Vietnam: The End, 1975 CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA History ABSTRACT Author: Bibby, Thomas M., Major USAF Title: Vietnam: The End, 1975 Date: 1 April 1985 The purpose of this paper was to examine the reasons for the sudden and total collapse of the Republic of Vietnam Armed forces (RVNAF) in the early months of 1975, and determine if the final outcome was inevitable or if Ameri- can will could have prevailed and insured South Vietnam's survival as a free and independent nation. Also, through a discussion of "lessons learned", the paper addresses the significant impact our experiences in Vietnam will have upon future US actions in foreign affairs. The paper begins with a brief introduction of the events surrounding the final collapse and their interpretation by both the North and South Vietnamese. Virtually everyone concerned considered the crucial turning point in the war was the signing of the Paris Agreements of 1973: the United States viewed the agreements as "peace with honor"; the North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolu- tionary Government (PRG) viewed them as the surrender and defeat of the Ameri- can "imperialists" and their "lackey puppet regime"; and the South Vietnamese viewed them as "abandonment" by a strong ally they thought would always be there. The first chapter begins with an examination of the Paris Agreements and describes what each of the parties concerned expected to achieve from the agreements. Chapter two continues to examine the events which occurred after the signing of the agreements and discusses the numerous violations of the agreements, and their overall impact upon the final collapse of South Vietnam.

In chapter three, the policy of Vietnamization is discussed in order to evaluate the overall capability of the RVNAF to effectively provide for South Vietnam's defense in 1975. In doing so, both the American and South Vietnamese assessments of the policy and its effectiveness are presented. Chapter four examines the collapse of the RVNAF from the viewpoint of failed leadership and destroyed morale. Although there were many reasons for South Vietnam's collapse, the major ones centered around low morale, un- controlled corruption, incompetent leadership, and lack of US military aid and air support in the period following the Paris Agreements of 1973. Finally, the paper identifies some lessons of the events surrounding our experiences in South Vietnam, and how they will affect future US actions in foreign affairs. They include: the requirement to distinguish between problems which lend themselves to political solutions and those which re- quire military solutions; the requirement for the US to have domestic sup- port for its foreign policy to succeed; and the requirement to understand the needs of the people we are trying to help. Above all, our political and military leaders must do a better job in articulating our nation's foreign policy to the US public and Congress to gain their support, and must care- fully analyze the public's willingness to support that policy over an ex- tended period of time, even under adverse conditions. However, despite US foreign policy failure in South Vietnam, the Vietnam War was for the South Vietnamese to win and not the Americans. The government of South Vietnam needed to quickly implement significant political reforms to rally the sup- port of its own people and soldiers, but simply ran out of time in 1975. VIETNAM: THE END, 1975 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1: PARIS AGREEMENTS OF 1973 1. North Vietnamese and PRG Expectations 13 2. South Vietnamese Expectations 19 3. American Expectations 24 CHAPTER 2: BREAKDOWN OF THE AGREEMENTS 1. The Postwar War: 1973-1975 31 2. Violations 56 CHAPTER 3: VIETNAMIZATION 1. American Assessment 67 2. South Vietnamese Assessment 72 CHAPTER 4: COLLAPSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) 1. RVNAF Leadership 74 2. RVNAF Morale 81 CONCLUSION 86 CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 96 CAST OF PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS 99 ENDNOTES 103 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 112 INTRODUCTION The Vietnam War is probably the most analyzed war and, simultaneously, the least understood war involving the United States since 1945. Of all U.S. allies, South Vietnam enjoyed more support from the United States than any other individual country throughout the free world. With over $160 billion in aid and the sacrifice of more than 50,000 American lives, it is difficult to believe that South Vietnam could have had a stronger ally than in the United States.1 Why then did South Vietnam fall? Even more disconcert- ing, why did it collapse so quickly? Unfortunately, there are not any easy answers to why the final outcome of this

divisive and costly war for both the United States and the Republic of South Vietnam came to such a devastating conclusion. In this paper, I shall examine the events leading to the final collapse on April 30, 1975. I shall also try to determine if, as the Vietnamese would say, the "fates" were against South Vietnam and the outcome was inevitable; or if American will could have prevailed and insured South Viet- nam's survival as a free and independent nation. In my research, I read numerous accounts of the war on the events from 1972 to 1975 by North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese and American sources. Each tended to present his own opinions with ideological biases; but, on the whole, a common thread of truth emerged. The Paris Agreements of 1973 (more formally called the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam) were viewed by all concerned as the crucial turning point in the war: The United States viewed the agreements as "peace with honor"; the North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) viewed them as the surren- der and defeat of the American "imperialists" and their "lackey puppet regime"; and the South Vietnamese saw them as "abandonment" by a strong ally they thought would always be there. It is highly questionable that if the Paris Agreements were not signed that South Vietnam would have survived in 1975; however, the conditions agreed to in Paris by the four signatory parties were not in the best interest of the government of South Vietnam (GVN). In his book, Our Great Spring Victory, the North

Vietnamese Army (NVA) chief of staff, General Van Tien Dung, presented a biased but extremely detailed account of the final collapse of South Vietnam. During its 21st plenum in October 1973, the Communist Party Central Committee decided that "revolutionary violence" was still the pathway to achieving North Vietnam's goals, despite the terms of the Paris Agreements.2 The following March, the Central Military Party Committee concluded, "the Vietnamese revolution may have to pass through many transi- tional stages, and can only gain victory through revolu- tionary violence--carrying out popular uprisings, relying on our political and military forces, or in the event that large-scale war returns, carrying out revolutionary warfare to gain complete victory."3 According to Dung's account, following the March confer- ence, the military command carefully monitored the battle- fields in the South; over the summer it reported to the party that "the fighting ability of our mobile main-force units was superior to that of the enemy's mobile main-force units." The balance of forces had changed in Hanoi's favor. In addition, resupply efforts were expanded and the Ho Chi Minh Trail was substantially improved by labor battalions working day and night. Arms, munitions and troops were now trucked on a 26-foot wide, all-weather road running from Quang Tri to eastern Nam Bo in the Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. General Dung wrote that their supply system resembled "strong ropes inching gradually, day by day, around the neck, arms, and legs of a demon, awaiting the

order to jerk tight and bring the creature's life to an end."4 The North Vietnamese did assess the possibility of renewed American intervention; they decided after a meeting of the Central Military Party Committee in October 1974, that the possibility seemed remote after the Watergate scandal, Nixon's resignation, the economic difficulties following the 1973 Arab oil embargo, and the sequence of Congressional votes against additional U.S. aid to Saigon. With the cutback of almost $2 billion annually in U.S. aid, South Vietnam was now forced to fight "a poor man's war," which put them at a distinct disadvantage in overcoming the overwhelming initiative enjoyed by both the North Vietnamese regular troops and the Vietcong guerrillas. Le Duan, the North Vietnamese Communist Party's First Secretary, stated: "Now that the United States has pulled out of the South, it will be hard for them to jump back in; no matter how they may intervene, they cannot rescue the Saigon administration from its disastrous collapse."5 The October 1974 conference unanimously agreed on five points which favored implementing their Spring 1975 offensive and would insure success: First, the Saigon troops were growing weaker militarily, politically, and economically every day. Our forces were stronger than the enemy in the South. Second, the United States was meeting diffi- culties at home and abroad, and its ability to give political or military aid to its proteges was declining every day. Not only had the United States had to decrease its aid to Saigon, it also faced increasing opposition to any effort to "jump back" into the South. And even if troops did intervene, they would not be able to rescue the collapsing Saigon quisling administration.

Third, we had set up strategic positions linking North and South, had increased our forces and our stockpiles of materiel, and had completed the system of strategic and tactical roads. Fourth, movements calling for peace, improve- ment of popular welfare, democracy, and national independence, and demanding that Thieu be toppled, gained momentum in the towns. Fifth, our people's just struggle had the sympathy and the strong support of the world's people.6 With the fall of Song Be, the provincial capital of Phuoc Long province, in January 1975, the North Vietnamese Politburo met again and decided on a strategic plan which called for large surprise attacks to be launched later in the year, and "create conditions to carry out a general offensive and uprising in 1976." The North Vietnamese leaders planned to conquer all of South Vietnam by 1976; however, they also stated that "if the opportune moment presents itself at the beginning or the end of 1975, we will immediately liberate the South in 1975."7 In his book, The Final Collapse, General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff, states his personal belief that it was the cutback in U.S. military aid and absence of U.S. intervention with air power (especially B-52s), in response to North Vietnamese and PRG treaty violations, that made defeat inevitable. After the 1973 Paris Agreements, the Republic of Vietnam armed forces (RVNAF) suddenly found it difficult to operate at the greatly reduced level of U.S. appropriations; they were now in a decidedly underdog position. Since their superior firepower and mobility were gone, they found it impossible to maintain tactical balance against an enemy

who held the initiative. The most the RVNAF could hope to achieve was a delaying action pending restoration of American military aid to its former level.8 American military aid to the government of South Vietnam was cut from over $2.5 billion in fiscal year 1973 to $700 million in fiscal year 1975.9 General Vien explained how the cutback in aid led to President Thieu's decision to abandon the Central Highlands in March 1975. This strategic error on Thieu's part resulted in disastrous consequences and significantly hastened the collapse of the RVNAF. General Vien had this to say about the impact the cutback in U.S. aid had upon the decision to abandon the Central Highlands: The big slash in appropriated funds made its tragic impact felt not only on the battlefield, but also in the minds of South Vietnamese strate- gists as well. The ability to hold territory, they felt, was a direct function of aid level. With the reduction now in force, perhaps it was no longer possible to maintain `territorial integrity.' It might be best, they reasoned, to tailor our defense effort to the aid appropriated. Simplistic as it might sound, the idea reflected the realities of the situation. Whatever the motives behind it, President Thieu's decision early in 1975 to redeploy forces was centainly not taken lightly or without firm grounds. But it was also this fateful decision that set in motion a series of setbacks whose cumulative effect led to the final collapse.10 However, it was the way in which the retreat was con- ducted that hastened the collapse of South Vietnam. Strategic withdrawals of the magnitude involved in 1975 require thorough planning with emphasis on its impact upon the civilian population. General Vien's remarks describe his feelings about the effect the execution of the retreat

had upon the final outcome of the war: In the context of the Vietnam War whose political and military aspects were intimately entwined, such a retreat was predisposed to doom if no consideration were given to the Vietnamese civilians who depended on the troops for protection and for whom the war was being fought. Our armed forces were not operating on foreign soil; their role and mission differed from those of an expeditionary force. Removing them from an area without taking steps to evacuate the popula- tion amounted to sheer dereliction. The redeployment fiasco in Military Regions (MRs) II and I demonstrated the tragic fact that the population could not be separated from the troops and that troop movements could be halted by a rushing mass of refugees. These are the facts of the case. They explain the rapid moral and physical disintegration of an army that had fought well until undercut by events beyond its control.11 In addition to aid cutbacks and poorly executed retreats from the Central Highlands, the suddenness of the actual collapse under the North Vietnamese offensive of 1975 was due to a number of additional factors. One was the adverse balance of forces that existed by 1975. In an attempt to keep the balance of forces at the January 1973 level, the terms of the Paris Agreements restricted the resupply of all forces inside South Vietnam (both Communist and non-Communist) to a one-for-one replacement schedule. In other words, only similar equipment could be replaced and only after it became unusable. However, since the signing of the Paris Agreements, North Vietnam had greatly strengthened the quantity and quality of its offensive capabilities in the South through the dramatic improvement of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Conse- quently, through its improved logistics network, the North was able to rapidly concentrate its forces, and attack South Vietnamese points of weakness almost at will.12

Another factor for the South Vietnamese vulnerability was the lack of a mobile reserve and strategic mobility due to shortages of fuel, transport and spares. Their soldiers had been conditioned by the U.S. to rely on massive air and artillery support in combat and had "forgotten how to walk" when military resources became increasingly scarce after the Paris Agreements and American support decreased.13 The South Vietnamese Army had too big a logistical "tail," with too little actual fighters to put "teeth" into its combat powder. General Tran Van Don, the last South Vietnamese Minister of Defense, stated that out of 1.1 million men under arms on paper, only 100,000 could be called "fighters.14 The rest belonged to logistical units. This inability to field effective mobile reserve divisions proved deadly to the RVNAF in 1975, for they were essential in order to counter the massive conventional assault by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) that year. The need to maintain huge numbers of non-combat per- sonnel to support combat troops is a function of modern conventional warfare and was not unique to South Vietnam. Similar ratios hold true for all modern nations, but they are most apparent in Western forces, particularly those of the United States. On the other hand, the North Vietnamese forces were less technologically-oriented, and their army was more manpower-oriented. Consequently, a greater per- centage of their soldiers were actually involved in combat. In fact, of the 160,000 NVA regular troops inside South Vietnam, there were only 71,000 administrative and logisti- cal troops supporting them. However, the gross figures of

1.1 million South Vietnamese versus 160,000 NVA troops in South Vietnam tell little about relative combat power. A comparison of fighting forces portrays a more accurate picture of the real balance of forces. At the end of January 1973, the NVA combat strength in South Vietnam consisted of 15 infantry divisions and 27 separate infantry and sapper regiments, whereas the RVNAF consisted of only 13 divisions and 7 Ranger groups. Also, the South Vietnamese forces were tied to a static defensive role, while the NVA forces were able to devote their forces in the South almost entirely to offensive operations, since they enjoyed a relatively secure rear area in North Vietnam.15 Next among the fatal weaknesses of the RVNAF was the lack of effective military leadership at the top. Many senior officers received their appointments for reasons of political loyalty rather than military competence. On the civilian side, corruption and inflation adversely affected both the national will and military morale. It was this failure of leadership that was responsible for the tragic and disastrous quick retreats from the Central Highlands, resulting in one of the most devastating routs in the course of military history.16 Although there were numerous factors involved in the collapse of South Vietnam, the role the U.S. played in the final outcome had a significant impact. Before the Paris Agreements, the South Vietnamese perceived Washington as a strong ally who would support them indefinitely. After the Paris Agreements, however, the American role took the form

of gradual abandonment of South Vietnam when the U.S. with- drew its combat troops, stopped air support, and cutback military and economic aid.17 It was this feeling of aban- donment--no longer being regarded by the United States as worth saving--that had a devastating impact upon the people and leaders of South Vietnam in those tragic last months of 1975. The ability of the North Vietnamese to wage a revolu- tionary war, which purported to offer the chance for a change in the political order as it existed, was extremely effec- tive in mobilizing the population in the South to support its war effort. By contrast, the South Vietnamese govern- ment's inability to offer its people a similar change through the ideals of democracy and economic growth insured a lack of support for the Thieu government, especially during the crisis days of early 1975. The people and soldiers simply had no reason to fight for a government which failed to meet their needs. It matters little that the North's government was just as corrupt and more repressive, as evidenced by the conditions existing in Vietnam today; it matters only that the North Vietnamese and PRG were more effective in offering the people a defi- nite change in the political order as it existed in South Vietnam in 1975. Because Thieu could not effectively eliminate corrup- tion within his regime, the enticing, ideological arguments offered by the North Vietnamese were able to drive a divi- sive wedge between the people of South Vietnam and their government. In summary, I intend to show that the collapse

of the RVNAF had not occurred suddenly in 1975, nor was the collapse due to any one single factor. Instead, the reasons were many: low morale, uncontrolled corruption, incompetent leadership, and the cutoff of U.S. military aid and air support. However, unless the government of South Vietnam could solve its own political problems, it was condemned to, not only losing the support of its own people, but the support of the American public and Congress as well. The Vietnam War was for the South Vietnamese to win. However, the U.S. could only provide aid to buy time for the govern- ment of South Vietnam to make significant reforms and rally the support of its own people to win the war against North Vietnam. CHAPTER 1 PARIS AGREEMENTS OF 1973 NORTH VIETNAMESE AND PRG EXPECTATIONS In March of 1972, the North Vietnamese, along with the Vietcong, launched a powerful conventional offensive. The Communist leaders hoped it would knock the U.S. out of the war altogether, or at least might force the Nixon Administra- tion to make further concessions in the long-stalled peace talks. North Vietnam's Lieutenant General Tran Van Tra, deputy commander of the Communist forces in the South, stated a year after the 1972 "Easter" offensive that "The aim of the 1972 offensive was to force the U.S. to sign a peace agreement."1 However, the offensive was a total disaster for the

North Vietnamese and the Communist leaders were far from pleased with the results. Despite their investment of 120,000 North Vietnamese regular troops and thousands of Vietcong guerrillas equipped with Soviet artillery, rockets, and tanks, they failed to smash the South Vietnamese Army.2 Instead of driving the United States out of the war, the U.S. increased its actions and proceeded to step up the bombing of North Vietnam. In the end, U.S. air interdic- tion in the North and airlift and close air support in the South, especially during the battles of An Loc and Kontum, gave the South Vietnamese forces a distinct advantage over the Communist forces in 1972.3 Although the Communist forces made substantial gains in the rich and populous Mekong Delta, they failed to beat the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces as they had beaten the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Without this type of psychological knockout, they were in no position to dictate peace terms.4 However, despite the staggering cost in human life of nearly 50,000 dead, and at least as many wounded, the 1972 offensive cracked the optimistic illusion of Vietnamization. To succeed on the battlefield, the South Vietnamese had to resort to the enormous reliance on U.S. air support and advisors. Thus, the 1972 offensive laid the groundwork for an eventual political deal and an ulti- mately successful future offensive in l975.5 After the failure of the "Easter" offensive to defeat the U.S. and South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese decided on a compromise to break the deadlock in the peace negotiations; they would also use the 1972 Presidential Election to put

pressure on U.S. negotiators--a period during which they felt that the pressure would be strongest for the U.S. to conclude negotiations at any price. In order to achieve a settlement, the North Vietnamese now considered offering a major concession: dropping their demand that South Viet- nam's President Thieu must be removed before the fighting could stop (a demand that they had been making since the beginning of peace talks in 1969).6 By making this con- cession, the North Vietnamese leaders would succeed in getting the U.S. to leave South Vietnam and allow them to continue their struggle at a more favorable future date. However, in typical Communist fashion, North Vietnam and the PRG, through the Giai Phong (Liberation) Press Agency, again pressed for his removal after Thieu refused to sign the accords agreed to in October 1972 by Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Le Duc Tho.7 The October draft of the accords called for an in-place cease-fire. Under this "leopard spot" arrangement, the South Vietnamese and the Vietcong would hold the areas they controlled at the time of the cease-fire, pending a final settlement.8 It would also allow the North Vietnamese to leave an estimated 160,000 regular NVA troops in the South-- a key issue in North Vietnam's future bid for power and control of South Vietnam.9 However, President Thieu of South Vietnam refused to sign this agreement which allowed North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South. He also gave Kissinger a list of 96 proposals to be made before he would sign the agreement.10

When Kissinger proposed these additional changes to Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese interpreted them as a "breach of faith" and demanded that the October draft be signed in its original form without changes. A deadlock ensued and talks between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho stalled in December 1972. On December 14, 1972, President Nixon sent North Vietnam an ultimatum to begin talking "seriously" within seventy-two hours or face the consequences. When the North Vietnamese failed to respond positively to U.S. demands, President Nixon gave the order on December 18, 1972 to begin the Linebacker Two operation. From December 18 - 30, 1972, the U.S. flew nearly 3,000 B-52 bombers and fighter sorties over the Hanoi and Hai Phong areas, dropping approximately forty thousand tons of bombs in the most concentrated air offensive of the war against North Vietnam.11 Four days before the bombing ended, the North Vietnamese notified the U.S. that they were willing to negotiate again, as soon as the bombing was halted. The bombing ended on December 30, 1972 and on January 8, 1973, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho resumed their talks and negotiated an agreement. The peace agreement was formally signed in Paris by representatives from the United States, the PRG, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam on January 27, 1973. In the end, the North Vietnamese achieved their goal because the agreement signed in Paris differed very little from the one proposed in October 1972. Hanoi looked upon the Paris Agreements as a "big victory" because it succeeded in removing the U.S. troops, thereby enabling them to continue the war in the South against only the

South Vietnamese troops, at a time of their own choosing, to "reunite" all of Vietnam. General Dung described the views of the North Vietnamese leaders when he aptly stated: The agreement represented a big victory for our people and a big defeat for the U.S. imperi- alists and their lackeys, the result of eighteen years of determined and persistent struggle by our army and people under the correct leadership of our party. The Paris Agreement marked an important step forward in our people's revolu- tionary struggle, and opened up a new period in the South Vietnamese revolution: the period for completing the people's democratic revolution, and for reuniting the country. That would be the final phase of the people's democratic revolution in general, and of revolutionary war in the South in particular.12 From General Dung's remarks, two conclusions are readily apparent: the North Vietnamese expectations of the Paris Agreements were that they would bring an end to the destruc- tion of their country by U.S. aircraft and they would set the stage for the eventual reunification of the two Vietnams. In addition, the promise of the U.S. to pay war reparations in return for their compliance with the terms of the agree- ments meant a substantial boost to the North's economy, which had been devastated by the war in the past year. However, the U.S. refused to pay war reparations to North Vietnam because of its blatant treaty violations following the signing of the Paris Agreements.13 The agreements also gave legal recognition to the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) by calling for the creation of a National Council of Reconciliation and Concord (NCRC), composed of both Communist and non-Communist members. How- ever, because President Thieu viewed the NCRC as too much like a coalition government, the NCRC was never formed.14

Like Hanoi, the PRG regarded the peace agreement as only a temporary truce which allowed them to retain a foothold in the South and use the time to build up their military strength, while they prepared to liberate the South. As events in South Vietnam after January 1973 later proved, Saigon also viewed the agreements as only a breather before the war resumed. SOUTH VIETNAMESE EXPECTATIONS While the North Vietnamese and PRG saw the Paris Agreements as a victory, the South Vietnamese were signi- ficantly less optimistic. However, they did hopefully expect that they would allow South Vietnam to survive as an independent nation. In order to achieve this goal, the Thieu government wanted to retain an American presence in South Vietnam as long as possible. Of course, with the terms of the agreements calling for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat troops within 60 days after the signing, and the U.S. Congress' increasing lack of interest in supporting the war in Indochina, it became evident that eventually the government of South Vietnam would have to sustain itself alone. When Henry Kissinger arrived in Saigon on October 18, 1972 to present the draft peace plan to the South Vietnamese, President Thieu was extremely offended that he was the last man consulted. Thieu also felt that he had no real voice in the outcome since the whole matter appeared to have been decided between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho during their pre- vious secret negotiations.15 South Vietnamese General Tran

Van Don mentioned in his book, Our Endless War, that Thieu would not agree to a peace agreement with the North that did not meet the four basic conditions of: "no coalition govern- ment, withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South, respect of neutrality of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and settlement of political differences to be left to the two Vietnams without foreign meddling."16 Thieu objected to two primary issues in the October draft: it failed to call for the withdrawal of an esti- mated 160,000 North Vietnamese troops from the South, and the formation of a National Council of National Reconcilia- tion and Concord which he felt was actually a cover for a coalition government. The withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops was considered essential before signing the agree- ments; this can be seen in the following testimony by Bui Diem, Saigon's Ambassador to Washington from 1967 to 1972: I still remember the words of President Thieu when I saw him a few weeks before the signing of the Paris Agreements and received his instructions for one of my frequent trips to the U.S. as his special emissary to watch over the peace nogotia- tions: "Go to Washington and Paris and try to do your best. To raise again at this hour the problem of the North Vietnamese troops on our territory is perhaps too late, but as long as we still have a chance to improve the Agreements, we have to try. If we cannot now obtain the basic requirements for our survival, things will be very difficult for us in the long run. And the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese troops is one of the basic requirements.17 It was becoming all too clear to President Thieu and the South Vietnamese leadership that U.S. interest in their country was beginning to wane. South Vietnam's political problems were minor in comparison to the larger and more complex political intrigue among the superpowers. During

this period in 1972, the U.S. was pursuing detente with the Soviet union and rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. Thieu expressed his concerns to Kissinger in a meeting between the two on October 22, 1972; he alluded to the effect the new U.S. world strategy would have upon South Vietnam: What does it matter to the United States to lose a small country like South Vietnam? We're scarcely more than a dot on the map of the world to you. If you want to give up the struggle, we will fight on alone until our resources are gone, and then we will die. The United States' world policy dictates that you dance lightly with Moscow and Peking, that you make different choices to follow your new strategies. But for us, the choice is between life and death. For us to put our signature to an accord which is tantamount to surrender would be accepting a death sentence, because life without liberty is death. No, it's worse than death!18 Kissinger responded that the U.S. would launch opera- tions north of the DMZ should Hanoi violate the accords. However, Kissinger's response did little to persuade Thieu that the accords were in Saigon's best interests.19 Obviously, Thieu did not stay on until the bitter end and die in the struggle; however, his words reflect much of the hopelessness and desperation expressed by most of South Vietnam's leadership at the time concerning the unfavorable terms in the Paris Agreements. Since the agreements signed in January 1973 did not significantly differ much from those proposed to Thieu in October 1972, why then did South Vietnam sign the Paris Agreements of 1973? The answer lies in President Nixon's threat to cutoff U.S. support and his secret assurance that the U.S. would "respond with full force should the settle-

ment be violated by North Vietnam."20 Several South Viet- namese leaders have noted that it was the increased pressure put on Thieu by the Nixon Administration to sign the agree- ments and "close ranks" with the U.S. that persuaded Thieu to accept the Paris Agreements. On January 16, 1973, President Nixon sent General Alexander Haig to Saigon to convince Thieu to sign the agreements and tell him that the United States would not hesitate to sign its own peace treaty with Hanoi if the situation demanded it.21 Bui Diem depicts the pressure to sign the agreements in the following excerpt: The final decision by Saigon to sign the Agreements came after a rather painful exchange of messages between Presidents Nixon and Thieu-- almost every day during the week prior to signing-- with some of the messages from President Nixon couched in the toughest language that diplomatic practice has ever seen: 'I am firmly convinced that the alternative to signing the present agree- ment is a total cutoff of funds to assist your country....' 'If you refuse to join us, the responsibility for the consequences rests on the government of South Vietnam....' 'If you cannot give me a positive answer by 1200 Washington time, January 21, 1973, I shall authorize Dr. Kissinger to initial the agreement even without the concur- rence of your government.22 After resisting the pressure to sign the agreements since October 1972, President Thieu finally concurred, realizing that to continue to fight without American support would result in disaster as long as the North Vietnamese were still being backed by the Soviet Union and China. In addition, President Nixon's guarantee of continued assistance and use of full force should North Vietnam violate the agreements, coupled with the memory of the Christmas bombings of North Vietnam, lessened his

resistance to signing the Paris Agreements of 1973. How- ever, by doing so, the government of South Vietnam had accepted the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South and gave defacto legal recognition to the Provi- sional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in South Vietnam, through the creation of a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord (NCRC) to settle "the internal matters of South Vietnam." The theoretical purpose of the NCRC was to insure a peaceful, political solution for these internal matters; however, the North Vietnamese troops ultimately threatened to impose a military solution. AMERICAN EXPECTATIONS What the United States expected, and what it finally achieved, in signing the Paris Agreements of 1973 is an extremely debatable issue. The Nixon Administration approached the peace talks with a firm commitment to achieve "peace with honor." However, given the fact that thee cease-fire ended almost immediately after it went into effect, the "undignified" departure of the U.S. from Saigon, and the abandonment of a former ally by the U.S. public and Congress, the period after the signing the peace treaty could hardly be called peaceful or our actions honorable. Ultimately, it seems that the U.S. was looking for a grace- ful way out of the war which would leave the government of South Vietnam a reasonable chance of survival.23 The accounts given by President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reveal that they negotiated with the North Vietnamese in good faith; they genuinely felt that

the agreements would achieve the desired peace and allow the United States to concentrate on more global concerns, such as detente with the Soviet Union and normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China. The follow- ing remarks by Henry Kissinger reflect the general hope within the United States in 1973 about the possible achieve- ments that the Paris Agreements could foster: I believed then, and I believe now, that the agreement could have worked. It reflected a true equilibrium of forces on the ground. If the equilibrium were maintained, the agreement could have been maintained. We believed that Saigon was strong enough to deal with guerrilla war and low-level violations. The implicit threat of our retaliation would be likely to deter massive vio- lations. We hoped that with the program of assist- ance for all of Indochina, including North Vietnam, promised by two Presidents of both parties, we might possibly even turn Hanoi's attention (and manpower) to tasks of construction if the new realities took hold for a sufficient period of time. Hanoi was indeed instructing its cadres in the South to prepare for a long period of political competition. We would use our new relationships with Moscow and Peking to foster restraint.24 Although the Nixon Administration believed that the 1973 settlement would work, there is further evidence in President Nixon's memoirs to show that the United States had become "war-weary" and that an agreement on the war had to be reached during the final series of negotiations in January 1973. On January 6, 1973, before he left for Paris, Kissinger met with President Nixon at Camp David to discuss the negotiating strategy. There were basically two options from which to choose. Under Option One, the U.S. would agree to an immediate settlement on the best terms it could negotiate. Under Option Two, the U.S. would break with South Vietnamese President Thieu and

continue the bombing until the North Vietnamese agreed to return the POWs in exchange for a complete withdrawal by the U.S. Evidence that the U.S. was ready to settle with the North Vietnamese immediately can be drawn from the following remarks President Nixon made in his diary after his meeting with Kissinger: Adding it all up I put it to Henry quite directly that even if we could go back to the October 8 agreement, that we should take it, having in mind the fact that there will be a lot of details that will have to be ironed out so that we can claim some improvement over the agreement. I told him that a poor settlement on Option One was better for us than Option Two at its best would be. He has finally come around to that point of view, although he believes that both from the standpoint of South Vietnam and perhaps our own standpoint in the long term, we might be better off with Option Two. I think he overlooks the fact that as far as our situation here is con- cerned, the war-weariness has reached the point that Option Two is just too much for us to carry on. The war continues to take too much of our attention from other international issues, such as the Mideast, and it also has a detrimental effect on our international relations, not only with the Soviets and the Chinese but even with our allies.25 Although the agreement reached in Paris was not the best one possible, it did achieve two important objectives for the United States: the safe withdrawal of U.S. troops and the return of all American POWs. The agreement, however, was not a peace agreement, for it allowed only for a cease-fire. American power in theory would ensure the peace through the firm assurance given to President Thieu by President Nixon that the United States would respond with full force if the North Vietnamese violated

the terms of the agreement. Nixon discusses this in his diary when he alludes to the notion that the agreement signed in Paris was not intended to be a peace agreement. The President wrote: Another plus item is that the South Viet- namese seem to be coming more into line. Our intelligence indicates that Thieu is telling visitors that it is not a peace agreement that he is going to get, but a commitment from the United States to continue to protect South Vietnam in the even such an agreement is broken. This, of course, is exactly the line I gave him in my letter which Haig delivered to him.26 The letter referred to by President Nixon was the one delivered by Alexander Haig on January 16, 1973 which gave President Thieu an ultimatum: either sign the Paris agree- ments or the U.S. would negotiate a treaty with North Viet- nam without South Vietnam's participation. This letter had the desired effect and Thieu was encouraged to sign. If, as the United States believed, the South Vietnamese were capable of dealing with the Vietcong and regular NVA troops located in the South at the time of the signing, why then did the Paris Agreements fail? Was the reason for failure, as some writers such as Frank Snepp claim, due to the fact that the United States was only negotiating to allow for a "decent interval" to transpire before the final collapse and allow the U.S. to gracefully bow out of Southeast Asia? In the end, this is what basically occurred. However, it is doubtful that the final tragic outcome in South Vietnam was ever consciously considered by the men involved in the negotiations at the time. A key point to consider in answering these complicated

questions is that the equilibrium of forces present in January 1973 did not remain stationary in the following years leading to April 30, 1975. In the period 1973 to 1975, when Soviet military aid to North Vietnam quadrupled, Ameri- can military aid to South Vietnam was cut from over $2.5 billion in fiscal year 1973 to $700 million is fiscal year 1975.27 This tremendous cutback in aid to South Vietnam after the signing of the Paris Agreements, while infiltra- tion of troops and supplies by North Vietnam into the South increased, seriously affected the equilibrium of forces that had been achieved in 1973; it definitely shifted the balance of power to the North Vietnamese by 1975. Led by Senator J. William Fulbright, the U.S. Congress passed, in June 1973, a bill to cutoff funds for combat activities in South east Asia. It set August 15, 1973 as the date for termina- tion of U.S. bombing in Cambodia, and required Congressional approval for funding of U.S. military action in any part of Indochina. This action by Congress had such an impact on President Nixon at the time that he wrote to House Speaker Carl Albert and U.S. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield to voice his grave concern about the serious consequences that would result: The abandonment of a friend will have a pro- found impact in other countries, such as Thailand, which have relied on the constancy and determina- tion of the United States, and I want the Congress to be fully aware of the consequences of its action.... ... I can only hope that the North Vietnamese will not draw the erroneous conclusion from this Congressional action that they are free to launch a military offensive in other areas of Indochina. North Vietnam would be making a very dangerous error if it mistook the cessation of bombing in

Cambodia for an invitation to fresh aggression or further violations of the Paris agreements. The American people would respond to such aggression with appropriate action.28 In his memoirs, President Nixon later confessed that Congress had removed the possibility of military action and he only had words with which to threaten North Vietnam. Unfortunately, the North Vietnamese knew this. The Nixon Administration was well aware of North Vietnam's intentions, but the President's power to act in order to carry out the promises made to South Vietnam was seriously hampered by an increasingly hostile Congress and the final unraveling of Presidential authority by the events surrounding Watergate. Henry Kissinger eloquently expresses his thoughts on the goal the United States attempted to achieve in Paris and a reason for failure: We had no illusions about Hanoi's long-term goals. Nor did we go through the agony of four years of war and searing negotiations simply to achieve a "decent interval" for our withdrawal. We were determined to do our utmost to enable Saigon to grow in security and prosperity so that it could prevail in any political struggle. We sought not an interval before collapse, but lasting peace with honor. But for the collapse of executive authority as a result of Watergate, I believe we would have succeeded.29 So, it was that an agreement negotiated in good faith by the executive branch of our government was undone by the Congress and public that had grown weary of their commitment to a burdensome ally and wanted out of Vietnam completely. While it is certainly true that the South Vietnamese leadership must bear the ultimate responsibility for the final tragic outcome of the war, the United States must also bear some responsibility for refusing to fulfill

its obligations to South Vietnam during the two year period following the signing of the Paris agreements. CHAPTER 2 BREAKDOWN OF THE AGREEMENTS THE POSTWAR WAR: 1973 - 1975 The signing of the Paris Agreements, or more formally called the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam, created the false impression that the cease-fire had ended the war. However, the agreements of January 1973 did not terminate the conflict in Vietnam. In fact, the "postwar war" began almost the moment peace was proclaimed. Anticipating success in the January negotiations, the North Vietnamese planned to launch general attacks through- out most of South Vietnam immediately before the expected date of the cease-fire. These attacks had one primary objective: to gain land and control of the surrounding population, and thus add legitimacy to the Communists' claim that the areas belonged to them when the agreements were signed. This offensive, known as LANDGRAB 73, occurred in late January and early February 1973. The operations followed the patterns established in October 1972, when the possibility of a cease-fire existed; except this time, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong waited until much closer to the expected date of the cease-fire to start their campaign. The objectives and techniques were virtually the same as had been used in the past: the main force units would generally defends the territory under their control and

attack to fix ARVN regular forces in their bases, while local NVA and Vietcong units entered the hamlets.1 However, LANDGRAB 73 was a dismal failure for the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. When the campaign ended on February 9, 1973, ARVN forces had killed over 5,000 Communists and only 23 of the more than 400 hamlets attacked were still reported by the South Vietnamese as contestable.2 Colonel William E. Le Gro, a senior staff officer with the U.S. Defense Attache Office in Saigon stated that the North Vietnamese and PRG erred in delaying their precease- fire operations in the expectation that the South Viet- namese armed forces would be deterred in counterattacking by the presence of International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) teams. The ICCS was created by the Paris Agreements and was supposed to detect and investigate violations, control entry into South Vietnam, and later, help supervise the national elections. The ARVN, local regional forces (RF) and popular forces (PF) proved much stronger than the Communists anticipated; they were able to deter the Communists' plans to capture populated areas, show the flag and then await the arrival of ICCS teams to declare and guarantee legitimacy to the Communists in the newly won areas. Colonel Le Gro also commented that the Communists committed an important strategic mistake by dividing their local forces into small units and attacking so many places, thereby reducing the staying power of any local unit. By dividing into

smaller units, the South Vietnamese forces were able to eliminate the Communist forces in piecemeal fashion, one by one.3 Colonel Le Gro notes that the local Communist forces were decimated after this campaign and never quite recovered. In fact, numerous articles written by both North and South Vietnamese leaders described the fighting before the final collapse as entirely conventional in nature, giving credence to the opinion that the Vietcong were unable to operate as an effective fighting force in 1975.4 The conquest of South Vietnam, thus became a completely North Vietnamese Army conventional operation. LANDGRAB 73 demonstrated that the South Vietnamese forces could hold their own against the North; it gave a clear indication to South Vietnamese leaders that the mili- tary balance of power was as much in their favor at the moment of the cease-fire as it would ever be. Although the ARVN forces were successful in decimating the enemy local forces in the South, there still remained the considerable threat of approximately 160,000 NVA regular troops still

remaining in the South after the signing of the Paris agreements. This is why South Vietnamese President Thieu, despite considerable pressure from the United States to sign the agreements, vehemently opposed two key provisions of the 1973 accords: one which allowed these NVA regular troops to remain the South, and the other one specifying the withdrawal of all U.S. combat troops within 60 days after the signing. Since Thieu felt that the military balance would never be more in his favor than it was in early February 1973 (especially after the failed Communist LANDGRAB 73 campaign), and American forces had not completely withdrawn, he decided to launch a series of military operations to seize areas still occupied by the Communists in the Mekong Delta and along the Cambodian border.5 Although these operations proved to be successful initially in establishing and main- taining control over formerly contested areas, they even- tually taxed the government of South Vietnam's resourcecs in both materiel and manpower.6 The last South Vietnamese Minister of Defense, General Tran Van Don, described the results of this disastrous policy in the following excerpt in his book: On our side, we did not adopt the correct military strategy to deal with the inexorable Communist steamroller. We spread our forces too thin, trying to maintain a presence in and defend each province town, an ambition clearly beyond our capability. Although by this time we had an armed force of over one million men, such a method of defense did not have a chance for success.7 The North Vietnamese leadership also took note of the landgrab operations being conducted by ARVN forces during

this period. Although he stops short in stating that Thieu's pacification operations were a success initially, North Vietnamese General Dung mentioned them in his book, Our Great Spring Victory; his remarks indicate that they were causing the North Vietnamese a considerable degree of difficulty in 1973: ... With this foundation the enemy threw their strength into carrying out their pacification and encroachment plans, with the intention of wiping out our lower level forces, destroying the scat- tered bases which we held in their zone of control, imposing an economic blockade on the border zones, and encroaching on the zones that had been liber- ated before the Paris Agreement was signed. Their scheme was to eliminate the existing situation, in which there were two zones of control, two armies, and two governments, and turn the South into a single zone entirely under their control. During the eleven months from the signing of the Paris Agreement until the end of 1973, the enemy used 60 percent of their main forces and all of their regional forces to begin more than 360,000 block- ade and encroachment operations and security sweeps, and brought together large forces for major operations against our liberated zones.... ...They pushed into almost all the zones we had liberated in our January 1973 campaign, and seized a number of the liberated areas scattered in their zone of control....8 However, the North Vietnamese were well aware that these pacification operations by the South would even- tually put the ARVN troops in the untenable position of being spread too thin in order to maintain control of the newly seized areas. General Dung later mentioned that the South Vietnamese government made a mistake in deploying its troops in this manner which eventually played a role in the defeat of the RVNAF. He commented about this ill-fated strategy: The enemy's position had weakened, and they had made big mistakes in strategy and in evalu-

ating us, which had led to incorrect troop deploy- ment plans and mistaken operating premises, and signaled the great defeat which was coming to them.9 After their disastrous defeat in the ill-timed LANDGRAB 73 operation, the North Vietnamese used the period after signing the Paris Agreements to regroup their forces and also try to repair the damage to their economy caused by the devastating warfare during 1972. The North Vietnamese were especially concerned about the ability of the United States to send troops back into South Vietnam. As a result, the question of American reentry into the war was heatedly discussed during politburo meetings.10 Until the American withdrawal was complete, the North Vietnamese chose to avoid any provocative moves that might provoke the U.S. into reentering the war. The PRG, which had suffered heavy losses in the years prior to the cease-fire, spent the first year after the cease-fire trying to consolidate the territory under its control and undermine the Saigon government through political agitation. The Communist Party Central Committee put forth the following guidance in 1973: "Coordinate the political and military struggle with diplomacy... the problems of gaining people, gaining administrative control, and developing the real strength of the revolution are the urgent and basic demands in the new phase...." The North Vietnamese Army, on the other hand, concen- trated on building up their forces and improving their logistics system in order to prepare for what eventually became their final offensive to conquer South Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese Politburo and Central Military Committee then met in October 1973; it decided that if they were to defeat the South on a large scale, "it would no longer be appropriate to use only independent and coordinated divisions." Instead, they "would need mobile commands and specialized branches combined on a larger scale, to deliver a powerful punch, which could be used at the most opportune moments, could go into action along the principal thrusts, and could take on the primary responsibility for destroying large enemy main-force units."12 Evidence that the North Vietnamese used this period follow- ing the signing of the Paris Agreements to prepare for their final offensive on the South is clear from following excerpt from General Dung's account of the events: From October 1973 onward, these corps were established one by one, brought together for combat training as combined units, and deployed in the best positions for strategic mobility. The development of high-level mobile commands allowed us to carry out campaigns with large- scale combined units, including many corps and divisions, which were strong enough to mount large assaults, had both high mobility and the strength for sustained combat, and could operate successfully in strategic campaigns. Along with the reorganization of our forces, an urgent task was to replace the equipment of our army with better and more modern material. Massive amounts of tanks, armored cars, rockets, long-range artillery, and antiaircraft guns, which the Americans tried unsuccessfully to destroy in their twelve-day B-52 bombing blitz against the North in December 1972, were now sent to the front one after another. And for the first time self-propelled long-range artillery and some of our good tanks got all the way to the rubber forests of the Nam Bo plains. This was a big step toward maturity for our army, and at the same time was a most positive preparation of our forces for the coming offensive.13 For years during the peace negotiations, the North Viet-

namese consistently denied the presence of their troops in the South. Now, after their conquest of South Vietnam was complete, General Dung arrogantly boasts about the massive infiltration of troops and equipment into the South, while all along accusing the United States of intervening in the internal affairs of South Vietnam and not respecting the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. His comments illustrate the fact that the Communists viewed this conflict as a political, ideological war; lies and truth were weapons to be used to their advantage in the struggle. Realizing that the military balance in the South favored the RVNAF, the North Vietnamese decided to attack only when they were clearly superior to South Vietnamese troops. By consistently following this plan of attack, North Vietnam's chief strategist, General Vo Nguyen Giap, felt it would eventually tilt the military balance in Hanoi's favor. To prepare for the final offensive, the North Vietnamese designed and implemented a major engineering program to improve the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By the beginning of 1975, they built an all-weather highway from Quang Tri province on the central coast of Vietnam down into the Mekong Delta and also constructed an oil pipeline approximately 3,000 miles long stretching from Quang Tri to the town of Loc Ninh, 75 miles northwest of Saigon. They also laid tele- communications lines down to Loc Ninh, making it possible for the North Vietnamese leaders to speak from Hanoi directly to their commanders on the battlefields in the South. As General Dung stated, they "had transformed the

battlefield situation to our advantage and mobilized the might of the entire country to support the front lines."14 The Paris Agreements called for the creation of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) to administer cease-fire proce- dures and foster national reconciliation. However, this was only window dressing, since the JMC could never achieve

national reconciliation when the political, economic, and social issues between Hanoi and Saigon were ideological opposites. Initially, the commission's members were the four signers of the agreements: the PRG, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United States. After 60 days, the four-party commission would be superseded by a new body consisting of just the two members from South Vietnam and the PRG. The delegates' theoretical responsibilities were numerous. Primarily, they were to investigate reported violations and issue instructions to prevent recurrence. Their most important responsibility was to "determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing" since its enforcement was the most crucial task for maintaining the cease-fire.15 However, this was primarily a political and not a military matter. General Frederick C. Weyand, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, warned in 1972 that if the negoti- ators in Paris could not agree on which side controlled which territory, military delegates in Saigon could hardly be expected to do so.16 He then predicted that handing this crucial political question to the truce commission would only jeopardize its ability to achieve the more limited aim of stopping the fighting.17 His prediction proved to be correct, for throughout 1973 until the end in 1975, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission continued to meet at Camp Davis in Saigon, while the fighting con- tinued in the South over who would eventually rule South Vietnam--a key problem which the negotiations in Paris failed to solve, but was to eventually be solved by North

Vietnamese on the battlefields in South Vietnam. With the Joint Military Commission unable to decide the question of which side controlled what territory, the future of the government of South Vietnam came to rest more on its success on the battlefield and less at the negotiating table. By the end of 1973, President Nixon was virtually powerless to act on South Vietnam's behalf, and Congress had taken decisive steps to curtail American involvement in the war. In November 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act over President Nixon's veto and the outlook for American military intervention to aid Saigon looked bleak. Also, in late 1973, President Thieu formally proclaimed the start of the "Third Indochina War."18 He then stepped up ground and air attacks on Communist bases and launched a series of land-grabbing operations in PRG held areas along the eastern seaboard, in the Iron Triangle and in the Mekong Delta.19 Unlike earlier successful operations, this time the North Vietnamese and Vietcong counterattacked and repulsed the ARVN units. The result proved disastrous for Thieu. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong retook much of the territory they lost in early 1973 during LANDGRAB 73 and seized additional territory formerly under the control of the government of South Vietnam. With the North Vietnamese extensive upgrading of the Ho Chi Minh Trail,by the fall of l974,the military balance had definitely shifted in their favor.20 During this period, South Vietnam's economic problems were steadily increasing due to the U.S. troop withdrawal, reduction in military aid,

and the sharp rise in worldwide inflation caused by the Arab oil embargo in 1973. In addition, the economic crisis com- pounded Thieu's political problems and provided his opposi- tion in both the United States and Saigon with valuable ammunition to assault his regime and spread a spirit of defeatism among the general population in South Vietnam. By the end of 1974, this fear of abandonment by the U.S. began to spread throughout the South. The U.S. Congress, faced with rising inflation and budgetary problems at home, continued to question and criticize the policy of continu- ing aid to the government of South Vietnam. Critics in America voiced their concern over the corruption and human rights violations within the Thieu regime; they also believed that if military aid was cut, it would encourage Thieu to seek a political settlement to end the war.21 The U.S. Congress had now tired of the war in Southeast Asia; Senator Edward Kennedy spoke for many in the Congress when he insisted that it was time to terminate America's "endless support for an endless war." By the end of 1974, Congress only approved an aid program of $700 million, half of which comprised shipping costs.22 In early 1975, Hanoi concluded that no United States intervention could occur in an expanded war; the opportune time to "launch a general offensive and uprising to liber- ate the South completely" had arrived.23 The test would be the province of Phuoc Long, northwest of Saigon. On January 6, 1975, the North Vietnamese succeeded in cap- turing the provincial capital of Phuoc Long. The ease of their victory indicated that the RVNAF had weakened since

January 1973. As General Dung wrote, Thieu was now forced to fight a "poor man's war" and the military balance of power rested with the North Vietnamese.24 Also, the fail- ure of the U.S. to respond in any meaningful way to the fall of Phuoc Long province confirmed the belief among the North Vietnamese leadership that the United States would not "jump back in"; they perceived Washington as in no position to rescue the government of South Vietnam.25 The final collapse began on March 10, 1975 when General Dung's forces attacked Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands. After taking the city in two days, Dung moved north to attack Pleiku and Kontum. Realizing that his forces were spread too thin to be effective against the massive assault by the North Vietnamese, President Thieu ordered his forces IMAGES THAT APPEAR WITH DOCUMENT in the north to withdraw and consolidate a defense in the South around Saigon.26 In addition to military necessity, some senior ARVN officers suggested another reason behind Thieu's decision to redeploy the Airborne Division in I Corps:to guard agianst a possible coup.27 In any event, no plans had been prepared to execute a strategic retreat of this magnitude and the North Vietnamese succeeded in cutting the major roads leading south. The withdrawal turned into a rout when hundreds of thousands of civilian refugees tried to flee with the departing soldiers and clogged the avenues of escape. As a result, much of the South Vietnamese army was captured and destroyed, and thousands of civilians died from enemy gunfire and starva-

tion.28 Subsequently, Pleiku and Kontum fell within a week. North Vietnamese forces continued their advance toward the coastal city of Hue. Thieu reversed his earlier deci- sion to withdraw and ordered that Hue be held to the last man.29 However, the population of Hue began to panic, many remembering the Communist massacres during Tet in 1968. By late March more than a million refugees were making their way towards Da Nang.30 On March 25, 1975, Hue fell and NVA forces marched on to Da Nang. The defending ARVN forces and civilian refugees, many of whom were families of the ARVN soldiers, tried to flee by both air and sea to escape the North Vietnamese Army. Rumors of a "deal" to

partition South Vietnam in half spread through the troops in I Corps and the civilian population. Now a retreat ensued on an even larger and more tragic scale than the one from the Central Highlands.31 On March 30, 1975, Da Nang fell and with its fall, both Military Regions 1 and 2 came under the permanent control of the NVA--splitting South Vietnam in two. The North Vietnamese Politburo then ordered General Dung to begin the general offensive on Saigon at the very latest by the final week of April 1975, before the end of the "dry season." In a tribute to their deceased leader, the Politburo renamed the Saigon campaign calling it the "Ho Chi Minh Campaign."32 The momentum was now with the North Vietnamese and they were determined to take Saigon before the dry season ended. However, the 18th ARVN Division put up the most valiant defense of the campaign around the town of Xuan Loc, north- east of Saigon. Outnumbered against a force of more than three NVA divisions, the 18th ARVN Division resisted fiercely from April 9 until finally being overwhelmed and forced to withdraw on April 20, l975.33 The delay allowed the United States to successfully evacuate more than 130,000 American and South Vietnamese citizens from Saigon.34 The battle at Xuan Loc was the final decisive battle of the Vietnam War. When it ended, there were 16 NVA divisions in

Military Region 3 ready to begin their final assault on Saigon.35 On April 21, 1975, the day after Xuan Loc fell, the U.S. Congress rejected President Ford's request for aid to South Vietnam for the last time and President Thieu resigned and fled to Taiwan; he blamed the entire collapse on the United States.36 He was replaced by Vice President Tran Van Huong, who attempted to negotiate a settlement based on the 1973 agreements. However, North Vietnam's leaders insisted that they would not negotiate with Huong and said they would be willing to talk only with General Duong Van "Big" Minh. Huong finally stepped down in favor of "Big Minh" on April 27, 1975, but the politburo had already unanimously decided against a negotiated settlement, regard- less of any political changes in Saigon.37 There was nothing left to negotiate; the government of South Vietnam no longer had control of anything in the South. On April 29, 1975, helicopter evacuations began and the U.S. Ambassador, Graham Martin, departed Saigon. On April 30,1975, the last U.S. Marine helicopter departed from the roof of the United States Embassy in Saigon and NVA forces entered the grounds of the Presidential Palace.38 South Vietnam's last president, "Big Minh" surrendered unconditionally to the North Vietnamese and the Vietnam War finally ended. However, the conflict in Southeast Asia

did not stop; the fighting still continues today in Cambodia, ten years later.

VIOLATIONS As far as treaty violations are concerned, all the signatory parties to the Paris Agreements must share the blame in committing violations--some more than others, however. To be sure, the organizations established by the Paris Agreements to investigate and deter violations lacked both the authority and manpower to carry out their obliga- tions. However, the parties themselves were the only ones capable of keeping the peace. Before reviewing some of the more serious violations committed during the period following the signing of the agreements, an examination of the organizations created to insure the implementation of the cease-fire is necessary. The responsibility for enforcing the Paris Agreements was given to the Joint Military Commission (JMC). Initially comprised of four parties (North Vietnam, South Vietnam, the PRG, and the United States) and called the Four-Party JMC, the commission was to become known as the Two-Party JMC (South Vietnam and the PRG) 60 days after the signing of the cease-fire agreements, when the U.S. had withdrawn all its combat troops from South Vietnam and Hanoi had returned all American POWs. The JMC had the responsibility under the agreements to deter and detect violations, to deal with the violations, and to settle conflicts and matters of contention between the parties relating to the cease-fire. It was then supposed to send joint teams to investigate alleged viola- tions of the agreements and assist the parties in finding

measures to prevent recurrence of similar cases. However, the JMC could only implement its responsibilities with a unanimous decision by all members of the JMC; therefore, it could operate only to the extent that each of the parties desired.39 The responsibility for controlling and supervising the implementation of the Paris Agreements was given to the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS). A successor to the International Control Commission that had existed since 1954, the ICCS was composed of representa- tives of four countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland. When it became apparent that the two Vietnamese sides would not adhere to the agreements, Canada on July 31, 1973, withdrew out of sheer frustration, and was replaced by Iran several months later. Throughout its short lifetime, the ICCS was composed of two Communist and two non-Commu- nist members.40 The ICCS had four missions: to observe the truce, investigate and report on violations, monitor the prisoner exchanges and supply shipments, and, later, to help super- vise the national elections.41 However, like the Joint Military Commission, it had a major weakness: the require- ment to operate on the principle of unanimity. Soon after the signing of the Paris Agreements, it became readily apparent that the Polish and Hungarian delegations were there not to foster conciliation, but rather to protect the interests of the Vietnamese Communists in every way possible. The two Communist delegations normally refused

to even authorize investigations of reported Vietcong or North Vietnamese violations. Since a unanimous decision by all four members was required to take any action, the non-Communist members were only able to make their own unilateral observations without any official standing under the agreements. However, even if the ICCS wasn't deadlocked at the poli- tical level, it still could not have controlled the situa- tion for it lacked any real power to do so (i.e., military troops). A truly neutral, international peacekeeping force, which had the power to enforce its will, was needed to deter violations. The warring parties alone had the responsibility and the power to enforce the agreements. Since they never really tried to make the cease-fire work, the ICCS really never had a chance to succeed.42 Of all the violations committed during the period following the signing of the Paris Agreements, the land- grabbing incidents had the most serious consequences. For the North Vietnamese and PRG, they made good sense; but for the government of South Vietnam, they were suicidal.43 The land-grabbing forced the RVNAF to disperse its forces to maintain control, which ultimately weakened its position tactically vis-a-vis the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces. In addition, since the Polish and Hungarian dele- gates to the ICCS were far from impartial, they consis- tently used the unanimity rule to block investigations of violations committed by the Communist forces. For the South, not only did it not enjoy the same preferential treatment from the ICCS as the Communists received, the

government of South Vietnam was also fully open to public scrutiny of its every action through the hostile voices of television and newspaper reporters ready to report the slightest infraction. These biased reporters and critics were quick to find fault with the South Vietnamese govern- ment, and agreed with North Vietnamese propaganda that it was the South Vietnamese forces who were the aggressors and were blatantly violating the cease-fire. Arnold Isaacs refutes these false accusations in his book, Without Honor: Yet, though they may have been technically violating the cease-fire, by any but the most narrowly legalistic standard the South Viet- namese were justified, and the Communists had to bear a heavy responsibility for much of the continued fighting. In sending squads of men to raise their flag just before the cease-fire in hundreds of places to which they had no historic claim, they may have acted within the letter of the peace agreement. But they grossly violated its spirit.44 The most serious violations of the agreements, however, had to do with North Vietnam's disrespect for the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia, and its infiltration of troops and supplies into South Vietnam after the cease-fire. The U.S. State Department delivered an official protest on January 11 1975 to the ICCS, mostly in response to the North Vietnamese over-running of the provincial capital of Song Be in Phuoc Long province; however, this protest listed numerous viola- tions committed by the Communists since the cease-fire on January 27, 1973. Among the violations, it accused the North Vietnamese of illegally infiltrating over 160,000 troops into the South, tripling the strength of their armor, increasing their artillery and antiaircraft weaponry and

improving their military logistics system (i.e., the Ho Chi Minh Trail) running through Laos, Cambodia, the DMZ and South Vietnam itself.45 The comments made by General Dung about the North's preparations for the final offensive on South Vietnam confirm the veracity of the State Department's accusations of Communist treaty violations: A key problem was to develop a system of roads for good mobility. The project to build a strategic road east of the Truong Son moun- tain range began in 1973 and was completed by the first part of 1975.... Day and night they enthusiastically carried hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies of every description down to the stockpiles for the various battlefields, to ensure the success of our large-scale attacks.46 Without a doubt, this post-cease-fire violation by North Vietnam was the most blatant one committed during the two year period following the signing of the Paris Agreements in 1973. Weakened by losses from the 1972 "Easter" offensive and LANDGRAB 73 operations, Hanoi needed a complete build-up in order to restore a military threat to South Vietnam. The terms of the Paris Agree- ments restricted resupply to both Communist and South Vietnamese forces in the South to a one-for-one replace- ment schedule. However, by pouring in troops and equip- ment into South Vietnam well in excess of the one-for-one replacement schedule allowed by the agreements, North Vietnam drastically shifted the military balance of power in its favor. Finally, because the U.S. Congress allowed this infiltration to go on unchecked by prohibiting U.S. bombing missions in Indochina, the North Vietnamese were able to recover sooner than they would have in previous

years when the U.S. was activeiy involved in the war. From the Communists viewpoints, there were several actions taken by both the United States and South Vietnam, aside from Thieu's later land-grabbing operations, that they considered violations of the agreements. The eleventh hour shipments of arms and equipment as a part of the Enhance and Enhance Plus programs in late 1972 were considered by the North Vietnamese as technically vio- lating the terms of the cease-fire agreements. Projects Enhance and Enhance Plus were undertaken in 1972 to accelerate the delivery of military equipment and improve the combat capabilities of the South Vietnam's armed forces before the cease-fire. Enhance was designed to provide guns, tanks and artillery to the Vietnamese Army (ARVN), while Enhance Plus was a program to augment and modernize the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) by providing additional aircraft such as helicopters, F-5 fighters, C-130 transports and AC-119 gunships. In the minds of the North Vietnamese, these programs justified their build-up of men and supplies after the truce, since their build-up restored what they considered to be the intended battle- field equilibrium when the agreements were signed.47 During the same time period, Hanoi received military aid from the Soviet Union and China. However, the Commu- nists' criticism of U.S. shipments to South Vietnam was perfectly consistent with their ideological beliefs and methods of conducting a political war. In addition, while replacement of equipment for South Vietnam was restricted on a one-for-one basis by the terms of the agreements,

there was no such similar restriction for supplies brought into North Vietnam. As far as the infiltration of troops and supplies into the South through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Hanoi simply chose to ignore the terms of the agreements. The North Vietnamese also charged that they had been misled by the United States into thinking that all U.S. military installations in South Vietnam would be dismantled within 60 days of the signing of the Paris Agreements.48 Instead, the United States transferred title of its materiel and bases to South Vietnamese control before it signed the Paris Agreements.49 Hanoi considered this action to be a violation of the terms of the agreements and used it for public propaganda to justify its continuation of the fighting in the South. General Dung's comments attest to this charge: Our people could not sit quietly by and watch the United States and their puppets cyni- cally violate the Paris Agreement.... If the enemy do not implement the agreement, and con- tinue the policy of Vietnamization, which is essentially a neocolonial war aiming to take over the whole of the South, then there is no other course for us but to conduct revolutionary warfare destroy the enemy, and liberate the South.50 The final major violation the PRG and North Vietnam accused the government of South Vietnam of committing dealt with the provisions in the Paris Agreements calling for establishing a National Council of National Reconcilia- tion and Concord and the holding of general elections. Shortly after the agreements were signed, Thieu sought to hold elections before the PRG could consolidate its terri- torial control. However, fearing that it would lose the

elections, the PRG refused to participate until Article 11 of the agreements dealing with democratic liberties of the people was fully implemented by the government of South Vietnam.51 The article basically called for: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and the right to free enterprise. President Thieu rightly refused to form a National Council of National Reconcilia- tion and Concord to implement Article 11 until all North Vietnamese troops inside South Vietnam were withdrawn. However, he was continually badgered on this point by several narrow-minded antiwar representatives of Congres- sional delegations visiting South Vietnam during this period.52 Even in the United States during World War II, when its national survival was at stake, the U.S. severely restricted several of the freedoms called for in Article 11; in addi- tion, the U.S. did not have to contend with over 160,000 enemy troops stationed inside its borders. Consequently, with the PRG's refusal to participate in any elections until Article 11 was fully implemented and Thieu's demand that all NVA troops withdraw first, the negotiations between PRG and the government of South Viet- nam broke down on April 16, 1974.53 By this time the military balance had shifted to Communists and they had obtained all they needed from the negotiations--time to rebuild! In October 1974, the Communists returned to their

familiar stance by refusing to negotiate further on any issue with Saigon until the Thieu government resigned.54 In essence, the Paris Agreements were clearly unenforce- able by the mechanisms created to deter serious violations. Both the ICCS and JMC lacked the real power to insure all parties complied with the terms of the agreements. This arrangement proved much more disadvantageous to South Vietnam than for North Vietnam and the PRG. While the ICCS proved grossly ineffective in insuring either side violated the Paris Agreements, Senator J. William Fulbright and the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate saw to it that the terms of the agreements were strictly enforced upon the government of South Vietnam.55 CHAPTER 3 VIETNAMIZATION AMERICAN ASSESSMENT Vietnamization had one primary purpose: to allow the United States to withdraw its combat troops from South Vietnam and transfer the responsibility for conducting the war to the South Vietnamese. The Nixon Administration felt that with continued U.S. aid, the South Vietnamese could be equipped and trained to defend themselves. In addition to teaching the South Vietnamese how to conduct the war in the field, a study by the BDM Corpora- tion, on strategic lessons learned in Vietnam, points out that Vietnamization also included U.S. assistance in developing and expanding South Vietnam's military schools

and institutions of advanced military learning. Astonish- ingly, the curriculum for junior officers at the Military Academy at Dalat was expanded to four years. The study comments on the adverse impact this action had on the military leadership of the South Vietnamese armed forces. An excerpt from that study follows: In the first case, the prime needs of the RVNAF, then engaged in the struggle for the national survival, required quickly trained commanders and leaders at all echelons to replace war losses and at the same time pro- vide for its rapid expansion. Four years of commitment to this type of institution, though of important military and academic value and highly beneficial for military career attainments, was a luxury that could be ill-afforded given the impelling course of the war for the RVNAF.1 Despite this gross mismanagement of South Vietnam's most capable young military leaders, the U.S. leadership was unaware of the serious consequences of their efforts to design and train the South Vietnamese armed forces in its own image. As the BDM study concludes, the excessively long military career training forced the South Vietnamese armed forces to fight without its most capable leaders just at the time when it needed them most on the battle- field. Throughout the entire Vietnamization period, the United States felt the program was working well. In fact, U.S. military and political leaders alike used the RVNAF defeat of the North Vietnamese army during the 1972 "Easter" offensive as positive proof that the Vietnamiza- tion program was a tremendous success. In the early stages of the North Vietnamese "Easter" offensive launched at the end of March 1972, President

Nixon viewed the invasion as a sign of weakness on the part of the North Vietnamese; he clearly believed that Vietnami- zation was working. The President stated that if Vietnami- zation wasn't working, the North Vietnamese would have waited and let the process fail on its own.2 Despite his outward optimism, President Nixon still expressed personal doubts about South Vietnamese durability and their willing- ness to fight. The following entry in Nixon's diary reflects his doubts: Of course, the weak link in our whole chain is the question as to whether the South Vietnam- ese have the will to fight.... The real problem is that the enemy is willing to sacrifice in order to win, while the South Vietnamese simply aren't willing to pay that much of a price in order to avoid losing. And, as Haig points out, all the air power in the world and strikes on Hanoi-Haiphong aren't going to save South Viet- nam if the South Vietnamese aren't able to hold on the ground.3 With the massive support of U.S. airpower, especially B-52 and F-111 bombing missions, the South Vietnamese armed forces did hold the ground and soundly defeated the massive North Vietnamese army conventional attack in 1972. The following comments by U.S. Army General William Westmoreland concerning the results of the 1972 operations support the conclusion that as far as the United States was concerned, the Vietnamization program was a success: Here, apparently, was the ultimate test of the long years of American effort to create via- ble South Vietnamese armed forces and of the decision taken by my predecessors many years before to organize regular units rather than light antiguerrilla forces. Even as the test developed, the last American battalions began to move, not to help in the fight but to com- plete American withdrawal...as the results of the test eventually demonstrated, the ARVN, for all of the many errors in plans and execution, no

longer required the assistance of American ground troops, although their success owed much to American tactical air support.4 Although the RVNAF showed they no longer required the assistance of American ground troops in 1972, they were still heavily dependent on U.S. airpower and U.S. resupply and maintenance support--both of which were severely cut by Congress after the U.S. troop withdrawal in 1973, and almost non-existant in early 1975. The United States taught the South Vietnamese armed forces well on how to fight and win a conventional war against the North Viet- namese; however, the U.S. taught them the American way, with massive firepower and plenty of mobility (i.e., artillery, air and helicopters) that could only be supported by continued U.S. aid--something a war-weary U.S. public and Congress were unwilling to fund. President Nixon noted this in his memoirs: For more than two years after the peace agree- ment the South Vietnamese had held their own against the Communists. This proved the will and mettle of the South Vietnamese people and their desire to live in freedom. It also proved that Vietnamization had succeeded. When Congress reneged on our obligations under the agreements, the Communists predictably rushed in to fill the gap. The Congressional bombing cutoff, coupled with the limitation placed on the President by the War Powers Resolution in November 1973, set off a string of events that led to the Communist takeover in Cambodia and, on April 30, 1975, the North Vietnamese conquest of South Vietnam. Congress denied first to me, and then to President Ford, the means to enforce the Paris Agreement at a time when the North Vietnamese were openly violating it. Even more devastating and inexcusable, in 1974 Congress began cutting back on military aid for South Vietnam at a time when the Soviets were increasing their aid to North Vietnam. As a result, when the North Vietnamese launched their all-out invasion of the South in the spring of 1975, they had the

advantage in arms, and the threat of American action to enforce the agreement was totally removed. A year after the collapse of South Vietnam, the field commander in charge of Hanoi's final offensive cited the cutback in American aid as a major factor in North Viet- nam's victory. He remarked that Thieu "was forced to fight a poor man's war," with his firepower reduced by 60 percent and his mobility reduced by half because of lack of aircraft, vehicles, and fuel. The war and the peace in Indochina that America had won at such cost over twelve years of sacrifice and fighting were lost within a matter of months once Congress refused to fulfill our obligations. And it is Congress that must bear the responsibility for the tragic results.5 Indeed, if Vietnamization had any chance at all in being successful in 1975, it was thwarted by Congress', withholding of two vital prerequisites: U.S. air support and military aid. However, there were serious problems within the South Vietnam government which acted to erode American public and Congressional support. These internal problems ultimately brought about the collapse of the South Vietnamese armed forces. The best the United States could do was to continue to provide aid and buy time to hopefully allow the South Vietnamese to solve their own internal problems. Unfortunately, U.S. patience had grown thin by 1975. SOUTH VIETNAMESE ASSESSMENT If American leaders felt that Vietnamization was a success, there were many South Vietnamese leaders who did not share that optimistic view; some in fact were highly critical of the program. Some even called it a "U.S. Dollar and Vietnam Blood Sharing Plan," enabling

the United States to stage a "peace with honor" solution in South Vietnam.6 One South Vietnamese leader who was critical of Vietnamization was General Tran Van Don, former Chairman of the Senate and House Defense Committee, and finally, Minister of Defense. Here is what he had to say about the Vietnamization program: I was an opponent of Vietnamization.... I will tell just one story. I visited (some units in the field) and tried to understand the program of Vietnamization of the war...it was in the head- quarters of 5th Division. I discussed the question with the commander of the division, General Minh Van Hieu, a most honest general, and capable, too. I was surprised by his answer; it opened my eyes. I asked him, "What do you think of Vietnamization?" He said to me, "It's impossible to be implemented." "Why?" He said, "The 5th Division covers an area where there were two other divisions, Americans, and now with the departure of the two American divisions I have only my division to cover the whole area. I have three regiments for this area and must use one regiment to replace one division. How can I face the enemy like this? I have become weaker." He looked very disappointed. I was surprised; he was a quiet man, a polite man, and he tried to do his best. But he said to me that this was impossible. "How can I cover a bigger area with less units?" So the Vietnamization of the war means that we are becoming weaker.7 Generals Don and Hieu were not alone in expressing con- cern that Vietnamization fostered weakness within the South Vietnamese armed forces. General Cao Van Vien, the last Chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff, also felt that the RVNAF were not prepared to take over, for the program would require ARVN to stretch its forces to fill the void created when the American forces withdrew: So, when the United States shifted its policy to negotiation and began withdrawing forces from Vietnam under the expedient program of "Vietnami- zation," the Republic of Vietnam armed forces were not entirely prepared to take over, psychologically or physically. How could they--without a substan- tial increase in the number of major combat units--

effectively replace seven divisions, four brigades, and innumerable support units of the U.S. forces committed in Vietnam in addition to other non- Communist forces? No amount of training, equip- ment, or political exhortation could effectively fill the physical void or ease the feeling of insecurity that set in. Our forces began to stretch and soon suffered the consequence.8 Using the results of the 1972 "Easter" offensive by the North Vietnamese as an example to illustrate the results of Vietnamization, General Vien came to the opposite conclusion from that given by General Westmoreland and President Nixon. Instead of proving the success of Vietnamization, he empha- sized that the 1972 operations brought to light the criti- cal and, ultimately fatal, weakness of Vietnamization: The enemy's offensive of 1972 dramatically brought to the surface the basic weakness of the Vietnamization process. Without U.S. support in airpower and mobility, the Republic of Vietnam armed forces could hardly have held An Loc, defended Kontum, or reoccupied Quang Tri.9 Perhaps the biggest complaint about the Vietnamization program is that it came along too late; however, when it did, it required too much, too soon of the South Vietnamese armed forces.10 For too long, the South Vietnamese officers and soldiers were relegated to a second class role while the Americans assumed full responsibility for fighting the war. The South Vietnamese armed forces became overly dependent on U.S. money and equipment to sustain itself, and needed U.S. airpower as a protective shield. Consequently, the South Vietnamese learned to do things the easy way, taking it for granted that the needed supplies would always flow, and if they did get into any serious trouble, the United States would always be there to rescue them. However, unlike in the 1972 North Vietnamese "Easter" offensive, the U.S.

chose not to intervene on South Vietnam's behalf in 1975. CHAPTER 4 COLLAPSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES RVNAF LEADERSHIP In analyzing leadership within the Republic of Viet- nam's armed forces prior to the final collapse in 1975, three characteristics of the top military leaders come into sharp focus: incompetence, passivity and corruption. This is not to say that these characteristics were exhi- bited by all of South Vietnam's military leaders nor that the required leadership to guide the RVNAF to success in 1975 was not available. Indeed, the brillaint resistance by the 18th ARVN Division at Xuan Loc, led by General Le Minh Dao, gives some evidence that good leaders did exist in South Vietnam in 1975; however, the system simply did not allow enough of them to surface in time and take charge in enough critical situations to have any signifi- cant impact on the final outcome of the war.1 In other words, South Vietnam ran out of time in 1975. In any nation, the political role of its armed forces is critical, especially if the nation looks to its mili- tary leaders for political leadership as well. Under these conditions where the military forms the political base of government, the military can be susceptible to politicization. Such a system ensures its military leaders are chosen, promoted, and favored for political loyalty rather than

professional military skill.2 Unfortunately for South Vietnam, this was the situation of the RVNAF top leader- ship in 1975. In fact, after the November coup of 1963 when the military overthrew the Diem regime, military leadership in South Vietnam became intricately entwined with the politi- cal structure. The political instability which followed the 1963 coup adversely affected the performance of the South Vietnamese armed forces; this precipitated increased involvement by the United States in conducting military operations in South Vietnam by 1965. Although the Thieu government succeeded in bringing some semblance of sta- bility to the government of South Vietnam, the corruption and politicized promotion system remained. General Cao Van Vien was highly critical of military leadership within the Republic of Vietnam's armed forces, and he had this to say about it: Of the flaws and vulnerabilities that military leadership in the RVNAF might have demonstrated, the most detrimental were perhaps political- mindedness and corruption. The November coup of 1963 had changed military leadership so completely that the RVNAF were never the same again. Its effect could still be felt even after elective democracy had been institutionalized. Politics had been so ingrained among senior commanders that it was impossible for them to relinquish it and return to military professionalism. The Thieu regime, in fact, feared not so much the enemy from the outside as those who had once been partners and comrade-in-arms. And that explained why, one by one, the politically ambitious ones had to go, but potential rivalry still persisted.3 The tragic results that can occur when a promotion system is based on loyalty instead of competence is clearly illustrated by the inept performance of II Corps' commander,

General Pham Van Phu, during the Central Highlands with- drawal operations in March 1975. General Phu's failed leadership produced a strategic disaster, causing approxi- mately 75 percent destruction of II Corps' combat strength and the permanent loss of the Central Highlands.4 During the withdrawal, General Phu left his men behind to fight the North Vietnamese while he fled to safety in Saigon by helicopter. General Don commented that Phu could have been a "famous colonel" but that Thieu "made him a general, and at Premier Khiem's personal recommendation gave him one of Vietnam's most difficult military jobs."5 General Don was specifically referring to Phu's appointment as the commander of II Corps. Unfortunately, only in a system which rewards loyalty instead of competence, could a general like Phu have achieved such high rank and command responsi- bility. While the politicized promotion system tended to push incompetent officers to higher levels of leadership within the RVNAF, the extensive American involvement in conducting the war produced passivity within South Vietnam's military leadership. Because they were completely dependent upon the United States for technology, firepower, and mobility, the South Vietnamese military leaders tended to rely on their American advisors to make decisions. In addition, most Americans preferred to work with Vietnamese who were willing to be cooperative. Buu Vien, former South Viet- namese Assistant Minister of Defense, stated that pleasing Americans became the principle goal of South Vietnam's officers. He describes the effect American involvement in

South Vietnam had upon its leadership in the following passage: The presence of American advisors at all levels of the military hierarchy created among the Vietnamese leadership a mentality of reli- ance on their advice and suggestions. Even though some officers didn't like the intrusive presence of their American counterparts, most of them felt more confident when they had their advisors at their sides. The ideas might be theirs, but they felt more assured when those ideas were concurred in by American advisors than when they were suggested by their superiors. Officers talking about their performance never failed to mention how much they were being appreciated by their American counterparts as though appreciation by American advisors was evidence of their success, their command ability, their honesty.6 The most common mistake the United States made in training South Vietnam's military leaders was to give them minor roles to play during joint U.S./Vietnamese operations; this discouraged independent initiative within the South Vietnamese armed forces. Colonel Vu Van Uoc, the Chief Operations Officer of the South Vietnamese Air Force, made the following comments concerning the manner in which the United States conducted joint operations and fostered South Vietnamese dependence: ... during the years 1964-1972 when U.S. troops were actively fighting in South Vietnam, most campaigns and big military operations were placed under American supervision. Even in joint U.S./Vietnamese operations, ARVN was only given a minor role and air force tactics were placed under the supervision of American advisors. In that situation, ARVN felt a too-heavy depend- ence upon U.S. forces and one can hardly say these operations were under Vietnamese jurisdic- tion. The same policy was applied to high-ranking and also to combat officers, so that ARVN com- pletely lost the notion of being an independent army.7 However, it is a natural tendency for any army which

supplies the major portion of the war fighting equipment to exercise greater control over operations. In addition, the political climate in the United States would simply not allow for South Vietnamese officers to command American troops during combat operations, especially if the possi- bility of incurring high U.S. casualties existed. The most damaging element found within the high-ranking military leadership of South Vietnam was corruption. The adverse impact corruption had in eroding the support of the U.S. public and Congress, and eventually the South Vietnamese people, spelled disaster for the Thieu regime and was largely responsible for the ultimate collapse of South Vietnam and its armed forces. Corruption assumed many forms from bribery to black marketeering. However, its most serious form involved the buying and selling of military appointments and the collec- tion of army pay from "ghost soldiers" and "roll-call" soldiers. In all cases, corruption succeeded in destroying morale and crippling the effective combat power of the South Vietnamese armed forces. The buying and selling of military appointments enabled inept officers to obtain positions, and in some cases criti- cal military commands, for which they were not qualified. In the case of "ghost soldiers," superior officers would pocket the salaries of soldiers who had been killed or had deserted by simply not taking them off the payroll. In order to evade the draft, the system of "roll-call soldiers" was devised whereby soldiers would appear only for roll-call

and would give their salary to their superiors in return for being allowed to be absent from duty. This had a more serious implication other than the loss of large amounts of money: many units were severely under-manned and this was not discovered until they had to go and fight in combat. More important than under-manned units and incompetent commanders, corruption created an ever widening gap between the leaders and the ARVN soldiers. This demoralizing situation eventually affected the soldier's desire to fight for their leaders and the country. A former South Viet- namese commander made the following comments concerning the effect of corruption upon the soldiers and the people: Corruption always engenders social injustice. In Vietnam, a country at war, social injustice was more striking than in any other country. Corruption had created a small elite which held all the power and wealth, and a majority of middle- class people and peasants who became poorer and poorer and who suffered all the sacrifices. It was these people who paid the taxes to the govern- ment, the bribes to the police, who had to buy fertilizer at exhorbitant prices and to sell their rice at a price fixed by the government, and it was also these people who sent their sons to fight and die for the country while high government officials and wealthy peopled sent theirs abroad. An army doctor once told me that he was disheartened to see that all the wounded, all the amputees who crowded his hospital came from the lower class, from the peasants' families, and that they had suffered and sacrificed for a small class of corrupt elite. The government professed to win the heart and the mind of the people, but all it had done was to create a widening gap between the leadership and the mass; and this increasing conflict, this internal contradiction, if we were to use Communist parlance, could not last; it had somehow to be resolved. Unfortunately it was resolved in the Communist way.8 In summary, the leadership within the South Vietnamese armed forces encompassed all the worst possible features. It lacked the competence to do the job when the crisis

arose; the aggressiveness to take and gain the initiative from the enemy; and ultimately, the moral credibility to maintain the loyal support of its soldiers and the South Vietnamese people. RVNAF MORALE In the end, the survival of South Vietnam depended upon the individual ARVN soldier's willingness to fight, resist and eventually defeat the enemy. This willingness to fight was extremely dependent upon troop morale. Yet, like every- thing else in South Vietnam, under the impact of the North Vietnamese offensive in 1975, the soldiers' morale also rapidly collapsed. While the events of 1975 would seem at first glance to indicate that morale collapsed suddenly after the Central Highlands debacle, a closer analysis indicates that the collapse of morale began much sooner and was undermined by serious economic and political condi- tions within South Vietnam. In 1973 an economic depression occurred in South Vietnam which had a devastating effect on military morale. There were two main factors which contributed to the crisis in South Vietnam. One was the rice shortage of 1972, caused by poor harvests throughout Asia, which sharply increased the price of rice for everyone, including the ARVN soldiers The second was the U.S. troop withdrawal and closing of American bases which wiped out about 300,000 jobs.9 The depression was also related in part to the worldwide economic crisis that followed the Arab oil embargo of late 1973 and the subsequent quadrupling of oil prices.

The economic crisis had a devastating effect upon the salaries of the ARVN soldiers which failed to keep pace withinflation throughout South Vietnam brought on by the oil embargo. A soldier's monthly salary actually supported him for only about a week. The U.S. Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Saigon reported that this salary situation affected "tactical performance, as well as morale," because so many men worked at other jobs and were unavailable for military duties. Surveys conducted by the DAO reported that 92 percent of enlisted men and junior officers thought their pay and allowances were inadequate, 80 percent felt standard rations were insufficient, half had insufficient clothing, and 40 percent had inadequate housing. In addi- tion, a DAO report in 1974 indicated that "it is quite clear that RVNAF personnel are forced to live at less than reasonable subsistence levels, and that performance and mission accomplishment are seriously affected." The report cautioned that "deterioration" had to be halted "if RVNAF is to be considered a viable military force."10 An indication that the deteriorating economic condition were affecting the morale of the South Vietnamese armed forces can be seen from the following comment by a high- ranking South Vietnamese officer: Yeah, you are a soldier, you are a squad leader with your squad, and you get the order to defend a hill to the death. You cannot defend to the death, when every week you hear from your family that they don't have enough food to eat. And you look back to Saigon, the rich had food, liquor, they have money, they relax, have a good time. Why fight to the death? For whom?11 The political conditions within South Vietnam also had

a direct bearing on the morale of the South Vietnamese armed forces. In particular, the corruption and discrimina- tion surrounding South Vietnam's mobilization system was counterproductive toward maintaining morale within the military. Instead of establishing a limited tour of duty in the military, the mobilization law required a draftee to stay in the army until he was either killed or became physically unable to fight. As a result, corruption, draft dodging and desertion reached epidemic proportions in South Vietnam, ultimately taking its toll upon the morale of the ARVN soldiers who felt they shared a dispro- portionate share of the burden in fighting the war. The former Assistant Minister of Defense, Buu Vien, said of the mobilization law that "in reality, it was a discrimina- tory law whose enforcement...due to several clauses on draft deferments, created two categories of citizens: those who were forced into the army and those fortunate enough to stay out."12 The departure of American forces in 1973, along with the subsequent cutback in U.S. aid and cutoff of U.S. air support, also had a debilitating effect upon the morale of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Because of the cutback of U.S. military aid, the RVNAF were forced to restrict their expendi- tures of ammunition for artillery and helicopter sorties for troop mobility and medical evacuation missions.13 This action resulted in increased combat losses creating a general feeling among the ranks that many soldiers were dying needlessly.

Many conditions occurred after 1973 that acted to under- mine the morale of the South Vietnamese armed forces. How- ever, when the end came in April 1975, there were three major factors which had a direct impact upon the final collapse of the RVNAF. The first was the "psychological collapse" where each soldier believed that "the war had lasted too long, had been too costly, and had offered too few prospects of favorable termination." Finally, the ARVN soldiers convinced themselves that "the enemy would never give up."14 The second factor was the breakdown of leadership and discipline when high-ranking commanders refused to fight and abandoned their units to seek personal safety.15 Such was the case with General Phu, II Corps commander, who after prohibiting his men from moving without orders and vowing to defend his region to the end, left his head- quarters without informing his subordinates and fled by helicopter to safety in Saigon.16 A third and most crucial factor also existed: the belief spread by rumors that deals had been made with the Communists by the Thieu regime to abandon certain areas South Vietnam defended and that the North Vietnamese would take control of areas where the ARVN soldiers' families lived.17 Unlike American forces, which fought abroad while their families lived safely at home, South Vietnamese soldiers fought in areas inhabited by their families. When the situation progressed to the point that the lives of their families were endangered, the ARVN soldiers deserted to save their families. Many were well

aware of the atrocities committed by the Communists after they captured Hue during the Tet offensive in 1968.18 In retrospect, these serious morale problems, along with the severe cutback in U.S. aid and cutoff in U.S. air support, combined to put enormous pressure on the RVNAF. The pres- sure was so great that South Vietnam's army totally disin- tegrated. An analysis of the final report written by the Defense Attache in Saigon accurately described what happened to the Republic of Vietnam's armed forces: "It was individual decisions of tens of thousands of ARVN troops to put the safety of their families ahead of their military duties that disintegrated the vast South Vietnamese military structure."l9 CONCLUSION April 30, 1985 will mark the tenth anniversary of the fall of South Vietnam. Still, after ten years, the haunting memory of millions of panic-stricken South Viet- namese fleeing by sea and air to escape the on-rushing North Vietnamese Army remains deeply etched in the minds of those who were there to witness those tragic events in 1975. Even more disheartening, the refusal of the United States to take decisive action to fulfill its obligations to a former ally may have serious implications for our future relationships with other democratic third world nations, and their perception of the U.S. as a reliable ally. Although numerous lessons can be drawn from Vietnam experiences, three will have significant impact upon future U.S. actions in foreign affairs.

The first lesson is the need to distinguish between problems which lend themselves to political solutions and those which require military ones. Indeed, the Paris Agreements failed miserably because they did not solve this very problem. The Joint Military Commission was one created to solve a political problem--that of determining which side controlled which territory. Because this issue of controlling territory was not decided through political means, the cease-fire could not last. Conversely, the U.S. and South Vietnam's reluctance to put effective military pressure on North Vietnam by conducting the ground war above the 17th parallel and denying Hanoi a secure rear area was a major mistake not to apply a military solution where one was needed. Instead, the U.S. only employed air warfare to a point where the North Vietnamese would agree to negotiate if the bombings were halted, allowing them time to regroup and prepare for their next offensive. By allowing the enemy to maintain the initiative, RVNAF morale suffered drastically because the soldiers eventually felt the situation was hopeless and appeared to them that the enemy would never give up. The policy to negotiate politically what had not been won on the battlefield proved disastrous throughout the Vietnam War, and is a key point our future leaders should keep in mind during nego- tiations in future armed conflicts. A second lesson to be learned from Vietnam is that the U.S. must have domestic support for its foreign policy to succeed. More importantly, our leaders must be articulate

enough to express that policy clearly, and convince the American people that our nation pursue that policy in order to protect our national interests. Again, U.S. policy- makers failed to analyze the U.S. public's willingness to support the Vietnam War and were unable to rally domestic support for our foreign policy in Vietnam, especially in the period following the signing of the Paris Agreements in 1973. Prior to engaging in future third world con- flicts, our national leaders must cautiously avoid commitment until certain that the national will is strong enough to sustain U.S. policy over an extended period of time--possi- bly under adverse conditions. Although I did not devote much time in this paper speaking about the role of the news media during this period, it's very apparent the North Vietnamese were much more effective than the U.S. in using the press to justify their policies and aims. Our leaders need to be more adept in explaining our foreign policy to the American public and more aggressive at correcting erroneous press reports. The outrageous reports of indiscriminate U.S. bombings of North Vietnam in December 1972 by the Western news media were extremely successful in substantially hardening public and Congressional opinions against continued American involvement in the war and forcing the Nixon Administration to stop the bombing. In halting the bombing when it did, the U.S. failed to destroy North Vietnam's war sustaining capabilities just at the most opportune moment when Hanoi's air defenses were almost completely annihilated and U.S. aircraft could have virtually roamed free over the skies of North Vietnam.1 As

a result, the North Vietnamese got the cease-fire they needed, succeeded in forcing the U.S. out of Vietnam, and gained precious time to rebuild their combat power for their final assault on South Vietnam. The truth about the Christmas bombings revealed that only military areas were targeted and hit (aside from some civilian structures such as the Bach Mai Hospital which suffered damage because it was built near a military airfield, despite repeated U.S. warnings to Hanoi not to locate civilian structures near military areas).2 In addi- tion, there were only 1,623 civilian casualties total during the entire 12-day operation--surprisingly small when compared to almost 84,000 people killed in one night during the fire bombing of Tokyo in March 1945 during World War II.3 Unfortunately, very little of this was ever explained to the American public by the news media at the time. This type of reporting damaged our foreign policy because it worked to distort and confuse the real issues. If our foreign policy is to be supported by the American people, our leaders must be more effective in dealing with the media to insure that our policies and actions are clearly and effectively explained to the people. Finally, our political and military leaders must under- stand the needs of the people that we are trying to help. Americans cannot always assume that our way of fighting is appropriate in every situation. In the case of South Viet- nam, the RVNAF was designed to resemble the U.S. military structure; they were inundated with modern, technologically

superior weapons and saddled with an enormously expensive and manpower-intensive logistics system to maintain their armed forces. Consequently, although the RVNAF numbered 1.1 million men, only 100,000 were actual combat troops. When the U.S. aid was cut after 1973 and the RVNAF had to restrict their expenditure of ammunition and use of heli- copters, they lost the technological advantage and mobility they enjoyed over the North Vietnamese Army in 1972; they were forced to fight a "poor man's war" against a numeri- cally superior enemy. This situation proved fatal in 1975. As I stated in the beginning of this paper, we would try to analyze some crucial events which occurred prior to April 30, 1975, and try to determine the reason the South Vietnamese armed forces suddenly and totally collapsed in those fateful early months of 1975. The reasons were many: low morale, uncontrolled corruption, incompetent leader- ship, and the lack of U.S. military aid and air support, especially close air and deep interdiction of Hanoi's war- sustaining operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. There were two critical events which occurred after 1973 that sealed the fate of South Vietnam and paved the way for North Vietnam to successfully conclude a military solution to the conquest of South Vietnam: the Paris Agreements in January 1973 and the Congressional bombing cutoff in August 1973. Without a doubt, the agreement signed in Paris to end the war and restore the peace in Vietnam was a critical turning point in the beginning of the end for South Vietnam. Although the Nixon Administration fully intended that South

Vietnam would remain free and independent, the fact remains that the agreement was only successful in withdrawing U.S. troops from South Vietnam and obtaining the return of American POWs from North Vietnam. Hanoi had good reason for strictly complying with these two terms: by removing the U.S. from the war, North Vietnam was free to rebuild after the devastation it suffered during the 1972 "Easter" offensive and prepare for its final offensive in 1975 to conquer all of South Vietnam. The superb military performance of the ARVN troops during the Communist LANDGRAB 73 operation provides clear proof that the South Vietnamese forces were militarily stronger than the Communist forces in the South in 1973. If the terms of the Paris Agreements were kept and North Vietnam not allowed to massively rebuild its forces in the South as it did, the cease-fire could have worked, and South Vietnam would have had a much more favorable chance for survival. The Thieu government definitely needed reform; however, with over 160,000 NVA regular troops inside South Vietnam's borders, democratic reform was a luxury a government concerned with national survival could ill-afford. However, removal of the external North Vietnamese threat could have gone a long way towards creating a favorable environment within the South to encourage meaningful reforms. Many former South Vietnamese leaders truly believed that the "fates" were against them in 1975. They felt that no matter what they could have done to change things in

1975, the outcome would have been the same. Some leaders, like South Vietnamese General Don, remarked that they seriously thought about overthrowing the Thieu regime and trying to form a coalition government with the PRG.4 How- ever, they were fearful that they would lose American support, since the U.S. was so constant in its support of President Thieu.5 However, the memory of the political chaos in South Vietnam that followed after the 1963 Diem coup was firmly established in the minds of the U.S. leadership and was one of the primary reasons the Nixon Administration held firm in its support of the Thieu government, despite its often corrupt and inefficient practices. The United States was firmly committed to decreasing its active involvement in the war and politi- cal stability in South Vietnam was necessary in order for Vietnamization to succeed. Indeed, because of the events which occurred after the overthrow of the Diem regime and the external military threat posed by North Vietnam, the Nixon Administration's position in relation to its support of the Thieu government was the correct one. The corruption and inefficiency within the Thieu regime was not unique and is common in many developing countries throughout Asia, including Commu- nist Vietnam today. The only reason the Western world doesn't see the corrupt, inefficient, and oftentimes cruel practices within Communist governments like Hanoi's is because the Communists have complete control over the press and systematically liquidate any political opposition which could cause unrest and dissension among the local popula-

tion. Despite the lack of support by the United States and the enormous external threat posed by the North Vietnamese Army, the Thieu regime cannot hold itself unaccountable for its failure to gain the support of its own soldiers in 1975. Although the scenes of south Vietnamese rangers fleeing in panic from Da Nang presented a horrifying and disgusting image of the RVNAF to the world, the perform- ance of some ARVN soldiers, especially during the battle of Xuan Loc, indicates that some were extremely capable and willing to fight, provided they had the proper leader- ship. The shortage of competent, professional military leadership in 1975 was a key factor in the disintegration of morale within the RVNAF, which precipitated the rapid and unprecedented collapse of one of the largest armies in Asia. Thieu's fixation on the internal threat to his regime and his policy to reward political loyalty with promotion and command proved fatal to South Vietnam by producing a military leadership which was incapable of dealing effectively with the external threat posed by North Vietnam in 1975. In conclusion, the top military leadership in South Vietnam, created by a politicized promotion system, proved incapable of successfully combatting the North Vietnamese threat in 1975. However, there were younger and more capable South Vietnamese officers who could have provided the necessary leadership to the RVNAF to prevent its collapse if they could have surfaced to the top earlier.

If the U.S. Congress had been willing to fulfill its moral obligations to South Vietnam and allowed the President a free hand to effectively punish Hanoi's blatant violations of the Paris Agreements, South Vietnam could have survived the 1975 NVA offensive. If the terms of the agreements had been strictly enforced upon Hanoi, there is a very strong possibility that North Vietnam would not have been able to recover as quickly as it did; and, with a little more time, the younger military officers in the RVNAF could have had time to move into top leadership positions. If these officers could have succeeded in making signi- ficant reforms within the armed forces, then the RVNAF may have been able to thwart the NVA offensive and quite possi- bly made a difference in the final outcome of the Vietnam War. However, events proved that the deficiencies inherent in the Thieu regime eroded the support of its people and soldiers; thus, the collapse was inevitable. Also, the political climate in the United States during this time period would not allow for U.S. support to the government of South Vietnam to continue indefinitely. Although these younger officers could have eventually fostered the neces- sary reforms, the South Vietnamese needed to make quick changes and simply ran out of time in 1975. CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 1972 - Serious negotiations conducted by the U.S. and

North Vietnam during this year to end the Vietnam War.

Jan 25 - President Nixon reveals that Henry Kissinger has been secretly nogotiating with the North Viet- namese since 1969.

Mar 30 - North Vietnam launches the “Easter” offensive. Jun 17 - Five men were arrested for breaking into Demo- Cratic National Committee offices; Watergate Episode begins. Aug 1 - Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho meet again in Paris to resume peace talks. Oct 8 - In Paris, Le Duc Tho proposes a new peace plan for the first time offering a settlement without the removal of South Vietnam’s President Nguyen Van Thiew. After reaching an agreement on all but a few details, he and Kissinger also agree that the pact will be signed October 31, follow- ing a secret journey by Kissinger to Hanoi. Oct 18 - Kissinger arrives in Saigon to present the draft agreement to Thieu. Oct 22 - Thieu rejects the agreement. He mainly rejects The formation of the NCRC and the acceptance of NVA troops inside South Vietnam. He gives Kissinger a list of 69 amendments to the agree- Ment before signing. Oct 26 - Radio Hanoi broadcasts the agreement and accuses the U.S. of reneging. A few hours later, Kissinger announces that “peace is at hand.” Nov 7 - Nixon is reelected by a landslide over Senator George McGovern. Nov 20 - Kissinger resumes talks with Le Duc Tho and pre- sents him with the 69 amendments demanded by Thieu. North Vietnamese interpret this as a “breach of faith” and demand the October draft be signed in its original form without changes. Dec 12 - Thieu announces that he still opposes the “false Peace.” Dec 14 - Hanoi calls for Thieu’s removal and peace talks are deadlocked. Kissinger blames Hanoi and Nixon sends North Vietnam an ultimatum to begin talking seriously within 72 hours or face the consequences. Dec 18 - Linebacker Two operations begin. Dec 30 - The “Christmas bombing” ends. 1973 - The “Third Indochina War” starts during this year and Congress enacts measures to limit further U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Jan 8 - Kissinger and Le Duc Tho meet in Paris and again agree on a settlement. The principal features are

basically the same as those drafted in October. Jan 21 - Nixon warns Thieu that U.S. aid will be cutoff if Saigon does not sign the agreements. Thieu agrees to sign. Jan 23 - Communists launch LANDGRAB 73 operation to gain land and population control prior to cease-fire. Jan 27 - Paris Agreements of 1973 formally signed. Feb 3 - LANDGRAB 73 operations end. Mar 29 - Last American troops leave Vietnam. Apr 1 - Last American POWs released. Aug 15 - Congress terminates U.S. bombing in Cambodia and requires Congressional approval for funding of U.S. military action in any part of Indochina. Nov 7 - Congress overrides Nixon’s veto of the War Powers Resolution. 1974 - North Vietnam’s leaders make plans during this year to “liberate” all of South Vietnam by 1976. May 9 - Impeachment hearings on Nixon begin in the Congress. Aug 9 - Nixon resigns; Ford becomes President. 1975 - North Vietnamese begin conventional offensive to

conquer South Vietnam this year. Jan 6 - Communists capture Phuoc Long province, north of Saigon. Feb 5 - North Vietnamese General Van Tien Dung goes south to take command of Communist forces. Mar 10 - Communists attack Ban Me Thuot. Mar 15 - Thieu orders northern provinces of South Vietnam abandoned to consolidate a defense around Saigon. Mar 20 - Thieu reverses himself and orders Hue be held to the last man. Mar 25 - Hue falls. Mar 30 - Da Nang falls; NVA controls both Military Regions 1 and 2. Mar 31 - Politburo in Hanoi directs General Dung to capture Saigon before the dry season ends; renames Saigon campaign the “Ho Chi Minh Campaign.”

Apr 9 - Battle of Xuan Loc begins; the last South Vietnamese Defense line before Saigon. Apr 17 - In Cambodia, Phnom Penh falls to the Khmer Rouge. Apr 20 - Xuan Loc falls; the next day, Congress rejects President Ford’s request for aid to South Vietnam for the last time. Apr 23 - President Ford calls the Vietnam War “finished.” Apr 25 - Thieu leaves Saigon for Taiwan. Vice-President Tran Van Huong becomes the new South Vietnamese President. Apr 27 - President Huong steps down in favor of General Duong Van “Big” Minh. Apr 29 - Helicopter evacuation begin; U.S. Ambassador Martin departs. Apr 30 - Last U.S. Marine helicopter departs from the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and “Big Minh” surrenders unconditionally to the North Vietnamese. Vietnam War ends. CAST OF PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS North Vietnamese Le Duan - Born in 1908 in Quang Tri, he rose rapidly in the Communist Party hier- archy. By 1959, he was secretary- general of the Lao Dong (Workers Party); later succeeded Ho Chi Minh as the North Vietnamese Communist Party’s First Secretary. Le Duc Tho - Born about 1912 in nothern Vietnam. Responsible for directing the insurgency in the South; at the same time, negotiated with Henry Kissinger to draft the paris Agreements of 1973. Tran Van Tra - Born in central Vietnam in 1918. Became a deputy commander of the Communist forces in the South; it is believed he was purged after 1975 for criticizing the Communist Party leadership. Van Tien Dung - Born in 1917; became a protégé of Vo Nguyen Giap. Directed the 1975 offensive against Saigon; became defense minister of Vietnam after 1975. Vo Nguyen Giap - Born in 1912 in central Vietnam. Chief Communist strategist during the Vietnam

War. Retired from public life after 1975. South Vietnamese Bui Diem - South Vietnamese ambassador to the United States from 1966-1972; later served as roving envoy for President Thieu. Cao Van Vien - South Vietnamese general who served as the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff. Duong Van Minh - Known as “Big Minh” because of his size, he served as senior army officer under Diem and led the coup against Diem in November 1963, but was toppled shortly after taking power. Became President of South Vietnam in April 1975; surrendered unconditionally to the North Vietnamese on April 30, 1975. Ngo Dinh Diem - South Vietnam’s first President. Over- thrown and murdered by his own generals in November 1963. His fall started the chain of events that led to full-scale American intervention in South Vietnam. Nguyen Van Thieu - Born in 1924 in central Vietnam. Became President of South Vietnam in 1967. Led South Vietnam during Vietnamization and the Paris peace negotiations. However, because of corruption and incompetence within his regime, he was unable to main- tain the popular support of the South Vietnamese people. He fled Vietnam just before the fall of Saigon in late April 1975, blaming the collapse on the lack of U.S. support. Tran Van Don - Born in France in 1917. Served as a senior officer in the Diem regime and later became one of the organizers of the coup to overthrow Diem. Served as South Vietnam’s last Minister of Defense and escaped to the United States in 1975 before the fall of Saigon. Tran Van Huong - Born in 1903 in My Tho. Served as mayor of Saigon and Prime Minister of South Vietnam for a few months in 1964 and early 1965 and again in 1968 for a year. Served as Thieu’s vice-president from 1971-1975. Became President of South Vietnam after Thieu resigned and served for one week; then he stepped down in favor of “Big Minh.”

Pham Van Phu - Incompetent South Vietnamese general in command of II Corps in the Central High- lands. Vowing to defend what was left of his region to the last man, he abandoned his men and escaped by helicopter to safety in Saigon. He later committed suicide before the fall of Saigon. Americans Carl Albert - Congressional representative from Oklahoma; served as Speaker of the House during the Nixon Administra- tion. Gerald R. Ford - Became President after Nixon resigned in August 1974. Tried to restore American aid to South Viet- nam in 1975 but failed; declared that the war was finished after Congress rejected aid after the fall of Xuan Loc on April 21, 1975. J. William Fulbright – Senator from Arkansas from 1945-

1979. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the Vietnam War. Later turned against the war and was instru- mental in passing the War Powers Resolution in 1973.

Alexander Haig - Commanded an infantry division in Vietnam and later joined Kissinger’s National Security Council staff in

1969. Negotiated with President Thieu during the final phase of the cease-fire talks in 1972.

Henry Kissinger - Appointed National Security Advisor by President Nixon in 1969. Nego- tiated with Le Duc Tho to achieve the Paris Agreements in January

1973. He was later appointed to Secretary of State by Nixon.

Mike Mansfield - Senator from Montana and early Supporter of the Vietnam War. Later turned against the war. Graham Martin - Last American ambassador to South Vietnam, from 1973 until the fall of Saigon in 1975. Richard M. Nixon - Elected to President of the United States in 1968 and 1972 but forced By Watergate scandal to resign in 1974. Enacted the Vietnamization

Policy to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam and sought “Peace with Honor” in negotiating the Paris Agreements in 1973. William C. Westmoreland – Appointed head of military advisory Mission to Vietnam in 1964 by Presi- dent Johnson. Commanded U.S. combat forces in Vietnam until 1968; later became Army Chief of Staff. Frederick C. Weyand - U.S. Commander in Vietnam in 1972 who warned that if the negotiations in Paris did not solve the crucial political question of territorial control, the military truce commission would be limited in its ability to stop the fighting. Proven correct, when the Third Indochina War began. ENDNOTES INTRODUCTION 1. Daniel S. Papp, Vietnam: The View from Moscow, Peking Washington, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1981, p. 206. 2. Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory. New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p. 10. 3. Ibid., p. 10. 4. Ibid., pp. 12-15. 5. Ibid., pp. 17-20. 6. Ibid., p. 19. 7. Ibid., p. 25. 8. Cao Van Vien, The Final Collapse, Washington: Govern- ment Printing Office, 1983, p. 7. 9. The BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Vol. II, South Vietnam, Defense Techni- cal Information Center Technical Report, Alexandria, VA: Defense Logistics Agency, 1980, pp. 5-50. 10. Cao Van Vien, The Final Collapse, Washington: Govern- ment Printing Office, 1983, pp. 7-8. 11. Ibid., p. 8. 12. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins,

Thee Falls of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilians Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, p. 12. 13. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 14. Ibid., p. 132. 15. William E. Le Gro, Vietnam frown Cease-Fire to Capitulation, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 30. 16. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, pp. 11-13. 17. Ibid., p. 9. CHAPTER 1 1. Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, p. 18. 2. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, New York: The Viking Press, 1983, p. 640. 3. Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, p. 19. 4. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, New York: The Viking Press, 1983, p. 647. 5. Ibid., p. 643. 6. Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, p. 23. 7. Ibid., p. 51. 8. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, New York: The Viking Press, 1983, p. 647. 9. William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 2. 10. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, New York: The Viking Press, 1983, p. 651. 11. Ibid., pp. 652-653. 12. Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p. 7. 13. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979, p. 254.

14. Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 174. 15. Tran Van Don, Our Endless War, San Rafael, CA and London: Presidio Press, 1978, p. 202. 16. Ibid., p. 215. 17. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, p. 29. 18. Tran Van Don, Our Endless War, San Rafael, CA and London: Presidio Press, 1978, p. 208. 19. Ibid., p. 209. 20. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1979, p. 1462. 21. Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978, pp. 749-750. 22. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civillian Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, p. 30. 23. The BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Vol. II, South Vietnam, Defense Technical Information Center Technical Report, Alexandria, VA: Defense Logistics Agency, 1980, pp. 5-50. 24. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1979, p. 1470. 25. Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978, p. 743. 26. Ibid., p. 744. 27. Denis Warner, Certain Victory: How Hanoi Won the War, Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977, p. 8. 28. Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978, p. 888. 29. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1979, p. 1470. CHAPTER 2 1. William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 21. 2. Ibid., p. 31.

3. Ibid., p. 32. 4. W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, The Lessons of Vietnam, New York: Russak, 1977, p. 279. 5. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, New York: The Viking Press, 1983, pp. 657-658. 6. Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 169. 7. Tran Van Don, Our Endless War, San Rafael, CA and London: Presidio Press, 1978, p. 230. 8. Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p. 9. 9. Ibid., p. 38. 10. Ibid., p. 19. 11. Ibid., p. 10. 12. Ibid., p. 13. 13. Ibid., p. 13. 14. Ibid., pp. 14-15. 15. Louis A. Fanning, Betrayal in Vietnam, New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1976, pp. 195-239. 16. Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, pp. 93-94. 17. Ibid., p. 94. 18. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979, p. 257. 19. Ibid., p. 257. 20. Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 171. 21. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979, p. 258. 22. Ibid., p. 258. 23. Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p. 25. 24. Ibid., p. 18.

25. Ibid., pp. 20-23. 26. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, p. 178. 27. Ibid., p. 178. 28. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979, p. 259. 29. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, New York: The Viking Press, 1983, p. 665. 30. Ibid., pp. 665-666. 31. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, p. 212. 32. Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1977, pp. 159-160. 33. William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 173-177. 34. Cao Van Vien, The Final Collapse, Washington: Govern- ment Printing Office, 1983, p. 149. 35. William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 177. 36. Louis A. Fanning, Betrayal in Vietnam, New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1976, p. 191. 37. Tran Van Don, Our Endless War, San Rafael, CA and London: Presidio Press, 1978, p. 253. 38. Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, pp. 475- 476. 39. Ibid., pp. 93-95. 40. William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 3. 41. Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, p. 96. 42. Ibid., pp. 96-98. 43. Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace, Stanford, CA:

Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 169. 44. Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, p. 79. 45. William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 138. 46. Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p. 14. 47. Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, p. 80. 48. Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 173. 49. Ibid., p. 173. 50. Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p. 10. 51. Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 174. 52. William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 144. 53. Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 174. 54. Ibid., p. 175. 55. Sir Robert Thompson, Peace Is Not At Hand, New York: David McKay, 1974, p. 140. CHAPTER 3 1. The BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Vol. II, South Vietnam, Defense Technical Information Center Technical Report, Alexandria, VA: Defense Logistics Agency, 1980, pp. 5-35. 2. Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978, p. 587. 3. Ibid., p. 600. 4. The BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Vol. II, South Vietnam, Defense Technical Information Center Technical Report, Alexandria, VA: Defense Logistics Agency, 1980, pp. 5-50. 5. Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon,

New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978, p. 889. 6. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, pp. 37- 38. 7. Ibid., p. 36. 8. Cao Van Vien, The Final Collapse, Washington: Govern- ment Printing Office, 1983, p. 6. 9. Ibid., p. 6. 10. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military adn Civillan Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, pp. 14- 15. CHAPTER 4 1. William E. Le Gro, Vietnam frown Cease-Fire to Capitulation, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 179. 2. The BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Vol. II, South Vietnam, Defense Technical Information Center Technical Report, Alexandria, VA: Defense Logistics Agency, 1980, pp. 5-56. 3. Ibid., pp. 5-51. 4. Ibid., pp. 5-33. 5. Tran Van Don, Our Endless War, San Rafael, CA and London: Presidio Press, 1978, p. 244. 6. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, pp. 72- 73. 7. Ibid., pp. 73-75. 8. Ibid., pp. 75-76. 9. Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, p. 301. 10. Ibid., pp. 300-301. 11. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civillan Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, p. 122. 12. Ibid., pp. 119-121.

13. Ibid., p. 121. 14. Ibid., pp. 126-127. 15. Ibid., p. 127. 16. Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, p. 381. 17. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, p. 127. 18. Ibid., p. 127. 19. Gareth Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, Stanfordville, NY: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, 1979, p. 659. CONCLUSION 1. Sir Robert Thompson, Peace Is Not At Hand, New York: David McKay, 1974, p. 135. 2. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, New York: The Viking Press, 1983, p. 653. 3. Ibid., p. 653. 4. Tran Van Don, Our Endless War, San Rafael, CA and London: Presidio Press, 1978, p. 241. 5. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins Thee Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, p. 259. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY A. North Vietnamese Sources - Books Dung, Van Tien. Our Great Spring Victory. New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1977. Extremely readable and straightforward account of the 1975 North Vietnamese offensive that conquered South Vietnam by the NVA's field army commander. Giap, Vo Nguyen. How We Won the War . Philadelphia: Recon Publications, 1976. Provides excellent informa- tion about the Communist Party's participation in the 1975 offensive. Clearly describes how the NVA used surprise in the timing and direction of attack to cause the RVNAF to make costly mistakes. Giap, Vo Nguyen. The Mllitary Art of People's War.

New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1970. Laced with ideological rhetoric, but provides a good background of the Vietnam struggle from the North Vietnamese perspective by the NVA's chief strategist. B. South Vietnamese Sources - Books Don, Tran Van. Our Endless War. San Rafael, CA and London: Presidio Press, 1978. Provides a thorough background of the Vietnam War from the South Viet- namese viewpoint by South Vietnam's last Minister of Defense. Hosmer, Stephen T., Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins. The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders. New York: Crane, Russak, 1980. A summary of oral and written state- ments by 27 former high-ranking South Vietnamese military officers and civilians on their percep- tions of the causes of the collapse of South Vietnam. Vien, Cao Van. The Final Collapse. Washington: Govern- ment Printing Office, 1983. Detailed account of RVNAF actions during the 1975 NVA offensive by the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff. C. American and Other Non-Vietnamese Sources - Books Amter, Joseph A. Vietnam Verdict. New York: Continuum Publishing, 1982. Although sympathetic towards North Vietnam, provides useful background informa- tion on the political arguments during the Vietnam War from 1945-1975. Fanning, Louis A. Betrayal in Vietnam. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington Press, 1976. Extremely critical of the U.S. Congress' actions in dealing with the government of South Vietnam. However, it provides a very detailed and accurate account of the clash between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government during the period prior to the collapse of South Vietnam. Goodman, Allan E. The Lost Peace. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. Provides excellent insight into the reasons for the failure of the 1973 Paris Agreements to keep the peace in Vietnam. Herring, George C. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. Provides a useful and informative account of both U.S. and South Vietnamese actions and policies from the earliest periods to the final collapse in 1975. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor. Baltimore and London:

The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Extremely detached and honest account of the post Paris Agree- ments period. Clearly examines events from the viewpoints of the North and South Vietnamese and the Americans. Provides very interesting reading. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: The Viking Press, 1983. From the fifteenth century until the final collapse, this book provides the most comprehensive and balanced history of the Vietnam struggle ever written. By studying Viet- nam's past and culture, as well as the political and military events that occurred in Vietnam after America's involvement, the book provided a great perspective to the Vietnam War. Kissinger, Henry A. White House Years. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1979. The memoirs of the former National Security Advisor to President Nixon and Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford Administrations covering the period 1969-1973. Provides a personal account of the peace negotia- tions and the U.S. position on achieving peace in Vietnam. Le Gro, William E. Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981. Provides an extremely detailed and accurate account of RVNAF, NVA and PRG military battles from the signing of the Paris Agreements until the battle for Saigon in April 1975. Lomperis, Timothy J. The War Everyone Lost--And Won. Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1984. Fairly useful analysis of the U.S. role in Indochina. The book analyzes U.S. tactics in Vietnam and concludes that in losing a people's war, the Communists went on to win the war by adopting a conventional strategy. Consequently, the U.S. won a war it thought it lost, and lost by default what it could have won. Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978. Provides an interesting personal account by an American Presi- dent and gives some insight into how domestic events affected U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam. Papp, Daniel S. Vietnam: The View from Moscow, Peking, Washington. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1981. Superb detailed analysis of the Vietnam War from the global perspective of the U.S., Soviet Union, and China. Porter, Gareth. A Peace Denied. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1975. Detailed account of how the numerous treaty violations

sabotaged the Paris Agreements and prevented the achievement of a lasting peace in Vietnam. Porter, Gareth. Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions. Stanfordville, NY: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, 1979. Extremely useful account of original message traffic, speeches and other documents during the Vietnam War which provided a unique insight into the events occurring in 1973-1975. Snepp, Frank. Decent Interval. New York: Random House, 1977. Extremely vivid reading about events and decisions made during the final period inside South Vietnam. The BDM Corporation. A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Vol. II. South Vietnam. Defense Technical Information Center Technical Report. Alexandria, VA: Defense Logistics Agency, 1980. Provides extremely useful informa- tion on various U.S. and South Vietnamese policies during the Vietnam War. Also contains discussions with many of the senior civilian and military decision-makers of the Vietnam era. Thompson, Sir Robert. Peace Is Not At Hand. New York: David McKay, 1974. Extremely accurate account of Communist treaty violations after the signing of the Paris Agreements. Provides a unique insight into the Communist negotiating strategy by the former head of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam. Thompson, W. Scott and Donaldson D. Frizell. The Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Crane, Russak, 1977. Excerpts from a 1973-1974 colloquium on the Vietnam War at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy which included 31 distinguished military and civilian panelists. Warner, Denis. Certain Victory: How Hanoi Won the War. Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977. Extremely readable and detailed account of events during the final collapse by an Australian news reporter.