''WarshiHMS Hesperus/ex-Brazilian 'H'-class destroyer

by Captain SopPeter Dickens, DSO, MBE, DSC, RN

FRONT COVER:

Commander Donald G. F. W. Macintyre DSO** DSC,Senior Officer Escort Group B-Two and CommandingOfficer I-/MS Hesperus, on his bridge in May 1943 (/WM)

Hesperus's presumed score at the end of May 1943-U 93,U357, U191, U223, U186. U223 was not, in fact, sunkbut Hesperus did complete her five with U242 in 1945.

(/ WM)

A Mark Vll Depth-charge exploding at 50ft (/WM)

Entering Gladstone Dock, Liverpool, after ramming U357(/ WM)

Havant, the first of the c/ass, as originally completed in December 1939 with tall funnels, three boats and minesweepinggearaft. Like Hesperus , she lacked herDCT but was fitted with eight depth-charge throwers and three traps (MOD)

HMS Hesperusby Captain Peter Dickens DSO, MBE, DSC

FOREWORD by Captain Donald G. F. W.Macintyre DSO** DSC , Royal Navy whocommanded ' HMS HESPERUS ' from 15.1.40-13.3.41 and from 28 . 8.42-22.3.44.When the torpedoing and sinking of the linerAthenia without warning by a German U-boat onthe first day of World War II led to the immediateinstitution of a convoy system, the Admiralty becamea victim of its own lack of foresight as well as thenation's parsimony in the provision of money fordefence and found itself woefully short of shipssuitable for escort duties. Covetous eyes wereturned on the six destroyers similar to the British'H' Class which were being built, two of each byThornycroft, Samuel White and Vickers, for theBrazilian Navy. They were quickly requisitioned andcompleted with equipment limited to what wasessential for anti-submarine warfare.One of these, launched by Thornycroft on 1 August1939, was given the name Hearty. The phoneticrisk of confusion with the flotilla leader Hardy,already in commission, caused this to be changed toHesperus soon after commissioning under mycommand in January 1940.Her debut was far from auspicious. Hurried to sea atWinston Churchill's insistence, her upper deck hadbeen incompletely caulked and she leaked like asieve in a seaway and had to be taken in hand forthis to be remedied. She had no gun-director nor anyform of gun-control. Her only anti-aircraft weaponswere two four-barrelled 0.5 inch machine guns. Hergyro compass was a Brown's, designed for thegentle motion and absense of shock to be expectedin a passenger liner; only in the calmest weather didit function under the rough treatment provided by adestroyer.Nevertheless, as Captain Peter Dickens' narrativeshows, the Hesperus was to be a credit to her

builders, give great good service to the Royal Navyand follow a splendidly successful career throughoutthe Battle of the Atlantic.

THE SHIP AND HER VITAL ROLEThe Battle of the Atlantic was as critical for us as theBattle of Britain. On our ability to keep our merchantships and their cargoes at sea depended our verysurvival and, having assured that, our ability to wagewar.The Flag-Officer U-boats, Admiral Doenitz, knewthis perhaps better than we did ourselves; and hewent even further by stating clearly that the onlyway Germany, despite her massive armies, couldhope to defeat Britain was by cutting her sealifelines. The drive, courage and persistence behindthe U-boats' attack reflected this single-mindedconviction and it very nearly succeeded.Only Hesperus and her small, rust-streaked, storm-battered, much-modified and perhaps not verybeautiful sisters, together with the aircraft of CoastalCommand and the Fleet Air Arm, held the enemy atthe eleventh hour and then routed him. It isimportant to recognize this stark, simple truth so asnot to fall into the common error of assessing theseships as ancillary to the mighty battleships andcarriers. They were the front line itself against theonly menace that really frightened Winston Churchill.Hesperus is particularly interesting as representingin microcosm every stage of the Battle from initialunpreparedness, through frantic improvisation, tofully-specialised Anti-Submarine (A/S) Escort. Shewas always in action at the key phases and usedevery weapon and equipment with deadly effect.

The LaunchingSenhora Heitor Galliez launched the Braziliandestroyer Juruena at Thornycroft's Yard on

1 73

Hurricane as completed in the summer of 1940. She hasher OCT (MOD)

Right: Asdic. showing dome, oscillator and housingarrangements

A typical range recorder trace of an attack on a submarinewith an ahead-throwing weapon.The iodised paper slowly descends. A 'stylus' at the topstarts from the left simultaneously with each transmissionand moves across, marking the paper with any signaldetected by the receiving circuit. The transmission itself isnot recorded as it would be too loud, but then are seenthe sea-reverberations gradually diminishing in intensityuntil the echo stands out clearly.The echo marks are firm when the oscillator pointsdirectly at the submarine but the operator deliberatelysteps across it to ensure that he always knows the centrebearing and is not misled into losing contact if the target'sbearing changes rapidly. There are therefore faint echoesbetween the firm ones; on two occasions he has steppedoff the submarine on to its wake, but the trace has perhapshelped him to see his error.The slope of the line of echoes gives the rate of approachand the bar, adjusted for own ships speed, estimateddepth and weapon data, is aligned with it. When themoving paper brings the two together the weapon is fired.

(MOD)

1 August 1939 but by 9 September her owners hadsubmitted gracefully to the inevitable and shebecame one of His Majesty's Ships. The nameHesperus, the Greek's Evening Star, was the first ofthe name in the Royal Navy and unquestionablyattractive; that it was also well-known as the Wreckof Longfellow's poem seems to have been over-looked by the Ships' Names Committee, usually soanxious not to upset the sailors' morale, in its searchfor anything beginning with 'H', but no harm wasdone for she was happy, lucky and very successful.Built to the plans of the well-tried British 'H' Classwith insignificant alterations she and her sisters,Havelock, Havant, Hurricane, Highlander andHarvester, were Fleet Destroyers designed asadjuncts to the battlefleet in attack and defenceagainst a surface enemy. Four low-angle 4.7in gunsand eight torpedoes were to be their main armamentand although they would have asdic and a fewdepth-charges they had virtually no defence againstaircraft. Except for their sturdy hulls and high speedthey were thus thoroughly ill-adapted to modernwar.However, the first important improvement wasordered before completion. This was a massivedepth-charge armament in place of 'Y' gun whichwas unique to the class and set it firmly on theA/S road. More innovations followed until the shipswere fully equipped for the climax of the Battle in thespring of 1943 and it is important therefore to knowwhat the modifications all were.

AsdicThis means of detecting a submerged submarine byemitting a sound beam into the water and hearing theecho was already generally fitted in small ships at theoutbreak of war; much credit is due to the small bandof dedicated scientists and naval officers whodeveloped it with little official encouragement.The component parts were:The Oscillator, a quartz crystal disc suspendedbeneath the ship which converted an electricalimpulse into sound and, if an echo was returned,vice versa. The instrument could also hear otherunder-water noises which was most useful but allwould be drowned by the rush of water past one'sown ship were it not for:

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PATT. A760,

PILLAR.

(AFTER)

TRAINING UNIT A/53D

PORTABLE COVER

LIFTING MOTOR

2B.H.P. 2000 RP.M

PATT. 9961-I1OV

PATT. 9962.2200

TOMMY BAR.

GROOVE TO DRAINWASTE OIL.

TRUNK. --

GUIDE BAR -

LOCKING TOES.

FAIRING PLATE -

STEADY BEARING

TOP CASTING

RUBBER SHEET -

ALPAX BODY -

BOTTOM CASING'

HT-C-AGLF

OSLILLA TOR

PATT 2125 HT CONNECTOR

LUBRICATOR

-"ALIGNMENT INDICATOR

PATT A833 BALL BEARING

(HOFFMANN .0 22)

--LIFTING SCREWS.

_-SCREW OPERATING SHAFT

PATT. A759,

PILLAR ASSEMBLY

(FORWARD)

WORM WHEEL

LIFTING NUT

OCTAGONAL SPANNER

-GROOVES TO DRAIN WASTE OIL.

STUFFING BOX

WITH PATT . A662 PACKING.

LIFTING TUBE

GUIDE

ROLLER.

RAFT, PATT. A762.

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DERMATINE JOINT PATT. 2282.

ZINC PROTECTORS.

OSCILLATOR STUFFING BOX

STEEL BAND

STAY BRIGHT STEEL WINDOW

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The Dome, a streamlined container which enclosedthe oscillator in still water and allowed operation upto speeds of about 20kts in calm weather. At fullspeed or in heavy seas the dome could be housedsnugly inside the hull to avoid damage.The Controls were near the Captain in a tiny hut onthe bridge and were operated by one man, directedand assisted by the A/S Control Officer. A knob atthe centre of a gyro compass repeater rotated theoscillator; and the Range Recorder initiated theshort, sharp transmissions, displayed visually anynoise or answering echo, computed the relativeapproach speed and indicated the moment ofweapon release.The receiving circuit was also amplified aurally andthis was essential to allow the greatest chance ofhearing the first suspicion of an echo and then toclassify it as wake, rock, wreck, tide-rip, fish or,when sharp and clear, a possible submarine. Adifference in note between sea reverberations andecho indicated target movement and there weremany other esoteric subtleties; operating skill was anart superimposed on science and Hesperus 's PettyOfficer Coster was a master,

Depth Charge Mark VIIThe first and, until 1942, the only weapon, this was asimple drum of high explosive which could be set todetonate at varying depths by hydrostatic pressure.The standard equipment for small ships in 1939 wasa trap from which charges were rolled over the sternand two mortars, or Throwers, which projected them1 20ft on either beam.The Captain guessed the submarine's depth, for theasdic could not help him there, and steered to putthe ship's stern over her future position. Contactwould be lost in the final stages as the U-boatpassed below the beam, but the recorder trace wouldgive him the moment to fire and this was done in thesequence:1. Trap and throwers; the trap charge would sinkstraight down but those from the throwers wouldcarry forward through the air to splash abreast the2. Second trap charge, which was followed at thesame interval by the3. Third trap charge.The pattern thus produced was a centred diamondand allowed some margin for error but experiencesoon showed that this was rarely enough. In 1940the ex-Brazilians were fitted with no fewer than

A Mark VIl Depth-charge ^ ling at 50ft (IWM)

The Controls. This exercise mock-up shows: ControlTraining Unit (bottom left) with which the operatordirected the oscillator. Range Recorder (with sloping bar)which displayed all underwater noises visually. Plottingtable. Own ship's track was drawn automatically and onto this was superimposed ranges and bearings of an echowhich revealed any movement. An important use of theplot was to suggest a new direction of sweep whencontact was lost. In Hesperus it was sited below thebridge and could be viewed through an aperture.Not shown are the operator's earphones and a loudspeaker.An echo was first detected almost invariably by ear, andmuch could be deduced by its sharpness and pitch

(MOD)

three traps and eight throwers giving a pattern of17; but even so, and although this terrifying seriesof explosions might well cover the submarine inplan, there could be no likelihood of a kill unless somelatitude was also allowed in depth. The answer wasto bolt heavy weights to half the charges whichthen sank faster and exploded deeper.The final pattern to emerge after many trials andmuch experience consisted of 10 from two traps andfour throwers of improved marks. This might becalled the killer pattern for use against a probable orcertain U-boat; for urgent attacks on newlydetected and possibly unidentified targets it wasusual to fire a five-charge pattern, while for themassive 'creep' attack on a slow, deep enemy asmany as 26 would be sent down.

Depth Charge Mark X-One TonA logical addition to the Mark VII, but not a replace-ment, since a shallow burst could sink the firing ship,this contained as much explosive as a 10-chargenormal pattern and was discharged from a torpedotube. Little faith and a good deal of awewas evidentlygiven to it, for each ship was allowed only one andeven that was rarely used, but with Hesperus the aimof sinking U-boats took precedence over all else andshe could have used more had she carried them.

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HedgehogEven Coster's skill could not induce his asdic to keepcontact with a submarine at close range when it hadpassed under the beam, and an ahead-throwingweapon was a clear need. Hesperus's hedgehogreplaced 'A' gun in early 1943 and fired an ellipticalpattern of 24 bombs over the bow at a U-boat still infirm contact; detonation was triggered by impact andone hit was lethal. The only snag was, 'no hit, nobang' and consequently no secondary damage ormorale effect; but it was a great advance and whenteething and familiarity problems had been over-come, the percentage of successful attacks rosefrom six to thirty.

German Counter - MeasuresBefore 1943 there was little a U-boat could do toengage an escort. To fire a torpedo with onlyhydrophone data had small chance of success andwould identify her for certain, while to surface andfight it out, though done, was a last ditch throw. Hermain asset was the ability to lose herself and successin this depended on the courage, wit and patienceof both her Captain and his opponent. Macintyre ofthe Hesperus had an uncanny gift of apparentlylooking into his unseen enemy's mind and divininghis next move.There was however one ingenious gadget availableto a U-boat, the Pi//enwerfer, a chemical dischargedinto the sea which effervesced like a monstrousAlka-Seltzer and returned a convincing echo to theasdic. Even Coster was misled when he firstencountered one and temporarily lost contact withthe submarine, gliding away silently and end-on,

G

Above: The Hedgehog Ahead- Throwing Anti-SubmarineWeapon.The spigot bombs are mounted in four rows, rising towardsthe rear. Each has its propellant charge in the stalk andan arming vane to allow detonation only when it issinking. Firing was in a ripple (MOD)

Each spigot was angled differently to produce theelliptical pattern and the rows were mounted on spindleswhich could tilt to allow 20' of training either side of thebow and compensate forship's roll (11,40D)

Left : The 24 bombs in the air (MOD) and right: The pattern fell 200 yards ahead of the ship in an ellipse 120ft by140ft (wide). Each bomb contained 351b of Torpex, sufficient by itself to hole and sink a U-Boat (MOD)

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beyond it. Once known however, this ruse wasmuch less effective.As allied fighting ability and strength increased andthe U-boat casualty rate rose, a weapon became avital need. The Zaunkonig (we called it'Gnat'-and anasty sting it inflicted) was the answer: an electrictorpedo that could hear an escort's propellers andhome towards them. From mid-1943 ships began, atfirst unaccountably, to have their sterns blown offand A/S action became a two-sided affair.Our Intelligence however was not unprepared andcounter-measures, material and tactical, were soonin operation. The 'Foxer' was a pair of towednoisemakers, each consisting of two, loosely fittingsteel bars which 'chattered' at speeds over 1Oktsmany times more loudly than the propellers andeffectively decoyed the gnat. But they also made ahideous racket in the asdic which often drowned theecho; so we compromised with one, 'Unifoxer',whose noise it was found possible, after muchtraining, to operate through, albeit still with reducedefficiency.On approaching a U-boat, ships had to 'step aside'with 60° zig-zags so that a gnat would follow theunifoxer clear of the ship and not catch her 'downthe throat'; or approach indirectly, faster than thegnat's 25kts. At close quarters, there was the optionof slowing to silent speed of about seven knots if theunifoxer's noise made contact-holding difficult.More skill and courage were needed to sink a U-boatequipped with gnats and we suffered many casual-ties : even the ship commanded by the wily Macintyreafter leaving Hesperus, HMS Bickerton, fell victim in1944.

THE ELECTRONIC WARSo much for close action, but how was the escort'sasdic, with its range of little over a mile, to be broughtinto contact with a U-boat in the vast Atlantic ? Thesecret lay in convoys which, being few in number,were hard to find, but when found, forced theattacker to brave the escorts. Two aims were thusachieved : protection was afforded to the merchantships and U-boats could be sunk. Both werenecessary since, although it might seem sufficient toprotect a particular convoy passively, U-boatstrength was growing as fast as Germany could

build and would, if unchecked, eventually becomeoverwhelming. It was often difficult for an EscortCommander to decide whether to leave the convoyto destroy a U-boat or to stay in close company.

The Wolf PacksDoenitz's answer to the convoy was to mass as manyU-boats as practicable and attack on the surface atnight, thus retaining flexibility, speed and visionwhich were lost when dived. To bring this about, hewould station lines of U-boats across likely routesand, when one sighted a convoy, she would surfaceand report by high frequency (H/F) radio; the restwould then close, moving on the surface exceptwhen necessary to avoid detection, until the'Wolf pack' was formed and poised. On the nextnight the U-boats, trimmed down to their conning-towers and appallingly difficult to see, would dashin between the escorts to sink and burn, leavingpathetic groups of survivors to the coldly mercilessocean; and a steeper downward slope on thecritical graph of available merchant shipping.Until 1942 we could not detect the enemy duringany of these phases but this we had to do or lose thewar. Aircraft were the answer to the surfacedU-boat but that aspect, though vital, is notappropriate to this Profile. Sighting reports andsurfaced U-boats at close quarters at night werehowever Hesperus's direct concern and both thesewere mastered in the nick of time bydevoted scientific effort at the Admiralty SignalsEstablishment.

High Frequency Direction Finding ( H/F D/F)Usually called 'Huff-Duff', the aerial did not revolvebut achieved its directional sensitivity by measuringthe signal strength received by each of the severalloops. It was remarkably accurate and, like the asdic,could be induced to yield far more than just thebearing by an operator with a real flair: LieutenantHarold Walker of the Hesperus could tell one U-boatfrom another, whether the aerial was wet or dry, andthe range, often to within a mile.Completely dedicated, Walker rarely left his set andsooner or later the bridge would be alerted by thereport, 'B-Bar', a German operating signal indicatingthat a U-boat had a sighting to report urgently. Then,

The purpose of it all, The safe and timely arrival of the convoy'. The box shape was standard, the leading edge being thelonger, to give a U-Boat the most difficult interception problem. In this case the mean course of advance is to the right,with the Commodore's ship in the centre of the leading edge. He is probably exercising his ships in emergency turnswhich they may have to carry out to avoid wolf-packs at any time, at night orin foul weather (IWM)

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The aerials of some of the sets fitted in Hesperus whichstarted what subsequently became known as ElectronicWarfare.Left: RDF Warning Combined, first fitted in late 1941.Primarily for air warning, but with a surface capability(it detected U93), this set was a great advance inperformance and flexibility over the earlier, fixed aerial,type. At first aerial rotation was by hand and echoes weredisplayed on an 'A' scan (a line of light displaced in a'blip' at the scale distance of the echo) but, in about 1943,power rotation and Plan Position Indicator (PPI), as inmodern radars, were fitted giving an all-round presentationof everything within range. Also at this time the term'radar' was introduced.The interrogator was part of a device (IFF) for identifyinga contact electronically as friend or foe in associationwith the radar (MOD)

Centre: RDF Warning Surface. The battle-winning setevolved by the Naval Signal School and Admiralty SignalsEstablishment expressly to detect the trimmed-down,surfaced U-Boat; it was fitted in Hesperus in 1942.With a frequency of 3000mc/s and a 14micro-secondpulse, the aerial was designed to give a very directionalbeam in azimuth while being broad in elevation to allowfor the roll of a small ship. This meant two dipole aerialswith cheese-shaped reflectors, one transmitter and onereceiver, mounted one on top of the other. The firstmagnetron only allowed a power output of 5kW and toavoid any losses through cables, part of the circuitry wasmounted on the aerials and had to be protected from theweather by a perspex lantern. Like the warning combinedset it developed from hand-rotation and 'A'scan to powerand PPI (MOD)

Right: High Frequency Direction Finder (H/F DIF orHuff-Duff'). Two aspects of the same aerial, showing howthe strut arrangement altered the apparent shape whenviewed from different angles. This was the set with whichHarold Walker extracted detailed information aboutU-Boats without their knowing.A U-Boat's sighting report on H/F travelled in an approx-imately straight line at a tangent to the earth's curvatureand achieved the long distance to base by being reflectedby the ionosphere. This was the 'sky wave' but if the'ground wave' were detected the U-Boat could not bemore than 15-20 miles distant and the set could sense thisvital difference (MOD, CourtesyA. Raven)

if the range was close, Hesperus would race downthe bearing at 30kts with every sense alert, bothhuman and scientific. Even if the U-boat was notheard or seen again, she was at least forced to diveand become blind, so that the convoy could bediverted away from the threat; but the team ofMacintyre, Walker and Coster, supported by asupremely happy and efficient ship, was soformidable that Hesperus sank no fewer than threeU-boats directly from H/F D/F reports. The Huff-Duff was at least as important as the moreglamorised radar since, when that was called intoplay, the enemy was already dangerously close.

RadarDeveloped initially for what turned out to be theBattle of Britain, in which it succeeded dramatically,radar was first fitted in ships primarily for airwarning. Hesperus's first set had fixed forward-looking aerials and was soon replaced by one whoseaerial rotated ; but these could not be relied upon todetect the surfaced U-boat at close range, for whichit was realised that a much higher frequency in the10cm band must be developed. The RAF's inventionof the Resonant Cavity Magnetron permitted this,and a surface warning (SW) set was evolved andfitted in the first escorts in 1942. Its conspicuoushooded lantern evoked a sense of awe in theuninitiated beholder and also, no doubt, the enemy;as well indeed it might, for it could detect a trimmed-down submarine at 21, miles or more. Not muchperhaps, but enough to tip the tactical balance and itis a measure of its importance that the DirectorControl Tower (DCT) was removed to make spacefor it, thus relegating the guns to a very secondaryrole.

Shore SupportBy the spring of 1943 Hesperus had become whollyspecialised for A/S warfare but improvements toasdic, weapons and electronics continued until thewar's end.From this regrettably over-simplified account ofHesperus's development, it will be appreciated thatthe Battle was not waged only at sea. To compensatefor our peacetime failure to understand where ourreal security lay, enormous effort had to be devoted :in the Admiralty (Staff, Intelligence and Technical

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departments), in drawing offices, on trial ranges, inTactical Schools, the Anti-Submarine School, theSignal School, the Admiralty Signals Establishment,the Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches'Headquarters and many less likely places such asGilbert's deserted garage at Waterlooville. The effortwas applied and the Battle won.

'HESPERUS ' S' STORYShe commissioned on 15 January 1940 underCommander Donald Macintyre into the 9thDestroyer Flotilla which comprised all six ships ofthe ex-Brazilian Class. By a long stretch of officialimagination she was pronounced ready for sea inearly April ; but her DCT was not available so thather three 4.7s had to be controlled locally and theirtarget indicated by the Captain waving his cap inits general direction; her torpedoes were acommercial type which could not be run forpractice and were reputed to blow up if hit; andshe was defenceless against air attack. Her engineswere good, however, and she did possess her largeA/S armament which proved in the end to be whatmattered most. Indeed she seemed inexorablyimpelled towards this role through being, bychance, virtually useless for anything else and alsoby her bond of union with Macintyre whosededicated ambition was to sink U-boats, a raredesire in a Navy dominated by thundering guns andgunnery officers.

Faroes Take-overHesperus and Havant were first assigned to theA/S defence of Scapa Flow, but soon after theGermans invaded Norway on 8 April, they were sentto the Farces to advise the Danish Governor that weintended to occupy the islands and forestall theenemy doing so; a likely move which would havegreatly facilitated the passage of German ships andsubmarines into the Atlantic. This was accomplishedin an atmosphere of civilised courtesy. Then toNorway, and real war.

NorwayIt was almost enjoyable at first, when she foundherself patrolling Narvik Fiord with orders to fire onany enemy troops or vehicles that appeared, eventhough her gunnery, as might be expected, was notspectacular. Air attack started painlessly, too, withhigh level bombing which was not accurate againstsmall ships who would use the long time of fall toget out of the way; and Macintyre, a former FleetAir Arm pilot, achieved a reputation among his menas an artful dodger.It was a different matter further south off Mo whereHesperus supported a troop landing on 15 May,hastily mounted to delay the enemy's advance onNarvik. Here she was within range of Stuka dive-bombers whose close approach, which could not beprevented by the wholly inadequate 0 5in machine-guns, allowed no time for manoeuvre. She twistedand turned at high speed-one technique was tosteer towards an approaching enemy to force himinto an uncomfortably steep dive. It was not longbefore those on the upper deck had to steel them-selves to watch, first the end-on view of the

Depth-charge attack (lower right)The ship has a firm echo, the characteristics of which implythat the contact is 'probable submarine'. As she ap-proaches, the echo pitch is clearly lower than the rever-berations, indicating movement away, which is furtherevidence that the contact is a submarine and which alsoprovides useful attack data.A 10-charge standard pattern is ordered and the ship'sspeed steadied at 15kts. As she nears her target, the echois held almost to the time when they become instant withthe transmission which indicates that the submarine hasprobably been surprised and is very shallow, since other-wise she would have passed below the asdic beam muchearlier. A mean depth setting of 75ft is ordered.The submarine now becomes aware of her danger havingheard both the asdic and propellers and increases speed,turns to port and dives; the ship however cannot detector allo w for these alterations.The range recorder, using information by now 30 secondsstale, initiates the firing sequence. First to go is one heavycharge, set to explode below the target's assessed depthat 100ft, from the midship trap; three seconds later (sothat neither charge should damage the other) comes alight set to 50ft from the starboard trap and two heaviesfrom the forward throwers which carry forward with theship's speed while in the air. At eight seconds the afterthrowers fire two lights and the trap releases anotherheavy.The 10-second point is depicted above and it can beseen that in theory the submarine has escaped damage,even though three more trap charges have yet to bedropped. The ship then strives to regain contact, butagainst the noise of exploding charges and her own wakeit is improbable that she will do so until she has run outto about 1200 yards, turned, and started a new asdicsweep by which time the submarine will have movedconsiderably

Hedgehog attack (upper right)The initial situation is the same but now the ship hasbeen fitted with Hedgehog. The submarine takes similaravoiding action but since she is in firm contact right up tothe moment of firing her movements are assessed and theweapon aimed accordingly. An indication of depth isimportant to the calculation of time to fire but extremeaccuracy is unnecessary as the bombs explode only onimpact. Immediately after firing the ship turns sharply toavoid running over the submarine andso maintains contact

aircraft with its menacingly crooked wings, then thebomb, perfectly circular and growing larger,shrieking in a crescendo as it fell, until the time cameto hurl themselves to the deck and pray.Hesperus was damaged aft by two near-misses andsent home with the next convoy. Perhaps she waslucky; to have survived Norway intact would havemade her available for Dunkirk where, with heruseless guns against even fiercer air attack, shemight well have been sunk like the poor Havant aftera very brief career.

Western ApproachesIn addition to repairs at Dundee, the after torpedo-tubes were removed and a 3in high-angle gun ofancient vintage substituted. AA gunnery was avastly complex technology which defied improvisa-

e

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Plan view

Hesperus

Hedgehog Attack

Cone of Missiles

Scale 100 feet =1 inch

Asdic showingcho in w it

^ I I I I I.

Depth Charge Attack

Sinkingat 64 feet

Explode at 100 feet Explode at 50 feet

0In air

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Enemy submarineshowing hit on stern

Direction

of ship

Sinkingat 64 feet0

Sinkingat 32 feet

0In air

Scale 100 feet=1 inch

Ill

Gordon Davies © Profile Publications Ltd

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tion, and the In gun without a control system oreven a good field of fire was a waste of space; theobsolete weapon even failed to boost morale.Towards the end of the year, the 9th Flotilla wastransferred from the Home Fleet to WesternApproaches Command and re-named the 9thEscort Group. Macintyre was delighted, for herewere the U-boats he knew to be his destined foes;but first we had to re-learn an old lesson the hardway before the long, slow climb to victory was evenstarted. True, our merchant ships sailed in convoybut an aggressive spirit, morally proper buttactically disastrous, led us to dispatch our A/Sships to the reported position of a U-boat, eventhough the evidence was uncertain and theposition was many miles distant. High speed,combined with North Atlantic weather, put a severestrain on engines, hulls and men so that many of oursmall force became non-operational unnecessarily,the U-boats having more than enough time to losethemselves in the ocean wastes.

The GaleHesperus, who can always highlight any aspect ofthe Battle, rode out a freak storm of tropical forcein company, appropriately, with Hurricane inJanuary 1941. The war was forgotten and allefforts concentrated on staying afloat; mountainousbreakers towered then crashed on board, carryingwith them everything moveable: in Hurricane'scase what should have been immovable as well, forthe whole of 'B' gundeck, with 'B' gun on it, waslifted upwards and pressed against the bridge. Themass of metal induced 30' of deviation in themagnetic compass, which was all she had to steerby, for the gyro had long since succumbed; and agaping hole to the messdeck below was exposed.Even Macintyre was reduced to prayer if, at theapproach of a mast-high comber, "Climb you bitch,climb !" can be so described.

A'iHavant arriving at Dover with troops from Dunkirk on31 May 1940. The next day she was crippled by bombingand had to be sunk by the minesweeper Saltash. Note hershortened funnels and the early Ninth Destroyer Flotillamarkings (black/ white/ white) (IWM)

Highlander passing through a troop convoy in the summerof 1947. The 9th D.F. funnel marking has now becomeblack- whitelblack/white. At her foremast head is thefixed aerial of the early RDF. The merchant ship carries aPAC anti-aircraft rocket (MOD)

Above: Toll of the battle. Child survivors from SS City ofBenares on board Hurricane (Courtesy Cdr C. Dickens)

Left: Weather damage to Hurricane and Hesperus inJanuary 7941. The normal maximum elevation ofHurricane's 'B'gun was40' (Courtesy Cdr C. Dickens)

Progress: Spring, 1941Another period in dock therefore followed. Thenthe new Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir PercyNoble, saw clearly, and implemented the essentialtruth, that the only place in which a submarine wasforced to reveal her presence, if she was toaccomplish her mission, was near her target; sothat, if our escorts were to be concentrated aroundthe convoys, they would stand the greatest chanceboth of protecting the merchant ships and ofsinking U-boats. From this time onwards, theBattle became really purposeful.

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An important application of this principle was theformation of Escort Groups which, instead of beingmerely an administrative unit of the same class ofship, would comprise all types needed for aconvoy's escort and remain together for training andoperations. For some reason, the Brazilians werenot yet absorbed into this organisation and, inMarch, Macintyre left Hesperus to form the 5thEscort Group which he immediately led to glory inthe famous 'Three Aces' battle, our first majorvictory. Prien, Schepke and Kretschmer were allsunk which raised our morale as much as itdepressed that of the enemy.

Force 'H'Macintyre had exchanged ships with his Dartmouthterm-mate, A. A. 'Harry' Tait of HMS Walker, whohad not yet been promoted Commander but whowas none-the-less of a fighter and leader for that.Gay and apparently extrovert, one neverthelesssenses an underlying unrest: indeed he confessedto one of his officers that he knew he would bekilled. A genuine premonition of death is rare, formost of us are illogically convinced that, 'it can'thappen to me.' Tait was even more specific,predicting that he would go down with his ship afterramming a U-boat. If this remarkable presentimentaffected his will to fight, his reaction was certainlynot for the worse.

Fighters to MaltaHesperus was not yet allowed to engage in theAtlantic Battle but was sent to Gibraltar in thespring of 1941 to join Admiral Somerville's Force'H' of carriers and heavy ships. She was with himin an operation to fly Hurricanes to Malta fromcarriers and no doubt her A/S protection waswelcome; but since the threat was mainly from theair, she was really more of a liability-LieutenantDavid Seely, tongue in cheek, issued rifles to hisgun's crew as being more effective than theuncontrolled, low angle 4.7s-and Somervilleresolved never to take her on such an operationagain.

Sent HomeIn late May, Force 'H' hurried into the Atlantic tolook for the Bismarck but the destroyers could notkeep up in the heavy weather and were detached.Hesperus was sent home with a convoy and under-went a short refit at Liverpool whence she emerged,still with the 3in gun and without a DCT, but fittedwith voice radio, H/F D/F and the early radar withfixed aerial. Although this radar proved less percep-tive than the human eye on a dark night, theinnovation was a start; it remained only for a fewmonths and was then replaced by the far superiorrotating aerial set.In August she helped escort the Prime Minister inthe Prince of Wales for his Atlantic Charter meetingwith President Roosevelt, but here again theweather was too bad for the destroyers to maintainhigh speed and the battleship was judged to besafer on her own. On this occassion structuraldistortion had occurred which necessitated goingalongside a repair ship in Iceland to patch up,

Hesperus in late 1941 after repairing weather damage atImmingham and fitting RDF Warning Combined. She alsohas her DCT at last but will soon exchange it for RDFWarning Surface. Note: mainmast abaft the searchlightplatform to extend the AA gun's field of fire; four depth-charge throwers a side, the forward pair angled aft, givinga 14 -charge pattern; 'Charlie Noble'orgalleyfunnel (IWM)

before proceeding to Immingham for permanentrepair . Here at last she was given her DCT.

The U - Boat War at LastFrom November 1941 onwards Hesperus wasproperly employed in her destined role, starting witha convoy to Gibraltar and then a spell of A/S patrolin the Straits through which the enemy was sendingU-boats to interfere with our North Africanoperations. On the night of 14 December herhand-cranked radar made what must have beenone of the first detections of a surfaced U-boat.Lieutenant Duncan Knight, the First Lieutenant, wason watch and gave her a full 14-charge patternwhich it seemed could not miss; but she surviveddespite Hesperus's and her consort's night-longefforts.The question was asked, should she have rammed ?Perhaps Tait's mystical fascination for rammingstarted then for he evidently thought so andresolved to do it next time and make sure. Hischance came with a northbound convoy fromGibraltar.

Convoy HG 78 , January 1942Hesperus was not part of the close escort but, underthe orders of Captain R. M. J. Hutton in thedestroyer Laforey, was acting as striking force in thevicinity. On 14th the Admiralty signalled that aU-Boat had made a sighting report to the westwardso the unit took station on that side, patrolling firstto the south and then the north. Then, having drawna blank, Hutton cleverly decided to go south againin the hope that the U-Boat having heard himapparently retire would surface and follow up theconvoy.

RDF ContactAt 0110 on the 15th, a fine, calm, moonless night,Hesperus was stationed 12 miles on Laforey'sstarboard beam when an exactly similar contact wasreported bearing 205', 11 miles. To complete thecoincidence Knight was again on watch and,wasting not a second, rang down for 18kts andturned towards. Almost at once confirmation came

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from the asdic and at 0113 a distinct wake wassighted; fire was opened with 'B' gun butunfortunately full-flash cordite was used, althoughflashless was embarked, and this was blinding sofire was soon checked.

Welcome AboardAt 0120 the port 1 Oin signalling projector illuminateda U-boat steering away at her full speed of 17ktsand Tait, who had taken over, rammed instinctively.Because of the relative positions of the ships, theblow was glancing but the submarine neverthelessheeled violently away. Then, equally fiercely, shecatapulted back at which precise moment the top ofher conning tower and Hesperus's motor boat camein contact : the U-boat's Captain and First Lieutenantwere thrown, or flung, from one to the other.When the conning tower was abreast the stern, thedepth-charge team got away a five-charge patternset to 50ft in what must have been a scene of wildconfusion ; the charge of the starboard thrower flewright over the target and one from the trap landed onher casing. As the ship drew ahead, 'X' gun openedfire and when Tait had swung her to starboard, 'A'gun was able to join in ; both scored hits, two on theconning tower and one on the pressure hull, andat 0126, only 16mins after first contact, U93abandoned ship.

Distinguished Service OrderDavid Seely in the whaler made a determinedattempt to board, for the U-boat still seemed in goodshape but, pull as the men might, they could notreach her. He discovered later that her EngineerOfficer, a brave man but a thoroughly unpleasant,dedicated Nazi, had not only set the demolitioncharges and opened the seacocks, but left theengines running slowly astern. Forty prisoners weretaken and Hesperus retired to Gibraltar to lick herhonourable wounds. She was flooded from the bowto No 14 frame, the whole of her starboard side wasbuckled, including the bilge keel, and the tips of herstarboard propeller were bent over. After temporarypatching, she was sent home with a convoy forpermanent repair at Falmouth, but not before Taitand his company had been enthusiastically con-gratulated and he had been recommended for a DSO.This was the normal reward for a U-boat kill and fewwould deny that in this case it was truly earned.Knight received the DSC.

To Ram or not to Ram?Ramming, with which neither Tait nor Hesperuswere finished, became the subject of official andunofficial controversy never to be wholly satisfac-torily resolved. Clearly one could easily lose one'sown ship by over-riding a submarine at speed andtearing the bottom out; but perhaps this was a fairexchange? Was there a compromise whereby onereversed engines before impact or would that reducedamage to the enemy to something less than lethal,observing that a pressure hull is very strong, whereasa lightly built destroyer is not? Or would not the verymanoeuvrable U-boat wriggle out of trouble if one'sspeed was low? For the time being each Captainanswered these questions in his own way.

After ramming U93 and subsequently sinking her inJanuary 1942, Hesperus enters Gibraltar listing tostarboard in consequence of extensive damage. Note:RDF (rotating aerial) with which she detected the U-Boat;OCT,H/FD/F early type, 24m searchlight (/ WM)

Hesperus's Captain, Lt-Cdr A. A. 'Harry' Tait, is con-gratulated by Rear-Admiral Sytret and Captain William-Powlett. He will shortly be promoted and awarded theDSO (/WM)

UThe Captain of U93 leaves Hesperus as he joined her,dry shod (/WM )

Hesperus (not surprisingly sometimes known as Heinz) inApril 1942. She has gained the battle -winning equipments,warning surface RDF (in place of the DCT) and H/F D/Fimproved type. Oerlikons have appeared on the bridgewings but she still has her 31n AA gun and 5 machineguns (MOD)

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Escort Group B 2In March 1942, it was decided that the fiveremaining Brazilians were ideally suited as leadersof escort groups. Hesperus was allotted 'B' (forBritish) 2, and Commander A. F. St G. Orpenappointed in command. Tait, now a commander,unaccountably became Senior Officer of 'B'3, butsince his leader was the Harvester he remains withinthe orbit of this Profile.Hesperus was herself again in early April and thenewly formed Group took convoy after convoyacross the Atlantic without incident; it wasmonotonous, rugged work but every merchant shiparrived safely and that, after all, was what the Battlewas all about. In June, Orpen was promoted Captainand Macintyre, who was languishing ashore in theresponsible but unexciting post of British Rep-resentative at the US Naval Base in Newfoundland,begged and was allowed to rejoin his old love.His team now comprised the destroyers Vanessa andWhitehall, the corvettes Campanula, Clematis,Gentian, Heather, Mignonette, Sweetbriar, and, ofcourse, Hesperus. She was an even finer instrumentin the hands of her master for, on the back of thebridge in place of the only recently fitted DCT, hadappeared the battle-winning SW radar. Her closerange anti-aircraft capability had also been improvedby two 20mm Oerlikons: not inappropriately, forconvoys were occasionally subject to low-flyingattacks by long-range, bomber/reconnaissanceCondors.

'B-Bar'The Group continued on the North Atlantic run forthe rest of 1942 without a single U-boat approachingwithin torpedo range, but not for want of trying.Walker was nick-named 'B-Bar' for the frequencywith which he used the expression to report enemytransmissions. Macintyre would send a ship racingdown the bearing, to attack the U-boat if possibleor, at least, to force her to dive, after which theconvoy could evade.Only one indecisive action took place during thisperiod, but once there were at least four U-boatstrying to get at the convoy and all were given theslip. Macintyre used the time to train his ships to ahigh pitch of efficiency and, particularly in Hesperus,a relaxed gaiety was superimposed on the earnestprofessionalism of the war that was a strength initself.

CONVOY HX219 , DECEMBER 1942They sailed from Newfoundland laden withChristmas presents unobtainable in wartime Britain;in Hesperus, every man had a turkey and these werestowed in the fore peak, 'so as to be out of theway.''B-Bar-astern-10 to15 miles!' The convoy waspast Rockall and about to disperse, when Walkermade his report and Vanessa, closely followed byHesperus, raced at full speed down the bearing andsoon sighted the surfaced U-boat, seven milesdistant.

Periscope!She dived at once and there followed a period ofanxiety when the two ships had closed the position,reduced to asdic operating speed and lowered theirdomes. Were they searching in the right place andwould the enemy have a crack at them before theypin-pointed him?Macintyre was astonished to see a full six feet ofperiscope rise out of the sea 50 yards on Hesperus'sbeam and stare malevolently at Vanessa. Yelling forfull speed, Macintyre turned away, so as to swingthe stern as close as possible to the U-Boat, anddropped an urgent pattern of shallow charges. It wasaccurate enough to startle the enemy, save Vanessaand force the U-boat to evade at depth.'Echo Bearing ... !'Asdic contact was obtained and deliberate attackswere delivered but, disappointingly, to no avail.How deep was the target? There was no way oftelling. Was she too deep for the charges? WhileMacintyre pondered, both ships lost contact for adesperate half-hour, possibly misled by Pif/en-werfers; but it was at moments like these thatMacintyre revealed his mastery of the game inlooking at the situation as his opponent saw it andheading straight for the right place.'Stand by to Ram!''Contact !'More attacks but, as before, no apparent results.However, this was not really so and, as Macintyrewas still searching his mind for some more effectivetactic, Vanessa signalled, 'U-boat on surface amramming.'The destroyer struck a glancing blow; in the darknessthe U-boat twisted and turned at full speed insidethe turning circles of the two destroyers who hurledthemselves at her, time and time again. Gunnery

Hesperus in September 1942 as Leader of Escort Group B-Two. She still has eight throwers giving a 14-charge pattern

(MOD)

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Ship heldPrimer Safety Gear

f` P' ^^`_ lW 3

Pistol

Stowed Positionof Portable Davit forRemoving Carrier

Gordon Davies © Profile Publications Ltd

AfterBuoyancy Chamber

Mark VII Heavy Depth Charge

Light Charge

Parbuckling / Securing ArrangementsHoisting Gear 1

Depth Charge Storage Rack and Thrower

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1 Mark 7 Heavy Depth Charge. The light charge was thesame without the weight. Sinking rates loft/sec (light),16ftlsec (heavy). Maximum depths 500ft (light), 900ft(heavy). Lethal range 25-40ft (Gordon Davies)

2 The Mark 4 Depth Charge Thrower and Loading Rack.With this improved system, charges were lnaded andfired quicker and more safely as they did not have to behoisted on swaying davits in a seaway, nor did thecarriers have to be replaced each time, being suckedbackinto the mortar after imparting the necessary impetus.Small sized racks are shown for simplicity; Hesperus'swere twice this size (Gordon Davies)

3 The Mark 10 Depth Charge, as carried in one ofHesperus's torpedo tubes in 1943. Depth settings 200,600, 800ft. The buoyancy chamber slowed the sinkingrate to allow the ship to get well clear but in later marksthis was reduced to ensure that the charge would reacha deep submarine as quickly as possible. Malicharge-1 ton /Vfinol (Gordon Davies)

became too dangerous at such close quarters andit was Macintyre's skill at ship-handling that finallytold. He clawed Hesperus round, helmsman andengine-room crew sweating as they obeyed hisviolent, ever-changing orders. There was the enemywhere he wanted him: right ahead and beam on.U357 disappeared under the flare of the forecastlewith 'a deeply satisfying crunch' and sank at once,cut neatly in half. Hesperus came to a standstillwithout vital damage because Macintyre hadremembered in the excitement to stop enginesbefore impact.

CrippledThe damage was serious enough, however, and,after the repair team had patched and shored, shemanaged only 15kts back to the convoy, whichcongratulated her noisily on their sirens. Then toLiverpool and more honour but alas no turkeys:these had been very much in the way and thoroughlyand finally marinaded with sea water and dieseloil.Docking down revealed an ugly wound, the ship'sbottom having been ripped open for nearly aquarter of its length, the ship needing three monthsaway from the Battle to repair. Inevitably theramming argument was revived and then, whileHesperus was still in dock, Harry Tait tragicallypursued it to the bitter end.

'HARVESTER 'S' LAST FIGHT , MARCH 1943Not all ships were lucky enough to have a Walker,and a pack of U-boats had been able to closeHarvester's convoy and sink four ships beforemidnight on 10 March. Then she ran down a radarcontact, saw the U-boat dive, dropped a pattern,and turned. The submarine, blown to the surface,appeared right ahead and Tait rammed her fair andsquare, evidently at high speed; the U-boat rolledover, crashed aft under the destroyer and becamejammed between her propellers for ten incredibleminutes. An internal explosion finally threw herclear and she limped away on the surface, Harvesterbeing immobile; however, the Free French corvette,Aconit, bustled up at her slower speed and rammedthe submarine again, after which a final, shallowpattern put U444 out of what must have been hertruly desperate misery.

Hesperus entering Liverpool in the last days of 1942 witha crumpled bow, honourably won byramming andsinkingU357 (ly, M)

Hesperus is honoured by a visit from the Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches, Admiral Sir Max Horton,after sinking U357. He is accompanied by Captain'Johnny' Walker, Comm ander Donald Macintyre is behindthe Admiral; wearing glasses is Lieutenant Harold ' L- Ear'Walker RNVR (subsequently DSC); and Lieutenant theHon DavidSeely is at the otherendoftl e line (IV,M)

Harvester. Commander Tait DSO, in May 1942 as Leader(black top to fore funnal) of Escort Group 13-Three(pattern on after tunnel). She already has her hedgehogin place of 'A 'gun and t//e latent) ilium H/F DIE (MOD)

Destiny?Harvester's propellers and shafts were so badlybuckled that she could only crawl on one engine,nevertheless Tait sent Aconit back to the convoywhich was still under attack. During the nightHarvester picked up 50 survivors from merchantships but finally her remaining shaft fractured underthe strain and she stopped, alone and terrifyinglyvulnerable.At daybreak, Aconit returned to look for her and wasjust in time to see her hit by two torpedoes, break

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in half, catch fire and sink. Aconit pressed onundaunted and immediately made contact with thesubmarine which was blown to the surface by herfirst pattern. The gallant little Frenchman turned,hitting the U-boat with shell-fire as she did so,rammed yet again and dropped a shallow patternwhich finally sank her. She picked up 20 survivorsfrom U432 but very few from Harvester: Tait wasnot among them.Ramming was then officially discouraged, thoughstill not forbidden.

CONVOY ONS 4 APRI L 1943Hesperus returned as good as new to the battle atthe height of its crisis. Better indeed, since she nowhad a hedgehog instead of 'A' gun, a Mark X depthcharge, four Mark IV throwers with loading racks,greater depth-charge stowage in place of the 3ingun, foxer against the gnat, and two moreoerlikons.

Seventeen U-BoatsBy 23 April the westbound convoy had reachedmid-Atlantic where Doenitz had exploited our lackof shore-based air cover to achieve many of hisdevastating successes. This time however theadvantage was nullified by a major innovation, theEscort Carrier, and HMS Biter was operating insupport. Without knowing it, one of her Swordfishforced the first-sighting U-boat to dive and losecontact, but she had reported the convoy andDoenitz vectored a group of 17 U-boats to theattack. 0191 found herself in the convoy's trackin daylight and fired four torpedoes which, had theyfound their marks, would have displeased Macintyrevery much. As it was, she surfaced astern to raisethe alarm-right into Walker's eager ear.

'Action Hedgehog!'Away went Hesperus, with Clematis following, andalmost at once they sighted momentarily theU-boat on the horizon before she dived; Macintyredivined her evading course and asdic contact wasquickly obtained. Now to try out the hedgehog-conditions were good and it was an unaccustomedluxury to retain contact right until the order, 'Fire I'Alas, it must be recorded that Hesperus, like the restof us, was not perfect; a vital mistake was made inthe drill and nothing happened. Then the U-boatwent deep.This U-boat had to be killed or the shame would beintolerable. Clematis joined and attacked; thenHesperus ran in again, with both a pattern of 10 anda one-ton charge. Strange noises were heard, as theenemy was forced upwards and back to within thecompass of the hedgehog. This time there was nomistake; 24 bombs sailed precisely through the airto splash in a perfect ellipse and, after an agony ofsuspense to the watchers as the projectiles sank,two sharp and final explosions thudded through theship.

Sea/Air /Sea Co - operationWalker was soon able to report that no otherU-boats were in contact with the convoy whosesafety, after U191's prompt dispatch, had been

The gallant Free French corvette Aconit after ramming andsinking both U444 and U432 and doing her best to saveHarvester in March 1943 (IWM)

greatly enhanced. Two days later U203 was heardtransmitting and this time the information wassignalled to Biter, one of whose Swordfish quicklysighted the diving U-boat before homing HMSPathfinder (of Biter's screen) to the spot. Thesubmarine was sunk after as neat an example ofprofessional teamwork as could be desired.

CraftyU108, alone, was the last on the scene; in trying toclose, she was constantly prevented by the escortsand, equally frustratingly, could not obtain anacknowledgement from any German station for herH/F reports. In fact, the only operator to hear herwas Walker and, as she continued to transmit, it wasclear that she did not relate her harassment to herbreaking of radio silence. But she never could bebrought to action, so Walker sought Macintyre'sapproval to 'pull the teutonic leg.' Knowing Germanwireless procedure intimately, he answered theU-boat and accepted her message for onwardtransmission to Headquarters. She then ceasedsignalling, no wolf pack materialised and theconvoy sailed on to Halifax in uninterrupted peace.

CONVOY SC 129 , MAY 1943-THE CLIMAXOF THE BATTLE

Massed U-BoatsMacintyre records a gay interlude in Newfoundlandwhere officers and men relaxed, played schoolboypranks and were serenely content with each otherand their ship. On 5 May, the Group sailed for homeand into a battlefield, for it was known that U-boatswere at sea in unprecedented numbers and that thetime to defeat them utterly was at hand. Confidencewas high and only perhaps in the most secretrecesses of War Headquarters was it fully understoodthat our ability to continue at war depended uponsuccess being achieved.

Two Merchant Ships LostDoenitz too knew that it was now or never. HisIntelligence had warned him of SC 129's approachand he disposed Group 'Elbe' of eighteen U-boatsto meet it.* On 11 May the convoy passed through

*Warship Profile No. 8: 0107, page 189

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the line and 0402, directly on track, torpedoed twoships in broad daylight and broke Hesperus's proudrecord of escorting all her charges safely for the firstand only time.The most thorough search was made withoutresult and then of course the convoy was reported.Walker heard more and more U-boats transmittingfrom astern and Macintyre, vengeance in his heart,stationed Hesperus in that quarter for the nightbattle to come. No one slept.

SW Radar into ActionIt started with a very small contact five miles on thequarter and Hesperus was quick off the mark asusual ; Macintyre himself sighted the white line ofthe U-boat's wake through Kretschmer's capturedbinoculars. The water was phosphorescent and theswirl left by the diving submarine was clearly visible,enabling the first, shallow pattern to be dropped byeye on the precise spot.U223 reeled to the shock with lights out, crew flungto the deck, broken glass everywhere, waterspurting in through a dozen distorted glands anddiving out of control. Levelling off at 1 80m, she wasmet by the next shattering pattern of 10, followed byanother with a one-ton charge added.Macintyre had judged the depth to perfection for theresult was cataclysmic : nothing in the boat seemedundamaged-even the handwheels came off controlvalves and sea water rushed into a darkness madethe more terrible by flames leaping from the starboardmotor. At 220m, somehow, they held her andOberleutnant zur See Wachter took the onlydecision still open to him : to surface if he could.

U223 Fights BackShe came up and lay still, so close ahead ofHesperus that the 4.7s would not bear, but theoerlikons swept her casing and prevented her ownguns being manned. Then her diesels started andshe moved ahead, increasing the range so that, bythe light of the signal projectors, Hesperus's gunsscored several hits. Surely she was beaten? But,incredibly, she had not yet begun to fight back.Driven off the bridge by the gunfire, Wachter fireda torpedo and subsequently three more, even tryingto ram, until the U-boat was stopped at last.The submarine lay sullen and still dangerous,Macintyre surveying her with respect. What shouldhe do? Ramming and consequent damage was outof the question, because the convoy was undermassive attack and needed every escort. Gently henudged his bow into her flank and pushed: sherolled on to her beam ends and only sluggishlyrighted herself, lower in the water. The end musthave been near and, anxious to hasten it, Macintyreran out to gun range, only to be narrowly missed byyet another torpedo. This surely was the last fling,for then the crew came on deck and some jumpedoverthe side. Macintyre was satisfied and, concernedfor the convoy, left at high speed to rejoin.

Never say Die!But U223 was still not finished. Reprieved at thelast moment, the indomitable but astonishedWachter rallied his men and, toiling with disciplined

AHesperus's presumed score at the end ofMay 1943-U93,U357, U191, U223, U186. U223 was not, in fact, sunkbut Hesperus did complete her five with U242 in 7945

(/WM)

frenzy, they saved her. In twelve hours she wassecurely afloat, able to move and to dive to shallowdepths; in twelve days she limped into St Nazaireand received a richly deserved commendation fromAdmiral Doenitz for her gallant fortitude.

Daylight ActionIt was certainly time for Hesperus to be back withthe convoy. At daylight on the 12th, H/F D/Freports showed that at least twelve U-boats were intouch, mostly abaft the beam, and striving to gainbearing for the next night's attack. Suddenly,however, one boat transmitted from close ahead,most ill-advisedly, because Walker was on to her atonce. Such was his accuracy that, as soon asHesperus slowed to asdic speed, there was theecho, confirmed seconds later by a sight of theperiscope: U186's Captain was not in the sameclass as Wachter and retribution for his inexperiencewas swift and awful.

Fourth KillAs before, the first urgent attack was by eye, andequally effective. By the time Hesperus had turned,the U-boat was already deep but that did notprevent the next, deliberate, pattern being veryaccurate. Escaping air and other unusual noiseswere heard and, after a third and final attack, thepressure hull crushed with an explosion that wasfelt throughout the ship; indisputable evidence ofHesperus's fourth kill then came welling to thesurface.

U-Boats EverywhereAll that day the U-boats surrounded the convoy: nofewer than eight were sighted on the surface by theescorts and pinned down, several being severelydamaged, though that fact could not be known at thetime. At nightfall, Macintyre drastically altered theconvoy's course in a bid to evade at least some ofthe enemy: everyone waited, alert in spite of nearexhaustion, for what should have been from pastexperience a massive assault.

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nor did a couple of convoys to Gibraltar provoke anynoteworthy opposition.Then, in the summer, the Allies, secure in their hardwon command of the sea and air, deployed theirenormous military strength across the Channel andour coastal waters had to be kept clear of U-boatsat all costs.

Commander Donald G. F. W. Macintyre DSO** DSC,Senior Officer Escort Group B-Two and CommandingOfficerHMS Hesperus on his bridge to May 1943 (/WM)

Anti-climaxNothing happened for hour after hour; thenWhitehall obtained a radar contact and rushed off,as did Heather on the other side of the convoy, butnothing came of either; were they phantoms, orU-boats whose fire had left them ? Finally Hesperushad her chance against a certain enemy, probablyU107*, whose contact was soon transferred fromradar to asdic and subjected to the usual treatment.The first shallow attack sent her deep, so deep thatonly heavy charges could have reached her, but noneof these were left, constant action and high swellhaving made it impracticable to replenish from themerchant ship carrying stocks. Macintyre turnedover the contact to Clematis who made two attacksand then lost it, most understandably, being allalone as she was.

VictoryMacintyre would have stayed had he known thatthe attack was to be the last engagement. The 'Elbe'Group had been beaten by B2 Group's aggressivedash and knew it; the convoy steamed serenely intothe dawn and once again Hesperus had both typifiedand contributed to the outcome of the Atlantic Battle.Doenitz himself quoted SC129 as one of the fivemajor convoy defeats which forced his decision towithdraw the U-boats from the North Atlantic on24 May.

EUROPE INVADED-NARROW WATERSHesperus and her Group took convoy after convoysafely across the ocean during summer, autumn andwinter. In March 1944 Macintyre left, sadly but withthree DSOs, to command another Group andCommander G. V. Legassick DSC, RNVR took over.The same drearily triumphant progress continued,

* See Profile No. 8, page 189.

Wreck ProblemsDoenitz had prepared his boats to operate in narrowwaters by fitting them with Schnorkel, a breathingtube which allowed the diesels to be run submergedand obviated the need ever to surface. The U-Boatssoon learnt that the best evasive tactic was to lie onthe bottom indistinguishable, except to a highlyexperienced A/S team, from the thousands ofwrecks which litter our shores. They knew betterthan to transmit unnecessarily and all had gnats.A great force of A/S aircraft and ships, includingHesperus, was allotted to the task of destroyingthe U-boats but it was still a painstaking, wearisomebusiness which demanded constant alertness andallowed little sleep: every probable wreck had to beminutely investigated in the constant awarenessthat it might suddenly eject a deadly gnat. Manynew techniques were evolved, including the use ofthe echo-sounder to draw a rough outline of thebottomed object; and a close watch was even keptfor conger eels surfacing after an attack, for thesemade their homes in the crannies of wrecks thoughnot, naturally, in submarines.

Not enough U-BoatsIn the autumn, Hesperus was transferred to the19th Escort Group and carried out endless butuneventful patrols which were tactically dull butstrategically successful for our armies were un-molested. In January 1945, she joined the 14th-alldestroyer-Group as leader, under CommanderR. A. Currie DSC, RN. Several times she rushed toassist other Groups in contact with U-boats but shenever got a look in; with so many ships in such asmall area, each had figuratively to queue for theprivilege of closing the enemy.

Captain F. J. Walker CB DSO***, the greatest U-Boatkiller of all, who died of overstrain in July 1944 and wasburied at sea from Hesperus. The then CO CommanderG. V. Legassick DSC RNR, is saluting to the left of thecoffin (IWM)

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Hesperus in September 1944 as a fullyspecialisedAnti-Submarine Destroyer; with two 4 7in, fourOerlikons, Hedgehog,four throwers, two traps, Radars, warning surface and warning combined; H/F D/F, four torpedo tubes carrying oneMark X depth charge and three torpedoes, large upper deck depth charge stowage (MOD)

Hesperus in September 1944. The HIFDIFinastis tall, straight and uncluttered to keep the aerial clear of hull currents(MOD)

Hesperus in September 1944. Note thrower loading racks(MOD)

'HESPERUS ' S' LAST U-BOATCo-operation with the RAFCurrie, with Havelock and Hotspur* sailed fromthe Clyde during the morning of 30 April 1945 andimmediately intercepted a U-boat report fromCoastal Command Sunderland H/201. The aircrafthad sighted a possible schnorkel and attacked, butthe depth-charges had undershot and the surfacewas then obscured by an unseasonal snow squall.The first position received was on Mount Snowdonbut the error was soon sorted out and the shipshastened to the right spot, northwest of Anglesea,where they reduced to 13kts with unifoxersstreamed.

Wreck?Currie decided to search a small 12 mile square onthe assumption that the U-boat (if the contact wasone and he was far from convinced) had bottomed.He was right, but wreck after misleading wreck hadto be probed before a submarine-sized echo was

* British 'H' Class

193

Hesperus at the end of the war as Leader of the 14th Escort Group

U-Boats at Lisahally, Co Londonderry. Hesperus broughtin the first eight to surrender ceremonially to theCommander-in-Chief on 14 May 1945 (IWM)

(/WM)

returned, slightly more promising than the rest. Twohedgehog attacks were delivered, probably veryaccurately, since the target was stopped and itsexact depth known. There was no evidence of a hitbecause all the bombs exploded either on thebottom or on the target: a hit from one, thoughpowerful enough to sink a submarine, might wellnot open her up enough to allow anything toescape.

U 242No eels appeared, however, and then an echo-sounder run produced an outline very like asubmarine which encouraged the still scepticalthough persistent Currie. Hesperus and Havelockmade six more hedgehog attacks, followed by twowith depth charges whose heavier explosions atlast had the desired effect: air bubbles, oil andwreckage spouted to the surface and a Germanfood tin marked with the date of filling, July 1944,was conclusive.

ENVOIOn 4 May, Doenitz ordered the U-boats to ceasehostilities. The symbolic end of the Battle of theAtlantic came on 14th when eight were escorted upthe River Foyle by a large group of allied warships,led proudly and fittingly by Hesperus, to make theirsurrender to the Commander-in-Chief in person.

Back to NorwayHer last operational task was to escort the exiledNorwegian Government home to Oslo, where shewas given a triumphant reception. Hungry boysswarmed over the ship devouring the sailors'rations; and in the wardroom an old English ladydrank her first tea for five years, from 1430 until 1830without intermission. Was this anti-climax or did itsymbolise what the war, and Hesperus's part in it,was largely about: freedom and tea ?

Ready, Aye, Ready?A front-line warrior all her short life, Hesperus wasspared the indignity of a lingering old age and shewas sold for scrapping in December 1945; herensign may still be seen in Yeovil Parish Church.She did us proud, and was certainly an excellent

194

example of our national gift for improvisation; butshe also typified our near-fatal unawareness of thevital importance of merchant shipping in war.Why did we not have escorts designed for thetask? And now, in 1972, do we have the proper,up-to-date weapons systems for it, and in sufficientnumbers, against a threat on a scale the Germansnever approached?We have not.When will we ever learn ?

Above: U-boats surrendered in Lisahally

Below: Surrendered U-boat crews, drying out

195

THE 'H ' CLASS ( EX-BRAZILIAN ) ESCORT DESTROYERS

War Complement: 7 officers. 145 men Engines: 2-shaft geared turbinesDimensions: 323(oa) 3312'z(dl)ft S.H.P.: 34,000=31'1 knots (dl)Displacement: 1 350(st), 1 860(dl) tons Fuel. 439 tons =5000/1200 miles at 14/30 knotsBoilers: 3-three drum, water tube, with superheaters

1940 1945

Guns: 3-4 7in, 45ca1 semi-automatic, low angle2-quad 0 5in M/Gs, anti-aircraft

2-4 7in with 2-2in illuminating rocket launchers on 'B' gunshield4-20mm Oerlikon AA

Torpedo Tubes: 2-quad 21 in 1-quad 21 in

A/S Weapons: 8-Depth charge Throwers3-Depth charge traps

4-Throwers, 2-Traps, 1 - Mk X(1 ton) depth charge.HedgehogIncreased depth-charge stowage

Asdic. Yes Yes, improved type

Radar: None Warning SurfaceWarning Combined

H/FD/F. Early type Improved type

M/FD/F: Yes Yes

Radio: W/T only, up to H/F W/T and Voice, up to VH/F

Searchlights: 1-24in 2-20in Signalling Projectors

THE SHIPS

ame uilder

Leaderof EscortGroup,1942 /3 -Boat Score ate

Harvester (ex-Handy, ex-Jurua) Vickers B-Three 2-sunk, 2-damaged Sunk by U43211 13143

Havant (ex-Javary) White Sunk by bombing and own forces off Dunkirk 1 /6/40

Havelock(ex-Jutahy) White B-Five 2-sunk, 5-damaged Scrapped 1946

Hesperus (ex-Hearty, ex-Juruena) Thornycroft B-Two 5-sunk, 2-damaged Scrapped 1946

Highlander (ex-Jaguaribe) Thornycroft B-Four 1 -sunk, 1 -damaged Scrapped 1946

Hurricane (ex-Japarua) Vickers B-One 1 -damaged Sunk by 0305 Christmas Eve 1943

BibliographyU-Boat Killer (Weidenfeld & Nicholson) DonaldMacintyreThe Battle of the Atlantic (Batsford) Donald MacintyreThe War at Sea (HMSO) S. W. RoskillAdmiral Doenitz Memoirs (Weidenfeld & Nicholson)Admiral DoenitzJanes Fighting Ships (Sampson Low, Marston)Warships of World War II (Ian Allan) Lenton & ColledgeThe British Destroyer (Putnam) T. D. ManningBritish Destroyers (Seeley, Service) Edgar J. MarchChronik des Seekrieges Dr Jurgen Rohwer

Warship Series Editor: John Wingate, DSC

AcknowledgementsWhile picking peoples' brains in order to put this shorthistory together, I have stumbled on the previouslyunsuspected truth that those whose interest is in shipsare invariably charming. I am immensely grateful to:Captain Donald Macintyre DSO"`, DSC, Rear AdmiralR. A. Currie, CB, DSC", Lord Mottistone (FormerlyLt. David Seely) Anthony Preston Esq. (NationalMaritime Museum) Martin Brice Esq. (Imperial WarMuseum) J. D. Lawson Esq. (Naval Historical Section)DrJurgen Rohwer (Director, BibliothekfurZeitgeschichte,Stuttgart) Alan Raven Esq. Miss M. E. Jell (Ship Dept.MOD) Captain Stuart Farquharson-Roberts OBE andLt-Cdr Jack Calam (HMS Vernon) Captain DouglasPoynter (Director of Naval Signals) Mrs M. Esson(Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment) JohnWingate Esq. DSC. Gordon Davies Esq. The Naval andMOD Libraries Commodore Duncan Knight, DSC

196

Warship""` seriesThe most ambitious series so far conceived and produced by Profile Publications Limited. This new inter-national series will span the era of the modern fighting ship from the launching of the Dreadnought in 1906up to the present day ship -a complex of floating electronics, weaponry and technology. Profile have createda team of international experts in naval history backed by a first rate group of researchers and consultants.This new series will continue to reflect the high standard of the Profile series already published. Present-ation will follow the format which has proved so popular with the other series with first rate text,supported by many superb black and white illustrations and, of course, the famous Profile colour centrespread which will show complete side and plan views of each warship and, where applicable, additionalinformation such as ships' badges, camouflage schemes, cross sections and details of ships' fittings.

Titles already published 10. HMS Illustrious1. HMS Dreadnought 11. HMS Illustrious2. HMS Cossack 12. IJN Kongo3. USS Hornet (CV 8) 13 . HMS Exeter4. Kriegsmarine Admiral Graf Spee 14. SMS Seyd/itz5. HMS Campbeltown (USS Buchanan) 15. USS Enterprise (CYAN 65)6. Kriegsmarine Prinz Eugen 16. HM Submarine Upholder7. HM Motor Torpedo Boat! Vosper 70ft. 17. R It. N Zara8. Kriegsmarine U-107 18. KM Bismarck9. USS Charles Ausburne (DD-570) 19. HMS Hood

Next 12 titles are20. HMS Hesperus 23. HMS Furious

The ex-Brazilian `H'-class destroyer who, as

leader of Commander Donald Macintvre's Escort

Croup, sunk no fewer than five U-Boats during the

Battle of the Atlantic. Macintyre in Hesperus

brilliantly fought one of the five critical convoy

actions against massive opposition that forced

Admiral Doenitz to admit defeat and withdraw his

U-Boats from the Atlantic. By Captain Peter

Dickens, DSO, MBE, DSC, RN.

21. USS Tennessee (BB 43)This famous battleship was built during the super-Dreadnought era of World War I and served in theUSN until placed in reserve after World War II.Receiving only minor damage during the Japaneseattack at Pearl Harbour, Tennessee was expensivelyrebuilt in 1942 and rejoined the Pacific Fleet forits attack on Japan. Ironically, it was Tennessee andher `old contemporaries', salvaged off the bottomof Pearl Harbour, who were destined to fight thelast battleship-to-battleship engagement in history,vice the big, new super battleships: by CommanderW. H. Cracknell, USN.

22. IJN YukikazeThe pre-war destroyer, completed in 1940 andarmed with six 5in. guns and two quadrupletorpedo mountings, who, bearing a charmed life,served with such distinction in many battles of thePacific war: by Commander M. Chihaya, I.J.N.(Retired).

Aircraft Carrier, 1917-1945. The history of thisship, whose long career spanned two world warsand was closely linked with much of the develop-ment of naval flying, will appear as two Profiles.The first, which covers her first eight years, ismainly concerned with the drastic constructionalsteps by which the first genuine aircraft carrier wasevolved: by Commander C. A. Jenkins, O.n.E.,R.N. (Retired), who was her Navigating Officerfrom 1937 to 1941.

24. HMS FuriousAircraft Carrier, 1917-1945. The second instal-ment follows the rest of her unusually varied careerin peace and war, including operations in Nor-wegian and Mediterranean waters and thesuccessful attack on the Tirpitz: also by Com-mander C. A. Jenkins.

25. SMS Emden26. FF. S/M Rubis27. SMS Torpedoboat B. 11028. USS Indianapolis (CA 33)29. HMS Belfast (Published and available)30. /JN Yamato31. E Boats

Available from your local book or model shop at 50p or if in difficulty direct from the mail order department of the publishers

Profile Publications Ltd, Coburg House , Sheet Street , Windsor , Berks . SL41 EBAlso published by Profile Publications Limited are the world-renowned Aircraft, Loco, AFV and Car Series.

Warships in Profile 1

VOLUME 1 WARSHIPS IN PROFILEGeneralEditor: John Wingate DSC

Exciting launch to impressive series devoted to the famous and infamous surface and underseavessels of the world's navies. Superbly detailed plan and side views; full-colour two-pageplates by Profile artists. Vol. 1 : 12 titles, approximately 7000 words each, with 420 photos plusarchitectural drawingsWarships included are: HMS Dreadnought; HMS Cossack; USS Hornet (CV8); K.M. GrafSpee; HMS •Campbeltown; Kreigsmarine Prinz Eugen; HM Motor Torpedo Boats;Kriegsmarine U-107; USS Charles Ausburne; HMS Illustrious: Parts 1 and 2; IJN Kongo.

304pp. Index. Glindura covers. Size 10in x72in.Price ( UK) £7.50 SBN 85383 060 6

Profiles are remarkable value for money , and are usually available from bookshops and model shops

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Profile Publications Ltd, Coburg House , Sheet Street , Windsor, Berks . SL41 EBWarship Profile and its contents are copyright © Profile Publications Limited, Coburg House, Sheet Street, Windsor, Berkshire, EnglandPrinted in England by Chichester Press Limited, Chichester, Sussex June 1972