Violence  and  drug  trafficking:  influence  on  society  and  state  reactions  

 

Fifty   thousand   dead:   that's   the   human   toll   of   drug   trafficking   in   Mexico   since   Felipe  

Calderón   came   into   power   in   2006.   This   figure,   to   which  must   be   added   those   of   many   other  

countries  in  the  region,  is  revelatory  in  linking  violence  and  drug  trafficking  in  South  America.  How,  

then,  might  we  set  about  explaining  the  sort  of  difficulties  faced  by  authorities  in  the  fight  against  

drug  trafficking?  This  question  in  turn  leads  to  another:  how  might  we  understand  the  intensity  of  

the  violence  surrounding  the  drug  trade?  The   latter  seems  to  take  root   in  societies   that  provide  

fertile   breeding   ground   for   a   sort   of   ‘narco   culture’.   An   analysis   of   the   societal   issues   raised  by  

drug  trafficking  requires  a  look  of  the  history  of  cartels.  In  addition  to  this,  it  is  worth  noting  that  

drug-­‐related  violence  is  closely  related  to  a  number  of  factors  specific  to  the  region.  

 

History  and  typology  of  cartels  

 

The   term   ‘cartel’   surfaced   in   the   1980s.   Created   by   the   American   judiciary   as   a   blanket  

term   to   describe   activities   related   to   drug   trafficking   in   South   America,   it   carries   no   precise  

definition1.  Elie  Tenenbaum  distinguishes  three  generations  of  drug  traffickers2.  The  first  was  born  

in  Colombia,  Medellin  (hence  its  name  ‘Medellin  Cartel’)  in  the  mid-­‐1970s.  The  head  (or  capo)  of  

the  Medellin   cartel,   Pablo   Escobar,   is   probably   the  most   famous   drug   trafficker   of   that   period.  

Born  into  an  underprivileged  milieu  and  poorly  educated,  his  desire  was  to  make  drug  trafficking  

an  ‘open  and  participatory’  enterprise3.  Cultivating  a  paternalistic  image  through  the  financing  of  

housing  and  community   facilities   (such  as   the  zoo  at  Hacienda  Nápoles),  he  would  recruit  youth  

from   disadvantaged   backgrounds,   acquiring   for   himself   a   sort   of   ‘Robin   Hood’   image.   He   even  

attempted   to   enter   politics   in   order   to   set   in  motion   the   ‘Medellin   without   Slums’  movement.  

However,  Escobar  is  also  characterized  by  extremely  violent  measures  that  resulted  in  the  murder  

                                                                                                               1  Adolfo  Leon  Atehortua  Cruz,  «  Les  organisations  du   trafic  de  drogue  en  Colombie  »,   in  Culture  et  Conflits,  Articles  inédits,  2008,  p.3.    2  Elie  Tenenbaum,  «  Mexique  :  Narco-­‐insurrection  au  pays  du  serpent  en  plumes  »,  DSI,  5  May  2011.  3  Adolfo  Leon  Atehortua  Cruz,  «  Les  organisations  du  trafic  de  drogue  en  Colombie  »,  art.  Cit.  p.4.  

of   many   politicians   and   journalists   eventually,   and   these   eventually   caught   up   with   him.   His  

assassination  by  a  paramilitary  group  in  1993  marked  the  end  of  the  Medellin  cartel.  

 

Also  born   in   the  1970s,   the   second  generation  of  drug   traffickers   is   collected   in   the   ‘Cali  

Cartel’.  Even  before  the  death  of  Escobar,  it  opted  for  a  different  approach  to  the  violence  of  the  

Medellin   cartel.   If   the  Cali   cartel   ‘is  not   inherently   less  violent   than  Medellin   [...],   its   strategy  of  

insertion  and  development  reserved  violence  for  specific,  targeted  goals  rather  than  employing  it  

as  the  principal  means  for  situating  and  maintaining   its  power’4.  The  druglords  of  the  Cali  Cartel  

confirmed   this   strategy   after   the   death   of   Escobar.   In   order   not   to   suffer   the   same   fate,   they  

decided  to  abandon  violence  and  preferred  a  strategy  of  widespread  corruption.  The  cartel   thus  

‘informally’  formed  alliances  with  regional  elites,  by  attending  social  gatherings  as  well  as   legally  

securing  economic  investments.  

 

In  the  1980s,  the  arrival  of  guerrillas  altered  the  existing  balance.  In  1981  the  guerrilla  M-­‐19  

kidnapped  Marta  Nieves  Ochoa,  one  of  the  daughters  of  the  Ochoa  clan,  a  family  of  the  Medellin  

Cartel,  leading  the  capos  of  different  cartels  to  join  forces  to  defend  their  interests.  They  created  

MAS   (Muerte   A   Secuestradores   or   ‘Death   to   Kidnappers’)   that   quickly   attracted   the   favour   of  

government:  both  the  state  and  drug  traffickers  united  in  a  common  interest  in  the  fight  against  

the   guerrillas5.   Such   cooperation   emphasizes   the   porosity   of   borders   between   legal   and   illegal,  

government   and   cartels,  which   reinforces   endemic   corruption.   In   addition   to   the   fight   between  

traffickers   and   the   Colombian   state   against   the   guerrillas,   there   was   a   war   between   cartels   in  

1988,  and  a  clash  between  the  cartels  and  the  FARC  guerrillas6  between  1987  and  19897.  The  fight  

against  cartels,  and  their  decommissioning  in  the  early  1990s,  worked  mostly  to  the  advantage  of  

the  FARC.  The  FARC  engaged   in  cocaine   trafficking   in   the  1980s,  working  hand   in  hand  with   the  

cartels:  the  drug  traffickers  would  produce  cocaine  on  territories  under  FARC  control  in  exchange  

for   a   share   in   the   profits.   However   from   the   1990s,   the   guerrillas   got   directly   involved   in   drug  

trafficking8.  

 

 

                                                                                                               4  Observatoire  Géopolitique  des  drogues,  «  Colombie  :  la  stratégie  du  cartel  de  Cali  »,  1994.  5  Adolfo  Leon  Atehortua  Cruz,  «  Les  organisations  du  trafic  de  drogue  en  Colombie  »,  art.  Cit.,  p.7.    See  also:  Daniel  Pécaut  «  Trafic  de  drogue  et  violence  en  Colombie  »,  1991,  in  Culture  et  Conflit,  p.7.  6  Fuerzas  Armadas  Revolucionarias  de  Colombia,  Revolutionnary  Armed  Forces  of  Colombia.  7  Adolfo  Leon  Atehortua  Cruz,  «  Les  organisations  du  trafic  de  drogue  en  Colombie  »,  art.  Cit.,  p.10.  8  Jean-­‐Michel  de  Marchi,  «  L'histoire  des  Farc,  de  la  révolution  au  trafic  de  drogue  »,  Rue89,  3  July  2008.    

There  no   longer  exist   cartels   in  Colombia  as   important  as   those   that  were  around   in   the  

1980s.   There  are  many   small   producers,   and   ‘drug  dealers   are  more   cautious,   less  exhibitionist,  

and  more   removed   from  politics  and   the  social  elite’9.  Drug   trafficking  has   ‘democratized’   itself,  

with   a   division   of   its   production   process:   in   Colombia,   there   is   a   split   between   production,  

conception,  etc.  The  most  dangerous  activities  such  as  transportation  of  the  product  to  the  United  

States   today  are  granted  mainly  by  Mexican  organizations.  Mexican   cartels   emerged  as   soon  as  

those   in   Colombia   disappeared   as   a   result   of   repression.   These   are   a   third   generation   of   drug  

traffickers,   who   combine   ‘the   coercive   force   of   the   first   and   the   underground   funding   of   the  

second,   the   entirety   of   the   operation   based   on   an   exceptional   adaptation   to   the   opportunities  

presented  by  globalization’10.  

 

These  cartels  are  characterized  firstly  by  an  extreme  recourse  to  violence,  founded,  unlike  

with  the  first  generation,  on  principles  of  militarization  and  professionalism.  The  latest  generation  

of  drug   traffickers   is   comprised   largely  of   former   soldiers  who  have  deserted   their   ranks  due   to  

negligible   earnings.   They   are   often   former   members   of   the   Fuerzas   Especiales   of   Grupos  

Aeromóviles  (GAFES),  elite  units  to  combat  terrorists  (that  is  to  say,  suppress  the  insurrections  of  

the   Ejército   Zapatista   de   Liberación   Nacional,   the   Zapatista   Army   of   National   Liberation,   in   the  

mid-­‐1990s).  These   former  military  men  and  other  corrupt  police  were  grouped  under   the  name  

‘Zetas’   in   the   early   2000s.   Initially   under   the   control   of   the   Gulf   cartel,   they   quickly   became  

independent.   Then   a   phenomenon   Tenenbaum   refers   to   as   zétanisation   occurred:   the  

employment   of  military   techniques   in   gang  warfare,   forcing   all   the   other   cartels   to   adapt   their  

approaches   in   rising   to   the   challenge.   The   arrival   of   the   Zetas   on   the   cartel   scene   initiated   an  

escalation   in   violence,   strengthened   by   the   acquisition   of   heavy   weapons   (anti-­‐tank   weapons,  

explosives,   etc.),   helicopters   and   even   submarines   with   the   profits   from   drug   trafficking   and  

kidnapping.  This  professionalization  and  militarization  of  criminal  activity  is  the  reason  behind  the  

increase  of  extreme  violence  characteristic  to  the  third  generation  cartels.  

 

The   second   characteristic   of   these   organizations   is   that   their   modus   operandi   is   not  

confined  to  ‘the  production  and  marketing  of  illegal  goods  and  services’11.  They  function  like  the  

Italian  mafia,  involving  themselves  at  all  levels  of  social  life  and  using  their  influence  to  manipulate  

                                                                                                               9  Adolfo  Leon  Atehortua  Cruz,  «  Les  organisations  du  trafic  de  drogue  en  Colombie  »,  art.  Cit.,  p.16.  10  Elie  Tenenbaum,  «  Mexique  :  Narco-­‐-­‐-­‐insurrection  au  pays  du  serpent  en  plumes  »,  art.  Cit.  11  Adolfo  Leon  Atehortua  Cruz,  «  Les  organisations  du  trafic  de  drogue  en  Colombie  »,  art.  Cit.,  p.1.  

the  economy   (e.g.   racketeering   traders)   as  well   as  direct  education  and  career  prospects12.   This  

‘exceptional   adaptation   to   the  opportunities  presented  by  globalization’   is  directly   visible   in   the  

diversification  of   the  activities  of   cartels,  branching  out   into  activities   such  as   the  kidnapping  of  

Latin   American   illegal   immigrants   in   the   process   of   being   deported   by   the   United   States.   The  

emergence  of  such  phenomena  can  be  explained  by  the  desire  of  cartels  to  diversify  their  sources  

of  income,  in  this  case  demanding  ransoms  from  the  families  of  these  deported  illegal  immigrants.  

Mexican  President  Calderon  clamped  down  on  drug  trafficking,  and  the  narcos  simply  adapted  and  

reacted  thus.  The  Mexican  National  Commission  on  Human  Rights  estimated  that  about  10,000  of  

them  were  kidnapped  over  the  course  of  6  months13.  

 

 The  influence  of  drug  trafficking  on  society:  the  emergence  of  a  ‘narco  culture’  

 

The  appearance  of  a   ‘narco  culture’   is  unique   to   the   third  generation  cartels.  Originating  

with  drug  traffickers,  this  culture  spread  to  a   large  part  of  Mexican  youth  and  those  living  in  the  

border   towns   of   Mexico.   It   seems   to   have   imbued   youth   culture;   most   young   men   are   drug  

dealers.  Narco  culture  can  be  defined  as  a  sort  of  criminal  subculture,  which  is  expressed  in  many  

areas:  music,  film,  architecture  and  even  religion.   In  the  arts,  music,  film  and  video  games14,  the  

growing  influence  of  narcos  in  Mexican  culture  is  visibly  reflected.  An  example  of  this  would  be  the  

appearance   in   Mexico   of   narcocorridos,   songs   in   praise   of   the   drug   traffickers.   Corridos   have  

existed  since  the  1910s  (at  the  time  of  the  Mexican  Revolution).  Guillermo  Benares,  a  researcher  

at  the  Centre  for  Advanced  Studies  in  Education  of  Monterrey  states:  

 

‘These  are  songs  that  tell  everyday  stories   in  the  tradition  of  the  troubadours.  They  draw  

on  people's  lives.  First,  the  revolutionaries,  then,  from  1925,  the  “tequileros”  cowboys  who  

led  the  herds  in  the  United  States  and  became  bootleggers  during  Prohibition.  Areas  that  

appreciated   the   corridos   were   those   that   trafficked.   Inevitably   then,   the   two   were  

eventually  married.  After  the  tequila  came  marijuana  in  the  60s  and,  from  1970,  cocaine.  

Since   the   late   90s   and   the   advent   of   drug   cartels,   the   narcocorridos   exploded   and   now  

accounts  for  80%  of  the  musical  production.’15  

 

                                                                                                               12  Mark  Stevenson,  «  Les  cartels  mexicains  s'inspirent  de  la  mafia  italienne  »,  Cyber  Presse,  2009.    13  S.A.,  «  Enlèvements  :  le  nouveau  business  des  narcotrafiquants  en  Amérique  latine  »,  RFI,  2010.  14  Aude  Lasjaunias,  «  Un  jeu  vidéo  sur  le  trafic  de  drogue  fait  polémique  au  Mexique  »,  Le  Monde,  11  March  2011.  15  Jerôme  Pierrat,  «  La  ‘narcoculture’  est  arrivée  »,  Le  Point,  8  November  2007.  

The   most   famous   of   these   narcocorridos   groups   are   Los   Tigres   del   Norte   and   Los   Tucanes   de  

Tijuana.   Their  music   can  be   compared   to   gangsta   rap   in   the  United   States   insofar   as   these   two  

musical  currents  condone  criminals.  Moreover,  given  that  these  narcocorridos  reach  audiences  in  

Mexican-­‐US   border   towns,   it   is   unsurprising   that   their   popularity   has   stretched   to   other   Latin  

American  countries   (Guatemala,  Honduras,  etc.).  Their  success   is   reviled  by  Mexican  authorities,  

which   accuse   these   narcocorridos   of   glamourising   a   lifestyle   based   on   extreme   violence   and  

ostentatious  displays  of  wealth16.  Traffickers  promote  and  enjoy  these  songs  largely  to  taunt  the  

police.   PAN   (Partido   Acción   Nacional,   the   National   Action   Party,   to   the   right   of   the   political  

spectrum  and  currently  in  power)  has  decided  to  ban  these  songs  and  put  their  singers  jail.  In  May  

2011  a  decree  banning  the  playing  of  these  narcocorridos  in  public  places  was  signed17.  It  is  a  well-­‐

known  fact  that  there  is  a  tight  connection  between  singers  of  these  narcocorridos  and  the  drug  

traffickers,  who  often  invite  them  to  play  for  their  private  parties18.  For  the  less  fortunate  who  are  

unable  to  afford  a  group  to  play  for  them  live,  narcocorridos  are  prolific  in  nightclubs  on  both  sides  

of  the  US-­‐Mexico  border.  

 

Narcocorridos   singers  are  not   the  only  ones  with   links  with   the  criminal  underworld.  The  

film   stars   who   play   these   narcos   often   maintain   ambiguous   relationship   with   their   ‘models’,  

sometimes   to   the  point   even  of   becoming   victims  of   gang  warfare.  As  with   each   genre,   ‘narco-­‐

cinema’  has  its  own  classics  (which  includes  La  Camioneta  gris,  made  in  1990),  its  own  stars  and  its  

own  codes  (extreme  violence,  corrupt  police).  It  is  estimated  that  the  revenue  of  this  trade  is  used  

to   bribe   police   officers19.   Shaul   Schwarz,   a   photographer   who   worked   on   Israeli   narco   culture,  

points  out  that  the  filming  of  these  movies  sometimes  even  takes  place  in  the  villas  of  traffickers.  

In  his  eyes  the  narcos  are  proud  to  open  the  doors  of  their  homes  to  these  production  companies,  

so  as  to  be  able  to  watch  the  movie  with  their  friends  and  say  “See,  such-­‐and-­‐such  was  filmed  at  

mine!”’20.  The  existence  of  a  narco  culture  is  also  reflected  in  the  field  of  architecture  and  fashion.  

If  the  houses  of  these  narcos  (purchased  with  money  from  the  drugs)  do  not  reveal  anything  very  

iconoclastic  an  architectural  point  of  view,  they  are  nevertheless  symptomatic  of  the  willingness  of  

dealers   to   exhibit   their   success,  manifested   by   the   use   of   ‘kitsch’   and   glitz.   Then   there   are   the  

specific  trends  in  fashion  associated  with  and  dictated  by  narco  culture.  

                                                                                                               16  S.A.,  «  Le  Mexique  veut  interdire  les  Narcocorridos  »,  Drogues  News,  1  February  2010.  17  Emmanuelle  Steels,  «  La  guerre  aux  ‘narcocorridos’  »,  La  Presse,  26  May  2011.  18  Ibid.  19  Louis  Lepron,  «  Mexique  :  Dans  le  narcocinéma,  ‘la  pute  est  une  pute,  le  flic  un  flic’  »,  Rue89,  29  January  2012.  20  Priscille   Lafitte,  «   Shaul   Schwarz   :   La  Californie  et   le  Mexique  qui   s’habillent  en  narco  »,  France  24,  5  September  2011.  

Beyond  the  artistic  aspect,  narco  culture  even  extends  to  the  religious  domain.  Present  on  

the  screen,  on   the   radio,  narco  culture  has  penetrated   into  some  of   the  most   intimate  spheres.  

They  lead  a  cult  to  Santa  Muerte,  the  protector  from  death,  as  well  as  to  Santa  Jesus,  father  of  the  

narcos  (a  highwayman  hanged  in  1909).  For  Shaul  Schwarz,  ‘even  the  most  feared  narcos  are  really  

afraid   of   Santa   Muerte’21.   How   to   explain   such   a   cult?   If   Mexicans   are   a   people   steeped   in  

Christianity,   syncretism   occurs   amongst   certain   indigenous   cults.   Narco   religiosity   is   part   of   a  

global  process  of  hybridization  of  religions22,  the  ‘saints  narcos’  being  also  recognized  by  either  the  

Catholic   Church   or   by   the   Mexican   government,   both   of   which   seek   instead   to   prevent  

proliferation   of   shrines   dedicated   to   them23.   Their   worship   and   protection   they   offer   are   not  

necessarily   reserved   to   narcos.   One   of   the   followers   of   Santa   Muerte   is   none   other   than   the  

Mexican   Minister   of   Public   Safety,   who   asks   him   for   protection   against   drug   traffickers.   This  

‘personification   of   death   for   people  who   risk   losing   their   lives   on   a   daily   basis   answers   to   their  

troubles   of   negotiating   constantly   with   the   end’24   and   corresponds   to   the   phenomenon   of   a  

‘religion  of  crisis’  observed  anthropology.  For  drug  traffickers,  the  figure  of  Santa  Muerte  does  not  

embody  so  much  the   fragility  of   life  but  rather   the  entirety  of   life.  Prisoners  appeal   to  her   for  a  

reduced   sentence.   It   does   not   appear   that   this   culture   can   be   likened   to   a   soft   power   (in   the  

terminology   of   Joseph   Nye,   meaning   a   tool   of   cultural   influence)   consciously   implemented   by  

traffickers.  It  is  rather  a  crucial  element  of  the  ‘Narco  Way  of  Life’  (analogous  the  American  Way  of  

Life),  which  has  spread  to  both  sides  of  the  US-­‐Mexico  border25.  

 

If  the  extension  of  this  is  culture  so  intimately  linked  to  drug  trafficking,  does  it  amount  to  a  

crime  in  itself?  While  it  is  clear  that  the  proliferation  of  a  culture  glorifying  narcotics  may  influence  

youths   to   join   gangs,   it   is   safe   to   assume   the  majority   of   those   who   live   along   the   US-­‐Mexico  

border   adopt   aspects   of   this   narco   culture  without   themselves  being   traffickers.   This   discussion  

points,  at   least  where  narco  cinema  and  music  are  concerned,  to  the  two  conflicting  theories  of  

catharsis  and  mimesis.  For  proponents  of  the  first  theory,  the  distribution  of  movies  and  songs  in  

praise   of   the   narcos   allows   the   viewer   (or   listener)   to   get   rid   of   his   impulses,   anxieties   and  

fantasies   by   living   through   the   hero   or   situations   represented.   In   other   words,   living   these  

adventures  in  the  imaginary  realm  stops  the  viewer  (or   listener)  from  replicating  them  in  reality.  

                                                                                                               21  Ibid.  22  Alma  Guillermoprieto,  «  Mexican  Saints  »,  in  National  Geographic,  May  2010.  23  Raphaël  Morán,  «  Santa  Muerte,  vierge  des  narcotrafiquants  »,  Le  Monde  des  religions,  17  January  2011.  24   Marion   Du   Bron,   «   Santa   Muerte   :   A   Mexico,   un   culte   grandissant   face   à   la   catastrophe   écologique   »,  lepetitjournal.com,  30  November  2010.  25  Priscille  Lafitte,  «  Shaul  Schwarz  :  La  Californie  et  le  Mexique  qui  s’habillent  en  narco  »,  art.  Cit.  

Conversely,  for  supporters  of  the  theory  of  mimesis,  watching  these  movies  and  listening  to  these  

songs  inevitably  lead  the  viewer  (consciously  or  not)  to  reproduce  these  behaviors  in  reality  (e.g.  

by  joining  a  gang).  In  all  cases,  there  is  no  denying  that  the  spread  of  this  culture  has  the  effect  of  

trivializing  the  violence  of  narcos,  which  surely  has  some  part  to  play  in  its  expansion.  

 

Explaining  the  level  of  violence  in  drug  trafficking  

 

Beyond  the  use  of  extreme  violence  for  psychological  ends,  in  order  to  create  a  climate  of  

fear  and  intimidation,  it  is  worth  examining  the  more  profound  causes  of  the  relationship  between  

drug   trafficking   and   violence.  Gabriel   Kessler   notes   that   violence   is   not   a   self-­‐evident  upshot  of  

trafficking.  In  fact,  one  of  the  objectives  of  criminal  organizations  is  actually  to  reduce  the  violence.  

Thus  one  must   search   for   factors   that  may  explain   its  undesired  escalation  and  maintenance  at  

destructive   levels26.   The   catalytic   role   of   the   economic   situation   is   the   first   explanatory   factor.  

Poverty,  informality  of  jobs  and  social  exclusion  are  all  conducive  to  this  phenomenon27.  For  Elena  

Azoala,  Advisor  to  the  Attorney  General  of  the  Republic  of  Mexico,  ‘the  root  causes  of  this  violence  

are  associated  with  the  enormous  inequalities  of  society’28.  The  weakness  of  state  institutions  also  

prevents  the  establishment  of  genuine  behavioural  control29.  Features  of  a  functional,  law-­‐abiding  

state,  that  is  to  say  a  state  where  each  citizen  –  in  government  or  governed  –  is  subject  to  the  rule  

of   law,   are   absent.   This   is   evidenced   by   the   daily   behaviour   of   individuals   (traffic   rules   rarely  

observed,   bribes   etc.).   Added   to   this   configuration   is   the   impotence   of   the   judiciary.   A   study  

conducted  by  Cidac  concludes  that  96%  of  violent  crimes  committed  between  1996  and  2003  have  

not   been   brought   to   justice30.   In   Colombia,   the  weakness   of   the   state   is   linked   to   geographical  

features,   such   forests   or   mountains   disrupting   communication.   There   is   little   confidence   in  

institutions  and  low  civic  solidarity31.  

 

Finally,  some  argue  that  the  assumption  of  cultural  violence  finds  its  roots  in  the  brutality  

of   Mexican   history,   which   has   seen   three   centuries   of   Spanish   colonisation,   a   century   of  

                                                                                                               26  Gabriel  Kessler,  «  Crime  organisé  et  violences  en  Amérique  latine  et  dans  les  Caraïbes  »,  Diploweb,  4  June  2010.  27  Manuela  Mesa,  «  Violence  «  Maras  »,  «  féminicide  »  et  violence  sociale  en  Amérique  latine  »,  Centre  de  formation  pour  le  développement  et  la  solidarité  internationale,  2008.  28  Ibid.  29  S.A.,  «  Approche  géographique  et  stratégique  du  Narcotrafic  en  Amérique  du  Sud  et  de  ses  acteurs  comme  facteur  de  violence  dans  le  continent  »,  Irenees.net,  2008.  30  Centro  de  Investigación  para  el  Desarrollo,  Asociación  Civil,  Mexican  think-­‐tank.  31  S.A.,  «  Approche  géographique  et  stratégique  du  Narcotrafic  en  Amérique  du  Sud  et  de  ses  acteurs  comme  facteur  de  violence  dans  le  continent  »,  art.  Cit.  

dictatorship  after  independence,  revolution  and  71  years  of  authoritarian  rule.  Catherine  Heau,  a  

history   professor   at   the   École   Nationale   d’Anthropologie   (National   School   of   Anthropology)  

emphasizes  that  there  has  never  been  in  Mexico  a  ‘distinction  between  police,  justice  and  thugs’32.  

This  porosity  is  a  sign  that,  as  in  Colombia,  there  is  no  ‘monopoly  of  legitimate  physical  violence’  

that  would  be  exercised  by  a  sovereign  state,  which  is  a  significant  contributor  to  the  diffusion  of  

violence   in   a   society33.  What   answers,   state   or   otherwise,   regional   or   international,   have   been  

given  in  response  to  this  phenomenon?  

 

The  fight  against  drug  trafficking  

 

A  radicalization  of  national  struggles  against  drug  trafficking  

 

Nationally,  this  struggle  is  carried  out  on  two  levels:  first,  there  is  the  focus  on  agricultural  

production  and  the  farmers  directly  concerned  with  the  manufacture  of  the  drugs.  Second,  there  

is   the   targeting   of   traffickers   in   Latin   America.   Radical   methods   are   used   in   the   fight   against  

peasant  agricultural  production  such  as  the  destruction  of  plantations  by  the  forced  shutdown  of  

production   or   by   the   aerial   spraying   of   chemicals,  making   them   unsuitable   for   production   use.  

Special  anti-­‐drug  forces,  particularly  in  Bolivia,  may  also  operate  in  the  jungle,  where  they  destroy  

laboratories   that   manipulate   coca   to   produce   cocaine34.   Peru   has   invested   heavily   in   the   fight  

against   trafficking   and  has   implemented   several   programs   to   develop   alternative   crops   to   coca.  

These  aim  to  diversify  the  country's  agricultural  production  as  well  as  to  ensure  employment  and  a  

living  wage  to  agricultural  producers.  Peru  has  also  created  public  programs  to  prevent  drug  use  

amongst   civilians.   In   addition   to   such  measures,   a   manhunt   was   launched   to   track   down   drug  

traffickers.  

 

Several   countries   have   promoted   not   only   repressive   policies   but   also   preventive   ones.  

States   severely   affected   by   drug   trafficking   such   as   El   Salvador   and  Guatemala   have   radicalized  

their  legal  system  with  the  launch  of  a  repressive  policy  against  the  narcos,  as  was  the  case  in  2011  

with  the  Mano  Dura  policy  (literally  translated  as  ‘Hard  Hand’)  launched  by  Guatemalan  President  

Otto  Pérez  Molina  and  his  counterpart  in  El  Salvador.  Salvadoran  law  thus  stipulates  that  anyone  

                                                                                                               32  Manuela  Mesa,  «  Violence  «  Maras  »,  «  féminicide  »  et  violence  sociale  en  Amérique  latine  »,  art.  Cit.  33  Max  Weber,  Le  savant  et  le  politique,  Paris,  Plon,  1959  (1919).  34  Vincent  Prado,  «  Bolivie,  le  nouvel  eldorado  des  trafiquants  de  cocaïne»,  Reportage  Enquête  Exclusive  (M6),  Ligne  de  Front,  6  November  2011.  

suspected  of  belonging  to  a  gang  because  of  tattoos  or  because  they  are  spotted  with  known  gang  

members,   even  without   any   evidence,   faces   up   to   twelve   years   imprisonment.   Along   with   this  

severe   law   criticized   by   the   Salvadoran   population,   a  Mano   Amiga   policy   (‘Friendly   Hand’)   was  

established  to  facilitate  the  social  reintegration  of  former  gang  members35.  

 

Both   phenomena   suggest   that   the   fight   against   the   narcos   underwent   significant  

radicalisation.   Serious   abuses   arose   from   the   fight   against   the   drug   cartels   such   as   torture,  

disappearances   and   extrajudicial   executions.   In   November   2011,   Human   Rights   Watch   (HRW)  

released  its  report,  Neither  Rights  Nor  Security:  Killings,  Torture,  and  Disappearances   in  Mexico's  

“War  on  Drugs”  which  concluded  that  instead  of  ‘reducing  violence,  war  against  drug  traffickers  in  

Mexico  has  caused  a  dramatic  increase  in  the  amount  of  murder,  torture  and  other  abuses  by  the  

security  forces’36.  Since  the  war  on  drugs  declared  by  President  Felipe  Calderon,  HRW  believes  it  

has   sufficient   evidence   to   inculpate   the   Mexican   police,   accusing   them   of   nearly   170   cases   of  

torture,   39   disappearances   and   24   extrajudicial   executions.   The   Mexican   Ministry   of   Justice  

furthermore  considers  that  of  the  nearly  45  000  homicides  since  2006,  only  22  would  have  been  

convicted  by  the  police37.  The  fight  against  drug  cartels  has  also  led  to  the  emergence  of  extremely  

violent   paramilitary   groups   in  Mexico   responsible   for   the   killings   of   gang  members,   such   as   the  

Matazetas  (killers  of  the  Zetas).  Even  if  the  fight  against  these  drug  cartels  is  the  main  objective  of  

these  central  and  Latin  American  states,  the  war  against  the  narcos  had  only  had  a  limited  impact  

and  has  essentially  given  rise  to  an  escalation  violence38.  

 

Towards  exit  from  this  international  imbroglio  

 

The  situation  is  complicated  at   international   level.  The  ineffectiveness  of  the  fight  against  

drug   trafficking   can   be   explained   in   part   by   the   decline   in  North  American   interventionism,   the  

progressive   methods   of   traffickers,   and   the   legal   framework.   Drug   traffickers   adapt   quickly   to  

certain  measures   taken   against   them.   For   example,   since   the  narcos   realised   that   their   tattoos  

could   lead   to   more   or   less   arbitrary   arrests,   some   simply   ceased   to   be   tattooed   or   had   their  

tattoos  removed.  

                                                                                                                 35   Sophie   Dubreil,   Marine   Verna,   Joseph   Brew,   Albert   Kimbembe,   «   Les   nouvelles   formes   de   violence   sociale   en  Amérique  Latine  :  les  gangs  comme  facteurs  de  conflits  et  comme  acteurs  de  violence  »,  2008.  36  Human  Rights  Watch,  “Neither  rights  nor  security”,  9  November  2011.  37  Catherine  Gouëset,  «  Mexique  :  la  sale  guerre  contre  les  narcos  »,  L’Express,  16  November  2011.  38  Global  Study  on  Homicide  Report,  p.25,  figure  1.11  subregional  trends  in  homicide  suicide,  the  Americas  1995-­‐2010.  

The  decline  of  U.S.   interventionism  in  the  fight  against  drug  trafficking  in  Central  America  

dealt  a  major  blow  to  these  countries.  Since  the  1980s  and  the  war  launched  by  the  United  States  

on  drug  trafficking,  drug  trafficking  was  considered  the  number  one  enemy  of  the  national  security  

of   the  country  mainly  because  of   its  proximity  to  Mexico,  and  so  a  U.S.   federal  police   force  was  

established.   The  majority   of   drug  users   are   located   in   the  United   States   and   the   fight   launched  

against   drug   trafficking   particularly   concerns   them.   According   to   the   Drug   Enforcement  

Administration  (DEA),  the  three  Mexican  cartels  of  Sinaloa-­‐Juarez,  Gulf  and  Tijuana  control  nearly  

three-­‐quarters  of  the  drug  market  in  the  United  States39.  DEA  operates  on  almost  the  entire  South  

American  continent,  where  it  is  responsible  for  ensuring  the  effective  implementation  of  the  fight  

against  drug  trafficking,  especially  against  the  American  Mafia  and  the  laundering  drug  money  in  

banks  or  tax  havens40.  Bolivia  no  longer  falls  under  its  responsibility,  as  President  Morales  expelled  

DEA   agents   in   2008,   accusing   them   of   political   espionage.   This   decision   immediately   benefited  

narcos   (especially   coca   growers),   who   now   had   free   rein   of   the   country.   This   case   has   had   a  

significant  impact  on  the  anti-­‐drug  budget:  the  withdrawal  of  U.S.  funds  reduced  it  to  a  third.  The  

failure   of   some  U.S.   operations   earned   them   considerable   criticism,   as   illustrated  by   ‘Operation  

Fast   and   Furious’   conducted   in   July   2010.   Initiated   by   the   ATF,   the   federal   agency   on   alcohol,  

tobacco  and  weapons,  this  programme’s  intention  was  to  pass  two  thousand  contraband  weapons  

to   Mexican   drug   traffickers,   in   order   to   trap   them   by   following   the   traces   of   these   weapons.  

However,   these   quickly   disappeared   and   two   hundred   of   them   were   found   or   used   on   crime  

scenes41.  

 

The  international  legal  framework  comes  no  closer  to  halting  the  spread  of  drug  trafficking,  

despite   the   signing   of   three   international   conventions   ratified   by   the   Central   America   states  

forcing  them  to  meet  their  commitments  and  translate  them  into  domestic  laws.  The  first  of  these  

conventions  dates  from  1961  and  was  ratified  by  179  states  on  1  November  2002:  it  established  a  

list   of   drugs   (the   main   ones   are   opium,   morphine,   heroin,   methadone,   codeine,   cocaine,   and  

cannabis).  The  second,  dating  from  1971  and  ratified  by  nearly  172  countries,  establishes  a  list  of  

psychotropic  substances  (ecstasy,  LSD,  amphetamines).  Finally,  the  1988  Convention  against  Illicit  

Traffic   in  Narcotic  Drugs   and  Psychotropic   Substances,   ratified   by   166   States,   complements   this  

legal  arsenal  by  providing   increased   international  cooperation  as  well  as  control  of  twenty-­‐three  

                                                                                                               39  Markus  Schultze-­‐Kraft,  «  Tout  un  continent  sous  l’emprise  des  narcos  »,  Courrier  International,  30  April  2009.  40  S.A.,  «  La  Drug  Enforcement  administration  »,  Le  Monde  diplomatique,  2000.  41  Darrell  E.  Issa,  Charles  E.  Grassley,  26  juin  2011,  «  The  Department  of  Justice’s  Operation  Fast  and  furious:  fueling  Cartel  Violence  »,  p.8.  

chemicals  needed  to  manufacture  illegal  drugs,  referred  to  as  ‘chemical  precursors’42.  States  that  

have   ratified   these   conventions  must  establish  national  drug   control   institutions,   and  a  national  

classification  of  drugs   in  order   to  better   target   them.  They   remain   free  however   to  decide  how  

they   wish   to   relevantly   penalise   criminal   offenses   relating   to   the   possession   and   trafficking   of  

drugs   as   well   as   the   implementation   of   devices   to   reduce   risk   and   lower   demand.   They   must  

however   cooperate  with  United  Nations   agencies,   in   particular  with   the   International   Narcotics  

Control   Board   (INCB),   which   oversees   the   implementation   by   states   of   these   international  

conventions   and   delivers   reports   assessing   the   progress   made   by   signatory   states.   In   its   2010  

report,   the   Board   has   welcomed   the   continuation   of   the   Central   American   Integration   System  

(SICA)   as   an   engine   of   regional   integration   and   cooperation   dealing   with   the   threats   of   drug  

trafficking  on  security,  renewing  its  commitment  to  953  million  dollars  in  the  organisation.  It  has  

also  been  noted   in   the  action  plan   resulting   from   the   summit  of   heads  of   state  of   the  member  

countries  of  SICA  in  San  Salvador  in  July  2010,  the  need  to  examine  the  role  of  the  police  chiefs  in  

the  national  struggle,  to  curb  corruption43.  

 

Despite  these  advances  in  international  and  regional  cooperation,  concrete  results  remain  

elusive.  The  Global  Commission  on  Drug  Policy  has  nevertheless  attempted  to  revive  the  process  

in  June  2011.  Composed  of  personalities  from  all  over  the  world  (Kofi  Annan,  Mario  Vargas  Llosa,  

Paul  Volcker,  four  former  presidents  -­‐  Fernando  Cardoso  of  Brazil,  Ernesto  Zedillo  of  Mexico,  César  

Gaviria  of  Colombia  and  Ruth  Dreifuss  of  Switzerland),  the  organization  started  from  the  premise  

that   ‘the   global  war   against   drugs   is   a   failure’44.   It   therefore   advocates   the   decriminalization   of  

drugs   –   a   decriminalization   of   recreational   use   and   possession   of   drugs,   and   a   ban   on   sale   and  

production   –   and   the   legalization   of   cannabis,   that   is   to   say,   an   authorization   of   its   sale   and  

consumption  via  a  state  control  on  production  and  distribution.   In  addition  to  this  proposal,   the  

Commission  wants   to   refocus   their  strategy   to  be   implemented  by  revising   the  current  policy  of  

zero   tolerance   launched   nearly   forty   years   ago   by   U.S.   President   Richard   Nixon.   To   this   end,   it  

proposes  to  revise  the  UN  conventions  on  drugs,  with  the  aim  of  encourage  a  dialogue  between  

producing  and  consuming  countries.  For  former  Brazilian  President  Henrique  Cardoso,  legalization  

would  enable  ‘huge  amounts  of  money  used  today  for  repressive  policies  to  be  used  in  preventive  

policies  and  rehabilitation’45.  

                                                                                                               42  «  Les  conventions  sur  les  stupéfiants  »,  1961,  1971  et  1988.  43  «  Rapport  Organe  International  de  Contrôle  des  Stupéfiants  2010  sur  l’avancée  de  la  coopération  »,  2010.  44  Rapport  de  la  Commission  mondiale  sur  la  politique  des  drogues,  juin  2011,  p.  12,  recommandation  n°2.  45  Adeline   Journet,   «  Mario  Vargas   Llosa  pour   la   légalisation  des  drogues   en  Amérique   latine  »,   L’Express,  4  March  

A  losing  battle?  

 

Despite  the  hopes  the  World  Drug  report  gave  rise  to,  for  many  observers  the  fight  against  

drug   trafficking   appears   doomed   to   failure.  Drug   trafficking   seems   to  have  outstripped  national  

and   international  governmental  efforts  at   intervention,   for   several   reasons.  First,   in   response   to  

the  ‘war’  waged  against  them,  drug  traffickers  move  their  production  to  other  countries  (including  

to   the   countries  of  Central  America,   as   in   the   case  of  Mexico).   This  phenomenon   is   termed   the  

‘duster   effect’   (or   the   ‘cockroach   effect’)   and   appears   to   prevent   any   sustainable   disruption   of  

production.   The   answer   to   this   permanent   displacement   might   lie   in   cooperation   and   full  

coordination   between   the   states   of   South   and   Central   America   in   the   face   of   their   common  

enemy,  but  so  far  this  remains  lacking.  The  other  two  factors  explaining  this  failure  must  be  sought  

in  the  socio-­‐economic  context  of  these  states  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  extension  of  political  and  

economic  power  of  drug  traffickers  on  the  other.  

 

The  complexity  of   the   fight  against  drug  production  and  drug   trafficking   in  Latin  America  

stems  from  several  characteristics  key  to  Latin  American  countries.  In  the  absence  of  other  equally  

lucrative  production  avenues,  the  cultivation  of  coca  is  the  first  single  stable  source  of  income  for  

farmers.  In  Bolivia,  coca  growers  (cocalejos)  receive  income  ranging  from  about  200  to  400  euros  

per   month46,   while   the   Bolivian   minimum   wage   is   50   euros   per   month.   This   discrepancy   is  

explained  by  the  strong  demand  for  coke  from  the  narcos.  The  removal  of  this  particular  sort  of  

agricultural   production   greatly   diminishes   the   standard   of   living   of   these   people.   On   the   other  

hand   some   crops   are   an   integral   part   of   culture   and   tradition.   In   these   countries,   as   Bolivian  

President  Evo  Morales  states,  ‘coca  is  not  poisonous  to  humans’47.  Instead,  it  is  a  plant  carrying  a  

sacred  and  mystical  value,  and  is  used  as  an  offering  to  the  goddess  Pachamama.  Furthermore,  the  

cocalejos  consume  coca  everyday  because  it  serves  as  an  appetite  suppressant  and  fights  certain  

ailments  such  as  altitude  sickness  in  the  Andes  Mountains.  

 

The  sustainability  of  drug  trafficking  can  be  explained  by  the  economic  and  political  power  

of   the   traffickers.   There   exist   palpable   links   between   political   power   and   the   narcos48.   For  

example,   General   Salabria,   one   of   the   senior   members   of   the   Bolivian   anti-­‐drug   effort,   was  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               2011.  46  Vincent  Prado,  «  Bolivie,  le  nouvel  eldorado  des  trafiquants  de  cocaïne»,  op.  cit.  47  Ibid.  48  Thierry  Garcin,  entretien  avec  Alain  Musset,  21  November  2011.  

arrested   because   of   his   membership   in   a   cartel.   Mexican   investigative   journalist   Anabel  

Hernández49  pointed  to  the  existence  of  a  collusion  between  the  police  and  the  powerful  Sinaloa  

cartel50,   led   by   Joaquin  Guzman.   Incidentally,   the   latter  was   ranked   one   of   the  most   influential  

people  in  the  world  by  Forbes  in  2009.  This  collusion  is  even  stronger  at  local  level:  nearly  70%  of  

Mexican  municipalities  were   infiltrated   by  narcos.   Their   goal   is   not   officially   take   power   but   to  

keep  the  elbowing  there  way  about  through  intimidation  by  violence,  and  if  necessary  by  targeted  

displays  of  it  to  affect  morale.  The  son  of  Honduran  President  Ricardo  Maduro  was  kidnapped  and  

then  murdered  in  1997.  Similarly,  the  Mexican  Minister  of  the  Interior  Francisco  Blak,  specializing  

in   the   fight   against   drug   trafficking,   died   in   a   helicopter   crash   in   November   2011.   The   same  

accident  had  occurred  two  years  earlier  with  his  predecessor  Juan  Camilo51.  Beyond  policy  makers,  

enforcers  of  law  often  have  relationships  with  cartels.  The  difficulties  inherent  in  their  profession  

is   summarized  by   the  unequivocal   formula   ‘lead  or   silver?’   (that   is   to   say,   ‘bullet  or  gold?’)   that  

explains  how  corruption,  massacres  and  money   laundering  are   commonplace.  One  of   the   latest  

examples   is   the  dismissal  of  284  senior  officials  acting   in   league  with  drug  traffickers   in  the  blitz  

that  took  place  on  the  outskirts  of  Tijuana  in  2007,  during  which  nearly  400,000  members  of  the  

police   at   all   hierarchical   levels   were   placed   under   surveillance.   Within   the   framework   of   a  

concerted  fight  against  corrupt  officials,  other  operations  of  the  same  magnitude  will  certainly  be  

executed  in  the  future52.  

 

If  the  fight  against  drug  trafficking  is  a  failure  at  both  national  and  international  levels,  the  

solution  might  lie  with  non-­‐governmental  actors  in  the  case  of  Mexico.  Pressure  from  civil  society  

could   bring   to   power   the   current   opposition,   the   Institutional   Revolutionary   Party   (Partido  

Revolucionario   Institucional   or   PRI)   in   the   forthcoming   presidential   elections   scheduled   for   July  

2012.  Hector  Moreno,   a   political   scientist   at   the   Technological   Institute  of  Monterrey,   said   that  

unlike  the  discredited  PAN,  the  PRI   retains   ‘the   image  of  a  strong  structure,  guaranteeing  public  

order  and  an  ability  to  govern  firmly’53.  Action  on  the  part  of  civil  society  was  seen  in  June  2011,  

with   the  crossing  of  Mexico  by  a   ‘Caravan  of  Peace’54.  The  second   initiative   likely   to  change   the  

situation   is   that  of   ‘hacktivists’,   in   this   case   the  Anonymous.   The   latter,  one  of  whose  members  

was   kidnapped   by   the  narcos,  managed   to   blackmail   traffickers   and   secure   the   release   of   their  

                                                                                                               49  Annabel  Hernandez  ,“Los  senores  del  narco”,  Grijalbo  Mondadori  Sa,  November  2010.  50  Delphine  Saubaber  et  Léonore  Mahieux,  «  Mexique  :  la  fausse  guerre  anti-­‐-­‐-­‐narcos  »,  L’Express,  24  December  2010.  51  S.A.,  «  Les  mystérieux  assassinats  des  ministres  de  l’intérieur  mexicains  »,  Le  Monde,  3  November  2011.  52  Babette  Stern,  «  Le  Mexique  tente  une  opération  mains  propres  dans  la  police  »,  Libération,  28  July  2007.  53  Frédéric  Saliba,  «  Mexique  :  le  possible  retour  de  l’ancien  parti  hégémonique  »,  Le  Monde,  2  January  2012.  54  Léonore  Mahieux,  «  Le  Mexique  traversé  par  la  caravane  de  la  paix  »,  L’Express,  16  June  2011.  

comrade   by   threatening   to   reveal   links   between   the   Zetas   cartel   and   the   government.   Their  

decentralized   nature,   without   hierarchy,   is   an   asset   for   this   group   of   hackers   from   threats   of  

retaliation  by  the  narcos.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  this  movement  will  develop  with  time  to  

become  a  real  player  in  the  fight  against  drug  trafficking55.  

 

There  is  a  spectrum  of  responses  to  narcos  from  grassroots  to  nationwide,  on  regional  and  

international   stages.   Answers   are   to   be   found   in   the   formation   of   a   new   sustainable   economic  

model,   ensuring   everyone   a   decent   standard   of   living   and   a   decent   income   through   greater  

involvement  of  the  civic  power  and  the  implementation  of  a  real  agricultural  policy  diversification  

of   crops   produced.   States   should   finally   solve   the   governance   problems   that   undermine   efforts  

from  inside  by  removing  corruption  and  promoting  greater  institutional  transparency.  

 

 

Club  du  Millénaire:  Antoine  Jeanneau,  Louis  Rossignol,  Hugo  Verger-­‐Garnacho  

 

Editorial  board:  Louis-­‐Marie  Bureau,  Sarah  Laffon  

 

Translation:  Rosalind  Tan  

                                                                                                               55  S.A.,  «  Anonymous,  pirates  du  net  aux  multiples  visages  »,  Le  Monde,  31  January  2012.