CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY •

WASHINGTON 25. O. C.

IRONBARK •

APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE:DEC 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT "Combat Against Enemy Nuclear Artillery,Free Rockets, and Guided Missiles inOffensive and Defensive nperations ofan Army" (Chapter VT)

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of Chapter VIof a seven-chaptir TOP SECRET Soviet publication entitled"Combat Against Enemy Nuclear Artillery, Free Rockets, andGuided Missiles in Offensive and Defensive Operations ofan Army". It was issued by Scientific-Research ArtilleryInstitute No. 1 in Leningrad in October 1960.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, thecodeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of csnBreports containing documentary Soviet material. The wordIRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used onlyamong persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. Requests for extra copies cif this report or , forutilization of any part of this document in any other formshould be addressed to the originating office.

udA6,744.4.4‘A.01

Richard HelmsDeputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,The Joint Staff

The Asaistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Department Of the Army

The Director of Naval IntelligenceDepartment of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, IntelligenceU. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of IntelligenceAtomic Energy Commission .

Nltional Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and AstronauticsIntelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

46-sistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

I IRONBARK

COUNTRY USSR

SUBJECT "Combat Against Enemy NuclearArtillery, Free Rockets, andGuided Missiles in Offensiveand Defensive Operations ofan Army" (Chapter VI)

DATE OF INFO : October 1980

APPRAISAL OFCONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation ofChapter VI of a TOP SECRET Soviet publicationtitled "Combat Against Enemy Nuclear Artillery,Free Rockets, and Guided Missiles in Offensiveand Defensive Operations of an Army". Thisdocument contains seven chapters and was publishedon 15 October 1960 by Scientific-Research ArtilleryInstitute No. 1 in Leningrad. Each chapter will bedisseminated as it becomes available and is trans-lated.

In some cases, there are imperfections in theoriginal text which leave doubt as to the accuracyof translation. Question marks are inserted inbrackets following uncertain words or phrases. Asin other IRONBARK reports, transliterated Cyrillicletters are underlined in translation, while Greekand Roman letters are given as in the original.

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Chapter VI,

"Principles of Planning Combat Against the

.Enemy's Offensive Nuclear Weapons"

k. General'Principlea in Planning Combat Against the Enemy's Nuclear Weapons

With the modern state of weapons of armedcombat, the attainment of fire superiority over theenemy is the most important factor for ensuringsuccess in an operation.

With the constantly growing role of offensivenuclear weapons and with their wide use by thebelligerents, in the end the struggle to attain

..ire superiority lies in combating the enemy's'Yoffensive nuclear weapons. It must start at the

beginning of the preparations for. the operationand must be continued uninterruptedly throughoutthe operation by the joint efforts of the artillery,missile troops, and aircraft,/-? . 7: Under modernconditions, the main burden Of combating the enemy'soffensive nuclear weapons falls on the missiletroops and the artillery.

Combating offensive nuclear weapons hasdecisgia-Mptirtance not only in operations duringthe initial period of a war, when surprise andmassed strikes with nuclear and thermonuclear weaponscan have an enormous influence on the course of thewhoAe.waxIbUtalso in subsequent offensive anddefensive operations.

In an offensive operation, the timely destructionof offensive nuclear weapons prevents the enemy's

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counterpreparation and separate nuclear strikes, andthis, in turn, ensures the preparation of troops forthe attack and the conduct of the subsequent advanceat a high speed.

In a defensive operation, timely destruction ofoffensive nuclear weapons ensures the carrying outof an effective counterpreparation and the breakingup of the enemy's fire preparation, while during theoperation it facilitates the successful committalinto battle of second echelons and reserves, theconduct of counters trikes and the attainment of theaims of the operation.

The variety of offensive nuclear weapons, theirdistribution in great depth, and their dispersalover a wide front demand a specific approach toperforming the tasks of combating these enemy weapons.

- The specific approach to performing the tasksof combating the enemy's offensive nuclear weapons

4lies in determining the procedure and time for des-x troying these or other objectives, in determiningthe kinds of fire for effect (annihilatingy neutral-izing, or harassing fire) or the degree of destruction,and in determining the forces and weapons to beemployed to destroy the various targets. In thisconnection, it must be borne in mind that the onlyway to break up enemy nuclear attacks or, at least,of weakening them to a considerable extent is todestroy his weapons and not to neutralize themfor a short time. Specially favorable conditions fordestroying offensive nuclear weapons can arise when

inuclear weapons are located in one word illegibleg,in concentration areas, in Wait ng areas, when theyare being transported by rail and other means ofcommunication, and also when nuclear warheads arein depots and assembly bases.

Fire for neutralization and harassment (inter-diction) should be regarded as a temporary measure

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because it can only upset the work of certain targetsfor a time (particularly of nuclear warhead depotsand assembly bases) or delay the readiness for actionof subunits which are making preparations to fire anuclear shell or to launch a free rocket or guidedmissile (cruise_Missile).

After fire has ceased,or during the intervalsbetween bombardmentsothe enemy will always be ableto resume his preparations op the projectile orfor firing (launching) nuclear projectiles (freerockets or guided missiles), or to take steps toevacuate a subunit which is being neutralized byour fire and to remove the nuclear warheads whichare in danger of destruction.. Therefore, fire toneutralize the 'enemy's offensive nuclear weaponsshould be regarded as a subsidiary form of fire foreffect. The main aim of such fire will be to pre-vent a projectile with sr..nuclear warhead beingfired (launched), before our Weapons, which arecapable of destroying the enemy's offensive nuclear

ayeapons, are prepared and brought into action7 (tactical or operational-tactical missiles withnuclear warheads, sufficient subunits of gun artillery,aircraft, airborne forces, or reconnaissance andsabotage groups),

It is only by systematically. puttingIoutof action enterprises producing nuclear warheads,and by destroying the stocks of such nuclearammunition and of their delivery vehicles, thatour troops can be made safe from massed nuclearstrikes.

In this connection, the destruction of depotsand assembly bases of nuclear ammunition must notbe Cput simply on the same level as the tasks givento The ground troops??..7, but must be accomplishedin the main as soon as they are detected C?..7.

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, As a rule, the enemy's artillery weapons for •nuclear attack will be at their firing positions(launch sites) for - a short time. As a rule, firing'positions and launch sites are occupied by them.just before firing (launching), and after firing(launching) they immediately leave them.

In this connection, the problem of reducingthe time between the detection of the enemyobjective and the opening of fire for effect atit becomes of the utmost importance. The resolutionof this problem depends on a'series of factors bothof a planning and technical nature.

Just as in previous warp, future armed conflictswill not be of the same intensity throughout theirfull extent. Periods of active combat operationswill be interspersed with periods of preparationfor them. Naturally, before the beginning of activecombat operations the daily activity of troops willbe supported mainly by fire using ammunition with

.,conventional charges. Nuclear ammunition will be ."brought up to firing positions of artillery batteriesin the main directly before active combat operationsbegin or just in time to fulfil individual tasks.Therefore, the possibility is not excluded that, insome comparatively rare cases, firefor the destructionof batteries . which are not using nuclear ammunitionat the given moment, would be inadvisable (for instance,through Cone word missing ,ammunition with convent-eional charges or through tWo words missingl usenuclear warheads). Such 'batteries should be C't7neutralized in the usual way, i.e., with the same27OI:te word misiang2 and methods and with the sameexpenditure of ammunition as are used to neutralizethe enemy's conventional batteries r/j.

Combating enemy offensive nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is organized at all levels, starting*ith:the-Oeneral Headquarters of the Supreme High Com-mand and ending with the large units fighting inthe firSt echelon.

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A front, which has under its direct commandlarge units and units of operational-tactical mis-siles, cruise missiles, bomber, fighter-bomber,reconnaissance, and artillery spotter aircraft aswell as other weapons, is the main organizer to com-bat the enemy's operational-tactical and tacticaloffensive nuclear weapons. In several cases theweapons of a front may also be employed to combatthe enemy's strategic offensive nuclear weapons.

Weapons at the direct disposal of a front willbe used to deliver strikes against military-industrialenterprises, depots C?_7 of nuclear ammunition, theirassembly bases, cruise missiles and long-range guidedmissiles on launch pads and launch sites, and to hitbomber, fighter-bomber, and reconnaissance aircrafton airfields and in the air, and artillery offensivenuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destructionat stations where they are loaded and unloaded, inconcentration areas, and on the march.

Combat against weapons of mass destruction islgplanned by the front commander and his headquarters.

The front commander with his :Atiff . de-termines the general tasks in combating the enemy'soffensive nuclear weapons and distributes them be-tween missile troops, the artillery, and aircraftThe tasks of combating the enemy's nuclear weaponsare determined and Cfive words missing:7. Besidesthis, the front commander and his .stsitEL-Oneand a half lines missingj the enemy's offensivenuclear weapons.

An army has under its command large units andunitg.of operational-tactical missiles and gun artillery,and in motorized rifle and tank divisions there aretactical missile battalions.

These means provide an army with the fullcapability of combating the enemy's tactical andto some extent his operational-tactical nuclear

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weapons: nuclear artillery, free rockets of the ."Honest John" and "Little John" type, guided missilesof the "Lacrosse" and "Corporal" type, and in severalcasespalso,guided missiles of the "Redstone" and -"Sergeant" type. There may be cases where there arelaunch pads for "Matador" and "Mace" cruise missileswithin range of an army's weapons. In addition,army weapons can destroy army ammunition supply points.

.Thus, an army now has a very considerable capabil-ity for combating the enemy's offensive nuclear weapons.If we take into account. that in the near futuman_armymay be provided with :longer range operational-tacticaland tactical missiles thanit has at the_presenttime,_then it can be considered that an army element (irmey-skoye zveno) will have at its disposal qUite.adeqUitefire weapons for stubborn combat against the.eiemflitactiiiTiihdTto some exteht:EigTOW.ktIi54.1:4A-4/411,objectives of nuclear attack . also,. the role of thearmy elementTn this fight will increase.

Combat against tactical offensive nuclear weaponsAs planned by the army commander and his 70taff-)7:c.

tv"and the command&ng officer of the army's missiletroops and artillery takes a direct part in this work .together with his 7stau.

The army commander and his -elaf.f.7.determine the tasks to be carried out by thearmy's missile troops and artillery in combatingthe . enemy's offensive nuclear weapons according .to the phases of the army's operations and laydown the procedure for combating these weaponsduring the period of fire preparation for anoffensive and during the operation (or during adefensive operation).

Besides decisions on other questions ipj,the commanding officer of the army's missi etroops and artillery, together with hisstaff. prepares L77.7 recommendations for

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the army commander on the problems L—?.." of com-bating the enemy's offensive nuclear weapons.

After the army commander has made his decision,the commanding officer of the army's missile troopsand artillery draws up plans directly for com-bating the enemy's offensive nuclear weapons withthe missile large units (units) and gun artilleryunder army command (taking into account the army'sreinforcements in forces and weapons), as well aswith the tactical missile battalions of the di-visions and the subunits of long-range gun artil-lery, attached to divisions Of the army's firstechelon.

The commanding officer of the army's missile,troops and artillery and his ,staff. set:,specific, tasks for large units and units underarmy command C"?...7 and lay down the procedurefor employing the tactical missiles and gun artil-lery of divisions (if such artillery has been at-

• ,tached to divisions) in combating the enemy'snuclear weapons.

Motorized rifle and tank divisions, whichhave, at the present time,battalions Of tacti-cal missiles in their composition, have only a .limited capability to combat the enemy's nuclearweapons. The limitation in fire weapons is alsoaggravated by the lack of appropriate reconnais-sance resources. Consequently, the divisions Z".."?_7are not able to combat the enemy's offensive nuclear.weapons with their own weapons. However, when thedivisions are reinforced with gun artillery andelements C?_7 of spotter-reconnaissance aircraftare attached to them, the divisions can organizethe combat against the enemy's tactical nuclearweapons: nuclear artillery, free rockets of the"Honest John" and "Little John" type, and guidedmissiles of the "Lacrosse" type.

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The necessity for a division to fulfill thistask with its own forces arises Cone word missing]whenever a division is operating on a separate axisifn?.1. Thus, the planning of combat against theenemy's offensive nuclear weapons is carried outat two levels r?..] - in the front and in the army.

The main echelon (instantsiya) or main level(zveno) for planning the combat against theenemy's operational-tactical offensive nuclearweapons is the front, and the main echelon ormain level for planning the combat against theenemy's tactical offensive nuclear weapons isthe army-.

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2. Resources Used to Destroy and Neutralize

the Enemy's Nuclear Artillery, Free Rockets,

and Guided Missiles, and Their Combat

Capabilities

At the present time, a combined-arms armycan make use of the following weapons to combatthe enemy's offensive nuclear weapons:

--army missile brigade, armed with operational-tactical missiles (8K11), capable of destroy-ing enemy objectives situated in the tacticaland operational depth of his defense atranges of 120 to 140 km from the forwardline of our troops;

--army gun brigade, armed with 130 mm guns,capable of destroying enemy targets situatedin the tactical depth of his defense atranges of 20 to 22 r?...7 km from our for-ward line;

--tactical missile battalion of motorizedrifle and tank divisions, capable ofdestroying enemy, targets situated in thetactical depth of his defense at rangesof 20 to 25 r?....7 km from our forward line.

Besides these forces and weapons, in a numberof cases an army may also have as additional meansof support independent subunits (units) of operat-ional-tactical and tactical missiles, and also ofgun f?dj artillery of the Reserve of the Supreme HighCbmman (RVGIE) with the same capabilities inrange as those given above.

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In some especially favorable cases, subunitsand units of divisional artillery, armed with 122 mmand 152 mm howitzers, can be brought in to neutralizeand destroy the enemy's offensive nuclear weapons.

When provided with the appropriate ammunition,the weapons listed above are quite sufficient tofulfil an army's tasks in combating the enemy'snuclear weapons.

As can be seen from Chapter IV, the task ofdestroying offensive nuclear weapons can beaccomplished by means of independent strikes withoperational-tactical missiles with a yield offrom 4 to 100 to 150 kt (depending on the natureOf the target and the range) and also by means ofstrikes with tactical missileswith a power Offrom 1 to 40 kt.

Batteries and battalions of conventional. artillery can be used successfully to destroythe enemy's tactical offensive nuclear weapons.In Chapter V it was shown that to destroy anytarget connected with the enemy's offensivenuclear weapons little time is required (from 5to 20 minutes) as a rule for batteries or bat-talions of artillery Z--?2. [five words missingjthat in the majority of cases it is enough if oneto two batteries are brought in to fulfil this task.

It is essential to take into account here thatthese data have been obtained for conditions ofpercussion fire (udarnaya strelba) with highexplosive fragmentation shells. rIt should benoted?.1 that the use of other ammunition, forinstance chemical L7/2 shells with tone wordmissingi rapid-actin c...?_' Cone word missing.]toxic substances T.? , orThy using r?...7 highexplosive fragmentation shells /-three words missinggconventional z7,?j artillery 47Two words missing.]and destruction of the offensive nuclear weaponsof the enemy Cone line missingg.

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Operational-tactical and tactical missiles, aswell as artillery, differ essentially from oneanother not only in regard to their range and thepower of the ammunition used. They differ greatlyin regard to the time required to prepare them foifire (firing or launching) for effect.

In this 'respect, artillery undoubtedly hasthe greatest effectiveness. From experiencegained during firings and tactical exercisesduring the last few years, it is known that anartillery battalion is capable of opening firefor effect against any target 2 to 3 minutes afterit has been given the coordinates of this target.The same battalion, when forming part of anartillery group, divisional artillery, and armyartillery, can open fire in 4,5, and 6 minutesrespectively after getting the coordinates ofthe target.

Thus, it can be reckoned that an artilleryipattalion has the capability of opening fire for''effect against offensive nuclear weapons in 3 to6 minutes after getting the coordinates of theseweapons.

From experience in exercises it is knownthat tactical missile battalions, when theirlaunch assemblies (startovyy agregat) are inthe positions in full readiness to launch, cancarry out a strike against a target of opportunity10 to 15 minutes after they have received thecoordinates of the target. If one takes intoaccount that to make a decision, to cipher anddecipher orders and to pass them down the channelsof command: army - division - battalion - up to15 to 20 C?_7 minutes at least are required, asexperience gained in exercises has shown, and upto 10 to 15 Minutes down the channels frombattalion to the crews, then it can be reckonedthat a tactical missile battalion can deliver a

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strike at a newly detected target in 20 to 35 1-'77minutes after the coordinates of this target havebeen received by the commanding officer or head-quarters of the army's missile troops and artillery,and 20 to 30 C?..7 minutes after the coordinateshave been received by the headquarters of divisionalartillery Lnz_7.

Thus, a tactical missile battalion is capableof delivering a strike against a newly detectedtarget in 20 to 35 minutes after the coordinates ofthis target have been obtained. -

Batteries armed with 8K11 operational-tacticalmissiles mid. with 8U218 launch assemblies cantechnically be at a readiness of 1, 15, 20, and of35 to 40 minutes. For firing at newly detectedtargets of opportunity requiring immediate destruct-ion (and particularly at the enemy's offensivenuclear weapons), operational-tactical batteries canbe kept at a readiness of 15 to 20 and of 35 to 40

1minutes, as 1-minute readiness can be used only incases of delivering massed nuclear strikes or whenstrikes have to be delivered at a definite timeindicated in advance.

A battery which is at a readiness of 15 to 20minutespaii fire•ataAarget of opportunity 15 to 20min-utes after the target's coordinates have beenobtained. To achieve such a stage of readiness,the launch assembly must be on the launch siteready to *operate With the assembly engine (dvigatelagregata) switched off after preliminary checkingof the missile and with the guidance equipmentarranged and prepared for operation, and the missileitself is in the vertical position and the work ofpreparing the missile for firing in accordance withthe "Directions for Firliitu Drill for 8811 MissileUnits" (Nastavleniyspo ognevoy sluzhbe raketnfthchastey 8K11); including checking the parameters ofthe nose cone ll having been'already carried out, i.e.

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all preparatory measures laid down in the temporary

Cti "Instructions for Launch Batteries on lihtitV::%rmed with 8K11 Missiles', 1960, have been carried out.

The launch battery Must be at the indicated state ofreadiness for not More than 24 L7.7_7 hours.

A battery which is at a stage_of readiness of35 to 40 minutes can fire at a -target-Of opportunity35 to 40 minutes after the target's coordinates havebeen received. To achieve such a stage readinessthe launch assembly with the missile in a horizontalposition must be on the launCh site or under shelternear it; in the latter case the cover must not befurther away than a place from which the launchercan be put in position . on the launch site within5 minutes. The personnel must be standing by theassembly and ready to take up their places accordingto the combat schedule (po boyevomu raschetu)..

, Of these two kinds of readiness, the more advan-tageous one is undoubtedly the readiness of 15 to 20

4minutes, and it should therefore be regarded as the N,'basic type of readiness for batteries on the alertwhich are intended to combat the enemy's offensivenuclear weapons . . If one takes into account that be-sides this time, considerable time is required tomake a decision, cipher, transmit, and decipher orders(up to 15 to 20 minutes), then it can be reckonedthat a strike with operational-tactical missiles canbe prepared at present not mOre quickly than 30 to 40minutes afterlhecommandtifg-Offtcer--or"reiaaWeFiof the army's missile troops and artillery has receivedthe coordinates of the target.

In concluding this summary of the characteristicfeatures of the combat capabilities of artillery,tactical, and operational-tactical missiles, whichmust be taken into account in planning the combatagainst the enemy's offensive nuclear weapons, itis necessary to add that missile troops and artillerycan accomplish this task at any time of the day

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or night or time of year, under any climatic Conditionsof nature, and practically in any weather conditions.In this respect, missile troops and artillery haveunquestionable advantages over aircraft.

3. Destruction of the Enemy's Offensive

Nuclear Weapons, Taking into Account

the Time They Are at Firing Positions

or Launch Sites

The characteristic feature of modern troops ingeneral, and of subunits' and units using nuclear wea-pons,in particular, is their great mobility, which,in the event of necessity, provides considerable -capabilities for making rapid changes in the battleformations. Under modern conditions, all troopswill change their locations systematically. SUch.changes of battle formations will be carried outlbarticularly often in the case of units and sub- .'units armed with offensive nuclear weapons. Thus,according to the views held in the US Army, unitsand subunits armed with offensive nuclear weaponsshould remain at their firing positions and launchsites only for the length of time necessary forpreparing to fire or launch a missile. Havingfired or launched a missile, a subunit must eitherchange its firing position (launch site) immediately .or must move to shelter situated a relatively largedistance from the firing position (launch site)..Therefore, the destruction and neutralization ofthe enemy's offensive nuclear weapons on theirfiring positions and launch sites depends wholly andentirely on opening fire for effect against thetarget at the right time.

However, the possibility that some partof theenemy's offensive nuclear weapons will be on thealert at the firing positioni and launch sites

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should not be excluded. The possibility of theirbeing on alert in this way will be a factor whichto some extent facilitates combat against theseweapons and increases its effectiveness. But oneshould not count on this. For Cone word missingcorrect methods it is essential to have Cone wordmissing3 unfavorable conditions for this 27.?...7%Such conditions are those which C?...7 make thequestion of opening fire for effect against atarget at the right time as one of first importance.

The requirement that fire for effect againsta target should be opened at the right time is thepriority requirement in planning the combat againstthe enemy's offensive nuclear weapons. This require-ment applies with equal force not only to such targetsas the firing positions and launch sites of theenemy's offensive nuclear weapons, but also to thosewhich may be in the positions they occupy for a longer Itime, for instance, technical positions, control pointsand guidance posts, etc.

The most favorable results for us in combatingthe enemy's nuclear weapons will be achieved only •in those cases when the destruction and neutralization Aof these weapons prevents strikes by them against ourtroops, i.e., in other words, the combat againstthese weapons will attain its greatest effectivenesswhen they are destroyed or neutralized before theyfire or launch a projectile. Accordingly, theseoffensive nuclear weapons should be destroyed attransportation points, on the march, in concentrationareas and waiting areas, and at depots and assembly .bases. In these cases, too, the question of firingin time is of the utmost significance. Thus, forinstance, the timely destruction of a depot ofnuclear ammunIttomm, leaving the firing subunitswithout nuclear ammunition, would prevent massedor individual nuclear strikes by the enemy; thedestruction of such a depot in a large unit, forinstance, after it has issued a considerable part

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of the ammunition, will have no effet-u, UK W111 naveonly a small effect, on the character and scale ofthe enemy's use of nuclear weapons.

The situation is more or less the same in regardto the destruction) of control points. Thus, for in-stance, the timely destruction of a control point fora battalion of "Corporal" guided missiles would putthe whole battalion out of action and, consequently,would completely prevent any nuclear strikes by thisbattalion.

However, stricter demands should undoubtedly beapplied to times Of readiness to open fire (firing)for effect when destroying (neutralizing) the enemy'soffensive nuclear weapons at their firing positions(launch sites).

Reconnaissance of the enemy's offensive nuclearweapons at their firing positions and launch sites isa complicated matter. But it is still more difficult,

ipad in some cases impossible, to determine subunits'•"degree of readiness for opening fire. Having detecteda gun, batteryy-ocla -launch site having on it a launch-er or a missile in a vertical position, one can comequite definitely to the conclusion that preparationsare being made on this position to fire or launch andthat the firing or launching can be carried out notlater than a certain time. However, it is very oftenimpossible to determine what state or what stage thework done at the position in preparation for firing orlaunching has reached. At the moment when a firingposition or launch site is detected it can be contend-ed with equal probability that preparations for firingfrom it have just started, that preparations on it havebeen going on for so many minutes, that preparationson it are coming to an end, etc. Hence, it can bereckoned that the time which determines the state ofreadiness of an Offensive nuclear weapon detected ata firing position or launch site can be allotted inaccordance with the law of equal probability. If, forinstance, about two hours are required for preparing alaunching of a "Corporal" guided missile and we have at our

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R P Pt C?_.7 (29)

libmcePlAis the probability of fulfilling the task

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disposal a weapon with which a strike can be madeonly one hour after the target is detected, thenit can be contended that the probability ofaccomplishing the task within the tire will beonly 0.5 (50 percent), i.e.,

.T - tt(28)

where Pt is the probability of fulfilling the firetask within the time schedule;

tis the time taken to prepare a strikeagainst a target from the moment of itsdetection to the moment when fire (around) for effect IA opened;

gp. is the time that the.eCemy gun, battery,or launcher is at the firing position orlaunch site from the moment it occupiesthe firing position or launch site tillit fires (launches).

In examining questions regarding the indicatorsof the effectiveness of fire it was accepted that .the probability of fulfilling such an important taskas that of destroying the enemy's offensive nuclearweapons must not be below 0.9. In Chapter IV, thisindex level for the effectiveness of fire was adoptedwithout taking into account the probability of ful-filling the task within the time schedule.

On the basis of what is stated above, it canbe concluded that the accepted probability factorin destroying any enemy offensive nuclear weaponshould be that al absolute probability (polnayaveroyatnost) equal to:

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in regard to accuracy.

If we reckon that P is taken to be equal to0.9 (90 percent) (for nuclear strikes), then itcan be considered that:

Having details regarding the time required toprepare the various nuclear weapons in a US .rmyfor firing or launching (given in Chapter itis quite easy to determine what length of time willbe required for preparing fire (one round) foreffect needed to ensure the various degrees ofprobability of destroying the enemy's firing positionor launch site before fire has been opened from it.rTwo words missing7 and the probability of ful-Tilling the task.

This time is calculated by using the formula:

- R)t-

0.9 (30)

Details of the calculation are given in Table 46.

414*Table 48

Malcom Mao Boquirod to Prepare Pro for BEfoot to Secure tho 01vca Dogroo ofProbability of Doctroying a Firing Pooition or Launch Oita (in ninutos)

Doolgantion of often:livemallow mason •

203.1 on colt-propolledbooitner203.2 on 000banicall7draon hooltmor or batteryof 203.2 on houltaor0 (79.7280 on gun 7121

"Vonont Jobb'. and "LittloJobs" frdo :nohow."Locroome guldod(ono launcbor)

nar4:1;:juidcd niacild

"Corporal" guided oloollo"Rodatono" guldad"Matador'•,cruloo cdoollo"Saco" cruise °Moil*

Biala= tico atSiring peonies(launch alto)for pimp. of fire

Probability of dootroying targof

B .30 0.40 0.90 0.00 0.70 0.80 I 0.90 f? _7

bola 3.9 2.0 2.9 1.7 1.1 tJ

30 pin 201 17 13 10 8.8 3.? 1.728 oin 17 14 11 0.2 5.0 3.8 1.4

18 nia•

80? ale.

10, 9 .8

33

7.7

27

9.9 ClI

20

5.5

13 Ell

1 ..7

8.8

0.?

7.82 boom eo 79 77 40 12 0.73 bourn Lao 100 00 80 40 se 10

1i bourn eo 7? 40 30 DI 20 18 5.09? oin 20 17 1? 10 8.3 7.3 1.7

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From Table 46 it can be seen that the given r?_.7degree of probability of destroying the target can beattained only in those cases where the time taken toprepare fire (one round) for effect can be measuredin a few minutes, and in some cases a few seconds,for instance in the case of the 203.2 mm self-propelledhowitzer and an independent "Lacrosse" guided missilelauncher. Consequently, the attainment of a highdegree of probability of destyoyiag_some ClOiatenuclear weapons is a very problematical matter andcannot be_achieved .with. the weapons now An existence*.in when &Whitt againif—these weapons is planned

perfectly.

The time shown in Table 46 it in summarized formand represents the time necessary:

--to determine the coordinates of the target;

--to. transmit the coordinates to the commander(commanding officer, chief) who has the rightto call for fire;

--for the commander (commanding officer) totake a decision to open fire against thetarget;

--to pass the order to open fire to those whowill carry it out;

--to prepare the settings for firing;'

--to prepare and set the guns, launcher, ormissiles to the target.

In addition, the time of flight of the shell ormissile should also be inclUded in the above time.

Experience-gained_during_qxero.ses_carried outduring the last few years has shown_that_to 4e-4irrmine the coordinates of a target and to designate a

•

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target considerable time is expended,.amounting toVans of minutes iia2kOmetimes to hoursrUle,a considerable part of the time taken can, beattributed to poor planning and poor technicaltarget determination (plokhoye tekhnicheskoyeobespecheniye tseleukazaniya) (insufficientcoordination of headquarters and reconnaissanceorgans, use of radiotelephones with a small radiusof operation, lack of experience C71 of recon-naissance personnel; etc.).

The fulfillment of scientific-research work onquestions concerning reconnaissance has shown, how-ever,tWilt.tflUkt.workof reconnaissance resources,communications, and target determination procedureare properly organized, it is quite possible;

--to datenninethe,t'argetwordinates from an air-craft (helicopter)* by visual reconnaissancewith the help of a large-scale map or of aerial Aphotographs and to report them in 3 to 4.min-utes (from the moment of detectiqg the targetto finishing the report);

--to determine the target coordinates from aphotograph from an aircraft on reconnaissanceusing the one-stage photographic process ?(photographing, processing, getting thecoordinates, and reporting them) in 10 minutes(from the moment of photographing the target

to finishing the report;

--to determine the target coordinates from a map,.to establish communications, and to pass thecoordinates of the target, determined by areconnaissance group or by secret agents (agentura)in 40 to 50 minutes (from the moment of detectingthe target to finishing the report).

* It is essential to bear in mind that reconnaissancefrom a helicopter of a previously undetected targetrtwo lines missing.7.

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As for vertical and oblique photography from anaircraft using the usual two-stage process, then atthe best 3 to 5 hours are required to get the co-ordinates of the target.

Of the data given above, the most acceptablecan be considered to be only those which relate toreconnaissance from an aircraft visually or by meansof photography by the one-stage process. Consequently,the minimum time which passes from the moment ofdetecting the target till its coordinates have been /reported to the commanding officer or ,chief who has /the right to make the decision on opening fireShould be reckoned as 3 to 4 minutes (in the caseof visual reconnaissance from an aircraft) or 10minutes (when using the one-stage photographicprocess for reconnaissance of the target).

Details have been given above of possible timein which opening of fire with conventional artillery,tactical missiles, and operational-tactical missilesqgn be prepared. If we add to this the minimum timePiaquired to determine the target coordinates andto designate the target (4 or 10 minutes), and if wealso take into account the approximate time of flightof shells and tactical missiles (about I minute) andof operational-tactical missiles (about 5 minutes),we can arrive at the approximate total time requiredto prepare fire (one round) for effect. This timet. is:

--for conventional artillery, from 8 to 17minutes;

--for tactical missiles, from 25 f?..7 to45 minutes;

--for operational-tactical missiles from40 to 55 minutes.

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11 The sign value t and the value (see Table 46)can be used to calculate the probability of fulfillingthe task of destroying the enemy's various offensivenuclear weapons K by means of conventional artillery,tactical, and operational-tactical missiles accordingto the formula:

Cmissingj

Results of the calculation are given in Table 47.

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K (31)

0-0.1?

0.28-0.52

0.66-0.70

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Table 47'

Probability of Destroying Offensive

Nuclear Weapons at Firing Positions

and Launch Sites

Probability of destructDesignation of weapon

ion

By artillery - By tacticalmissiles

By operational-tactioal missiles

1 43

203;2 mm self-prop.y vitzer

1203.2 mmAhechanicallydrawn howitzer

T121 280 mm gun

"Honest John" and"Little John" freerockets

"Lacrosse" guidedmissile (one launcher)

"Lacrosse" guidedmissile (battalion)

"Corporal* guided

missile

0.35 4:Z.1-O. ?

0-0.42

0.65-0.78 0.08-0.30

0.49-0.60

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"Redstone" guidedmissile

"Matador" cruise'missile

"Mace" cruisemissile

0.68-0.78 0.62-0.70

O.574-Z".4g

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. From the details given in Table 47, we arrive v'at the following extremely important practical con-clusions. From these details,it_ip_dlear_first_ofall thatAn-several-CIWPIL.0..clestroying.certain offenSive.4140,81R_T940n8 bOPYP.4497.havetired at . our_troopscannot,fiiiillfilled_in practidia.up to the present time the most operational(from the standpoint of rapidity Of opening fire)is artillery. However, even it is not capable ofpreventing fire from such weapons as 203.2 mm howitzers.

There is very little probability of artillerybeing able to destroy such weapons as free rocketsof the "Honest John" And "Little John" type andguided missiles of the "Lacrosse" type. When themost urgent procedure for givinK firing orders isadopted, i.e., when the order L-7 is given direct 1!to a battery, ' the probability of destroying thesetargets before they have opened fire is not greater Ithan 0.4 (40 percent). If the target coordinates 1are determined by photography (one-stage process),

•1nd the firing orders are given down the chain of5bommand; headquarters of the army's missile troopsand artillery; headquarters of an artillery largeunit; headquarters of a unit; battalion, then the iprobability of destroying targets of the type of"%nest John" and "Little John" free rockets and"Lacrosse" missiles before they have fired willbe nill because the time taken to prepare our fire Iwill exceed the time taken to prepare these weapons !to open fire. The destruction of batteries of 203.2mm howitzers and of 280 mm guns at their firing.positions before they have fired can be carried outby gun •:artillery with a reliability of from 0.30to 0.65, depending on the method adopted to deter-mine the target 'coordinates and the procedure forpassing.._the-firing orders to those who will executethem.

Such offensive nuclear weapons as guided missilesof the "Corporal" and "Redstone" type cannot be

1111,SEC(ET11 me. An.a.dr...M7Ill',TEVIN.

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destroyed by tube artillery in the overwhelmingmajority of cases because they will be located outof its range.

Tactical missiles are a less operational weaponthan gun artillery. As a rule the fairly considerabletime required for preparations to open fire (25 to45 minutes) excludes hitting such targets as the203.2 mm self-propelled howitzers, 280 mm guns,"Honest John" and "Little John" free rockets, andindividual "Lacrosse" guided missile launchers before p,they have fired. When the time required for pre-parations to open fire is such, the probability ofdestroying batteries of 203.2 mm howitzers beforethey have fired is very low (less than 0.15). More-over, the destruction of a battery of 203.2 mmhowitzers before it has fired can only 'be accomplishedunder conditions of visual reconnaissance from anaircraft and when the transmission of the order is'madep by the authority which makes the decision toopen fire,direct to the battalion (bypassing all

jntermediate echelons).

Tactical missiles can attain a somewhat higherdegree of probability of destroying their targetswhen firing at siting areas of "Lacrosse" guidedmissile battalions, if one bears in mind that abattalion may remain at the area for not less than60 to 70 minutes. Of course, it is impossible toprevent the first firimpfrom individual "Lacrosse"launchers from such a siting area by means of anuclear strike with one tactical missile; however,some of the firings can be prevented, and theprobability of destroying "Lacrosse" launchers whichhave not yet fired can vary from 0.25 to 0.50.

Nuclear weapons such as "Corporal" and "Redstone"guided missiles cannot be destroyed by tacticalmissiles either, because of their limited range offire. If tactical missile units and subunits areequipped with missiles whose range will extend to

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60 to 70 km and if the time taken to p epare MEleMfor firing does not exceed the limits given above,then such missiles can also be used to destroy"Corporal" and "Redstone" guided missiles on theirlaunch sites. The probability of destroying suchweapons will be of the order 0 •65 to 0.75.

The time required for preparing to launch 8K11operational-tactical missiles is such that in prac-tice it excludes their use against the enemy'stactical offensive nuclear weapons with the objectof preventing their firing. Of the enemy's tacti-cal offensive nuclear weapons, only a "Lacrosse"guided missile battalion in a siting area can beregarded as' a possible target for our operational-tactical missiles. However, it is essential to takeInto account here that the probability of destroyingthis target by means of a nuclear strike can varyonly from 0-08 to 0-30. Consequently, it is inad-visable to make use of operational-tactical missilesto destroy the enemy's tactical offensiye nucleargweapons at their firing positions (launch sites).

When using operational-tactical missiles againstsuch targets as "Corporal" and "Redstone" guidedmissiles and cruise missiles of the "Matador" typeon launch sites, the probability of destroying suchtargets can reach 0-50 to 0-70, i.e., these nuclearweapons can be destroyed successfully by operational-tactical missiles. As for "Mace" cruise missiles,they cannot be destroyed after being detected atlaunch sites or launch pads, because the total timetaken to prepare our missile for launching exceedsthe time these cruise missiles remain at their po-sitions.

Thus,be used toweapons at"Redstone"missiles.

8X11 operational-tactical missiles candestroy only such offensive nucleartheir launch sites as "Corporal" andguided missiles and "Matador" cruise

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1.,sive nuclear weapons at their positions (before theyhave fired) make it essential that these weapons fli

The limited capabilities of destr y.Luis uziwu-

should be destroyed before they move into their firing 1;positions or launch Isites,,i.e., when they are inconcentration areas or in waiting areas, and also onoccupying or leaving firing positions or launch sites.

The destruction of offensive nuclear weaponsin concentration areas and in waiting areas is

of combating these weapons by fire. However, thea very significant C?_7 factor in the general system

accomplishment of this is accompanied by rij awhole series of difficulties, connected With therone word missingj and reconnaissance of such areas.It is known that in occupying concentration areasand waiting areas rtwo words missing2 units andsubunits take the maximum possible measures to cam-ouflage such areas, setting up dummy concentrationareas, etc. Moreover, it is very difficult to dis-tinguish units and subunits armed with offensivenuclear weapons, located in concentration areas orAniting areas, from other military units and subunits.The sum total of all this taken together is that theratio of destroying offensive nuclear weapons inconcentration areas and in assembly areas cannot begood enough. However, this element should on noaccount be left out of the reckoning.

An equally vital moment in combating the enemy'soffensive nuclear weapons is that of reconnaissanceand, if possible, destruction of them while theyare moving into a firing position or launch site. Upto 15 to 20 minutes are required to deploy some ofthe enemy's offensive nuclear weapons. Naturally,in cases when we manage to find some subunit atthe momentitistoving to its firing position or launchsite, fire for destruction will be more reliable be-cause those firing will have a little more time attheir disposal. However, to ensure the detection(razvedka) of offensive nuclear weapons while they

MIS aE*;1'

Ms .1111.■■•••■ ilul■ •Ol■ AINI•IM la 6-0

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are moving. th.firing positions or launch sites it is -essential to maintain continuous, mainly airl recon-naissance of definite areas. The maintenance ofcontinuous air reconnaissance of certain areas,Cone word missing2 of a kind that will ensuregetting and passing the coordinates of the targetwithin 5 to 10 minutes after detecting the target,is a Cone word missingj matter under modern con-ditions, as for carrying on such continuous recon-naissance it is necessary to Cone line missing2the enemy's antiair weapons.

Besides the possibilities of destroying offen-sive nuclear weapons at firing positions and launchsitea, outlined above, thereis the possibility ofdestroying these weapons on their positions afterthey have carried out a firing or launching.

In Chapter I it was noted that certain offen-sive nuclear weapons could not leave their positionimmediately after firing. For instance, the T121

z7..? minutes, a battery of 203-2 mm mechanical280 mm can leave the firing position only after

traction howitzers 20 minutes, and an "Honest John"launcher 5 minutes after firing or launching. Someweapons can leave their position even faster, forinstance the 203-2 mm self-propelled howitzer. Itcan be surmised that such weapons as launchers of"Little John" free rockets and of "Lacrosse" guidedmissiles will leave their positions , not later than3 to 5 minuted after having launched a rocket ormissile. Consequently, certain types of offensivenuclear weapons can be destroyed while they arebeing Moved from r?..7 firing positions C?...7, Coneand a half lines missing.] positions before fire forannihilation or neutralization is organized againstthem.

First eleven lines of paragraph missing2directing the launching, situated on a motor vehicleor under shelter. On carrying out the launching,

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all these vehicles and assemblies leave the launchsite immediately (in practice in 3 to 5 minutes)and move off to shelter.

We shall now determine the possibility ofdestroying the enemy's offensive nuclear weaponswhich have revealed themselves by firing or launch-ing, assuming that there is time to fulfill thistask.

At the moment of firing or launching, a gun,a launcher, or a missile (guided missile) betraysitself by several revealing indications (flash,dust, smoke and sound of firing, flame from theengine of the missile or guided missile, flight ofthe projectile itself, breaking '4adio::.: silence,etc.). Naturally, it is much easier to detect afiring position or launch site at such a moment.However, it is necessary not only, tok'detect such atarget, but also to establish that a nuclear pro-jectile has been fired or launched. Moreover, it.

:Lis essential to determine the coordinates of the.1detected target with sufficient accuracy, and this

circumstance considerably reduces the effectivenessof those reconnaissance means which are capable ofgettlitgthestargiatcoordinates from only one firing(launching).

It is possible to detect a target from onefiring and then to determine its coordinates froman aircraft or helicopter, by means of visualreconnaissance, and also with the "QATEEE" radarCone word missingjCbeinej deverdOed at thepresent time.

As has been stated above, the detection of atarget from an aircraft or helicopter, the dfiter-mination of its coordinates, and the transmittingof target designations rtwo words missingj takesa minimum of 3 to 4 minutes. If the aircraft orhelicopter is in direct contact with a battalion

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of gun artillery, then fire for effect can be openedat the target not earlier than 5 to 7 minutes afterit has been detected. If the aircraft or helicopteris in contact with headquarters of the army's missiletroops and artillery, then fire for effect can beopened at the target not sooner than 8 to 10 minutesafter it has been detected. Consequently, such tar-gets as the 203 . 2 mm mechanical traction howitzerand individual 280 mm guns can be caught by artilleryfire before they leave theirpositione t regardless ofthe ways in which target designations are transmittedand orders to open fire are given,

The time given to prepare artillery fire exceedsthe time taken to leave their firing positions orlaunch sites by individual 203-2 mm self-propelledhowitzers (2 minutes), batteries of such howitzers(3 to 5 minutes), and by individual "Honest John" and"Little John" free rocket launchers and "Lacrosse"guided missile launchers (2 to 3 minutes). Consequentlyopening fire against these weapons, in cases where theyare detected from an aircraft or helicopter, is quite

46bviously inadvisable C?_7.The radar "SATURN" ("Utes") now under develop-

ment is intended to detect guns, batteries, free rocketlaunchers, and guided missile launch sites,on firingor launching. This station is capable of determiningthe coordinates of the target from a Single firing orlaunching; moreover, the coordinates are determinedautomatically in:10 to 15 C? ...7 seconds. The time forcone word missing..7 these coordinates with 2:threewords missing cannot exceed one to one and a halfminutes L7..? . Consequently, in this case not more thantwo minuTes C?7 are required to detect the targetand to report its coordinatee. If this radar is direct- ' linked CF to an artillery battalion, then it will

be possible • ?__7 to open fire on the target 4 to 5minutes after its detection. This amount of time isadequate to ensure successful firing not only againstthe firing positions of 2032. mm howitzers and 280 mm

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1111118E‘ET

it.010

"kr..

guns, but also against "Honest John" launchers, whichwill not have enough , time to leave positions they arein after launching a rocket.

Thus, gun artillery can destroy batteries of2032. mm mechanical traction howitzers and individual280 mm guns which betray themselves by firing, ifreconnaissance of these targets is carried out visuallyfrom an aircraft or helicopter. If reconnaissance ofthe enemy's offensive nuclear weapons after firing(launching) is carried out with the help of radar ofthe "SATURN" ("Utes") type, then gun artillery canalso destroy "Honest John" launchers.

As has been statedyaAteadY, the time requiredto prepare the launching of a tactical missile..which is in full readiness on its position . is 10to 15 minutes from the moment that the target's co-ordinates are received. Taking into account that anarmy and in some cases a division rftattalion?..7 canhave the right to decide to carry out a nuclear strike,

Lit can be reckoned that for taking the decision andor transmitting the order, for ciphering and decipher-ing it4,directly to the battalion C?_7 a minimum of 2to 3 cl 7 minutes will be required. The total timerequired-if/ill thus be 13 to 22 minutes Z-Zi when thecoordinates of the target are determine ff from an air-craft or helicopter (using visual reconnaissance) or1? to 20 C?_7 minutes when reconnaissance of. thetarget is carried out with the help of a "SATURN" ("Utes")radar. Consequently, even under the most favorablecircumstances by means of strikes with tactical missiles,it is possibieto destroy onu batteries of 203 • 2 mmmechanical traction howitzers, and in some cases 280 mmguns. In the case of all individual targets L7? 7 suchstrikes will not give the desired result because-launchersor guns will have time not only to leave the positionfrom which they have fired, but to get altogether outof the area which can be hitlay a nuclear burst. How-ever if the total time taken to prepare a tactical mis-sile for launching is more than 20 to 25 minutes (for

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example in enciphering and deciphering the order),then generally speaking they cannot be used for strikesagainst targets that reveal themselves by firing orlaunching.

The position in regard to operational-tacticalmissiles is similar. The time required at presentto prepare them for launching is still so great thatit definitely does not ensure being able to destroythe targets and assemblies on the enemy's launchsites during the very short time they are there afterlaunching a guided missile or a cruise missile.

, , s- on firing positionsThevehicles

only possibilityand assemblies

of destroying guns, launch-iiers !and launch sites after they have fired or launched J _Lwill occur in cases when not one, but two or sever- 7Cal firings (launchings) are carried out from thisposition, and particularly when the possibility of .adestroying them occurs with Z-7_7 individual bat- s Iteries of 203 • 2 mm self-propelled as well as mechan-

.1cal traction howitzers when they fire shells withlEonventional charges /14. The possibility also .cannot be excluded that onest John" rockets and •"Lacrosse" missiles, as well as "Matador" and "Mace"cruise missiles may be Cone word missing] launchedfrom the same position*. However such cases willoccur Cline and a half missing].

Thus, of all r?jr rtwo words missing.] of theenemy's offensive nuclear weapons after they havecarried out a firing or launching, our weapons candestroy only the 20302ammechanical traction howit-zers and individual 280 mm guns, and when a "SATURN"("Utes") radar is available, "Honest John" launchers Ican also be destroyed. All the other weapons havethe capabilityclUleaving the firing position orlaunch site in time to avoid being destroyed. Con-sequently, it is inadvisable in 'the.great.majprity.ofcases to prepare and carry out a strike againstthese positions.

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That is the way things stand in reg r s-troying individual firing positions or launch sitesafter firing or launching.

The possibilities are a little better in caseswhere units (subunits) of the enemy's offensivenuclear weapons are disposed compactly within thelimits of a comparatively small area. It is known,for instance, that in some cases battalions of "Hon-est John" free rockets and of "Lacrosse" guidedmissiles can occupy one siting area, the size ofwhich does not exceed 1000 m in width and 1000Anfindepth. "Honest John" free rocket batteries ofinfantry and armored divisions may also be disposedin a similar compact way on firing positions. Con-sequently, even if one launcher is picked up C?_.7and detected, there is a possibility of destroyingthe whole battery or the whole battalion locatedin the siting area by a strike with a tacticallandin.some cases with an operational-tactical, missile,assuming that battalions or batteries of "Honest John".free rockets and battalions of "Lacrosse" guided mis-Ailes will be in 2:two words missingj area for acomparatively long time. Thus, for Instance a"Lacrosse" guided missile battalion can be Ethreewords missing:7in the siting area not less than??to ?? minutes. If to this time Cone word misiing:7the time for preparing the first launching (??. -minutes), then it can be reckoned that after thefirst launching (i.e., after the "Lacrosse" launcheris detected as a result of the launching of a missile)we will have about 35 to 50 minutes, and this amountof time, as has been established earlier, is suffici-ent to prepare a strike with a tactical missile, andin some cases it will also be adequate to prepare astrike with an operational-tactical missile. However,such possibilities of destroying units and subunitsof free rockets and guided missiles can occur onlyin cases where it has been reliably establishedthat battalions and batteries of "Honest John" freerockets and battalions of "Lacrosse" guided missiles

are systematically occupying combat positions inone comparatively small area. When "Honest John"free rockets and "Lacrosse" guided missiles aredisposed in their combat positions in other, moredispersed ways, the destruction of whole units andsubunits of these offensive nuclear weapons will beimpossible.

4. Planning and Technical Measures to Raise the

Effectiveness of Combating the Enemy's

Offensive Nuclear Weapons

As is already known, the most important factorCone word missing? successful C?_] combat againstthe enemy's offensive nuclear weapons is the timelyopening of fire for destruction against the target.Conse uently, questions of reducing the time to pre-Apare [L7 both for (-separate headquarters or ele-Monts as well as Cthree words missing7 thework ? '7 preparing Tire for effect on the targetf

?Xare now extremely pertinent and acuteThe problem of reducing the time taken to preparefire for effect can be solved only by means of im-provements in equipment C?..] Cfour lines missing].

By the planning aspect of resolving this prob-lem is meant the system of planning the combatagainst nuclear weapons at a certain level (front,army); the procedure for receiving reconnaissanceinformation and transmitting the tasks to those whowill execute them; the grouping of weapons availableto combat the enemy's offensive nuclear weapons; de-termining the procedure to destroy these weaponsduring the various phases of the operation; theorganization of coordination with other arms of troopsyand particularly with aircraft, etc.

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By the technical aspect of resolving this prob-lem is meant a whole series Of measures directed to-ward the constructive improvement, or replacementwith new modelsj of the Combat equipment with whichour army is now equipped; the development of automaticinstruments and mechanisms which would enable the timetaken to prepare launchers for firing for effect to bereduced; the use of automatic communications security.apparatus (avtomaticheskaya Zasekredhivayushchayaapparatura svyazi-ZAS) for transmitting orders to openfire; the improvement of the means of communications, etc.

Let us consider some of these problems and measuresin greater detail..

For successful combat against the enemy's offensivenuclear weapons, the control of the forces and weaponswhich are made available to fulfill this task must becentralized. The main levels at which this centraliza-tion must be effected Miti*the front and the army. Cow-,bat against the enemy's operationil -ind Opeiiiional-

tactical weapons is planned on a front scale, while thengagement of the enemy's tactical, and in some cases

also operational-tactical offensive nuclear weapons,is planned on an army scale.

When control is centralized, the right to give anorder to means using nuclear weapons to open fire be-longs only to the commander in whom this centralizedcontrol is vested. In an ammx, this right is held bythe army commander. This inevitably entails a rathercumbersome system for transmitting the intellikencedata obtained, for analyzing these data, for Makinvadecision, and for passing the tasks to those who willexecute them. For instance, this system may consistof the following elements: certain means of lntelligence; intelligence department of army headquarters,chief of staff of the army, army commander, commandingofficer of the army's missile and artillery troops,missile or artillery large unit (unit), battalion, andbattery. There can also be the following alternatives:

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certain means headquarTers-ox.xne army smissile troops and artillery, commanding officer ofthe army's missile troops and artillery, army comman-der, commanding officer of the army's missile troopsand artillery, missile or artillery large unit or •unit, battalion, and battery.

Consequently, the process of preparing fireor a strike against some enemy offensive nuclearobjective can comprise up to_..6...to_8_..er,helons_ofcommand (instantsiya). Experience.gained in trainingexercises shows that such a procedure demands avery great expenditure of time - from some tens Ofminutes to one to two hours. As a result of this,the fire effort that is prepared against the enemy'soffensive nuclear objective cannot meet with anysuccess.

Thus, the question of the right to order opening .of.f ire in general and the question of the right todeliver nuclear strikes against the enemy's offensivevuclear weapons in particular is of very great impor-lande.

The following structure may be a more acceptablealternative for the general organization in an armyfor combat against the enemy's offensive nuclearweapons.

The army commander, together with his staff, onthe basis of instructions or a directive from thefront troop commander, an elucidation of the army'stask,an; evaluation of the situation regarding theenemy's offensive nuclear weapons, and an analysisof one's own capabilities of destroying and neutraliz-ing these weapons, determines the army's general tasksin combating the enemy's offensive nuclear weapons,

• decides how his forces and weapons should be grouped,and also plans the procedure for conducting thiscombat in the various phases of the operation.

IRONBARK

In making a decision, the army comman er must'determine the quantity of. nuclear (and if necessaryof conventional) ammunition allotted to combat theenemy's offensive nuclear weapons in the variousphases of: the operation, and he mugi.also _authorizethe commanding officer of the army's missile .troopsand artillery_to . expend this ammunition-on,confirmedtargets which must be destroyed immediately. Togeth-er with giving the commanding officer of the army'smissile troops and artillery authority to order •opening of fire, he must also put directly under

1 his command the :.inteliigex0.0 means.Of the army, orthose attached to it, which are to play a decisiverole in planning the destruction of the enemy's .offensive nuclear weapons at the right moment.

The commanding officer of the army's missiletroops and artillery, together with his Stati,is directly responsible for planning the combatagainst the enemy's nuclear weapons.

•. In planning this combat, provision must be madeor measures which will ensure the maximum operationalefficiency in the work of reconnaissance units andsubunits, especially in reporting the enemy's offen-sive nuclear weapons detected by them. The best formof organization for coordination with intellitence;means will bethe one that will ensure that informa-•tion regarding detected enemy offensive nuclear ob-jectives reaches. the headquarters of the army's mis-sile troops and'artillery directly from the partic- Iular reconnaissance element which has detected theseobjectives. Together with this', conditions mustbe created which will ensure.that firing tasks willreach those.who will be directly carrying them outwith the maximum speed; likewise, provision must beinside for units and submits to be in a constant stateof readiness to open fire against a target , of oppor-tunity.

'The passing of firing tasks to those who willbe carrying them out with the maximum speed can be

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achieved if two conditions are met: firstly, bypassing the tasks directly to whoever will carrythem out and bypassing all intermediate links, i.e.,by using the "Orel" method of fire control l which hasjustified its value in practice in conventionalartillery; secondly, by giving up encoding orderswith the help of various tables. It is comparativelyeasy to meet the first of these conditions. Forthis, it is essential to set up and make good use ofthe "Orel" fire .control method in training, and incommand and staff exercises and tactical exercises.The second condition is a more complicated matter.In order to achieve a considerable reduction inthe time taken to encode and decode orders, it isnecessary to introduce and make extensive use ofcommunications securing apparatus. And taking intoaccount that this is a very complicated problem, itis necessary at the same time to continue passingorders for nuclear strikes also in the form of con- -veutional gunnery orders with the minimum amount ofcoding. In addition, it is advisable to study theproblem of giving uncoded orders in cases where there:ts a possibility of delivering a strike immediatelyafter receiving the order or a few minutes afterreceiving it, i.e,,. in cases where the enemy, havingintercepted our order, could do nothing about it.

Constant combat readiness of missile units andsubunits to deliver a nuclear strike against the enemyoffensive nuclear weapons that have been detectedis achieved by detailing units and subunits to beon the alert. The number of units and subunits puton the alert is determined on the basis of thetotal number of missile large units and units:atthe disposal of the army commander, the availability.of nuclear ammunition, and the. number of the enemy'soffensive nuclear weapons which he can deploy in adefinite period of time (for instance, in .twenty-four hours) in the army's zone of combat operationsand on its. flanks. The proposed number of objectivesfor reconnaissance is determined from an analysis ofthe opposing enemy grouping and of the results of pre-vious C?...7 operations..

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Taking into account the various times at which.the enemy's offensive nuclear weapons are detected,it can be reckoned that the number of subunits onthe alert can be comparatively small and can comprisenot more than one-third L7?...7 of the total strengthof forces and weapons available to combat the enemy'snuclear weapons.

Thus, for instance, the number of subunits puton the alert in an army can be determined on thebasis of the following calculation:

-- operational-tactical missiles - one or two• launch assemblies, in practice, one battalion forthe whole army zone;

-- tactical missiles - one launcher for 15 to20 km of army front, altogether 4 or 5 launchers,i.e., in practice two to three battalions of tacti-cal missiles;

-- subunits of gun artillery - one battalionIf 130 mm guns for 15 to 20 km of the army's front--altogether 4 to 5 battalions of gun artillery.

It is necessary to note that the availabilityof battalions of tactical missiles, in motorizedrifle and tank divisions only, does not ensure theireffective use for combating the enemy's nuclearweapons. To combat the enemy's offensive nuclear •weapons successfully, an army must have its owntactical missiles in the form of an independent unit./Such a unit can be an army regiment of tactical mis-siles consisting of two to three battalions (withthree launchers in each battalion) or a tactical mis- /-silo regiment of the Reserve of theibUpieneAdgh.XeMmand(RV010, which could be attached to an army in support.

As for tactical missiles held by motorizedrifle and tank divisions, their main task should bethat of destroying and neutralizing the opposing

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enemy troops when our troops go over to the offensiveand of repelling the attacks of the advancing enemywhen our troops go over to the defensive. The taskof combating the enemy's offensive nuclear weaponscannot constitute the main task of these'WeaponsCone word missinf because a division does not haveat its disposal the necessary material capabilitiesfor this, and, in particular, the appropriate resources(‹ilfor _intelligence,— However, this circumstance can-not be regarded as a reason for failing to destroythe enemy's offensive nuclear weapons in cases whereit is quite possible to destroy them. Confirmednuclear attack objectives of the enemy must be destroy-ed by all suitable weapons.

The problem of organizing the coordination ofmissile troops and artillery with aircraft is of no'small importance for successfully combating theenemy's offensive nuclear weapons. Aircraft, especial-ly fighter-bomber aviation units, can be employed todestroy and neutralize not only the enemy's operationaland operational-tactical offensive nuclear weapons,

Abut also to destroy his tactical offensive nuclearweapons. In this, aircraft have a definite advantageover missile troops and artillery. This advantagelies in the fact that with appropriate planning air-craft are capable of destroying and neutralizingthe enemy's fire weapons immediately after they aredetected in concentration areas, on the march, andat firing positions. In a previous section ofthis chapter it was shown thatnuclear attack ob-jectives such as individual 203-2 mm self-propelledhowitzers cannot be caught at firing positions eitherby missile strikes or by fire from gun artillery.These weapons can be...destroyed or neutralized atfTiIng positions only by .figaiii;boMbers,11-64:thianonly 14 thenie- aircrafich Otect_these.weaiaiig-while they are moving into their_positions. Nat-uriaiy, the-planning and execution of ii4stematicflights by fighter-bombers "on the hunt" (if such anexpression can be used) for offensive nuclear weapons

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calls for the systematic neutralization of theenemy's antiair weaponsl and first of all for theneutralization and destruction of subunits of anti-aircraft guided missiles (ZURS). In addition, suchflights must be coordinated as for_plaCe_and..tiMe_with the combat operations . 61-iissile and artilleryunits and subunits in order to preclude the possibil-ity of our own aircraft being destroyed by our nuclearstrikes or projectiles in flight. Coordination with:inte1ligen9P: . . • groups operating in the enemy's rearmust be just as carefully organized. When it ispossible to adjust the fire of the gun artillery,intelligence groups should have direct communica-tions with the units and subunits of gun artillery.

The organization of close coordination betweenunits and subunits of gun artillery and tacticalmissile units and subunits is a significant factorin successfully combating the enemy's offensivenuclear weapons. In several cases, only gun artillerycan prepare and open fire for effect immediatelyagainst a nuclear target; in order to prevent the:Panemy from firing a nuclear projectile, andalso inorder to stop the enemy from leaving his position,it is advisable to start neutralizing this objec-tive by gun artillery fire and then to deliver anuclear strike against this objective as soon as atactical missile has been prepared. There is nodoubt that the best results from such joint opera-tions can be attained only when control of theseoperations is centralized, when good communicationshave been arranged with the various units and sub-units, and when the units or subunits themselvesare in constant readiness to carry out the tasksthey are given.

Together with resolving organizational problems,it is essential to improve our combat equipment andraise their capabilities, all the time, especiallyin regard to reducing the time required to preparethem for firing or launching. The time calculations

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given in a previous section of this chapter Coneword missingj the equipment now in service in thearmed forces of our probable enemies. However, thearms in the armies of our probable enemies arebeing continuously improved. This improvement canbe clearly seen by comparing some of the new modelswith previous ones. Thus, for instance, it takesabout one and a half hours to prepare a "Matador"cruise missile for launching on a launching pad,whereasthe new "Mace" cruise missile, which is re-placing the "Matador," takes only 30 minutes. Asa result of this reduction in the time required toprepare cruise missiles for launching, the possibili-ties of destroying them by 8K11's on launch pads orlaunch sites have decreased sharply (if they have notdisappeared altogether). To restore the lost pos-sibilities of destroying cruise missiles, it is es-sential to reduce the total time required to preparethe launching of missiles to 10 to 15 minutes. Similarexamples can be given in regard to other offensive nu-clear weapons possessed by the enemy, and our means ofldestroying them. And the only conclusion from an an-MiLlysis of such examples will be the conclusion regard-ing the absolute necessity of reducing the time requiredto prepare missilesibr launching.

Possible ways of achieving this end are furthershortening and simplification of prelaunching checkout,automation of the preparation of settings for a tar-get strike, replacement of instruments the prepara-tion of which for action requires a considerable time(for instance velectrolytic integrators of longi-tudinal acceleration) (elektroliticheskiy integratorprodolnykh uskoreniy) by other instruments whichdo not require lengthy preparation for action, etc.

At the same time it is essential to bring into_.service instruments and apparatus Which speed upand simplify reconnaissance and the process ofdetermining the coordinates of targets (for instance,observation instruments [four words missing_7, radar

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stations of the "SATURN" type, etc.

In designing and building these new models ofequipment_r7 one of the main tactical-operationaldemands 7must be the requirement regarding thetime nee e to prepare them for firing or launching.Here, it should be borne in mind that in order tocombat similar weapons of the enemy successfully,the total C?..7 time spent on preparing for firingor launching should be at least 30 to 40 percentless than that required by the enemy to prepare afiring (launching).

Chapter Conclusions

1. Organizing the combat against the enemy'soffensive nuclear weapons is done at two levels --by the front and by the army. The main level organ-izing combat against operational-tactical offensivenuclear weapons is a front, and the main element4Wganizing combat against the enemy's tactical of-fensive nuclear weapons is an army.

2. The weapons at present in service in an armycan fundamentally ensure the capability of success-fully combating the offensive nuclear weapons of ourprobable enemies. But for this it is essential tocreate an efficient system of control of missileand of artillerY . Units and Subunits,'a ' system thatwOuld ensure the minimum expenditure of time on thesetting of tasks and greater operational efficiencyof :_intelligence means and that would also svb-stantially improVethe field training of headquarters,.units, and subunits. Moreover, it is essential toautomate and mechanize the processes of preparingsettings for fire (firing or launching) for effectagainst a target.

3. The deetruction and neutralization of theenemy's offensive nuclear weapons can be carried out

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by operational-tactical and by tactical missiles,and also by gun artillery. Gun artillery, using am-munition with conventional fillings, has very con-siderable capabilities to destroy and neutralize theexisting tactical offensive nuclear weapons of ourpotential enemies. Therefore, gun artillery shouldbe regarded as one of the main means of combatingthe enemy's tactical nuclear weapons.

Tactical missiles are the main weapons todestroy the enemy's tactical offensive nuclear weaponsby nuclear strikes. However, their capabilitiesare somewhat limited by their comparatively shortrange and the relatively long time required to pre-pare them for launching. To create more favorableconditions for combating the enemy's nuclear weapons,an army must have tactical missiles . tmder its direct

_ . _command.

• Operational-tactical missiles are the mainweapons to destroy the enemy's operational-tacti-Nal offensive nuclear weapons. Owing to the con-Tdiderable time required to prepare operational-tac-tical missiles for launching, they cannot be used todestroy and neutralize tactical offensive nuclearweapons located at firing positions and launch sites.

4. As a rule, the enemy's offensive nuclearweapons, located at firing positions and launchsites, must be destroyed before they have been firedor launched. The overwhelming majority of offen-sive nuclear weapons cannot be annihilated on theposition they occupy, if these positions are de-tected when projectiles with nuclear warheads arefired (or launched).

5. To increase the chances of destroying theenemy's offensive nuclear weapons, located at firingpositions (launch sites) it is advisable to make thefire effort against them in two stages: as soon asthese weapons are detected, neutralization fire should

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be opened against them immediately by gun artillerywith the object of preventing their firing (launching)a projectile with a nuclear warhead or leaving theirfiring position (launch site), and then, as otherweapons are_unkd restlx, for instance, a tacticalmissile or the necessary quantity of artillery,a strike (or a sufficiently heavy fire concentra-tion) should be delivered with the object of destroy-ing these enemy weapons.