Ky Greene

PHL 2000-105

18 February 2017

Summary of “Virtue Theory and Abortion”

Rosalind Hursthouse gives a sketch of virtue theory before applying it to abortion. As she

gives the sketch, she counters five arguments she considers to be criticisms of virtue theory that

arise from misconceptions of what virtue theory is. The sketch she gives of virtue theory is

straightforward. There are three parts to it: 1) “An action is right if it is what a virtuous agent

would do in the circumstances”; 2) “A virtuous agent is one who acts virtuously, that is, one who

has and exercises the virtues”; 3) “A virtue is a character trait a human being needs to flourish or

live well” (Hursthouse).

In countering the five misconceptions, the first thing Hursthouse says is that virtue theory

doesn’t have a peculiar weakness because it involves the concept of eudaimonia, or human

flourishing. One of the common misconceptions is that some view the concept of eudaimonia as

being hopelessly obscure, but Hursthouse argues that virtue theory has never been dismissed on

the comparative obscurity of its central concept but rather that the central concepts of deontology

and utilitarianism lack this obscurity. Hursthouse argues that this is clearly a false statement, as

both rationality and happiness are easily just as difficult and obscure in their own respective

theories as the concept of eudaimonia is within virtue theory. Hursthouse also points out that

virtue theory isn’t trivially circular, answers the questions of what needs to be done as well as

what an ideal person is, that each virtue corresponds with a vice to produce instructions and

prohibitions, and that virtue theory isn’t committed to reductionism of moral concepts.

Hursthouse then rejects the major criticism of virtue theory by saying that the conditions

of adequacy required for virtue theory to do more than make assertions is implausible, as moral

knowledge must be learned. She makes the assertion that while there are young mathematical

geniuses, it is rare for there to be young moral geniuses, and this is evidence that moral

knowledge is much more complex than it may first appear to be. She also makes the assertion

that moral guidance is sought from those who have experience in certain matters, as the

consideration of what is worthwhile differs. Hursthouse argues that if the pursuit of what is

worthwhile wasn’t considered in moral issues, then a person could easily seek guidance on moral

issues from anyone, regardless of that person’s experiences with that moral issue. After rejecting

the major criticism of virtue theory, she applies virtue theory to abortion.

When she applies virtue theory to the moral issue of abortion, the first thing she does is to

throw out the two major arguments of abortion- women’s rights and the status of the fetus. In

terms of virtue theory, she says, both arguments are irrelevant. In regards to women’s rights, the

question that is asked about abortion through the lens of virtue theory is whether having the

abortion in the prescribed set of circumstances would be the result of the agent acting virtuously,

viciously, or neither virtuously nor viciously. The answer to that question is all that matters. She

argues that the only relevant question in relation to the status of the fetus is how the information

about the status of the fetus figure into the practical reasoning, actions, and thoughts of the

virtuous and nonvirtuous person. She says that it is important to consider the fact that terminating

a pregnancy is the termination of a human life, and, for that reason, it needs to be considered

very seriously as it connects with all our thoughts about life, death, parenthood, and family

relationships.

Overall, Hursthouse makes the argument that there are both virtuous and nonvirtuous

reasons for a person to have an abortion or even not to have an abortion – everything depends on

the circumstances of the abortion and the way virtue and vice intertwine with one another in each

situation. She doesn’t really seem to be making a case either for or against abortion. Rather, she

seems to be saying that the morality of abortion is dependent on the concept of eudaimonia and

that the issue of abortion, in the realm of virtue theory, is a complex one.