ABSTRACT What the warfighter needs is not what he is getting in terms of responsiveness to the emerging threat, interoperability among systems, and systems readiness and training. This disconnect between Fleet opera- tions and the acquisition requirements process is becoming more pronounced as systems grow larger and more com- plex and as warfighting becomes more joint. Knowing what the warfighter wants and how he envisions using it in a concept of operations is fundamental to the requirements process. The source of this information is the commander in chief‘s (CINC’s) operations plan (OPLAN), which contains the concept of operations (CONOPS) for each warfighting theater. It is critical that the CONOPS be used as the basis for deter- mining performance requirements, because it contains the military judg- ment, context, and authority of the the- ater CINC. The defunct Arsenal Ship program, which was rightly vetoed by the theater CINCs because it would not meet their warfighting needs at accept- able risk, is a recent example of the mis- match between what is being asked for and what is being provided.

Warfighter Needs in the 21st Century: Linking =leet Operations to lequired Capabilities

lntroduct ion h e warfighter is not getting what he needs to perform his mission because of a disconnection between what the warfighting CINCs are requesting and what the acquisition community is providing. This has become more pronounced as systems grow more com- plex and as warfighting becomes more joint. The defunct Arsenal

Ship program, which was rightly vetoed by the theater CINCs because it would not meet their warfighting needs at acceptable risk, is a recent example of the mismatch between what is being asked for and what is being provided. The primary cause, Goldwater Nichols notwithstanding, is that the warfighter’s input is not being used in the system’s development process. This is because the systems requirements process has become so torturous and arcane that the warfighter is unable to exercise proper oversight. Processes, such as func- tional analysis, system requirements engineering (SRE), and design refer- ence missions (DRM), which purport to analyze the operational requirements and translate them into system performance specifications, often, in fact, build an impenetrable wall of paper that is neither understandable to the warfighter nor traceable to the operational requirements document (ORD). This obfus- cation disconnects the mission need from the performance specification, thereby thwarting the warfighter in his critical oversight role. This is the sin- gle greatest contributor to systems failing to meet operational needs.

The key to translating mission needs into system capabilities is in knowing what the warfighter needs to do and how he envisions doing it. That is the starting point in determining performance-based requirements. The source of this information is the CINC’s OPLAN, which contains the concept of oper- ations (CONOPS) for each warfighting theater. The CONOPS provides an overall picture of the operation. It is a broad outline of the commander’s assumptions and intent in regard to an operation or a series of operations. It is critical that the CONOPS be used as the basis for determining system perfor- mance requirements because it contains the military judgment, context and authority of the theater CINC.

This paper will describe the current requirements generation system, which is doctrinally sound and urge that it be followed in order that warfighters main- tain their vital role in the requirements generation process.

Problem There is a widely held view that the theater CINCs are so consumed with today’s problems that they don’t have time to think about tomorrow’s needs. Also, there is not a clear understanding of the primacy of the warfighting CINC in determining mission needs. Finally, there is a general lack of knowledge

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about the CINC’s requirements generation process. These factors have led to the following misperceptions about the requirements generation process: (1) the warfighter does not have a coherent, rigorous process for defining mission needs, (2) the warfighter’s needs as expressed in the CINCs Integrated Priority List (IPL) are too general and lack prioritization, and (3) the warfighter doesn’t really know what he needs. These mispercep- tions impede communications between the warfighting CINCs and the acquisition community. They also intro- duce, confusion, ignorance, and doubt about what the CINC plans to do, how he intends to do it, and ultimately what his needs are. The inability to communicate effec- tively is the bane of all organizations-in a bureaucracy it’s endemic. In the case of CINC needs, poor communi- cations result in products delivered late, over cost, tech- nological obsolescent, and most importantly, unable to satisfy the mission need.

The acquisition community claims to be moving to implement performancebased requirements, yet by not employing the CINC’s CONOPS, they fail to relate sys- tem performance to warfighting plans and concepts. This is particularly true the further one gets from the ORD, which is the “contract” between the warfighter and the acquisition community. The acquisition community has become hopelessly entangled in a lexicon of functional analysis that is neither traceable to CINC needs nor understandable to the warfighter. In the absence of good communications, a thriving business has grown up in scenario development, design reference missions, and functional analysis. The resulting documents purport to analyze the warfighter’s needs; however, they are frequently developed in the absence of authoritative sources-namely the CINC’s OPLAN and time phased force and deployment dataVPFDD). This gives rise to the warfighter’s lament: “Just give me what I asked for, when I need it, in sufficient quantity to do the job.”

Requirements Generation System Here the news is good! The requirements generation system, on paper, is current, coherent, and doctrinally sound. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruc- tion 3170.01A dated 10 August 1999 is a well written description of how the three DoD decision support sys- tems-(1) the requirements generation system; (2) the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS); and (3) the acquisition management system-work inter- actively to meet the mission needs of the warfighter. The joint instruction establishes the primacy of the warfighter to define mission needs in broad operational terms and sets up the Joint Requirements Oversight Council UROC) to prioritize joint requirements and acquisition programs to meet the national military strat- egy. It provides a comprehensive, logical, and authorita- tive process for generating mission needs statements

(MNS), capstone requirements documents (CRD), and operational requirements documents (ORD). For an ORD, the joint instruction states that system perfor- mance should: w Describe mission scenarios (wartime and peacetime, if

different) in terms of mission profiles, employment tactics, countermeasures, and environmental condi- tions.

w Identify system performance parameters such as range, accuracy, payload, speed, mission reliability, interoperability, etc. Recommend which parameter shall be considered a Key Performance Parameter. These parameters should be used with little or no

change to analyze system performance.

Thesis Simply stated, communication with the Fleet should be in the context and terminology of the CINC planning process. Specifically, the new joint instruction for gener- ating system requirements should be followed. This means using the mission profiles, employment tactics, countermeasures, and environmental conditions delin- eated in the system ORD to analyze system performance. The key performance parameters (KPP) and information exchange requirements (IER) contained in the ORD should be the bases for the analysis. The CINC‘s OPIAN and the TPFDD should be used explicitly. These docu- ments tell us what the warfighter intends to do and how he envisions doing it at the operational level of warfare. This is the methodology directed in the CJCS instruction, it the one being used by the theater CINCs to identify their warfighting needs, and it should be the way the acquisition community analyzes system performance. Following the joint instruction will synchronize system performance with the operational requirements through the use of CINC-generated mission profiles and ORD- specified KPP/IER

Global Change By now everyone has recognized the changed geopoliti- cal landscape. The Soviet global threat has imploded- replaced by regional threats, principally North Korea, Iraq, and Serbia. These rogue states have isolated them- selves politically by their xenophobic policies, and mili- tarily their aggressive actions have confined them to their own borders held in check by US. and allied forces. These changes have greatly influenced the U.S. national military strategy, which calls for “full spectrum domi- nance” by joint forces in the warfighting theaters Uoint Vision 2010 1995). The military implications of this strat- egy (listed below) are important to consider because they have a profound effect on what military products we will need to acquire in the future.

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‘We do not anticipate the emergence of a “peer com- petitor “ in the next decade, but the world will still be a very dangerous place.” (Shelton 1998) “State and non-state actors that do not share our values or interests will have the ability to confront us in a vari- ety of ways, from sophisticated conventional weapon systems, such as next-generation ballistic missiles and advanced conventional submarines, to asymmetric threats such as weapons of mass destruction and com- puter network attacks.” (Shelton 1998) “The nature of warfare in modern times is synony- mous with joint warfare.” Ooint Vision 2010 1995) Low intensity conflict (LIC) involving terrorism, insur- gency/counterinsurgency, and transitional crime (piracy, drugs, immigrants, weapons, endangered species, fishing enforcement) will be the more likely methods of conflict undertaken by aggressor nations non-state entities. Near-zero friendly casualties will be required by U.S. public opinion in military operations other than war (MOOTW). U.S. casualties in higher level conflicts will be tolerated only if the public perceives vital U.S. interests are at stake. Maneuver warfare, which applies speed, boldness, surprise, and initiative aimed at enemy centers of grav- ity to exploit weaknesses, characterizes the American Way of War. The U.S. and its global strategic partners are capable of surrounding, isolating, and dominating the regional theaters, if necessary. The warfighting theaters, namely the Arabian Gulf, the Korean theater of operations, and the Central/ Eastern Mediterranean, are joint commands with well- established, mature C4ISR infrastructures. The U.S. carrier battle group (CVBG), which includes the complementary amphibious ready group (ARG), has the capability to dominate the maritime battle space with a combination of active/passive sensors, precision engagement weapons, and networked C4ISR command and control systems. Stealth technology is less concerned with making ships invisible to detection than in making them diffi- cult to target and attack. These factors illustrate the nature of change from

global superpower confrontation with the potential involvement of thermonuclear weapons to regional war- fare dominated by non-nuclear, coalition forces. For naval forces this means a change in requirements from generic open-ocean, all-environments scenarios to theater-spe- cific littoral scenarios involving joint and combined forces. It also suggests a much different approach to requirements generations. The implications of these changes are summarized as follows: rn Because of the defined and contained nature of the

warfighting theaters, operational requirements can be much more specific (less generic) regarding the-

ater geography, enemy order of battle, threat charac- teristics, C4ISR infrastructure, logistics support, envi- ronmental conditions, etc. CINC OPLANs and TPFDDs can be analyzed explic- itly and in more detail with respect to the commander’s intent, alternative courses of action (COA), and CONOPS.

rn System concepts can be simulated, developed, tested and exercised in the projected operational environ- ment (POE) of the specific warfighting theater and in the context of the CINC’s CONOPS. Prototype capabilities can be left in-theater for further testing and evaluation, as well as contingency employ- ment on a limited scale.

rn Theater logistics support can be addressed through a combination of theater-specific military and commer- cial resources, including theater seaports, airports, shipyards, etc. Training to theater-specific Navy mission essential task lists (NMETL) is feasible.

Requirements Process The question becomes “How do we incorporate the CINC’s warfighting plans into the requirements process?” To answer that question we must first under- stand the requirements generation system and how it relates to the operational planning process.

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between planning documents (middle column) and requirement’s docu- ments (right column). The left column represents the command responsible for the planning document and for exercising oversight of the requirements document. The arrows and hierarchical structure illustrates the close flow-down relationship between the joint operational plans and the system requirements documents. The acronyms are defined in the text that follows.

The OPLAN contains the theater CINC’s operational plans and CONOPS for accomplishing joint missions at the operational level of force employment. The TPFDD contains the time-phased force deterrent options/force enhancements (FDO/FE) for specific theater contingen- cies. The TPFDD controls the flow of forces and logistics to theater. These plans contain critical operational assumptions, geographical and environmental condi- tions, and force structure levels, which shape and define operational requirements. Recall that “An operational requirement is a system capability or characteristic required to accomplish approved mission needs” (CJCSI 3170.01A 1999). Thus, the mission-to-requirement rela- tionship is the fundamental reason for using the OPLAN and the TPFDD explicitly to analyze system require- ments and capabilities.

Analysis of the OPLAN, which is regularly done as part of the commander’s estimate, may result in mater- ial shortfalls that can only be addressed by issuing a mi+

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F I G U R E 1 . Operations-Based Requirements Flow-Down

sion needs statement for new capabilities. The mission needs statement (MNS) is a non-system-specific state- ment of operational capability identifying the potential need for a new concept/system. MNS may be generated from any source-typically a mission area analysis (MAA), a mission need analysis (MNA), or the CINC’s OPLAN.

The MNS generation process consists of four phases-definition, documentation, validation, and approval. During the approval phase, the Joint Require- ments Oversight Council UROC) determines whether a capstone requirements document is appropriate to cap ture overarching requirements for a mission area that forms a family-of-systems (FoS) (e.g., space control, t he ater missile defense) or system-of-systems (SoS) (e.g., national missile defense). A CRD identifies the opera- tional concepts, overarching capabilities, and the scope and requirements of the individual systems envisioned in the FoS/SoS. “A capstone requirements document (CRD) is inherently developed for a joint mission area; therefore, requirements for a CRD must reflect the needs of the joint force commander.” (CJCSI 3170.0lA 1999).

Joint operation planning in pursuit of national objec- tives is conducted within the chain of command that runs from the national command authority (NCA) to the com- batant commanders. Joint operation planning is a sequen- tial process performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Joint operation planning is categorized as deliberate planning, campaign planning, or crises action planning. It includes the preparation of OPLANs, campaign plans, and operation orders by joint force commanders. The system is designed to provide interoperability through a uniform set of policies, proce- dures, and reporting structures called the joint opera- tion planning and execution system (TOPES).

The joint strategic capabilities plan USCP), which flows from JOPES, provides the strategic direction from

the JCS Chairman to coordinate the planning efforts of the combatant commanders. The JSCP provides the strategic direction.for the deliberate planning efforts. Deliberate planning usually begins with an OPLAN, which during crisis action planning is used to develop a campaign plan and an operation order (OPORD). The employment planning phase of the OPLAN defines how existing and projected capabilities will be used to obtain theater warfighting objectives. The OPLAN is also used in the CINC assessments process to assess capabilities, determine risks, and identify needs.

Capability shortfalls are identified in exercises, tech- nology demonstrations, experimentation, assessments, and lessons learned from actual deployments. Capability shortfalls are contained in the CINC’s integrated prior- ity list (IPL), which is submitted annually by each CINC to identify and prioritize warfighting needs in their respective theaters. The OPLAN and TPFDD are used in developing the IPL. Recent guidance from the chairman requires that the IPL identify specific programs of con- cern by service.

The CINC’s IPL is the basis for the component com- manders’ issue papers (CCIP), which are service-specific shortfalls submitted to OPNAV by the Fleet CINCs. The CCIP is the result of a formal Fleet CINC assessment process, which responds directly to the IPL with infor- mation taken from the President’s budget submission. Concurrently the IPL is used by Pentagon resource spon- sors to shape the OPNAV sponsor’s program proposal (SPP). These processes close the loop back to the theater CINC.

As the naval component commander (NCC) in the warfighting theater, the numbered Fleet commander executes the CINC’s OPLAN in time of crisis or war. Fig- ure 2, the theater CINC model, depicts the numbered Fleet conducting joint force operations in the area of operations (AO). In wartime, the CINC’s OPLAN in the

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F I G U R E 2 . Theater CINC Model

form of Fleet tasking is the forcing function; Combat Assessment is the feedback loop by which the tactical commander adjusts his plans to actual events. In peace time, Fleet battle experiments (FBE), advance concept technology demonstrations (ACTD) , and Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD) are conducted by the CINCs and the numbered Fleet commanders to demonstrate military feasibility and to validate require- ments early in the acquisition process.

This simplified view of Fleet operations provides some useful insights into the requirements generation system: rn Operational theaters are joint and are controlled by

CINC’s OPLAN, OPORDS, policies, and doctrine rn CINC uses joint doctrine and CONOPS to achieve

unity of effort rn Fleet operations are the real determinant of system

requirements; therefore, the closer the requirements generation process can remain to Fleet operations the better the definition of the requirement

rn Requirements traceability is essential to generating requirements, because it maintains the operational con- text that allows oversight by operational commanders

rn CINC’s are operational-level commands capable of executing today’s missions and articulating tomor- row‘s needs These insights give rise to one overriding conclusion:

Communications with the Fleet should be in the context and terminology of their operational planning, execution and requirements generation processes.

Referring again to Figure 1, the Chief of Naval Opera- tions staff (OPNAV) is the first time that naval require- ments “come ashore.” Typically this takes the form of a Fleet CINC approved operational requirements docu-

ment (ORD). The ORD provides the general description of operational capability (missions, threats, operational and support concepts, etc.) and the KPP/IERs, which the system must meet at a threshold level to warrant Fleet introduction. In addition to its use in system acquisition, the operational concepts and system performance are analyzed in the integrated warfare assessment process @WAR) and the sponsor’s program proposal (SPP) to pri- oritize the Navy’s budget request. High-level program guidance is provided by the defense planning guidance (DPG) , which prioritizes warfare requirements across the FYDP (future year defense plan). The CNO planning and programming guidance (CPPG) provides toplevel guidance on Navy program integration and prioritization.

The transition of requirements from OPNAV to the program executive officer (PEO) in the systems com- mands is where the ORD enters the world of functional analysis, system requirements engineering (SRE) , and design reference missions (DRM). These processes are supposed to analyze the operational requirements in detail and translate them into system performance spec- ifications. Often, however, there is an attempt by analysts and systems engineers to start with a “clean sheet of paper” using their own homegrown scenarios and judg- ments. Their analytical processes are usually undefined and lengthy with little or no regard for the mission sce- narios, employment tactics, countermeasures, and envi- ronmental conditions contained in the ORD. These processes build a wall of paper between the operational concepts contained in the ORD and the system perfor- mance specifications that emerge from the analyses. This makes it virtually impossible to trace and venfy require- ments. Typically, after several years of tedious effort, dur-

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ing which every member of the military group responsi- ble for generating the mission need has been either transferred or retired, the results of the functional analy- sis are brought forth in the form of a systems require- ments document (SRD) or a top-level requirements PLR) specification. Listen to the words taken from a recent SRD for a Navy command and control system:

The System is a collaborative fabric of systems comprised of (1) a Sensor Fabric, (2) an Information Fabric, and (3) a Weapon Fabric. The Information Fabric transcends the entire force and provides the connectivity for sensor data, weapon data and con- trol & status information that is exchanged between participants. Contrast that to the description of network centric war-

fare (NCW) by Vadm. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka in Naval Institute Proceedings Uan’98):

Network-Centric Warfare derives its power from the strong networking of well-informed but geo- graphically dispersed forces. The enabling ele- ments are a high-performance information grid, an integrated sensor grid closely coupled in time to shooters and C2 processes, and an engagement grid capable of massing the effects of firepower delivered from dispersed forces. The information grid enables the operational architectures of sen- sor grids and engagement grids. Sensor grids rapidly generate high levels of battlespace aware- ness and synchronize awareness with military oper- ations. Engagement grids exploit this awareness and translate it into combat power. In the thousands of pages that have been written on

network centric warfare and the large number of exer- cises and operations that have been conducted in the years since its inception, the Navy has developed an understanding, experience level, and lexicon that should form the basis for analyzing the NCW concept. Nowhere in that lexicon does the word “fabric” appear. Further- more, the concept of “an integrated sensor grid closely coupled in time to shooters and C2 processes, and an engagement grid capable of massing the effects of fire- power delivered from dispersed forces,”( i.e., sensor-to- shooter), is unrecognizable in the SRD.

Continuing this example, Figure 3 depicts a topdown functional model for analyzing tactical command and con- trol. The model is based on joint warfare doctrine and the NCW concept. The overall warfighting objective is “full spectrum dominance” achieved through unity of effort. The maneuver warfare concept of the OODA loop- observe, orient, decide, act-is superimposed on the NCW grids to provide common situational awareness, the common tactical picture, and sensor-to-shooter con- nectivity. C2 has two parts: planning and execution (“Concept for Future Joint Operations, Expanding Joint Vision 2010,” 1997). Common situational awareness and the common tactical picture are the functional products

of the planning function. Sensor-to-shooter connectivity is the functional product of the execution function. The roll- up of data (connectivity, data exchange, data registration, etc.) to achieve common situation awareness is warfight- ing oriented, essential, and measureable-the criteria for KPPs. These same criteria are also met by the equations for probability of mission success (Pms) for each warfare area. These functions and associated metrics are a pos- sible starting point for analyzing naval command and con- trol. This model is well understood by the warfighter and has the advantage of using tactical data generated in Fleet.

Referring again to Figure 1, another requirement’s dis- connect is the failure of the acquisition system to link sys- tem performance to the joint mission essential task list/Navy mission essential task list UMETL/NMETL). The JMETL is the list of tasks determined by a joint force commander UFC) to be essential to accomplishing the joint mission. The NMETLis the Navy and Marine Corps tasks selected by the Navy component commander as those required to support specific naval operations. The Navy tactical task list, or “ITL, is a comprehensive list of Navy and Marine Corps tasks at the unit level (e.g., ship, squadron, or MEW. These tasks are tied directly to the operations planning and training proficiency of deploying forces. If we “train the way we intend to fight,” then we should link system performance to the “ITL. Likewise, system ROCs (required operational capability) and POEs (projected operational environment) should be directly related to operational concepts, probably through the JMETLINMETWNTTL metrics. The ROC/POEs are important because they assign primary and secondary mission areas, which guide both status of resources and training systems (SORTS) reporting and casualty reports (CASEP). ROC/POEs should be rationalized with JMETL/NMETL/N?TL, so that readiness and assessment metrics are consistent with system perfor- mance measures. “ROC/POEs have the extra dimension of providing the recipe for computing manpower require ments. Their impact on the ship is directly reflected in the ship manning document (SMD) and the Navy train- ing plan (NTP).” (Cavalluzzo and Smith 1996) If these relationships come about, the issue of retaining both JMETL/NMETLs and ROC/POEs should be addressed in the near future. Fundamentally, both constructs are simply lists of tasks (capabilities) to be accomplished at the unit or force level, thus there is much to be gained from a common set which measures operations, training, and requirements.As the CINC’s mission and CONOF‘S flow-down to lower levels, the NTTL and ROC/POEs would provide a quantitative basis for system toplevel requirements and force readiness. The idea is the same-Fleet operations should drive system require- ments and readiness assessment.

An ofien-asked question is how do you analyze a clas- sified OPLAN?There are a number of ways ranging from

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Taclical Sitiabon

Awarenes PmS

Tra& lnlormabon Data Data Connediwty M W ASUW ASW Integration Management Registrabon Exchange Pms Pms PmS

F I G U R E 3 . Command and Control Functions

a classified analysis to the use of unclassified sources, accurate to the level of detail required. Examples of unclassified sources include Junes Defense Intelligence Review, The Early Bird, Time (which had an excellent description of OPLAN 5027 several years ago), and books authored by recently retired CINCs. Although not of tactical quality, the information contained in these sources is often more current and better integrated than found in classified publications. The key to either approach is to accept the OPLAN as the basis for the operational analysis.

Concept-Based Requirements From a warfighting view, the common thread in the requirement’s process is the concept of operations, or CONOPS. The concept of operations serves several pur- poses, discussed below; however, its common objective is to achieve overall unity of effort. JCS Publ-02 defines concept of operations as:

“Averbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, partic- ularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an over- all picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called com- mander’s concept.” This definition clearly applies to the CINC OPLAN,

which must be executable at any time with existing forces. The concept of operations can also be applied to future capabilities, which will eventually become part of the campaign plan. The CONOPS describes how the warfighter intends to employ the capability and what sup porting capabilities will be needed. This helps the requirement’s analyst and the system designer to define the performance trade space. As the development pro- ceeds, both the CONOPS and the future capability will

change to incorporate technology innovation and to respond to changes in the threat. The requirement’s process is intended to be flexible and iterative in such a way that both the CONOPS and the capability evolve over time.

Maneuver warfare, which arose from lessons learned in Vietnam. is concept-based. The U.S. entered the Viet- nam War with a modified attrition strategy left over from WWII and Korea; however, in the aftermath, leaders like Gen. Edwin Meyer, USA, Gen. Al Grey, USMC, and Gen. Norman Schwartzkoff, USA revamped our strategy to one of maneuver. Employing speed, boldness, surprise, and initiative to reduce the observation-orientation- decision-action (OODA) loop, maneuver warfare greatly increases the tempo of combat Maneuver warfare, depends to a much greater degree on battlefield leaders understanding the commander’s concept of operations and executing mission orders in a decentralized scheme of rapid, slashing maneuver. Operation Desert Storm was the first largescale implementation of maneuver war- fare doctrine in which it proved it highly successful.

The former Naval Doctrine Command describes a “warfare concept” as a “tool for thinking an innovation through, and to guide efforts in war gaming, modeling, simulation, and experimentation in addition to identifying and focusing research and analysis. Warfare concepts promote innovative approaches to a situation or chal- lenge where either technology can be driven to provide a capability or through the operational application of existing technologies to achieve the required effect” (Naval Doctrine Command 1998). This is of particular importance in software applications, which perhaps more than anything else translates the warfighter’s concept of operations into system performance capabilities.

The Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) has an even more robust view of concepts declaring that I ‘ . . .concepts and the process to evolve them, better iden- tify future operational capabilities. Concepts don’t just explore new hardware or platforms, they influence orga- nizational and doctrine changes which in turn guides training and education. When these operational changes

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are not sufficient, we turn to technology and hardware where concepts have a strong interplay, each building on the other” (Naval Warfare Development Command 1998). Here the linkage between concepts and future operational capabilities seems explicit.

One of the highest priorities of the Chairman and Joint Staff is “to translate the concepts ofjoint Vision 2010 into operational capabilities for the warfighter” (Shelton 1998). The JCS Chairman’s goal is to produce revolu- tionary changes and transform the U.S. military into a force that exploits new systems, doctrine, and operational concepts. The objective is full-spectrum dominancethe ability to dominate any opponent across the range of operations in peacetime, crisis, and if necessary, war. According to General Shelton, this can be achieved only if we rigorously test our technology, ideas, and plans through joint experimentation.

Conclusions Warfighting theaters are joint in every respect-com- mand and control, planning, C4ISR and forces. Theater CINCs have a well-defined process for formulating oper- ational plans, budgets, and requirements. The acquisition process should focus on joint force operations and con- cept-based requirements to better understand the warfighter’s needs, including the training and readiness of the operator. Specifically, the OPLAN, theTPFDD, and the theater CONOPS should provide the military context and rationale for analyzing warfighting capabilities. The operations and support concepts contained in the system ORD define the operational capabilities, key perfor- mance parameters, and information exchange require- ments that must be engineered into a new or improved system in order that it meet the warfighter‘s needs. The ORD parameters should be used explicitly to analyze sys-

tem performance. This will maintain the continuity and traceability between the operational requirements and system performance that is vital to the war fighter’s role of requirement’s oversight. + References Cavalluzzo, LC. and K. Smith, “Required Operating Capability

(ROC) and Projected Operating Environment (POE): An Assessment of the Framework,” Center for Naval Analyses report, Feb., 1996.

Cebrowski, AK, and J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare Its Origins and Future,” Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan., 1998.

“Concept for Future Joint Operations, Expanding Joint Vision 2010.” May 1997

“Defense Acquisition,” DoD Directive 5000.1, Mar., 1996. “Joint Vision 2010,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995. “Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Pro-

grams (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs,” DoD 5000.2-R, Mar., 1996.

“Requirements Generation System,” CJCSI 3170.01A, Aug, 1999.

Shelton, H. H., ‘Translating Concepts into Capabilities,” Naval Institute Proceedings, Sept, 1998.

Acknowledgments Mr. Edward W. Gohring of the Aegis Training & Readi- ness Center provided his ideas and expertise in a num- ber of ways that significantly improved the content and quality of this paper. I wish to gratefully acknowledge his efforts and thank him for his contributions.

Capt. Victor A. Myer, USNR (Ret). served in the US. N a y for over thirty#ive years as a miakhipman, nuclear- powered submarine officer, and naval reserve officer He is cur- rently employed at SAIC/AMSEC as a combat system engineer and naval warfare analyst. He has been an ASNE member since 1987.

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