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Asian Survey, Vol. 48, Issue 4, pp. 650–672, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2008 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis-sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights andPermissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2008.48.4.650.

650

David Koh is Senior Fellow and Coordinator, Institute o SoutheastAsian Studies, Singapore. Email: <[email protected]>.

LEADERSHIP CHANGES AT THE 10TH

CONGRESS OF THE VIETNAMESECOMMUNIST PARTY

David Koh

AbstractThis paper argues that while there was a large leadership turnover at the 10th

Vietnamese Communist Party Congress in April 2006, the wait continues foryounger leaders to emerge. The congress showed increased intraparty democ-

racy. The willingness to go beyond regional distribution of power in the selec-

tion of top leaders was remarkable.

Keywords: Vietnam, leadership, Congress, Communist Party

Introduction

The National Congress o the Vietnamese Commu-

nist Party (VCP), held once every fve years, is the lighthouse o one-partypolitics in Vietnam. At every Congress, the Party sheds older leadersand brings in younger people. Ever since the 9th Congress in 2001, andmore so at the 10th Congress in 2006, selection o the top leaders o theVCP has been less straightorward than generally expected o communistparties. Instead o winning their election by respectable—engineered— margins, leaders elected at the 10th Congress ound themselves unsure andunsettled by subtle, behind-the-curtain challenges. While the structure o top-down selection remained unaltered, in reality the structure was tested

by a multitude o dierent voices calling or the replacement o the topleader as well as a change in the structure that selects the Central Commit-tee, the Political Bureau, the general secretary, and the executive or thegovernment.



DAVID KOH 651

Overview of the Stipulated CentralCommittee Election Process and Result

For the 10th Party Congress, preparations or leadership succession wereled by the Subcommittee (o the 9th Central Committee) or Personnel Ap-pointments. The general secretary chaired this subcommittee and workedclosely with the head o the Commission or Organization and Personnelto prepare a list o nominees or election to the 10th Central Committee,which elects the 10th Political Bureau.1 The 12th Plenum o the 9th Cen-tral Committee (July 2005) discussed the principles o appointment policyto guide the subcommittee.2 Ater July 2005, the subcommittee held dis-cussions with important organizations and individuals within the Party, in-

cluding the Party Inspection Commission (in charge o investigation andrecommendations regarding complaints against Party members) and vet-eran members such as ex-leaders (numbering dozens o people)3 and the en-tire Political Bureau. The last stage was at the Congress, where in additionto the list that the Central Committee recommended, delegation groups(organized according to province) at the Congress could also propose theirown candidates. For this Congress, individual members could also nomi-nate themselves. Ultimately, the ull list or the 10th Congress’s CentralCommittee election included 207 candidates running or 160 ull members’

seats; the 9th Central Committee proposed 174, delegation groups pro-posed 31, and there were two sel-nominations.4 For alternate member seats,46 persons contested or 25 vacant seats; among the 46, the 9th Central

1. While research into the preparations or previous VCP National Congresses as well asthe national congresses o the other communist parties in the past and present may proveotherwise, it could be reasonable to assume that the general secretary o the Party has thebiggest role to play in the matter o appointment o leaders. It could also be reasonable to as-sume that preparations or appointments and elections at the VCP National Congresses are

in broad strokes similar to those o the National Congresses o other communist parties–– there would be a role or the head o the Party department on organization and personnel andthat this list would more or less have to be approved by the Political Bureau, i not also by theCentral Committee o the Party.

2. These principles were: (i) quality o candidates in terms o qualifcations and a “clean”CV, and (ii) reasonable distribution o candidates among dierent sectors and representationsrom among the population to ensure total Party leadership in all areas. Nhân Dân, July 13,2005, <http://www.nhandan.com.vn/tinbai/?top=0&article=35809n>.

3. At the 10th Party Congress, the most prominent ex-leaders consulted in this processwere Do Muò i, Lê Ðúc Anh, Võ Van Ki∙êt, Võ Nguyên Giáp, and Nguyên Ðúc Tâm. Essen-tially, they were members o the ormer Political Bureau or had held responsible positions in

the Party hierarchy that allowed them access to inormation about the younger leaders to benominated or higher ofce.4. “Sáng nay, công bô danh sách Ban Châp hành TU

¸mói” (List o new Central Commit-

tee members announced this morning), Thanh Niên, April 24, 2006.





DAVID KOH 653

was the largest number o retirements rom the Political Bureau in history.The new Political Bureau would have an absolute majority o resh mem-bers. However, the vote at the 13th Plenum was not binding: the “voting”session was called a “survey.” Suspense began to fll the air, although morepeople expected the eight mentioned to retire than otherwise; many alsoelt an intense political struggle approaching.

There was also no rule to automatically give the post o general secre-tary to the highest vote getter, and there was in general a reluctance to re-move the incumbent unless the person had oended every conceivableinterest or action or political patron.9 What was considered unortunateby some people was that Nguyên Van An, then chairman o the NationalAssembly and ranked number our in the Political Bureau, was also“voted” out. Many people considered him to be the next possible strong-man the country needed in the Party—i only he could be made generalsecretary to succeed the incumbent Nông Ðúc M.anh. Also leaving werePrime Minister Phan Van Khải and State President Trân Ðúc Luong,number three and number two, respectively.10 That the PM and state presi-dent were leaving was not a surprise; Phan Van Khải, at least, had indi-cated a number o times that it was going to be his last term, in act hisonly ull term as PM.11 Deense Minister Ph·am Van Trà had reached re-tirement age; Nguyên Khoa Ðiêm, head o the Commission or Ideologyand Culture, had asked to retire; and Tru ong Quang Ðu ·oc, vice chairmano the National Assembly, was ill and also had to retire.

Besides Nguyên Van An, the other surprises were Nông Ðúc M.anh’stwo purported allies, Phan Diên, Party Secretariat standing secretary andeectively deputy Party general secretary, and Trân Ðình Hoan, head o the Commission or Organization and Personnel. They were surprise losers.To demonstrate his leadership qualities or the impending selection, orabout a year Phan Diên had adopted a high profle in the media and hadtaken the lead in pushing or the exposure o corruption as the Congress

9. In the history o the VCP, since 1956 only two incumbent general secretaries had beenremoved––Truong Chinh in 1956 (ater national anger reacting to the excesses o the land re-orm) and Lê Khả Phiêu in 2001, at the 9th Party National Congress.

10. Thus, the eight that were to retire going by the results o the “survey” were, in protocoldescendance: State President Trân Ðúc Luong, Prime Minister (PM) Phan Van Khải, Na-tional Assembly Chairman Nguyên Van An, Party Secretariat Standing Secretary Phan Diên,Head o Commission or Party Organization and Personnel Trân Ðình Hoan, Deense Min-ister Ph∙am Van Trà, Head o Commission or Ideology and Culture Nguyên Khoa Ðiêm, and

Vice Chairman o the National Assembly Tru¸o¸ng Quang Ðu

¸∙o¸c.11. Phan Van Khải (as PM) and Trân Ðúc Luong (as state president) were elected by the

Party mid-term Congress in 1997 to their positions together with Lê Khả Phiêu (generalsecretary).



654 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVIII, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2008

approached. These eorts ailed to get him elected but produced spectacu-lar and unexpected results: the rapid exposure o a number o corruptionscandals including the now inamous PMU18 scandal uncovered just be-ore the 13th Plenum.12

Paying the price or this aair, Minister or Transport Ðào Ðình Bìnhreportedly as a result received the lowest number o votes at the 13th Ple-num survey, coming in below the 50% passing mark or retention. TrânÐình Hoan also received less than 50%. He had entered the Political Bu-reau in 2001 and ascended to head the Commission or Organization andPersonnel, which wielded enormous power over personnel appointments.Apparently during Hoan’s term, there were accusations o regional nepo-tism, which may have been the primary cause o his downall. Similar ac-cusations had brought down ormer General Secretary Lê Khả Phiêu in2001. Hoan’s imminent departure was a shock because until the 13th Ple-num, the general opinion among the elites regarding his uture was goodand the orecast was or him to stay or one more term.

The third surprise was the revival o Tru ong Tân Sang, who was asso-ciated with the Nam Cam scandal13 in 2000/2001 and was pushed to thebackground at the 9th Party National Congress in 2001. Ater the con-gress, he was redeployed rom Ho Chi Minh City to become the head o the Economics Commission, evidently a demotion in status and importance.Five years later, however, he managed to obtain more than two-thirds o the “votes,” coming in near the top. He was thus reelected, even whilememory o that scandal had not completely aded away. This suggestedthat many members o the Central Committee could have seen Tru ongTân Sang as the all guy or the Nam Cam scandal, taking the blame onbehal o higher-ups as well as reecting the severe lack o transparency

12. PMU18 was the abbreviation or Project Management Unit 18, a subordinate depart-

ment o the Ministry o Transport, where Nguy˜ên Vi∙êt Ti

´ên was vice minister. In late 2005, agroup o PMU18 ofcials was arrested or gambling in a park. Investigations revealed they

were also involved in betting on oreign soccer matches, and the head o PMU18 Bùi TiênDung had bet millions o dollars using unds o the PMU18. Further investigations impli-cated Nguyên Vi∙êt Tiên, a ormer head o PMU18 and predecessor o Bùi Tiên Dung.

13. Nam Cam was a godather o the underworld in Ho Chi Minh City in the 1990s, withhis notoriety peaking toward the end o that decade. At this peak, government ofcials in thatlocality were supposedly at his beck and call, and he had hands in many lucrative and illegalbusinesses that enjoyed the protection o police riends. Ater he was arrested in 2000, investi-gations reected the lack o oversight on the part o Ho Chi Minh City party leaders in thelate 1990s, and also inappropriate relationships between them and Nam Cam. Truong Tân

Sang was responsible as the Ho Chi Minh City party secretary at that time. Because it wasonly a matter o inappropriate relationships and not wrongdoing, Sang was merely repri-manded by the Party Central Committee; consequently, he retreated to a back seat during2001–06, as head o the Central Committee Commission on Economics.



DAVID KOH 655

and probity in the political system, an environment that all politicians hadto operate in.

The Position of the General Secretary

With the 13th Plenum results in place, the views o political and govern-mental elites who sat on opposite sides o the reorm-security spectrumwere mixed. For those who preerred aster reorm or Vietnam, the fveyears 2001–06 were essentially seen as lost time. There was growth, andpoverty was reduced, but they increasingly saw the incremental and slowchanges in politics as key impediments holding the country back, well be-hind aster-paced developments in China and elsewhere. These reorm

elites wanted a stronger leader who could stamp his mark on a wide rangeo issues above the struggles o a variegated elite that pulled the politico-economic system in dierent directions. Thus, the camp desiring quickprogress sought a pair o strong hands that could not be easily swayed butthat had had enough inuence to rally people with dierent opinions tohis cause. Members o this camp saw no such capability in the general sec-retary during his frst term, and thus news that Nông Ðú c M.anh was tostay on the next Central Committee and by deault could likely secureanother term, persuaded them to start a vigorous campaign against the

incumbent.14

On the opposite side, however, was the security-conscious camp o thosewho believed that reorm was necessary, but “peaceul evolution” was avery real danger. (Peaceul evolution, as a conceptual guide to securitypolicies, warned against incremental transormation o the political sys-tem, arguing that this approach could prompt the collapse o CommunistParty rule.) In the view o security proponents, or at least in the politicalposition they ormally adopted, the bilateral trade agreement with theU.S. brought benefts but might also hurt the security o the Party, which

could all prey to the American global agenda to spread the U.S. brand o democracy. They cited as evidence the U.S. post-Cold War oreign policyand military interventions in Eastern Europe, as well as in the Middle East.Continuing demands by the U.S. government and Congress on domesticissues in Vietnam, such as curtailing the suppression o political and reli-gious dissidence, bolstered a belie that Vietnam was a possible target o peaceul evolution. Thus, to have an incumbent general secretary knownor his cautiousness, prudence, and tendency to preer consensus in policy

14. From the conversations I held with senior government ofcials and ordinary Vietnam-ese rom the years 2002 until the holding o the 10th Party Congress in April 2006, the persis-tent eedback was a perception that the incumbent general secretary was not a strong leaderand was instead a consensus builder.




making was good news because in this way the more-conservative viewswould not be ignored and Party and country would be sae rom oreignintererence.

Party Elders Supported DifferentCandidates

The views o Party elders, ormer Party Central Committee Advisors15 LêÐúc Anh, Ðô Muòi, Võ Van Ki·êt, and General Võ Nguyên Giáp appearedto carry some weight in this struggle, although a number o people haveinsisted that they were irrelevant in the eventual choosing o leaders.16 In-stitutionally, they might have mattered little; they were not in the Central

Committee, they had no voting powers, and the Advisors scheme had endedwith the 9th Congress. The political culture o Vietnam, however, meantdeerence to the wishes o living elders and ex-leaders. Also undeniablewas the likelihood that these ex-Advisors still had clients among the eliteswho could be called upon to exert inuence. Lê Ðú c Anh and Ðô Muòiwere reportedly in the camp o those who primarily supported the reelec-tion o Nông Ðúc M.anh, whereas Võ Van Ki·êt and Võ Nguyên Giáp a-vored a change. All our o them, however, concurred on Nguyên Van Anbeing retained in the Political Bureau and possibly becoming the next gen-

eral secretary. The key points in M.anh’s avor were that he had made nograve mistakes during his term and did not wish to step aside. Võ VanKi·êt, however, appeared also open to southerner Nguyên Minh Triêt be-coming the general secretary. In addition, the views o those soon retiring —such as Prime Minister Phan Van Khải and State President Trân ÐúcLuong—were also taken into consideration. At one point in time, up to aew months beore the 13th Plenum, Phan Van Khải was said to be sup-porting Nguyên Van An or general secretary as well, and was intending

15. Central Committee Advisors were positions created by the 6th Congress in 1986 andeliminated by the 9th Congress in 2001. This scheme allowed incumbent leaders to graceullystep down rom the highest positions to make way or the younger generation but yet retainenormous inuence on processes in the party, government, and the state, especially in the se-lection o next leaders. Advisors were not a part o the ormal decision-making bodies suchas the Political Bureau or the Central Committee, but they were consulted beore major deci-sions were presented or discussion. Their views were transmitted at meetings where they wereusually absent; these views carried weight. Occasionally, they were also invited to participatein Political Bureau meetings.

16. C. the view o Hông Hà in his interview with Radio Free Asia, August 20, 2006. HôngHà is a ormer member and head o administration o the Party Central Committee. Hông

Hà cited the ailure o Nguyên Chí V∙inh, head o the 2nd General Bureau o Intelligence o the military, to enter the Central Committee despite being nominated, ostensibly through theinuence o ex-Advisor Lê Ðúc Anh. Nguyên Chí V∙inh was supposedly the oster son o LêÐúc Anh and son o Vietnam War hero General Nguyên Chí Thanh.



DAVID KOH 657

to introduce the matter into the agenda o the National Congress at theCongress itsel, i such a measure was necessary.

The PM Position Issue

For the PM position, the candidates that Phan Van Khải had supportedor successor at dierent times included Nguyên Thi·ên Nhân, vice chair-man o the Ho Chi Minh People’s Committee; Vu Khoan, deputy primeminister (DPM) in charge o security and oreign aairs; and in the fnalhour Nguyên Tân Dung, standing DPM. On the other hand, it was alsosaid that Võ Van Ki·êt had wanted to recommend Nguyên Minh Triêt orPM. One other source said that Nguyên Minh Triêt was aiming or the top

position o general secretary because his chances or the PM post were notexcellent when compared to those o Nguyên Tân Dung. Other candidatesor the PM position could cite Triêt’s lack o experience at the nationalgovernment level to deny him. I he was aiming only or the PM post, hecould return empty handed.

The Nguyen Van An Story

The chie difculty, however, in retaining Nguyên Van An was this: bywhat rationale would he be retained? He was already “surveyed” out by

the Central Committee and he did not win a high percentage o support(only in the mid-60% range) when the National Assembly in 2002 votedhim in as the new chairman o the National Assembly to replace NôngÐúc M.anh, who had moved out to head the Party. In a political context inwhich the Party leaders could exert considerable pressure on the CentralCommittee to accept Nguyên Van An’s retention, pushing strongly or thisgoal was not a major problem. The insurmountable obstacle, however, wasthat Nguyên Van An had also reached the age o retirement, 67.17 NguyênVan An was born in the year o the Ox (1937) and would have been 69 by

the Political Bureau election. Most signifcant, our other Political Bureaumembers were born in the year o the Ox (Phan Diên, Phan Van Khải,Trân Ðúc Luong, Trân Ðình Hoan. Collectively, they were called the FiveOxen). Retaining Nguyên Van An would give the other our grounds to de-mand retention. This would have hampered leadership renewal and blockedopportunities or younger leaders (meaning those in their early 60s!) waiting

17. The 9th Party National Congress in 2001 set the retention age and entry age limits or

Political Bureau members at 65 and 60, respectively. Beore the 10th Congress, at the 12thPlenum, this was amended to 65 + 2 and 60, respectively. The age limit or frst entry into theCentral Committee was 55. One public source to confrm this is “Ủy viên trung uong tái củ không quá tuổi 60.”




in the wings. The latter would be expected to oppose this move, causinggreat difculties in reaching consensus and making the Party look bad instalemate.

Political Maneuvers againstNong Duc Manh

These considerations did not stop those who believed Nông Ðúc M.anhwas ineective rom staging a campaign against his removal so as to makeway or Nguyên Van An. The PMU18 scandal presented an opportunityto do so. There was a rumor that the son-in-law o the general secretary wasworking in PMU1818 and by implication his ather in-law was not ft to

continue in ofce. In this light, the added rumor that punishments wouldbe light or the PMU18 and that some o its managers were escaping pun-ishment altogether were damaging to the position o the general secretary.These were, o course, rumors that could be waved away. The more dam-aging doubt placed on the head o the general secretary was based on theact that Vice Minister or Transport Nguyên Vi·êt Tiên was implicated inthe PMU18. He was supposedly on the list o candidates proposed or elec-tion to the Party Central Committee by the subcommittee or Appoint-ments, chaired by the general secretary. I Tiên had been elected, he could

very well have been made the next Minister or Transport ater one term.How did he pass through the vetting that was supposedly tight and con-trolled by the general secretary? The incumbent Minister or TransportÐào Ðình Bình was also known to be an ally o the general secretary,which did not help matters or the latter. Nông Ðúc M.anh’s son NôngQuôc Tuân was also used as ammunition against his ather. In early March2005, Tuân was elected to head the Union o Youth Organizations (H·ôiLiên Hi·êp Thanh Niên) and thus was entitled to attend the 10th Party Na-tional Congress. This, together with the rumors about PMU18, strength-

ened the perception that Nông Ðú¸c M.anh was doling out patronage to hisamily members and political allies. While rumors and news o these per-

sonal and political connections were being circulated, there was also a pushagainst Nông Ðúc M.anh rom a number o party veteran leaders, includ-ing Võ Van Ki·êt, General Võ Nguyên Giáp, and ormer General SecretaryLê Khả Phiêu. There was supposedly a meeting at which General Giápand Phiêu asked Nông Ðúc M.anh point blank not only to step aside butnot to run or the 10th Central Committee.19 The incumbent, as it turnedout, reused.

18. “The Top Brass,” Straits Times, November 11, 2006.19. Radio Free Asia, April 12, 2006.



DAVID KOH 659

The Regional Distribution Formula

Another actor that the entire cast o players deciding on the eventual

slate o political leaders had to consider was the regional distribution or-mula. Here, a little background may be useul.Post-war Vietnam under the rule o the VCP has always been keen to

promote a sense o national unity across a country once splintered by re-gionalism. There were many sources or this regionalism such as dier-ences in culture and traditions that developed over the dynastic, colonial,and Vietnam War periods; ideology; and also traditions where loyalty toone’s place o origin is esteemed. One o the lessons, in act, that the a-ther o the modern Vietnamese nation, Hô Chí Minh, had oten empha-

sized was that unity is the source o strength that leads to success. Thisexplains the reason why ater the war, the Vietnam Fatherland Front wasestablished as a orum cum policy-making body to incorporate the viewsrom dierent parts o the population and the country. One might alsonote that in act, there were three dierent communist parties in Vietnam,one organized in each region, beore the VCP was established by the mergero those three parties in 1930.

The keen desire to promote national unity, the lack o which is otenused to explain the loss o the nation to colonialism and war, also explains

why an unwritten regional distribution ormula has structured the selec-tion o leaders into the top VCP organs, chiey the Political Bureau andthe Central Committee. While not trying consciously to counter the chargethat the reunifcation o Vietnam was an “invasion” o the south by north-erners that eclipsed the ormer, the leadership has always been deliberatelycomposed o people rom dierent regions. The frst Political Bureau aterthe war increased the number o its members rom 11 to 14 to allow morerepresentation rom the south.20 What the ormula pertained to was essen-tially the equitable distribution o leadership positions among people rom

three dierent regions: north, central, and south. While a central-north-south distribution appears to be equitable and nicely balanced, the moreimportant and readily recognized distribution pattern is between the northand the south. Among all the top leadership positions, the most importantare the general secretary, who heads the VCP, and the prime minister, whoheads the government. Ater the 6th Party National Congress o 1986,northerners and southerners have always taken one each o these twopositions.

This regional distribution ormula appeared most clearly on the occa-

sion o the mid-term Party National Congress o the Eighth Plenum, held

20. The writer registers his thanks to a reeree o this paper who pointed out this act.




in 1997. Among other reasons, that congress was held to bring in newleaders to succeed the three top retiring leaders Ðô Mu òi (northern, gen-eral secretary); Võ Van Ki

·êt (southern, prime minister); and Lê Ðúc Anh

(central, state president). At that point in time, however, there was no topleader rom the central region already within the Political Bureau whomthe Bureau considered qualifed (Political Bureau membership was a must)to be state president. Ex-Prime Minister Ph ·am Van Dông rom the centralregion managed to convince the leaders then that a central region personshould be given a seat among the top three positions listed above, or rea-sons o national unity. Conerring respect on the elderly veteran o therevolution, the extant leaders decided to promote Trân Ðúc Luong, a dep-uty prime minister but not the most senior o the DPMs, into the PoliticalBureau so that he could become state president. Without this special ar-rangement, it was still an open question o whether Trân Ðúc Luongwould have made it into the Political Bureau at all.

Seeing the mixed sentiments about Nông Ðúc M.anh and Nguyên VanAn, ater the results o the 13th Plenum “survey” became known, andusing the regional distribution ormula as the pretext, several o the eightPolitical Bureau members eligible or retirement began to oat scenariosand alternatives to their retiring. The reasons cited were the need to bal-ance out the top three party-state-government posts among the three re-gions, as well as the need or continuity i too large a number o PoliticalBureau members were asked to retire together. Nguyên Van An’s retentionwould boost the strength o these arguments, including the retention o Phan Diên as the central region person, to assume the post o state presi-dent, according to the ormula at work since 1986.

To urther highlight the mood or replacement o the general secretaryin avor o more dynamism, and to counter the undesirable eect o sacri-fcing merit in avor o regional distribution, ex-Advisor Võ Van Ki·êt madesuggestions while the subcommittee or Personnel Appointments was be-ginning its work, about 12 months beore the Congress. In particular, Ki ·êt,also an ex-prime minister, proposed to the 11th Plenum ideas to reormthe Party Congress mechanism including the direct election o the generalsecretary by the Congress.21 He also suggested disbanding the preparatorycommittees just beore the Congress took place, allowing the Presidiumo the Congress ull powers; direct election by the Congress o members o

21. These ideas were supposedly ed to the Central Committee 11th Plenum by Võ Van

Ki∙êt, through a letter dated January 11, 2005, made available on <www.ykien.net>, a websiteknown to be anticommunist but also known or supposed leaks o important party and statedocuments. (See <http://ykien.net/tl_viettrung73.html>, accessed April 17, 2007.) These leakswere neither confrmed nor denied by the Vietnamese authorities.



DAVID KOH 661

the Party Inspection Commission; giving the Congress’s delegates the ulti-mate authority to decide on all matters put beore them; no more mid-term Congresses; reduction o the size o the Central Committee by aboutone-ourth to one-third; holding the election o state leaders in the Na-tional Assembly much earlier than one year ater the Party Congress; se-cret ballots or elections and reedom o individual party members tostand in Central Committee elections; and fnally, using the positions o Party general secretary and state president.22 Apparently, the 9th CentralCommittee at its 11th Plenum held in January 2005 rejected all items ex-cept the early National Assembly leadership election proposal.23

From the 14th to the 15th Plenum

A urry o opinions and moves dominated discussion until the 14th Ple-num o the Central Committee held in March 2006. In any case, by con-sensus, when the Central Committee met or the 14th Plenum, the PoliticalBureau did suggest an alternate cast o leaders. Nguyên Van An was to re-main (with Nông Ðúc M.anh moving on to become state president) andPhan Diên was also to be retained so that a central region person was rep-resented among the top three positions—perhaps Phan Diên could becomethe chairman o the National Assembly. But this was not to be, or the

14th Plenum upheld the “survey” results o the 13th Plenum through a or-mal vote, quashing all rumors that Nguyên Van An could be retained andthat Nông Ðúc M.anh would step down in the ace o strong pressure.

The 15th Plenum was held a ew days beore the Congress (April 14 –16,2006). According to Bùi Tín, a political dissident exiled or some time inParis, Phan Van Khải, Nguyên Van An, and Nguyên Minh Triêt togetherpressured the Political Bureau not to end the discussion on appointmentsat the 14th Plenum. Instead, they sought to leave the issue to the 15th Ple-num to decide, a plenum that was originally not in the schedule o meet-

ings.24

This decision was also reportedly supported by Phan Di˜ên, whereasHoan, Ðiêm, and Trà opposed it. The purpose o the pressure group was

22. Võ Van Ki∙êt argued the 2nd and 3rd Party National Congresses maniested best theprinciple o democratic centralism within the Party. He argued that at these two congresses“the National Congress was the highest leadership organ o our Party” and “between Con-gresses, the Central Committee was the highest leadership organ.”

23. Eventually, this suggestion to essentially hold back-to-back elections o the VCP andthe National Assembly (which would then elect the government) was adopted by the 12thNational Assembly, in July 2007. The Assembly adopted a resolution to shorten its own term

by one year and to lengthen the term o local people’s councils by one year. The result is, allthree elections o political signifcance in the Vietnamese political system will, rom 2011, beheld in the same year and thereater.

24. Radio Free Asia, April 13, 2006.




to give Nông Ðúc M.anh more time to change his mind. The key or sup-port o this was because PMU18 was still a hot issue. According to HoàngThanh Phong, who worked or an international non-governmental organi-

zation (NGO) in Hanoi and was well inormed, at the end o the 15th Ple-num the 9th Central Committee decided that or the posts o generalsecretary, prime minister, and chairman o the National Assembly, therewould be two candidates or each post. For the post o state president,whoever lost in the race to become general secretary would occupy thatpost. The candidates were as ollows: Nông Ðúc M.anh and Nguyên MinhTriêt or general secretary, Nguyên Tân Dung and Nguyên Sinh Hùng orPM, and Nguyên Phú Tr·ong and Truong Tân Sang or chairman o theNational Assembly.25 Past practices saw the nomination o only one can-

didate or each post. While the 9th Central Committee nominated candi-dates, it was the 10th Central Committee, at its 1st Plenum held ater itwas elected by the 10th Congress, which voted on the candidates.

The 15th Plenum decided that the delegation groups o the Congressshould also be given the right to introduce candidates in addition to thelist that the 9th Central Committee had authoritatively drawn up.26 Forthe other matter o top personnel appointments, however, the 15th Ple-num let intact the decisions or leadership changes o the 14th Plenum,which would be presented to the Congress or ormal approval. On the

other hand, the BBC reported that the Central Committee and the leadersat this stage had not reached a consensus on the Party’s choice or generalsecretary. The same report quoted scholar Carlyle Thayer as saying that ata meeting o the diplomatic corps at which DPM Vu Khoan was present,Vu Khoan had used the plural noun to indicate the number o candidatesrunning or the post.27

The 10th Congress

The Congress was thus convened in an atmosphere o contestation and

uncertainty over leadership succession; the body would soon vote in a newCentral Committee, which would then choose the new leaders. Some sta-tistics, taken rom a Vietnamese newspaper report on the election, are in-teresting. The number o 9th Central Committee members reelected to the10th Central Committee was 81; thus 79, or 47.5%, were new with FullMember status. The candidate with the highest vote received 97.88% andthe lowest was 63.41%.28 Other than Ðác Nông Province, all the other

25. Ibid., April 16, 2006.

26. Ibid., April 17, 2006.27. BBC, April 16, 2006.28. “Kêt quả bâu củ có gì đáng chú ý?” (Points o interests in results o elections), Tuổ i

Trẻ, April 25, 2006.



DAVID KOH 663

provinces and cities had a Full Member representative on the 10th CentralCommittee.29 All nominations or Full Member seats by the DelegationGroups were not able to triumph and thus all 160 Full Members werenominations rom the 9th Central Committee.30 Two sel-nominated mem-bers also ailed to get in.31

The results o the 10th Central Committee election produced a numbero surprises. Six ministers who stood or reelection ailed: Ðô QuangTrung, minister or Interior; Nguyên Minh Hiển, minister or Educationand Training; Trân Th·i Trung Chiên, minister or Health; Ðô Trung Tá,minister or Post & Communications; T·a Quang Ng·oc, minister or Fish-eries; and Quách Lê Thanh, head o the Government Inspectorate.32 Thebiggest shock was the deeat Ðô Quang Trung suered, because there wasa plan to nominate him or election to the Political Bureau to take over theportolio o Trân Ðình Hoan, a plan hatched ater it was clear that Hoanhad to retire.

A second shock was the act that no career ofcial rom the Ministry o Foreign Aairs (MFA) managed to get elected, probably because o thelack o younger candidates, as well as a reaction by the Congress againstthe alleged lack o solid achievements in oreign aairs. The MFA underNguyên Dy Niên had reportedly suggested to the Congress that the ageceiling should be relaxed, implying that the Foreign Aairs sector shouldbe allowed more exibility.33 The youngest MFA candidate or a Full Mem-ber seat, Nguyên Phú Bình, was already 56 years old—one year beyondthe stipulated age limit—when he was seeking his frst seat in the CentralCommittee. He was also the youngest o the three vice ministers o theMFA. One MFA ofcial, the director o the International OrganizationsDirectorate, Ph·am Bình Minh, managed to get a seat as an Alternate Mem-ber.34 The portolios o Education and Health were very difcult publicpolicy areas that the incumbent ministers did not manage well, and thisaccounted in the main or their ailure to be reelected.

29. Ibid.30. “Các đoàn đê củ và t∙u ung củ đêu tru ·ot ủy viên chính thuc” (All nominees rom dele-

gation groups and sel-nominees ailed to become Full Members), VN Express, April 24,2006.

31. “Kêt quả bâu củ có gì đáng chú ý?”32. Minister or Environment and Natural Resources Mai Aí Tr∙uc was also shortlisted or

election to the Political Bureau, but he decided to retire rom government and not run or theCentral Committee. Given his decisive style and reputation as a technocrat, some quarterseven elt he had the potential to be the next general secretary ater Nông Ðú c M∙anh had re-

tired at the end o the 2006–11 tenure.33. “Tổng bí thu Nông Ðúc M∙anh đu ∙oc đê củ vào trung uong X.”34. The 10th Congress also saw the return o the Alternate Member scheme or the Cen-

tral Committee.




As the Congress was progressing, however, an opinion was articulatedthat perhaps the body should move to directly elect the general secretaryas well as the head o the Party Inspectorate. Type II mass media (i.e.,those not expressing the ofcial view),35 such as newspaper Tuổ i Trẻ ande-news website VN Express, were pushing or the reorm. They had eveninterviewed Party veteran and ormer Political Bureau member NguyênÐúc Tâm and quoted him as supporting the idea.36

Election of the General Secretary

Ater the Central Committee election, an innovation in the electoral pro-cess or the general secretary was introduced. A survey orm was circu-

lated to survey the opinion o the 1,176 Congress delegates on whom theythought should be the next general secretary.37 On the survey orm werereportedly the names o our persons—Nông Ðú c M.anh, Nguyên MinhTriêt, Nguyên Van An, and Nguyên Phú Tr·ong. The survey results sup-posedly showed Nông Ðúc M.anh ar ahead, with Nguyên Minh Triêt adistant second, and Nguyên Phú Tr·ong even urther behind. Nguyên VanAn had asked to withdraw because he was not on the list o the new Cen-tral Committee, a prerequisite or election into the Political Bureau. (Inact, Delegation Groups at the Congress nominated him but as the list o

candidates was being fnalized at the Congress, he asked that his name bewithdrawn. Together with him were Nguyên Khoa Ðiêm and DPM VuKhoan.38) According to the rules, however, the Central Committee electedthe Political Bureau and the Central Committee voted on candidates orthe top posts. Because the Congress was not empowered to elect the gen-eral secretary directly, the survey remained just that. To what extent thisaected opinion in the new Central Committee was not clear. Anotherversion o the event said that every one o the Congress delegates was

35. Type I media included the Nhân Dân, Quân Ð∙ôi Nhân Dân, television and radio

channels.36. “Nên để Ð∙ai h∙ôi Ðảng bâu tr∙uc tiêp tổng bí thu” (The Party Congress should be al-

lowed to directly vote in the general secretary), VN Express, April 21, 2006; “Se thêm nhiêuđảng viên t∙u ung củ vào trung uong” (Many additional sel-nominees or Central Committeeelection), ibid., April 22, 2006. That Vu Mao was also suggesting it was possible or that tohappen i the Congress had decided so indicated that there were perhaps some orces thatwanted to push this line at the Congress. “Ủy viên trung uong tái củ không quá tuổi 60.”

37. According to Vu Mao, the 9th Central Committee had agreed to this measure on the

condition that this survey was carried out only ater the 10th Central Committee had beenelected. See ibid. Vu Mao also said in the same interview: “The Congress could also decide toelect the general secretary directly.”

38. “Sáng nay, công bô danh sách Ban Châp hành T.U¸

mói.”



DAVID KOH 665

given a list o the members o the 10th Central Committee who had justbeen elected. They were given the liberty to vote or anyone on the list thatthey preerred.39 From there, the 10th Central Committee decided on theperson to nominate. This version was also that given by the elected generalsecretary at a press conerence the next day.40

Ater it was elected, the Central Committee held its frst Plenum in theaternoon o April 25, 2006, and dealt with as the frst item on the agendathe election o the general secretary. According to an ofcial newspaperreport, two names were put orward, that o Nông Ðúc M.anh and NguyênMinh Triêt. The ofcial report said that instead o going to a vote, Triêtannounced that he was withdrawing, ollowing a Party tradition o havingno contest or the top post. On the other hand, there were anecdotal re-ports that said a vote had taken place and Nông Ðú c M.anh had triumphednarrowly. Nông Ðúc M.anh vigorously denied there was a “power strug-gle” (“đâu tranh quyên l ·uc”) at a press conerence the next day. What ol-lowed was also interesting to note: eventually the fve top “vote” getters inthe 13th Plenum “survey” held three months earlier were ultimately ap-pointed to the top fve jobs, general secretary, state president, prime minis-ter, chairman o the National Assembly, and standing secretary o theParty Secretariat. As was the tradition, no frst-time members o the Polit-ical Bureau assumed one o the top fve posts.

The 1st Plenum, however, reportedly ended much later than the sched-uled time. Apparently ater voting in the general secretary and the othertop posts, a discussion was initiated on whether the Political Bureau couldbe strengthened in numbers, because the Central Committee had onlyvoted in 14 members or 16 seats. The rules said that any member standingor election to the Political Bureau had to obtain more than 50% o thevotes, and there was a Central Committee member that managed to ob-tain exactly 50%. In the end, the Central Committee decided not to makeexceptions simply or the purpose o flling up the vacant seats.

Ranking within the Political Bureau

It had been de rigueur or Political Bureau members to be ranked in theofcial listing according to the unctional posts they held within the Partyand state. In order o descending protocol importance, the top ranks con-sisted o Party general secretary, state president, prime minister, chair-man o the National Assembly, and standing secretary o the Party Central

39. “Các ủy viên BCH TW khoá X đêu trúng củ¸

vó¸i sô phiêu trên 63%.”40. “Tổng bí thu Nông Ðúc M∙anh: Phải biêt l áng nghe, cả nhung phê phán gay g át!”

(General Secretary Nông Ðú c M∙anh: We must listen to opinions careully, including strongcriticisms!), Thanh Niên, April 26, 2006.




Committee Secretariat. Beyond these important posts, criteria o age andthe importance o the posts become equal considerations. For instance,being the party secretary o either Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City would be amore eminent position than being a government minister, but this crite-rion is balanced out by seniority (in terms o number o years o member-ship in the Political Bureau).

At the end o the First Plenum o the 10th Central Committee, manypeople were surprised that Le Hong Anh, spending his second term in thenew Political Bureau and only a minister (o Public Security), was rankedsecond on the ofcial list. No ofcial explanation has been orthcoming,but a source maintained to the writer, ater repeated queries, that Le HongAnh’s second place was a result o an agreement within the Political Bu-reau to rank its members according to the numbers o votes that eachmember received at Bureau election by the Central Committee.

Barring the opening o the Party’s top secret archives, it would be dif-cult to veriy this assertion. What is signifcant, i the assertion is true, isthat this Political Bureau raises the importance o popularity with theCentral Committee as a new benchmark or the ranking o elites.

Thereafter in the National Assembly

With a relatively high turnover in Party leadership in April 2006, the ques-tion arose whether leadership changes in the state organs should await thenext National Assembly election in July 2007 or begin immediate replace-ment. Waiting or the election would be the tradition, but given that theAsia-Pacifc Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit was to be held inHanoi in November 2006, ailing to change the leadership o state organswould have meant letting APEC leaders meet with Vietnamese counter-parts who were on the way out o ofce. The Party leadership thereoredecided that the state positions should be occupied by the new Party lead-

ers and should be put in place by the next seating o the National Assem-bly in June. To do this, however, the National Assembly had to allow theincumbents to retire. Their applications to retire o course had to be frstsubmitted to and approved by the Central Committee.41 This was done atthe 2nd Plenum at the end o May.

The National Assembly could not but rubber stamp the resignationsubmissions once the Central Committee had already approved them.The results showed, perhaps, a lingering wish among a signifcant minor-ity or Nguyên Van An to stay on. Among the three retiring leaders whose

41. “Thủ tu ong Phan Van Khải sãn sàng bàn giao chú c v∙u” (PM Phan Van Khải is readyto hand over), VN Express, May 5, 2006.



DAVID KOH 667

applications had to be approved procedurally by the National Assembly —Chairman Nguyên Van An, Prime Minister Phan Van Khải, and StatePresident Trân Ðúc Luong—Nguyên Van An received the ewest votes,362 o 474 (73.43%) approving resignation, compared to the PM’s 456 o 470 (92.49%) and the state president’s 462 o 467 (93.71%), respectively.42

The new ofce holders were voted in by the National Assembly with rel-ative ease. Nguyên Minh Triêt received 94% o votes to become the nextstate president.43 Nguyên Tân Dung was elected PM with 92% o thevote,44 and Nguyên Phú Tr·ong garnered 84.58% to become the chairmano the National Assembly.45

At the same seating o the National Assembly, new ministers or De-ense, Foreign Aairs, Finance, Culture & Inormation, Education & Train-ing, Transport, and Government Inspectorate were also appointed. O note was the act that the National Assembly was assertive in marking itsdisapproval where the nomination o ministers did not quite meet expec-tations. Standing DPM Nguyên Sinh Hùng and Lê Doãn H ·op, ministeror Culture and Inormation, both received only 58% o votes or appoint-ment rom the Assembly. One needs to bear in mind that 92% o the Na-tional Assembly deputies were Party members.46

A Preliminary AssessmentThe listing o the 10th Political Bureau (14 members, two seats vacant)appears in Table 2, in the order as given by ofcial sources. This body wasrevived at the 9th Party National Congress. It acted on behal o the Politi-cal Bureau when the latter was not meeting. It comprised not solely PoliticalBureau members but instead a mixture o Bureau members as well as se-nior members o the Central Committee who might be considered ready

42. “Ð`ông chí Nguy

˜ên Phú Tr∙ong đu

¸

∙o

¸

c b`âu làm Chủ t∙ich Qu

´ôc h∙ôi” (Comrade Nguy

˜ênPhú Tr∙ong elected National Assembly chairman), Lao Ð

·ông, June 26, 2006. Another source

said that Nguyên Van An had 78.5% (387), Phan Van Khải had 91.68% (452), and Trân ÐúcLuong had 92.9% (458). Lê Huân, Lê Tảo, “Hôm nay, tân chủ t∙ich Quôc h∙ôi nh∙âm chúc”(New National Assembly chairman sworn in today), ibid., June 26, 2006.

43. “Ông Nguyên Tân Dung đu ∙oc gió i thi ∙êu làm Thủ tuóng” (Mr. Nguyên Tân Dungintroduced to become PM), VN Express, June 27, 2006. Also according to this report, 61o 64 National Assembly Groups (provincially categorized) agreed to Nguyên Minh Triêt’snomination.

44. Ibid. Also according to this report, all National Assembly delegation groups agreed tohis nomination. This is interesting because while all delegations’ ofcial stance was to support

Nguyên Tân Dung’s nomination, in act Nguyên Tân Dung received 2% less votes thanNguyên Minh Triêt, who only had 61 o 64 Groups’ ofcial support.45. Lê Huân, Lê Tảo “Hôm nay, tân chủ t∙ich Quôc h∙ôi nh∙âm chúc.”46. Hông Hà interview.




to enter the Political Bureau at the next Congress or sooner, and who wereat the top o their areas o work in the Party-State hierarchy. The Party

Secretariat elected by the Central Committee comprised eight members,with fve o them also being Political Bureau members. The other threemembers o the Secretariat were Lê Van Dung rom the armed orces;Tòng Th·i Phóng rom an ethnic minority (to take care o ethnic minorityissues); and Tô Huy Rúa, who usually worked in the inormation and cul-ture sector. It was also interesting to note that while the plan was to havenine to 11 persons, the Secretariat eventually only had eight. This was alsothe case or the Political Bureau; the plan was to have 15–17 people butthe number eventually admitted was only 14.47 We note that the Political

TABLE 2 Tenth Political Bureau of the VCP, April 2006

Name

Year

of Birth

Province

of Origin Eventual Post

1. Nông Ðức Mạnh* 1940 (66) Bắc Cạn (N) General secretary2. Lê Hồng Anh** 1949 (57) Kiên Giang (S) Public security minister3. Nguyễn Tấn Dũng 1949 (57) Cà Mau (S) Prime minister4. Nguyễn Minh Triết 1942 (64) Bình Dươ ng (S) State president5. Trươ ng Tấn Sang* 1949 (57) Long An (S) Standing secretary6. Nguyễn Phu Trọng 1944 (62) Hà Nội (N) Chair, Nat. Assembly7. Phạm Gia Khiêm 1944 (62) Hà Nội (N) DPM, MFA minister8. Phùng Quang Thanh 1949 (57) V ĩ nh Phúc (N) Deense minister

9. Trươ ng V ĩ nh Trọng * 1942 (64) Bến Tre (S) DPM, anti-Corruption10. Lê Thanh H ải 1950 (56) Tiền Giang (S) Secretary, Ho Chi Minh City11. Nguyễ n Sinh Hùng 1946 (60) Nghệ An (N) Standing DPM12. Nguyễ n V ăn Chi * 1945 (61) Quảng Nam (C) Hd. Inspection Commission13. H ồ Ðứ c Vi ệt* 1947 (59) Nghệ An (N) Hd. Organization & Pers.14. Phạm Quang Nghị 1949 (57) Thanh Hoá (N) Secretary, Hà Nội

SOURCE: Compiled by author rom various Vietnamese news sources and interviews.NOTE: Names in italics are new members entering the Political Bureau or the frst time.* Concurrently members o the Party Central Committee Secretariat.

** Lê Hồ

ng Anh was minister or Public Security. Placing his name in second place wentagainst the tradition o placing the occupants o the top three posts o general secretary,state president, and prime minister as the top three, and this arrangement generated someamount o controversy and mystery. Some sources said Lê Hồng Anh was placed second be-cause he garnered the second highest number o votes when the Central Committee voted inthe Political Bureau; but other sources disputed this view and said that it was in alphabeticalorder ater the frst among equals, the general secretary.

47. “Tổng bí thu Nông Ðúc M∙anh tái đ ác củ” (General Secretary Nông Ðú c M∙anh is re-elected), Tuổ i Trẻ, April 25, 2006.



DAVID KOH 669

Bureau preerred to have ewer members rather than lower its entrybenchmarks.

Several results are discernible rom this Congress. The most obvious wasthe departure rom the regional distribution ormula or the election o thetop leaders. Three southerners—Nguyên Minh Triêt, Nguyên Tân Dung,and Truong Tân Sang—now dominated the top layer versus two north-erners, Nông Ðúc M.anh and Nguyên Phú Tr·ong. An attempt at the 14thPlenum to stick strictly to the regional ormula was denied. Furthermorei one looked at the wider Political Bureau, one would realize that sixmembers o the Bureau were rom regions west o the Mekong in the Me-kong River Delta. Since people rom those regions were very easy-goingand practical in outlook, policy making could take a turn toward more co-hesiveness (because they could get along better with each other) and be-come less ideological as well. On the other hand, the systems utilized toappoint ofcials, to make policies, and to generate political outcomes haveremained unchanged. In a situation where power was ragmented andwhere the more open-minded groups did not hold all power, this impactwas likely to be limited.

Another important characteristic o the way leaders were selected atthis 10th Congress was the willingness o the Political Bureau to stick tothe guiding opinions o the Central Committee as expressed through vot-ing. One case in point was adhering to the results o the “survey,” leadingto the eight members who either received low votes or were over the ageceiling to retire; the other case was the insistence on adhering to the rulesthe Central Committee established regarding elections and respect or theresults. Thus, instead o taking 25 Alternate Members, the Congress de-cided that only 21 who passed the 50% mark should get in. The 14 Politi-cal Bureau members were supposedly ranked by the number o votes theyreceived rom the Central Committee election. Most important, the topfve vote getters o the 13th Plenum survey eventually were rewarded withthe top fve leadership posts.

Second, there did not seem to be any strong, even deliberate, attempt toquickly introduce more youthulness into the top leadership. The averageage o the Political Bureau was now 59.9 years. More than hal the mem-bers were replaced by younger members at the 10th Congress, but it wasnot exactly a generational change. Even excepting the oldest, Nông Ðú cM.anh, the average age o members was still around 59. One ring down, inthe Central Committee, the average age among candidates who stood orthe 10th Central Committee elections was 53.26 years.48 Taking only mem-bers born in 1945 or ater, the average age was a slightly lower 51.2. In fve

48. “Se thêm nhiêu đảng viên t∙u ung củ vào trung uong.”




years’ time, by the 11th Congress in 2011, the situation will not have im-proved by much (see Table 3). At that time, Bureau members allowed bythe rules to stay or another term and thereore qualifed to occupy the top

fve posts would be at a higher age o 62.8. This top layer o decision mak-ing is likely to remain not only slow in its work because o the diusion o power (as seen through the party elections) and age. They are also notlikely to put orward transormative ideas to shape the system.

Rejuvenation o the Political Bureau must begin by making the CentralCommittee more youthul and promoting younger ofcials through theParty-State machinery so that they can enter the Central Committee early.Observers could perhaps look orward to the next change o leaders, whenit would become possible to have younger people born as late as 1960 enter

the Political Bureau. Those born in the 1950s and early 1960s would haveexperienced economic comort in the early 1960s and national unity in the1970s, growing up during the Vietnam War and the war with Kampuchea.They would also have gone through the post-war subsidy period, with itsimmense economic difculties, while in their prime. Between the oldestand youngest member o the present Political Bureau is 10 years’ dier-ence in age. Hopeully by 2016, the time o the 12th Congress, those bornin the 1960s could become top leaders and bring on quicker change. Forthose born in the 1970s, especially born ater the Vietnam War ended, withthe current momentum and parameters o succession, they could enter thePolitical Bureau by the 2020s.

Quick change was also not likely to emerge because frst-term memberso the Political Bureau were usually not allowed to assume the top posts

TABLE 3 Tenth Political Bureau Members at the Time of the 2011––11thCongress

Remaining Uncertain Retired

Name (Average Age: 62.8) Age Name Age Name Age

1. Lê Hồng Anh 62 Nguyễn Phú Trọng 67 Nông Ðức Mạnh 712. Nguyễn Tấn Dũng 62 Phạm Gia Khiêm 67 Nguyễn Minh Triết 693. Trươ ng Tấn Sang 62 Trươ ng V ĩ nh Trọng 694. Phùng Quang Thanh 625. Lê Thanh Hải 616. Nguyễn Sinh Hùng 65

7. Nguyễn Văn Chi 668. Hồ Ðức Việt 649. Phạm Quang Nghị 62

SOURCE: Compiled by author rom various Vietnamese news sources.



DAVID KOH 671

right away. One point that consistently came through in my interviews o senior party and government ofcials was that leaders in senior positionswho have the ability to inuence opinions and make decisions, are thosethat rationally preer to deal with what they know. They were predisposedto avor what/who was known rather than unknown. This was the biggestasset that Nguyên Tân Dung had in the race to become PM, because hehad been DPM or a long time. He was not just someone who was trust-worthy to higher leaders but someone whose style was already well set.

Conclusion

A variety o leadership change scenarios existed that had a chance o be-

coming accepted. A number o dierent actors within the Party articu-lated these dierent scenarios, no doubt with their personal and groupinterests driving them. It was still quite certain, or the projected 11th and12th Party Congresses, that the top appointments would be given to Politi-cal Bureau members, and even more precisely, to those whose numbercould be counted on one hand. Seniority and ofcial rank continued to tiltthe table in avor o more established leaders over newcomers. But therewas also uncertainty among those in contention: there were no clear lead-ers in the race, no clear person o merit that stood above the rest. Within

limits, dierent groups within the Party suggested, lobbied, pressured,acted—and everybody was fnally allowed to choose through voting. Eventhe regional ormula, thought to be a cornerstone o leadership appoint-ment and the dominant paradigm rom 1986 until 2001, was qualifed.This imperect paradigm was likely to continue into the next Congress un-less an able and eminent person rom the Central region emerged well be-ore then.

The results o the Party elections or the post o general secretary couldhave gone another way, which showed that there was really no strong per-

sonality to regulate aairs, and in its absence the elites have chosen to userules to govern aairs among themselves. Thus, i the use o laws and rulesto regulate government and state aairs was a dominant theme o politi-cal reorm in the past two decades, the trend was now seen in the runningo Party aairs.

The entire leadership selection process o the Vietnamese CommunistParty was not undamentally altered at the 10th Party Congress. Never-theless, there were signifcant changes to indicate that as a collective, theleaders o the Party think it important to move beyond a number o old

practices in their selection process. The result was the elevation o theCentral Committee’s collective decisions to hold the reins over personnelappointment and policy making. Another outcome is allowing dierent




opinions on alternatives to be articulated, while retaining the power to ac-cept or reject them within the Central Committee and the Political Bu-reau. It would be reasonable to say that these changes constitute politicalreorms designed to democratize the Party through raising the status o the Central Committee, especially in respecting the collective’s decision onpersonnel decisions, and in reducing the roles o powerul individuals inmaking such decisions.

Documents

VN Leadership 10 Congress Kuo