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Vienna, November 27, 1933.

'l'he Pr.lident, The 1'lh1 te Bouse,

Vfaahington, D. c., U. s.A.

My dear Ur. Preaidenta

Following your inatruotione, I have oalled on the

AmerioUI Ambeasador in Berli.n, and the American J.linhtera

to Pngue Uld Buda Poath.

I have also juat completed a journey through the

nine Auatrian province• in whioh I interviewed the Governors,

Commanding Gonerala and Chambere of Coamerce. Chancellor

Dollfuaa haa talked frankly to me many timea, a a did

Preaident Uaaaryk when I was in Prague and I have utili&ed

every opportunity poaaible to learn the sentiments of

politioians and business men in Austria , Germany, Hungary

and C&eoho Slovakia,

The laat four years have boon bed enos tor prophets,

but linoe your orders were to aend you my i~tpruaiona, I am

doin& eo.

Econ.,.llioal1y, Central Europe 1a barely holding her

own. The poople to a men in these oountriea, are watching

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your progreso , in Amorloa, t'eoliO« that it a tur11 tor tho

better 11 t o • ..,. it cuat orlsi~~ato in Aaorioa.

In Auat r i a, tho eoonoodo aituation i a ali~ht1y bettor.

It only tredo rolationa with other oountr1oo oould bo but alight -

ly improved, Austria would bo on tho road to mueh bettor thinr;a

and tho Dolltuu Govor=ant t11"1111j establ1ahed. rr torelp>

trade dooa not i~rovo, tho Dolltuas Govornoont will tall .

In Garmany, thoro la o ol i ght improvement 111 buainooo

atnce June, but oonditiona are muoh wor•• than a year a,o. Her ahlpplnc and torelp> trade have autterod tr8l:lO!'IdOU1lY duo

to tho Jewish boycott .

Pol1t1oally tho whole situation 1n Eur ope oontora on

Hitler . In ~ opi.Dion, he 11 a paranoiac , with a pft of

eloquon<>o or a ldnd about halt way between Bryan ond Billy Sunday.

Ho io opportunist enough to oapitol izo tho Garcon reaotion

ogoinot tho Voraaillea Treaty, magnify tho C~at throa t

and otlr up tho l a t.,nt rooiol anti patey ot' tho Gor:ana to t ho

Jowo, a thln& oaay to do aino" tho Jews etill have a little

lett, tn cont raot to tho utter 1mpovor1aho>e.nt of tho Gorman••

Be baa mdo tho m1litar1at1o apirlt today 1n Go,.,..ny

tho moat 1ntenao in her history.

rnat • paranoiac wi ll do when ho t'oola hls powor wan­

ill«, and whether Germany 11 adequately a rmed, oro questions

I oan not t.nnor.

liltler 1a on Aust rian and more t han anything ho

wonto Austria oa part ot tho Gorman Roloh. Tho orudo

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t aotios he hao used to break tho Austrian reaiatanoo, hao

resulted in the growth of a real A'•strian llationalhm, that

no~or existed before. In the paet , the Austrian children wore

taught that tho history and traditions of Austria wore inseparably

linked with tho Hapsburgs. With tho fall of tho Hapsburgs , tho

Austrians wore b~•ildorod and hopeless and ready to beoomo a

provinoe or Germany. Now, tha.ko to Hitl er's methods, only the •

llazie want the }.nsohluss.

Or one thing I am sure. Hitler has surrounded Germany

with a r ing of enemies bound together by a great fear of the

ruthless military effioienoy of the Pruasian.

The Hitler virus injooted into the German veins is well

exemplified by the German ~~niater Rieth here.

He takes the most insolent attitude toward tho Austrian

Government, ignoring tho invitetiono or tho President and Chon-

oollor to their reooptions, s~ying that tho Austrian Government

is purely a makeshift arfair and will end at any m=ent.

\"lhon he returned "'¥ oall, ha asked me if I would frank-

ly tell him my impression8 of my trip through Austria .

I then told him I had found tho Nazi aentimont had do-

creased.

Rieth booo...,o very angry, aa1d that he had agents · in

every olaaa and ocoupation in Austria, that Austria was 50%

Nui, that a !lui putsoh would swoop Dollfuas out at any

J:>oment and then wnnld oome a pogrom auoh as Europe had never

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aeen, that every Jew of every nationality would lose their

property and be lucky to escape £rom Austria with thei r livea.

There are several hundred American Jewish ~ootora,

atudente and their faciliee he re t hat I tool personally :eapon-

eible for.

If this putech comes, as most or the foreign diplomats

and newspaper men believe i t will, I am afraid there woul d be

• lit tle I could do or say to help them in the hyateria or that

time.

For this reason in tel ling the prose about the beauties

and resources of Aust ria that I saw in my trip, I injected the

statement that we Americana were purely observers a.nd what Austria

did internally wo s her bu aine.. and not ours, but that s_ince

90j( ot Americans v1ere descended froll' ;>eople who had come there

to eacspe raoial or religioua persecution, that the sympathy

or the American people would not likely remain with a nat i on

that indulged in such pe!'aecution.

The Austrian is like a college freshman who desires

popularity above all else and members of the foreign office

have ~old me my atatament would have great influence, and Doll­

fuse said that it hod not only not embarrassed him but had

helped him in deali D$ with thie issue.

I understand there hae been criticism of my statement

in America.

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Please believe me, Mr. President, that I regret

more than I ca.n say it seDtiments of humanity on '11111 part

and a desire to protect American citizens have caused me

to commit a diplomatic blunder and embarrass you in ·~

way. I aaaure you I shall be very oaretul or what I say

in the future .

In summarizing tho sltuation, I believe the peace

or Europe depends upon tho independence of Aust ria and that

Austrian independence depends entirely on her economic

welfare.

Before I left America , I talked with prcm1nent

busineea men, publicists ahd bankers.

All wore willing to do everything in their power

to promote trade wit h Austria. Dollfuss is enthuoiaoti o

about ouch a plan and wonts me to go baok wi th o business

representative of the Aust rian Government in January to die-

cuss the matt er and get action if possible.

In tho last three years America has lost millions

of doll ars of exports to Austria in meats, automobiles, etc.,

which could be replaced it we would t ake her wines, cheese,

eto.

In closing, may I quote the words of Sir "ilalford

~elby, Bri tiah Minister to Austria•

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"If tho lluh oomo to powor and attempt the Aileohluea,

ocmo O.rll)' will urohl"

Roapoottully and lo)'&lly yow-a,

q ~.Q... H. ~onOc:. ".!

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l e44, voluno S, pp. 8GO-VG4, 856-867

(2S6J)

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0 THE WHITE HOUSE

0 '

< _.. ~WASHINGTON

'7y~ ,.0

/ April 15, 1944.

~1®ioR'i.11DOif FORa

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I .ppron your l ottor or April 12th

1D recarda to the .Arohduka otto. I think

tbe polioy ebould be br outbt. by you or

•-body 1D tbe lltata Dapart&eut0 to hia

attentiODo

r. o. a.

Transmitting carbon of meaoraa:l111:1 which the President received troo t he Secretary of State under date of 4/12/41., i.n re the Archduke otto ot Austria .

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of

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DEPARTMENT Of' STATE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR TH~ PRESIDENT Ap\'"il 1, , 1944

With reference to the letter ot April 4 addressed to the President by the Archduke Otto, and the President ' s covering memorandum ot April 7 requesting comment on the Archduke' s proposals: -

Action by this Government along the linea suggested by the Archduke would require consideration ot several mat­ters ot major importance, to wit:

' 1. The plane outlined by the Archduke Otto i n Annexes II and III to his letter &mount in substance to a proposal that the direction ot the resistance •ovement wi thin Hungary, and the operations leading to the restoration or the Crown ot Hungary to the Archduke, be conducted trom the United States, with the active participation or agencies, military and civilian, ot this Government;

2. The support required tor the proposed Hun­gar ian Council or Resistance which would be established in Washington, would involve even more than the •recog­nition• t he Archduke is willing to forego , in that the detail or liaison otticere, the use ot American commu­nications services, the authorization ot publicity and propaganda agencies , and the allocation or blocked funds (Annex III), would place the Hungarian Council di rectly under the auspices ot this Government;

3. The proposal contemplates an exclusively American sponsorshi p tor the conduct or the Hungarian reeietance movement, whereas this Government has agreed that our dealings with Hungary, ae with the other enemy states in Europe, will be in t ull consultation wi th t he British and Soviet Governments.

The implications ot these considerations suggest t hat neither from the point ot view o! public opinion in this country nor in view ot our political and military engage­mente tor acting Jointly with other governments 1n the con­duct ot the war in Eur ope , would it be to our national

interest

intereat tor this Government to agree to the propoeala advanced by the Archduke.

It should be observed that steps have already been taken to achieve some or the aims eet rorth in the Aroh­duke1u proposals . Immediately attar the Ger man occupa­tion or Hungary the Department authorized our representa­tives in the neutral capitals informally to aesiet in en­abling the various Hungarian diplomatic miaeione and un­derground agents to coordinate their plane tor building up the reeietanoe torcee within Hungary. These were pro­visional and emergency etepe, but they served their pur­pose in enabling the Hungarians abroad to survey their prcepecte t or contributing to Germany1e defeat. The Brit­ish are informed or what these Hungarian representatives are planning, and the Russians are probably now coming in­to the picture ae well. The British, in tact, have now notified the Department ot their viewa aa to a more defi­nite policy, and hope that Waehington and Moecow Will ex­press their general agreement and thue make it a joint policy. In summary the British proposal discourages the recognition or a tree Hungarien movement, but ravore steps to build up the Hungarian otticiale who have repudiated the present regime, with emphasis on strengthening the reeiet­ance elements within the country, leaving Hung~y1 t future to be worked out by the people at home it they unite in active resistance to t he Germane.

The Department hae not yet replied to the British sug­gestion, but would recommend it to the President as being in substantial accord with the Department's views, and preferable to a unilateral support, on our part, or any particular Hungarian group. It would be appreciated it the Preaident would indicate whet her he approves. Horeover, the advantages or a joint policy, with ita additional value as an example or cooperation or the principal Allies in European questions, are apparent.

Enclosures:

Letter trom the Archduke Otto with ita enclosures.

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Washington D.O. ,April 4th 1944,

Dear Mr. President,

Fi r&t of all , let me thank you most warmly for your kindness for hevin~ acted rapidly on my requests in these last days. I am the more grate -fUl as I know that you hava not been feeling well and that therefore my let t ers and notes meant an added strain on you.

For this reason also it is only re -luctantly that I sand you this latter and the vital Annexes to it. I would have certainly waited i f I was not forced to act because of the situation in ~~rope. But without endangering the whole future I can no longer let the Hungarian diplomats and the Underground wait for instruction and for guidance .

I join to this letter three Annexes, which cover the problems :

1.) A short historic review of the events leading to my present letter to you;

2 . ) The plan of the Hungarian Council for Resistance.

3 . ) A short outline or measures that would be necessary and for which we would ask your kind assi stance in order to help the Hungarian Council for Resistance.

I would be most grateful if you could let me know as soon as possible, for the aforementioned reasons, your views, your advice and your daeisions on all these matters.

Needless to say that , as in the peat, you can be assured of my absolute discretion on this

. entire subject.

With ~ best wishes for a prompt end complete recovery of your health end with my renewed thanks for your kindness and respectful regards I remain, dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely

' ..

Allnax I.

Biato~io ~eview or tha diplomatic and military events leading

-------------------------------------------------------------to the present latter.

M.B. This i s a compilation from Hungarian offi c i al documents -- and otticial telegrams f rom Liebon.

1.) Evolution of the situation aince J anuary : B.ltler rd'usea to Genoral Szombathely, Chief of start of tha Roy­

al Hungarian Army, the return of the remainder s or the eight ~ungarian divisi ons, which aro scatter ed behind the Russian front . He dem~nds new acti on,agai nst the J ews, the sending of Hungarian workers to Ge~many, mora supplies and more r sw-materiala.

Be demands t he extradition or the interned American and British

pilots . Al l those demands are re jected. Hitle~ declares early

in Feb~ua~y that he expects that the Hunga~ian army shall fight

on the Hungarian border against t he Russians. In the same t i me Hitler conspires with Hungarian llazis.

2 . ) On Warch 14th Hitl e r demands in a stiff note t ha shipping or 25.000 Jaws per week to Germany , Reason : In Hungary live in freedom more than a milli on Jews, more than in the whole remainder or Europe; this becomes intolerable with the

approach or the Soviets. - The Hungarian Cabinet rejec t s this

demand unanimously and notifies the Germans on March 15•h.

3.) On Warch 16th Bitler invi tes Horthy urgently fur a visit at his headquarters i n Germany on t he matter or the

Hungarian troops in Russia. - Horthy sends a telegram to the Hungarian ministers in neutral countries ordering them that, in

case or German invasion, they should immediately seek contact with their American and British collea~es and should put them -

selves at my disposal. He fUrthermore sends a document for me ae t he l egit imate Kin~ or Hungary, containing full powers. This

d.ocument is deposited with my brother Charloa Louie 1n Li sbon. Horthy orders the army to resist in case ot i nvasi on. Only then

doe s he leave for Hitler's headquarters.

4 . ) arming had alec an intermediary

A Bungari8.0 Underground 1a or ganized a.nd ita been started. It i s put under my orders t hrough agent in a neutral COil."> try.

5.) At Horthy•a arrival Hitl er demands from him the

complete mob1l1cation of Hungary against Ruaai a, the extradition

ot all Jews , refuge es a.nd prisoners ot war to Garmany, the ahip -

ping or 250. 000 workens to Germany, the handing over or the Hunger­

inn rood and raw-material reserves ; Horthy refuses these ra -questa. Since that tirue nobody haa seen him and the plece or his

present residanco 1s unknown.

l.

e. l mana a ttack bf ebutlata. 1ba

While theaa conversetlona take plaoa, the Ger~ aurprlaa Bungar7 with extanaive ~•• ot para -Bungtrlan troops otter acstterod rte1etanoo.

'1.) 'l'ha Eallq·Oo•a~ant r atu.aaa to raatgo and the

Ot~ana, not Hor thy, appoint I DIW Oovarnoent 1D Bungar, , wbicb

at onoe euppreaaea tho Hungerian Conat1tut1on.

8.) Onl7 the Hungarlu M1o1ater ln Ankara tollowa

tba ord.ara or the Qu.1al.1~-0o•arn:sant. !ha otbtr hat<la o~ d.l·

plo.atlc K1ea1ons follow HortbJ's ordtra to tatp tba Legationa tor the legal Government, eubjact to ~ 1nat~ct1ona. Tbia ia done 1n L1tbon, Kadrld, Bern, Bala1nk1 and Stockhole. There 11 good outlook that tba neutral countrlta will continue to reeog­

aiaa tbeaa diplomate 18 tba rtpraltDt&tiVII Of tbl legal GoVIZ'D•

cent ot HUf18&r'7•

9.) Tht Juat men~toned t1Ye Mln1etera report to mt

on March 29th. tbeJ ask tor turther lnatructlona, auggeat1ng tbat., i n conton!dt7 wltb their inet naetlona and the powers 4e­

I>Ot·1ted. bJ H.orthf, I at once appoint a caw Bungariu OoTtrnaent.

Annex II.

Plan of the Hungarian Council tor Resistance.

----------------------------------------------

Although the legal basis obviously exists. I do not intend , - tor the time being - to create a Hungarian Govern­ment in exile. On the other hand, i t has become urgent and in­dispensable that some competent Hungarian Authority be created tor guidance and coordination of all Hungarian efforts for the

fight against Hitler.

It is therefore plonned to organize a Hungarian Council

tor Resistance, composed now ot the five loyal Hungarian Ministers ,

namely the Ministers in Lisbon, Stockholm, Madrid, Bern and Hels­

inki . - As soon as this Council is organized, it shall elect as its Chairman Nr. John Pelenyi, rormor Hungarian Minister in Washing­

ton D.O., and at this time professor in Dartmouth Colloge. The members of the Council retain their present diplomatic posts.

Membership or the Coa~cil is l imited to active diplomatic repre -

aentatives of Bu~ary, whose number mi~bt still increase. Besides

electing Mr. Pel6nyi as its President, the Council may designate also other Hungarian personalities for specific tasks or missions.

Neither myself nor Mr. Bckhardt are included in the Council.

The Council is not a Government . It constitutes neverthe­

less the only existing organ or the legal Hungarian Government deprived at present of its liberty ot action. By tho formation ot thia Council , the continuity or Hungarian constitutional lite

is maintained. The Council shall cease to exist when constitutional

order on Hungarian soil is restored.

The Council otters its services to the Allies.

The Council ' a aims are :

1 . ) To unite, organize and direct the Underground Forces in Hungary as well as Hungarian factors abroad for po­litical resistance and tor armed tight against Hitler.

2.) To save patriots, Jews and refugees i n Hungary from extermination by the Nazis.

The Council haa no other'eim. But by its existence and

by ita actions Hungarian Statehood survives and the participation

or Hungary in the fight against Hitler is assured.

I believo it to be ~ duty to proceed to the formation

ot this Hungarian Council for Resistance as soon as your acceptance of this plan has been won.

1

Annex III.

Requests

Leadership or the contemplated action and the Central Office of the Council for Resistance, is planned to be located in Waabington D.C. , as I desire to keep all activi­ties or the Council in fUll harmony with tho u .s.A. views and policies. Should I be fortunate to reoeivo your consont, the following assistance seems indisponseble for tho efficient and orderly fUnctioning or the Council :

A. ) In general I

l . ) Authorisation for the publication or the organization end the aims or the Council, with the moral backing ot the U.S.A. Government .

2.) As the main activity or t he Council for Re­sistance would be carried on along Underground lines, some form of stable mil i tary collaboration, also by appointment of a mili­tary liaison Off icer with the Council. Designation of an Officer ot liaison also by other interosted Government agencies would improve efficient collaboration in every respect.

3 . ) Authorization of rapid and secure means or communication between the Central Office in Tlashington D.C. and each member or t he Council in neutral countries.

4.) Authorization tor the use or an adequate news-and propaganda service diroetod towards Hungary for tho in­formation and guidance of the Hungarian people.

l .

S.) If necessary: the unfreezing or aome Hungarian assets in order to cover the costs of the Washington Central Of­fice and eventually also or member-legations in neutral countries which do not possess adequate financial means.

Should you, Wr. President, approve of th9se measures, I beg to ask you to give cne necessary orders to t he interested Government agencies.

B.) Specific instructions : seem further needed

in order to secure urgently harmony amongst the widely scattered Hungarian forces or resistance in Europe :

l.) An order to General B1asell to grant me the possibility to wire to my brother throu~h General Bisaela channels ( as in the past week ). Also au thorization to my brother Charles

Louis to send me wires through the same channel.

2.) Authorization for Archduke Gharles Louis to travel by the Mili tary Transport Plane from Lis­bon or from the Azores to the United States and back to Lisbon. - Also instruction to grant to him the U.S.Visa in Lisbon as well as an i mmediate EXit-Permit from the United States for his return to Lisbon. The reasons tor his trip are 1

a) Charles Louis has received valuable secret information which he should report personally to you and to myself.

b) Charles Louis is seriously ill and has to go to a hospital , probably for an operation, which should be performed here and not in Portugal. But he cannot leave Lisbon before he is adequately replaced by his brother Rudolf .

3 . ) Authorization that my brother Archduke Rudolf be granted the use of the Military Transport Plane to the Azores or to Lisbon, in order to replace urgently Charles Louis, especially in maintaining contacts with the Underground.

2.

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THE WHITE H OUSE

WASHI N GTO N

Apr il 7 , 1944.

110N. JAi.ll·.B C. DUliN

i<ill ::ou be J;Ood enou:;h

t o let uc have :1\lUr views on t he

enclosec fro~ krchd~e Otto?

F. D. R,

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