Was Benedict Arnold a scoundrel?

Viewpoint: Yes. Benedict Arnold was an avaricious and egocentric traitorwho acted out of injured pride after he was censured for malfeasance andpassed over for promotion.

Viewpoint: No. Benedict Arnold was an honorable man who increasingly feltthat the Revolution was being led by false Patriots; he switched his loyalty tothe British in order to preserve his reputation as a gentleman.

Benedict Arnold's participation in the Revolutionary War (1775-1783)provided him with a golden opportunity to obtain fame; instead, he achievedinfamy by betraying the Patriot cause. Indeed, his name is synonymous withtreason. Yet, considering Arnold's enormous devotion and sacrifice for theAmerican cause early in the war, his villainy is both puzzling and shocking.He helped capture Fort Ticonderoga and St. Johns and made a brave, yetfutile, assault on Quebec in 1775 that left him partially crippled for life; he suc-cessfully stymied General Sir Guy Carleton's efforts to invade the Northernprovinces in 1776; and he played an indispensable role in the Patriot victoryat Saratoga the following year. This distinguished service earned him the rankof major general in the Continental Army, an appointment as commander ofPhiladelphia and later to West Point, and the utmost respect of GeorgeWashington, who did much to further Arnold's military career.

Why, then, in the face of these achievements, did Arnold join the enemy?The answer to this question will never be known for certain, for as Mark Twainobserved, "a wee little part of a person's life are his acts and words. His reallife is led in his head." Of course, this fact has not dissuaded historians fromthoroughly discrediting Arnold's explanation—that he was profoundly dis-turbed by the French alliance and in despair over the American cause—andoffering their own conflicting conclusions. The different interpretations ofArnold's motivations ultimately center on the enigmatic quality of his charac-ter. Traditional accounts depict Arnold as an arrogant, ambitious, and merce-nary miscreant who lacked public virtue or dedication to the American cause.When these rewards did not come fast enough for him, and when a courtmartial reprimanded him for using his position to enrich himself, Arnoldoffered his secrets and services to the British in return for a large sum ofmoney.

More recently, historians have taken a more apologetic stand on Arnold'streason. Instead of a self-serving scoundrel, they portray him as a superpa-triot so dedicated to the Revolution and its republican principles that when heperceived an overwhelming lack of public support among Americansengaged in the war effort, he switched sides in order to protest the sorry stateof relations between the army and American society. He hoped that hisextreme act of political defiance would be a catalyst for the collapse of theAmerican cause. If this goal was truly Arnold's motivation, it horribly backfiredas Americans, disgusted with his act of treason, rallied behind the Revolution.

9

ARNOLD

Viewpoint:Yes. Benedict Arnold was anavaricious and egocentric traitorwho acted out of injured pride afterhe was censured for malfeasanceand passed over for promotion.

It is interesting that George Washingtonand Benedict Arnold were the two Revolution-ary War generals most alike in daring and deter-mination. For several years Washington esteemedArnold as one of his best and bravest generals.Famed for his incredible march on Quebec in1775, Arnold later led such a spirited defense ofLake Champlain that British general Sir GuyCarleton chose to return to Canada. In 1777Arnold played a major role in America's victoryat Saratoga. Yet, a quarrelsome and mercenarynature raised a host of critics, in Congress andout, and by 1779 he was conspiring with theBritish. The result was a plot to betray WestPoint (a strategic fort on the Hudson River) tothe enemy. Recent biographers have debunkedmyths "explaining" Arnold's treason. There isno evidence he was cruel to others as a youth,nor a deserter in the French and Indian War(1754-1763). His pre-Revolutionary War careeris that of a man of enterprise and honesty. In1775 his commitment to public virtue and theAmerican cause appeared genuine. Yet, evidencesuggests that he began to use his rank in theContinental Army for personal profit and fame.Reverses in his military career nurtured aself-serving and mercenary character that even-tually embraced treason. By 1780 Washingtonhad become a symbol of patriotism; Arnold,the epitome of treachery.

Born in 1741 in Norwich, Connecticut,Arnold was a precocious, if aggressive, youth.Arnold's father enjoyed success as a merchant,but he lapsed into alcoholism and eventual finan-cial ruin. His death in 1761 prevented Arnoldfrom attending Yale College. Thereafter, Arnolddevoted a great part of his life to attempting toregain his family's name and his lost inheritance.As an apothecary and merchant, he worked dili-gently and by 1775 he became a prominent figurein Connecticut. At the same time, according toPaul J. Sanborn in The American Revolution,1775-1783: An Encyclopedia (1993), he had builta reputation as "a proud, vain, willful man,extremely sensitive to criticism and unrepentantfor his actions." Indeed, Arnold was quick to takeoffense and defend his honor by either legal suitsor dueling.

In the early years of the Anglo-Americancrisis, Arnold so disapproved of Britain's colo-nial policies that he joined New Haven's young

radicals and became their leader. Upon hearingnews of the skirmish between British redcoatsand militia at Lexington in April 1775, he ral-lied the governor's Footguards and marchedthem to Massachusetts. This aggressive actionsignified the beginning of a career that wouldmark Arnold as the Continental Army's mosteffective battlefield commander.

On his way to Boston, Arnold learned ofthe vulnerability of Ticonderoga—a fort ofmajor strategic importance on Lake Champlainand holding scores of cannons. The Massachu-setts legislature authorized him to attempt itscapture, but he was forced to share a commandwith Ethan Allen, whose Green Mountain Boyshad been sent by Connecticut for the same pur-pose. Although both groups would claim thecredit for Ticonderoga's capture, Arnold gainedmuch recognition. His reputation ascended fur-ther when he led an army on a march throughMaine and Canada and assaulted Quebec Cityin late December 1775. While the Americansultimately withdrew, Arnold's leadership andresourcefulness impressed Washington. Assignedto Horatio Gates's Northern Army, Arnold—byvirtue of his experience as a merchant sea cap-tain—was ordered to prevent the British fromusing Lake Champlain in a southward invasion.Hastily constructing a fleet, Arnold gave battleto a British flotilla at Valcour Island in October1776. While his outnumbered force had toretreat, Arnold's boldness and shrewd tacticsfrustrated British plans and delayed Major Gen-eral John Burgoyne's march for six months—set-ting him up for a defeat at Saratoga in October1777. In that clash Arnold—though wounded inthe leg—broke through the British entrench-ments. By 1778 Washington held no battlefieldcommander in greater esteem than Arnold,who, in turn, considered himself Washington'sprotege. Yet, within a year, Arnold was betray-ing both his country and friend to the Britishgovernment they supposedly condemned.

Historians have long debated why thisAmerican Icarus fell from grace. Some argueArnold's quest for British gold followed, anddid not cause, his decision to defect. Execrablethough his treason was, they maintain itstemmed from frustration and a thwarted ideal-ism. Revolutionary historian James Kirby Mar-tin argues that Arnold's actions were based on agrowing anger at the betrayal of republican ide-als by the men supposedly responsible forthem: the Continental Congress and state lead-ers. As evidence, Arnold could point to thetreatment afforded capable leaders such as him-self. Though he constantly put his life on theline, Arnold found his achievements ignored ortwisted by a whimsical Congress, which pro-moted lesser men over neglected heroes. He

10 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

was hounded by "villains" accusing him offinancial manipulations and slighted by power-ful politicians. Revolutionary ideals of indepen-dence, fair play, and individual striving hadbeen perverted to deny him honor and even therepayment of monies he had spent on the war.This situation made a mockery out of therepublican idealism of the American cause.Clearly, republicanism had failed, and Americansuccess would prove ruinous for colonials aswell as England.

There is some validity in this approach.Arnold had carelessly revealed his plans to takeTiconderoga to a fellow officer. This event ledto Connecticut's authorization of Ethan Allenand several ambitious merchant/politicians(Major John Brown and Colonel James Easton)to take the fort. Later, Brown and Easton down-played to authorities Arnold's role in the battle.And if Arnold's epic march on Quebec finallyended in failure, that was hardly his fault giventhat a leg wound confined him to a hospitalduring much of the siege. Also, Congresscaused exasperating delays in repaying him forexpenses incurred in supplying his troops andthen slighted him in awarding promotions.Even Arnold's remarkable performance at Val-cour Island was depreciated: enemies criticizedhis loss of eleven ships and his failure to keepCrown Point out of Carleton's hands. DespiteArnold's valiant role at Saratoga, General Hora-tio Gates relieved him of command and laterdepreciated his role. Still, Washington rewardedArnold for his services by appointing him mili-tary commander in Philadelphia while recover-ing from wounds received at Saratoga.

Unbeknownst to Washington, he hadplaced Arnold in a politically hostile environ-ment. Joseph Reed, the state council president,made Arnold a target for all those fearing mili-tary control in the new republic. In turn,Arnold's abrupt demeanor brought him city-wide censure and accusations of malfeasance.Arnold demanded a court martial for vindica-tion. Before the court martial returned a ver-dict, he had made his first overtures to theBritish. Arnold's patience was at an end; retri-bution must follow.

All these facts cannot absolve Arnold ofblame, however. He brought much of his miseryupon himself. Arnold hungered for recognitionand status, and when war came he linked it tohis own fame and reputation, demanding thathis achievements be duly recognized. Yet, toalways demand one's just due is naive. By expect-ing a gentleman's code of strict accountability,he insured his own frustration. As the Canadiancampaign wound down, Arnold failed to keepMassachusetts apprised of his efforts. That fact,and his abrasive treatment of Easton and Brown

RISK AND REWARDTh& following is a decoded tetter from American general Benedict Arnoldto British major John Andre, dated 23 May 1779. In it, Arnold demon-strates his willingness to cooperate with the by offering intelli-gence concerning American political, military, and diplomatic affairs. Theletter also reveals the monetary motivations behind Arnold's decision toloin %w wwmy.

Our friend Stansbury acquaints me that the propos-als made by him in my name are agreeable to Sir HenryClinton, and that Sir Henry engages to answer my warm-est expeotations for; arty ;stivfces rtmtersA As I esteemthe interest of America and Great Britain inseparable SirHenry may depend on my exertions and intelligence. Itwill be impossible to cooperate unless there is a mutualconfidence. Sir Henry shall be convinced on every occa-sion that his i$ not misplaotC

Gen. Washington and ilia army move to the NorthRiver as soon as forage can be obtained. Congress havegiven up Charles Town if attempted. They are in want ofarms, ammunition and men to defend it. 3 or 4 thousandmilitia Is tha most ctn bf mustered to fight on my emer-gency. Seizing papers is impossible. Their contents canbe known from a member of Congress, 4 montis since,the French Minister required Congress to vest theiragents with powers to negotiate peace with Britain. Thetime is elapsed In disputing if they shall demand inde-pendency with their ortgtert terms or insist on the addi-tion of Newfoundland. No decision, no measure taken toprevent the depreciation of money; no foreign loanobtained. France refused to beeome surtfy; no encour-agement from Spain. The French fleet has conditionalorders to return to this continent. They depend on greatpart of their provision torn hence. A transport originally a64 and a foreign 28 guns are daily expected here for pro*vision*

I will cooperate when an opportunity offers, and aslife and everything Is at \ wilt expect some otr-tainty, my property here secure and a revenue equivalentto the risk and service done. I cannot promise success; Iwill deserve it. Inform me what I may expect. Could Iknow Sir Henry's intentions ht should never be at a lossfor intelligence. 1 shall expect a particular answer throour Mend Stansbury*

Source: Carl Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolu-tion (Mow Ywte Wm Wft J&M1-4&.

(who became bitter opponents), reveal a politi-cal blindness. According to Willard M. Wallacein Traitorous Hero: The Life and Fortunes of Bene-dict Arnold (1954), Arnold lacked the ability to"recognize his own faults, the moral stature toforgive or overlook slights, or the patience toendure persecution." Constant agitation anddemands for courts of inquiry reveal a pride andlack of self-control that finally destroyed him.

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11

stake

British

Simply, he "could never rise above the personalissue." His military exploits in Canada are a casein point. When the Americans abandoned theircampaign, significant amounts of goods takenfrom Montreal merchants disappeared. AfterArnold laid the blame on Colonel MosesHazen, the latter demanded a court martial.When Arnold's chief witness was not permittedto testify, Arnold exploded, prompting thecourt to demand his arrest. Although Gatesrefused this request, the episode revealedArnold's sense of persecution. Shortly thereaf-ter, his Ticonderoga nemesis, Brown, hurled var-ious charges against him: from misconduct toincompetence. Regulations required Gates toforward these to Congress. Meanwhile, anotherfigure from that campaign, Hazen, triumphedwhen a military court ruled that Arnold hadslandered him. Even his courage at Saratoga ledto grief. Once friendly with Gates, Arnoldbecame involved in a growing feud with him.Gates was likely jealous of a potential rival andwas irritated at Arnold's opposition to his strat-egy at Saratoga. However, Arnold's blind friend-ship with Gates's critics reveals a politicalnaivete on his part. While not denying Arnold'sbravery, Gates's battle report gave him littlecredit. Given Gates's defensive strategy, whichArnold ignored, Gates might have thought itwarranted. Anyway, he disliked Arnold's ten-dency to disregard orders—though the latteralways expected obedience to his commands.Finally, Gates had admirers in Congress. Inshort, by 1778 many leaders had woundedArnold's pride.

Perhaps most insulting of all was the Con-tinental Congress's 1777 decision to pass overArnold in its military promotions. Most legisla-tors considered him deserving. Yet, Congress-men, as leaders of a tenuous coalition stilllacking a sense of nationalism, had to take statesensibilities into account. To a large extentArnold was denied promotion to major generalbecause Connecticut already had its quota ofofficers at that rank. James Thomas Flexner inThe Traitor and the Spy: Benedict Arnold andJohn Andre (1953) observes that more-radicalCongressmen also feared that promotion byseniority "might end in a dictatorship . . . mak-ing the army independent of legislatures." Itwas Arnold's misfortune to be caught up in thiscontroversy, and his protests aggravated manyboth in and out of Congress. When at last hewas promoted, Congress—irritated at his appar-ent challenge of their authority—did not restorehis seniority. Angrily, Arnold resigned his com-mission in July 1777 but asked that it be sus-pended so he might take part in the Battle ofSaratoga. One may regret Congress's decision(Washington did); yet, it stemmed from a desirefor union. However, Arnold saw it as weakness,

or worse, a hatred for him. Of course, anyonemistreated may protest or resign. Ultimately,Patriots must choose to put the larger causebefore themselves. Arnold could not, andnursed his resentment. Wallace believes theslight was "an implied impeachment on hischaracter." As historian Martin notes in "Bene-dict Arnold's Treason as Political Protest":when "Arnold started putting more emphasisupon personal honor than on the pursuit of lib-erty . . . his change in outlook clearly appearsduring the period of the promotion contro-versy in 1777."

Arnold's insulted vanity also played on hisother character flaw—a growing avarice and will-ingness to use his rank to feed this hunger. If"victim" he must be, Arnold would miss noopportunity to obtain his due. He had come todespise politicians, and his anger with Congressfor failing to supply necessities to the troopswas unfeigned. Martin suggests Arnold sin-cerely believed in offering soldiers better pay orpensions. Yet, Congress was painfully short ofmoney. A strong government—which Arnoldvalued—might have commandeered the goods,but the tenuous federation that existed couldonly request them from the states. In addition,with a shortage of funds, Congress was hesitantto make blanket reimbursements, whatever therecipient's "honor." (Given his notoriousself-indulgent lifestyle, Arnold experienced thishesitancy soon enough.) The fact that he was asgenerous with others as with himself made littledifference. Arnold thought that any gentle-man's claim for expenses, however ill sup-ported, should be paid without question. So heseethed at Congress's examination (and reexam-ination) of his claims for money spent in Que-bec and for the fleet on Lake Champlain.Arnold saw this development as further evi-dence of Congress's parsimony, disdain for him,and willingness to listen to cowardly detractors.Moreover, while some accusations of financialirregularity were false, his anger at Congressand its questions hid an avaricious egotism.Congress was unduly slow but hardly betrayedrepublican values by reviewing all claims care-fully. Yet, to Arnold it was all "villainy." As heexplained to Washington, "Having . . . become acripple in the service of my country, I littleexpected to meet such ungrateful returns."

Arnold's leg wound sustained at Saratogarequired a long recovery. If Washingtonintended an easy assignment for him duringrecuperation, an appointment as military com-mander in Philadelphia was a great error. First,it gave Arnold a chance to become enamored ofPeggy Shippen, the young and beautiful daugh-ter of a Philadelphia Tory. He began wooingher in the summer of 1778, and they married in

12 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

April of the following year. According to Wal-lace, "Though marriage into one of Philadel-phia's leading families brought Arnold greatsocial status, in his pursuit of Peggy and hisattempts to keep her in the style to which shewas accustomed, he was forced to live farbeyond his means. Hard-pressed, he developeda number of money-making schemes, most ofthem of a dubious character." Already hostile tothe French alliance, Arnold now had Peggy topersuade him that America's cause was ill con-ceived and his services to it unappreciated.Thus, his Philadelphia command was a disasterwaiting to unfold. Keeping peace among bitterpolitical factions and maintaining ties with lead-ers jealous of national authority required highpolitical skills—of which Arnold had none.Although some military men are deficient inpolitical skills, Arnold was clueless. Indeed, fewhave been so self-obsessed and unaware ofhuman relations. His clash with the Pennsylva-nia Council and Reed was a case in point. Thelatter took it upon himself to make Arnold atarget for those suspicious of the military or apotential aristocracy. The clash ended in a list ofcharges against Arnold, who requested a courtmartial. If Congressional politicians were overlydutiful to Pennsylvania's complaints, they didfind Arnold innocent save on two charges. Bothconcerned his avarice: that he had used publicwagons to save personal property from captureand that he gave the Loyalist ship, CharmingNancy, permission to enter Philadelphia harborwithout its cargo being confiscated. The latteraction was all the more questionable sinceArnold later obtained an interest in the ship.Washington was told to reprimand him (whichhe did, much to Arnold's mortification). Infact, Arnold was guilty of these, and perhapsother, crimes. Washington's language was a bitharsher than required by the military court butconveyed no lack of confidence in him. Indeed,Washington had already decided to offerArnold command of the army's left wing. How-ever, neither the verdict nor reprimand drovehis protege into the enemy's arms, for Arnoldhad already contacted the British monthsbefore. Personal vanity and a growing appetitefor money had done their work.

The negotiations with Clinton—whichArnold initiated—are further evidence of hisgreed. Even if he changed sides on principle, itwas reasonable to want some financial support.After all, he would lose his American property.Yet, Arnold spent the spring and summer of1779 haggling over his price (demanding up to£20,000) as he fed the British bits of militaryinformation. Money was now the crucial objec-tive. Indeed, if nothing had been said of WestPoint to that point, it was still true that Arnoldhad already committed treason "in his heart."

His final betrayal, however, was a personalone: that of his close friend and mentor, Wash-ington. The latter had been Arnold's staunchsupporter; no one had done more to befriendhim. Washington's only rebuke, in 1780, was inobedience to Congress. However, by thenArnold had already sold out the Americancause. Later, Arnold wrote to Washington, theclear attempt of a guilty conscience to justifyitself. Whether his plot included Washington'scapture (historians disagree on this matter),nothing could have threatened Washington'sdefensive line—and perhaps even led to his cap-ture—so much as the enemy seizure of WestPoint. Only a complete British victory couldhave repaired Arnold's reputation. Patriot vir-tue demanded that everyone must put thecause ahead of individual interests, successahead of individual glory. An exaggeratedambition or financial greed must never eclipsethe revolution. In the end, Washington's repu-tation grew because he understood this point;Arnold did not, and he reaped the contempt oflater generations.

-EVERETT W. KINDIG,MIDWESTERN STATE UNIVERSITY

Viewpoint:No. Benedict Arnold was anhonorable man who increasinglyfelt that the Revolution wasbeing led by false Patriots; heswitched his loyalty to the Britishin order to preserve his reputationas a gentleman.

While Benedict Arnold's name is synony-mous with the word traitor in American lore,such a tidy characterization conceals the com-plex and honorable reasons that motivatedArnold to break with the American cause andreturn his loyalty to Great Britain in 1780. Inthe early years of the Revolutionary War (1775-1783) Arnold emerged as a bold and coura-geous military leader who helped the fledglingrepublic secure critical victories against Britain.Despite the sacrifices and risks that Arnold andother military leaders endured in the name ofrepublican virtue and honor, Arnold becameincreasingly disillusioned with a civilian govern-ment and a general populace who were unwill-ing to make a similar commitment to therevolutionary struggle. Arnold believed thatexperienced soldiers were not receiving the sup-port or recognition they deserved because theContinental Congress dismissed them as a band

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 13

of mercenaries who threatened civil society.After the Continental Congress failed to pro-mote him and acknowledge his heroism,Arnold concluded that the American peopleand their government lacked the ability toattain the republican ideals of the Revolution.Arnold joined the British cause to protest thegap between revolutionary rhetoric and politi-cal reality and to disassociate his own reputa-tion from such a dishonorable movement.Arnold's repudiation of the American wareffort did not happen overnight or because ofsome preexisting character flaw. Instead, thetransformation happened incrementally afterrepeated skirmishes with an unsupportive pub-lic and government.

The growing tensions between the Ameri-can colonies and Britain during the 1770sintroduced Arnold to military service and therepublican ideas of virtue and honor that pro-vided the intellectual basis for American inde-pendence. The Crown's revenue measuresdirectly affected Arnold as a merchant, and hequickly sided with the Patriot cause. When hos-tilities broke out between British troops andthe residents of Lexington and Concord, Mas-sachusetts, in 1775, communities throughoutthe Thirteen Colonies organized themselvesinto militia companies to support the Patrioteffort. The city of New Haven selected Arnoldto lead its militia, reflecting the level of respectand admiration that he engendered in hisadopted home. Upon his appointment, Arnolddemonstrated his commitment to revolution-ary ideals by leading the New Haven Foot-guards to Massachusetts to reinforce the militiacompanies. Overnight, the inexperiencedArnold had been transformed from merchantto military leader.

The early years of the American Revolutionillustrated the gap between military leadership

and civilian support that produced Arnold'seventual disillusionment. When Arnold led theFootguards from Connecticut to Massachu-setts, the decision to declare independence wasstill one full year away, with popular and politi-cal opinion in the colonies equally divided. Inthe meantime, the military response to Britainwas undertaken by a ragtag group of militiamenin need of coordination, leadership, and a clearmission. From 1775 until 1778 Arnold engagedin a series of daring military actions thatenabled the American forces to gain strengthand confidence in preparation for the decisivebattles they would face later. Arnold's successesled to his rapid rise in the American militaryfrom the rank of captain to major general. As headvanced the American cause, he increasinglybelieved that the Continental Congress under-cut the war effort by failing to support therepublic's military leaders. Arnold realized thatAmerican independence was not attainable ifcivilian leaders were not as committed to thestruggle as their military counterparts.

Arnold's first encounter with military suc-cess and civilian disappointment occurred inMay 1775 when he joined Ethan Allen and hisGreen Mountain Boys in securing Fort Ticon-deroga on Lake Champlain in Upstate NewYork. Although Arnold had planned to leadmore troops to Massachusetts, he decided thatAllen's mission deserved his attention instead.Proceeding to Upstate New York without theFootguards, Arnold joined the effort to gaincontrol of this fort before the British did. WithTiconderoga temporarily under American con-trol, tensions grew between Arnold and Allenas competing accounts of the event reached theMassachusetts Provincial Congress. Since thisbody had authorized Allen to undertake theattack, they supported his account, which lion-ized his efforts and ignored Arnold's role.

14 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Although disappointed by Allen's omission ofhis exploits, Arnold decided not to dwell onthis episode and instead turned his attention tothe larger war effort.

In August 1775 Arnold advanced his mili-tary career when he traveled to Cambridge,Massachusetts, to meet with George Washing-ton, the new commander of the ContinentalArmy, to offer his services. Washingtonshrewdly observed that the risk-taking Arnoldpossessed the necessary determination anddrive to lead troops through the dense Mainewilderness for an invasion into Canada. Arnoldaccepted the assignment and earned the rank ofcolonel in the Continental Army. With an expe-ditionary force of one thousand men, Arnoldbegan the arduous trek through Maine in Sep-tember 1775, arriving outside Quebec inNovember. Because the British troops outnum-bered the Americans, the Rebels suffered a deci-sive defeat on 31 December. Despite theconsiderable obstacles facing Arnold, includinga wound to his leg, he worked to contain Britishcounterattacks during January and February.Congress recognized his heroic efforts in Que-bec by promoting him to brigadier general,while the American public praised him as"America's Hannibal." Washington concurredwith Congress and the public, declaring thatthe continuing blockade of Quebec was "freshproof of Arnold's ability and perseverance inthe midst of difficulties." Recognizing theimportance of Canada to the American wareffort, Washington sent reinforcements fromConnecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hamp-shire to assist Arnold and his troops. Althoughthe British expelled American forces from Can-ada by the summer of 1776, Arnold's determi-nation and sacrifices earned him, at leasttemporarily, public and civilian accolades.

Soon afterward Arnold's exalted reputa-tion suffered a stinging blow. The ContinentalCongress embarked on investigations to assignblame for the defeat, while Arnold's fellow sol-diers accused him of thievery during the Cana-dian campaign. Although Arnold waseventually vindicated, the charges tarnished hisreputation and inflicted psychological woundsto match his physical ones. Arnold expressedhis hurt feelings to General Horatio Gates inSeptember 1776, declaring, "I cannot but thinkit extremely cruel when I have sacrificed myease, health and a great part of my private prop-erty, in the cause of my country, to be calumni-ated as a robber and thief." The attacks to hisreputation continued a year later when the Con-tinental Congress appointed five major generalson 19 February 1777 but did not includeArnold among the promotions. DespiteArnold's military contributions, five less quali-

fied officers now outranked him in the Conti-nental Army. Civilian disrespect for his heroismcaused Arnold to believe that the ContinentalCongress did not recognize the qualities or ide-als associated with the revolutionary struggle.Its lack of commitment to the revolutionarycause continued to erode his faith in the viabil-ity of republican ideals.

Arnold's greatest moment on the battle-field occurred on 7 October 1777, when he leda daring assault at the Battle of Bemis Heightsnear Saratoga, New York. Ten days later MajorGeneral John Burgoyne surrendered to theAmericans. This victory marked a critical turn-ing point for the American war effort becauseit resulted in France's joining the war effortand led ultimately to the defeat of the British.Although Arnold should have been remem-bered as the "Hero of Saratoga," this title wentto his commanding officer, Gates, who choseto downplay Arnold's decisive contribution tothe victory. Arnold, who had sustained anotherdebilitating leg wound during the battle,became increasingly bitter toward the Ameri-can cause as he contemplated the lack of recog-nition for his heroic efforts and sacrifices.Congress eventually upgraded Arnold to thegrade of major general, but the damage hadalready been done as Arnold lost faith in theAmerican cause.

Arnold's assignment as the commander ofPhiladelphia proved to be disastrous because itbrought his contempt for the civilian authori-ties to the point of no return. Washington,wanting to place the convalescing general in aposition worthy of his talents, appointedArnold as commander of the city in June 1778.Serving in this position required political sensi-tivity, tact, and respect for the civilian govern-ment, qualities that the disillusioned Arnoldlacked. The ailing general repeatedly clashedwith the Continental Congress and the Councilof Pennsylvania, which were both headquar-tered in the city. While Arnold's earlier dis-agreements with the Continental Congresscentered upon rank, recognition, and supportfor the cause, the new disagreements assumed amore personal cast. During his tenure in Phila-delphia, Arnold made some profits from trade,which was not unusual for post commanders inthe eighteenth-century military. However, hisbusiness dealings led the civilian authorities toaccuse him of abusing his power for personalgain. Although acquitted of fraud, Arnold wasfound guilty of imprudent and improper con-duct, and he suffered an official reprimand fromWashington. From Arnold's perspective, theContinental Congress's campaign against himmerely confirmed his belief that they weresmall-minded officials with no regard for the

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 15

revolutionary cause or its military officers. Hav-ing lost faith in the republic's civilian leader-ship, Arnold began to take steps to return hisloyalty to Great Britain in 1779. With his first-hand experience of the Continental Congress'slimitations, Arnold concluded that a republicangovernment premised on virtue and honor wasan illusion. In protest against the civilian gov-ernment's failed leadership and to defend hisown reputation, Arnold donned the redcoat ofa British brigadier general in late 1780 and com-manded a royal force against his home state ofConnecticut the following year. Ultimately, hisactions represented a stinging critique of hiserstwhile comrades and their revolution.

-SANDY MOATS,

UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS

References

John Richard Alden, A History of the AmericanRevolution (New York: Knopf, 1969).

Issac N. Arnold, The Life of Benedict Arnold; HisPatriotism and His Treason (Chicago: Jansen,McClurg, 1880).

Clare Brandt, The Man in the Mirror: A Life ofBenedict Arnold (New York: RandomHouse, 1994).

James Thomas Flexner, The Traitor and the Spy:Benedict Arnold and John Andre (New York:Harcourt, Brace, 1953).

James Kirby Martin, Benedict Arnold, Revolution-ary Hero: An American Warrior Reconsidered(New York: New York University Press,1997).

Martin, "Benedict Arnold's Treason as PoliticalProtest," Parameters, 11 (1981): 63-74.

Willard Sterne Randall, Benedict Arnold: Patriotand Traitor (New York: Morrow, 1990).

Randall, George Washington: A Life (New York:Holt, 1997).

Paul J. Sanborn, "Arnold, Benedict (1741-1801)," in The American Revolution, 1775-1783: An Encyclopedia, volume 1, edited byRichard L. Clanco and Sanborn (New York:Garland, 1993), pp. 46-56.

Willard M. Wallace, "Benedict Arnold: Traitor-ous Patriot," in George Washington's Gener-als, edited by George Athan Billias (NewYork: Morrow, 1964), pp. 163-192.

Wallace, Traitorous Hero: The Life and Fortunes ofBenedict Arnold (New York: Harper, 1954).

16 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION