Case Nos. 1141044 and 1150027 ════════════════════════════════════════════════

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

────────────────────────────────── STATE OF ALABAMA, Appellant,

V.

$223,405.86 et al., Appellees.

──────────────────────────────────

KC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Cross-Appellant,

V.

STATE OF ALABAMA, Cross-Appellee.

──────────────────────────────────

On appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County (Hon. William Shashy, sitting by designation,

CV-13-900031)

════════════════════════════════════════════════

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA

════════════════════════════════════════════════

LUTHER STRANGE Attorney General Andrew L. Brasher Solicitor General John L. Kachelman III Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 (334) 353-2609 (334) 242-4891 (fax) abrasher@ago.state.al.us Attorneys for Appellant/Cross-Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

════════════════════════════════════════════════

E-Filed 11/19/2015 @ 03:14:07 PM Honorable Julia Jordan Weller Clerk Of The Court

i

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

This case is important, but the answers to the

questions presented are straightforward. The trial court

incorrectly concluded, based on the evidence before it,

that so-called electronic bingo is permissible in Macon

County and that the State disparately prosecuted this case

and violated the equal protection safeguards of the U.S.

and Alabama Constitution. The games played at VictoryLand

were not the traditional game of bingo under Barber v.

Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65 (Ala.

2009) (“Cornerstone”), and, therefore, were properly seized

as illegal gambling machines. Likewise, the State properly

seized related currency and gambling paraphernalia,

including records. This Court explicitly stated that the

Cornerstone factors should be applied to the seized

machines in this case. See Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337,

356 (Ala. 2013). Because the briefs and the record

adequately present the facts and legal arguments, oral

argument is unnecessary. Ala. R. App. P. 34(a)(3). But if

the Court determines that oral argument would be

worthwhile, the State would welcome the opportunity to

present its argument.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ......................... i 

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................. v 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... vi 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................... 1 

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ................................... 5 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .................................... 5 

A.  State agents made undercover visits to VictoryLand, where they observed electronic machines that were not the traditional game of bingo ............................................ 6 

B.  State agents obtained and executed a warrant at VictoryLand and seized machines, currency, and gambling paraphernalia ...................... 10 

C.  KCED presents evidence about how the proponents of Amendment 744 want “bingo” to be defined ......................................... 12 

STANDARDS OF REVIEW ...................................... 14 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................. 15 

ARGUMENT ................................................. 17 

I.  The trial court improperly dismissed this action under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution .................................. 19 

A.  There is no evidence of partiality in the application or enforcement of the law ........... 19 

B.  The trial court’s equal protection analysis is erroneous as a matter of law .................... 22 

iii

C.  The trial court’s sua sponte equal-protection ruling is contrary to the sole argument made by KCED ......................................... 25 

II.  The trial court improperly redefined “the game of bingo” based on testimony regarding voter intent despite this Court’s definition in Cornerstone ....... 26 

A.  This Court has firmly established the definition of the game of bingo in Macon County and all other counties with bingo amendments ...................................... 27 

B.  Amendment 744 is a cut-and-paste from other local bingo amendments without any special or unique language ................................. 30 

C.  Dubious legislative history cannot overturn this Court’s established definition of bingo in derogation of the text of the amendment ...... 32 

1.  The plain and common meaning, not a secret or technical meaning, controls the interpretation of a constitutional provision .................................. 33 

2.  The ipse dixit of a single legislator or a handful of voters is irrelevant .......... 35 

3.  Amendment 744’s drafters intentionally omitted language that would address “electronic bingo.” ........................ 37 

III. The trial court failed to apply Cornerstone and incorrectly found that KCED’s machines were legal gambling devices ..................................... 39 

A.  The evidence showed that the games available for play on electronic machines at VictoryLand were unlawful gambling devices, not “the traditional game of bingo.” ..................... 42 

1.  The VictoryLand games did not involve cards ...................................... 42 

iv

2.  The numbers in the VictoryLand games were not drawn and announced like traditional bingo ...................................... 43 

3.  The VictoryLand games did not require players to pay attention to the announced values or physically act to mark each announced value ............................ 44 

4.  The VictoryLand games did not permit a player to “sleep” a bingo, as in the traditional game of bingo .................. 49 

5.  The VictoryLand games did not require a player to recognize winning patterns or announce such a pattern in competition with other players, as in traditional bingo ...................................... 50 

6.  The VictoryLand games were not like the group activity of traditional bingo because they involved individuals playing at separate computer terminals, unable to determine who else was participating in the same game .............................. 54 

B.  The servers and related electronic devices seized from VictoryLand were part of the networked system that facilitated illegal gambling ........................................ 56 

C.  The trial court should have granted the State’s petition for forfeiture of the currency, records, and other gambling paraphernalia seized from VictoryLand ........... 58 

CONCLUSION ............................................... 61 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................... 62

APPENDIX - Applicable language from bingo amendments

v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This appeal from a final judgment of Judge William

Shashy, specially appointed for the Circuit Court of Macon

County, Alabama, involves an amount in excess of fifty

thousand dollars ($50,000), which places this lawsuit

outside of the exclusive jurisdictional limits of the Court

of Civil Appeals under Code of Alabama (1975) § 12-3-10.

Appellant therefore brings this appeal before the Supreme

Court of Alabama pursuant to Code of Alabama (1975) § 12-2-

7.

The trial court entered judgment on June 25, 2015. C.

1041-1046. On June 26, 2015, appellant filed a timely

notice of appeal. C. 1047-1053. On July 7, 2015, appellee

filed a motion and supporting brief under Rule 59,

Ala.R.Civ.P, seeking to alter or amend the judgment and for

findings of fact. Supp. 1 R. 2-35. The trial court granted

appellee’s motion in part on October 2, 2015. Supp. 2 R. 2-

5. Appellee timely filed a notice of appeal of the October

2 order on October 8, 2015. Supp. 2 R. 6-12. The appeals

were consolidated by this Court.

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority et al., 801 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2015) ...................... 22, 32

Barber v. Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65 (Ala. 2009) ............................ passim

Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing Ass’n, Inc., 960 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 2006) ................. 14, 18, 56, 58

Barrett v. State, 705 So. 2d 529 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) ............... 28, 40

Bright v. Calhoun, 988 So. 2d 492 (Ala. 2008) .............................. 33

Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944) ...................................... 34

City of Bessemer et al. v. E.B. McClain et al., 957 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 2006) ............................ 33

City of Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So. 2d 435 (Ala. 1994) .......................... 28, 40

City of Pinson v. Utilities Bd. of City of Oneonta, 986 So. 2d 367 (Ala. 2007) .............................. 38

Davis v. City of Leawood, 893 P.2d 233 (Kan. 1995) ................................ 35

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ..................................... 28

Doe v. Bridgeport Police Dep't, 198 F.R.D. 325 (D.Conn. 2001) ........................... 35

Eagerton v. Terra Res., Inc., 426 So. 2d 807 (Ala. 1982) .............................. 39

Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397 (Ala. 2013) .............................. 35

vii

Ex parte McConathy, 911 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 2005) .......................... 15, 59

Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337 (Ala. 2013) .......................... passim

Ex parte Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 2001) .............................. 33

Ford v. Strange, 580 F. Appx. 701 (11th Cir. 2014) ....................... 25

Ford v. Strange, No. 2:13-CV-214-WKW, 2013 WL 6804193 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 23, 2013) ............................................... 25

Foster v. State, 705 So. 2d 534 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) ................... 40

Houston County Economic Development Authority v. State, 168 So. 3d 4 (Ala. 2014) ............................ passim

I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) .................................... 22

Idaho Dep't of Law Enf't By & Through Richardson v. $34,000 U.S. Currency, 824 P.2d 142 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) ...................... 23

In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 832 P.2d 1303 (Wash. 1992) .............................. 36

Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2004) .......................... 24

James v. Todd, 103 So. 2d 19 (Ala. 1957) ............................... 35

Kean's v. Par. of E. Baton Rouge, 668 So. 2d 1343 (La. Ct. App. 1996) ..................... 34

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) ..................................... 22

Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Ancient Free & Accepted Masons of Kansas v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of

viii

Shawnee, 912 P.2d 708 (Kan. 1996) ................................ 36

Noonan v. East–West Beltline, Inc., 487 So. 2d 237 (Ala. 1986) .............................. 38

Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) ................................. 23, 24

State By & Through Dep't of Highways v. Pub. Emp. Craft Council of Montana, 529 P.2d 785 (Mont. 1974) ............................... 34

State v. $191,249.11 et al. (Greene Co. Circuit Court, CV-2014-900041) .............. 21

State v. Greenetrack, Inc., 154 So. 3d 940 (Ala. 2014) ...................... 21, 29, 40

State v. Sayre, 24 So. 89 (Ala. 1897) ................................... 27

Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp., 327 P.3d 518 (Nev. 2014) ................................ 37

United States v. “MONKEY”, A Fishing Vessel, 725 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1984) ........................... 23

United States v. United States Currency $31,828, 760 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1985) ............................ 23

United States v. United States Currency Totaling $87,279, 546 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D. Ga. 1982) ....................... 23

Utility Ctr., Inc. v. City of Ft. Wayne, 868 N.E.2d 453 (Ind. 2007) .............................. 35

Wade v. State, 986 So. 2d 1212 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) ................... 60

Water Works & Sewer Bd. of City of Selma v. Randolph, 833 So. 2d 604 (Ala. 2002) .............................. 34

Statutes 25 U.S.C. § 2703 ......................................... 32

ix

Ala. Code § 12-2-7 ....................................... 15

Ala. Code § 13A-12-20 ..................................... 1

Ala. Code § 13A-12-30 .................................... 59

Rules Ala. R. App. P. 34 ........................................ i

Ala. R. App. P. 4 ......................................... 3

Constitutional Provisions Ala. Const. amend. No. 508 ............................... 31

Ala. Const. amend. No. 674 ............................... 31

Ala. Const. amend. No. 744 ............................... 31

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is about KC Economic Development’s (“KCED”)

attempt to defy Alabama’s anti-gambling laws by labeling

its machines “bingo” despite the characteristics that make

those machines unlawful slot machines and gambling devices.

See Ala. Code § 13A-12-20(5) & (10). Alabama seized the

machines, gambling records, and currency involved in the

gambling operation at VictoryLand, a casino located at 8680

County Road 40 in Macon County. C. 23-25.

In 2013, the State of Alabama filed a forfeiture

petition pursuant to Ala. Code § 13A-12-30, seeking the

forfeiture of those gambling devices, records, and

$263,105.81, used as bets or stakes in gambling activity.1

C. 23-150. The complaint named 1,615 gambling devices,2

including servers and other devices. C. 24-25, 30-150.

The complaint also listed entities that may have an

ownership interest in the property. C. 23-24.

1 The State filed its original complaint on February 25, 2013. Subsequently, the State amended its original petition with a more exact amount for the seized currency after an official count by a financial institution. C. 377-502.

2 The seized gambling devices were listed on the attached Exhibit to the State’s Complaint. C. 30-150.

2

KCED intervened in the forfeiture action filed by the

Appellant. C. 242-246,281. After intervening and answering

the petition, KCED objected to the amended complaint and

moved to dismiss the forfeiture complaint pursuant to Ala.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (4), (5), and (6), arguing that the

State failed to properly plead the entire currency in the

original petition and that trial court lacked jurisdiction

over the seized currency. C. 503-513. The trial court

took no action on KCED’s motion.

The trial court then heard testimony over four days and

reviewed over seventy (70) exhibits, including undercover

video of game play at VictoryLand. R. 79-80; see also

Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 (Videos of Undercover Visits). The

trial court accepted proposed Orders from all parties by

October 27, 2014, and the State filed a post-trial

Summation & Post-Trial Brief. C. 898-1038.

The trial court issued an Order dismissing the petition

for forfeiture on federal constitutional grounds. C. 1041-

1046. The trial court did not make any findings on the

facts of the case, failed to apply the Cornerstone factors

to the games being played at VictoryLand, and determined

that the State unfairly enforced the laws of Alabama

3

against the property and intervenors in the case –

allegedly violating the equal-protection clause of the

Constitution. Id. The State timely appealed this final

order the next day. C. 1047-1049.

After the State filed its notice of appeal, KCED filed

a Motion to Amend or Alter and Make Findings of Fact

requesting the trial court to make factual findings and

rulings with respect to the return of the seized property

that were not included in the previous order. Supp. 1 R.

2-35. The State filed its own post-judgment motion,

requesting that the trial court follow the directions of

this Court and apply the Cornerstone factors to the

evidence submitted during trial. Supp. 1 R. 36-44. The

State’s appeal was held in abeyance pending a ruling on the

post-judgment motions. See Ala. R. App. P. 4(a)(3).

The trial court held a hearing on the post-judgment

motions and issued another Order on October 2, 2015. Supp.

2 R. 2. The trial court held that electronic bingo may be

played in Macon County because of voter intent and ordered

the State to take legal action in other counties within

forty-five days or return the seized property. Supp. 2 R.

2-5.

4

With the trial court’s ruling on the post-judgment

motions, the State’s appeal became effective. KCED timely

filed a cross appeal. Supp. 2 R. 6-8. This Court

consolidated KCED’s cross appeal with the State’s original

appeal.

5

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

This case presents essentially three issues:

(1) Did the trial court err by dismissing the case

based on an equal-protection argument that no party raised?

(2) Did the trial court err by dismissing the case on

the grounds that the word “bingo” in Macon County’s local

amendment means something completely different than the

same word in comparable local amendments that apply to

other counties?

(3) Do the electronic devices seized from VictoryLand

play “bingo” as that word has properly been defined by this

Court?

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

This Court is well aware of the State’s ongoing attempt

to enforce its gambling laws in facilities in various

counties. Despite many previous rulings from this Court,

casinos continue to set up machines that are slot machines

and call them bingo. The State enforces Alabama law that

prohibits gambling, this Court reiterates that gambling is

prohibited and bingo exceptions should be narrowly

construed, and casinos reopen shortly thereafter with new

6

devices. The cycle seems to continue despite every effort

to encourage all elected officials to enforce the laws.

In this latest case, KCED applies the name “bingo” to

activities at VictoryLand that do not remotely resemble the

traditional game of bingo. At VictoryLand, players tap a

computer screen or press a console button, and a computer

populates a digital grid with characters and makes the

determination whether a “winning match” exists. If no

match exists, the game is over; if a match exists, the

player receives the winnings from the wager without any

further action required. KCED applies bingo terms to

various elements of each activity but the games are not the

traditional game of bingo and are illegal under the laws of

this state.

A. State agents made undercover visits to VictoryLand, where they observed electronic machines that were not the traditional game of bingo.

Several state agents investigated VictoryLand in an

undercover capacity, recording what they saw. Agent Gene

Sisson visited VictoryLand two times. R. 73-74. Agent

Crocker visited one time with Agent Smith. R. 222. Deputy

John Weatherly, of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office,

also visited the facility. R. 78. The agents all observed

7

or participated in electronic gambling on machines at

VictoryLand.

Several agents who played the machines at VictoryLand

attempted to record audio and video of their experiences.

R. 74-80; R. 222; see also State’s Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.

Agent Sisson testified that he “observed all of [the

games]” at VictoryLand and that they all substantially

operated in the same manner. R. 449.

After arriving at VictoryLand, the agents purchased a

player card3 and obtained a corresponding PIN number at the

account services area. R. 87-91, 223. VictoryLand patrons

used these player cards to initiate play on the game

systems. Agent Sisson and Crocker testified that they took

their player cards to a machine, inserted or swiped it on

the machine, and entered their PIN. R. 87, 91, 232. Once

logged in, the player was able to adjust his wager after

logging in to the player account associated with the player

card number and connected PIN. R. 98. On some terminals,

players could choose between “six different game systems to

3 The player cards were like credit cards that had a magnetic strip so that it could be swiped on the machine to insert credits onto the machine to play. R. 536. These cards were not cards which were used in the play of the games.

8

play on that one machine.” R. 96. All the games played in

substantially the same manner. R. 449.

After selecting a particular game, Agent Sisson

observed a prominent display of spinning reels on the

screen. R. 99-100. He also saw a small video representation

of a five-by-five bingo grid in the corner of the screen

that was about three inches by three inches. R. 100. He

would “simply hit play and the reels would start spinning.”

R. 99. Agent Sisson would then become a spectator as he

watched the reels spin, heard “bells and dings that you

typically hear with slot machines,” and waited until the

reels stopped. R. 100-101. Players were only required to

press the play button once to go through an entire game

cycle. R. 104, 233-234. Agent Sisson did not have to know

or look for any particular pattern when he played; instead,

the machine identified winning games automatically without

any further interaction. R. 106-107, 125. Touching the

screen or the five-by-five grid at any other time had no

effect. R. 124-125.

Agent Sisson testified that he did not use a paper or

printed card to play the game. R. 93, 129, 136. He never

heard anyone else say “bingo” aloud. R. 107. He never

9

interacted with any other player. R. 142-143. He could

not determine whether any other player participated in any

of the games he played. Id. He never heard an announcer

call any numbers for his game. R. 136. He never

interacted with an announcer, even when he won. R. 107.

And he never informed the announcer or anyone else when he

won a game. Id. KCED’s own expert, Richard Williamson,

corroborates Agent Sisson’s descriptive testimony because

he agreed that the human player did not have to do anything

but hit a single “play” button and allow the software to do

all other aspects of the gameplay. R. 533-534.

Additional testimony showed that the games were not the

ordinary or traditional game of bingo because of other

aspects. Agent Sisson testified about the play of “bonus

rounds.” R. 124-125, 129. During a bonus round, the

machine “would launch into a series of repetitive,

sequential game cycles without any interaction from

[Sisson] at all.” R. 124; see also R. 553-559 (Williamson

testifies that there are actually four separate “bingo

games” played during bonus play without any human

interaction). The machines automatically added any bonus

winnings to Agent Sisson’s account. R. 124. Testimony

10

also indicated that the games on the machines were “house

banked” games. R. 545. Consequently, this differed from

the traditional game of bingo. Instead of paying a jackpot

from the pari-mutuel pool of money from purchased cards,

the machines at VictoryLand jackpot was independent from

the number of players and cards in an individual game. See

generally R. 543-546.

B. State agents obtained and executed a warrant at VictoryLand and seized machines, currency, and gambling paraphernalia.

After gathering evidence about these activities at

VictoryLand, State agents applied for a warrant for the

gambling devices, currency, and materials at VictoryLand.

C. 24-25; see also R. 149 and Exhibit 11 (Search Warrant).

On the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, this Court

ordered a circuit judge to issue the warrant. Ex parte

State, 121 So. 3d 337, 356 (Ala. 2013).

Several agents went to VictoryLand in an undercover

capacity to play games just before others executed the

warrant and remained while agents catalogued the seized

items. R. 356-366, 386-390. When officers arrived to

execute the warrant, they cleared patrons from the casino

floor. R. 391.

11

Teams of agents then inventoried the machines or

terminals on the casino floor. R. 151-152. Agents seized

all of the machines from the casino floor, keeping track of

each machine by serial number. R. 152; see also Exhibit 12

(Property Inventory Sheets). A VictoryLand employee logged

into the servers and showed agents which ones were

controlling and running the devices on the floor. R. 253.

In the server room, away from the casino floor, agents

found and seized servers that controlled game play on the

terminals and other connected devices. R. 270-274. As

agents unplugged the servers, the terminal screens on the

casino floor began displaying a message indicating “network

connection lost.” R. 155.

From the cashier room, agents seized money from the

counter area and drawers in the cashier cage area. R. 315-

316. They also seized money from card kiosks – ATM-like

machines - on the casino floor and money from a case

located behind the “account services” lobby area. R. 324.

To store the seized currency, the agents securely sealed

the money into separate evidence bags for the different

locations. R. 317, 327-328. Initially, agents

unofficially counted the seized currency and believed they

12

had seized a total of $223,405.86. R. 334-336. A later

official count by a financial institution indicated that it

was in fact $263,105.81. C. 378. Agents did not seize

currency from the vault area, ice cream parlor area, pari-

mutual gambling area, bar area, or the restaurant area. R.

340-341. Agents were even circumspect from seizing money

that was clearly marked as “identified as coming from the

restaurant.” R. 337.

Agents also searched for “records that related to the

ownership, the use, the operation of the gaming

devices...records that showed...how the machines were

operated, who owned the machines, where the machines came

from” and other business records in the offices at

VictoryLand. R. 368. They discovered and seized records in

the office area. R. 368-369. Agents also seized computers

they found in the office areas along with the business

records. R. 404.

C. KCED presents evidence about how the proponents of Amendment 744 want “bingo” to be defined.

In the trial court, KCED argued that the word “bingo”

in Amendment 744, which applies to Macon County, means

“bingo in all forms,” including “electronic,” because that

13

is what the voters and the sponsors of the amendment

intended. R. 13.

Tuskegee Mayor Johnny Ford, who originally sponsored

Amendment 744 in the Legislature, testified that he

intended the amendment to allow “all forms of bingo” so

that Macon County would be competitive with all other

gaming in the state – including the Poarch Creek Band of

Indians. R. 634. Former Senator Myron Penn testified that

he also wanted the legislation to “give the citizens of

Macon County the opportunity to vote on different forms of

bingo, including electronic bingo in Macon County.” R.

669. They testified that, during debate in the

Legislature, groups opposed the amendment because of the

concern that it would “lead to expanded gambling in the

state.” R. 637. But Penn encouraged passage in the Senate

because “the citizens of Macon County wanted the

opportunity to have the same forms of bingo that the

Indians had and what the Native Americans had initiated.”

R. 670. Ultimately, the legislation passed both the House

and Senate without dissent, but it did not include any

language that would expressly allow “electronic bingo”. R.

663, 654-655, 682.

14

The subsequent debate in the community by opponents and

supporters focused on a belief, or fear, that the amendment

would lead to “electronic bingo.” R. 638-640. Articles

and editorials appeared in local publications discussing

“electronic bingo.” R. 646-647; see also KCED Exhibits 9-

10. Legislators held meetings where they handed out flyers

and told attendees that passage of the amendment would

allow “electronic bingo” or “all forms of bingo” in Macon

County. R. 661, 691, 705; see also e.g., KCED Exhibits 4-7

(flyers regarding Amendment 744). Three other witnesses

from Macon County testified that they believed that passing

Amendment 744 would allow “all forms of bingo” – including

electronic bingo – in Macon County. R. 686, 691, 706, 714-

715. In 2003, the citizens of Macon County passed the

Amendment and VictoryLand began offering so-called

“electronic bingo” shortly afterward.

 

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Most of the issues in this appeal are legal questions

that this Court reviews de novo. Barber v. Jefferson Cnty.

Racing Ass’n, Inc., 960 So. 2d 599, 603 (Ala. 2006)

(“Barber”). To the extent the circuit court made fact

15

findings, those findings are reviewed for clear error.

Because the trial court heard evidence ore tenus at the

forfeiture proceeding, “the trial court’s judgment is

presumed to be correct unless the record shows it to be

contrary to the great weight of the evidence.” Ex parte

McConathy, 911 So. 2d 677, 681 (Ala. 2005). See also Ala.

Code § 12-2-7(1).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court made three errors, which resulted in

the judgment below.

First, the trial court incorrectly concluded that the

State violated the Equal Protection Clause of the

Constitution by enforcing the gambling laws in Macon County

against the seized property. KCED never made this argument

in the trial court, and it introduced no admissible

evidence to show that the State was enforcing the gambling

laws in a partial manner. Even if such evidence were

introduced, however, the trial court did not find that the

State was treating similar parties dissimilarly based on an

unconstitutional classification, which is the legal

standard for selective prosecution. In fact, the trial

court’s sua sponte equal protection analysis is contrary to

16

the only legal argument that KCED made--an argument that

VictoryLand should be treated differently, not that it

should be treated the same, as other gambling operations.

Second, the trial court erroneously held that the words

“bingo games” in the local bingo amendment applicable to

Macon County should be interpreted differently than the

same words in other local bingo amendments. The trial

court’s reasoning flies in the face of a long line of this

Court’s precedents in which it has held that the six-factor

test in Cornerstone applies to all of Alabama’s local bingo

amendments. Even if the Court were to reconsider that

precedent, its reasoning should still apply to Macon

County’s local amendment. The relevant portion of Macon

County’s amendment is exactly like the amendment at issue

in Cornerstone and exactly like the amendment at issue in

an earlier case, Evans, which held that such language must

be strictly and narrowly construed. The drafters of Macon

County’s amendment testified that they intentionally used

the same language of other Alabama amendments. The

ordinary words of the law control, not a secret or

technical meaning intended by the law’s proponents.

17

Finally, because the trial court misapplied the law,

the trial court erroneously denied the State’s petition for

forfeiture. KCED did not meaningfully argue that its

gambling devices were consistent with this Court’s six-

factor Cornerstone test. And the State proved with

overwhelming evidence that the gambling devices seized from

VictoryLand do not play the game of “bingo” as this Court

has defined it. Accordingly, the gambling devices are

unlawful and subject to forfeiture. Moreover, the State

established that the money, records, and other

paraphernalia that it seized from VictoryLand were related

to unlawful gambling, even though KCED contested the link.

Because the great weight of evidence established that the

gambling activity at VictoryLand violated the law, the

trial court erred when it denied the State’s petition for

forfeiture.

This Court should reverse the trial court and enter

judgment for the State.

ARGUMENT

This Court has made clear that Alabama’s constitution

and statutes “prohibit the vicious system of lottery

schemes and the evil practice of gaming, in all their

18

protean shapes.” Barber, 960 So. 2d at 614 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Local bingo amendments to

Alabama’s constitution “should be narrowly construed.”

Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 78. These amendments, including

Macon County’s, permit only the traditional game of bingo.

Regardless of actions by local officials, “the question of

what the constitution means by the term ‘bingo’ is a purely

legal question that must be decided by the courts.” Ex

parte State, 121 So. 3d at 356. No state amendment is

exempted from the analysis in Cornerstone. Houston County

Economic Development Authority v. State, 168 So. 3d 4, 11

(Ala. 2014)(holding that the “analysis in Cornerstone is

applicable to the other local bingo constitutional

amendments in this State”).

In light of this body of law, the trial court made

three errors in this case. First, the trial court

erroneously dismissed the State’s forfeiture petition based

on an erroneous equal protection argument, which no one

ever raised and the federal courts have rejected on these

same facts. Second, the trial court erroneously held that,

as a matter of law, the definition of “bingo” in the local

bingo amendment that applies to Macon County is materially

19

different than the definition of the same word in

comparable local amendments. Third, the trial court

declined to grant the petition of forfeiture, even though

the State’s evidence proved the illegality of the gambling

devices and proceeds under established law.

I. The trial court improperly dismissed this action under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.

The trial court’s initial error arises from its first

order dismissing the case. C. 1041-1046. Instead of

dealing with the question of the gambling’s legality, the

trial court dismissed the case sua sponte on the grounds

that the State “is cherry-picking which facilities should

remain open or closed.” C. 1044. The trial court held

that this purported “cherry-picking” violated the Equal

Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The trial

court’s reasoning is manifestly incorrect under the

applicable law and facts.

A. There is no evidence of partiality in the application or enforcement of the law.

The evidence before the trial court fails to

substantiate the accusation that the State is improperly or

dissimilarly enforcing the law. This Court is well aware of

the ongoing efforts to enforce the anti-gambling laws in

20

our state. Gambling laws that are regularly enforced by

forfeitures and convictions in Jefferson, Madison, and

Mobile counties are actively undermined in other counties.

In this atmosphere, the State has attempted to enforce the

laws as best as possible with the limited resources

available. These efforts most assuredly are not a violation

the U.S. Constitution.

The trial court relied on “testimony and discussion

with counsel for all the parties” to conclude that illegal

gambling devices were openly operated in other areas of the

State. C. 1042. This evidence was inadmissible. KCED

offered demonstrative charts of law enforcement activities,

but those charts have no foundation in testimonial

evidence. R. 734, 749-752. But, even if KCED’s charts and

“attorney conversations” were proper evidence, that

evidence would still fall far short of the kind of evidence

that is required to make a finding of a violation of equal

protection. See generally Supp. 1 R. 20-55. KCED’s

evidence and “attorney conversations” purport to show only

that gambling operations have reopened after the State has

closed them and filed forfeiture actions precisely like

this one. This evidence is not about the State’s law

21

enforcement actions at all; it concerns the actions of

third parties who are breaking the law even though the

State is litigating (and in some cases has already won)

forfeiture actions against their so-called electronic bingo

machines.

In fact, the trial court’s conclusion that the State is

engaged in the selective enforcement of gambling laws is

belied by public records, including cases that have gone

before this Court, which this Court can judicially notice.

The trial court claimed that the State has not enforced

gambling laws in Houston County, but this Court granted the

State’s request to forfeit gambling devices and proceeds

from Houston County last year. HEDA v. State, 168 So. 3d 4

(Ala. 2014). The trial court claimed that the State has

not enforced gambling laws in Greene County, but this Court

has resolved multiple appeals arising out of the State’s

efforts to do precisely that, see, e.g., State v.

Greenetrack, Inc., 154 So. 3d 940 (Ala. 2014), and the

State held a trial in an “electronic bingo” gambling case

as recently as October 2015 in Greene County. See State v.

$191,249.11 et al. (Greene Co. Circuit Court, CV-2014-

900041)(pending final order). The trial court claimed that

22

the State has not enforced gambling laws with respect to

the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, but the State filed a

federal lawsuit to contest the legality of those gambling

activities. Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority et al., 801

F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2015). In light of the number and

variety of cases the State has filed to enforce the

gambling laws, it “blinks reality”4 for the trial court to

find that the State has enforced the laws selectively.

B. The trial court’s equal protection analysis is erroneous as a matter of law.

Even assuming that the trial court’s fact-finding is

correct, its sua sponte equal protection analysis is

legally erroneous. This is so for several reasons.

First, the defendant in this forfeiture action is the

property, not a person. Property does not have an equal

protection right under the federal Constitution. The

general rule in forfeiture proceedings is that the

government can forfeit illegal contraband, even if the

contraband is seized in a way that violates a person’s

constitutional rights. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza,

468 U.S. 1032, 1046–47 (1984); United States v. United

4 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 234 (2005).

23

States Currency $31,828, 760 F.2d 228, 230-31 (8th Cir.

1985); United States v. “MONKEY”, A Fishing Vessel, 725

F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1984); Idaho Dep't of Law Enf't

By & Through Richardson v. $34,000 U.S. Currency, 824 P.2d

142, 145 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); United States v. United

States Currency Totaling $87,279, 546 F. Supp. 1120, 1126

(S.D. Ga. 1982). Any other rule would require the

government to return cocaine, meth, and marijuana when the

drugs were seized without a warrant or probable cause.

Second, the Constitution does not eliminate a

prosecutor’s discretion to use limited resources in the

wisest way. Instead the United States Supreme Court has

explained that the government’s exercise of prosecutorial

discretion violates the Constitution only if the discretion

is based on an unjustifiable, unconstitutional ground.

Accordingly, the first step of an equal protection claim

based on selective prosecution is to show that the

prosecution is “based upon an unjustifiable standard such

as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”

Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).

Here, the trial court did not find that the State’s

purported selective enforcement of the laws was based on an

24

unjustifiable classification. The trial court instead

reasoned that any disparity in the enforcement of the law

violates the Constitution, regardless of the reasons for

that disparity. That ruling is obviously not the law.

“[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in

enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional

violation.” Id. Contrary to the trial court’s legal

reasoning, the Constitution does not require the State to

stop all illegal activity in order to stop any illegal

activity.

Third, the federal courts have evaluated and rejected

this precise equal-protection claim when VictoryLand’s

supporters have made it in other cases. “[D]ifferent

treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not

violate” the Equal Protection Clause. Jackson v. BellSouth

Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004). The

Middle District of Alabama has explained that gambling in

Macon County is not comparable to gambling in Greene County

for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause:

Greene County’s constitutional amendment defines “bingo” as including an “electronic marking machine.” To the contrary, the word “electronic” does not appear in Macon County’s Amendment No.

25

744; it only later appeared in the sheriff’s rules and regulations.

Ford v. Strange, No. 2:13-CV-214-WKW, 2013 WL 6804193 at

*4, n.5 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 23, 2013) (citations omitted).

And, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that Indian casinos

are not “situated similarly to VictoryLand” because “gaming

on Indian lands is subject to an entirely distinct

regulatory regime in which the State may often have a

lesser role.” Ford v. Strange, 580 F. Appx. 701, 714 (11th

Cir. 2014). KCED obviously has no similar argument that

federal Indian law gives it the right to operate gambling

devices that are illegal under state law.

C. The trial court’s sua sponte equal-protection ruling is contrary to the sole argument made by KCED.

Finally, it was error for the trial court to sua sponte

inject the Equal Protection Clause into this case. KCED

never made an equal-protection-clause argument, and the

trial court’s equal-protection analysis is contrary to the

only argument KCED did make. The only legal argument KCED

ever made is that Macon County’s amendment should be

interpreted differently than every other comparable bingo

amendment in Alabama. See generally R. 781-795. In other

words, KCED argued to the trial court that judicial

26

decisions that apply in other areas of Alabama do not apply

with respect to them because the voters in Macon County

intended something different. This is an argument for

special treatment, not equal treatment. The lower court’s

sua sponte equal protection ruling is inconsistent with the

only legal argument that KCED made in the lower court.

II. The trial court improperly redefined “the game of bingo” based on testimony regarding voter intent despite this Court’s definition in Cornerstone.

The trial court’s second error came in its order

granting KCED’s post-trial motion, in which the trial court

accepted KCED’s only legal argument. KCED erroneously

argued, and the trial court erroneously held, that the word

“bingo” in Amendment 744 has a special definition that

allows so-called “electronic bingo” to be played on devices

that are indistinguishable from slot machines. The trial

court reached this result in spite of the fact that

Amendment 744 does not use the word “electronic.” The

trial court reached this result in spite of the fact that,

prior to Amendment 744’s passage, the Alabama courts had

already held that the word “bingo” in local bingo

amendments must be given its common, ordinary meaning. The

trial court reached this result in spite of this Court’s

27

case law holding that the word “bingo” means the same thing

in every local bingo amendment. The trial court’s support

for its anomalous conclusion was testimony and evidence

about so-called “voter intent” at the time of Amendment

744’s passage. The trial court’s reasoning was erroneous.

A. This Court has firmly established the definition of the game of bingo in Macon County and all other counties with bingo amendments.

This Court has already defined the game of “bingo” for

Alabama’s local constitutional amendments, but the trial

court ignored that definition. In Cornerstone, this Court

held that local bingo amendments must be construed based on

the ordinary meaning of the term “bingo,” interpreted in

light of the history of the term’s use. See Cornerstone, 42

So. 3d at 79 (Ala. 2009) (quoting State v. Sayre, 24 So.

89, 92 (Ala. 1897)). The Court explained that “except where

the language of [the terms used in] constitutional

provision[s] requires otherwise, we look to the plain and

commonly understood meaning of the terms used in that

provision to discern its meaning.” Id. The Court

emphasized that the Constitution’s “words and phrases were

used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from

28

technical” or “secret” meaning. Id. (quoting District of

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008)).

The Court properly looked to the history of local bingo

amendments in Alabama to develop its six-prong test in

Cornerstone. The Court reviewed definitions from local

statutes in Alabama and definitions from other states

before issuing a six-prong Cornerstone test for whether a

game is “bingo.” See generally, 42 So. 3d at 81-86. The

Court also cited to its longstanding caselaw that local

bingo amendments must be construed narrowly in light of the

state’s strong public policy against lotteries as expressed

in Section 65 of the Alabama Constitution. See id. (citing

Barrett v. State, 705 So. 2d 529 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) and

City of Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So. 2d 435, 436 (Ala.

1994)).

Based on its understanding of the common, ordinary

definition of “bingo,” the Court in Cornerstone adopted a

six-factor test for the legal definition of “bingo.”

Although the case before the Court in Cornerstone

specifically concerned the charity “bingo” amendment in

Lowndes County, Amendment 674, the rule the Court

established in that case applies with full force in all

29

counties with these amendments. The Court in Cornerstone

announced that it was deciding the case, despite the

appellee’s suggestion that the case had become moot,

because it needed to resolve “legal questions” over the

meaning of “bingo” that were “likely to recur and indeed

already have recurred” in “other locales.” Cornerstone, 42

So. 3d at 77. The Court thus “ascrib[ed] meaning to the

term ‘bingo’” not only for the Lowndes amendment at issue

in that appeal, but also for “similar amendments applicable

to other locales.” Id. at 77 n.9.

The Court has continued to apply the six-factor

Cornerstone test in subsequent cases regarding illegal

gambling in Alabama. See Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337

(Ala. 2013); State v. Greenetrack, Inc., 154 So. 3d 940

(Ala. 2014); HEDA v. State, 168 So. 3d 4 (Ala. 2014). The

Court has held that this definition for the game of bingo

applies in every county that has a constitutional amendment

allowing charitable bingo. Greenetrack, 154 So. 3d at 959

(holding that “the game of ‘bingo’ as that term is used in

local constitutional amendments throughout the State is

that game ‘commonly or traditionally known as bingo,’...

this game is characterized by at least the six elements we

30

identified in Cornerstone.”)(emphasis added). The Court

also held that the Cornerstone test specifically applies in

Macon County when it granted the search and seizure warrant

that led to the forfeiture in this case. There, the Court

explained that “that test, which refers to the game

commonly and traditionally known as ‘bingo’ and then

describes further elements of that game, is more than clear

enough to serve as guide in measuring the facts of this

case.” Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337, 356 (Ala. 2013).

B. Amendment 744 is a cut-and-paste from other local bingo amendments without any special or unique language.

Even if the Court were inclined to reconsider the body

of law that we have discussed above, it should not. As a

matter of text and history, the Cornerstone definition of

“bingo” is entirely consistent with the use of the term

“bingo” in Macon County’s local amendment. This is so for

at least three reasons.

First, the relevant portion of Amendment 744 is

identical to the same portion in Amendment 674, which was

at issue in Cornerstone. Amendment 674 provides that

“[t]he operation of bingo games for prizes or money by

nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or

31

other lawful purposes shall be legal.” Ala. Const. amend.

No. 674 (Lowndes County). Amendment 744 provides “[t]he

operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit

organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful

purposes shall be legal.” Ala. Const. amend. No. 744

(Macon County). This operative statement about what is

allowed under the amendment can be found in many other

local bingo amendments in Alabama as well. As an Appendix

to this brief, we have reproduced the applicable language

from each of Alabama’s local bingo amendments and noted any

differences between those amendments and Macon County’s.

See Appendix.

Second, when the voters of Macon County adopted

Amendment 744 in the early 2000s, this Court had already

held that the identical language in Amendment 508 had to be

narrowly construed in Evans. The operative phrase of the

Macon County amendment is identical to Amendment 508, which

was addressed in Evans. Exactly like Amendment 744,

Amendment 508 provides “[t]he operation of bingo games for

prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for

charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be

legal.” Ala. Const. amend. No. 508. By incorporating the

32

exact phrasing of pre-existing local amendments, the

drafters of Amendment 744 incorporated this Court’s

announced understanding of those amendments.

Third, Amendment 744 is completely devoid of any

language that could reasonably be interpreted to allow a

special definition of bingo that includes electronic or

technological devices. At the time Amendment 744 was

enacted, federal law had long provided that Indian tribes

could conduct “the game of chance commonly known as bingo

(whether or not electronic, computer, or other technologic

aids are used in connection therewith).” 25 U.S.C. § 2703.

There are legitimate debates about what that language

allows. See Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority et al., 801

F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2015). But the drafters of Amendment

744 did not use that language. Instead, they simply copied

Alabama’s other local bingo amendments, which say nothing

about so-called “electronic bingo” or the use of machines.

C. Dubious legislative history cannot overturn this Court’s established definition of bingo in derogation of the text of the amendment.

KCED argues, and the trial court agreed, that Amendment

744 allows for the playing of so-called “electronic bingo”

because of the voters’ intent behind the amendment. During

33

trial, KCED produced several witnesses that testified that

when ratifying Amendment 744 it was the intent of the

voters and legislators to approve the play of so-called

“electronic bingo.” R. 632-763. Essentially, this

testimony was offered to show that this Court’s ruling in

Cornerstone did not apply to Macon County. Supp. 1 R. 2-

35. See also R. 790-795. To the extent the trial court

relied on this testimony and evidence, it committed three

errors.

1. The plain and common meaning, not a secret or technical meaning, controls the interpretation of a constitutional provision.

The trial court ignored the fact that the words in

Macon County’s amendment are the same words in other local

amendments in Alabama. When interpreting the Constitution,

we must first look at the plain meaning of the words. Ex

parte Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 2001); City of Bessemer

et al. v. E.B. McClain et al., 957 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 2006);

Bright v. Calhoun, 988 So. 2d 492 (Ala. 2008).

In interpreting a statute, this Court must ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature as expressed by the statute ...When determining legislative intent from the language used in a statute, a court may explain the language, but it may not detract from or add to the statute...When the language is

34

clear, there is no room for judicial construction.

Water Works & Sewer Bd. of City of Selma v. Randolph, 833

So. 2d 604, 607 (Ala. 2002)(citations omitted). Regardless

of what voters and legislators say, it cannot be that the

people of Macon County intended that bingo mean something

completely different when they enacted a constitutional

amendment with exactly the same words as other local bingo

amendments. Instead, when a drafter pulls language from an

obvious source, courts rightly presume that the drafter

intends the words be interpreted in the same way. “[T]he

general rule [is] that adoption of the wording of a statute

from another legislative jurisdiction carries with it the

previous judicial interpretations of the wording.” Carolene

Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944).5

5 See also State By & Through Dep't of Highways v. Pub. Emp. Craft Council of Montana, 529 P.2d 785, 787 (Mont. 1974) (“When legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on the same or an analogous subject is framed in the identical language, it will ordinarily be presumed that the Legislature intended that the language as used in the later enactment would be given a like interpretation.”); Kean's v. Par. of E. Baton Rouge, 668 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (La. Ct. App. 1996)(“when a municipality or parish chooses to adopt a tax ordinance which copies the language of a state tax statute, the interpretations given to the state statute are deemed to be incorporated in the municipal or parish ordinance”).

35

2. The ipse dixit of a single legislator or a handful of voters is irrelevant.

When interpreting a law, the court cannot rely on the

words of the legislator or a group of voters in derogation

of the law’s plain text. The overall intent of the entire

legislative body is what is deemed important after it

passes a law and that intent is derived from the text:

The intention of the Legislature, to which effect must be given, is that expressed in the statute, and the courts will not inquire into the motives which influenced the Legislature or individual members in voting for its passage, nor indeed as to the intention of the draftsman or of the Legislature so far as it has not been expressed in the act. So in ascertaining the meaning of a statute the court will not be governed or influenced by the views or opinions of any or all of the members of the Legislature, or its legislative committees or any other person.

James v. Todd, 103 So 2d. 19, 28 (Ala. 1957). The views of

a single legislator are irrelevant.6 Similarly, testimony

6 See Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 414 n.8 (Ala. 2013)(“This Court

will not rely solely on the views of a single legislator in ascertaining the intent of a bill, even when that legislator was a sponsor of the bill.”); Utility Ctr., Inc. v. City of Ft. Wayne, 868 N.E.2d 453, 459 (Ind. 2007) (“In interpreting statutes, we do not impute the opinions of one legislator, even a bill's sponsor, to the entire legislature unless those views find statutory expression.”); Doe v. Bridgeport Police Dep't, 198 F.R.D. 325, 348 n. 16 (D.Conn. 2001) (“Post-enactment views of those involved with the legislation should not be considered when interpreting the statute.”); Davis v. City of Leawood, 893 P.2d 233, 244 (Kan. 1995) (concluding that

36

from a few voters cannot be determinative of the intent of

all voters’ in a jurisdiction. See Most Worshipful Grand

Lodge of Ancient Free & Accepted Masons of Kansas v. Bd. of

Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Shawnee, 912 P.2d 708,714 (Kan.

1996) (finding that a small group of “affidavits are not a

representative sample of Kansas voters and have little

value as evidence of voters’ intent”).

Regardless of what the voters or legislators meant to

say or wanted to say, Amendment 744 says nothing about

electronic bingo. There is no textual hook for imposing an

interpretation of “bingo” in Amendment 744 that is

different from the definition of the same word when used in

other local bingo amendments. “[T]o seek the intent of the

provision's drafters or to attempt to aggregate the

intentions of [the] voters into some abstract general

purpose underlying the Amendment, contrary to the intent

expressed by the provision's clear textual meaning, is not

the proper way to perform constitutional interpretation.”

Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp., 327 P.3d 518, 522 (Nev.

“post-enactment statements of individual legislators” are not “reliable indicators of the legislative intent”); In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 832 P.2d 1303, 1308 (Wash. 1992) (“[T]he comments of a single legislator are generally considered inadequate to establish legislative intent.”).

37

2014). The words of a law must speak for themselves.

Constitutional interpretation is not a show of hands.

3. Amendment 744’s drafters intentionally omitted language that would address “electronic bingo.”

Finally, to the extent the testimony of legislators and

voters is relevant at all, it underscores that the

Legislature intended Amendment 744 to be interpreted the

same way as other local bingo amendments, although they

rightly feared that local authorities would adopt an

expansive definition.

Legislators and voters testified that, at the time

Amendment 744 was proposed, they knew bingo was being

played in other places using electronic devices. See

generally, R. 632-763. But, in spite of their knowledge,

they did not include any language in Amendment 744 that

would expand the definition of “bingo” to include

electronic bingo or “bingo in all its forms.” Because the

Legislature and voters were apparently aware of the

potential for “electronic” bingo, but chose not to include

words to that effect, the only reasonable conclusion is

that they did not intend to broaden the definition. “It is

not proper for a court to read into the statute something

38

which the legislature did not include although it could

have easily done so.” City of Pinson v. Utilities Bd. of

City of Oneonta, 986 So. 2d 367, 373 (Ala. 2007) (quoting

Noonan v. East–West Beltline, Inc., 487 So. 2d 237, 239

(Ala. 1986)).

Moreover, former Representative Johnny Ford, who was

the sponsor and author of Amendment 744, testified that

this was no oversight. Instead, he testified that he

intentionally chose not to add language that would

differentiate Amendment 744 from all other bingo

amendments. See R. 661 (“I didn’t fail to place it in

there. I decided not to...”). The implication from his

testimony is that he did not want other members of the

Legislature to know that he had a “secret” or “special”

meaning for the word “bingo” in Amendment 744. Allowing a

legislator’s secret, unexpressed intent to become law would

defeat the purpose of the legislative process. The intent

of the legislature is expressed in the words the

legislature voted on. A law’s meaning must be in the open,

not a secret hidden in the mind of a bill’s sponsor.

* * * * * *

39

The trial court completely disregarded this Court’s

definition, its application in Macon County, and the clear

instruction by this Court to apply this definition to the

games at VictoryLand. Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d at 356.

If the trial court had heeded this Court’s direction, it

would have properly excluded testimony from former

legislators and other witnesses regarding the passing of

Amendment 744. See, e.g., Eagerton v. Terra Res., Inc.,

426 So. 2d 807, 809 (Ala. 1982) (“The motives or reasons of

an individual legislator are not relevant to the intent of

the full legislature in passing the bill.”). Instead the

trial court used such testimony to promulgate its own

idiosyncratic interpretation of the meaning of “bingo.” The

trial court’s decision to ignore this Court’s case law and

the plain text of Amendment 744 was erroneous.

III. The trial court failed to apply Cornerstone and incorrectly found that KCED’s machines were legal gambling devices.

The trial court never applied the Cornerstone test to

the machines and gambling proceeds at issue in this case.

But the uncontroverted evidence supports the forfeiture and

condemnation of the seized evidence. Because the trial

court applied the wrong legal standard, the court

40

incorrectly found that the machines, servers, and specific

devices are lawful gambling devices. Supp. 2 Vol. 1 R. 2-

5. The Court should reverse that finding and render

judgment for the State.

Under this Court’s controlling Cornerstone decision and

its progeny, the only game authorized by state bingo

amendments is the ordinary, traditional game commonly known

as bingo––with all of its human skill elements intact.

Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 80–81; Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d

at 356 (stating that the Cornerstone “test, which refers to

the game commonly and traditionally known as ‘bingo’ and

then describes further elements of that game, is more than

clear enough to serve as guide in measuring the facts of

this case” in Macon County). Moreover, this Court has

repeatedly said that Alabama’s bingo amendments must be

strictly and narrowly construed, while all prohibitions on

gambling are to be given a broad construction. See

Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 78; City of Piedmont, 642 So. 2d

at 436; Barrett, 705 So. 2d at 532; Foster v. State, 705

So. 2d 534, 538 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); Greenetrack, 154

So. 3d 940 (Ala. 2014). Under these precedents, a

41

purported bingo game must, at a minimum, strictly comply

with each and every one of the following six criteria:

1. Each player uses one or more cards with spaces arranged in five columns and five rows, with an alphanumeric or similar designation assigned to each space. 2. Alphanumeric or similar designations are randomly drawn and announced one by one. 3. In order to play, each player must pay attention to the values announced; if one of the values matches a value on one or more of the player’s cards, the player must physically act by marking his or her card accordingly. 4. A player can fail to pay proper attention or to properly mark his or her card, and thereby miss an opportunity to be declared a winner. 5. A player must recognize that his or her card has a “bingo,” i.e., a predetermined pattern of matching values, and in turn announce to the other players and the announcer that this is the case before any other player does so. 6. The game of bingo contemplates a group activity in which multiple players compete against each other to be the first to properly mark a card with the predetermined winning pattern and announce that fact.

Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86. The trial court

intentionally ignored the application of these required

factors in this case.

42

A. The evidence showed that the games available for play on electronic machines at VictoryLand were unlawful gambling devices, not “the traditional game of bingo.”

Although the screens on KCED’s machines often showed

the word “bingo” and even displayed a small grid, the game

on those screens was not the traditional game of bingo.

From a player’s perspective, “[w]on or lost, you just

pressed [a button] one time to play and ran through a game

cycle and stopped.” R. 104.

1. The VictoryLand games did not involve cards.

The games offered at VictoryLand did not involve

“cards.” Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86; C. 3696. Instead,

the games showed a small digital representation of a grid

with five columns and five rows. R. 100. No paper cards

were ever used to play the so-called “electronic bingo”

machines. R. 129, 136. Mr. Williamson agreed that the

game uses no physical cards; the alphanumeric designations

are not verbally announced one by one; and the players are

not required to pay attention to the values announced and

match the values on a card or physically mark his or her

card accordingly. R. 532-534.

Amendment 744, like all other Amendments, requires a

bingo “card” used by the player. A video depiction of a

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card, which the player can only watch, is insufficient.

HEDA, 168 So. 3d at 13 (rejecting HEDA’s argument that an

“electronic depiction of a bingo grid will suffice”).

2. The numbers in the VictoryLand games were not drawn and announced like traditional bingo.

The VictoryLand games did not satisfy Cornerstone’s

requirement that the “[a]lphanumeric or similar

designations [be] randomly drawn and announced one by one.”

42 So. 3d at 86. The numbers involved in the VictoryLand

games were supposedly “randomly drawn” using a random

number generator. R. 484, 490. The display of numbers on

the VictoryLand games is so rapid-fire that not only the

video depiction of a ball draw, but the entire game, is

over within mere seconds after the player presses play. R.

136-137. The draw appears “[v]irtually, all at once” so

that it is “too fast for [a player] to recognize” and

leaves no possibility for player interaction between

numbers. R. 137; see also R. 238 (calling the appearance

of numbers on the screen “faster than I could keep up

with”). This computer-speed mockery of “announcing” could

never be held as compliance with this Court’s requirement.

Thus, the rapid pace and lack of public announcement of the

numbers fail to satisfy the second Cornerstone factor.

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3. The VictoryLand games did not require players to pay attention to the announced values or physically act to mark each announced value.

The VictoryLand games did not require players to “pay

attention to the values announced” or “physically act” when

“one of the values matches a value on one or more of the

player’s cards” by “marking his or her card accordingly.”

Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86. On the games, the player

must do nothing except place a bet, press a button to start

play and wait for the results. R. 550-553. Not only was a

player not required to pay attention to the ball draw, but

attempting to pay attention could not affect the outcome of

the game. R. 102–103. Moreover, attempting to pay

attention was pointless because the player was not allowed

to personally decide what numbers on his card were matching

numbers and physically daub them accordingly. R. 102, 533.

The only matching numbers that the machines daubed were the

numbers, if any, recognized and highlighted by the computer

as part of a winning pattern. R. 103, 534.

At VictoryLand, the machine pays attention to the

values displayed in the mass ball draw and automatically

marks any winning pattern on the player’s screen. On most

machines, the player simply places a bet and presses play

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and watches the machine display a result within seconds. On

a few other machines, the player is prompted to press the

button a second time, which then causes only the numbers

already identified by the machine as matches to be daubed.

R. 239, 497. Neither of these scenarios satisfies

Cornerstone’s mandate. In order for the game to be legal

bingo, the game must require that “each player must pay

attention to the values announced; if one of the values

matches a value on one or more of the player’s cards, the

player must physically act by marking his or her card

accordingly.” Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86 (emphasis

added).

Agent Sisson testified that the player has no

meaningful role in playing the game displayed on the

gambling machines:

Q. Were you required to pay any attention at all to the number drop display in order to win on these machines?

A. No, sir.

R. at 137.

Q. Were you ever required to personally identify and mark any of the individual matching numbers on your bingo video grid as those numbers appeared in the number drop?

46

A. No, sir.

Q. If the matching number was not part of a winning pattern, was it ever highlighted by the machine?

A. I can't answer that. I -- there were times when I wasn't given an opportunity to compare.

Q. Could you ever personally highlight or mark a number on the video bingo grid if the machine had not highlighted it for you?

A. No, sir.

Q. When there was a winning pattern on your video bingo grid, who identified or what identified that pattern to you?

A. The computer determined winning pattern and informed me of such.

Q. Did you have time to react in any way to one number before the rest of the numbers appeared on the screen?

A. No, sir.

Q. When the number drop display was complete, could you ever mark a matching number that was not part of the winning pattern highlighted by the machine?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did the machine decide what numbers to mark as matches on the bingo video grid or did you decide?

A. The machine did -- or the network did. I --

Q. Was it possible for you to fail to any mark any one matching number on your

47

video bingo card display on any of these machines that you played?

A. Well, in the sense that I wasn't required to mark anything, I couldn't fail to mark anything.

R. at 138-139. Most telling of all, Agent Sisson testified

that he could play the machines with his eyes closed. R.

106.

Witnesses agree, including VictoryLand’s own, that once

the player presses the “play” button to start the game, the

player is not required to pay any attention to the numbers

displayed on the machines’ video screens. R. 105–06, 137,

239, 362, and 534. VictoryLand’s own expert admits that the

computer software does all comparative analysis between the

drawn values and the digital representation of a bingo card

on the screen. R. 534. No human decision making,

interaction, or ability could influence which numbers were

daubed or what the outcome would be. Since the player was

not required to pay attention to the ball draw at all, much

less to each number as it is drawn, and neither was

required to “physically” mark “one” matching value on his

card when he personally spotted it, these machines fail the

Cornerstone test for that reason alone. Cornerstone, 42

So. 3d at 86.

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The machines also included bonus rounds, in which the

“game cycles without any interaction from [the player] at

all” as the computer generated numbers, populated the grid,

selected winning patterns, and continued that cycle without

any input at all from a player. R. 124. Instead, “the

machine would play multiple bingo games by itself with no

human interaction.” R. 558. When a player won during

these bonus rounds, the machines automatically credited his

or her account. R. 124.

Both regular play and bonus play on the VictoryLand

machines did not require players to pay attention to any

numbers. Instead, unlike the traditional game of bingo,

players were only required press a single button to

initiate the play of the game and the machine did

everything else. In the bonus rounds, a player was not

required to physically act in any way in order to receive

credit for that win. Because the games on the VictoryLand

machines did not require a player to pay attention or act

in the way a player must during traditional bingo, these

games do not satisfy the third Cornerstone factor.

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4. The VictoryLand games did not permit a player to “sleep” a bingo, as in the traditional game of bingo.

The trial court failed to determine that the

VictoryLand games do not permit a player to “fail to pay

proper attention or to properly mark his or her card, and

thereby miss an opportunity to be declared a winner” in the

manner of traditional bingo. See Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at

86. In the VictoryLand games, as shown above, the player

is not required to pay any attention at all to the video

depiction of a ball draw or the video depiction of a bingo

grid in order to win. Failing to pay attention to those

things does not negatively affect the player’s chances of

winning, and paying attention does the player no good

because the player cannot avoid nor overrule the machine’s

fully automated decisions on what numbers match, what

numbers will be daubed, what if any winning patterns will

be recognized. Likewise, a player cannot react to a called

number during a game on the machines by marking the wrong

number on his card.

Agent Sisson specifically testified about this

impossibility:

Q. Was it possible for you to fail to any mark any one matching number on your

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video bingo card display on any of these machines that you played?

A. Well, in the sense that I wasn't required to mark anything, I couldn't fail to mark anything.

R. 139. Instead, the gambling machines do all the

recognizing and matching. Id. A player does not have to

pay attention to the ball draw at all. A player cannot

improperly or accidentally daub a number. In fact, the

machines ignore any attempt to daub. Agent Sisson

testified about his inability to daub:

Q. Did the machine require you to make your own decision about what numbers you wanted to daub on your video bingo grid and then daub on that basis?

A. Well, you couldn't. Even if you wanted to, you couldn't daub that card.

R. 102-103. Because a player could not lose a VictoryLand

game through inattention or improper marking, these

machines fail to comply with the fourth Cornerstone factor.

5. The VictoryLand games did not require a player to recognize winning patterns or announce such a pattern in competition with other players, as in traditional bingo.

The VictoryLand games did not require a player to

“recognize that his or her card has a ‘bingo,’ i.e., a

predetermined pattern of matching values” or to “announce

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to the other players and the announcer that this is the

case before any other player does so.” Cornerstone, 42 So.

3d at 86. KCED’s attempts to draw analogies between

traditional bingo and the games at VictoryLand again fall

flat.

As evidence before the trial court proved decisively, a

player does not have to recognize a predetermined pattern

to play or win on the machines. R. 240. Instead, the

computer makes all of those decisions by itself:

Q. Did the machine decide what numbers to mark as matches on the bingo video grid or did you decide?

A. The machine did -- or the network did…

...

Q. Could you as the player mistakenly claim a bingo?

A. I mean, I never had to claim one at all; so, if I was to jump up an [sic] holler bingo, it wouldn't have any effect on what was going on anyway.

R. 139-140. All witnesses agree that the machine not only

determines whether there are any matching values, but also

determines whether any matches form a winning pattern—all

on a fully automated basis. R. 72, 106–07, 125, 138–40,

240, and 400.

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The player also does not have to notify any other

players or announcers that they have a matching bingo

pattern. Nobody audibly announces “bingo” to the other

players. R. 107 and 363. Former Agent Crocker testified

to the absence of audible interaction between players or an

announcer while playing the games.

Q. When you played the machines at VictoryLand, did you hear or see anyone announcing those numbers or those balls that had been drawn one by one to the people playing the game?

A. No, sir, I did not.

Q. Did you at any point in time hear an announcer calling out numbers or anything else to player's in the game?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you at any time hear the players announcing out that they had had a bingo or a matching pattern on their cards?

A. No, sir.

R. 238.

Q. Were you required to announce to other player's that you had a winning pattern in order to win the game?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever have to yell out bingo?

A. No, sir.

53

R. 240. The absence of announcing anything violates the

Supreme Court’s fifth Cornerstone requirement.

Nor did the VictoryLand games require players to

announce their winning bingo pattern to anyone at all, much

less before any other player had a winning pattern. R.

107. In fact, players at VictoryLand could not learn of

anyone else’s wins or identify the person who won any

particular game, even if they wanted to. R. 107. The only

possible way a player may have been able to tell they were

playing the same game would be if they were sitting side-

by-side and could look at the other person’s game screen.

R. 143.

Unlike traditional bingo, where players compete to be

the first to identify and announce bingo, the actions of

other players in the VictoryLand games were immaterial to

an individual’s game play. Players were racing no one. R.

140. Players never saw any indication that they were

competing against anybody. R. 96.

Because the VictoryLand games identified winning

patterns instead of requiring players to recognize them,

did not require players to announce a winning pattern to

anyone, and did not exclude any players from winning once

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one player announced a win, the trial court correctly found

that they did not satisfy the fifth Cornerstone factor.

6. The VictoryLand games were not like the group activity of traditional bingo because they involved individuals playing at separate computer terminals, unable to determine who else was participating in the same game.

The trial court failed to properly apply the law

despite the overwhelming evidence that the VictoryLand

games look nothing like the traditional game of bingo.

These games are not “a group activity in which multiple

players compete against each other to be the first to

properly mark a card with the predetermined winning pattern

and announce that fact.” Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86.

But even if the games at VictoryLand were configured to

require a minimum of two players, that hardly constitutes a

group activity. And a player at VictoryLand had no way of

knowing how many players were involved in any given game,

or what players were involved in the same game. R. 142.

Also, as discussed supra, players were not required to

announce a winning pattern. Merely linking various

terminals through a central server is not sufficiently like

the traditional game of bingo to satisfy the sixth

Cornerstone factor. See R. 487-488.

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* * *

The only question before the trial court should have

been whether the games meet the Cornerstone factors. And

the evidence was decisive at every point: the machines do

not satisfy Cornerstone and do not play bingo as defined by

this Court. The fully-automated game that state law

enforcement officers observed, videoed, and played at the

VictoryLand facility fails to fully preserve any, much less

all, of these important human and interactive elements.

The so-called “electronic bingo” games at VictoryLand are

played entirely by machines on a server-based system, and a

player is not actively involved in any of the steps of play

of any games on the seized machines. Indeed, the evidence

shows without contradiction that the drawing, matching,

daubing and pattern identification are all completed

entirely by the machine. The player is given no

opportunity to do anything other than place a bet and press

a button to initiate play, and on a few of the machines, to

press “daub” once when told to do so. This complete lack of

human skill, human ability, human recognition, human

performance of the steps of play, and human attention in

the play of the games is fatal to any claim that this form

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of gambling is legal bingo. These machines are merely slot

machines playing illegal games.

B. The servers and related electronic devices seized from VictoryLand were part of the networked system that facilitated illegal gambling.

It was undisputed in the trial court that the servers

and other electronic equipment were part of the same

networked gambling system. This makes them subject to

forfeiture under Barber, 960 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 2006). This

Court has already held that server-based slot machines with

gambling elements “dispersed throughout the various units

and processes of the integrated network” are illegal

gambling machines. Id. at 614; see also HEDA, 168 So. 3d

at 17 (agreeing that “linking various terminals through a

central server is not sufficiently like the traditional

game of bingo”). As a result, the question the trial court

had to answer was whether these specific servers

facilitated illegal gambling.

Although this Court has held that expert testimony is

unnecessary to prove such facts, testimony from KCED’s own

expert actually supports the finding that the servers were

an integral and necessary component of the gaming systems.

In addition, the record reflects that the particular

57

servers seized from VictoryLand were part of the illegal

gaming systems at VictoryLand.

According to KCED expert Richard Williamson, pursuant

to the request by the Sheriff of Macon County, they looked

at a server, software and player stations for their

testing. R. 482-488. The player consoles had to be

connected to the server to play the game. R. 488, 491.

The server matched numbers on the terminal with drawn

numbers and displayed winning number combinations. R. 497.

The system also maintained a count of the player’s credits,

transmitting the player’s account information to the

VictoryLand cashier. R. 394-395. Even some minimum player

settings were controlled by the server programming. R.

482, 497, 537. The server recorded all the information

regarding the game play activities including the card

number and prize value. R. 494. According to Williamson,

the machines he tested were connected to a server in order

to operate at all. R. 488.

When state agents executed the warrant, a VictoryLand

employee who had the proper credentials to log into the

server assisted them in identifying which servers

controlled which devices. R. 253-263. Agents disconnected

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and seized servers that were networked with the terminals.

Id. Agent Larry Crocker testified that the servers were

linked in an internal network that controlled the gaming

devices at VictoryLand. R. 263-264. Agent Sisson testified

that as other state agents powered down the servers, he saw

that the terminals displayed a “network connection lost”

message. R. 155.

KCED’s own expert explained that servers facilitated

game play on terminals like those at VictoryLand, and the

record shows that the particular servers seized by the

State facilitated game play on VictoryLand terminals. As

discussed, these networked machines were part of an illegal

gambling operation that was not bingo under Cornerstone.

Such networked machines constitute illegal gambling devices

or slot machines. See Barber, 960 So. 2d at 614.

Accordingly, the evidence attests that the State properly

seized the servers and the trial court should have ordered

the servers forfeited.

C. The trial court should have granted the State’s petition for forfeiture of the currency, records, and other gambling paraphernalia seized from VictoryLand.

It was error for the trial court to refuse the State’s

petition to forfeit the gambling proceeds, records and

59

paraphernalia that the State seized. The State’s evidence

established that the currency seized from the cashier area

and ATMS were used as bets or stakes in the illegal

gambling activity at VictoryLand Likewise, the records

that the State seized relate to that gambling activity.

The evidence at trial established that undercover

agents obtained PIN numbers enabling them to play on the

machines by giving money to the cashiers, and they received

money or winnings in their account by cashing out with the

cashiers. R. 236-237. Agents seized currency from drawers

in the cashier area. R. 313-323. They seized currency

from kiosks located inside VictoryLand. R. 323-329. They

also seized currency from the account services area. R.

329-332. All of these areas were connected to the purchase

of player cards, use of player cards, and cashing-out

activity at VictoryLand.

This evidence required the entry of an order that the

currency was used as bets or stakes in an illegal gambling

operation. See Ala. Code § 13A-12-30(c) (providing for the

seizure and forfeiture of “money used as bets or stakes”

used in violation of the law). KCED’s speculative

assertions during trial that the money could have come from

60

the bar or the restaurant are insufficient to rebut this

evidence or contradict the evidence. Agents found money in

an envelope that was connected to the restaurant, but they

did not seize either. R. 337. Nor did agents seize any

money from the ice cream parlor, bar, pari-mutuel, or

restaurant areas. R. 340. The agents were careful to

seize only the money that was connected to the illegal

gambling, not money that may have been generated through

other legal means. Thus, the unrebutted evidence at trial

showed that “the only business being conducted” at the

cashier cage and account services area related to the

illegal gambling machines. Wade v. State, 986 So. 2d 1212,

1220 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).

Ala. Code § 13A-12-30 provides for the forfeiture of

gambling records possessed in connection with an illegal

gambling operation. State agents looked for and seized

“records that related to the ownership, the use, the

operation of the gaming devices that were located inside

the facility, looking for records that showed who -- how

the machines were operated, who owned the machines, where

the machines came from, whether there was -- there were

funds that were generated -- or proceeds that were

61

generated from the operation of the machines.” R. 368-370.

As discussed above, the gambling activities at VictoryLand

were unlawful. The State properly seized the records of

that unlawful operation.

CONCLUSION

This Court should REVERSE the trial court and RENDER

JUDGMENT for the State.

Respectfully submitted,

Luther Strange Attorney General

BY:

s/ Andrew L. Brasher Andrew L. Brasher Solicitor General John L. Kachelman, III Assistant Attorney General OF COUNSEL:

Office of the Attorney General 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130 (334) 353-2609 (334) 242-4891 (fax) abrasher@ago.state.al.us

62

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 19th day of November, 2015,

a copy of the above and foregoing document has been filed

with the Clerk of the Court using the Appellate Courts e-

Filing System and served by electronic mail to all parties

of record.

John Bolton Charlanna Skaggs Hill Hill Carter Franco Cole & Black P.O. Box 116 Montgomery, AL 36101 jbolton@hillhillcarter.com cskaggs@hillhillcarter.com

Joe Espy III William Martin Espy James Flynn Mozingo P.O. Box 5130 Montgomery, AL 36103 jespy@mewlegal.com wespy@mewlegal.com fmozingo@mewlegal.com

Craig Izard P.O. Box 130277 Birmingham, AL 35213 cizard@bham.rr.com

s/ Andrew L. Brasher Andrew L. Brasher Solicitor General

APPENDIX

Comparison of Amendment 744 (Macon County) Language to Other Amendment Language

Amendment 744 (Macon Co.)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Macon County.

same as Macon Co.

Other Amendments

Amendment 386 (Jefferson Co.)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit organizations for charitable or educational purposes shall be legal in Jefferson county, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions.

Amendment 387 (Madison Co.)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit organizations for charitable or educational purposes shall be legal in Madison county, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions.

Amendment 413 (Montgomery Co.)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Montgomery county, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions as provided by law regulating such operation.

Amendment 440 (Mobile Co.)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Mobile county, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions as provided by law regulating such operation.

Amendment 506 (Etowah Co.)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable or educational purposes shall be legal in Etowah county, subject to the provisions of any resolution by the county commission.

Amendment 508 (Calhoun Co.)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Calhoun county, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions as provided by law regulating such operation.

Amendment 542 The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain

(St. Clair Co.) nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in St. Clair County, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns within their respective jurisdictions as provided by law regulating such operation.

Amendment 549 (Walker Co.)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal outside of the corporate limits of the City of Jasper in Walker County, subject to any resolution by the county governing body as provided by law regulating the operation of bingo.

Amendment 550 (Jasper)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in the corporate limits of the City of Jasper in Walker County, subject to any resolution or ordinance by the city governing body as provided by law regulating the operation of bingo.

Amendment 565 (Covington Co.)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations and certain private clubs for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Covington County, subject to any resolution or ordinance by the county commission as provided by law regulating the operation of bingo.

Amendment 569 (Houston Co.)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations and certain private clubs for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Houston County, subject to any resolution or ordinance by the county commission as provided by law regulating the operation of bingo.

Amendment 599 (Hartselle, Falkville, & Decatur)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal only within the boundaries of the Cities of Hartselle and Falkville and that area of the City of Decatur located within the boundaries of Morgan County, subject to any resolution or ordinance by the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions.

Amendment 612 (Russell Co.)

The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations and certain private clubs for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Russell County, subject to any resolution or ordinance by the county commission as provided by law regulating the operation of bingo.