Walder - The Remaking of the Chinese Working Class

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The Remaking of the Chinese Working Class, 1949-1981Author(s): Andrew G. WalderSource: Modern China, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), pp. 3-48Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188897 .Accessed: 09/05/2013 20:30

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TheRemaking f the ChineseWorking lass, 1949-1981

ANDREW G.WALDERColumbia University

It is commonly emarked, nd with bvious ustification, hatthe working lass did not make the Chinese revolution. Anequally ustified emark s rarely eard: hat he evolution, n thecontrary, as made the Chineseworking lass. This,baldly tated,is the major thesis of this essay. The year 1949 marked sharpbreak in the continuity f Chinese working-class istory. Notonlydid it mark hebeginning f an unprecedented ccelerationin the ccumulation f both ndustrial apital nd new) ndustrialworkers, ut t ushered nthe beginnings f rapid ransformationof virtually ll aspects of working-class xistence: he size andtype f enterprises hat mployworkers; ow workers re hired,trained, nd paid; their ob security, ocial security, nd otherbenefits; ow they find housing and buy daily necessities; ndhowfirmly hey re attached o theirworkplaces nd the nature fthis ocial tie.

AUTHOR'S NOTE:An earlier version f this rticle was presented t the conference,World Labor and Social Change, cosponsored by the American Council of LearnedSocieties nd the USSR Academyof Social Sciences, nd held at the Fernand BraudelCenter, tate University f New York, Binghamton, rom January 7-29, 1983. wouldlike to thank GailHershatter, arl Riskin and Lynda Shafferfor heir ritical ommentson this arlier ersion, nd Jean Oifor manyfruitful iscussions bout abor rrangementsin rural reas. I am solely responsible or what sprinted ere.

Modern China, Vol. 10 No. 1,January 984 3-48) 1984Sage Publications, nc.

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4 MODERN CHINA / JANUAR Y 1984

Parts of this story re quite familiar. Before 1949, China'sworkers uffered rom fate common to their ounterparts nother oor nations n the fringes f the world conomy. A smallsector of "modern" industrial nterprises was dwarfed by amassive "secondary ector" of tiny workshops nd individualhandicraftsmen. ob tenure was unstable, abor turnover igh,and the numbers of unemployed were continually welled bymigration rom rural areas (Chesneaux, 1968: 48-70; 85-86).Wages were at a level that guaranteed poverty ven for theregularly mployed. Basic social security nd welfare rovisionswerenonexistent, nd labor egislationweak at best Chesneaux,1968: 71-79; 88-105).

Equally familiar s the story f the significant, ften trikingchangesmade after 949-the reorganization nd consolidationof the secondary ector of small shops; the rapid growth f amodern ndustrial ector of large enterprises, ncreasingly nheavy industry; he raising of wages; improvements n thestandard of living; attainment f extraordinary ob security;major advances in health care, ife expectancy, ocial security,and labor protection. ll of these hanges, however, avetakenplaceunder evere nd growing emographic ressures hathavelimited dvances n the past and willrequire eadjustment n thefuture. ot until ecently, ith hereleaseof the first ignificantbatch of statistics ince 1959 i.e., State Statistical ureau, 1959)on employment, opulation, and standard of living, has thisdemographic factor been entirely lear. One purpose of thisarticle s to specify owthe demographic etting orgrowth nChina has limited mprovement n the standard of living nddictated hanges npatterns fgrowth, mployment, nd welfare.

The eastfamiliar spects f his ostrevolution ransformationare the most fundamental nes. First, atterns f capital nvest-ment n China were adically ltered fter 949. Changes n flowsof capital led to marked changes in forms of industry, ndpatterns f industrialization, n a very brief period-changesmuch more rapid than anything urope experienced uring tsso-called industrial evolution see Tilly, 1981a; 1981b).Theeffects f this n working lassexperience, nd on something hat



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Wa/der CHINESE WORKING CLASS 5

might e called historical radition, were normous. Related tothis change n flows of capital was a gradual but fundamentalchange n the process f proletarianization-the rocess hroughwhich industrial wage labor emerges from a population ofsubsistence gricultural abor see Tilly, 1978).And finally, fterthese two changes had been in effect or a decade or so, a newsystem of stratification merged that sharply differentiatedsegments f the working lass and indicated heemergence f a

bureaucratically dministered tatus ociety rom he husk of theold class society. All of these changes suggest hat China after1949witnessed hebirth f the econd working lass in Chinesehistory-one created in the image of a highly centralized,industrializing ocialist tate.

REMA KINGIND USTRY, 1949-1957

Within very rief panof ightyears, hina's new ommunistregime otonlyremadeurban ndustrial roduction, ut beganhistoric transformation n the working lass itself. Privatelyownedenterprises ere ll transformed nto one form r anotherof state ownership nd control. The massive sector of smallprivateworkshops asgradually ooperativized nd nationalized,and the mallshops werephysically ombined nto cooperativesor small, state-run factories. The equally large numbers ofindividual andicraftsmenncities nd townswere ither ecruited

into small state nterprises r grouped, by trade, nto handicraftcooperatives. he state gained ncreasing ontrol ver ndustrialinvestment a control omplete by 1956) and poured resourcesinto modern, arge-scale heavy ndustry. nd by the end of thisperiod, ocalgovernments adgainednear-complete ontrol verthe hiring nd firing f workers Howe, 1971) and created newand uniform ageand ncentive olicies, nding arlier ractices.

The structure f employment n Chinese ndustry n 1949wascharacteristic f dual economies nunderdeveloped egions f he

world.Of the otalof8.9million mployed nmanufacturing hatyear, 5.7 million, r 64%,were self-employed ndividualhandi-



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Walder/ CHINESE WORKING CLASS 9

craftsmen; nother 1.6million, r 18%,worked n small privateworkshops hat mployed n average f only 13people. Only 1.4million, r 15%,worked n a sector f ndustrial nterprises withan average mployment f lmost 00)that ould be described smodern see Tables 1, 2, and 3).

By 1957, these proportions had been almost completelyreversed hrough he implementation f three measures. First,individual andicraftsmen, hosepresencewas nitially olerated

and whose numbers n fact grew to 7.6 million by 1954, werethereafter apidly organized by specialty nto small handicraftcooperatives. By 1957, only 760,000 of the individual handi-craftsmen emained see Table 1).The majority f these peopleappear to have been absorbedby cooperatives, ince he ncreasein cooperative employment oughly paralleled the decline ofindividual handicraftsmen uring this period. Yet a sizableminority, specially fter 955, ppear to have been transferredeither o state ndustry r to nonindustrial ines of employment.

Second, the mallprivate ndustrial orkshops,which rew oemploy 2.2 million by 1953, were rapidly consolidated andtransferred ostate wnership y 1956 see Tables 1and 2). Largenumbers f these mallshops still verymuch n evidence n theside streets f Hong Kong) were ombined o form new state orjoint state-private nterprises, s the rapid drop n the number fsmall hops from 34,278 n 1954 o1,037 n 1956), nd the rapidrise in the number of state and especially oint state-privateenterprises rom 1954to 1956 shows see Table 2). (The rapid

drop in the total number f ndustrial nterprises ver the sameperiod reflects he process of amalgamation.) By 1956, only14,000were mployed n these mallprivate hops, and the nextyear the category ropped out of official tatistics ntirely.

Third, as the total number f enterprises radually declinedand the averagesize of these nterprises rew, virtually ll newstate nvestment ent nto ndustry, redominantly eavy ndus-try, rather han into handicrafts. s a result, he proportionemployed n ndustrial nterprises other han mall workshops)

as a total of manufacturing mployment osefrom .4 million, r16%of the total, to 7.9 million, r 55% of the total n 1957 seeTable 1).



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In sum, n a mere years, China's manufacturing conomywastransformed rom one overwhelmingly ominated by smallworkshops nd ndividual raftsmen o one n which, or he firsttime n China's history, arge-scale, modern" ndustrial nter-prises dominated manufacturing mployment. his process,moreover, ook place in a period of unprecedented ndustrialexpansion, especially n heavy ndustry. otal employment nhandicrafts emained oughly tationary rom 949 o 1957, while

industrial mployment ore han doubled see Table 1). The netincrease f almost 6 million n total manufacturing mploymentdrew n far more han he reserves f ndividual raftsmen. ostof these ormer andicraftsmen ppear to have endedup in smallhandicraft ooperatives. his large net ncrease n employmentrepresents ew entrants o the ndustrial workforce ho camefrom hehugenumber f urban unemployed, s well s from herecent migrants rom the countryside, who were arriving nunprecedented numbers. Behind this doubling of industrial

employment as an even more rapid eap in ndustrial utput-the nnual grossvalueof ndustrial utput rew y factor f 5.5during this same period State Statistical Bureau, 1959: 177).China's industrial manufacturing as not only becomingmoremodern nd larger n scale, t was alsoexpanding normously sthe state began a massive ndustrial nvestment nd productiondrive n the growing ndustries nder ts control-a control hatwas virtually omplete y 1957.

The rapid transformation n the tructure f employment nd

in patterns f investment ad a deeper social and historicalmeaning hat s not made evident by merely iting he relevantstatistics. n Western Europe and the United States, socialhistorians ncreasingly ecognize hat he ndustrial evolution-based on modern factory roduction and a rapid takeoff fproduction nd capital ccumulation-was only he ast tep namuch onger rocess f craft-based ndustrialization n both ownand country Tilly, 1981a; 1981b). And even well into thisindustrial evolution, he modern factory was often rganized

internally long craft ines, with workers possessing all therelevant kills, rganizing nd scheduling roduction, nd con-



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Walder / CHINESE WORKING CLASS 11

tracting with management for the completion of jobs (seeMontgomery, 979:9-31; Nelson, 1975: 34-54). t was not untilafter World War that management ommonly ttained ontrolover relevant kills, eorganized he production rocess, ssertedits own control over production, cheduling, nd wages, andestablished he managerial ureaucracies hat re today ssociatedwith he modern actory Nelson, 1975).

By leaping cross the craft nd early raft-industrial tagesof

industrialization, nd directly nto the modern bureaucraticfactory tyle f production using hierarchies orrowed rom heSoviet Union), the new Chineseregime iterally reated, lmostfrom scratch, a new tradition of labor relations.' Westerntraditions were decisively haped by the long conflict etweencraft unions and management ver control of the productionprocess and over the~ hare of profits ccorded each). Whileworkers ltimately id lose the contest or ontrol ver produc-tion, their ong conflictwith management haped a tradition f

labor relations haracterized y collective argaining, trict obdefinitions, ontracts pecifying ages according o complex obgrades, and often nion control over the hiring nd training fnewworkers see Sabel, 1982; Cole, 1979:101-109).n China, onthe ontrary, herewasnever ny question fworker ontrol verproduction fter 949,or evenof workers ontesting or ontrol.Thesmall oreof killed ndustrial orkerswere wamped uringthe 1950sbynewrecruits o ndustry.2 anagement herefore idnot need to seize control over the production rocess and the

skills nvolved: t created he production rocess nd called ntobeing and trained new mass of workers. he state tself ookover the task of hiring nd remunerating ew workers; prioragreements with regard to wages, apprenticeships, nd hiringwere ll suspendedwith he stablishment f ocal labor bureausand the final wagereform f 1956,whichput all workers nderthe ame set ofregulations. n allof this, nmarked ontrast otheUnited States and western Europe, workers were essentiallypassive participants n the making of the new institutions hat

determined heir aily existence.



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12 MODERN CHINA /JANUAR Y 1984

From comparative istorical erspective, he ransformationsof the 1950screated the social basis for a tradition f laborrelations marked by worker ependence nd managerial ater-nalism.3Unlikeworkers lsewherewho confronted anagementfor control of production, China's industrial workforce waslargely creation f state-directed anagement; nstead f beinga skilled workforce with proprietary ontrol over skills, tech-niques, and training, he bulk of Chineseworkers y the mid-1950shad entered hefactory ithout kills nd experience, ndwere trained en masse by management. nstead of havingcohesive craft unions, effective ollective rganization, nd atradition f resistance nd common onsciousness, hina's newindustrial workforce treamed nto factories without ommonorganization nd past tradition, nd was absorbed- y official,party-controlled company unions," whose function t was todistribute enefits, ron out conflicts, nd prevent rganizedopposition. acking ontrol ver rucial esources nd a capacityfor collective organization, workers herefore ere markedlydependent n official argesse, oth politically nd economically.Some have suggested hat the system f labor relations thatresulted epresents he nfluence f "Chinesetradition" Howe,1971;Brugger, 976), but t s possible hatwhatweunderstand sChinese tradition would look quite different oday without hesweeping nstitutional hanges f the 1950s.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC SETTINGAND ITS IMPACT

The changeswe have ust described, s important s they re,represent nlypart of the picture.No account f the remaking fthe working lass after 1949 would be complete without nanalysis f hedemographic etting or ndustrialization nChina.Asinvirtually ll other reindustrial ocieties, hina'spopulationwas overwhelmingly ural at the start of its period of rapidindustrial rowth. ut completely nlikevirtually ll of ts non-



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Walder CHINESE WORKINGCLASS 13

Asian counterparts, hina already had an extensive etwork flarge ities, nd a large, ensely ettled ural opulation upportedby a highly roductive, abor-intensive ystem f agriculture. nthe early 1950s,moreover, he population was growing t anincreasing ate. The end of decades of war and civil strife, herevival f the conomy, nd the mergence f n era ofpeaceandstability timulated ncreased otal fertility ates,while mprove-ments n public health nd famine elief oweredmortality ates.

All of this meant hat Chinacould not repeat hedemographicexperiences f earlier ndustrializing ations. t could not affordto urbanize rapidly nthe ourse of ndustrial rowth, ecause tscitieswere lready ery arge, ts rural opulationmassive, nd tsrural rates of population growth very high. The demographicsituation was thus worlds part from Europe at- he start f itsperiod of rapid growth. No matter ow rapid the rate of urbanindustrial rowth, he shift f population from griculture oindustry ould not be expected to reduce significantly hepercentage f the population hat wasemployed n agriculture nthe near future. n other words, China could not, in the nearfuture, movefrom eing predominantly ural ociety obeingpredominantly rban one. The demographic ituation ompelleda different ask: to prevent rural-to-urban migration fromswamping hecitieswith ob seekers n need of employment ndhousing, nd to reduce unemployment mong and improve hewelfare f the existing rban population Davis, 1975).

This demographic etting had an enormous mpact on thereshaping f the working lass that wasquite ndependent f theinstitutional hanges f the 1950s. t resulted, y the early 1960s,in a strict ystem f control ver ll migration rom ural o urbanareas, as well as severe imits n the ob mobility f workers. tpresented he planned conomywith growing abor surplus hatcontinually hreatened o outrace the capacity of industry oabsorb labor. It dictated he adoption, by the late 1950s,of a"high employment, ow wage" policy, under which dditions othe labor force took precedence over increases n the average



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TABLE 4Urban Population Growth, 1940-1979 (in millions)

Urban As % ofYear Population Total Population

1949 57.6 10.6%1950 61.1 11.2%

1957 99.0 15.4%1958 107.2 16.2%

1960 130.7 19.8%

1965 101.7 14.0%

1970 102.3 12.4%

1975 111.7 --1976 113.4 12.2%

1979 128.6 13.2%

SOURCE: Zhang and Chen (1981: 40-41).

wage. It led to a two-decadepolicy of austerity ith regard oimprovements n workers' tandard of living. And it led to theemergence f a new, tablepattern fdualism nemployment hatfroze nto place some rather triking ectoral nequalitieswithinthe working lass tself. hese outcomes, o intimately elated othe demographic etting, illoccupyus for rest f this rticle.

During the period we have ust examined, n which he newChineseregimewas still onsolidating ts ontrol oth overurbanindustry and therefore mployment pportunities) nd overagriculture the collectivization f agriculture as not completeduntil 1956,the communesnot formed until 1958),rural-urbanmigration was not yet under ontrol. This migration ortendedsevere nd chronic ocialproblems f nothing was done to curtailit. China's urban population ncreased xplosively n the eight



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Walder CHINESE WORKING CLASS 15

years rom 949to 1957,nearly oubling, rom 7.6 million o99million see Table 4). Over half 56%) of this total ncreasewasdue to migration, nd this greatly ompounded the 32% rise nurban population that was due solely o natural ncrease Zhangand Chen, 1981:40). This uncontrolled migration bstructedprogress toward reducing urban unemployment, which wasbetween 18%and 31%in 1949 Hou, 1968:369). Hou estimatesthat despite ignificant eductions nunemployment rom 949 o

1953,unemployment ad reached ts former evelsby 1957. And,based on figures or the city of Shanghai, Howe (1971:39) hasestimated hat out of a total of 1.31 million new entrants o thecity's abor force from 1949to 1957, obs were found for only640,000,or somewhat ess than half. Migration rom ural reaswaspreventing apid ndustrial rowth rom esulting nsustainedreductions n the unemployment ate.

The problem clearly ould be alleviated only by addressingthree ariables imultaneously: y stemming ural-urbanmigra-

tion by curtailing natural ncreases; by bringing ertility atesrapidly nder ontrol n both ity nd countryside; nd byrapidlyexpanding employment pportunities hrough ontinual eco-nomic growth, especially in labor-intensive ectors. Such astrategy was temporarily iscarded during the Great LeapForward of 1958-1960,which oncentrated xclusively n a vastincrease in industrial mployment nd on an unprecedentedeffort t massive mobilization f abor for capital constructionand accumulation. Employment n industry hot up from 7.9

million o 23.7 million rom 957 o 1958 lone Emerson, 1965a:130),with most of the ncrease n abor power oming rom uralmigrants. By all accounts, unemployment as reduced drasti-cally-in Hou's lower estimate 1968:369),it was reduced from19.5%to 0.3%of the malenonagricultural opulation from 957to 1958. Accordingly, heurban population balloonedunder heforce f this cceleratedmigration. t increased by 8.2 million n1957-1958alone, and by 1960, China's urban population hadreached 130.7million, n ncrease f 32% na mere years.Ofthis

increase, 90% was due to migration Zhang and Chen, 1981:40-41).At this point China's urban population omprised 9.8%



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16 MODERN CHINA / JANUA R Y 1984

of the total, the highest egree of urbanization n the nation'shistory, ot equaled in subsequentyears.

The mushrooming ndustrial rowth nvisaged y heplannersof the Great Leap Forward never ccurred-worse, t created neconomic -swell s a demographic risis.Muchof the reportedlymassive ncreases n output werefalsified nd a large proportionof the actual increases were comprised of flawed or uselessproducts hat created dditional problems or heir users. Vast

and uncontrolled ncreasesnthe abor bill, n capital onstruction,and in the ordering f materials eft the industrial ystem nfinancial haos. Labor productivity hrank, wasteof capital andrawmaterials hot pward, while ational upplies were xhaustedin the initial rapid mobilization. A serious shortage f usablemachinery, pare parts, nd industrial aw materials eveloped.The hoped for explosion of productivity ed instead to animplosion, s worsening hortages f materials, arts, nd capitaldictated utbacks nd plant closings.

The ensuing ndustrial epressionmeant hat he Great LeapForward not only failed to solve the urban unemploymentproblem, ut greatly ggravated t. The problem was no longerone of restricting igration rom rural areas while graduallyincreasing mployment. fter 1960, ndustry nderwent con-traction f a magnitude lmost equal to the expansion of 1958.Employment n all state owned units, for which we have acomplete statistical eries, ndicates a rapid retrenchment opre-1958 employment evels (Figure 1). Plant closings and

reorganizations ere of a scale such that as late as 1965,therewere till fewer tate ector ndustrial nterprises hanthere hadbeen in 1956 (see Figure 2). The problem was not to restrictfurther migration, but to remove excess urban labor forcethrough massive, nforced ut-migrations o rural reas. From1960 to 1965, the urban population was reduced from 130.7million o 101.7million, hereduction f 29 million epresentingan excess of out-migration ver natural ncrease see Table 4).Workers dled by layoffs r the disbanding f their nterprises

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From this time forward, migration ontrols were enforcedvigorously, specially with regard to large coastal cities. Acomplete rban household registration ystemwas established ncities, n which egal registration astied o rations or grain ndother oodstuffs the rationing ystem asremained n force orwidevariety f foodstuffs nd-daily ecessitieso the present ay),and coupled with system f household esidencenspections ylocal neighborhood ommittees see White, 978). llegalmigrantsto the ities were o be deprived otonly fjobs, but also of food.In rural areas, the completed ollectivization f agriculture n1957had madepossible related se offood rationing okeep hepopulation on the and. In order o receivebasic grain rations,peasants had to be present orwork n their roduction eams.Theycould not be absent from heir eams nd still receive rainwithout heir eam eader'spermission. f one family memberwasabsent, it also reduced family ncome and food allotmentsthrough work point systems see Oi, 1983; Parish and Whyte,

1978).The result was to create thorough ystem f enforcementthat ied peopleto rural nd urban tatuses hat hey ttained tbirth.4

The subsequent rowth oth of China's urban population ndof ts urban working lass has been due almost olely onaturalincrease r, more ccurately, o the xcessofnatural ncrease vernet ut-migration rom he ities.By 1964,whenmost f the ruralmigrants f the Great Leap Forward had been relocated n ruralareas, natural ncrease had begun to add increasing umbers f

youths o the labor force as the large postrevolution, ostwarbaby boom birth ohorts began to reach working ge (see Ivoryand Lavely, 1977). Thus began the policy of relocating rbanyouths n rural and border reas to keep them off urban abormarkets see Bernstein, 977; White, 1978).During the decadeafter 965, n whichurban population grewfrom 101 million o11 million, herewasa net out-migration f 5 million youths 16million elocated nd a reverse low of 11 million, mostly fter1971;see Zhang and Chen, 1981: 40-41). The more rapid urban

growth f recent ears 14 million et ncrease rom 976 o 1979)



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20 MODERN CHINA / JAN UAR Y 1984

has been due to a large return low f resettled ouths eclaimingtheir rban status see Gold, 1980; Zhang and Chen, 1981).

This demographic ituation has meant that, for the ast twodecades, rural residents have not been able to join the urbanindustrial abor force (industry has, however, come to thecountryside o a significant xtent, topic we will return obelow).It has meant, with he entry f the arge post-1949 irthcohorts nto the abor force, hat urban ndustrial mployment

has become very difficult o attain, ven for people with urbanresidence tatus. The average size of age cohorts ntering heurban abor force achyearhas ncreased rom essthan 1millionin the early 1950sto over 3 million urrently. uring the FirstFive Year Plan (1953-1957), n average of 950,000young peopleentered he abor force ach year, nd almost all were providedwith obs, most n the rapidly growing tate sector Feng andZhao, 1982: 125). The figure rew to an annual average of 2million during he decade from 1966-1976, ringing fforts o

divert total of 17 million eopleto rural nd border reas Fengand Zhao, 1982: 126).5 As time passed, a permanent obassignment n the state sector became more rare. By 1977, theranks of the 3 million urban youths eachingworking ge eachyear were swelled by a return low of urban youths from hecountryside. his means hat million eoplehavebeen nteringthe urban abor force nnually ince 1977 Feng and Zhao, 1982:131). The types of jobs they are finding eflect he growinginability f tate nterprises o absorb them. n 1980, nly 7%of

those who found mployment ere ssigned ostate nterprises,43% were assigned to collective nterprises, % became self-employed a resurgence f the old individual aborer or he firsttime ince the socialization of industry-see Table 5), and 14%weregiven emporary obs (China Almanac, 1981:357).Over 11million of the recent entrants o the labor force remainedunemployed (China Almanac, 1981:357).6In sum, not only has itbecomealmost mpossible orrural esidents o move to cities, thas also become increasingly ifficult or urban residents o

secure tate ector mployment.



20/47

Walder CHINESE WORKING CLASS 21

TABLE 5Self-Employed Individuals in the Urban Economy, 1952-1981

As percentageNumber of total collective

Year (millions) and state employment

1952 8.83 55.l1?1953 9.0

1956 1.01 3.4%

1957 1.041958 1.5

1965 1.71 3.4%

1975 .24 0.3%

l 79 .32 0.3%1980 .81 0.7%1981 1.13 1.0%

SOURCES: 1952,1957,1965,1975,1979: Economic Yearbook (1981: VI-7). 1980:Economic Yearbook (1981: VI-30). 1953, 1956, 1958: Feng and Zhao (1982:130).

1981: State Statistical Bureau (1982: 105).

These demographic ealities, ombined with he efforts f ahighly entralized ocialist tate ograpplewith hem, pelled heend in China of the broader world-historical rocess-prole-tarianization-that has generated modern ndustrial workingclass over the past several centuries. This three-step rocess,involving he xpropriation f rural producers, reclassificationof rural population from peasant to wage laborer, and the

transfer f rural population ourban reas Tilly, 1978)has beenchanged n complexways.The expropriation f ndividual uralproducerswaseffectively ompletedwith he xtensive ollectivi-zation of agriculture n the ate 1950s, nd peasants became, neffect, age aborers n collective arming nits paid wages bothin cash and in kind).

With regard o these first wo steps, herefore, he process ofproletarianization ouldappear to have beenbrought apidly oitshistorical ulmination. he third tep f he process, owever-

the ransfer f population rom ural o urban reas-was halted



21/47

22 MODERN CHINA / JANUAR Y1984

and in some periods reversed. s a result, ince the early 1960s,almost ll of he growth nChina'surban ndustrial orkforce ascome from he natural ncrease of the urban population, andthere s some evidence which we will present hortly) hat newmembers f the urban ndustrial orkforce omedisproportion-ately from working lass families. The taming of the trans-formative ower fmarkets nd capitalism as been ccomplishedby a bureaucratic ystem hat hannelsmobility nto the narrow

bounds of a status ystem ased on residence nd birth.

TRENDS IN WELFARE AND STANDARD OF LIVING

Thesedemographic ealities aveshaped trends n welfare ndin standard f iving s well.Theperiod mmediately fter 957, nwhich he urban population risis ame to a head, saw a decisiveshift n wage and employment atterns, nd a slowing f rapid

improvements n wage levelsand standard of living. After hispoint, the government witched o what t called a "low wage,high employment" olicy. Wage raises, which had led to rapidincreases n the averagewagesof workers rom 949-1957,werecurtailed. uture ncreases n the nation's wagebillwere eservedfor ncreases nthe ize of he abor force. tate policy tressed hecreation f obs, not ncreases n rates of remuneration rates ofcapital accumulation remained high). As a result, he averageannual wage for tate ndustrial mployees ellby 58 yuan over

the wodecades fter 957, nd tdropped ven more recipitouslyfrom peak of741yuan n 1964 o632yuan n 1977 seeFigure ).(The drop n the veragewagereflects dditions othe abor forceat the bottom wagegrades, with general freeze or most otherworkers t their xisting ates of pay.) When adjustments remade for ncreases n the cost of iving State Statistical ureau,1982:403, column 2), there was a drop in the average realindustrial wage of 19.4%for heperiod from 1957to 1977, nd16.5% for heperiod from 964to 1977. The trend was reversed

only fter national ecision n 1977 o devote larger ortion fthe tate budget o the wage bill, yet n real terms veragewages



22/47

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stillhavenot returned o their 956-1957evels see AppendixA.)A similar rend ffected ousing pace-an important omponentof the tandard f iving. he averageper capita housing pace nurban reas declinedby20%from n already rowded .3squaremeters er person n 1952 o3.6square meters n 1977 Zhou andLin, 1980). Again, only after recent policy changes stressinginvestment n new housing stock and reductions n capitalconstruction as this rend een reversed.7

Population growth as also put continuous ressure n foodsupplies. As of 1977,China's average per capita daily caloricintake, orboth urban and rural reas, was 2,105-a figure hatput t ust ahead of ndia, but ust behind Sri Lanka, and morethan 100 calories behind ndonesia nd Pakistan. Moreover, hisnumber has slightly eclined n the two decades since 1957 seeWorld Bank, 1981,Annex B: 12-13).Whilefood consumption scertainly igher orurban workers hanfor he verage peasant,theworkers'diet asremained spartan ne. Rationing f lmost

the entire rray of foodstuffs except vegetables nd fruits) asbeen in force throughout his period, and rations are set lowenough orequire arge djustments epending n whether r notan employee ngages nphysically emanding abor that equiresmore calories. While in principle t has been possible to buyadditional foodstuffs t unregulated and much higher) prices,private lots and free markets were o severely estricted rior o1978that supplies were often imply unavailable. Before thelegalization f private markets n 1978,black market oodstuffs

were several times the state-set rice, f they could be found.Rationed amounts werenot too different rom ctual consump-tion. While the situation has improved ince then, finding ndbuying ufficient uantities f meat, vegetables, ooking il, andcoal remains dailypreoccupation or he verageurban family.

The trend f slowedprogress n past decades has also affectedChina'sgenerouswelfare nd abor nsurance rovisions or tatesector mployees. tate enterprises rovide lmost otal ecurityfor their mployees:virtually uaranteed ifetime mployment,

complete disability ompensation, aid sick leave, fully paidmedical arefor mployees nd subsidized ervice or ependents,



24/47


generous etirement ensions, eath benefits or urviving amilymembers, oans for mployees n financial rouble, nd paymentof funeral osts Kallgren, 969;Korzec and Whyte, 981).Stateenterprises, urther, ften provide housing for significant er-centages f heir mployees, suallyhaveplant hospitals,medicalclinics, or referral ervices to nearby hospitals, and usuallyprovide meal halls, kindergartens, nd day-care centers. Thisbroad range of services nd benefits ost the state budget ome

527 yuan per state sector worker n 1978, an amount equal to82% of the average state sector wage that year (EconomicYearbook, 1981:IV-34). State enterprises ave generally eenable to mprove he ervices rovided oemployees ver he years,becausefixed percentages f factory arnings re automaticallyreinvested n these amenities. The demographic etting hasaffected hedelivery f these generous welfare rovisions ot byforcing utbacks, but by making tate sector mployment ro-gressively more difficult o obtain. As the proportion f the

working population employed n the state sector declines, hespread of these ervices lows,and perhaps s reversed.All of these trends would mean stagnant r worsening iving

standards over past decades were it not for changes in theemployment patterns within urban family households. Theproportion f urban residents ainfully mployedhas increasedsteadily since 1949. In 1957, 30% of urban residents wereemployed. By 1980, this figure had surpassed 50% (Gongrenribao, 1981).8This means that while average family ize has

undergone ittle etchange see Table 6), the veragenumber femployed amilymembers as nrcreasedignificantly, nd depen-dency ratios have plummeted. n 1957,each urban wageearnersupported 2.3 dependents; n 1980,each supported ess than 1dependent. As a result, verage per capita income increasedconsiderably rom 957 to 1980,perhaps by a magnitude f 50%or more n real terms see Table 6).9

Surveys completed during the 1920s suggest the Chineseworking-class amily f that era was primarily small nuclear

family f around 4 members, n which n average f more han 2memberswere mployed Chesneaux, 1968:109-112;Whyte nd



25/47

26 MODERN CHINA / JANUARY 1984

TABLE 6Family Data for Urban Wage Earners, Selected Years

YEAR

1957 1964 1980

Average Family Size 4.4 5.3 4.3

Average No. Employed FamilyMembers 1.3 1.6 2.4

DIpendents per Wage Earner 2.3 2.4 .8

Avt- age Per Capita MonthlyIncome (Constant 1957 yuan) 21.0 IS.3 34.2

Averaqce D..sposable Per CapitaIncomm (Constant 1957 yuan) 19.6 17.0 30.1

SOURCE: Economic Yearbook (1981: VI-25). Calculations of wage values inconstant 1957 yuan based on Appendix A.NOTE: These annual data are based on separate urban surveys using differentsamolina frames. The data therefore are not strictly omparable, and do notindicate a continuous trend. We can take these data as being only roughlyindicative of overall trends in per capita income.

Parish, 1984: Ch. 6, Table 12). The prosperity f the familydepended directly n the number f employed amilymembers(Chesneaux,1968:109-112).Thepast20 years n China have seenan intensification f this raditional attern, ith ittle hange nthe proportion f nuclear nd extendedhouseholds Whyte ndParish, 1984). But urban families, ncludingworking-class ami-lies, have undergone a process of "economic involution" toenhancegeneral iving tandards hat s similar n some respectsto the abor-absorbing atterns f development orwhichGeertz(1965)coinedthe term agricultural nvolution." Recent ncomesurveys have made it clear that ust as for the 1920sfamiliessurveyed, t s the number f familymembers mployed nd notthe average wage that leads to income differences mongcontemporary amilies see Table 7). And it s by ncreasing hepercentage mployed that families have been able to cope.Especiallyfor the state sector worker, ocialismhas made the



26/47

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27/47

28 MODERN CHINA / JANUARY 1984

enterprise he entral ocus f welfare rovisions nd the deliveryof services, but it has also made the nuclear (and partiallyextended) family he locus of worker strategies o enhancepersonal onsumption nd standards f iving.

SOCIALIST DUALISM: THE NEWHIERARCHY OF INDUS TRIALLABOR

China's demography as not only restrained ncreases n thestandard f iving nd required ery trict ontrols n migrationand ob mobility. t hasat the ametime ed to the development fa rather ronounced orm f economicdualism-quite different,to be sure, from he kind of dualism still evident n 1949.Thenumber f potential ntrants nto the ndustrial abor force hasfar outstripped he ability f the favored urban state sector oabsorb abor. Thishas ed,first, othe growth f separate ector

of urban collective enterprises hat is descended from thehandicraft ooperatives f the 1950sbut s increasingly nvolvedin small-scale ndustrial roduction. his had led, second, o theestablishment f mall-scale ollective ndustries n rural reas toabsorb the surplus labor power of people who in anothereconomic regime would have migrated o the cities n search ofnonagricultural mployment. And this has led, third, o thewidespread use of various kinds of temporary abor in urbanindustry. n each of these nstances, hepay evels nd benefits f

employment re considerably essthan n the urban tate ector.

Thishierarchical attern sevenmore triking hen neconsidersthat here svery ittle mobility mong mployment ectors, ndthat the structure f inequality s a whole, given the currentdemographic ressures, s likely oremain ntact, f not virtuallyfrozen, t least nto the twenty-first entury.

RURAL WORKERSIN COMMUNEINDUSTRY

At the bottom f China'shierarchy f ndustrial abor aresome

20 million residents of rural communes1O ho are paid in



28/47

Walder/ CHINESE WORKING CLASS 29

cash an averageof374yuan nnually n 1980), nd sometimes nkind, for heir work n small-scale, ollectively wned ndustrialenterprises perated byrural ommunes nd brigades EconomicYearbook, 1981: IV-55). They work n some 767,000of thesesmall rural enterprises 80.6% of the nation's total industrialenterprises), ach of which employs an average of 26 people.These employees produced roughly 10%of the nation's grossvalue of industrial utput n 1980 Economic Yearbook, 1981:

IV-55).'They have rural residence tatus nd receive heir rainrations from heirproduction eamson the commune. A smallminority eside n small towns under commune urisdiction, r"collective villages" jitizhen), nd do not participate n agri-cultural production. People with rural residence tatus are notpermitted omigrate ocities r to seekpermanent mploymentin the state sector or urban collective nterprises, here wagesand working onditions re much better. hey an participate nthese favored urban sectors only as temporary, easonal, or

contract aborers a separate status category o be discussedshortly). ositions n local small-scale nterprises, owever, rehighly valued by rural residents, ecause this brings majorincrease n the family's ash ncome. And these positions llowthe ommune member oescapethe lements nd the drudgery ffield abor, which s still argely nmechanized.

While opportunities or local industrial employment angreatly oost family ash income, n most cases the majority ffamily needs are still met by the family's rivate agricultural

sideline production livestock, egetables), hegrain and otherfood rations distributed y the production eam, and the cashincome distributed t the end of the year Parish and Whyte,1978: 59-7 ).Employment n ocalenterprises, urthermore, anbe quite temporary nd irregular, epending n the decisions fthe brigade or team leaders, on seasonal labor demands inagriculture nd n the mall nterprise, nd on business rends orthe nterprise's roducts.A minority f he rural workersmaybeable to stay on a near-permanent asis in their industrial

positions, ut most ontinue o work n agriculture t eastpart fthe year American Rural, 1977: 216-218). Peasants cannot be



29/47


released to work n these ocal industrial oncerns without hepermission f their eam leaders, and often his permission sobtained onlywith he understanding hat hepersonwillreturnduring he peak harvest eason if needed.12 he wide array ofwelfare enefits, ervices, nd insurance rovisions rovidedbystate nterprises or heir mployees, urther, re simply navail-able nthese mall ommune actories. he commune dministra-tion still bears responsibility orwelfarematters, nd the rural

worker's reatment n this respect s at the same level as theaverage ommune easant's,which s well belowurban ndustrialstandards n every espect.

RURAL TEMPORARY WORKERS

In addition o those employed n local small-scale ndustries,another nine million rural residents re able to find emporaryemployment n arge nd small urban enterprises f all types, n

terms anging rom he egalto the overt State Council,1982).3This is a very diverse and shadowy group, and governmentstatistics n its earnings, f such statistics xist, re simply notavailable.The earnings obe had from emporary ork n urbanenterprises omewhat xceedthose nthe rural ndertakings, utemployment smore rregular. he paths aken o find hesejobs,and the terms f employment nvolved, ary normously. uralworkersmayfind obs individually r commune fficialsmay ctas brokers. The workers may have fixed ndividual or group

contracts, r no contracts t all; they may work n a singleplacefor a week, or stay on for years. The bewildering ariety ftemporary obs stems from he informal nd often uasi-legalnature of the arrangements, hich are largely utside of stateregulation nd planning. he unifying eatures f his ategory femployment re that he workers re residents f rural ommunesand are outside f official lant mployment osters egulated ystate plans Walder, 1981:23-28).

One common form f temporary abor is seasonalwork jijie

gong) or casual labor (san gong) in nearby state-run county ormunicipal nterprises. his often ccupies peasants during he



30/47

Walder CHINESE WORKINGCLASS 31

slack agricultural eason, when there s a large demand forseasonal labor in enterprises hat process food or cash crops-especially otton pinning, ugar refining nd paper-making, heprocessing of oil-bearing lants and seeds, and the milling fgrain. The worker must normally get permission rom teamleaders to be absent during hisperiod nd must usually rrangeto pay part of the wages nto production eam coffers.

A second common form f temporary work, contract abor

(hetonggong), s more ommon n the ommunes hat urroundurban centers. State enterprises ccasionally have short-termlabor needs hat xceed heir lanned abor llocation. Theyoftenmake arrangements ithnearby ommune fficials oallocateafixed number f workers or a contracted eriod, usually fromone to six months, ut ometimes or s long s three ofive ears.These ob opportunities re allocatedamongvariousproductionteams, with he ommune, rigade, r team depending n whichlevelof eadership rranged he ontract) eeping percentage f

the contract worker's wage. These workers usually do heavyphysical abor-excavation, construction, oving nd hauling-that hepermanent mployees f the nterprise annot be sparedto do. A variation f this s "rotation abor" lunhuan gong), nwhich a contracted evel of rural workers s maintained n anurban nterprise y brigade r commune hat ssignsworkers othem n a rotating asis.

A third common form s a type of outside contract work(waibao gong) nwhich state ndustrial nterprise ontracts ith

a construction eam made up of rural workers o complete ajob-usually construction, xcavation, or moving nd hauling.The enterprise may or may not organize he work and providematerials nd tools,depending n the ircumstances. he head ofthe construction eamwillbe paid and will distribute hecash tothe workers often fter aying percentage o team or brigadeaccounts, nd sometimes fter aying ribes olocal officials). fthe construction eam was organized by the rural productionteam eaders themselves, hemoney s turned ver entirely o a

brigade r team, n which asethe workersmay be paid partly nwork points.'4



31/47


Whatever orm his abor may take-and the variations reseemingly ndless-this diverse roup of workers as importantfeatures n common. While they an greatly ncrease heir ashincome hrough utside abor, hey nd their amilies re still iedto the production eam'sagricultural conomy nd its year-enddistributions. hey depend on team or brigade leaders forpermission oengage n outsidework, nd they sually urn verportions f their wagesto team offers n return or rain ations.

Their onnectionwith he tate nterprise s tenuous nd usuallybrief. They are not eligible for any of the fringe benefitspermanent tate workers normally eceive, xcept for limitedlabor insurance while they re employed.As residents f ruralcommunes, hey re officially enied heopportunity obecomepermanent tate mployees.

URBANTEMPORARY WORKERS

A third istinct roup mong China'sworkers re the roughlyfour million urban residents who engage n temporary ork nstate ector ndustrial nterprises. 5Unlike herural emporaries,these people do not have agricultural ouseholds nd thereforedo not have the lternative ources f ivelihood hat gricultureaffords hefamilies f their ural ounterparts. o maintain heirlivelihood, heymust work ontinuously nstate nterprises, ndtheir ncome rises or falls n direct roportion o the amount oftime hey re employed. ut nother espects, heir osition nthe

state enterprise s similar o that of rural emporaries. hey areoutside f the nterprise's lanned fficial oster nd receive nlypartial abor insurance nd benefits.

Urban temporaries re allocated,hired, nd compensated n awidevariety f ways that reflect he emiregulated ature f theactivity. hey often work under oral or written ontracts hatrangeup to oneyear n ength, lthough omework s casual daylaborerswith no fixed erms f employment. any, specially nthe arger ities, re allocated through bureaucratic ystem or

registering t labor service stations n their neighborhoods.



32/47


Municipal labor bureaus serve as a clearinghouse, equestingtemporary workers romneighborhoods nd assigning hem oenterprises hat have filed requests for temporaries. ome,however, find these obs through asual inquiries or personalconnections, especially with the smaller enterprises. Urbantemporaries re usually paid a fixed wagethat s set by custom,generally t the rate of a grade two permanent orker-slightlybelow the average pay for manual workers n the 1970s. Butveteran, killed emporariesmay be classified t higher ates hatare fixed n their iles t labor bureaus.

While urban temporary mployment s quite varied, urbantemporaries iffer rom heir rural counterparts n importantways. First, they re more dependent on their wages for theirlivelihood, aving o rural household ncome o fall backon, andtherefore heymust be more ontinuously mployed n ndustry.Second, they re more ikely o be skilled nd integrated nto hecore production rocess.One major source ofdemand for urbantemporaries s in heavy ndustrial lants during he hot summermonths, whenpermanent tate workers ake advantage of theirpaidsick eave n argenumbers. hird, ecause urban emporariesdo not have periodic bligations oreturn o communes oworkand often have nformally cquired skillsvalued by enterprises,the more diligent nd obedient mong them re more ikely ohave their eriods f employment xtended ndefinitely. t is notunusual for urban temporaries o work for many years at thesamefactory. nd finally, ecausethey avean urban household

registration nd can maintain heir amilies n urban reas, thesetemporaries re far more likely to be hired eventually y anenterprise s part of the permanent abor force.16While theseopportunities re relatively are, some workers have used thisemployment tatus as a stepping tone to later employment nstate ndustry. Most havenot, however, nd recent mploymenttrends that have made permanent ob assignments n stateindustry rogressively ore difficult o obtain will make thisstatus long-term ne for n ever-growing roportion f young

urban residents.'7



33/47

34 MODERN CHINA / JA NUAR Y 1984

URBAN WORKERSIN COLLECTIVEENTERPRISES

A fourth tatus group among China's industrial workers rethe 15 million urban residents who make a living as regularemployees f ollective nterprises dministered y own, ounty,and municipal overnments. here re currently ome I1,000 fthese enterprises, nd they range n size from mall handicraftcollectives mploying few ozenpeopleto medium-size actoriesthat manufacture mall machines or fabricated metal parts,employing s many as 1,000people. As a group, they have anaverageof 134 mployees. heseenterprises, specially he argerones,are often ubsidized n somewayby ocal governments, uttheir workers re not paid according o official tate pay scales,and they are not fully overed by the same regulations hatprovide abor insurance nd welfare enefits or tate workers.The result s a complex patchwork f payment ystems ndbenefits, ut n general,wages, nd especially enefits, re ower

thanthose of permanent tate employees.The average annual

wage in collective nterprises as 622 yuan in 1981, ess thanthree-fourths f the average wage of a permanent worker n astate nterprise seeTable 8).

Theemployment f ollective orkers, nlike hat f emporaryworkers, s usually ong-term, nd the arger nd more table theenterprise, hemore ermanent he mployment s n fact, fnot nlaw. Benefits nd welfare rovisions lso varywithin his ector,but are n most asesquite imited elative othe tate ector. Thesmaller ollectives, specially he mallest 0%run byurban treetcommittees China Almanac, 1980:293), rarely provide morethan a small wage and relatively table employment. argercollective nterprises un by county r municipal overnments,which ypically mploybetween 100 and 400people,pay higherwages and provide the worker with imited orms f accidentinsurance, ick eave, nd retirement enefits. he argest ollectiveenterprises, hich, ike state ector nterprises, re usually fullyintegrated nto ocalindustrial lanning ystems nd which ftenemploy over 1,000, may also provide some of the benefitsroutinely ccorded state workers-a meal hall with subsidized



34/47

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35/47

36 MODERN CHINA / JAN UAR Y 1984

food, medical linic, nd various kinds fwage upplements seeLiu et al., 1980:20;79-85).

Collective nterprises mploy igniflcantly arger roportionsof young peopleand housewives han tate ector nterprises. n1981,57%of the mployees n this ector werefemale,while hestate ector figure as 32%(State Statistical ureau, 1982:121).The smaller he nterprise, hegreater heproportion f femalesand youth. The rising ates of abor force articipation n urban

areasover he past decadeshave been due in argemeasure o themobilization of nonparticipating emales nto this sector es-pecially t the street nd neighborhood evel). Since the demo-graphic queezebegan to affect tate ector mployment ppor-tunities, ncreasinglyargenumbers fyouths ave been placed ncollective nterprises ach year. These enterprises re currentlythe most common destination or new entrants nto the laborforce43% of those given obs were assigned to collectiveenterprises n 1980 China Almanac, 1981:537).

Onceone is assigned oa collective nterprise, nly n the veryrarest f circumstances an one subsequently e assigned statejob. Rural residents cannot obtain permanent tate sectoremployment ecauseof residence estrictions. ut another ir-cumstance blocks the upward mobility f the collective ectorworker. The state will assign each worker nly one ob. If thatassignment srejected, r f he worker ater esigns, he tate willassume no responsibility or a subsequent assignment. Mostcollective ector positions are considered official ssignments.

Therefore, collective ector worker assomewhat esshopethanan urban temporary f eventually ttaining tate ector mploy-ment. A significant umber of youths who are awaiting obassignments this can take several years at present) work tem-porarily n the smallest ollectives.But once a young worker sofficially ssigned collectiveob, that worker, iven urrent obopportunities, ill probably remain n the collective ector forlife.



36/47

Walder/ CHINESE WORKINGCLASS 37

PERMANENT WORKERS IN STATE ENTERPRISES

The argest tatus roup mong China'sworkers, he 4 millionpermanent mployees f state ndustrial nterprises,'8 s the onlyone of these groups to participate ully n China's welfare tate.There are economic reasons for this. These workers, whocomprise only 42% of the total ndustrial workforce, roduced75% of the country's ross value of industrial utput n 1981.

Their average annual wage, 854 yuan, was almost 40% higherthan that of the averagecollective ector worker, nd well overtwice he verage or emporary orkers nd workers ncommuneindustry see Table 8). Perhaps even more mportant, owever,are the many fringe enefits, age supplements, nd welfare ndinsurance provisions hat the state provides or them-benefitswhose cash value averaged 527 yuan per worker n 1978,anamount qual to an additional 2%ofthe veragewagethat year(Economic Yearbook, 1981: V-34).These workers njoyvirtual

lifetime enure nless hey ommit crime r a political offense,or are guilty of the most flagrant orms of absenteeism ndirresponsibility n the ob. They are paid a basic wage on an8-grade cale that givesthem n increasing ncomethrough helife cycle, and bonus income is paid them as well. Theirenterprises, n addition, are often able to provide them withsubsidizedmeals,housing, nd medical are.

Not all state ector nterprises re able to supply full ange fthesebenefits. he smaller tate nterprises ay mploy s few s

100.Their abilityo

supplymeals and to

providemedical care,

medical facilities, ousing, nd other services s usually quitelimited, nd often s no greater han that of the arger ollectiveenterprises. ut all state ector mployees,with ome variationaccording o seniority, et full ick eave,and maternity, etire-ment, medical nd injury enefits.Many of thesebenefits xtendto family members s well. The larger tate enterprises-thosethat mploy more han500people-often can provide or very



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38 MODERN CHINA/ JANUAR Y 984

broad array f worker eeds,with dded rations nd foodstuffs,mealhalls, ubsidized ood,housing,medical are,factory linicsand hospitals, kindergartens, urseries, rimary chools, voca-tional chools, nd other esources. he largest tate nterprises,which mploy ens f housands n huge omplexes, re near-totalsocial institutions hat completely nvelop workers nd theirfamilies.

SUMMARY: THE NEW DUALISM

The fact hat only 37% of young urban abor force ntrants none recent ear received tate ector ob assignments epresentsculmination f a two-decade rend hat has made this tatus nincreasingly losedone-first, with egard o rural esidents, ndlater, with egard vento urban residents. he rate of ncrease nthe size of the abor force has simply utpaced the ability f thecapital-intensive tate ector o absorb abor. t costs an average

of over 10,000yuan of fixed capital nvestment o employ oneworker n the tate ector Economic Yearbook, 1981: V-34). Itcostsonly ,000 yuan oemploy neworker n an urban ollectiveand 950 yuan to employ one in commune ndustry EconomicYearbook, 1981:IV-56; Feng and Zhao, 1982: 130).The com-bination f capital osts nd pressures oabsorb aborwilldictatethe maintenance f this tratified abor force or very ong ime,with perhaps he nonstate ectors f employment rowingmorerapidly.

There are signs, further, hat ndustrial ositions are beinginherited cross generations. Many large state enterprises untechnical-vocational chools, from which most of their newskilled workers nd technicians re recruited. he offspring femployees endto make up most of the student odies of theseschools. More interesting s a policyunder which worker andesignate a son or daughter s his or her replacement ponretirement-something hat has gradually become commonpractice ver the past decade. It is current olicy to encourage

early retirement f this ort n order o enhance abor turnover(Shirk, 1981:577;Emerson, 983:11-12). o valued s the bility



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WaIder/ CHINESE WORKING CLASS 39

to transmit his high status to offspring hat a rumor hat thispolicywould soon bediscontinued pparently elped ouchoffwave of early retirements n one province n 1980 Gu, 1981).These are simply dditional igns of what rends n employmentpatterns lready uggest-that this five-tiered tatus ystem, nwhich there s very ittle mobility mong statuses, s becomingincreasingly losed at the top.

The rigidity f this status order, dictated by China's demo-

graphic conditions, ontrasts markedly with omparable devel-opments n the Soviet Union. Rather than experiencing aborsurplus, he oviet ndustrial conomy as suffered rom hortagesof abor in past decades Feshbach and Rapawy, 1976: 127-130).One result s a lack of restrictions n the mobility f ndustriallabor-excessive turnover n industry s, in fact,- widely itedproblem Powell, 1977;Koszegi, 1978).Workers an thereforechange obs with elative ase, and there s no Soviet counterpartto the urban collective ector.'9 Throughout oviet industrial-

ization, urthermore, here asbeena continued low f migrantsfrom ural ourban reas. The"Europeanpattern" furbanizationexperienced n the USSR-61% rural n 1950,compared with35%in 1980 Zhang and Chen, 1981: 41)-means that here regenuine opportunities n urban industry or rural residents.Shortages of labor on collective arms-especially hortages fyouthful, ble-bodiedmales-are, infact, n mportant onstrainton Soviet agriculture oday. And finally, ot only s there muchgreater mobility n the USSR, but the differences etween

statuses re considerably ess than n China. During heBrezhnevera, herewasacontinuous eveling ff f hegreatest ifference-that between ncomes n the city nd in the ountryside-and, nfact, tate ector ncomeguarantees nd pensionswere xtendedto all collective farm families n the 1970s Hough, 1976: 12;Wiles, 1974:48). Even if China were to attain Soviet levelsofdevelopment, uch an extension of state benefits o the entireworking population would be unthinkable s long as the vastmajority f ts abor force oiled n the countryside. omparison

with he Soviet Union makes t painfully lear that he doublingof the Chinesepopulation n the past three decades has turned



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past callsfor evelling hese ocial differences nto mpty logans.Ironically, here has instead developed a pattern of sectoralinequality-especially within he ndustrial abor force-whoserigidity as never een equalled n the USSR.

FROM CLASS TO STATUS: WORKERSIN A B UREA UCRATIC ORDER

In over30years f ocialist evelopment, heChineseworkingclasshas beencompletely emade. ndustrial workers-the greatmajority f the working lass-have multiplied y a factor f 5,and very ewof the current members f the working lass haveever xperiencedwork under apitalism. n 1949,urban workerswere employed predominantly n small shops or as individualhandicraftsmen; oday they are employed predominantly nlarge-scale,modern nterprises. efore 1949,employment as

highly nstable, urnover igh, nd geographicmobility onsid-erable; oday mployment sextraordinarily table, nd turnoververy ow, nboth he tate nd urban ollective ectors.Geographicmobility s tightly estricted. herefore, orkers re tied muchmore tightly o a local enterprise nd community. efore 1949,workers usually receivedvery ittle besides a wage from heiremployers, r received ood and lodgingpartly n lieu of wages(Honig, 1983; Hershatter, 983),but today urban enterpriseshave become focal points for the provision f welfare, ocial

security, nd the distribution f a wide array of goods andservices. Real consumption evels have risen markedly, ut inorder omakethispossible, heworking lassfamily asassumedincreasing mportance as an instrument or the pooling ofindividual ncomes nd housing pace. Before 949, hehistoricalprocess of proletarianization asproceeding ullforce, oncen-trating formerly gricultural r semi-agricultural opulation nbloated ities, ut his processhas now beenhalted-agriculturalpopulation is tied to the land and to rural institutions, nd

industrys instead

comingto

the countryside n the form ofcommune nterprises.



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All of these hanges re part of a more fundamental hange-the move from class to a status ociety. Before 1949, the ifechances of workers were determined y their disadvantaged)position n markets or abor and commodities. Today the ifechances of workers re bounded by their esidence nd employ-ment tatuses-two factors hat ort workers nto the five mainstatus groups within oday's working lass. Whether workershave urban or rural residence status, whether they have apermanent ob assignment, nd whether hey have been given nassignment n state ndustry illdetermine otonly heir ncome,but their bility o receive dequate housing nd medical care,and to enjoy a whole range of services, menities, nd socialsecurity enefits. person's tatus, n otherwords, trictly efinesthat person's standard of living hroughout is or her ifetime.Once these statuses are attached to individuals, t is almostimpossible to change them. Furthermore, nder the severepopulation pressure f the past decades, this status system as

become an increasingly losed one. The highly favored statesector, he ector most apital-intensive, illnot be ableto absorbthe surplus abor force. For the foreseeable uture, he labor-intensive nd small-scale ollective ector will bsorb the growingarmies of ob seekers. tate sector mployment tatus will ikelybecome a slowlydecreasing roportion f total employment nthe short and middle-run. nless basic structural hanges aremade in China's urban economy, the rapid improvement nbenefits, welfare, nd standard of living hat accompanied the

rapid pread of tate ector mployment nthe 1950s willgivewayto a stable pattern f nequalitywith he highest tatus reservedfor fixed nd perhaps hrinking inority.

This shift rom lass to status ociety asonefinal mplication.This essay began with he claim that the revolution as createdand shapedthe Chineseworking lass that xists oday. t will ndwith n equally bald assertion hat herevolution as ushered nthe unmaking of the Chinese working class. The process ofgrowing olitical unity, ollective rganization, nd conscious-

ness of common interests n opposition to other classes-aprocessdescribed y E. P. Thompson 1966) as the "making" f



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42 MODERN CHINA/ JANUAR Y 1984

the English working lassearly n the nineteenth entury, nd aprocess certainly well underway n China by the 1920s-waseffectively eversed fter 1949. The nrgid tatus distinctionsbetween different egments f the industrial abor force haveobjectively ivided heclass rrevocably. nd amongthe core ofstate sector workers, hegrowing ependence n the enterprisefor the satisfaction f needs, the lack of mobility betweenenterprises, nd the strict hanneling f political activity nto

approved channelswithin ach separate workplace, urther plitand immobilizedworkers s they were absorbed nto the owerstatuses f an economicbureaucracy Walder, 1983).The often-fleeting istorical rocess fgrowing elf-awareness nd politicalself-assertion asended for heworking lass-their conscious-nesswas increasingly ictated o them ybureaucrats n a Partyclaiming to be their historical gent. In this final sense, this"second" Chineseworking lass is profoundly ifferent rom tspredecessor.



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APPENDIXAYearly Wage Data for State Sector Industry, 952-1981

ConsumerPrice Real Wage Real Wage

Nominal Index ReaI Wage Index IndexYear Wage (1950=100) (1950 Yuan) (1952=100) (1956=100)1952 515 115.5 446 100.0 81.71953 576 121.4 474 106.3 86.81954 597 123.1 485 108.7 88.8

1955 600 123.5 486 109.0 89.01956 674 123.4 546 122.4 100.01957 690 126.6 545 122.2 99.81958 526 125.2 420 94.1 76.91959 514 125.6 409 91.7 74.91960 538 128.8 418 93.7 76.61961 560 149.6 374 83.8 68.51962 652 155.3 419 93.9 76.71963 '720 146.i 493 110.5 90.3

1964 741 140.7 527 118.2 96.51965 729 139.0 524 117.5 96.01966 689 137.3 501 112.3 91.81967 701 136.4 514 115.2 94.11968 689 136.5 505 113.2 92.51969 683 137.8 496 111.2 90.81970 661 137.8 480 107.6 87.91971 635 137.7 461 103.4 84.41972 650 137.9 471 105.6 86.31973 640 138.0 464 104.0 85.01974 648 138.9 467 104.7 85.51975 644 139.5 462 103.6 84.61976 634 139.9 453 101.6 83.01977 632 143.7 440 98.7 80.61978 683 144.7 472 105.8 86.41979 758 147.4 514 115.2 94.11980 854 158.5 539 120.9 98.71981 852 162.5 524 117.5 96.0

SOURCE: Nominal Wage and Consumer Price Index, State Statistical Bureau(1982: 403, Column 2; 426, Column 2). Other columns calculated from theseseries.



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44 MODERN CHINA / JA NUAR Y 1984

NOTES1. This statement s intentionally rovocative. To document t satisfactorily, e

would needto know more bout how production was organized nsidedifferent inds fpre-1949 actories, nd howmuch ontrol killedworkers xercised nthe process.Honig(1983)makes the mportant istinction etween he contract abor systems nitiated ymanagement bao gong hi) and those nitiated nd controlled yothers the baoshen hi,or the contract abor system ffecting emalecotton mill workers). While the formerroughly arallels ts ontemporary estern ounterparts s far s hiring oes,we need toknowmore bout howworkwas organized nside actories y he ontractors hemselves.It maywellbethat he process fjumping astwhatwere rolonged istorical tages nthe

West began evenbefore 949.This question waits further esearch.2. The impact f the massive nflux f new recruits an be inferred rom ata on theagestructure f he abor force. y 1955, 5% of he mployees nrapidly xpanding tatesector ndustry ere35years f ageor younger-few of them ould havebeenemployedbefore 1949. In some of the new ndustrial nterprises, s much as 70% to 80% of theworkforce were under ge 26. By sharp contrast, more than 66% of the employees nprivate ndustry, hichwasnot growing, eremore han 35years ld Emerson, 1965b:14-15).

3. Cole (1979)has made a similar rgument bout the emergence f modern aborrelations n Japan, but t ppears that Japan's raft tage f ndustrialization, s short s itwasrelative oWestern urope, was onger hanChina's;the apidity f he hift rom raftto factory roduction was less abrupt than China's after 1949;and Japan's unions,

relatively eakas theywere,were till tronger han China's. n other words,most f thefactors ole identifies s having reated distinctive odern ystem f ndustrial elationsinJapan operated venmore trongly nChina, specially fter 949. explore omeof heconsequences f worker ependence n shop-floor uthority elations n Walder 1983).

4. Despite tight ontrols, oughly 3 million peasants were ble to attain varioustypes f urban mployment nd urban esidence n the decadeafter 966 Emerson, 1983:8). This occurred more frequently n small towns n the hinterlands, nd in newly uiltindustrial omplexeswhere demand for abor outstripped upply. Controls re muchtighter n the arge ities.The recent mplementation f family esponsibility ystems nagriculture asbegun ochangework-point nd grain ration asedsystems f control ncomplex ways.We describe hesystem s it operated prior o 1979.The recent eformsweaken hecontrols n migration.

5. The discrepancy etween he Feng and Zhao (1982)figure f 17million nd theZhang and Chen 1981)figure f 16 million s due to the atter uthors'exclusion f onemillion ntellectuals, adres, nd "bad elements" ent o the countryside fter 966,whowere lso part of this xodus of 17million.

6. Official stimates f unemployment n urban China range from 0million o25million. merson 1983)argues hat he ctual number s close to the ow end of his ange.

7. After concerted rive o build newhousing npast years, verage rban housingspace rose to 4.4 square meters n 1979,and by 1981reached 5.3 square meters StateStatistical Bureau, 1982:421).In the Soviet Union, which lso suffers rom hortages fhousing pace, the problem s nowhere near as severe s in China. Each urban dwellerthere ccupied n averageof 11.8 square meters n 1973 Hough, 1976).

8. In the urban reas of Beijingmunicipality, hefigures ere 4%in 1949, nd 60%in 1978, ccording oofficial nternal tatistics hat haveseen.The sourcemust emainanonymous.

9. The Chineseworker nder Mao fared onsiderably etter n this espect handidSovietworkers nder talin, ven f we take nto ccount hat he figures ust cited ncludethe years 1977-1980, uring which heaverage ndus

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Walder - The Remaking of the Chinese Working Class