and Territory are listed under the Statutes at Large, Vol. 32, Public
Law No. 33, chapter 196, pg 775 as a right to carry and it defines the Military, National
Guard and the people as organized and unorganized militias to defend the State.
11
33.) The Dick Act cannot be repealed as to do so would violate the Constitution under the
2nd Amendment and would violate any public officer's sworn Oath and Surety Bond to
uphold the U.S. Constitution.
34.)Which bring us to the Public No. 33 of 1903 the “Dick Act of 1902 The Dick
Act of 1902 also known as the Efficiency of Militia Bill H.R. 11654, of June 28, 1902
invalidates all so-called gun-control laws. The Dick Act of 1902 cannot be repealed; to do
so would violate bills of attainder and ex post facto laws which would be yet another
gross violation of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
CHAP. 196 .-An Act To promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes .
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled,
That the militia shall consist of every able-bodied male citizen of the respective States,
Territories, and the District of Columbia, and every able; bodied male of foreign birth
who has declared his intention to become a citizen, who is more than eighteen and less
than forty-five years of age, and shall be divided into two classes-the organized militia, to
be known as the National Guard of the State, Territory, or . District of Columbia, or by
such other designations as may be given them by the laws of the respective States or
Territories, and the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia .
35.) Bill: H.R. 822 (112th): National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011House Passes Right-to-Carry Bill
Washington, D.C. – The House of Representatives today passed a bill that recognizes the
importance of the Second Amendment and makes it easier for individuals with concealed
carry permits to carry a firearm in other states. H.R. 822, the National Right-to-Carry
Reciprocity Act of 2011, allows law-abiding gun owners with valid state-issued concealed
firearm permits to carry a concealed firearm in other states that also allow concealed
carry. The bill passed by a vote of 272-154.
VII. Firearm Defined
12
All issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 42 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
36.) Statute at Large Vol.48 , chapter 757 page 1236, Public No.474 National Firearm
Act limitation of term of Act. “Firearm” (a) A shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less
than 18 inches in length, a machine gun, a muffler or a silencer, does not include a pistol
or a revolver.
37.) Title 27 CFR, section 479.11 defines firearms
Firearm. (a) A shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length;
(b) a weapon made from a shotgun if such weapon as modified has an overall
length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length;
(c) a rifle having a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length; (d) a weapon
made from a rifle if such weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26
inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length; (e) any other weapon,
as defined in this subpart; (f) a machine gun; (g) a muffler or a silencer for any
firearm whether or not such firearm is included within this definition; and (h) a
destructive device. The term shall not include an antique firearm or any device
(other than a machine gun or destructive device) which, although designed as a
weapon, the Director finds by reason of the date of its manufacture, value, design,
and other characteristics is primarily a collector's item and is not likely to be used
as a weapon. For purposes of this definition, the length of the barrel having an
integral chamber(s) on a shotgun or rifle shall be determined by measuring the
distance between the muzzle and the face of the bolt, breech, or breech block
when closed and when the shotgun or rifle is cocked. The overall length of a
weapon made from a shotgun or rifle is the distance between the extreme ends of
the weapon measured along a line parallel to the center line of the bore.
38.) Title 26 USC, 5845 defines firearms
13
Firearm. (a) A shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length;
(b) a weapon made from a shotgun if such weapon as modified has an overall length of
less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length; (c) a rifle having
a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length; (d) a weapon made from a rifle if such
weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of
less than 16 inches in length; (e) any other weapon, as defined in this subpart; (f) a
machine gun; (g) a muffler or a silencer for any firearm whether or not such firearm is
included within this definition; and (h) a destructive device. The term shall not include an
antique firearm or any device (other than a machine gun or destructive device) which,
although designed as a weapon, the Director finds by reason of the date of its
manufacture, value, design, and other characteristics is primarily a collector's item and is
not likely to be used as a weapon. For purposes of this definition, the length of the barrel
having an integral chamber(s) on a shotgun or rifle shall be determined by measuring the
distance between the muzzle and the face of the bolt, breech, or breech block when
closed and when the shotgun or rifle is cocked. The overall length of a weapon made
from a shotgun or rifle is the distance between the extreme ends of the weapon measured
along a line parallel to the center line of the bore.
39.) District of Columbia Code, Section §22-4501
Machine gun, sawed-off shotgun, or weapon/instrument of kind commonly known as a
blackjack, slingshot, sand club; silencers; imitation pistol with unlawful intent;
unlicensed pistol concealed
40.) District of Columbia Code section 22-4503
Unlawful possession of firearm (a) No person shall own or keep a firearm, or have a
firearm in his or her possession or under his or her control, within the District of
Columbia, if the person:
(1) Has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year;
41.) District of Columbia Code section 22-4507 REPEALED)
SECTION HISTORY 1973, c. 788, §94 (NEW). 1977, c. 417, §14 (RPR). 1983, c. 577, §17 (RP).
14
42.) District of Columbia Code section 22-4514 Possession of certain dangerous
weapons prohibited; exceptions
(a) No person shall within the District of Columbia possess any machine gun, sawed-off
shotgun, knuckles, or any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a
blackjack, slingshot, sand club, sandbag, switchblade knife, nor any instrument,
attachment, or appliance for causing the firing of any firearm to be silent or intended to
lessen or muffle the noise of the firing of any firearms; provided, however, that machine
guns, or sawed-off shotgun, knuckles,s, and blackjacks may be possessed by the
members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps of the United States, the
National Guard, or Organized Reserves when on duty, the Post Office Department or its
employees when on duty, marshals, sheriffs, prison or jail wardens, or their deputies,
policemen, or other duly-appointed law enforcement officers, including any designated
civilian employee of the Metropolitan Police Department, or officers or employees of the
United States duly authorized to carry such weapons, banking institutions, public carriers
who are engaged in the business of transporting mail, money, securities, or other
valuables, wholesale dealers and retail dealers licensed under § 22-4510.
VIII. Equal Rights Under The Law
All issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 47 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
43.) USC Title 42, Section 1981. Equal Protection under the Law.
44.) The United States Constitution, Article IV. Full Faith and Credit
45.) 14th Amendment, section 1. Equal protection under the Law.
46.) Statutes at Large Vol 59 chapter 652 page 669 public law 291 International
Organizations Immunities Act of 1945
Section 9. The privileges, exemptions, and immunities of international organizations and
of their officers and employees, and members of their families, suites, and servants,
15
provided for in this title, shall be granted notwithstanding the fact that the similar
privileges, exemptions, and immunities granted to a foreign government, its officers, or
employees, may be conditioned upon the existence of reciprocity by that foreign
government: Provided, That nothing contained in this title shall be construed as
precluding the Secretary of State from withdrawing the privileges, exemptions, and
immunities herein provided from persons who are nationals of any foreign country on the
ground that such country is failing to accord corresponding privileges, exemptions, and
immunities to citizens of the United States.
47.) Reference by Yale Law School League of Nations Treaty Series 49 Stat. 3097; Treaty Series 881. Convention on Rights and Duties of States
ARTICLE 9. The jurisdiction of states within the limits of national territory applies to all
the inhabitants.
Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and the national
authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other or more extensive than those
of the nationals.
IX. Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction
All issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 58 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
48.) The concept of Quasi in Rem jurisdiction has become all but obsolete. It is no longer
acceptable for a state court to gain personal jurisdiction over a defendant merely because
the defendant owns property in the state. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct.
2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a respondent must have
a minimum level of purposeful contacts with the forum state before a state court may
gain jurisdiction over the respondent. With enough contacts a respondent is deemed to
16
have consented to the jurisdiction of the state and its courts. The Shaffer Court also held
that courts should consider fair play and substantial justice in determining whether to
require the appearance of an out-of-state respondent. These considerations should be
applied to all forms of personal jurisdiction: in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem.
49.) The Prosecution is claiming “Quasi in Rem” jurisdiction under P.L.1, 48 stat, C 1,
Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Also under the Social Security Act of 1935 and the Alien
Registration Act of 1940.
50.) The Prosecution knows that the State holds ownership over all property as nothing
has been or can be properly “paid for” by the People.
51.) As the People are given Federal Reserve Notes to do their purchasing and because it
is unknown by the People that said Federal Reserve Notes are not “money,” but “a mere
promise to pay money” (at a future, but “not certain” date). (See Congressman McFadden
speech on June 10, 1932 in the Congressional Records on page 12598.)
52.) The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, section 16 clearly shows that the Federal Reserve
Note is for the use of the Federal Reserve banks only and is an obligation of the United
States, and not of the People.
53.) The Statutes at Large, Vol. 48, Public Law 1, 48 stat, C1 has deprived the People of
the means of purchasing any property for “ownership” as the federal government banned
the use of gold as the means of buying and purchasing and did make a penalty of
punishment by imprisonment and fines.
54.) The Statutes at Large, Vol. 48, Public Law 10, chapter 48, 48 stat 112 was intended/
required to be the remedy on the People’s behalf but this remedy is being denied by the
court system and the Prosecution to the citizens of the United States.
17
55.) The Statutes at Large, Volume 49, Public Law No. 271, chapter 531, page 620
known as the Social Security Act of 1935 under Title 5, section 501, 502 indicates that for
each live birth in the United States that it had a value of $1.8 million to which the States
received $1 million each fiscal year for each live birth as a grant to subsidize the States
with a means of income.
56.) The Statutes at Large, Vol. 54, Public Law No. 670, chapter 439, page 670 is the
Alien Registration Act that requires a Birth Certificate and a footprint of the individual in
order for the state to validate the live birth of U.S. citizens.
57.) The Statutes at Large, Vol. 54, Public Law No. 670 also deals with the Smith Act that
holds public officers who advocate the overthrow of the United States government and
the Constitution, on which this country was founded, as a criminal offense.
58.) Therefore State agencies and the Prosecution is claiming a Quasi in Rem jurisdiction
over the Declarant, however all “things” are registered to the government and not
“owned” by the Declarant.
X. District Of Columbia Is A Corporation
All issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 64 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
59.) The Statutes at Large, Vol. 16, The Act of 1871 "CHAP LXII --Act to provide a
Government for the District of Columbia," pg 419 created the District of Columbia and
created the “10 mile square.”
60.) The Statutes at Large, Vol. 16. The Act of 1871 "CHAP LXII" clearly shows that the
District of Columbia, by legal definition, is a Corporation that can be sued and can sue as
a business/corporation.
18
61.) 2012 District of Columbia Code
Section 28-4513 Cooperation with federal government and states Except as provided in
section 28-4505(k). The Corporation Counsel may cooperate with the federal government
and the states in the enforcement of this chapter.
62.) Whereas the court and the Prosecution claimed that the District of Columbia is not
part of the United States but is a “territory unto itself,” then the Declarant holds immunity
under Foreign Sovereign Immunity as well as under international laws as the Declarant
has entered into a “Foreign District” to that of the perceived, national, several United
States and the Declarant knows it.
63.) This now creates a dilemma as there is no “border” and no “border” guards nor are
there custom agents that one has to go through before entering the City of Washington,
District of Columbia, nor is this “area” defined or publicly advertised as a “foreign
entity” or a “foreign nation” or a “territory” and not part of the perceived, several “United
States.” In contrast, an American attempting to enter into Canada or Mexico would have
to cross a “border” and such border guards and custom agents would be present to
validate their separateness (Canada's or Mexico's) from the United States as the American
people would understand it.
64.) Whereas the District of Columbia is not protected by border guards nor custom
agents then it would be a reasonable assumption that the District of Columbia IS part of
the several United States and that equal protection under the law, as all legislative and
Supreme Court decisions come from the District of Columbia, would be a reasonable
assumption and that a person would be protected by his own state laws in the District of
Columbia and would have the same equally protected rights as in his own State.
XI District of Columbia define as a State
19
All issue are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 72`as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent to Mislead.
65.) Federal Statutes clearly show that the District of Columbia hold the same standing as
any other State in the Union. Title 28 USC sections 1343, 1442 JUDICIARY and
JUDICIAL PROCEDURES and Title 18 section 1961, 2340 and chapter 31 definitions,
CRIMINAL CODES and Title 26 section 6331 IRS CODES. The District of Columbia
set on the same land as Maryland and Virginia as D.C. is made up of property of these
two States.
66.) 18 USC CHAPTER 31` DEFINTION
(9) State. - The term "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia,
and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
67.) 28 U.S.C. § 1343: US Code - Section 1343: Civil rights and elective franchise
(1) the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a State;
and
(2) any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District
of Columbia.
68.) 28 USC, section 1442
(5) The term “State” includes the District of Columbia, United States territories and
insular possessions, and Indian country (as defined in section 1151 of title 18).
(6) The term “State court” includes the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, a
court of a United States territory or insular possession, and a tribal court.
69.) 18 USC § 2340 – DEFINITIONS
3)“United States” means the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia,
and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States.
20
70.) Title 26 section 6331 IRS CODES
(a) Authority of Secretary
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days af-
ter notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax (and such
further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all prop-
erty and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under section 6334) be-
longing to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the pay-
ment of such tax. Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer,
employee, or elected official, of the United States, the
District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of the United States or the District
of Columbia, by serving a notice of levy on the employer (as defined in section 3401(d))
of such officer, employee, or elected official. If the Secretary makes a finding that the
collection of such tax is in jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate payment of such
tax may be made by the Secretary and, upon failure or refusal to pay such tax, collection
thereof by levy shall be lawful without regard to the 10-day period provided in this sec-
tion.
71.) These Congressional Statutes clearly show that the District of Columbia is consid-
ered to be a State under the equal protection clause of legislative acts.
72.) These legislative acts clearly show that the District of Columbia is considered a State
to which it carry concealed permit granted by one state holds equal standing in the Dis-
trict of Columbia and the same means that the States have a right to vote than the District
of Columbia falls under that same equal protection as it is considered State it also has the
right to vote in the elections as any other State.
XI Additional Federal Statutes Define the District of Columbia as a State
All issue are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 80`as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent to Mislead.
21
73.) Title 49 › Subtitle VI › Part B › Chapter 313 › § 31301
49 USC § 31301 – DEFINITIONS (14) “State” means a State of the United States and
the District of Columbia. (15) “United States” means the States of the United States and
the District of Columbia.
74.) Title 49 › Subtitle VI › Part A › Chapter 301 › Subchapter I › § 30102
49 USC § 30102 - DEFINITIONS (10)“State” means a State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, and the Virgin Islands.
75.) Title 49 › Subtitle VI › Part A › Chapter 303 › § 30301
49 USC § 30301 – DEFINITIONS (7)“State” means a State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the
Northern Mariana Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any other
territory or possession of the United States.
76.) Title 49 › Subtitle VI › Part A › Chapter 305
49 USC CHAPTER 305 - NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE TITLE INFORMATION
SYSTEM Title 49 › Subtitle VI › Part A › Chapter 305 › § 30501 49 USC § 30501 -
DEFINITIONS (9)“State” means a State of the United States or the District of Columbia.
77.) Title 49 › Subtitle VI › Part B › Chapter 311 › Subchapter I
49 USC CHAPTER 311, SUBCHAPTER I - GENERAL AUTHORITY AND STATE
GRANTS 49 USC § 31101 - DEFINITIONS (4)“State” means a State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa,
Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
22
78.) 49 USC § 31132 - DEFINITIONS (8)“State” means a State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, and, in sections 31136 and 31140–31142 [1] of this title, a political
subdivision of a State. (11)“United States” means the States of the United States and the
District of Columbia.
79.) Title 49 › Subtitle VI › Part B › Chapter 313 › § 31301 49 USC § 31301 –
DEFINITIONS (14) “State” means a State of the United States and the District of
Columbia. (15) “United States” means the States of the United States and the District of
Columbia.
80.) 49 USC SUBTITLE VI - MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS
49 USC CHAPTER 311 - COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
49 USC § 31132 - DEFINITIONS (8) “State” means a State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, and, in sections 31136 and 31140–31142 [1] of this title, a political
subdivision of a State
XII Willful Intent To Violate Professional Ethics To Cause Harm
All issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 102 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
81.) The Declarant will make the issue that in the “10 mile square” of the District of
Columbia sits Congress, which makes the laws, and the Supreme Court, which makes
final decisions as to how laws are to be interpreted.
82.) Congress writes the laws and defines the laws with definitions to how they are to be
interpreted and they are not to be taken out of context on how they are written.
23
83.) The Supreme Court hears these issues on these laws on how they are to be
interpreted and then make their decision on how all courts are to interpret these decisions.
84.) Title 36 of the United States Code, chapter 705, section 70503 details the
disqualification for any bar member belonging to the federal bar to be disbarred for a
willful intent to disregard the written law and the decisions that the Supreme Court has
made for interpretation of the laws and the Constitution.
85.) The District of Columbia Rules of Professional Ethics prevents not just the lawyers
that represent a defendant to not mislead, misconstrue, and intentionally disregard
congressional legislation as well as Supreme Court decisions on any given topic, but they
also pertain to the “Prosecution” when representing the government in the courtroom and
they, too, are not to “mislead, misconstrue, and intentionally disregard congressional
legislation as well as Supreme Court decisions” on any given topic in favor of the
defendant.
86.) The Prosecutor, being highly educated in the law and of Supreme Court decisions,
cannot claim ignorance of the fact that a Higher Court’s decision, such as the Supreme
Court decision, has found that the gun laws in the District of Columbia were found
unconstitutional. The Prosecution was required to present this information before the
court whenever a defendant is charged with such an alleged violation.
87.) The Prosecution, being highly educated in the law, also cannot claim ignorance when
the phrase “firearm” is being used in order to charge a defendant in the courtroom
knowing that the terminology and the definition of the phrase “firearm” is being taken out
of context, or being outright misused, as to what a defendant had or has in his possession.
24
88.) The Declarant has placed such case law and phrasing of the word “firearm” into this
case to provide evidence that the Prosecution did, intentionally and deliberately and with
full knowledge of his duties, disregard the Supreme Court's decision in this instant case
and did usurp the law with intent to mislead the court in order to get a conviction. (See
section VII of this filing.)
89.) The District of Columbia Professional Rules of Ethics for lawyers and Title 36
United States Code, chapter 705, section 70503 has been violated with willful intent to
defraud and has placed fraud upon the Court in order to get a conviction. (See USC Title
36, Chapter 705, Sec. 70501. Organization-STATUTE- “(a) Federal Charter. - The
Foundation of the Federal Bar Association (in this chapter, the "corporation") is a
federally chartered corporation.”)
90.) Such actions by the Prosecution violate the Professional Code of Conduct and Ethics
that was intended to instill confidence in the integrity of the court system.
91.) The Declarant also points to Supreme Court doctrines known as “the fruit of the
poison tree,” Castle doctrine or a Defense of Habitation Law or “Stand-Your-Ground,”
and as the Prosecution is an expert in the law and is aware of these doctrines, this also
should have been taken into consideration in the courtroom during the initial
hearing/arraignment on Friday, June 7, 2013 on behalf of the Declarant.
92.) The Declarant will point out that the original charge for a parking violation was
dismissed and, thereby, anything obtained through this parking violation falls under the
“Fruit of the Poison Tree” as immiscible, as the original charge was dismissed prior to the
Declarant's pre-hearing on June 10, 2013.
25
93.) These actions by the Prosecution again are a deliberate attempt, and shows intent, to
disregard Professional Conduct under the District of Columbia's Rules of Professional
Ethics of performing his job, maintaining good morals, and acting with good ethical
behavior.
94.) The Declarant also points to the “Clean Hands Doctrine” that the Prosecution, being
legally educated and highly qualified in law, was aware of the past court rulings that
defined the District of Columbia’s gun laws as unconstitutional, and being an attorney at
law is aware of the Castle doctrine or a Defense of Habitation Law or “Stand-Your-
Ground” as other courts have ruled on these principles as the right to self-defense, as well
as the legal definition of the word “Firearm” for the District of Columbia, is misleading
the court and the charges are/were being totally taken out of context.
95.) The Prosecution, knowingly, willingly and with full understanding of the law, did
disregard court rulings and the legislative law under the Dick Act of 1902 as well as other
court rulings of self-defense. (See section IV, above, on the Dick Act of 1902.)
96.) The Prosecution cannot disregard Legislative Public Law such as the Dick Act of
1902 as defined above. This public law invalidates all gun laws in the District of
Columbia as it is the means of defending the capital from possible invasion as once
happened in this country's history during the War of 1812.
97.) Even in the strictest sense of the District of Columbia’s Federal Statutes (USC) it
shows that one is required to have a permit and have their arms registered to allow them
to be carried. The Declarant did comply and does have a carry permit and the arms were
registered.
26
98.) Even under your own District of Columbia Code, according to the definition of the
word “firearm,” the Declarant did not have anything that is defined as a “sawed-off
shotgun of a certain length,” “a fully automatic machine gun,” or “a silencer” in his
possession.
99.) As it is shown in Title 28, United States Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure,
under sections 1343 and 1442, the District of Columbia is clearly shown to be
considered a State as any other State in equal standing.
100.) As all gun laws for the District of Columbia are created within the District of
Columbia as the seat of government for the United States, and whereas this is where
Congress legislates the laws and that the Supreme Court also sits within the District of
Columbia which rules on all gun law issues, then under the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and under the Statutes at Large and the United States Codes, the District of
Columbia is bound by such rulings as all laws and rulings come from this “10 mile
square” “District.”
101.) The Declarant also points to the United States Code under Title 18, section 1346
Definition of “scheme or artifice to defraud”: “For the purposes of this chapter, the term
“scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services.” These are the rules and procedures on how the
Prosecution is to place documents before the court in order not to mislead, misrepresent
or misconstrue the facts in a court case.
102.) The Prosecution is aware of United States Code, Title 18, section 1001, Statement
or entries generally;
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the
27
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the
United States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3)
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic
terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the
matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591, then
the term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not more than 8 years.
Again, these are the procedures on how the Prosecution is to place documents before the
court in order to not mislead, misrepresent or misconstrue the facts in a court case.
XIII SUMMARY OF STATE CCW LAWSAll issues are incorporated in paragraphs 1 through 111 as a foundation of the
Declarant's contention of Procedural Errors, Professional Ethics Violations, and Willful
Intent To Mislead.
103.) Concealed Carry Prohibited
Illinois15, Wisconsin1617
104.) Concealed Carry Allowed
Most states allow the carrying of concealed weapons by persons who obtain a permit. States that issue CCW permits are generally categorized as either “shall issue” or “may issue” states. In “shall issue” states, law enforcement officials are required to issue a per-mit to anyone who meets certain minimal statutory requirements (e.g., that the person is not a convicted felon or mentally incompetent). Once a permit has been issued, the permit holder is allowed to carry a loaded, concealed firearm in public places, although a num-ber of states prohibit concealed weapons in government buildings and other specified lo-cations. “May issue” states give discretion to the issuing official to grant or deny the per-mit, based on various statutory factors. Only two states allow the carrying of concealed weapons without a permit.
28
105.) “Shall Issue” States
Arizona18, Arkansas19, Colorado20, Florida21, Georgia22, Idaho23, Indiana2425, Kansas26, Kentucky27, Louisiana28, Maine29, Michigan30, Minnesota3132, Mississippi33, Missouri34, Montana35, Nebraska36, Nevada37, New Hampshire38, New Mexico39, North Carolina40, North Dakota41, Ohio42, Oklahoma43, Oregon44, Pennsylvania45, South Carolina46, South Dakota47, Tennessee48, Texas4950, Utah51, Virginia52, Washington53, West Virginia54
106.) “May Issue” States
Alabama55, California56, Connecticut57, Delaware58, District of Columbia 59 60 , Hawaii61, Iowa62, Maryland63, Massachusetts64, New Jersey65, New York66, Rhode Island67, Wyoming6869
107.) No Permit Required
Alaska70, Vermont71
108.) States that Require Applicants for Concealed Weapons Permits to be of Good Char - acter
Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachu-setts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island
109.) States that Require Applicants for Concealed Weapons Permits to Demonstrate Knowledge of Firearm Use and/or Safety
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah
110.) States that Limit the Locations Where Concealed Weapons May be Carried
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Co-lumbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming
111.) Description of State Laws Governing the Carrying of Concealed Weapons
1. Standards for Issuing Concealed Weapons Permits in “May Issue” States: In “may is-sue” states, concealed weapons permits are issued at the discretion of the licensing au-thority. In Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Wyoming and the District of Columbia, concealed weapons permits are issued by local law enforcement agencies. Concealed weapons permits in
29
Maryland are issued by the state police. (Massachusetts and New Jersey also authorize the state police to issue concealed weapons permits, in addition to local law enforce-ment.) In Delaware and New Jersey, court approval is required.
In addition to requiring applicants to pass a background check, concealed weapons laws in these states contain a variety of standards to guide licensing authorities in exercising their discretion:
a. States Requiring a Showing of Good Cause for Issuance of a Permit: Most “may issue” states require a showing of need by the applicant to carry a concealed firearm. Alabama, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and the District of Columbia require applicants for concealed weapons per-mits to demonstrate good cause or a justifiable need to carry a concealed weapon. Some states further delineate the circumstances that constitute good cause or justifiable need: Alabama, Massachusetts and Rhode Island require the applicant to show a “good reason” to fear injury to his or her person or property, or any other proper reason for carrying a concealed firearm. Delaware issues concealed weapons licenses only “for personal pro-tection or the protection of the person’s property.” Hawaii grants licenses to carry con-cealed weapons “[i]n an exceptional case, when an applicant shows reason to fear injury to the applicant’s person or property.”
b. States Requiring Applicants to be of Good Character: Most “may issue” states also re-quire the licensing authority to consider the character of the applicant. Alabama, Con-necticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and the District of Columbia allow per-mits to be issued only to “suitable persons.” California, Delaware and New York require the licensing authority to find the applicant is of “good moral character.” New Jersey re-quires that three “reputable persons” who have known the applicant for at least three years certify that the applicant is of “good moral character and behavior.” Delaware also requires that the applicant include with his or her application a certificate signed by five “respectable citizens” of the county in which the applicant resides, stating that the appli-cant is of good moral character, has a reputation for peace and good order, and that pos-session of a concealed deadly weapon by the applicant is necessary for the protection of the applicant or the applicant’s property.
2. States Requiring Applicants to Demonstrate Knowledge of Firearm Use and/or Safety: Among “may issue” states, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachu-setts, New Jersey and Rhode Island require applicants to complete a firearm safety course, or otherwise demonstrate their qualification to use a firearm safely. Delaware’s
30
firearm safety training requirement, which applies to the applicant’s initial license only, is particularly strong, specifying that the training course must include instruction regarding:
Knowledge and safe handling of firearms and ammunition;
Safe storage of firearms and ammunition and child safety;
Safe firearms shooting fundamentals;
Federal and state laws pertaining to the lawful purchase, ownership, trans-portation, use and possession of firearms;
State laws pertaining to the use of deadly force for self defense; and
Techniques for avoiding a criminal attack and how to manage a violent confrontation, including conflict resolution.
Delaware also requires that the training include live fire shooting exercises on a range, in-cluding the expenditure of a minimum of 100 rounds of ammunition, and identification of ways to develop and maintain firearm shooting skills.
Rhode Island requires applicants to obtain a certification that they are qualified to use a handgun of a caliber equal to or larger than the one they seek to carry. The certification can be obtained by passing a firing test conducted by a range officer or pistol instructor.72
Among “shall issue” states, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas and Utah require firearm safety training. Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina, South Carolina and Texas require live fir-ing as part of the firearm training component of the law.
3. States Limiting the Locations where Concealed Weapons May be Carried: Most states that allow carrying concealed weapons impose some restrictions on the locations where they may be carried. The majority of states prohibit concealed weapons on school prop-erty, in prisons or jails, courthouses and other government buildings, and at locations where liquor is served. A smaller number of jurisdictions prohibit concealed weapons in a wide range of other locations, including places of worship (Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming); polling places (Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, South Carolina and Texas); sports arenas (Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska and Oklahoma); hospitals and/or medical facili-ties (Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, South Carolina and Texas); sites where gambling is permitted (Indiana, Missouri, North Dakota and Oklahoma); and mental health facilities (Kansas, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Washington).
31
Conclusion
The Declarant comes before this court in his legislative position as a Private
Attorney General and as a Bounty Hunter with the authority of Congress to enforce the
laws on those parties who violate procedure under “color of law” and who misuse their
position by fraudulent means before the court. The Declarant has laid out intentional
fraud with intent to mislead and with intent to do harm not only to this Declarant but to
the public interest in violation of the District of Columbia’s Rules of Professional Code
and Ethics as well as Title 36, United States Code, chapter 705, under section 70503.
This court is being made aware of higher court rulings of declaring the District
of Columbia’s gun laws unconstitutional as well as the legislative law of the Dick Act of
1902 which also makes the District of Columbia’s gun laws unconstitutional.
For the court or the Prosecution to maintain this action would place the District of
Columbia in violation of Federal Statutes created within that 10 mile square area. This
would now violate the Prosecutor’s oath of office and surety bond to hold that position in
honor and with integrity thereby allowing the Declarant to bring an action against the
District of Columbia for disregarding Federal Statutes in violation of their oath to uphold
the 2nd Amendment as a perjured oath. That would now violate Title 18, United States
Code, section 1621 for perjury.
United States Attorney Manual, Title 9, sec. 1743 Perjury overview of 18 U.S.C. §§
1621 and 1623. Violations
Several Federal statutes criminalize perjury and related false statements. The two
most commonly used statutes for perjury offenses are 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 and 1623.
Section 1621 is the traditional, broadly applicable perjury statute, and is used to
32
Prosecute perjuries committed before legislative, administrative or judicial bodies.
Section 1623, added in 1970, eliminated some of the proof problems associated with
these difficult prosecutions, but Congress limited its applicability to false statements
before Federal courts and grand juries. In Hubbard v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 1754, 1764
& n.15 (1995), the Supreme Court noted that these statutes, as well as sections 1503
(obstruction) and 287 (false claims) can apply to and penalize false statements made to
the Judicial Branch. The Court also specifically found the Federal false statement statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1001, inapplicable to statements to the judiciary. However, in 1996, Congress
amended the § 1001 in the False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, P.L. 104-292,
H.R. 3166, Oct. 11, 1996. The amendment restored the Department's ability to prosecute
false statements made to the legislative and judicial branches. See also this Manual at 902
et seq.
United States Attorney Manual, Title 9, 1007, Fraud
The statute does not define the phrase "obtained by fraud." Fraud is defined by
nontechnical standards and is not to be restricted by any common-law definition of false
pretenses. One court has observed, "the law does not define fraud; it needs no definition;
it is as old as falsehood and as versatile as human ingenuity." Weiss v. United States, 122
F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941). The Fourth Circuit,
reviewing a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2314, also noted that "fraud is a broad term,
which includes false representations, dishonesty and deceit." See United States v.
Grainger, 701 F.2d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 947 (1983).
Procedural Foundation For Just Cause For Return of All property & Dismissal
33
The Declarant has set forth, in the above documentation, enough evidence of
procedural violations of Ethics violations committed by the Prosecution. Any bar attorney
that represented the Declarant or the public interest in such a matter would be disbarred
and suspended from practice for bringing forth such information. For any attorney to
show such misrepresentation by the government prosecutors would cost that attorney his
bar license and suspension in the practicing of law. No defense attorney would dare bring
up Title 36, United States Code, chapter 705 nor the District of Columbia’s rules of
professional conduct and ethics in order to show ethical violations of the Prosecution for
misrepresenting the law and failing to uphold court decisions based on this very issue that
sits before the court today.
Therefore the Declarant would be placed at a disadvantage of misrepresentation
by legal counsel as his legal counsel would be barred from such actions of protecting his
client’s due process and his rights in court. Even though the District of Columbia's rules
of Professional Conduct and Ethics requires the attorney to defend his client with
unbiased behavior and without restrictions, the result for the attorney to do so would
mean automatic disbarment.
The Declarant will point out that any person with a reasonable mind reading this
document and who is not a lawyer or judge and is impartial and neutral in the law, would
see the errors committed by the Prosecution as the laws are required to be written in a
manner that even an uneducated person can understand.
As Supreme Court rulings and other Court rulings on this issue clearly show that
the District of Columbia’s gun laws have been found to be unconstitutional and reading
the Congressional records of the Dick Act of 1902 and National Firearm Act of 1934 and
34
the written USC definition of a “firearm” any person with a reasonable mind would read
the documentation in favor of the Declarant and would agree that there were procedural
and ethical violations committed by the Prosecution. Again, even in the strictest sense the
Declarant had a concealed carry permit and all items were also then registered in his
home state and, thereby, even in the strictest sense the Declarant would come in
compliance with the District of Columbia’s permit and registration laws.
Therefore this court is requested to dismiss this case “with prejudice” and return
all property on behalf of the Declarant and to give restitution and make him whole for his
damages and inconvenience as there have been procedural errors and abuse of the public
office which wastes taxpayers money and the courts time on frivolous charges. There are
a number of court rulings that address these issues in favor of the Declarant and
legislative law that cannot be overturned, and this issue is backed up by the 2nd
Amendment to the Constitution to which all who hold public office did swear an oath to
and are required to have surety bonds to uphold, defend and protect while in public
office.
Whereas the court did also place restrictions on the Declarant and barred him
from coming back into the District of Columbia, except under certain terms, this falls
under “Equity” thereby placing an injunction to restrict and to penalize the Declarant,
and, furthermore, judgment was passed BEFORE punishment was adjudicated in a trial.
Because of this the Declarant moves the court for “Dismissal for want of Equity”.
Black’s Law Dictionary 5th Edition “The court’s dismissal of a lawsuit of
substantial, rather than procedural, grounds, usu, because the plaintiff’s allegations are
found to be untrue or because the plaintiffs pleading does not state an adequate claim.”
35
See: Reinman V. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 35 S.Ct 511, 513, 59 L Ed. 900
The Declarant reserves all his rights and his right to amend this document at any
time without leave of court and the right to use his document as a counterclaim in an
action on his behalf as it shows and evidences the errors of the Prosecution.
States that Require Applicants for Concealed Weapons Permits to be of Good Char-acter
Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachu-setts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island
b. States Requiring Applicants to be of Good Character: Most “may issue” states
also require the licensing authority to consider the character of the applicant. Alabama,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and the District of Columbia allow
permits to be issued only to “suitable persons.” California, Delaware and New York
require the licensing authority to find the applicant is of “good moral character.” New
Jersey requires that three “reputable persons” who have known the applicant for at least
three years certify that the applicant is of “good moral character and behavior.” Delaware
also requires that the applicant include with his or her application a certificate signed by
five “respectable citizens” of the county in which the applicant resides, stating that the
applicant is of good moral character, has a reputation for peace and good order, and that
possession of a concealed deadly weapon by the applicant is necessary for the protection
of the applicant or the applicant’s property
Rodney-Dale; Class Private Attorney General Seal Private Attorney General Street address redacted in this version High Shoals N.C. [email protected] Bounty Hunter Seal
36
Exhibits 1 & 2
1. Congressional filing for the Private Attorney General position. Filed on Feb 2 2009
2. Congressional filing for the Private Attorney General and for the Bounty Hunter position to enforce Constitutional Law ,United States Laws, Treaties, laws of the several states and hold position under the Constitutional 14th amendment section 4 as Bounty Hunter. Filed on May 30 2013
37
Exhibit 3
3A.Statutes at Large, Vol. 32, chapter 196, pg 775Public Law No. 33, Dick Act
3B.Congressional Record Senate September 10 1917 Titled Senate
3C.Appendix to the Congressional record Titled the Militia
3D.The Dick Act of 1902 explained with HR 11654 Bill
38
Exhibit 4
4. Statute at Large Vol.48, chapter 757 page 1236, Public No.474 National Firearm Act
39
Exhibit 5
5. Reference by Yale Law School League of Nations Treaty Series 49 Stat. 3097; Treaty Series 881. Convention on Rights and Duties of States
40
Exhibit 6
6. Statutes at Large Vol 59 chapter 652 page 669 Public Law 291 International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945
41
Exhibit 7
1.National Right to Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011 H.R 822
42
PROOF OF SERVICE
Now Comes Rodney–Dale; Class, by Congressional Legislation under the Statutes at
Large and by United States Codes created by the United States Congress within the
District of Columbia Territory, in the position of Private Attorney General and Bounty
Hunter to set forth this document TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE: ADDENDUM JUST
CAUSE FOR RETURN OF ALL PROPERTY & MOTION TO DISMISS to be
placed before the Superior Court Judge and the Clerk of Court of the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia on this ______ day of _____________ in the year of our Lord
2013 AD. Declarant also delivered a copy to the Prosecution via Registered or 1st Class
U.S. Mail.
Rodney-Dale; Class Private Attorney General Street address redacted in this version High Shoals N.C. [email protected]
Cc
District of Columbia Prosecutors office United States Attorney's Office555 4th Street, NWWashington, DC 20530
Atty Donald L. Dworsky P.O. Box 409 Glen Echo, Md 20812
43
Superior CourtDistrict Columbia
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CASE # 2013 CF2 009225
Foreign Plaintiff
Vs Administrative Law JudgeNASH, STUART G
Rodney-Dale; Class America National Citizen
Declarant
Entry Of Judgment
The Superior Court finds the Declarant's motion before the court TAKE
JUDICIAL NOTICE: JUST CAUSE FOR RETURN OF ALL PROPERTY &
MOTION TO DISMISS has substantial justification as an error(s) in law(s) has/have
been made.
This court hereby grants the Declarant's Dismissal based on procedural errors
and legal errors created by the Agencies/United States Attorney's Office in the District of
Columbia against Rodney-Dale; Class and points to the legislated statutes and their
definitions and other court rulings to the right to carry and to the Dick Act of 1902 and
agrees that it rules the District of Columbia’s gun regulations as unconstitutional as
defined by legislative definitions and terms under the national firearms act of 1934 which
defines federal legislation to what is a firearm.
The court finds a number of procedural violations as pointed out in Mr. Class'
document as to when the Miranda Warning was read while he was in court before the
Judge HOWZE, KAREN on Friday morning, and due to the fact that the parking ticket
44
was subsequently dismissed all evidence presented by the Prosecution on which to base
any charges, thereafter, falls under the “clean hands doctrine” or the “fruit of the poison
tree doctrine,” and is just cause to dismiss this case in favor of Rodney-Dale; Class with
prejudiced.
The court hereby lifts the restrictions imposed upon Mr. Class of not being able
to come into the District of Columbia without a Court Order from the Superior Court and
hereby dismisses all allegations and claims against him by the Capitol Police and/or by
Federal Agencies in the District of Columbia.
The Superior Court of the District of Columbia recognizes Rodney-Dale; Class'
position as a “Private Attorney General” and as a “Bounty Hunter” as an Act of
Legislative Law created by Congress in the Statutes at Large as well is United States
Code and recognizes his authority as a Constitutional Enforcement Officer with the same
legal standing and authority as the “U.S. Marshals” who were also created by Congress
under the Judiciary Act of 1789.
This court will ask Mr. Class if restitution needs to be given to him for his
inconvenience and the hardship caused him by this incident. Any reasonable restitution
will be considered by the Superior Court as just and fair compensation for his
inconvenience and hardship.
So ordered on this ______ day of ____________ in the year _______.
________________________
Administrative Law Judge
Judge NASH, STUART G
45
Superior CourtDistrict Columbia500 Indiana Ave N.WWashington, D.C.20001
District of Columbia Prosecutors office United States Attorney's Office555 4th Street, NWWashington, DC 20530
Atty Donald L. Dworsky P.O. Box 409 Glen Echo, Md 20812
46
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