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Web Security Challenges Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C Thomas Roessler, W3C [email protected] [email protected]

Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C [email protected]

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Page 1: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Web Security ChallengesWeb Security Challenges

World Wide Web Conference 2006World Wide Web Conference 2006

Thomas Roessler, W3CThomas Roessler, [email protected]@w3.org

Page 2: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

OverviewOverview

● Digression: XML SignatureDigression: XML SignatureAuthentication, Usability, and the WebAuthentication, Usability, and the WebThomas Roessler, W3CThomas Roessler, W3C

● Security Requirements for the Ubiquitous WebSecurity Requirements for the Ubiquitous WebDave Raggett, W3CDave Raggett, W3C

● Access Control, P.I.Access Control, P.I.Charles McCathie Nevile, OperaCharles McCathie Nevile, OperaThomas Roessler, W3CThomas Roessler, W3C

Page 3: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Digression: XML SignatureDigression: XML Signature

● XML Signature is coming of age.XML Signature is coming of age.● XML Canonicalization (C14N) has known issues.XML Canonicalization (C14N) has known issues.

– xml:id xml:id – oops – oops – xml:base xml:base – oops(2)– oops(2)– XML Core WG currently preparing C14N 1.1XML Core WG currently preparing C14N 1.1

● We're in listening mode about what the next We're in listening mode about what the next steps should be for XML Signature.steps should be for XML Signature.

Page 4: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Web Authentication Today: Web Authentication Today: A padlock means “secure.”A padlock means “secure.”

Page 5: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

This is a padlock.This is a padlock.

Page 6: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

This is not a padlock.This is not a padlock.

From a recent phishing attack. The attacker's site was, like the original, From a recent phishing attack. The attacker's site was, like the original, serving the form using plain HTTP.serving the form using plain HTTP.

Page 7: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

A padlock means “secure.” Not.A padlock means “secure.” Not.

Page 8: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Better don't click on the padlock, Better don't click on the padlock, or else...or else...

Page 9: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Better don't click on the padlock, Better don't click on the padlock, or else...or else...

Page 10: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Better don't click on “View”, Better don't click on “View”, eithereither

Page 11: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

A padlock means “secure.” Not.A padlock means “secure.” Not.

Page 12: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

But it gets worse...But it gets worse...

Page 13: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

““Examine”Examine”

Page 14: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Or the user could go with the Or the user could go with the default...default...

Page 15: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

A padlock means “secure.” Not.A padlock means “secure.” Not.

Page 16: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Can we do better than this?Can we do better than this?

● The padlock doesn't make sense.The padlock doesn't make sense.● X.509 certificates are technical gibberish.X.509 certificates are technical gibberish.● Current implementation doesn't even help Current implementation doesn't even help

suspicious users.suspicious users.● Can we make Web authentication more usable?Can we make Web authentication more usable?● 15/16 March: Workshop in NYC15/16 March: Workshop in NYC

– 41 position papers, 60 participants, 23 41 position papers, 60 participants, 23 presentationspresentations

– banks, browser & security vendors, academics, banks, browser & security vendors, academics, content providerscontent providers

Page 17: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Workshop ResultsWorkshop ResultsSecure Chrome & Secure MetadataSecure Chrome & Secure Metadata● Show different stuff to usersShow different stuff to users

– logos?logos?– ““this is a bank site”? “verified by ***”?this is a bank site”? “verified by ***”?

● Show it safelyShow it safely– The part of the user interface that displays The part of the user interface that displays

metadata must be protected from faking through metadata must be protected from faking through mark-up and scripting.mark-up and scripting.

– Restrict browsers' abilities.Restrict browsers' abilities.– Specific security mode?Specific security mode?

Page 18: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Which one is the browser?Which one is the browser?

From: http://www.w3.org/2005/Security/usability-ws/presentations/37-googleFrom: http://www.w3.org/2005/Security/usability-ws/presentations/37-google

Page 19: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

What can W3C do here?What can W3C do here?

● Enable browser vendors to restrict functionality Enable browser vendors to restrict functionality in a concerted way.in a concerted way.

● Enable content providers to connect security Enable content providers to connect security features to their brands.features to their brands.

● Specify data to be displayed.Specify data to be displayed.– could be “please use the logoType extension”could be “please use the logoType extension”– could be more complex than that – think content could be more complex than that – think content

labelslabels

Page 20: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Forms and authenticationForms and authentication

● HTTP authentication isn't used widelyHTTP authentication isn't used widely

Page 21: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Forms and authenticationForms and authentication

● HTML forms, POST and Cookies are the state of HTML forms, POST and Cookies are the state of the artthe art

Page 22: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

HTML Forms and HTML Forms and HTTP AuthenticationHTTP Authentication● If user agents could recognize that an HTML If user agents could recognize that an HTML

form is used for credentials....form is used for credentials....– user agents could manage credentials, reliablyuser agents could manage credentials, reliably– user agents could give the current user interfaces user agents could give the current user interfaces

and combine them with HTTP-level authenticationand combine them with HTTP-level authentication– user agents could trigger intelligent user interface user agents could trigger intelligent user interface

behaviour – this could be a hook for login ritualsbehaviour – this could be a hook for login rituals● New tags v. microformats / annotations?New tags v. microformats / annotations?

Page 23: Web Security Challenges - w3.org · Web Security Challenges World Wide Web Conference 2006 Thomas Roessler, W3C tlr@w3.org

Where do we go from here?Where do we go from here?

● Next step: charter draft(s).Next step: charter draft(s).● Please join the discussion:Please join the discussion:

http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-usable-authentication/http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-usable-authentication/

● Nearby:Nearby:– IETF is discussing possible future developments on IETF is discussing possible future developments on

HTTP authenticationHTTP authentication– Online Identity (dix, Infocard, OpenID, ...)Online Identity (dix, Infocard, OpenID, ...)