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A Wannsee Conference on theExtermination of the Gypsies? NewResearch Findings Regarding 15January 1943 and the AuschwitzDecree

Karola Fingsaa NS-Dokumentationszentrum der Stadt Kln (City of Cologne'sDocumentation Centre on National Socialism), Appellhofplatz23-25, Kln 50667, GermanyPublished online: 02 Dec 2013.

To cite this article: Karola Fings (2013) A Wannsee Conference on the Extermination of theGypsies? New Research Findings Regarding 15 January 1943 and the Auschwitz Decree, Dapim:Studies on the Holocaust, 27:3, 174-194, DOI: 10.1080/23256249.2013.852766

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A Wannsee Conference on the Extermination of the Gypsies? NewResearch Findings Regarding 15 January 1943 and the Auschwitz Decree

Karola Fings

NS-Dokumentationszentrum der Stadt Kln (City of Colognes Documentation Centre on NationalSocialism), Appellhofplatz 23-25, Kln 50667, Germany

(Received 1 October 2012; accepted 1 December 2012)

Was the persecution of the Sinti and Roma under National Socialism an act of genocide? Thisarticle posits that the conference of January 15, 1943 constituted a point of culmination for Nazipolicy toward Gypsies. Until now, researchers have attached little importance to this event, butthe author will show that various actors gathered at this meeting to shape Nazi Germanys racialpolicies including those directed at Gypsies and reached agreement on subsequent actionsagainst Mischlinge, persons of mixed race. This paper explores the increasing persecution ofthis minority and its escalation in 1943 with deportations to the concentration and exterminationcamp Auschwitz-Birkenau. Such persons were to be rendered extinct within a generation bymeans of forced sterilization; only a very few were to be Germanized. On the basis ofempirical data, the author also shows that the group of Gypsies dened as racially pure, andtherefore exempted from deportation to Auschwitz, was extremely small. The racially-motivatedelimination of Gypsies continued until the end of the Nazi regime. The author also makes clearhow the men who made Nazi racial policy correlated the lessons learned from the parallelprocesses of the persecution of Jews and the persecution of Sinti and Roma.

Keywords:Wannsee Conference; genocide of Sinti and Roma; Mischling policy; Auschwitzdecree

On 15 January 1943, a meeting took place in the Reich Criminal Police Department (RKPA,Reichskriminalpolizeiamt). Along with representatives of the RKPA, personnel from the ResearchCenter for Racial Hygiene and Biology of Human Populations (RHF, Rassenhygienische und bev-lkerungsbiologische Forschungsstelle), the Security Service (SD, Sicherheitsdienst) whichwas under the authority of the Reich Security Main Ofce (RSHA, Reichssicherheitshauptamt) and the Race and Settlement Main Ofce (RuSHA, Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt) also partici-pated. The composition of the group of participants, the matter negotiated and the context inwhich this meeting took place are reminiscent of the Wannsee Conference, where the practicalimplementation of the nal solution of the Jewish question a program that had been previouslydecided upon and set into motion was ne-tuned in discussions between the RSHA and the keyReich ministries barely one year earlier.

Parallels primarily exist, however, with the subsequent conferences of 6 March and 27October 1942, referred to in the literature as the second and third Final Solution conferences.Negotiations at these meetings focused on groups about which the Nazis had reservations

2013 The Institute for Holocaust Research, at the University of Haifa

This article appeared initially as Eine Wannsee-Konferenz ber die Vernichtung der Zigeuner? Neue For-schungsergebnisse zum 15. Januar 1943 und dem Auschwitz-Erlass in the Jahrbuch fr Antisemitismus-forschung 15 (2006): pp. 303333, and was revised for this publication.

Dapim: Studies on the Holocaust, 2013Vol. 27, No. 3, 174194, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23256249.2013.852766

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about deporting.1 These included Jews living in mixed marriages that is, Jews, who werelegally married to a spouse deemed to be of German blood and so-called Mischlinge,persons of mixed racial heritage. The question posed in this article, however, is this: On 15January 1943, did deliberations deal with the concrete realization of the nal solution of theGypsy question, an objective that had been sought for years?

Before examining the reason for this meeting, the participants and the issues on the table,however, a comment on the body of source material is necessary. A record of the meeting pre-pared by the RKPA exists. By Joachim S. Hohmanns account, the original of this documentwas available to him when he published the transcribed minutes in a study that appeared in1991.2 Unfortunately Hohmann died in 1999 and provided no indication of the provenance ofthe document or of any other document in his study. When comparing the other sources hetranscribed with accessible originals, however, we can conrm that, in all probability,Hohmanns rendering was faithful and meticulous. Although it remains problematic to base ahypothesis on a source not acknowledged in the original, I shall proceed with the assumptionof its authenticity.3

A decree issued by Heinrich Himmler on 16 December 1942, called for the deportation ofGypsy Mischlinge, Romani Gypsies, and Balkan Gypsies to a concentration camp, and is men-tioned in the minutes as the reason for the January 1943 meeting.4 As stated in the transcripts, inaccordance with this order, the majority of these Gypsy-like persons (zigeunerische Personen)[were] to be deported to a concentration camp and ofcials were to refrain from deportationonly in special cases, which required a clarication of the issue of what [was] to be done

1Raul Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der europischen Juden, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1990), 419425, 436449. See also Mark Roseman, Die Wannsee-Konferenz. Wie die NS-Brokratieden Holocaust organisierte (Munich and Berlin: Propylen, 2002), 165184, for a facsimile of the record ofthe proceedings. The conference, convened by the head of the RSHA, Reinhard Heydrich, in a villa near theGroer Wannsee, dealt with the coordination of the procedures for the wholesale murder of Europes Jews, aprocess already underway at the time. Among the 15 participants RSHA personnel, SS ofcers and admin-istrative heads of departments there was consensus regarding the deportation and killing of the Jews, verb-ally camouaged as the nal solution. Nonetheless, there was still a considerable need for coordinationregarding the groups to whose deportation some opposition was anticipated.2Joachim S. Hohmann, Robert Ritter und die Erben der Kriminalbiologie. Zigeunerforschung im Natio-nalsozialismus und in Westdeutschland im Zeichen des Rassismus, Studien zur Tsiganologie und Folkloris-tik, vol. 4 (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1991), 7577.3According to Hohmann, this source is cited in various places, including the most important summary pre-sentations of the National Socialists persecution of Gypsies. See Michael Zimmermann, Rassenutopie undGenozid. Die nationalsozialistische Lsung der Zigeunerfrage, Hamburger Beitrge zur Sozial- und Zeit-geschichte, vol. 33 (Hamburg: Forschungsstelle fr die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus in Hamburg,1996), 302; Martin Luchterhandt, Der Weg nach Birkenau. Entstehung und Verlauf der nationalsozialis-tischen Verfolgung der Zigeuner, Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Gesellschaft fr Polizeigeschichte e.V.,vol. 4 (Lbeck: Schmidt-Rmhild, 2000), 244; and Isabel Heinemann, Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut.Das Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas (Gttingen: Wall-stein, 2003), 557. Even though the authenticity of the source seems certain, there is still a need to nd theoriginal. According to information provided by the widow of Joachim S. Hohmann (personal communicationwith the author on 3 November 2006), his Nachlass in the Landesbibliothek Fulda contains only the printedbooks, articles and supplements, as well as his collection of poetry. Part of the written Nachlass went to thearchives of Rom e.V. in Cologne. No reference to the document in question is to be found there, however (asaccessed on 13 December 2006).4Himmlers order of 16 December 1942 (Tgb. Nr. I 2652/42 Ad./RF/V), has not survived, but is mentioned inthe RKPA Schnellbrief (circular letter) dated 29 January 1943, which contains the exact provisions forimplementation. See Reichskriminalpolizeiamt, ed., Vorbeugende Verbrechensbekmpfung. Erlasssamm-lung, Schriftenreihe des Reichskriminalpolizeiamtes, vol. 15 (Berlin, n.d.), 322, cited from Institut fr Zeit-geschichte (IfZ), Dc 17.02.

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with the remaining Gypsy-like persons.5 This question was debated by the leadership of the insti-tutions that had a decisive role in shaping National Socialist policies toward Gypsies.

Institutions participating in the January 1943 conference included, for one, the Reich CentralOfce for Combating the Gypsy Menace (Reich Central Ofce, Reichszentrale zur Bekmpfungdes Zigeunerunwesens), a subdivision of the Preventive Detention Department of the RKPA (alsoknown as Ofce V AmtV of the RSHA). The Reich Central Ofce coordinated the registrationand monitoring of Gypsies6 throughout the Reich and was represented at the meeting by its headKriminaldirektor Heinrich Bhlhoff, and his colleagues Kriminalkommissar Albert Wiszinsky,Kriminalinspektor Josef Eichberger and Kriminalkommissar Wilhelm Supp.7 The RHF also par-ticipated and was represented by its director, Dr. Robert Ritter, and his closest associate, EvaJustin. From the mid-1930s, the RHF had worked diligently to acquire a monopoly on deningthe terms of the discourse on the racial classication of the Gypsies, and had rmly entrenchedits authoritative position with the RKPA as well. Thus the RHF provided the racially based ideo-logical framework for designing policy toward Gypsies throughout the Reich.8 Above all, it

5Cited from Hohmann, Robert Ritter, p. 75.6As a result of the civil rights movement, the term Sinti and Roma has become generally accepted in theFederal Republic of Germany as a replacement for the discriminatory term Gypsies, while Roma is usedin the European context. Sinti denotes the largest group, which has lived in German-speaking Europe foraround 600 years, and Roma is used to refer to the groups that have migrated from eastern and southernEurope since the late nineteenth century. In the context of the National Socialists persecution of theGypsies, I deliberately employ the word Gypsies, the term used by the authorities for the objects of thepersecution. Employing terminology based on the way those concerned viewed themselves is not possiblefor the very reason that their conception of themselves does not emerge from the contemporary sources and iscertainly not identical with the racist classications used by the racial biologists or Kripo detectives.7On the RKPA, see Patrick Wagner, Volksgemeinschaft ohne Verbrecher. Konzeption und Praxis der Krimi-nalpolizei in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik und des Nationalsozialismus, Hamburger Beitrge zur Sozial-und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 34 (Hamburg: Christians, 1996), especially pp. 233253. The life histories of thestaff members at the Reich Central Ofce have barely been studied, despite these individuals special pos-itions in the National Socialists persecution of the Gypsies. Heinrich Bhlhoff, born in 1896, was with theRKPA from 1941 until April 1945 in Department A2 (Preventive Detention), the director of which was sim-ultaneously head of the Reich Central Ofce; Albert Wiszinsky, born on 13 January 1913, in Altenwald,from summer 1940 to August 1944 also employed in the Preventive Detention Department; Josef Eichberger,born on 21 August 1896, in Endorf near Rosenheim, employed in the Reich Central Ofce from 27 October1939, to 25 January 1945, attaining the rank of Kriminalinspektor; Wilhelm Supp, born on 3 July 1906, inNuremberg, from 1941 until at least October 1943, a case ofcer at the Reich Central Ofce. See Lande-sarchiv NRW, Abteilung Rheinland (LAV NRW, Abt. R), Ger. Rep. 231/1537, 1542, 1546; Zimmermann,Rassenutopie, p. 482f.8Robert Ritter (19011951), who held university degrees in psychology and medicine, in spring 1936assumed the leadership of the newly established RHF, afliated with the Reich Ofce of Public Health(Reichsgesundheitsamt), and in 1941 also became head of the Criminal Biological Institute of the SecurityPolice (Kriminalbiologisches Institut der Sicherheitspolizei). Eva Justin (19011966), beginning in 1934,worked closely with Ritter and became his deputy at the RHF. On both, and on the RHF, see Reimar Gil-senbach, Wie Lolitschai zur Doktorwrde kam, in Wolfgang Aya, Reimar Gilsenbach, and UrsulaKrber, (eds.), Feinderklrung und Prvention. Kriminalbiologie, Zigeunerforschung und Asozialenpolitik,Beitrge zur nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik, vol. 6 (Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1988),pp. 101134; Heike Krokowski, Die Rassenhygienische und Bevlkerungsbiologische Forschungsstelleim Reichsgesundheitsamt. Zur Bedeutung wissenschaftlicher Forschung bei der Verfolgung von Sinti undRoma whrend des Nationalsozialismus, Beitrge zur Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung inNorddeutschland 1 (Bremen: Ed. Temmen, 1994), pp. 7384; Luchterhandt, Weg, pp. 123137, 172183,206234, 259265; Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, especially pp. 125155; Eve Rosenhaft, Wissenschaftals Herrschaftsakt: Die Forschungspraxis der Ritterschen Forschungsstelle und das Wissen ber Zigeuner,in Michael Zimmermann, (ed.), Zwischen Erziehung und Vernichtung. Zigeunerpolitik und Zigeuner-forschung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007), pp. 329353; Tobias

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developed the procedure for utilizing race-biological evaluations to classify individuals asGypsies on the basis of a highly differentiated table. Once relegated to one of three maingroups Gypsies, Gypsy Mischlinge (part-Gypsies) and non-Gypsies a systematicpolicy of exclusion under the Nuremberg Laws became possible in 1941.9

To date, scholarship has undervalued the signicance of this meeting on National Socialistpolicy toward Gypsies, in part because there was no further pursuit of the question of the identityof the representatives of the SD and the RSHA and the necessity of their involvement.10 And yet,their biographies prove quite enlightening. The representative of the SD, SS-StandartenfhrerHans Ehlich, served as head of the SDs Department III B for Racial and Ethnic Policy (Volkstum-spolitik).11 He began his career in the SD Head Ofce in 1937 as director of the Racial andNational Health (Rasse- und Volksgesundheit) Department after serving as advisor on race inthe Health Department of the Saxon Ministry of the Interior and working in the NSDAPOfce of Racial Policy (Rassenpolitisches Amt). As a member of mobile killing squad Einsatz-gruppe V, he had gained practical experience in the ethnic struggle (Volkstumskampf) againstPoles and Jews when the German Wehrmacht invaded Poland. From that time he was amongthe principal coordinators of the SS policy of expulsion and relocation. From late October1939, he served as special advisor to the Immigration and Settlement Department for the Occu-pied Territories (Einwanderungs- und Siedlungsreferat fr die besetzten Gebiete), and hadworked closely with the special advisor for evacuations, Adolf Eichmann.12 Ehlich had alsobeen responsible for the ethnic and racial examinations of Baltic Germans scheduled for reset-tlement and in this function had had close contact with the Staff Main Ofce of the Reich Com-missioner for the Strengthening of Germandom (Reichskommissar fr die Festigung deutschenVolkstums).

Along with Eichmann, Ehlich proposed a conference to be held on 30 January 1940, at whichparticipants debated the problems that had cropped up in the course of the resettlements. The massdeportation of all Jews and Gypsies from the Reich was also discussed at this meeting. The fol-lowing year, Ehlich participated in deliberations on the killing of Jews in the occupied territories,

Schmidt-Degenhard, Vermessen und Vernichten. Der NS-Zigeunerforscher Robert Ritter (Stuttgart: FranzSteiner Verlag, 2012), dissertation, Universitt Tbingen, 2008, Institut fr Ethik und Geschichte derMedizin; Michael Zimmermann, Mit Weigerungen wrde als nichts erreicht. Robert Ritter und die Ras-senhygienische Forschungsstelle im Reichsgesundheitsamt, in Tobias Jersak, (ed.), Karrieren im National-sozialismus. Funktionseliten zwischen Mitwirkung und Distanz (Frankfurt amMain and New York: Campus,2004), pp. 291317.9On the evaluation procedures, made compulsory as of 1941, see Karola Fings and Frank Sparing, Rassis-mus, Lager, Vlkermord. Die nationalsozialistische Zigeunerverfolgung in Kln, Schriften des NS-Doku-mentationszentrums der Stadt Kln, vol. 13 (Cologne: Emons, 2005), pp. 132151; Karola Fings, DieGutachtlichen uerungen der Rassenhygienischen Forschungsstelle, in Zimmermann, Zwischen Erzie-hung und Vernichtung, pp. 425459.10Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, p. 303. Zimmerman does not interpret Ehlichs participation and surmisesthat the RuSHA was involved at Himmlers behest, but possibly also at the wish of the RKPA and RHF,seeking to reduce their share in the responsibility. Luchterhandt, Weg, p. 244, reduces the presence ofEhlich and Harders to a vote on the denition of Gypsies and further procedures in the ReichsgauDanzig-West Prussia.11The following information is based on Michael Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten. Das Fhrungskorpsdes Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002), 176180, 381, 490, 495, 613, 642,664f.12Appointed SS-Obersturmbannfhrer in 1941, Adolf Eichmann headed the Reich Security Head Ofce(Reichssicherheitshauptamt) Department IV D 4 for emigration and evacuation (Auswanderung undRumung) starting in October 1939, and later organized the genocide of European Jewry as the directorof Department IV B 4 for Jewish affairs and evacuation (Judenangelegenheiten und Rumung).

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and in October 1941 he accompanied the head of the RSHA, Reinhard Heydrich, to a conferenceat the Reichs Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, where the matters at stake includedthe regulation of the Jewish question in the course of resettlement. Moreover, Ehlichs Depart-ment III B developed the rst Master Plan East (Generalplan Ost)13 in the rst half of 1941,which provided for the resettlement, forced labor or extermination of millions of people.

It was no accident that the Race and Settlement Main Ofce of the SS, RuSHA, was also rep-resented at the January 1943 meeting, because it, like the SD, had been involved as early asJanuary 1940 in the deliberations regarding deportation of all Gypsies. As part of the policy ofGermanization in the conquered East, the RuSHA was concerned with the race-based selectionof the population and was involved with resettlements and racial examinations, as well as withthe planning and carrying out of strategies of extermination. Like Ehlich, RuSHA representativeSS-Obersturmfhrer Georg Harders was a top specialist for race questions. Harders had beenwith the RuSHA since 1935 and became one of the key gures in its Race Ofce by assumingleadership of the Re-Germanization Department in 1942.14 He too was among the participantsin the third Final Solution conference on 27 October 1942.15

The participation of Ehlich and Harders in the 15 January 1943 meeting is evidence that thelong-standing goal of the nal regulation of the Gypsy question was to be decisively expeditedon this day. On the basis of their career proles, both Ehlich and Harders were makers of exter-mination policy. As strategists and practitioners, they were equipped with experience in thekilling of the European Jews. Mass sterilization and the displacement of millions of peoplewere just as much a part of their sphere of action as the racial selection of individuals for aneventual decision on, for example, their Germanization or extermination. The institutions theyrepresented were involved at an early stage in the planning for a comprehensive deportation ofall Gypsies from the Old Reich.

The outcome of the meeting also favors this assumption. The approach agreed upon regardingpersons not to be deported to Auschwitz mainly conformed to the considerations discussed at theFinal Solution conferences. The objective was to achieve racial purity in the German ethniccommunity by using deportation or sterilization to completely isolate inferior groups, whichwould then die or become extinct while superior subgroups would merge into the ethnic com-munity. The decisions made at the Final Solution conferences provided for sterilization of theJewish Mischlinge of the rst degree (people with two Jewish grandparents). Although this pro-cedure was described as voluntary, refusal to undergo sterilization was to result in deportation.The Jewish Mischlinge of the second degree (people with one Jewish grandparent), on theother hand, were to be treated as persons of German blood. All Jewish Mischlinge,however, would continue to be subject to the existing anti-Jewish measures. Jews living inmixed marriages would be forced to divorce and, once deprived of their privileged status, thenwould be deported.

13The original of the rst version of the Master Plan East, drafted by the RSHA, has not been preserved.According to the second version, prepared in May 1942 by the ofce of the RKF and the RSHA, 31million people were to be moved out of the occupied eastern territories to be used for forced labor or tobe exterminated, and the rest of the population around 14 million people were to be Germanized.The plan was not carried out in this form, of course, but it had considerable inuence on occupation policies.See Gtz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung. Auschwitz und die deutschen Plne fr eineneue europische Ordnung (Frankfurt am Main: Hoffmann und Campe, 1993), 394440; Czesaw Madajc-zyk, ed., Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan. Dokumente (Munich: Saur, 1994); Heinemann,Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut, pp. 359372.14Ibid, p. 618.15Hilberg, Vernichtung, p. 443f.

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For various reasons, these plans were not put into effect before the wars end.16 In late 1942and early 1943, of course, it was not yet known that the radical solution discussed in October 1942would more or less come to nothing. At that time, only around 51,000 German Jews a smallpercentage of a population that had previously numbered 500,000 were still living in theReich, and Himmler assumed that the deportations and mass sterilizations still pending couldbe implemented both practically and politically.17

The decisions reached at the RKPA on 15 January 1943 regarding the further handling of theremaining Gypsies in the Reich following the deportations also included a policy of splitting upand isolating this group, an approach based on sterilization and intended to cause those of mixedancestry, theMischlinge, to disappear. The size of the group and its genetic rating had been pains-takingly ascertained by the RHF in previous years. By its account, the RHF had collected data onexactly 28,607 persons in the territory of the Reich and prepared evaluations of 18,904 of them byNovember 1942. Accordingly, 1079 were classied as full Gypsies, 1017 as Lalleri, 1585 asRoma, 211 as Balkan Gypsies, and 2652 as non-Gypsies. The largest category consisted of12,360 persons dened as Gypsy Mischlinge.18

The course for the treatment of the various categories had already been set. Unless alreadydeported in 1938 or 1940, a small number of full Gypsies and Lalleri were to receive specialstatus as racially pure Gypsies. All Roma, Balkan Gypsies and the vast majority of Mischlingewere to be deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau. Differentiation within these groups resulted from theclassication by the RHF, which ascribed characteristic properties to each of the different strainswithin the Gypsy population.19 In contrast to the racial classication of Jews, within which

16The group scheduled for sterilization, around 64,000 persons in all, was so large that implementation of thisplan in wartime seemed impractical, both medically and administratively. In addition, large-scale protests onthe part of those concerned and their relatives were anticipated and would have destabilized the domesticpolitical situation and possibly posed a threat to the overall project of the extermination of Europes Jews.For the same reasons, there was a retreat from across-the-board compulsory divorce and deportation ofthe approximately 17,000 Jews living in mixed marriages in the Old Reich at the end of 1942. Bothgroups were nonetheless subject to intense pressure from measures of persecution, culminating in deporta-tions. See Hilberg, Vernichtung, pp. 443449; Heinemann, Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut, pp. 544559;Roseman, Wannsee-Konferenz, pp. 114119; Cornelia Essner, Die Nrnberger Gesetze oder die Verwal-tung des Rassenwahns 1933-1945 (Paderborn: Schningh, 2002), pp. 410442; Wildt, Generation, pp. 627642; Beate Meyer, Jdische Mischlinge. Rassenpolitik und Verfolgungserfahrung 1933-1945, Studien zurjdischen Geschichte, vol. 6 (Hamburg; Dlling und Galitz, 1999), pp. 98f., 162358. Plans to complete thedeportation of all Jews living in mixed marriages, in accordance with the order issued on 15 January 1945,were thwarted by Germanys capitulation soon thereafter. See Wolf Gruner, Von der Kollektivausweisungzur Deportation der Juden, in Die Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland. Plne-Praxis-Reaktionen 1938-1945, Beitrge zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 20 (Gttingen: Wallstein, 2004), pp. 2162, herep. 59.17Figures based on Gruner, Von der Kollektivausweisung, p. 58. Starting in 1937, Himmler considered theidea of having inferior persons sterilized, and from 1940 on he instructed physicians to search for ways ofperforming mass sterilizations. Shortly thereafter, sterilization experiments in concentration camps werelaunched. See Gisela Bock, Zwangssterilisation im Nationalsozialismus (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag,1986), 452456. Shortly before the third Final Solution conference, Himmler was informed that such amethod had been found. See Hilberg, Vernichtung, p. 444.18Historisches zur Zigeunerfrage, Bundesarchiv Berlin (BA Berlin), Zsg 142, Anh. 27; also, Luchterhandt,Weg, p. 235f.19Robert Ritter, Die Zigeunerfrage und das Zigeunerbastardproblem, Fortschritte der Erbpathologie, Ras-senhygiene und ihrer Grenzgebiete 3 (Leipzig: Thieme Verlag, 1939), pp. 220; Robert Ritter, Die Bestand-saufnahme der Zigeuner und Zigeunermischlinge in Deutschland, Der ffentliche Gesundheitsdienst 6B(1940/41), pp. 477489. The Rom, for example, were regarded as a small, quite dangerous group wholived only off scams and cunning rackets and made a decidedly Jewish impression. See Eva Justin,Die Rom-Zigeuner, Neues Volk. Bltter des rassenpolitischen Amtes der NSDAP 11: 5 (July 1943),

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Mischlinge were ranked higher in the racial hierarchy, Ritter also had dened Gypsy Mischlingein particular as especially inferior and antisocial. Across the board, more than 90% of allGypsies living in the Reich were pronouncedMischlinge. Therefore, for him, the Gypsy question[was] very predominantly a Mischling problem.20 According to a grid based on blood percen-tages, someone was regarded as a GypsyMischling if he or she had even one or two grandparentswho each were one-quarter Gypsy by blood. Only people with at least three grandparents classi-ed as full Gypsies were classied as Gypsies.21

Against this backdrop, one can also understand why the meeting in January 1943 dealt exclu-sively with the treatment of the remaining GypsyMischlinge in the Reich. Participants reached anagreement that sterilization would be aimed for in the following cases: (1) all GypsyMischlingewith predominantly German blood and all Gypsy Mischlinge with equal shares of Gypsy andnon-Gypsy blood; (2) legally married Gypsy Mischlinge with predominantly non-Gypsyblood and their children; and (3) Gypsy Mischlinge with predominantly non-Gypsy bloodwho were legally married to spouses of German blood and their children, provided they alsowere deemed Gypsy Mischlinge with predominantly non-Gypsy blood. A fourth category ofGypsies was to be Germanized: Gypsy Mischlinge with predominantly non-Gypsy bloodwho were legally married to spouses of German blood, provided their children were deemednon-Gypsies and their genotype [was] good.22

For the performance of the sterilization, those concerned were to submit a declaration ofconsent. If they refused to do so, ofcials were to look into whether they too [were] to beplaced in a concentration camp.After sterilization took place, the RHF was to present new evalu-ations with the category non-Gypsy. These individuals were to be excluded from regulationsapplying to Gypsies and treated by the police as persons of German blood, although theywere classied as genetically impaired. This categorization left them subject to bans on marriageand deemed unable to be Germanized, which meant that their legal status remained limited. TheGermanization of the fourth category was to be promoted by the RuSHA and the RHF, with thenal decision about each individual to be made in joint discussions in the RKPA. For special situ-ations not covered by regulations, the RKPA reserved the right to make decisions on a case-by-case basis.23

The second group of topics addressed in the meeting dealt with the question of how GypsyMischlinge were to be treated with regard to inclusion in the German Peoples List (DeutscheVolksliste). Because the provisions of the Decree of 4 March 1941 concerning the GermanPeoples List and German Citizenship in the Incorporated Eastern Territories barred Gypsiesfrom inclusion but did not explicitly mention GypsyMischlinge, it was assumed that the inclusionofMischlinge had already been achieved. In the January 1943 meeting, participants agreed upon aprocedure designed to avoid such instances in the future: The Germanization commissions ofthe RuSHA, with the involvement of SD Department III, were to make sure that only the

pp. 2124. The members of Gypsy clans of Balkan origin, not of German blood were families that hadmigrated to Germany from the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, someof whom repeatedly attracted attention as bear trainers with their small circuses. See Karola Fings,Gehetzt wie Tiere: Sinti und Roma in der Region Aachen 1900 bis 1945, Zeitschrift des AachenerGeschichtsvereins 106 (2004), pp. 354388, here p. 379f.20Ritter, Zigeunerfrage, p. 19.21See the table showing blood percentages, broken down into 34 groups, in BA Berlin, R 165/181; repro-duced in Fings and Sparing, Rassismus, p. 136.22The following is based on the record of the meeting published in Hohmann, Robert Ritter, pp. 7577.23This passage suggests that the number of special cases not covered by regulations was considered to besmall.

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above-mentioned fourth category was in line for inclusion, and then only under a legally restrictedstatus with revocation possible at any time.24

On 29 January 1943, the RKPA issued more precise instructions to district ofces of the Crim-inal Police (Kripo), as well as to all relevant ofces of the SS, NSDAP and SD. These were con-cerned with the categories of people to be deported pursuant to the decree of 16 December 1942.25

Regardless of the degree of the particular Mischling, all Gypsy Mischlinge, Roma Gypsies andBalkan Gypsies were to be placed indeported to Auschwitz-Birkenau.

The following categories were excluded from deportation: (1) racially pure Sinti and LalleriGypsies; (2) Gypsy Mischlinge who are good Mischlinge in the Gypsy sense and (...) areadded to individual racially pure Sinti Gypsy clans and to Lalleri Gypsy clans deemed to be raciallypure; (3) Gypsy-like persons who are married to persons of German blood; (4) socially integratedGypsy-like persons who already had stable employment and a xed residence before the generalregistration of the Gypsies; (5) Gypsy-like persons who are exempted from the regulations apply-ing to Gypsies by order of the Reich Criminal Police Department; (6) Gypsy-like persons who arestill in military service or were discharged from military service during the current war after beinginjured or decorated; (7) Gypsy-like persons whose removal from work deployment is declined bythe relevant Armament Inspectorate or by the Labor Ofce because of the importance of this workto the war effort; (8) spouses and the dependent children of the Gypsy-like persons listed aboveunder 3-7; (9) Gypsy-like persons whose placement in the Gypsy camp is to be suspended for thetime being for special reasons, in the opinion of the relevant Kripo district ofce; and (10) Gypsy-like persons who can prove possession of foreign citizenship.

If these criteria for exemption are understood as part of a consistent selection strategy, itbecomes clear that all suggestions of the institutions vitally concerned with the Gypsy questionhad some inuence. Ritters breakdown and construction of a hierarchy of Gypsy groupsserved as a basis for the decree, which particularly seized upon his separation of genuineGypsy clans from especially maligned clans and Gypsy Mischlinge, and his long-standingappeal for sterilization.26 Further, the decree reects the notion of the presence of Aryan residuesamong Gypsies, an idea allegedly inuenced by the SS think tank, the Ahnenerbe (Research andTeaching Community the Ancestral Heritage, Forschungs- und Lehrgemeinschaft das Ahnenerbee.V.). As a result, a group of racially pure Gypsies was to be exempted from deportation. Alsotaken into account, however, was the desire of the Wehrmacht not to further diminish the strengthof its manpower and to continue its protection of highly regarded war invalids and decorated

24Cited from Hohmann, Ritter, p. 77. See also Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, 1941, p. 118, Verordnung ber diedeutsche Volksliste und die deutsche Staatsangehrigkeit in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten, March 4,1941, and Ibid., part I, 1942, p. 51f., Zweite Verordnung ber die Deutsche Volksliste und die deutscheStaatsangehrigkeit in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten, Jan. 31, 1942. In NS-Volkstumspolitik und dieNeuordnung Europas. Rassenpolitische Selektion der Einwandererzentralstelle des Chefs der Sicherheitspo-lizei und des SD (1939-1945) (Paderborn: Schningh Paderborn, 2011), Andreas Strippel does not examinethe selection process with regard to Gypsies and makes no mention of the conference on 15 January 1943 orof Ehlichs participation in it. Strippel states that there was unanimity concerning the selection of Jews andGypsies on the basis of race policies, but that the exclusion of Gypsies in the practices of the Central Immi-gration Ofce (Einwandererzentralstelle) played no role. See also p. 328. Ehlichs concern with this subject,however, suggests that further empirical studies are needed.25Schnellbrief des RKPA betr. Einweisung von Zigeunermischlingen, Rom-Zigeunern und balkanischenZigeunern in ein Konzentrationslager, Jan. 29, 1943, IfZ, Dc. 17.02, fols. 322327.26On the ideas of the future Gypsy policy at the RHF, see also the text written by Eva Justin, dated Novem-ber 1942, which is titled Vorschlge vom RKPA an RF [Suggestions from the RKPA to RF] (another poss-ible reading is to dF [an dF], that is, to Adolf Hitler), BA, Zsg 142/22, reproduced in part inLuchterhandt, Weg, p. 238f.

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soldiers. Finally, the RKPA reserved the right to decide on deportation exemptions on a case-by-case basis. The exclusion criteria for Gypsies working in factories vital to the war effort and forGypsies holding and demonstrating foreign citizenship indicate that protests originating in thearmament industry or with the Labor Ofce were as much to be avoided as diplomatic imbroglioswith friendly or neutral states. Here too, the Germans had learned lessons from their experiencesduring the deportation of the Jewish population.27

The detailed exemption regulations nonetheless left local Kripo detectives a wide margin ofdiscretion, as they uniformly applied only to people who neither had a long criminal record norwere to be viewed as roaming Gypsies. Of central importance, however, is the fact that all ofthose excluded from deportation of age 12 and above in groups (3) to (9) that is, all but theso-called racially pure Gypsies and the foreign nationals were to be sterilized. Here, theresults of the meeting on 15 January 1943, found direct expression.

To assess the relative importance of the meeting, however, a closer look at the deportationplans and their concrete execution is required. Before deportation to Auschwitz-Birkenaubegan in March 1943, the RKPA and the RHF the institutions concerned with National Socialistpolicies toward the Gypsies separated the Gypsies living in the Reich into three categories: (1)those to be deported to Auschwitz, (2) those to remain behind and undergo sterilization, and (3)the so-called racially pure Gypsies.

In the portrayal of the persecution of the Gypsies in the territory of the Reich, deportation toAuschwitz has special signicance because it is generally considered to be the beginning of a sys-tematic, planned, or factory-like mass murder, especially in the numerous studies on local andregional history.28 Emphasis placed on these adjectives indicates a metadiscourse that apparentlyrefers to the quality of the genocide of the Sinti and Roma. On the other hand, publicationsreceived by the public at large placed special emphasis on the quantitative extent of the persecution.In the process, exceedingly problematic statements have been made and are supported by thedecrees issued in the context of the deportations and by the gures circulating in various institutionsregarding the Gypsy groups living in the German Reich. Thus, in Yehuda Bauers essay on Zigeu-ner [Gypsies] in the Enzyklopdie des Holocaust one nds the assertion that about 14,000 of the37,000 Gypsies registered in the German Reich (including Austria) were classied as racially pureor almost racially pure Gypsies and were therefore, in most cases, spared from measures of per-secution.29 Guenter Lewy even goes so far as to claim that a substantial number of the Gypsiesliving in the Reich, perhaps even a majority, were able to escape deportation.30

27In carrying out the deportations of the Jewish population from the Reich, ofcials had learned to selectthese groups in a graduated process. See Hilberg, Vernichtung, pp. 459468.28In fact, this applies only to the Old Reich and, with restrictions, to post-Anschluss Austria; in the occupiedcountries, no complete census of all Gypsies was sought, no racial biological examinations were undertaken,and no evaluations by experts were prepared. Targeted killings of Roma took place in the occupiedcountries, especially in southeastern Europe, long before the deportation of the German Reichs Gypsiesto Auschwitz. As early as November 1941, 5007 Austrian Gypsies were deported to the Litzmannstadt(d) ghetto, and in early January 1942 they were killed in gas vans in the Kulmhof (Chemno) extermina-tion camp. On persecution in occupied Europe, see Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, pp. 231292, on Litzmann-stadt, pp. 223228. On the Soviet Union, see: Martin Holler, Der nationalsozialistische Vlkermord an denRoma in der besetzten Sowjetunion (1941-1944) (Heidelberg: Heidelberg Dokumentations- und Kulturzen-trum Dt. Sinti und Roma, 2009).29Yehuda Bauer, Zigeuner, in Eberhard Jckel, Peter Longerich, and Julius H. Schoeps, (eds.), Enzyklop-die des Holocaust. Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europischen Juden, vol. 3 (Berlin: Argon, 1993),pp. 16301634, here pp. 1632, 1634.30Guenter Lewy, Rckkehr nicht erwnscht. Die Verfolgung der Zigeuner im Dritten Reich (Munich andBerlin, 2001), pp. 251, 374; also in Guenter Lewy, Himmler and the Racially Pure Gypsies, Journal ofContemporary History 34 (1999), pp. 201214, here p. 210.

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Such statements are problematic not only because they suggest that persecution was random,selective or sloppily carried out. They also assign Gypsies intentionally or not a lower rank inan imagined hierarchy of victims. Further, they are problematic because they are based on ques-tionable numbers and, moreover, they mistakenly equate the statutory position with actual prac-tice. As will be shown, incorrect assumptions about the percentage of Gypsies who escapeddeportation to Auschwitz were the basis of controversy between Yehuda Bauer and SybilMilton as well as Romani Rose with regard to the politics of memory.31

A scientically sound assessment of the practice of persecution, however, is only possibleagainst the backdrop of empirically supported data. The number of victims among the Romain occupied eastern and southeastern Europe will probably never be accurately quantiable.32

But for the territory of the Reich, a very few collections including Gypsy les from formerKripo district ofces have survived, and they do indeed enable us to make representative state-ments. In addition to some fragmentary collections,33 one can mention the 174 individualles (Personenakten) of the former Berlin Agency for Gypsy Affairs (Dienststelle fr Zigeuner-fragen) and almost 600 les from the former Magdeburg branch of the same agency.34

The largest surviving collection of les about the Gypsy population 810 Zigeunerpersone-nakten in total is for the area of the former Cologne district ofce of the Kripo, whose authorityextended to the city of Cologne and the administrative districts of Aachen, Coblenz, Cologne andTrier.35 With the aid of these les and additional research, 1600 persons registered as Gypsies andaffected by persecution measures could be identied.36 Thus, it is possible to gather more preciseinformation about the history of the persecution of people registered as Gypsies for one of the 17Kripo district ofces that existed in the Reich in 1940. Decisions made in the context of deporta-tion to Auschwitz, as well as their consequences for the individuals affected, can be assessed on a

31Correspondence: Yehuda Bauer and Sybil Milton, Gypsies and the Holocaust, The History Teacher 25: 4(Aug. 1992), pp. 513521; Romani Rose, Fr beide galt damals der gleiche Befehl. Eine Entgegnung aufYehuda Bauers Thesen zum Genozid an den europischen Juden, Sinti und Roma, Bltter fr deutsche undinternationale Politik 4 (1998), pp. 467472; Yehuda Bauer, Es galt nicht der gleiche Befehl fr beide. EineEntgegnung auf Romani Roses Thesen zum Genozid an den europischen Juden, Sinti und Roma, Bltterfr deutsche und internationale Politik 11 (1998), pp. 13801387.32For many of these countries there are no gures or, at best only tentative ones, because the victims eitherwere not registered or, as in the case of many Roma, fell victim to massacre without having been previouslyregistered as Gypsies. For a cautious provisional appraisal of the state of knowledge as of the mid-1990s, seeZimmermann, Rassenutopie, pp. 381383; Donald Kenrick and Grattan Puxon, in Gypsies under the Swas-tika (Hateld: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2009), p. 153, proceed on the assumption of 200,000 Romamurdered in the parts of Europe under National Socialist occupation and numerous unreported cases, difcultto quantify, but they distance themselves from their earlier estimate of 500,000 victims.33Two les on individual Gypsies from Paderborn (Kreispolizeibehrde Paderborn, nos. 3, 4, StaatsarchivDetmold, D 2 C), 14 archival units from Nuremberg (Akten der Kriminalpolizeistelle Nrnberg, Erfassungvon Zigeunern 19391944, Staatsarchiv Nrnberg, Rep. 218/4), 30 individual les from the DuisburgKripo (Polizeiprsidium Duisburg, Zigeunerpersonenakten, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Haupt-staatsarchiv Dsseldorf, BR 1111/29-60). On Duisburg, see: Marc von Lpke-Schwarz, Zigeunerfrei! Die Duisburger Kriminalpolizei und die Verfolgung von Sinti und Roma 1939-1944 (Saarbrcken: VDMVerlag, 2008).34Polizeiprsidium Berlin, Anhang II: Zigeuner-Personenakten, nos. 1174, LHA Potsdam, Rep. 30 BerlinC Tit 198 A; Polizeiprsidium Magdeburg, Anhang II.1, LHA Magdeburg, Rep. C 29. While the Berlinles were consulted by Lucherhandt, Weg, a full assessment of the Magdeburg holdings has not yet beenmade.35LAV NRW, Abt. R, BR 2034.36The les were a major source for Fings and Sparing, Rassismus, Lager, Vlkermord, pp. 1520, where anexact description of the holdings can be found.

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statistically representative basis for the German Reich for the rst time. With the aid of theCologne database, following is a closer examination of two groups that are repeatedly causesfor speculation. They are the so-called racially pure Gypsies, and those who were notdeported because of the Auschwitz Decrees exemption clauses. In conclusion, the signicanceof the January meeting for the persecution process is summarized and assessed against thisbackdrop.

Gypsy chiefs

Until now, current scholarship has assumed that the Ahnenerbe Ofce of the SS ordered deporta-tion to Auschwitz. This organization emerged in September 1942 as a competitor of the RKPAand the RHF. By order of Himmler, it sought to identify the supposedly racially pure Gypsieswho originated in India and to investigate their Aryan roots, all with the aim of grantingthem limited freedom of movement.37 Opposition to such plans arose in the RKPA, which wasaverse to granting Gypsies any freedom of movement at all, and in the RHF, which feared forits status as sole authority on the terms of the discourse. Nonetheless, as prompted by Himmlerin September, the head of the RKPA, SS-Gruppenfhrer Arthur Nebe, issued a decree as earlyas 13 October 1942, with the assistance of the Reich Central Ofce for Combating the GypsyMenace and the RHF. For the territory of the Old Reich, nine spokesmen were appointed,also termed Gypsy chiefs in the language of the decree. Their task was to designate raciallypure Gypsies.38 The RHF made the nominations for the appointment of Gypsy spokesmen,39

and selected older men held in high esteem in their extended families to be leaders and authorities(Rechtsprecher).40

Somewhat later, in early November 1942, Himmler instructed the Reich Central Ofce toreorganize the treatment of the Gypsies in the Reich.41 On 3 December 1942, the head of theNSDAP Party Chancellery Martin Bormann lodged a protest with Himmler because special treat-ment of the so-called racially pure Gypsieswould run counter to previous policy, as well as to theviews of the population and the NSDAP, and would under no circumstances meet with Hitlersapproval.42 Himmler managed to speedily rebut this objection. The subsequent operating pro-cedure was agreed upon after talks between entities involved and after Himmlers meetings

37On the decision process, see Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, pp. 297304; Michael Zimmermann, DieEntscheidungen fr ein Zigeunerlager in Auschwitz-Birkenau, in Zimmermann, Zwischen Erziehung undVernichtung, pp. 392424; Luchterhandt, Weg, pp. 235242. Both Zimmermann and Luchterhandtassume that it was as a result of the instructions to the Ahnenerbe and deliberations regarding separate treat-ment of racially pure Gypsies that planning for deportation of the other Gypsies got started in the rst place.38RSHA (RKPA) betr. Zigeunerhuptlinge, Oct. 13, 1942, IfZ, Dc. 17.02, fol. 306f.39See the text written by Eva Justin to exonerate herself, prepared in 1960 at the latest, reproduced inHohmann, Robert Ritter, pp. 469500, here p. 497.40The social structures of the Sinti, however, never corresponded to the communal life in clans delineatedby Ritter. See Reimar Gilsenbach, Oh Django, Sing deinen Zorn. Sinti und Roma unter den Deutschen(Berlin: BasisDruck, 1993), p. 150.41On 4 November 1942, Bhlhoff and Otto mentioned a corresponding instruction from Himmler. See thenote by an ofcial in charge at the Reich Ministry for Food Supply and Agriculture (Reichsministerium frErnhrung und Landwirtschaft), dated Nov. 14, 1942, BA Berlin, R 14/156, cited from Luchterhandt, Weg,p. 239. See also pp. 237239, and Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, p. 299.42Martin Bormann to Heinrich Himmler, Dec. 3, 1942, BA Berlin, NS 19/180, fol. 1f. Michael Schenk, Ras-sismus gegen Sinti und Roma. Zur Kontinuitt der Zigeunerverfolgung innerhalb der deutschen Gesellschaftvon der Weimarer Republik bis in die Gegenwart, Studien zur Tsiganologie und Folkloristik, vol. 11 (Frank-furt am Main: P. Lang, 1994), p. 268, correctly points out that Bormann, in his objections on 3 December1942, could invoke only statements by third parties.

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with Hitler and Bormann.43 A small, handpicked group of racially pure Gypsies, as well as a fewGypsy Mischlinge, were to be allowed to live with strict regulation in an area yet to be deter-mined in occupied territory. The great majority of the Gypsies, however, were to be deported.This restrictive handling was in complete conformity with the line taken by the RKPA and theRHF, which wanted to keep the number of exemptions low from the outset. In summer 1942Ritter had estimated the number of tribally authentic Gypsies in the German Reich to bebarely one hundred families.44

The parameters of the activities of the appointed Gypsy spokesmen were narrowly dened.They rst had to sign a statement declaring their agreement with the actions expected of themand acknowledging the threat of deportation to a concentration camp if they or a clansmanviolated any of the provisions. Their primary task was to compile lists for the RKPA, givinginformation about the residence and occupation of all Gypsies known to them. At the sametime, they had to suggest who, as good Mischlinge in the Gypsy sense, would bepotential candidates for admission to the group of racially pure Gypsies.45 In additionto this direct preliminary work, which implied the creation of a kind of involuntary bodyof informers within the minority,46 the RKPA expected a disciplining inuence on theGypsies.47

By taking on these obligations, the spokesmen entered into an alliance with their persecutorsthat they found difcult to comprehend and ultimately threatening. Since 1938, they had forciblyexperienced the Kripos immediate penalization for perceived and actual infractions with depor-tation to a concentration camp. Because the Gypsy spokesmen risked their lives by pledging thatthose they recommended would comply with the Kripo-specied measures despite oppressiveliving conditions, the Nazis anticipated that the Gypsy leaders would limit proposals to theirclosest family circle. Punishments for violating Kripo dictates included the separation of familiesthrough the decree limiting their mobility (Festsetzungserlass) and through deportation, prohibi-tions on relations, restrictions on mobility that went as far as compulsory internment in camps,forced labor, reductions in food rations and exclusion from social welfare benets. As theCologne les on the Gypsy population reveal, ultimately only six families from the urbanregion, comprising 24 persons, as well as one man from Trier, were actually placed formallyamong the ethnic group of racially pure Gypsies.48

In contrast to the 25 people classied as racially pure and spared from deportation, more than463 were deported to Auschwitz from the area of the Kripos Cologne district ofce starting inMarch 1943.49 In other district ofce areas, the number in the racially pure category is likelyto have been similarly low and the kinship afliation with the Gypsy spokesmen similarlyclose. At Berlins Marzahn internment camp, apart from the two Gypsy spokesmen in addition

43Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, p. 300f.44Das Zigeunersippenarchiv, Westdeutscher Beobachter, June 20, 1942.45RSHA (RKPA) betr. Zigeunerhuptlinge,Oct. 13, 1942, IfZ, Dc. 17.02, fol. 307f. See also Luchterhandt,Weg, p. 236.46Udo Engbring-Romang,Die Verfolgung der Sinti und Roma in Hessen zwischen 1870 und 1950 (Frankfurtam Main: Brandes & Apsel Verlag GmbH, 2001), p. 333.47See the opening negotiations in RSHA (Amt V), betr. Zigeunerhuptlinge,Oct. 13, 1942, IfZ, Dc. 17.02,fols. 305307, here fol. 307. For an example of supervision of regular work delegated by the Kripo districtofce in Berlin to the Gypsy spokesmen of the Lalleri, see Lewy, Verfolgung, p. 305.48LAV NRW, Abt. R, BR 203/2, 3, 72, 73, 116121, 123, 130, 131, 188, 900904, 951, 1168, 1180, 1194.On the activities of the two successively appointed Cologne Gypsy spokesmen, see: Fings and Sparing, Ras-sismus, pp. 292297.49Of that number, 374 in the context of the mass deportations in spring 1943, and 89 in the course of indi-vidual deportations. See ibid., p. 307.

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to the spokesman for the Sinti, there was also a Reich-wide spokesman appointed for the Lalleri only a good two dozen of their closest relatives were selected for this group. For Berlin overall,only 37 exceptions in total are documented.50

Because Kripo ofces and the RKPA reviewed every individual application for admission inadvance, the Kripo carried the greatest weight in the selection process for the group of raciallypure Gypsies. The Gypsy spokesmen had real discretionary authority only when it came toassenting to the admission of a person selected by the Kripo.51 Operating on the assumptionthat all nine Gypsy spokesman chose or could choose only their close relatives, then at most200 to 300 people within the Reich escaped deportation to Auschwitz as a result of these exemp-tion regulations.52

From the RKPAs perspective, the Gypsy chiefs were a component of the selectionprocess for Auschwitz; a tiny group received an alleged status of privilege, while the vastmajority of the population was to be deported or sterilized. Once completed, the appointmentof spokesmen would not only yield relatively small frictional losses for the persecuting auth-orities, but further served these entities interests by separating the group of Sinti and Romastill remaining in the Reich. The Gypsy spokesmen were inevitably integrated into the perse-cution apparatus because of their enforced proximity to the persecutors, their active infor-mation-gathering for the Nazi authorities and the imposition of full responsibility forappropriate social behavior on the part of their entire group. Even their hopes of being ableto protect themselves and others from deportation proved deceptive for the most part, andthe effort to save their closest family members inevitably resulted in the exclusion ofothers.53 The delegation of selection and control functions to the Gypsy spokesmen issimilar to the Gestapos involvement of Jewish representatives of traditionally established orforcibly created communities.54 Both the Gypsy and the Jewish representatives had onlyminimal scope for action, and in the end they nevertheless contributed to the smooth operationof the persecution process.55

Himmlers declaration that racially pure Sinti Gypsieswould be allowed a certain freedom ofmovement, so that they can roam in a xed area, live according to their customs and mores, and

50See Gilsenbach, Sinti, p. 151f.; and Luchterhandt, Weg, p. 242.51In the individual les in Cologne, only one case is documented in which the Gypsy spokesman refused toadmit a man. LAV NRW, Abt. R, BR 2034/133. In this decision, pressure apparently had been put on R. bythe district ofce. There would have been no doubt that severe sanctions would have been imposed on R. aswell, in the event of any misconduct by the man. See, on the other hand, the presentation of the case in Lewy,Himmler, p. 212. In addition, those concerned could not lose sight of the fact that admission into the group ofracially pure Gypsies could have positive or negative effects on their living situation. Further, one must notforget that the categorization undertaken by the RHF is by no means to be equated with the categoriesassigned by those concerned. In this respect, it is not at all surprising if those concerned insisted that theywere not racially pure Gypsies.52Gilsenbach, Sinti, p. 153. This estimate is the basis for the assumption, veried for Berlin and Cologne, thatalong with each Gypsy spokesman, around 2030 people were selected for the group of racially pureGypsies.53Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, p. 302; Engbring-Romang, Verfolgung, p. 330.54See Hilberg, Vernichtung, pp. 189196 (Reich Association), 227251 (Jewish councils, or Judenrte, inghettos); Beate Meyer, Tdliche Gratwanderung die Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschlandzwischen Hoffnung, Zwang, Selbstbehauptung und Verstrickung (1939-1945) (Gttingen: Wallstein,2011); Beate Meyer, Handlungsspielrume regionaler jdischer Reprsentanten (1941-1945). Die Reich-svereinigung der Juden in Deutschland und die Deportationen, in Die Deportation der Juden aus Deutsch-land. Plne-Praxis-Reaktionen 1938-1945, Beitrge zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, vol. 20(Gttingen: Wallstein, 2004), pp. 6385.55Meyer, Handungsspielrume, pp. 63f., 84f.

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pursue a characteristic occupation,56 was never enforced. The notions of the Gypsies purportedAryan roots absurd ideas in light of the previous race policies were much discussed in the cor-ridors of the ministries. They resulted in a temporary halt of plans, including the sending of judicialprisoners to concentration camps, and unnerved a few underlings57 but, in the end, were not furtherpursued. The executive director of the Ahnenerbe, Wolfram Sievers, indeed met with Arthur Nebein the RKPA on 10 February 1943 to deal with the question of the settlement of the racially pureGypsies,58 but a special directive on the treatment of the pure Gypsies heralded in October 1942was not forthcoming. During the entire undertaking, no signicant relief emerged for the SintiGypsies, said Eva Justin after the war. After a few months nobody talked about it anymore.59

Until the wars end, the supposedly privileged group remained subject to the rigid special law(Sonderrecht), as well as to the forced labor system and the constant threat of deportation.

Mixed marriages and forced sterilizations

Next, we will look at the example of the group of those not deported to Auschwitz from Cologne.This groups size, composition and the practices of persecuting authorities with regard to thegroup will be examined.

Gypsy-like Persons Registered in the Area of the Cologne Kripo Ofce, 1943194560

Category Number of persons(a) Failed deportations 25(b) Registered as Yeniche (Jenische) or traveling performers 30(c) As racially pure Gypsies, exempt from deportation 25(d) Excluded from deportation on the basis of other exemption clauses 43(e) Families in which one parent is deemed to be of German blood 225

Total 348

The exclusion from deportation of what at rst glance seems a large group 348 people byno means indicates anything arbitrary about measures of persecution. Rather, in each case reasonsexist that are attributable to the scope of the decree and the specic local situation. The case of therst group of failed deportations (a) included two individuals and three families, the deportation ofwhom was scheduled but for various reasons could not be carried out before the war ended.Specically, their foreign citizenship could be proven, a proceeding to determine their citizenshipwas pending, or documents regarding ancestry were otherwise lacking.61 Ultimately, the advanceof the Allied troops and the liberation of Aachen in October 1944 also put a halt to the bureau-cratic preparations for the deportation of these families living in the western part of the area underthe authority of the Kripos Cologne district ofce.

56IfZ, Dc. 17.02, fol. 306.57On 14 December 1942, Bormann placed a temporary moratorium on the sending of Gypsies from the judi-cial system to concentration camps, a procedure initially ordered on 14 September 1942. See Luchterhandt,Weg, p. 240. Rudolf H, camp commandant at Auschwitz, also seemed unnerved; in April 1943, becauseHimmler is planning something special with the Gypsies, he asked the SS Economic and AdministrativeMain Ofce (SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt) to supply better provisions for pregnant Gypsywomen and their small children. See SS-WVHA (Oswald Pohl) to Personal Staff RFSS (Brandt), April 9,1943, BA Berlin, NS 19/180, fol. 3.58Luchterhandt, Weg, p. 245.59Text written by Eva Justin to exonerate herself, prepared no later than 1960, reproduced in Hohmann,Ritter, pp. 469500, here p. 498.60Evidence for the individual groups: see the following text.61On the individual cases, see Fings and Sparing, Rassismus, p. 332f.

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In addition to Yeniche or traveling performers (b), who were classied as non-Gypsies,62 thesmall group (c) of racially pure Gypsies was also spared from deportation. For the next groupspared via other exemption clauses (d), references to specic reasons for the postponement ofdeportation also exist. Twelve persons from this groups family milieu were effectively treatedas racially pure Gypsies, but apparently without formal assignment to that category by theCologne district ofce.63 In this case, the Kripo detective in charge seemingly made use of hisdiscretionary powers, as in the case of a family of 11, which was not scheduled for deportationbecause of the social adaptation of its members. The rationale supplied to the RKPA by theCologne district ofce was that the family had resided in Cologne since 1930 and thus far hadnot come into the picture as Gypsies. The father, born in 1904, had served in the Wehrmachtand had been classied as a Gypsy in July 1941.64 The family was indeed not deported, butalso does not seem to have been exempted from Gypsy regulations.

In the case of Gustav F. from Aachen, a different provision applied. He had volunteered formilitary service in 1938 and was not released from active duty in the Wehrmacht until 1942.Because of his long years of service, he was not deported but he continued to be classied asa Gypsy Mischling and was reported as such to the Labor Ofce.65 The last family, to whichyet another exception clause was applied, lived in the area of the Coblenz Kripo ofce. InJanuary 1943, an agreement to undergo sterilization had already been extorted from this largefamily of 19, so that its members unlike many of their relatives were not deported.66

But the largest group (e) with 65 percent not deported to which an exception clause appliedwas comprised of Gypsy-like persons who are legally married to persons of German blood, asstated in the Auschwitz Decree.67 Until the end of the war, in the area for which the CologneKripo district ofce was responsible, 48 families (225 persons) lived in a situation in whichone parent was deemed a Gypsy and the other a person of German blood.68 In view of the accel-erated and usually successful segregation policy that the NSDAPOfce of Racial Policy had prac-ticed since the early 1940s,69 along with the Cologne Agency for Gypsy Affairs, the number ofmore than 200 people still living in mixed-marriage families after the deportations to Auschwitz

62This referred to six individuals and six families with two to seven members, who were registered with theKripo district ofce and were exempted in part from the requirements. See LAV NRW HSA, BR 2034/659661, 682686, 792, 1139, 1152; ibid., Kartei: Anton, Eva, and Klara H., Nikolas M.; NS-Dok., Polizeipr-sidium Kln, ED-Kartei: Johann L.; Gemeindearchiv Morsbach (GAMb), no. 1676; Mrkisches MuseumWitten, Sammlung Wlfrath 756/20; Landeshauptarchiv Koblenz (LHAK), 510,1/209, fol. 66f.; ibid.,510,1/210, p. 173; ibid., 510,1/211, fol. 11.63LAV NRW, Abt. R, BR 2034/77, 110, 115, 124126, 128f., 132, 211, 938, 981.64Ibid., BR 2034/1002. The parents and other relatives of Mr. L. had already been deported in May 1940.65Ibid., BR 2034/14.66Ibid., BR 2034/1234, 12731290; LHAK, 517,1/210, fol. 131f.; ibid., 517,1/211, fol. 16.67IfZ, Dc. 17.02, fol. 323.68Cases identied in accordance with LAV NRW, Abt. R, BR 2034/4, 6, 11, 55, 5961, 70f., 75f., 91f., 94f.,100, 105, 111114, 138, 161f., 168, 244, 272, 339, 345f., 353, 411, 416, 420, 431435, 455, 469, 495, 531f.,552f., 560, 575, 600f., 608, 614, 627637, 655, 658, 668, 680, 687, 689691, 721723, 727, 739, 748, 751,755757, 759768, 782, 787, 791, 793, 825, 830, 836, 872876, 882, 906, 945, 966f., 970, 982987, 991,997, 1004, 1006, 10081011, 1049, 1052, 1070f., 10761078, 1117f., 11311134, 1138, 1154f., 11571161,1163, 1181, 1190, 1195, 12001203, 1206, 12131221, 12451255, 1260f., 12641268, VH II/90; LHAK,517,1/211; GAMb, no. 1676. For the assessment except in the cases of two extended families from Mors-bach und Coblenz the classic nuclear family was used as the basis; that is, married couples or partners andtheir children. Owing to gaps in the records, the total number of persons affected is presumably larger. Part-ners who were deemed to be of German blood were included as well, wherever possible. They were alsosubjected to intense pressure through persecution, especially if they had children. Most of the families wererecorded in Cologne (22 families) and Coblenz (15); seven lived in Bonn, three in Aachen, and one in Trier.69Fings and Sparing, Rassismus, pp. 255263.

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may seem high. Analysis of the coverage dates, however, indicates that the Kripo district ofce inCologne was unaware of many of them until 1943. As a result of extensive inquiries or messagesfrom, for example, military reporting ofces or other Kripo (district) ofces, almost half went onthe record only after that point.70 The deportations in 1940 and 1943 primarily affected peoplealready known and registered as Gypsies for some time. Because of the genealogical investi-gations of the RHF, Gypsies lacking outward physical characteristics or stereotypical meansof earning a living and those who had been acculturated for one or more generations only gradu-ally came to the Kripos attention as well.71

For 11 of the mixed-marriage families (39 people), the history of persecution could not beclaried because of unsatisfactory source material. For the remaining 37 families (186 people),the persecution practiced on the basis of racial classication can be divided into two categories,depending on whether the families were forcibly separated or were allowed to continue livingtogether. Fifteen families, of which only 42 persons remained, were separated by divorce, issu-ance of restrictions, and deportation; the children in these families were sterilized or institutiona-lized. Substantial pressure was applied in an attempt to break up the other 22 families (144 people)as well, but separation was not enforced, because the male members of the families either hadserved in the Wehrmacht for a long time or were still in active military service. Therefore,racial and biological evaluations, some provisional, were prepared, and to some extent affectedthose also temporarily exempted from the Gypsy regulations. This group too, however, wasthreatened or affected by sterilization.72 There was a threat of placement in a concentrationcamp, particularly if the husband was the partner not of German blood, and preparations fordeportation were made.73

The district ofce employed the sterilization clause of the Auschwitz Decree as its chiefmeans of exerting pressure. This provision applied to all partners or children not ofGerman blood, regardless of whether the marriage or relationship had already been disruptedor not. As was customary from 1942, the persons concerned had to give consent to steriliza-tion, as these extralegal sterilizations were supposed to be implemented through the ReichsCommittee for the Scientic Registration of Serious Hereditary and Congenital Illnesses(Reichsausschuss zur wissenschaftlichen Erfassung von erb- und anlagebedingten schwerenLeiden). The district ofce asked the subordinate police ofces for such documents ofconsent74 or summoned those concerned to the ofce to coerce them into issuing suchdeclarations.

Some agreed to undergo the procedure because the prospect of exemption from thespecial law was reserved for those who had been sterilized. In many cases, however,the Cologne district ofce failed due to the substantial resistance of those concerned. Byand large, active-duty Wehrmacht soldiers were best able to avoid forced divorces and the ster-ilization of their wives and children. By early summer the RKPA had been forced to soften itssterilization policy. It recommended that a husband of German blood on furlough from a

70Nineteen of 37 families whose history can be reconstructed went on the record only after March 1943. See,for example, LAV NRW, Abt. R, BR 2034/608 (report of Dortmund Kripo ofce, May 1944), BR 2034/1133(report of Dsseldorf Kripo district ofce, Nov. 1943); BR 2034/531 (exemption from Wehrmacht andreport, June 1944).71See also Robert Ritter to DFG, March 23, 1943, BA Berlin, R 73/14005. Ritter comments in the documentthat the RHF continually uncovers mixtures between persons of German blood and Gypsies.72See the table in Fings and Sparing, Rassismus, p. 335, for a more detailed portrayal of different familyconstellations.73LAV NRW, Abt. R, BR 2034/1190, 105.74Cologne KPLSt to OPB Morsbach, March 24,1943, GAMb, no. 1676.

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combat unit be informed in detail about the undesirable genetic makeup of his wife or chil-dren so that the parties in question would be sensible and consent to sterilization.75 To avoidraising further concern, the evaluation practices of the RHF were aligned with this new course.The children of soldiers of German blood were classied as non-Gypsies, to some extent byway of provisional evaluations.76 In the few instances in which Gypsy Mischlinge were stillon active duty in 1944, they and their children were provisionally classied as non-Gypsiesbecause the authorities wanted to keep the men with their combat units. After the victory,a decision was to be made on the next steps.77

An estimated total of 2000 Gypsies were forcibly sterilized in the German Reich pursuant tothe Auschwitz Decree.78 In Cologne, the disorganization of the Kripo district ofce due to thewar, the collapse of the Cologne health care system beginning in 1943, and the advance of theAmerican troops probably spared many at-risk families from sterilization. Bureaucratic delaysresulting from the subordination of the Kripos Coblenz and Trier ofces to the district ofcein Frankfurt am Main on 1 June 1944 also most likely contributed to the failure of the intendedsterilizations, at least in some cases.79 Primarily, however, these plans failed because of thedogged resistance of those concerned. They sought to delay surgery by ling petitions withvarious Reich authorities or went into hiding amid the increasing confusion of the nal monthsof war.80

Even though many planned sterilizations were not carried out, the RKPAs sterilization policyfor the most part followed the course agreed upon at the conference on 15 January 1943 until thewars end. It had been decided at the conference that once sterilization was performed, the RHFwould prepare new evaluations for those affected, classifying them as non-Gypsies to exemptthem from the special law, while still retaining the prohibitions against marriage. From Decem-ber 1944 at the latest, in such cases the RKPA operated with individual waivers,81 which effec-tively superseded previous racial and biological evaluations prepared by the RHF. The racialclassication now merged with the Kripos aim of producing an overall decision on the statusof those concerned.82 In no case, however, was Germanization, a measure also discussed at theconference in January 1943, carried out.83

75Ibid., RKPA to Cologne Kripo district ofce, June 1,1943. An identical letter, sent on May 28, 1943, to theDortmund Kripo ofce, appears in Hansjrg Riechert, Im Schatten von Auschwitz. Die nationalsozialistischeSterilisationspolitik gegenber Sinti und Roma (Mnster and New York: Waxman, 1995), p. 117.76LAV NRW, Abt. R, BR 2034/689-91, 1070f., 1010f.77Ibid., BR 2034/100, 830, 836, 1157.78Riechert, Schatten, p. 135.79Polizeibehrden vor 1945, Nr. 38, Meldeblatt der KPLSt Kln Nr. 24, July 18, 1944, LAV NRW, Abt. R.80Additional examples in Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, p. 360f.; Hans Hesse and Jens Schreiber, VomSchlachthof nach Auschwitz. Die NS-Verfolgung der Sinti und Roma aus Bremen, Bremerhaven und Nord-westdeutschland (Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 1999), pp. 102104; Peter Sandner, Frankfurt, Auschwitz. Dienationalsozialistische Verfolgung der Sinti und Roma in Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes& Apsel, 1998), p. 228f. In general, after the war began, performance of sterilizations was to continueonly in cases of especially great danger of reproduction, owing to the workload of the health caresystem. See Lewy, Verfolgung, p. 312. The priority assigned to the sterilization of Gypsies under these con-ditions is a topic that has yet to be researched on the basis of case studies. Riechert, Schatten, p. 119, assumesthat this priority remained high until the end of the war.81Example from Dec. 1, 1944, in Hesse and Schreiber, Schlachthof, p. 44. Hesse and Schreiber, ibid., pp. 4548, interpret the document as an indication of a hitherto unknown decree. Facsimile of such a statement,dated Jan. 2, 1945, in Lewy, Verfolgung, p. 309.82Ibid. The ve-gure number entered beneath the log number in the document could be the numbering cus-tomary in the evaluations.83Such a case is documented neither in the body of literature nor in the individual les in Cologne.

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In most cases, a nal decision on the subsequent treatment of those marked for deportation orsterilization was postponed to an unspecied time after the war.84 Meanwhile, medical pro-fessionals in the concentration camps conducted experiments seeking to develop faster andcheaper methods of sterilization. It was no accident that the last deportation to Auschwitz fromthe area under the Cologne Kripo district ofce in April 1944 targeted precisely those individualswho allegedly had feigned consent to sterilization but actually intended to avoid the surgery.

Despite all the resource problems, the Kripo pursued time-consuming investigations into theorigins and social adjustment of Gypsies until the wars end. With regard to these investigations,Guenter Lewy wrote, Such cases were worked on practically until the end of the war, though onemight think the authorities would have had more serious worries in those days.85 In the context ofthe practices of persecution, however, it is apparent that this process should by no means beregarded as an irrational trie. On the contrary, these efforts evidence the high value placed ona racist program of forced assimilation with regard to Sinti and Roma as a component of theReich`s policy aiming at racial purity.

The empirical ndings for the individuals registered as Gypsies in the area under the authorityof the Cologne Kripo district ofce are summarized below:

Persecution of Gypsies in the Area of the Kripos Cologne District Ofce86

May deportation (1940) 622Auschwitz (1943/1944) 414Individual deportations 59Deported: 1095

Failed deportations 25Deportation to Auschwitz deferred 68Mixed marriages 225Yeniche 30Emigrated, escaped, lived in hiding (illegally) 21Threatened: 369

Deceased 40Unaccounted for 79Others: 119

Total 1583

The vast majority, 1095 of 146487 people, or 75 percent, were deported. An additional 25percent were affected in different ways by persecution measures such as forced sterilization until the wars end, or were otherwise threatened by them until the military capitulation of Reichput an end to all plans that had been postponed to the period following the nal victory.

84This became a common justication in the individual cases in which several authorities could not agree ona uniform approach. See the example of the mail distribution clerk in Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, p. 364.85Lewy, Verfolgung, p. 310.86Fings and Sparing, Rassismus, pp. 344346. To avoid double counts, the persons deported in May 1940were placed only in this column. If they returned from the Generalgouvernement and fell victim to eitherindividual deportations or later to the Auschwitz deportation, they were not listed again in these columns.87Percentage calculated without taking into account the group labeled Others because a majority of thisgroup was also affected by measures of persecution. Among the deceased are persons who died ofnatural causes, as well as persons whose cause of death is unknown. Therefore, death due to persecutioncannot be ruled out. The Unaccounted for group includes several families known only by name; in all like-lihood they were deported in May 1940.

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Conclusion

What parallels between the Wannsee Conference or the Final Solution conferences and themeeting at the RKPA can now be observed? Their rst commonality is that top-ranking peoplefrom Himmlers organization responsible for Jewish or Gypsy policy met with representativesfrom the institutions concerned with open cases and questions that would emerge after thedeportations of the vast majority of the Jews and Gypsies deportations that already had beendecided upon. The objectives were identical on a crucial point: it was a matter of permanentlyremoving racially undesirable minorities from the Aryan ethnic community. This involvednot only their physical removal by means of deportation, but also a highly differentiated Mis-chling policy, designed to cause the greater part of the remaining group to disappear as aresult of sterilization and the rest through Germanization.

If one traces these resolution strategies further back, the prospect of a racial restructuringof the Reich becomes the focus of attention. Such reorganization had been projected in theRSHA as early as 27 September 1939, the very rst month of the war. It was outlined asfollows: (a) [relocate] Jews as quickly as possible into the towns, (b) Jews from the Reich toPoland, (c) the remaining 30,000 Gypsies to Poland as well, (d) systematic transport of theJews from the [new] German territories by freight train.88 In addition, at the previously men-tioned conference on 30 January 1940 instigated by Ehlich and others, there was renewedsupport for the plan to deport the approximately 30,000 Gypsies in the Reich.89 Even thenRitter had favored sterilization over the deportation plans, because he thought the Gypsy ques-tion could not be viewed as solved until the further propagation of this Mischling population[could be] permanently halted.90

The temporary failure of the deportation plans is well established. Instead of a nal sol-ution, for the time being partial campaigns (Teilaktionen) were carried out,91 with muchhigher priority assigned to the deportation of the Jewish population than to that of theGypsies. It is signicant, however, that both at the center (in the RSHA, including the ReichCriminal Police) and on the periphery (at the level of the local authorities) the option of a depor-tation of all Gypsies remained a real and present threat. This possibility was reinforced not inthe least by the decree limiting mobility in October 1939,92 which actually was intended as apreparatory step for general deportation. The curtailment of Gypsies freedom of movementcreated a situation that placed permanent pressure on Reich authorities, especially in thelocal administrative districts, as a stop had been put to their traditional policy of forceddisplacement.

By August 1940, however, Himmler had already declared that the evacuation of Gypsiesand Gypsy Mischlinge from the territory of the Reich would be suspended until the Jewish

88Cited from Gtz Aly, Endlsung. Vlkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europischen Juden (Frank-furt am Main: S. Fischer, 1995), p. 29f. See also Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, p. 167.89Grundstze fr die Aussiedlung von Polen, Juden und Zigeunern in das Generalgouvernement, record ofthe meeting on Jan. 30, 1940, BA Berlin, R 58/1032, fols. 3544.90Ibid., Arbeitsbericht von Dr. Robert Ritter, Jan. 1940, R 73/14005, fol. 7. Emphasis present in the orig-inal. On the dates, see Riechert, Schatten, p. 95.91For the deportation of the Jews, see the general overview by Gruner, Von der Kollektivausweisung; alsoZimmermann, Rassenutopie, pp. 165175.92Ibid., p. 187f. On 17 October 1939, the RKPA set aside days for a count of Gypsies along with animmediate freeze on their mobility, requiring them to remain in their present location whether it wasthe place of residence of the person concerned or not. This injunction remained in effect until the end ofthe war and made it easier for Kripo ofces to monitor the Gypsies and supplied grounds for individualdeportations.

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question [is] generally resolved.93 Soon after, in November 1940, he postponed the prospect ofthe nal settlement of the Gypsy question in the territory of the Reich for the postwar period.94

For the next two years, until October 1942, this remained the ofcial stance of the Reichsfhrer-SS.95

Within a few weeks, however, the situation changed, and Himmler gave the order for thedeportation of Gypsies to Auschwitz. Several factors probably contributed to this decision.First, for Himmler, the Jewish question in Germany was no longer open to debate; as hestated on 23 November 1942, it was being solved by deportation.96 Thus, the deportation ofthe Gypsies to Auschwitz appears to be a resumption of a deportation process that had beenmerely postponed. In addition, increased importance was given to the concentration camps inFall 1942, which also were under Himmlers authority. Through the increased deployment of pris-oner labor, camps were to be utilized for planning SS housing areas and for the wartime economy,and at the same time the aspect of extermination of certain groups in the camps includingGypsies received even greater emphasis.97

Against this backdrop, it is implausible to trace the 16 December 1942, deportation order backto the initiative of the SS-Ahnenerbe alone. Rather, it must be assumed that this initiative onlyinuenced the details of the deportation plans. It also should not be ruled out that the RKPA,advised by the RHF, backed the appointment of Gypsy spokesmen with the expectation thatresistance a reaction familiar from previous deportations could be circumvented in this way.98

If one thinks of the persecution of the Gypsies, like the persecution of the Jews, as neitherplanned nor designed from the start and as proceeding in an inconsistent manner, then the late1942 to early 1943 period served as a point of culmination for this persecution process. Manyfactors inuenced the development of these policies and many decision-makers with specicinterests were involved in a process that became steadily more radical as the war progressed.In this context, the meeting in January 1943 exemplies the way in which lessons learned in par-allel processes of persecution were correlated. Ehlich and Harders quite likely were involved pri-marily because a harmonization of the Mischling policies in the Reich appeared necessary afterthe deportations of the Jews and Gypsies.

93Amt des Generalgouverneurs an die Distriktchefs, Kreis- und Stadthauptleute betr. Evakuierung vonZigeunern aus dem Reich, Aug. 3, 1940, Archiv Lublin, Sygn. 203, fol. 10.94See the correspondence from 1940-1941, Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, Aktenband 364, Zug. 1975/3 IINr. 23.95An order from Himmler to refrain from any further resettlements of Gypsies for the duration of the warwas issued in October 1942 to the NSDAP in the Gau Westphalia-North. See Kriminalpolizeistelle Dort-mund an den Regierungsprsident Minden,Oct. 14, 1942, Staatsarchiv Detmold, M 1 I P no. 14578, fol. 34.96Der Dienstka