"Vraisemblance" and Moral Instruction in Seventeenth-Century Dramatic Theory

"Vraisemblance" and Moral Instruction in Seventeenth-Century Dramatic TheoryAuthor(s): Henry PhillipsSource: The Modern Language Review, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Apr., 1978), pp. 267-277Published by: Modern Humanities Research AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3727100 .

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'VRAISEMBLANCE' AND MORAL INSTRUCTION IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY DRAMATIC THEORY

The main theme of this article will be the relation of vraisemblance to moral instruction in seventeenth-century dramatic theory. While it is by no means a new subject for discussion I feel that a restatement of the whole question needs to be made, especially in the light of a recent article by Jeremy N. J. Palmer in which he attempts to see Corneille in basic agreement with his contemporaries on the subject of vraisemblance and thus attributes to him a similar moralistic aim.1 My article is a reply to this view.

Essential to my argument is the opinion that there is a fundamental link for orthodox dramatic theorists in the seventeenth century between the illusionist theatre in which vraisemblance plays a crucial role and the notion of moral instruction. Certainly the topic of vraisemblance is not new to the seventeenth century, nor indeed is the idea that drama should have a didactic purpose. We know that theorists in France were greatly influenced by those of their sixteenth-century Italian counterparts who took Horace's familiar but liberal view of the useful in poetry as a dogmatic assertion and who endowed Aristotle's unexplained notion of catharsis with a quite erroneous moralistic bias. But the continuance of a tradition and the influence of scholars is insufficient to explain the renewal of interest in moral instruction in the first half of the seventeenth century.

It is my contention that this whole notion developed hand in hand with the evolution of stage technique where the spectator is, ideally, led to believe that he is a witness at an actual event. Andre Villiers, among others, has rightly pointed to the influence of the discovery of perspective, that is, of a 'truer' spatial concept, on stage theory.2 The importance of a stage decor using perspective, which gives a more realistic setting to the dramatic action, is that it relates the audience directly to the stage; moreover, the spectator is in the same space as the actor (pp. 1-17). Now the relation of spectator to the 'real' space of the stage has obvious consequences for the presentation of the characters who appear in that space; they must be 'real' too. It is for this reason that dramatic theorists are so concerned with meurs and bienseances since the characters' attributes must be recognizable to the audience. In any case Aristotle becomes an ideal authority for the stage aesthetic in his definition of drama as the imitation of an action and in his insistence on verisimilitude. Indeed French theorists very much emphasize the need for vraisemblance, part of the function of which, both in the question of subject and the conduct of the action, is to control the terms within which reality may be credibly reproduced on the stage. It is, I argue, in the context of maintaining the spectator's belief in the stage action that dramatic theorists saw an effective way of communi- cating a moral lesson to the audience.

But the maintenance of the audience's belief in the stage action is not simply on a technical level. The need to prevent the audience from being alienated from its belief in what is happening demands that there be a moral component

1 'The Function of "le vraisemblable" in French Classical Aesthetic Theory', French Studies, 29 I975), I5-26.

2 'Illusion dramatique et dramaturgie classique', XVIIe siecle, 73 (I966), 3-35.



'Vraisemblance' and Moral Instruction

in the dramatic illusion. Here it will become clear that vraisemblance possesses a vital function in regulating the content of the moral lesson and thus forms a bridge between the dramatic illusion and the idea of moral instruction.

The relation of the dramatic illusion to moral instruction is immediately shown in the theorists' preference for vraisemblance (a possible reality) over verite (reality itself) as the essential feature of drama. In his preface to Marino's Adonis Chapelain states categorically that 'la vraisemblance . .. et non la verite sert d'instrument au poete pour acheminer l'homme a la vertu';1 the art of epic and dramatic poetry leads men to useful pleasure 'plus facilement. .. par le vraysemblable qui ne trouve point de resistance en eux, que par le vray, qui pourroit estre si estrange et si incroyable qu'ils refuseroient de s'en laisser persuader et de suivre leur guide sur sa seule foy'.2 Truth cannot be the subject of drama, then, because it is sometimes stranger than fiction and becomes an obstacle to the spectator's involvement in the action. With regard to the presentation of the action on the other hand, the spectator, while it is true that 'ce qui se represente soit feint', must regard it as 'veritable'; if he fails to enter into the characters' feelings as 'reellement arrivant' he will lose the profit which poetry aims to give him (Opuscules, p. I21). In this context the unities assume great importance in helping to create the illusion for the spectator. In his Lettre sur la regle des vingt-quatre heures Chapelain remarks that were not the unity of time observed the spectator, noticing the 'faussete' of the dramatic action, would not lend credence to it, 'sur quoi se fonde tout le fruit que la poesie put produire en nous' (Opuscules, p. I 7). Clearly the technical aspects of illusion are inseparably connected with the moral aim of drama.

Along with their considerations of the role of vraisemblance in dramatic theory in general, seventeenth-century French dramatic theorists also emphasize the importance of vraisemblance in helping to produce the most appropriate conditions for the experience of catharsis, whose very success depends on the playwright's ability to induce in the spectator the necessary degree of emotional involvement. It is of course one basic prescription of classical dramatic theory that the spectator should be able to participate fully in every passion portrayed on the stage. Chapelain I have already quoted as saying that the spectator must do this if any profit is to come from his experience in the theatre, and by profit Chapelain, as we shall see, clearly means the 'purgation' of passion. Indeed Scudery obviously considers vraisemblance of subject as a necessary prerequisite to the spectator's involvement in the characters' passions when he comments in his Observations sur le Cid that the poet who aims to arouse the spectator's passions by those of his characters, 'quelques vives, fortes, et bien poussees qu'elles puissent estre', can never achieve this if 'ce qu'il veut imprimer en l'ame n'est pas vraysemblable' (Gaste, p. 75). Later in the century Racine is of a similar opinion when he says in his preface to Bere'nice that 'il n'y a que le vraisemblable qui touche dans la tragedie'. It is Chapelain, however, who places the effectiveness of catharsis more firmly in the context of the dramatic illusion: 'A l'election succede la foi, ou la creance que l'on peut donner au sujet; point important sur tous autres pour ce qu'ils disent qu'oui la crdance manque, l'attention ou l'affection manque

1 Opuscules critiques, edited by Alfred C. Hunter (Paris, 1936), p. 87. 2 Sentiments de l'Academie sur le Cid in La Querelle du Cid, pieces et pamphlets publids d'apres les originaux

edited by A. Gaste (Paris, I898), pp. 364-65.

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aussi; mais ou l'affection n'est point, il n'y peut avoir d'6motion et par cons6quent de purgation, ou d'amendement es moeurs des hommes, qui est le but de la poesie' (Opuscules, p. 85)

It is worth noting that Chapelain sees vraisemblance in the subject as being a necessary condition for vraisemblance in the play. In order to involve us, the characters have not only to act credibly within the framework of the play, they must also be

posed as credible by the subject. It is obvious from what Chapelain has said that if what is portrayed on the

stage were manifestly false the moral lesson would have no meaning for the audience. We could, then, say at this stage that the dramatic illusion is necessary to the success of moral instruction in that, the more the spectator can believe in what is happening on the stage, the more likely he is to accept the moral lesson offered. The immediacy of this lesson is further enhanced by the spectator's feeling that he is himself present at the characters' actions.

But the way in which the stage action is made accessible to the spectator is also governed by a moral component in the dramatic illusion and here we are intro- duced to the second function we earlier ascribed to vraisemblance. Andre Dacier, a classical scholar of the latter part of the seventeenth century whose commentary and translation of Aristotle's Poetics has been grossly neglected in discussions of dramatic theory, especially in view of his knowledge of Corneille's theories and his criticism of current trends in the writing of tragedy, explains in greater detail why the truths of history (or verite) cannot instruct of themselves: L'Histoire ne peut instruire qu'autant que les faits qu'elle rapporte, luy en donnent l'occasion, &, comme ces faits sont particuliers, il arrive rarement qu'ils soient proportionnez a ceux qui les lisent, il n'y en a pas un entre mille a qui ils puissent convenir, & ceux memes a qui ils conviennent ne trouvent pas en toute leur vie deux occasions ou ils puissent tirer quelque avantage de ce qu'ils ont lu.

Poetry, on the other hand, concerning itself with 'choses generales', 'est d'autant plus morale & plus instructive, que les choses generales surpassent les particulieres'; the latter 'ne conviennent qu'a un seul, & les autres conviennent a tout le monde'.' It is therefore not the facts of history which instruct but the underlying principles behind them; the latter are the concern of poetry.

Rapin is of a similar opinion to Dacier when he asserts that with regard to the conduct of the action heroic poetry (similar, we may add, in many respects to dramatic poetry) 'propose l'idee d'une vertu bien plus parfaite que l'histoire' because the latter 'ne propose la vertu qu'imparfaitement, comme elle est dans les particuliers', whereas poetry 'la propose sans aucune imperfection, & comme elle doit estre en generale'.2 Moreover: La vraysemblance sert a donner de la crdance a ce que la Poesie a de plus fabuleux: elle sert aussi a donner ... un plus grand air de perfection, que ne pourroit faire la veritd meme quoyque la vraysemblance n'en soit que la copie. Car la verit6 ne fait les choses que comme elles sont; & la vraysemblance les fait comme elles doivent estre.

Truth is nearly always defective 'par le meslange des conditions singulieres, qui la composent'; there is nothing in the world 'qui ne s'eloigne de la perfection en y naissant' and we must seek 'des originaux & des modeles dans la vraysemblance, &

1 La Poetique d'Aristote (Paris, 1692), p. I3I. 2 Les Reflexions sur l'eloquence, la poetique, I'histoire et la philosophie (Paris, 1684), p. 127.

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dans les principes universels des choses' where 'il n'entre rien de materiel & de singulier, qui les corrompe'; this is where historical portraits are less perfect than those of poetry.1 In one sense, then, vraisemblance is a means of eliminating what is too unusual in events and allows the poet to convey an experience which can be universally shared.

But in another sense Rapin's view of the matter, especially in his use of the verb devoir, allows for a notion of vraisemblance which itself has a specific didactic content. D'Aubignac too comments that the task of drama is not to portray things 'comme elles ont este' but 'comme elles devoient estre'; the poet must 'retablir dans le sujet tout ce qui ne s'accommodera pas aux regles de son Art, comme fait un Peintre quand il travaille sur un modelle defectueux'.2 Devoir, therefore, carries not only the sense of more probable but also that of more morally correct.3 Drama which is vraisemblable presents an already exemplary reality to the spectator.

Indeed the further implications for vraisemblance in d'Aubignac's attitude become more apparent in his discussion of veriti. He comments that the Vray cannot be the subject of drama because 'il y a bien des choses veritables qui n'y doivent pas estre veues, et beaucoup qui n'y peuvent pas estre representees'. Thus vraisemblance is a means of avoiding morally unacceptable subjects. In the following statement d'Aubignac stresses the importance of belief in our response to drama and illustrates perfectly the ambiguity of devoir: it is true that Nero cut open his mother's womb at her death but this barbarity, although pleasing to its perpetrator, 'seroit non seulement horrible a ceux qui le verroient, mais mesme incroyable, a cause que cela ne devoit point arriver, et entre toutes les Histoires dont le Poete voudrait tirer son sujet, il n'y en a pas une, ... dont toutes les circonstances soient capables du Theatre, quoy que veritables' (p. 76). His conclusion is that only 'le Vray- semblable' could 'raisonnablement fonder, soustenir et terminer un Poeme Dramatique' (p. 77). Clearly d'Aubignac's idea of belief and the maintenance of the illusion is in part directly related to the moral prejudices of the audience. An audience cannot believe in the subject of a play which runs counter to its own values. Vraisemblance, therefore, assumes the function of a moralistic control.4

This is most evident when the theorists discuss the concept of punishment of vice and reward of virtue, which, they consider, is better accommodated by vraisemblance than by verite. According to Chapelain, the difference between history and a subject where the rules of vraisemblance have been observed in the conduct of the action is that in history events are not regulated but depend on fortune, the evil being enriched as well as the virtuous; poetry on the other hand 'met le premier en consideration l'universel et ne le traite particulierement qu'en intention de faire tirer l'espece, a l'instruction du monde & au benefice commun'. This is why in poetry 'la suite des actions, ou bonnes ou mauvaises, est toujours semblable, chacune en son genre; tout bon reconnu, tout mechant chatie, comme procedant

1 Rapin, p. 105. 2 La Pratique du thedtre, edited by P. Martino (Paris, 1927), p. 68. Professor Knight has pointed out that the Latin translation of the Greek distorts Aristotle's thought; there should be 'possunt' rather than 'debent' (Racine et la Grece (Paris, 1950), pp. 66-67). 3 Professor Knight too makes this point in Racine et la Grece, p. 201.

4 It must not be forgotten that both Chapelain and d'Aubignac go into much greater detail on the purely technical aspects of illusion which have been adequately studied elsewhere.

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de la vertu, ou du vice dont la nature est de recompenser ou de perdre ceux qui les vont suivant' (Opuscules, p. 86).

However, this moral idealism on the part of dramatic theorists must not be taken for naivety. They are aware that sometimes virtue goes unrewarded and vice unpunished. If this is the case in any particular play, then, as La Mesnardiere recommends, the poet must ensure at least that the virtuous are publicly praised by another character,1 and that evil characters should at least be threatened with divine justice by a character 'qui exagere & qui deteste leur honteuse difformite' (p. 224). D'Aubignac agrees that the first rule of drama is that 'les vertus y soient toujours recompensees, ou pour le moins toijours loiiees, malgre les outrages de la Fortune' and that 'les vices y soient toujours punis, ou pour le moins touijours en horreur, quand mesme ils y triomphent' (pp. 8-9). But for La Mesnardiere total impunity is wholly undesirable and it is, he remarks, better for the sake of moral example that the evil should be seen by the virtuous to be punished, lest the latter should consider it of doubtful advantage to remain in the paths of virtue, and lest the evil should be encouraged in their vice by the triumph of their like (pp. 170-7 ).

It could, however, be argued that the notion of vraisemblance poses more problems than it solves when a playwright comes, as he must, to combine effective drama with equally effective moral instruction. Indeed in the article I referred to in my introduction, Jeremy N. J. Palmer has pointed to what he believes are contradictions within the classical aesthetic when one looks more closely at writers' views on the subject of vraisemblance. How, he asks, can dramatic theorists recom- mend the merveilleux on stage (which, in its sudden reversal of fortunes, thereby allows for 'the most romanesque solutions') while at the same time obliging the poet to remain within the bounds of credibility (pp. 22-23) ? Perhaps one answer to this problem lies in Dacier's discussion of the various accidents productive of surprise. He denies that all of these are appropriate to tragedy, because a house falling down or a man killed by a stone thrown at random are too fortuitous, there being no known cause to which they are attributable. For him the sort of surprise tragedy requires is 'celle que produisent les incidens, qui naissent les uns des autres contre l'attente du spectateur'. Dacier here refers specifically to the text of Aristotle com- menting that the Philosopher 'ne dit pas "des incidens qui viennent les uns apres les autres"; mais "qui naissent les uns des autres" '.2 In other words the spectator is amazed at the time of the incident but may on reflection endow the incident with an attributable cause. The general framework of vraisemblance is thus not impaired. Whether, however, this accurately reflects the thinking of theorists earlier in the century is, I agree, open to debate.

Dr Palmer also approaches the broader question of vraisemblance and mimesis which he sees as two potentially contradictory elements. Certainly my own analysis of vraisemblance in the context of moral instruction has shown that dramatic theorists are less concerned with verite than with the possible and re-ordered reality through which the moral lesson is communicated. The operative word, however, is a possible reality. While it is true that in reality the virtuous are less often rewarded and the evil less often punished the opposite is none the less conceivable. But the playwright must convince his audience by making his characters' behaviour conform to a

1 La Poitique (Paris, 1640), p. 221. 2 Poetique d'Aristote, p. 142.

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general type of vraisemblance (which, as Dr Palmer points out, also includes the many aspects of bienseances) and by conducting the dramatic action so that it too remains credible. Within this framework the spectator can still imagine that he is present as a witness to an event. The passage of Chapelain quoted by Dr Palmer, where the theorist comments that there must be no difference between the thing imitated and that which imitates, cannot surely mean mimesis in an absolute sense, but only in the general sense that the action is credible enough for the audience to relate it to their own experience.' Moreover, in the Lettre sur la regle des vingt-quatre heures, Chapelain is keen to emphasize the possibilities of the perspective set which he sees as offering the same visual experience the spectator gets in reality.

A play, then, exists on two levels for theorists like Chapelain and d'Aubignac. The choice of material and its presentation must conform to certain moral requirements on the lines of the re-ordered reality I have described. The action of the play may not necessarily be true in the sense of it actually having happened thus (for Dacier and Rapin this could never be so, given the distinction between history and poetry); but it may be possibly true in that it could have happened thus, with all the ambiguity this implies. In performance, however, no such distinction should exist for the spectator, and the perspective set must contribute to this effect.

Another way of looking at the problem is that art should not necessarily contra- dict history but complete it. History presents us with the bare bones of a moral lesson to which playwrights, if they have sufficient intelligence and imagination, add the flesh. But this obviously demands a judicious selection of material, something which, as we shall later see, provided the main argument between Corneille and his opponents in the controversy over Le Cid.

Indeed Dr Palmer's explanation of the problems surrounding the critical writings of Corneille constitutes the most contentious part of his thesis. To attribute to Corneille anything like the same moralistic intentions as his opponents is, in my view, to misunderstand the basic arguments underlying the whole question of moral instruction and vraisemblance in seventeenth-century dramatic theory. It seems significant to me that Corneille simultaneously rejects orthodox notions of vraisemblance (this Dr Palmer denies) and any notion of a consciously didactic aim for drama.

Let us deal firstly with Corneille's views on moral instruction. As Dr Palmer points out, Corneille does not wholly approve of punishment of vice and reward of virtue as a prescription for drama, and in the first Discours he explains the origin of the notion as our natural siding with virtuous people. It is not a precept of art but 'un usage que nous avons embrasse, dont chacun peut se departir a ses perils'.2 Moreover, the Ancients themselves never held to it absolutely (p. I2). On the more general question of moral instruction Corneille is quite outspoken and positively provocative. Referring to the example of Dorante in Le Menteur and its sequel he says: 'Mais pour moi qui tiens avec Aristote et Horace que notre art n'a pour but que le divertisse- ment, j'avoue qu'il est ici bien moins a estimer qu'en la premiere comddie, puisque avec ses mauvaises habitudes, il a perdu presque toutes ses graces, et qu'il semble avoir quitt6 la meilleure part de ses agr6ments lorsqu'il a voulu se corriger de ses d6fauts'. (p. 183)

1 See Palmer, p. 21. 2 Corneille, Writings on the Theatre, edited by H. T. Barnwell (Oxford, 1965), pp. 6-7.

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Pleasure has clearly been sacrificed to a moralistic aim. Furthermore, those who endow drama with the lofty aim of instruction and who think they are raising the dignity of the poet's profession are in fact in danger of harming his possible merits as an artist since, 's'il est oblige de prendre soin de l'utile, il evite seulement une faute quand il s'en acquite, et n'est digne d'aucune louange'. Corneille expresses his admiration for those who achieve the fusion of the pleasurable and the profitable especially when they are not obliged to do so. He denies, however, that in the opposite case artists are guilty of breaking any rule and adds ironically that he would blame them only 'de ne s'etre pas propose un but assez digne d'eux, ou si vous me permettez de parler un peu chretiennement, de n'avoir pas eu assez de charite pour prendre l'occasion de donner en passant quelque instruction a ceux qui les ecoutent ou qui les lisent'. His position is clear in that, provided poets have found the means to please, 'ils sont quittes envers leur art; et s'ils pechent, ce n'est pas contre lui, c'est contre les bonnes moeurs et contre leur auditoire' (p. I84). Plaire is thus entirely separate from instruire, and is indeed the prime aim of the poet. The laws of art stand apart from the laws of morals. This does not give leave for the poet to be immoral; in certain cases he must defer to the sensibility of his audience. But avoiding the immoral in this way is not the same as consciously proposing its opposite, despite Dr Palmer's rather confusing and unexplained reference to the Romantic and post-Romantic concept of the poet (pp. 20-2I). Simply, the playwright must not alienate the goodwill of his public, most of whom, at least at the time of Le Cid, did not seem to share the narrow-minded reactions of Corneille's critics.1 Playwrights must start from purely artistic principles, and the first prin- ciple of art must be its autonomy and the poet's freedom from any outside obligation.

The previous point about ensuring the goodwill of one's audience rather than setting out to instruct them brings me to Corneille's attitudes to vraisemblance. Dr Palmer sees the need to choose between the view of Louis Forestier that Corneille is alone in his opposition to orthodox views on the subject and Rene Bray's assertion that the opposition between Corneille and his contemporaries 'ne touche pas au fond de la doctrine' (p. I6).2 While Dr Palmer sides with Bray, I most decidedly agree with Forestier. It is difficult to see how Corneille's efforts in the Discours and elsewhere (especially in the case of Le Cid) tend towards the views held by Chapelain and his like. Throughout his entire career Corneille disliked and fought every restriction imposed by classical theorists who allegedly found theirjustification in Aristotle's Poetics. Professor Barnwell has amply demonstrated Corneille's fundamental opposition to the illusionist view of drama as expressed in the works of d'Aubignac and Chapelain.3 In general terms he sees no need for vraisemblance in subjects like Le Cid since historical truth of itself commands belief. He writes in the second Discours that 'Lorsque (les actions) sont vraies, il ne faut point se mettre en peine de la vraisemblance, elles n'ont point besoin de son secours' (p. 54). Corneille

1 Interestingly many of the pro-Corneille pamphlets in the querelle du Cid reject any notion of moral instruction and emphasize exclusively the pleasure they derive from theatrical experiences.

2 This is the nature of Dr Palmer's choice. Professor Barnwell, in his article entitled 'Some Reflec- tions on Corneille's theory of vraisemblance as formulated in the Discours' (Forum for Modern Language Studies, I (I965), 295-3Io) has shown that Corneille was not indeed unique in holding such theories on vraisemblance.

3 Barnwell, 'Some Reflections ... ', pp. 298-304.

18

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274 'Vraisemblance' and Moral Instruction

even goes as far, in the question of staging, as pointing himself to the contradictions of orthodox notions of vraisemblance in the presentation of the action. It is, for example, invraisemblable that the plotters in Cinna should appear and speak in the same place as those they are plotting against (the unity of place being justified by his opponents on the grounds of vraisemblance) (p. I I3).

In this sense Corneille puts up a better case for mimesis than, say, Chapelain. Typically, Corneille offers his contribution to the topic of moral instruction as if didacticism were in any case an integral part of his own dramatic activity. In the first Discours he sees one means of moral instruction as consisting in 'la naive peinture des vices et des vertus, qui ne manque jamais a faire son effet, quand elle est bien achevee, et que les traits en sont si reconnaissables qu'on ne les peut confondre l'un dans l'autre, ni prendre le vice pour vertu. Celle-ci se fait toujours aimer, quoique malheureuse, et celui-la se fait toujours hair, bien que triomphant' (p. 5). This position enables Corneille, firstly, to reject the need for punishment of vice and reward of virtue as a precept of drama, and, secondly, to introduce very good and very bad characters as opposed to those possessing the bonte mediocre favoured by purist Aristotelians but despised by Corneille.' But Corneille's cham- pioning of verite over vraisemblance also frees him from the restrictions on subject matter made by Chapelain and d'Aubignac, and allows Corneille to concentrate on finding themes which offer the maximum of theatrical effect. His complete statement on mimesis comes in his Epitre dedicatoire (1639) of Medee; in this play, he says: vous trouverez le crime en son char de triomphe, et peu de personnages sur la scene dont les moeurs ne soient plus mauvaises que bonnes; mais la peinture et la poesie ont cela de commun ... que l'une fait souvent de beaux portraits d'une femme laide, & l'autre de belles imita- tions d'une action qu'il ne faut pas imiter. Dans la portraiture, il n'est pas question si un visage est beau, mais s'il ressemble; et dans la podsie, il ne faut pas considerer si les moeurs sont vertueuses, mais si elles sont pareilles a celles de la personne qu'on introduit. Aussi nous ddcrit-elle indiffdremment les bonnes et les mauvaises actions, sans nous proposer les der- nieres pour exemple; et si elle nous en veut faire quelque horreur, ce n'est point par leur punition, qu'elle n'affecte pas de nous faire voir, mais par leur laideur, qu'elle s'efforce de nous reprdsenter au naturel. (p. I80)

Art therefore reflects the moral neutrality of reality and one must assume in one's audience a sufficient sense of morality to see right from wrong. Undoubtedly, Corneille's priority is the degree of exactness of the portrayal from a purely artistic point of view. This has little to do with his opponents' ideas on the relation of verite to vraisemblance.

As evidence of Corneille's basic agreement with his opponents on the subject of vraisemblance Dr Palmer cites Corneille's own discussion in the second Discours of two subjects for tragedy, where he shows grave reservations about portraying actual historical events too faithfully on the stage. In both cases, according to Dr Palmer, Corneille suggests changes to the ending in much the same way as Chape- lain in the case of Le Cid, thus showing himself more in accordance with orthodox notions of vraisemblance than in opposition to them (pp. i6-i8). But no such com- parison is possible. Quite simply both examples show that what Corneille wants to avoid is shocking his audience unnecessarily. Indeed there seems to be no sort of general rule even here since, while Corneille does not wish a son to kill his own

1 See Examens to Le Cid and to Nicomede (Writings, pp. I02 and I 7).



H. PHILLIPS

mother (Clytemmestra, moreover, is on her knees pleading for mercy) he is not so worried about a mother killing her own son, or a brother killing his own sister. Each case has thus to be considered on its merits (whereas a strict adherence to vraisemblance of subject provides a general exclusion). Obviously Corneille does not feel that Le Cid falls into the same category.

However, there is a further point to be made here concerning Corneille's whole conception of dramatic conflict and tragic emotion. It is clear from Corneille's various discussions of Aristotle's ideal tragic hero, who is neither entirely good nor entirely bad and who evokes by himself the emotions of pity and fear, that he does not consider la bonte midiocre as wholly appropriate to men and women of heroic stature.1 Corneille proposes as a possible alternative the evocation of pity and fear by separate characters within a single play, which would have the advantage of introducing the very good and very bad characters Aristotle advises against. In this way Corneille prepares us for what he considers the most appropriate tragic emotion, namely admiration, which, unlike pity and fear, can be granted indiffer- ently to both good and bad characters (for example, Cleopatre and Nicomede). It is in the context of this opposition of his own practice and Aristotle's advice that Corneille remarks in the case of Cleopatre's death that 'je voudrais la faire arriver sans la participation du premier acteur, pour qui nous devons toujours menager la faveur de l'auditoire' (p. 47). The dramatic conflict, then, given this division among the various characters in a play, is the clear opposition of good and evil, of right and wrong, before which the mind of the spectator must not be confused by an inconsistency of character.2 Such would be the case, however, if with Orestes, Electra, and Antiochus, the spectators were suddenly given the opportunity of feeling dislike for a character to whom they would otherwise extend their favour, especially since Corneille says elsewhere that it is an audience's natural inclination to desire the triumph of characters it likes (p. 6). Orestes must not therefore for- feit the goodwill of the audience by killing Clytemmestra nor Antiochus by murdering Cleopatre. Moreover, the evil of both mothers must remain in obvious opposition to their offspring's innocence. As opposed to Chapelain's choice of an improved ending for Le Cid Corneille takes not a moral view but a decision based on effective dramaturgy.

The very same conflict is at the root of the querelle du Cid where Corneille's position can in no way be assimilated to that of his opponents. Again one of the major issues in the querelle is that of vraisemblance. As we have seen, Corneille's ideas did not change over the years. His opponents on the other hand took a different view. In his Observations sur le Cid Scudery, while agreeing that Chimene's marriage to Rodrigue is indeed historical fact, argues that it is not vraisemblable because it shocks 'la raison et les bonnes mceurs' (Gaste, p. 77). Invraisemblance is here clearly what is morally undesirable and vraisemblance on the level of subject exercises the

1 It is worth pointing out here that in all his critical writings Corneille utterly rejects the whole concept of a moralistic catharsis, or a catharsis of any kind, and the aesthetic obligations incumbent upon playwrights in this connexion. The question is obviously too complex to encompass within the scope of this article.

2 Such an opposition is still present in Le Cid, though in a way different from Rodogune. Rodrigue and Chimene are clearly presented as being right in what they are doing, and both accept that their respective duties conflict with each other. The wrong is postulated in the arguments by which the characters reach and justify their choice.

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moralistic control I have discussed earlier. Similarly, the conduct of Chimene, who suffers her father's murderer to enter her home and to speak with her at length on two occasions, provokes Scudery's hysterical description of her as a prostitute and earns Chapelain's description of her meurs in his Sentiments de l'Acadimie as 'scandaleuses, si en effet elles ne sont depravees' (Gaste, p. 94 and p. 372). It is therefore interesting to note that in his Examen of the play Corneille defends the two private meetings of Chimene and Rodrigue on the grounds of the audience's heightened sense of excitement at the time. In other words they were dramatic- ally successful. One further complaint of both Chapelain and Scudery was that Chimene's conduct goes unpunished (Gaste, pp. 89-90 and p. 372). It is obvious that what really concerns these two critics is that the conduct of Chim6ne and Rodrigue goes beyond the norm, escapes the bounds of socially acceptable behaviour and is thereby subversive. I agree with Dr Palmer when he asserts that the classical aesthetic proposes 'the propagation of a set of socially defined norms' (p. 2I) and one can point to any number of works which discuss and outline 'correct' procedures for characters of different types to follow.1 One often has the impression from dramatic theorists that characters in drama must be formed in the image of well-tried and proven precedents. But we cannot draw the same conclu. sion about Corneille who, in Le Cid, is offering not an experience which conforms with the ready-made moral categories of the ordinary run of spectator, but one which is entirely new and which shakes the spectator out of his preconceptions of behaviour. It is thus against his opponents that, as Dr Palmer says, Corneille's polemic is designed to 'provide a theoretical justification for a dramaturgy that concentrated on the representation of exceptional behaviour' (p. i9). Corneille is not trying to extend the range of the basic rules contained in his contemporaries' interpretation of Aristotle but stands in vital opposition to them.

It seems to me significant that the Acadimie was asked to intervene in the matter of Le Cid. The request was made not simply to show off the intellectual powers of its members but to make a very political point. How could Richelieu, at the same time that he was endeavouring to impose a common code of political conduct (which necessarily involves a large measure of conformity) on a reluctant aristocracy, tolerate the portrayal of an experience which aimed at transcending this conformity? This is not a fanciful notion. Chapelain himself underlines the connexion between the security of the state and artistic experience which can be harmful to it when he says: Les mauvais exemples sont contagieux, mesme sur les theatres; les feintes representations ne causent que trop de veritables crimes, et il y a grand peril a divertir le Peuple par des plaisirs qui peuvent produire un jour des douleurs publiques. Il nous faut bien garder d'accoustumer ny ses yeux ny ses oreilles a des actions qu'il doit ignorer, et de luy apprendre tantost la cruaut6, et tantost la perfidie, si nous ne luy en apprenons en mesme temps la punition, et si au retour de ces spectacles il ne remporte du moins un peu de crainte parmy beaucoup de contentement (Gast6, pp. 360-6I). Or again: I1 y a des verit6s monstrueuses, ou qu'il faut supprimer pour le bien de la soci&t6 ou que si l'on ne les peut tenir cach6es il faut se contenter de remarquer comme des choses estranges.

1 La Mesnardiere is such a case, and more significantly d'Aubignac, in his Dissertations on certain of Corneille's tragedies, while at times highly personal and polemical, chooses to argue on the grounds of appropriate behaviour in much the same way as Scud6ry and Chapelain in the case of Le Cid.

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H. PHILLIPS 277

C'est principalement en ces rencontres que le Poete a droit de preferer la vraysemblance a la verit6, et de travailler plutost sur un sujet feint et raisonnable, que sur un veritable qui ne fust conforme at la raison.1

Vraisemblance in this light is much more than a simple moralistic control. May I be bold enough to suggest that Corneille's opposition to the whole notion may also

explain his popularity right up to the end of the seventeenth century amidst an

aristocracy who found themselves prisoners of the aristocratic zoo of Versailles

yet who remained nostalgic for their glorious past? HENRY PHILLIPS

UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

1 Gaste, p. 366. Chapelain is not alone in his concern for drama to accord with the public good. The political implications of a king's portrayal on stage are discussed at length by both La Mesnar- diere (Poetique, p. I02 and p. I2o) and d'Aubignac (Pratique, pp. 72-73 and Dissertation on (Edipe in Recueil de dissertations sur plusieurs tragedies de Corneille et de Racine, edited by Fr. Granet, 2 vols (Paris, I739), In, pp. 31-34).



Documents

"Vraisemblance" and Moral Instruction in Seventeenth-Century Dramatic Theory