Venezuela Negative - MSDI 2013

8/13/2019 Venezuela Negative - MSDI 2013

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Table of Contents

***China CP*** .............................................................................................................................. 2

China CP 1NC ............................................................................................................................. 3

Solvency: Venezuela ............................................................................................................... 4

Solvency: Oil Advantage ......................................................................................................... 7

2NC Venezuela Says Yes ........................................................................................................ 8

Chinese Soft Power Good: Warming ...................................................................................... 9

2NC Perm Do Both ............................................................................................................... 11

A2: Not Zero Sum ................................................................................................................. 12

A2: Increasing Engagement Not Key .................................................................................... 13

A2: Chinese Involvement Bad ............................................................................................... 15

**Aff Answers** ...................................................................................................................... 16

2AC: General Answers .......................................................................................................... 17

2AC: Perm Do Both .............................................................................................................. 19

2AC A2: Net Benefit ............................................................................................................. 20

***Case Answers*** .................................................................................................................... 22

A2: Solvency ............................................................................................................................. 23

A2: Oil Advantage ..................................................................................................................... 25

Oil Advantage Answers: General .......................................................................................... 26

A2: Oil Shocks ...................................................................................................................... 29

A2: China Advantage ................................................................................................................ 31China Advantage Answers: General...................................................................................... 32

A2: Democracy Impact .......................................................................................................... 34

A2: Credibility Advantage ........................................................................................................ 35

A2: Relations Advantage ........................................................................................................... 37



***China CP***



China CP 1NC

Text: The People’s Republic of China should substantially increase economic

engagement with Venezuela by increasing oil investment contracts and refinery

rent subsidies.

China supports interacting with Venezuela on energy issuesAmineh 2012 *Mehdi Parvizi Amineh; Yang Guang, “Secure oil and alternative energy : the

geopolitics of energy paths of China and the European Union” Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2012.+

The international financial crisis was a turning point for both sides to accelerate their comprehensive cooperation. The

promotion of mutual China-Venezuelan benefits and common prosperity not only helps the

long-term development of ties, but also helps the two states to withstand the global financial

crisis. In February 2009, on a visit to Caracas, Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping announced that: “China

and Venezuela should boost cooperation in energy and finance. Energy cooperation is a priority and

constitutes an important part of bilateral cooperation. The two sides would make a joint effort to push

forward an all-round energy partnership. The two countries should explore more fields and channels for

cooperation. Apart from energy cooperation, we should better tap the cooperation potential in agriculture,

infrastructure and high tech, as well as promote projects in the housing, railway, telecommunication and electric power

sectors.” Sino-Venezuelan energy cooperation began as early as November 1985, when the two

countries signed the protocol on scientific and technological cooperation in oil survey and

exploration. This was a trial period and process for both countries, and a chance to weigh up the possibilities and potential of

collaboration. That said, the signing of the agreement was a clear indication that both countries were aware that hydrocarbon

cooperation could not be ignored. In November 1996, during Chinese Premier LI Peng’s visit to

Venezuela, the two governments signed a further agreement on joint oil exploitation. Since

then, cooperation between the two countries has not only continued, but has been deepened.

Chinese engagement with Venezuela solves the aff and sustains Chinese soft

power in Latin AmericaNye 4/29 [Joseph S. Nye is an American political scientist and former Dean of the John F.

Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About

Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, April 29, 2013,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_

soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0)

In his new book, China Goes Global , George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spent billions of dollars

on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not

limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style

emphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that

opinions of China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly

negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0






Solvency: Venezuela

Venezuela values engagement from ChinaXinhuanet 5/10 [“Future China-Venezuelan cooperation looks optimistic,” May 10, 2013,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-05/12/c_132376693.htm]Officials from Venezuela and China have voiced confidence in bilateral relations since President

Nicolas Maduro took office in April, saying the two countries' cooperation prospects look great. China and Venezuela

established diplomatic relations in 1974. In recent years, the two countries have expanded their cooperation in

energy, finance, infrastructure, technology and production. During his 14-year mandate, the late Venezuelan

President Hugo Chavez visited China six times and boosted bilateral relations. After Maduro was sworn in last month, he said

his government will continue to attach great importance to its strategic partnership with

China and will further deepen and promote their cooperative relations in various fields. "The best

way to pay tribute to Chavez is to continue to deepen Venezuela and China's strategic relationship," he said. The China-Venezuela

High Level Joint Commission was established in 2001 as a high-level decision-making center of the cooperation between the two

countries. A joint development fund between the two nations was created in 2007. Han Deping, regional chief of China Development

Bank's American division, told Xinhua that the joint development fund and the long-term financing loans

are cornerstones of cooperation between the two countries. They not only help undertaking the financial

risks for the Chinese enterprises, but also solve the budget restriction for the Venezuelan government, Han said. Wang Yong, China's

economic and commercial counselor to Venezuela, said trade volume between China and Venezuela amounted to over

23 billion dollars in 2012. Venezuela has become China's fourth largest trading partner in Latin America. China has

provided more than 30 billion dollars to Venezuela in financing nearly 300 bilateral cooperation projects in energy, agriculture,

industry, technology and infrastructure, he added.

China provides loan assistance and financial investments to Venezuela nowSimon Romero, April 18th, 2010, Brazil and South American Bureau Chief for The New York

Times, The New York Times, "Chávez Says China to Lend Venezuela $20 Billion”,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/world/americas/19venez.html?_r=0

CARACAS, Venezuela — President Hugo Chávez said over the weekend that China had agreed to

extend $20 billion in loans to Venezuela, pointing to deepening ties between the two

countries as China seeks to secure oil supplies here. ¶ The announcement of the loans followsother financing agreements with China that have softened a sharp economic downturn in

Venezuela, including a $12 billion bilateral investment fund. China’s ties with Venezuela have

grown increasingly warm in recent years, marked by rising Venezuelan oil exports to China, the

Chinese launching of a satellite for Venezuela and the sale of Chinese military aircraft to

Venezuela. ¶ If the loans materialize, they could give Mr. Chávez a much-needed cash infusion.

Some financial analysts, including the American investment bank Morgan Stanley, have said that

Venezuela could soon face a cash crunch as it grapples with low oil revenues and a dearth of

foreign investment. ¶ “All the oil that China needs for its growth and consolidation as a power

is here,” Mr. Chávez said at a ceremony on Saturday announcing the loans. ¶ Details about the

new financing deal were sparse. Xinhua, the Chinese government’s news agency, said it involved

“soft loans” channeled through the China Development Bank. ¶ The linchpin of the loans appearsto be China’s thirst for oil, with the China National Petroleum Corporation, or C.N.P.C., agreeing

to form a venture with Venezuela’s national oil company to explore for oil in southern

Venezuela. Eventually the companies could produce 400,000 barrels a day in the area.

Venezuela’s energy minister, Rafael Ramírez, said C.N.P.C. would need to pay $1 billion to move

the venture forward. ¶ Venezuela, faced with a slump in oil production, has recently been

seeking to reach similar deals with energy companies from Russia, India and Spain, as well as the

Chevron Corporation from the United States. Mr. Ramírez also made a rare trip to Washington



this month where he spoke about oil projects. ¶ While the United States remains the top buyer

of Venezuela’s oil, China is emerging as a new market. But the precise nature of energy relations

between Venezuela and China remains something of a mystery. Venezuela claims it is exporting

460,000 barrels a day of oil to China, while Chinese government data show the country

importing around 132,000 barrels a day. ¶ Moreover, Venezuela’s government has announced

dozens of oil-exploration and refining ventures with companies from an array of countries

including Iran, Uruguay and China itself. But almost none have been completed during Mr.

Chávez’s 11 years in power; the refurbishment of an oil refinery in Cuba is a rare exception to

this record. ¶

China’s relationship with Venezuela was a direct response to lack of interest in

a relationship with the U.S.Aljazeera, ‘13 [Chris Arsenault, Phil Lind Fellow (University of British Columbia) and Wolfson

Press Fellow (Cambridge),

“Venezuela looks to China for economic boost,” March 12,

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/201331271053389351.html] China is the Future for Venezuela President of OrOctrading, a consulting firm, Sanchez - sporting thick cufflinks with the red Chinese

flag and a dark blazer - has been teaching Venezuelan companies about doing business with the world’s second-largest economy.“Usually, manufactured goods from China are coming into Latin America and raw materials are

going out,” Sanchez told Al Jazeera. “Venezuela has posted a positive trade balance with China,

because of oil exports, but without those we would have a major deficit.” Trade between Venezuela, holder of the

world’s largest oil reserves, and China grew to $18bn in 2011, a 24-fold increase from 2003, reported China Daily, a

government-backed newspaper. Venezuela exports more than 500,000 barrels of oil to the Asian giant

daily, according to government figures, and plans to increase that to one million by 2015. The two countries had

signed 300 bilateral agreements, including 80 major projects, according to a University of Miami study in 2010. Looking

east As relations between Venezuela and the US soured in recent years, Venezuela looked away

from its traditional trading partner towards the east. China could soon surpass the US as Venezuela’s

largest trading partner. Venezuela's interim President Nicolas Maduro, who took the job following the death of President

Hugo Chavez on March 5, held talks with Chinese officials over the weekend. "The best tribute that we could give to our comandante

Chavez is to deepen our strategic relationship with our beloved China," said Maduro, who once served as Venezuela’s foreignminister. In a televised meeting with Maduro, Zhang Ping, chairman of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, said

“deepening relations between China and Venezuela” are “the only way to comfort the soul of President Hugo Chavez”. If elected

president on April 14, Maduro has said his first trip abroad will be to China . Henrique Capriles, leader of

Venezuela’s opposition, criticises most government policies but generally supports expanding trade with China. The countries have

launched two satellites together in recent years, and China is negotiating a free trade deal with Mercosur, a

South American trading zone.

No offense – china already gave massive amounts of aid to Venezuela for

petroleum and coal extractionEllis 5 (June 2005, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for

Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external

actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores” and more than 20 articles inthis research area. Strategic Studies Institute. “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America”

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=606)

It can be argued that Venezuela is currently China’s principal strategic partner in Latin America, both

in terms of the volume of investment, as well as in the nature of the relationship between the

two countries.29 China currently has over $1.5 billion invested in Venezuela―prior to the recently announced

$100 million in investment commitments, the largest investment position of any country in the region.30 Bilateral trade between

China and Venezuela increased from $150 million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 2004,31 and is anticipated to reach $3 billion in 2005,

based on agreements signed during the state visit of Venezuela’s populist president Hugo Chávez Frias to China during the 2004

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/201331271053389351.html

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=606

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=606

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/201331271053389351.html



Christmas holiday,32 as well as a series of 19 cooperation accords signed between Venezuela and China in January 2005.33 These

figures reflect growth in both imports and exports. Venezuelan imports from China grew by 120 percent over 2004 to reach $560

million, while similarly growing oil exports have allowed Venezuela to maintain a net trade surplus.34 The Chinese relationship with

Venezuela reflects not only Chinese interest in Venezuelan resources, but also the receptivity of President Chávez. His interest in

developing alternative markets for Venezuelan petroleum, and developing a hedge against U.S. influence in the region, make him a

strong potential Chinese ally.35 In his highprofile state visit to China, Chávez signed a number of accords in which he committed

Venezuela to put its petroleum production “at the disposition of the great Chinese fatherland.”36 On the other hand, he is also a

potential threat to Chinese interests, insofar as his Bolivarian revolution and support for indigenous populism and antiglobalist

causes could foment instability in China’s trading partners in Latin America, and undermine Chinese access to the resources of the

region. China’s principal interest in Venezuela, based on trade and investment patterns, is petroleum

products. Exports of Venezuelan petroleum products to China registered a 75 percent increase in 2003,37 and a 25 percent

increase in 2004, reaching a level of $640 million.38 Although the volume of petroleum shipments from Venezuela to China is limited

and there are restrictions on the size of tankers and cargo ships which can be sent through the Panama Canal, infrastructure projects

are under consideration which could sidestep these constraints by using pipelines to carry the oil overland to Pacific ports―either

across Colombia or Panama. As part of a series of accords signed during the state visit of Chávez to China in December 2004, and

leveraging the close working relationship with the Chinese developed over recent years,39 Venezuela will give China access to 15

mature oil fields, with proven reserves of up to a billion barrels of oil, for Chinese firms to develop and exploit.40 As part of the

accord, China will invest $350 million toward bringing these fields on line,41 and in exchange will be allowed to build refineries on

Venezuelan territory to process the oil.42 The agreement will help the Venezuelan government to overcome the shortfalls in

technical management that it created when it fired half of all workers in its state oil firm, Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), following

the December 2002-March 2003 national strike. By allowing the Chinese to directly develop these fields,

Venezuela will be able to almost double its production despite a lack of internal technical

capacity to do so, selling significant quantities of oil to China while still serving its traditional

markets. As a compliment to its assistance to Venezuela in extracting its oil, China is also investing $60 million in a number of

projects to help Venezuela extract its natural gas. 43 During a scheduled state visit at the end of January 2005, Chinese Vice-

President Zeng Quinghong and senior directors of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will analyze the viability of even

greater Chinese investment in the development of Venezuelan natural gas reserves.44 A third significant element of

Chinese engagement with Venezuela in the petroleum sector involves the Chinese purchase of

Venezuelan ormulsión, and conversion of Chinese facilities to use it for the generation of

electricity. Ormulsión is a low-grade, high-pollution content fuel oil traditionally given little or

no value because of the lack of a global market for its use. In December 2001, CNPC and PdVSA established

the joint venture Orifuels Sinoven, S.A (Sinovensa) and invested $330 million to develop a capability to produce 6.5 million metric

tons of ormulsión per year by the end of 2004. In conjunction with this effort, in November 2003 CNPC began constructing a special

new type of power plant capable of burning ormulsión in the Guangdong province of China.45 Through a deal finalized in 2004,

China’s commercial agent, Petrochina, a subsidiary of CNPC, is currently purchasing 1.5 millions of tons of orimulsión annually from

Venezuela.46 By building the new power plant, China is able to make use of the Venezuelan ormulsión, which it is able to 8 purchase

at relatively low cost because of the lack of a global market. Moreover, Venezuela is China’s natural partner for the

ormulsión deal, in that the Latin American country currently possesses the world’s largest

proven ormulsión reserves―almost double those of Saudi Arabia, the next largest source.

China is also helping Venezuela to extract its coal. At the end of 2004, China announced that it will invest in the

development of mines in the Orinoco River Basin area in the south of the country.47 China Minmetal and the Venezuelan firm,

Corpozulia, are slated to sign an agreement during the scheduled state visit of Chinese Vice President Zeng Quinghong at the end of

January 2005 that would use Chinese investment to increase Venezuelan carbon production.48 Beyond the domain of extractive

industries, the ChineseVenezuelan partnership has extended to the agricultural sector, where Venezuelan interests in improving

agricultural productivity coincide with Chinese interests in developing reliable, friendly suppliers of foodstuffs. As part of the accords

reached between the two nations during the Christmas 2004 visit of Chávez to China, the Asian giant has agreed to provide

Venezuela with agricultural machinery and credits for the nation to increase its food production.49 In keeping with the vertically

integrated strategy that China has pursued in other Latin American countries to secure access to sources of supply for strategic

materials, China announced in December 2005 that it will invest in the construction of a national railway line, helping Venezuela to

transport raw materials and foodstuffs to market.50 Finally, China is also helping Venezuela to develop its telecommunicationsindustry, including assistance to Venezuela in access to space. As part of the series of accords reached during the Christmas 2004

visit of Hugo Chávez to China, the two nations announced that China will launch a telecommunications satellite for Venezuela,

helping the nation become less dependent on U.S. telecommunications networks.51 The initiative built on broader discussions of

how China could help Venezuela to develop and modernize its telecommunications infrastructure more broadly, including a

December 2004 visit to Venezuela by Vice minister of the Chinese information ministry Lou Kinjian to discuss possible collaboration

on telecommunication projects with the Venezuelan telecommunications firm, CVG Telecom.52



Solvency: Oil Advantage

Venezuela is more responsive to oil trade with ChinaJianhai 2005 *Bi Jianhai and David Zweig, Foreign Affairs, “China's Global Hunt for Energy” Sep-

Oct 2005 http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031703] Washington remains wary, especially as Beijing seeks cooperation ¶ from other governments on the United States' shortlist of rogue

states. ¶ China is undermining U.S. efforts to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions by ¶ resisting the imposition of sanctions against the

Islamic Republic in the ¶ event it resumes its efforts to enrich uranium. And Beijing is strengthening ties with the

temperamental Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, who likes to poke the Americans in the

eye. "We have been producing ¶ and exporting oil for more than loo years," Chavez told a group of Chinese

business executives last December. "But these have been ¶ loo years of domination by the United States. Now we are

free, and place this oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland." Souring relations ¶

between Caracas and Washington have already prompted the Senate ¶ Foreign Relations

Committee to mandate contingency plans in case Venezuelan oil stops flowing to the United

States. Chinese officials, ¶ meanwhile, deny that China's oil hunger is increasing friction with ¶ the United States. According to Han

Wenke, deputy director general ¶ of the energy institute affiliated with China's National Development ¶ and Reform Commission,

"Although oil trade plays an important role ¶ in every field, it has a limited influence in Sino-American relations."



2NC Venezuela Says Yes

Venezuela says yes to Chinese infrastructure cooperation – empirically provenAmineh 2012 *Mehdi Parvizi Amineh; Yang Guang, “Secure oil and alternative energy : the

geopolitics of energy paths of China and the European Union” Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2012.+ In the infrastructure sector, China and Venezuela have cooperated on a number of high profile

projects, including the National Rail Network, hydraulic works for the Bolivarian Aqueduct and

the National Plan for Residential Construction. In addition, Venezuela and China formed a joint

venture worth $7.5 billion to build a railway that will link farm and oil regions in the south of

Venezuela. The china Railways Engineering Corporation (CREC) hold a 40 per cent stake and the

Venezuelan state owns the rest. Venezuela suffers from severe electricity shortages, caused by

a lack of adequate investment; consequently, in a long-term $20 billion financing deal, China is

providing assistance to Venezuela to build three electricity generating plants.

They’ll say yes to China: resent U.S. involvement Kurlantzick 7 (4/9, Joshua, visiting scholar at the China Program of the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, “Beijing's Big Push,” Newsweek, p. lexis)Putin's bear hug was no anomaly, and though done for good strategic reasons, also reflects Russian public opinion. Even as relations

between Moscow and Washington continue to sour, China is growing more popular than ever; a major public-opinion poll last year

found that most ordinary Russians now think China has "a positive impact on the world" and that the United States has a negative

one. And Russians are far from alone in these sentiments. Over the last five years, while anti-Americanism has

surged around the globe, Beijing has worked hard to ingratiate itself in Asia, Latin America and

Africa. The name of this game is soft power: making China and its culture as attractive as possible to foreign publics,

not just their leaders. For years, Washington has dominated the field. But Beijing's new outreach--through foreign

aid, investment, deft diplomacy, tourism and education--is starting to best American efforts. Ordinary people across

the planet now view China more warmly than they do the United States. Polls taken by the Program on

International Policy Attitudes and the BBC show that majorities of people in most countries

today consider China to be a more positive influence and less of a threat to international

peace than the United States is. Such sentiments are particularly strong in the developingworld; China is rated far more favorably than the United States is in places ranging from Saudi Arabia (54 percent to 38 percent)

to Turkey (27 percent to 15 percent) to Indonesia (60 percent to 40 percent) to Brazil (53 percent to 42 percent). Even in Australia,

one of Washington's closest allies, polls by the Lowy Institute now show that average citizens feel as good about China as they do

about the United States.



Chinese Soft Power Good: Warming

Chinese soft power is key to solve global climate change – it’s key to getting

other nations on board

CSIS 9 (March, Jesse Kaplan and Julianne Smith, “Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for theUnited States: competition and cooperation in the developing world”

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf)

When it comes to China and combating climate change, everyone, from Al Gore to T. Boone Pickens, recites a common yet troubling narrative: with global temperatures rising,

the need for a peak in global greenhouse gas emissions is incompatible with continued Chinese economic growth. The People’s Republic of China, which recently became the

world leader in carbon emissions, has completely ignored environmental considerations. Kinder critics explain that renewable energy is hopelessly expensive for developing

countries. Conspiracy theorists grumble that China is determined to destroy the Pax Americana with emissions, if not with military and economic might. All, or at least most,

agree that Chinese obstructionism is a primary obstacle to global efforts to combat climate change.

If only the Chinese would do something, the thinking goes, perhaps the United States would have an

incentive to act as well. This narrative is familiar. It is also almost entirely wrong. To be sure, the climate picture is alarming.

Experts agree that to limit global warming to a moderately safe level of two degrees Celsius above the preindustrial norm, global carbon emissions will need to peak in the next

decade and then be more than halved by 2050. Practically, this means that developed countries must have zero-carbon economies by mid-century and developing countries

must followe suit a few decades later. In quantifiable terms, the avoidable costs of climate change inaction range between 5 and 20 percent of global gross domestic product

(GDP) – approximately the cost of both world wars and the Great Depression combined. The environmental, human development, and quality-of-life costs are far greater. Even

before it passed the United States as the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, China figured prominently in climate change discussions. The International Energy Agency has

projected that if China were to do nothing to curb emissions, it would emit more carbon dioxide

during the next 25 years than the worlds 26 richest counties combined . Almost every week a coal-fired and highly

polluting power plant large enough to service all of San Diego or Dallas opens somewhere in China, and the Chinese build enough such plants annually to light the entire United

Kingdom. The Chinese coal sector alone produces upward of 16 percent of global carbon emissions. These numbers are sobering. In contrast with the common narrative,

however, they are not sobering only to Western eyes. The Chinese widely recognize that the threat of climate change is

real, and they have taken significant steps in recent years to counter that threat. To start, China

has a National Climate Change Plan, something about which U.S. environmentalists can only dream, and China has mustered a

wide array of legislative, economic, and governmental instruments to foster shifts to more

sustainable industrial activity. China has invested heavily in renewable energy and has more stringent efficiency standards for its automobiles than

does the United States. In his annual address in 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao made 48 references to “environment,” “pollution” or “environmental protection,” and party

leadership has pursued efforts at structural reform to ensure compliance with environmental regulations. However, significant gaps between

well-intentioned rhetoric and concrete action remain. In addition, Chinese efforts to stem emissions are sometimes contradictory

and not always effective. The country is nevertheless of the correct path, and its recalcitrance about addressing climate change is, if not a complete myth, not an obstacle to

engagement either. Villainizing China, while convenient, distorts reality and distracts from U.S. inaction.

ExtinctionDeibel 7 [Terry L. Professor of IR at National War College, 2007 “Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic

for American Statecraft”, Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today+

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature,

which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the

stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been

observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has

passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on

climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that

anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is

virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fun damentals of global

warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of

newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the

next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread

of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants

are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global

increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005

was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”;“Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute

to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads ; “widespread

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf



bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is

slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate

change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the

industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At

present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels.

Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to

reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; theonly debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show,

we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease,

mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying

countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and

West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would

cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich

Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline

circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would

otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of

warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening

scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of

water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures .Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even

though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can

conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to

playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst,

says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re

going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were

crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan

popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would

not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s

equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over

the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not

only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on thisplanet.



2NC Perm Do Both

China will perceive U.S. influence as interfering with their interestsJohnson 5 (Stephen, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison

Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute forInternational Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin

America, 10/24/05, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-

growing-influence-in-latin-america) China's main rival for global preeminence is the United States. China sees the United States as preventing

Taiwan's reunification with the mainland and thwarting Beijing's rise as a power. Previously, China was

isolated, but now plays key roles in Asian geopolitics and aspires to do so elsewhere. Besides status as a nuclear nation,

it is a member of the U.N. Security Council, the World Trade Organization, the Group of 77 developing nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group. It also holds

observer status in the Organization of American States. While China has become the second-largest U.S. trade partner after Canada, it challenges U.S.

influence wherever it can. In fact, it will soon have more attack submarines than the United States, with the addition of four Russian Kilo-class subs and

new diesel-electric vessels equipped with technology that will allow them to run quieter than nuclear submarines.[1] According to former U.S. Ambassador to Beijing James Lilly,

"[T]he facts are that [the Chinese] run massive intelligence operations against us, they make open statements against us, their high-level documents show that they are not

friendly to us." Chinese military white papers promote power projection and describe U.S. policies as "hegemonism and power politics."[2] In the Western Hemisphere, the

Chinese are taking advantage of failures of half-hearted market reforms and Washington'sunwillingness to pursue neighborhood relations with much enthusiasm. National Defense University professor

Cynthia A. Watson notes, "[T]he 1990s turned into a period of severe disappointment as free markets led to rampant

corruption and unfulfilled expectations in Latin America while Washington became the

world's superpower rather than a partner for the region."[3]

Maduro does not want U.S. involvementFillingham ‘13 (Zachary, BA in IR from York University, MA in Chinese Studies from School of Oriental and African Studies in

London, analytical area of expertise in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in regards to how nationalist issues affect Chinese policy,

GeopoliticalMonitor.com, “Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?” http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-

chavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/)

Current polls indicate that Maduro would triumph in the coming election, a scenario that does not bode well for a

thaw in US-Venezuelan relations. Maduro has dropped several indications that he plans tocarry on his predecessor’s anti-American tone, notably by suggesting that the U.S. might be

behind Chavez’s illness and by kicking out two U.S. military attaches under the accusation of

“trying to destabilize Venezuelan politics.”

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america


http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/









A2: Not Zero Sum

Chinese engagement trades offWorldCrunch 5/6 (2013, Wang xiaoxia, staffwriter, economic observer, “In America’s Backyard: Chinas Rising Influence in

Latin America” http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-

policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/) China is busy in America's backyard. Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding their

footprint in Latin America in a number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade to ensure a steady supply of

bulk commodities such as oil, copper and soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American sub-forum

was created that included the participation of several heads of state from the region. Since 2011, China has overtaken the

Netherlands to become Latin America’s second biggest investor behind the United States. China has

signed a series of large cooperation agreements with Latin American countries in such f ields as finance, resources

and energy. According to the latest statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American

trade grew in 2012 to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 8.18%. This trend risks undermining

the position of the United States as Latin America’s single dominant trading partner. In 2011, the

U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion.

Power is zero sum – even a peaceful china rise erodes US powerEllis 11 (NDU Press, 1

st Quarter 2011, Issue 60, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and

simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin

America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and

Wherefores” and more than 20 articles in this research area. Strategic Studies Institute. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A

Case Study” http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf)

The reemergence of China as a dominant global actor highlights longstanding ambiguities in U.S. thinking regarding what constitutes

national security. People’s Republic of China (PRC) policymakers have emphasized the “peaceful” nature of

China’s rise and have generally avoided military or political actions that could be seen by the United States as “threatening.”

Nonetheless, the economic, institutional, and cultural battles through which the PRC has advanced its position have both

leveraged and contributed to an erosion of the U.S. strategic position globally. The advance of China

and the multidimensional strategic challenge that it poses are most effectively characterized by one of the most loosely defined and

misunderstood buzzwords in the modern parlance: soft power.

http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf





A2: Increasing Engagement Not Key

China’s involvement with Latin America is growing Jianhai 2005 *Bi Jianhai and David Zweig, Foreign Affairs, “China's Global Hunt for Energy” Sep-

Oct 2005 http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031703] Beijing has also been active in Latin America. Brazil's development ¶ minister visited Beijing nine times in 2003 and

2004. Dozens of business leaders accompanied President Hu on his four-stop trip to the ¶ region in November 2004, during which he

announced $20 billion ¶ in new investments for oil and gas exploration and other projects. ¶ During his visit to Latin

America and the Caribbean last January, Vice ¶ President Zeng Qnghong signed various trade

and oil-supply agreements with Venezuela. According to the Financial Times, trade between ¶

China and Latin America has quintupled since 1999, reaching almost ¶ $40 billion by the end

of last year. A recent report by the Spanish bank ¶ BBVA indicates that Latin America has continued to benefit

greatly ¶ from China's economic growth, in terms of both investment and trade. ¶ Last year,

China invested $1.4 billion in the region; it is now the main ¶ impetus for export growth for

many Latin American states.

China is engaging Latin American countries now – sustained outreach critical forexpanding tradeBethel, 2013 *Erik, “How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?” Dialogue's daily

Latin America Advisor, January 18, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210]

China's ambassador to Chile, Yang Wanming, told newspaper China Daily that the Asian nation should look to Latin America to

make up for declining demand from developed markets. Chinese exports to the region grew 12 to 15 percent last year, and it "is

now a strategically important market," he said. How significant is Latin America as an export destination for China?

Are business and government leaders actively looking to the region to expand trade? Where is the Chinese economy headed next

year and in the mid-term, and how will that affect Latin America? A: Erik Bethel, managing partner of SinoLatin Capital: "Latin

America's 19 countries, 575 million people and $6.8 trillion GDP offer a tantalizing opportunity for Chinese

exports. China is already a major exporter in Latin America, but there is a lot of room for further growth. In order

for this to happen, Chinese firms need to view the market not on a regional basis, but rather country-by-

country. There is no question that Sino-Latin relations have been strengthening at a rapid pace, as

demonstrated by China's direct investment in the region ($175 billion in cumulative FDI as of September), membership in the Inter-

American Development Bank and the many bilateral visits that have taken place. However, Chinese firms need to approach the

region with the understanding that Latin American countries have uneven levels of development, varying political models, alliances

and outlooks. All of this requires deft political engagement in developing the relationships, trust and

public support in order to open markets further. There is no question that while China's appreciation for Latin

America and its opportunities has significantly increased in the last decade, there is still work to be done in

deepening its understanding of the region's differing customs, histories, nuances and subtleties. Achieving this

heightened awareness and understanding will be critical. Conversely, Latin Americans need to better understand China and define a

fair and constructive relationship. It is clear that while Latin American consumers could greatly benefit from China's wide range of

inexpensive imports, concerns remain over the effects of increased Chinese competition on domestic Latin American industries.

Herein lays Latin America's conundrum. Latin America greatly benefits by selling raw materials to China and by purchasing

inexpensive Chinese electronic goods, textiles, furniture and other goods. But the concern is that the region will remain trapped as a

low value-added raw material supplier with a struggling manufacturing sector and limited employment opportunities. Without adoubt, a great foundation for expanded trade is in place. However, seeing it grow over the coming years

will require a sustained educational and outreach effort on both sides."

Chinese economic engagement key for increasing trade relationsHungbo, 2013 *Sun, “How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?” Dialogue's daily

Latin America Advisor, January 18,

http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210)

http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210






"China regards Latin America as a promising strategic trade partner not only for diversifying export destinations, but also for

safeguarding commodity import security. According to official statistics, Chinese exports to Latin America represented 6.74 percent

of its total exports for the first nine months of 2012. Compared to the United States, European Union and Asia, Latin America

has absorbed a marginal share of China's fast export expansion . From 2003 to 2011, the region's share of

China's export volume only rose from 2.71 percent to 6.41 percent. Chinese policymakers expect to build a more

sustainable and balanced trade relationship with Latin America. This issue has been widely negotiated both

in political and commercial circles from the two sides. However, the bilateral effort still needs to find an efficientway to achieve satisfactory results, particularly for those countries that have a trade deficit with China. China

continues to increase its imports from Latin America-with the region supplying 3.62 percent of China's total imports in 2003 to 7.13

percent in 2012. China's slowdown in 2012 caused serious concern in commodity-exporting countries in South America.

Nonetheless, Chinese trade with Latin America in 2012 is estimated at more than $250 billion, higher than the year prior. Chinese

business groups will attach great importance to the market volume in Latin America, but the export opportunities will also depend

on strong economic growth in this region. In 2013, China's highlighted macroeconomic policy device for

sustaining stable growth is to accelerate the pace of high-quality urbanization, which will

necessitate increasing imports of mineral, agricultural and energy products from Latin

America."

Chinese influence depends on U.S. desertion- plan reverses thatJohnson 5

[Stephen Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison

Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for

International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin

America, 10/24/05, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-

growing-influence-in-latin-america]

China's main rival for global preeminence is the United States. China sees the United States as preventing

Taiwan's reunification with the mainland and thwarting Beijing's rise as a power. Previously, China was

isolated, but now plays key roles in Asian geopolitics and aspires to do so elsewhere. Besides status as a nuclear nation,

it is a member of the U.N. Security Council, the World Trade Organization, the Group of 77 developing nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group. It also holds

observer status in the Organization of American States. While China has become the second-largest U.S. trade partner after Canada, it challenges U.S.

influence wherever it can. In fact, it will soon have more attack submarines than the United States, with the addition of four Russian Kilo-class subs and

new diesel-electric vessels equipped with technology that will allow them to run quieter than nuclear submarines.[1] According to former U.S. Ambassador to Beijing James Lilly,

"[T]he facts are that [the Chinese] run massive intelligence operations against us, they make open statements against us, their high-level documents show that they are not

friendly to us." Chinese military white papers promote power projection and describe U.S. policies as "hegemonism and power politics."[2] In the Western Hemisphere, the

Chinese are taking advantage of failures of half-hearted market reforms and Washington's

unwillingness to pursue neighborhood relations with much enthusiasm. National Defense University professor

Cynthia A. Watson notes, "[T]he 1990s turned into a period of severe disappointment as free markets led to rampant

corruption and unfulfilled expectations in Latin America while Washington became the

world's superpower rather than a partner for the region."[3]







A2: Chinese Involvement Bad

China provides a good model for Latin American economic developmentAdrian H. Hearn and José Luis León-Manríquez (social policy professor at the University of

Sydney) July 31st, 2011 http://www.eurospanbookstore.com/media/pdf/extracts/9781588267672.pdf In search of effective strategies for engaging China, analysts have suggested that Latin American

countries would do well to learn from China’s¶ development trajectory and consider the

benefits of a more “proactive” state.3¶ Present conditions favor this tactic. The global financial

crisis has generated an¶ environment in which governments in Latin America and beyond have taken ¶

unusually bold steps to get their economies back on track through stimulus¶ packages, tighter regulatory

controls, and, in some cases, more active industrial¶ policies. Together these actions could leverage

sustainable benefits from¶ China’s long-term demand for resources if state intervention is

carefully¶ directed toward human capital advancement, economic diversification, and¶

coordination with Chinese enterprises, whose overseas investments often dovetail with the

infrastructure and development agendas of foreign governments

http://www.eurospanbookstore.com/media/pdf/extracts/9781588267672.pdf






**Aff Answers**



2AC: General Answers

China doesn’t solve Venezuela crisis Fillingham 3/10 (2013, Zachary, BA in IR from York University, MA in Chinese Studies from School of Oriental and African

Studies in London, analytical area of expertise in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in regards to how nationalist issues affect

Chinese policy, GeopoliticalMonitor.com, “Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?”http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/)

Just to recap: what we are likely to see is a Maduro win, followed by a politico-economic crisis that ushers in either a return to credible multi-party

democracy or a descent into conspicuous authoritarianism. But how will this impact US-Venezuelan relations? Given its precarious economic situation,

Venezuela will need outside assistance in the near future. And while some would say that China is best

suited to step up and bail out Caracas, there are a few reasons to question whether this will actually come to

pass. First of all, The Chinese Development Bank has already provided a huge amount of money to

the Chavez government, about $40 billion between 2008 and 2012 alone. Thus, if Venezuela were to be faced with a

default, it would be Chinese investors with their money on the line. Any debt renegotiations would

surely include provisions that didn’t sit well with the Venezuelan public. After all, there have already been agreements

reached between Venezuela and the Chinese state-owned company Citic Group that have raised populist alarm bells regarding the signing of mineral

rights over to foreign companies. In this context, a limited rapprochement makes sense from a Venezuelan point of view, as it would balance against a

preponderance of Chinese economic influence. Now that the “Bolivarian Revolution” is all but discredited, andcountries like Brazil have proven that it’s possible to alleviate poverty through trade and keep

US influence at arm’s length, a US-Venezuelan thaw is theoretically possible. However, authorities in

Washington will likely have to endure another round of vitriol and wait until the dust settles in Venezuelan domestic politics before their window of

opportunity presents itself.

The US is best for aid to VenezuelaFillingham 3/10 (2013, Zachary, BA in IR from York University, MA in Chinese Studies from School of Oriental and African

Studies in London, analytical area of expertise in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in regards to how nationalist issues affect

Chinese policy, GeopoliticalMonitor.com, “Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?”

http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/)

And by all indications, Venezuela’s finances aren’t going to hold out for very long. The country is currently running a

deficit of over 20 percent, and its national inflation rate fluctuates between 20 and 30 percent. Though it presides over one of the world’s largest oil

reserves and is a card-carrying member of OPEC, Venezuela’s oil yields have been dropping throughout the Chavez era due to

a lack of foreign investment. The same is true of Venezuela’s food industry. A lack of foreign investment, inefficiency, and costly subsidies

have stunted overall output, resulting in food shortages that are now showing themselves in the huge lineups spilling out of government food depots

nationwide. A reoccurring theme of Chavez’s economic policy was a willful ignorance regarding the creation of infrastructure and social capital that could drive economic

growth beyond the era of direct government handouts. Given the structural challenges that the Venezuelan economy now faces, challenges that will

preclude the government’s ability to continue Chavez-era patronage ad infinitum, a Maduro government will inevitably be faced

with an economic reckoning of sorts. In the aftermath of this economic reckoning, there will be an opportunity

for both domestic opposition forces within Venezuela, and American foreign policy to make inroads.

China’s presence results in destabilizing US security interestsEllis 5 (June 2005, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for

Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external

actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores” and more than 20 articles in

this research area. Strategic Studies Institute. “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America”Executive Summary http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=606)

In this monograph, the author argues that China?s pursuit of longterm strategic objectives is leading the country to increase its presence in

Latin America, with serious national security implications for the United States. Sustained Chinese economic

growth requires ever greater quantities of basic commodities such as petroleum products, coal, iron and steel, and strategic minerals. As the new

generation of Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao has moved away from the more cautious approach of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, China has begun

to aggressively court Latin America as its principal source of supply outside Asia. Figures from the Chinese National Statist ics Office show that, for

example, 77 percent of all Chinese foreign investment outside Asia in 2003 went to Latin America. The pattern of Chinese investment in countries such

as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile suggests that the Asian giant is seeking to assure access to critical commodities by constructing vertically integrated

supply networks over which it has leverage. China is purchasing interest in key Latin American suppliers such as the Canadian minerals firm Noranda, or







the Argentine oil subsidiary PlusPetrol Norte. It is also building cooperative relationships with supplier governments such as the joint oil exploration and

refinery construction deals signed with Venezuela and Brazil in 2004. Where necessary, China is also investing in the infrastruc ture of Latin American

countries to help them more effectively bring their products to market. In addition to documenting China?s aggressive new posture in specific Latin

American countries, this monograph argues that the expanded Chinese trade and investment presence in the region ultimately will give China a s take in

the politics of the region and may tempt it to become involved in the region?s security affairs. Expanded Chinese trade and i nvestment in Latin

America, for example, will expand greatly the community of Chinese nationals in the region. The broadened community of Chinese nationals multiplies

opportunities for incidents involving those nationals, while also expanding the community in China with an interest in the region. At the same time,

significant Chinese investments in Latin American extractive industries and increasing

dependence on its production will cause the Chinese government to seek to deflect politicalmovements in Latin American countries that could expropriate these investments or disrupt

these resource flows. Ultimately, this monograph argues that Chinese engagement with Latin America will

make the nation both a powerful competitor and a potential partner for the United States in the region .

On one hand, China, with major investments in Latin America and dependence on its material flows, is likely to be a nation interested in reducing

political instability, armed groups, and criminal activity in the region, rather than fueling radical populism and insurgency. On the other hand, the

United States needs to consider to what degree it is willing to accept a China that has

increasing leverage in Latin America through its investment and trade presence?and a growing

interest in the political course of the region. Now, rather than later, is the time for the United States to begin ser iously

considering how to most constructively engage the Chinese in the Western Hemisphere.

Chinese Presence in Venezuela is ineffective

Evan Ellis ( professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is ananalyst of Latin American economic, political and security issues) The Manzella Report, May

10th, 2013 “Critical Problems for New Chinese Presence in Latin America”

Finally, the new Chinese presence on the ground in Latin America makes it vulnerable to the

actions of the governments where it operates. This is a critical problem, since the new Chinese

projects are disproportionately concentrated in the countries in the region with the worst

track records of respecting investors, such as Venezuela and Argentina. Chinese construction of

a new petrochemical complex in Tierra Del Fuego has been blocked by the Argentine

government’s restrictions on importing supplies. In Venezuela, Chinese frustration in dealing

with PdVSA has paralyzed progress in negotiating the development of the new Junin-1 and

Junin-8 oilfields in the Orinoco. Similar frustration with delays in China-financed construction

projects led the PRC to deny Venezuela a new $4 billion line of credit in February 2013.



2AC: Perm Do Both

Perm do both – the US and China aren’t competing in Latin America – both

countries can maintain a relationship with Venezuela

Global Times 5/31 (2013, “China, US not competing over Latin America: expert”http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.Uaqh_kCkqUI)

Chinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit

aiming at promoting China's cooperation with the region.Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico follows his first foreign trip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania,

South Africa and Republic of Congo, shortly after taking office in March. While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is

concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling

visits" by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in

Latin America is on display." Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can

"carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao

Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a

coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US

influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of

influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum

game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America. Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of their

respective strategic needs, Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperate with other countries, and visits of such high-level

are usually arranged long time before they starts, Tao said. China has embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once- in-a-

decade leadership transition with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several

high-level visitors to Beijing. After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to the US for his first summit with President Barack Obama on June 7 to

8 in California.



2AC A2: Net Benefit

CP doesn’t solve Chinese soft power – limited abilities and strategic flawsNye 4/29 (2013, Joseph S. Nye is an American political scientist and former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government

at Harvard University. “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power”

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0) Power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants, and that can be accomplished in three main ways -- by coercion,

payment, or attraction. If you can add the soft power of attraction to your toolkit, you can economize on carrots and sticks. For a

rising power like China whose growing economic and military might frightens its neighbors into counter-balancing coalitions, a

smart strategy includes soft power to make China look less frightening and the balancing

coalitions less effective. For a declining power like Russia (or Britain before it), a residual soft power helps to cushion the

fall. The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political

values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral

authority). But combining these resources is not always easy. Establishing, say, a Confucius Institute in Manila to teach Chinese

culture might help produce soft power, but it is less likely to do so in a context where China has just bullied the Philippines over

possession of Scarborough Reef. Similarly, Putin has told his diplomats that "the priority has been shifting to the literate use of soft

power, strengthening positions of the Russian language," but as Russian scholar Sergei Karaganov noted in the aftermath of the

dispute with Georgia, Russia has to use "hard power, including military force, because it lives in a much more dangerous world ...

and because it has little soft power -- that is, social, cultural, political and economic attractiveness." Much of America's soft power is

produced by civil society -- everything from universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture -- not from the government.Sometimes the United States is able to preserve a degree of soft power because of its critical and uncensored civil society even

when government actions -- like the invasion of Iraq -- are otherwise undermining it. But in a smart power strategy, hard and soft

reinforce each other. In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China

has spent billions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and

Latin America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style

emphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its

investment. Polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but

predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.

Even China's soft-power triumphs, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale. Not long

after the last international athletes had departed, China's domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its soft power

gains. Again in 2009, the Shanghai Expo was a great success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo

and screens were dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft power boost

from the Sochi Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is likely to step on his own message. China and Russia

make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power. In today's

world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government

propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China

Central Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda. As the

Economist noted about China, "the party has not bought into Mr. Nye's view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the

private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom

it thinks might have global appeal." But soft power doesn't work that way . As Pang Zhongying of

Renmin University put it, it highlights "a poverty of thought" among Chinese leaders. The development of soft power

need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain from finding each other attractive. But for China and Russia to

succeed, they will need to match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full talents of their civil societies.

Unfortunately, that is not about to happen soon.

No Chinese soft power – no cultural drawThe Atlantic 4/11 (2013, China File, “Can China Do Softpower” http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/can-

china-do-soft-power/274916/)

Jeremy Goldkorn: Chairman Mao Zedong said that power comes out of the barrel of a gun, and he knew a thing or two about power,

both hard and soft. If you have enough guns, you have respect. Money is the same: if you have enough cash, you can buy guns, and

respect. Israel and Saudi Arabia are examples of the limits of such respect. Both countries are rich and in some ways very powerful,

but people in other countries with no cultural connections don't look at Israel, or Saudi Arabia and think: "Gee, I want to live like that

and watch their movies!" But we, the rest of us, everyone who is not American, we all want to watch American





movies. I am from South Africa, and I'll confidently represent the entire Third World and the rest of the First World assure you

that it's true. We don't want to watch Israeli or Saudi or Chinese movies, nor buy Chinese sneakers. Nor, with

the exception of a few eccentrics such as myself, do we want to live in Chinese cities. The Saudis and Israelis do not

seem to care about this, but China does, hence the endless hand-wringing about soft power. The

essence of Joseph Nye's articulation of of soft power is the power to attract, to co-opt and to seduce. China now has enough cash to

open Confucius Institutes, fund movies, TV stations, and schools, open art zones, buy aircraft carriers and islands, but China has

not made itself an attractive place to live or work or dream. Until Chinese political leaderswould rather their daughters went to Peking University over Harvard, until Chinese people would rather

buy Mengniu infant milk formula over the equivalent brand from New Zealand, until Beijing and Shanghai become as pleasant to live

in as New York and L.A., China will find its soft power ambitions thwarted. As the ancient American saying has it,

you can put lipstick on a pig, but it's still a pig --doesn't matter how much you spend on the lipstick.



***Case Answers***



A2: Solvency

Venezuelan Government Has Empirically Reacted Adversely to US InvolvementJones, '84 [Randall J., Jr., Professor of Political Science at Central Oklahoma University,

“Empirical Models of Political Risks in U. S. Oil Production Operations in Venezuela,” Journal of

International Business Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring - Summer, pp. 81-95]

In 9 of the years between 1961 and 1978, Venezuelan regimes took actions adverse to the

profitability of U.S. oil companies' local production operations. In this study 2 time-series

discriminant models were developed for classifying each of the 18 years according to the

occurrence of such action. In the first model, adverse government action was found more likely

to occur following years of economic decline and periods when U.S. companies earned high

profits from petroleum investments in Venezuela. In the second model, government action

tended to occur after periods of relative deprivation experienced by Venezuelans. To illustrate

the use of discriminant models in forecasting political risks, hypothetical scenarios were

formulated from which projections were made through 1985 of the likelihood of governmentaction against those U.S. oil companies' operations remaining since the nationalization of

petroleum.

Venezuela only willing to cooperate if U.S. stays out of their affairs.MercoPress [South Atlantic News Agency, “Venezuela wants best of relations with the

US based on ‘mutual absolute respect,’” January 18, 2013, MercoPress,

http://en.mercopress.com/2013/01/18/venezuela-wants-best-of-relations-with-the-us-

based-on-mutual-absolute-respect]

“In the framework of this new reality, the Venezuelan government will always be

willing to have the best possible relations with the governments of the US, at anymoment”. But, insisted Maduro “on the basis of absolute respect and non

intervention in the internal affairs of our country”. Last 4 January Maduro revealed

that at the end of November there had been three contacts between Venezuela and the

US in which the establishment of improved relations in the understanding of mutual

absolute respect was considered. Maduro who considered the contacts as ‘normal’ said

they involved the Venezuelan ambassador before OAS, Roy Chaderton and were

specifically authorized by Chavez who remains convalescent in Cuba. Although the US

remains as the main trade partner of Venezuela, bilateral relations have gone through

bad moments, currently probably the lowest since the end of 2010 when ambassadors

were withdrawn. Venezuela denied consent to the new US ambassador followingstatements before the US Congress and Washington left the Venezuelan ambassador in

the US with no visa.

Venezuela won’t accept foreign oil investment Coggin ’11 [John, Senior Editor for International Policy Digest, “Venezuela‟s Oil Sword,” May26, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2011/05/26/venezuelas-oil-sword/]

http://en.mercopress.com/2013/01/18/venezuela-wants-best-of-relations-with-the-us-based-on-mutual-absolute-respect



http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2011/05/26/venezuelas-oil-sword/

http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2011/05/26/venezuelas-oil-sword/





It’s the uncertain quantity and quality of Venezuela’s oil reserves that keep U.S. foreign

policy analysts and energy forecasters up at night. Like Saudi Arabia‟s national oil company, PDVSA

operates behind a cloak of secrecy. The Venezuelan constitution strictly forbids foreign

investment in upstream oil activities. U.S. oil companies ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips

exited Venezuela in 2007 due to nationalization reforms.



A2: Oil Advantage



Oil Advantage Answers: General

Venezuelan oil industry decliningThe Economist, ‘12 *“Venezuela’s oil industry up in smoke,” August 27, 2012,

http://www.economist.com/ blogs/americasview/2012/08/venezuelas-oil-industry]On August 25th a gas leak at the Amuay oil refinery in western Venezuela set off a giant explosion. The force of the blast destroyed

scores of homes and businesses in the surrounding area and has killed at least 41 people, many of them soldiers from a National

Guard unit stationed nearby. Days after the fireball erupted, the plant’s fuel storage tanks were still ablaze, and pools of oil from

seeping underground pipes filled the neighbouring streets. The government has suggested that the disaster was a freak accident.

Its critics counter that the charred wreck of the refinery is an apt symbol for the overall state of Venezuela’s oil industry

since Hugo Chávez became president in 1999. The sector’s decline began in 2003, following a strike by the

employees and managers of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state oil company, in protest

against Mr Chávez’s leftist policies. When the conflict ended, the president had almost 20,000 workers sacked. Since

then, PDVSA’s chairman, Rafael Ramírez, has steadily replaced them with loyal chavistas: he has made it an

explicit company policy to employ only supporters of the president. He has also allowed Mr

Chávez to use the company as a piggy bank for his “socialist revolution”: last year, PDVSA

spent twice as much on off- budget government programmes as it did on taxes, royalties and

dividends. With so little attention paid to the actual business of extracting oil, it is little

wonder that PDVSA’s production has fallen from 3m barrels a day in 1999 to 2.4m today, according to OPEC. In

the same period, its foreign debt has risen fivefold. Moreover, oil union leaders say PDVSA’s

industrial-safety procedures have deteriorated sharply. The petroleum and mining ministry’s annual report

shows that maintenance work is frequently postponed for lack of cash. Residents of the Amuay area have told reporters that the gas

leak was apparent hours before the blast, though the government denies this.

Oil Shocks no longer have impacts- 2003 ProvesWilliam Nordhaus (Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University) “Who’s Afraid of a Big Bad

Oil Shock?” Brookings 2007

Who’s Afraid of a Big Bad Oil Shock? When the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, many

economists feared that the war would lead to a sharp decline in Iraqi oil production, a spike in

oil prices, and a woeful U.S. economy that would follow the scripts of the oil shocks of 1973,

1978, and 1990. Real oil prices did increase, indeed more than tripled, from $20 in 2001:Q4 to

$62 in 2006:Q3 (in 2007 dollars). But the ailments associated with earlier oil-price increases did

not appear. Instead output grew rapidly, inflation was moderate, unemployment fell, and

consumers remained reasonably happy.

Venezuela’s over reliance on oil hurts the economyAgnani 2011 [Universidad de Granada, May 2011/ article

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1514032611600056]

Venezuela's growth experience over the 56-year period from 1950 to 2006 was characterized by

a high economic growth rate from 1950 to 1974 and a low economic growth rate from 1974 to

2006. We show that the country has been immersed in a ‘great depression’ since the mid-seventies. We also show that although Venezuela is an oil abundant economy , this growth

experience is largely due to the evolution of its non-oil GDP. We perform a growth accounting

exercise to quantify the extent to which the growth experience in the non-oil sector is a result

of physical capital accumulation, finding that non-oil sector behavior can largely be explained

by the evolution of total factor productivity (TFP). Finally, we calculate the correlations

between oil rents and physical capital accumulation and TFP in the non-oil sector, finding a

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1514032611600056

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1514032611600056



high positive correlation during the good performance period, but a negative correlation in the

implosion period.

US already cutting demand for foreign oilIISS 2013 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, “U.S. Need for Foreign Oil Falls

Dramatically,” March 6, 2013, Real Clear World,http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/03/06/us_need_for_foreign_oil_falls_dra

matically_100597.html)

Over the last seven years, the United States has dramatically reduced its dependence

on oil imports. From their peak in 2006, imports have fallen 40% as a result of

declining demand and strong growth in domestic production of liquid fuels, leading to

predictions that the US could reach oil self-sufficiency within 15-20 years.

The United States isn’t going to make any progress with Venezuelan oil Landers ’13 (Jim Landers of Dallas News Business, “Crumbling Venezuelan oil sectorexpected to remain hostile to U.S. investment,” March 7, 2013, Dallas News,

http://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/20130306-crumbling-venezuelan-oil-sector-expected-to-remain-hostile-to-u.s.-investment.ece

Venezuela has more oil reserves than any other country thanks to massive deposits ofasphalt-like crude in what‟s called the Orinoco oil belt. Development of these deposits is both technology- and capital-intensive. Chávez’s push for more national controlover the oil sector in 2007 led Exxon Mobil Corp. and ConocoPhillips Co. toabandon big Orinoco projects. Other international companies stayed,including firms from Russia, China and Vietnam, and the Orinoco nowaccounts for about 20 percent of Venezuela’s oil production. Mark McNabb,director of the Emerging Markets Research Center at UTD’s Naveen JindalSchool of Management, said in a phone interview that he expects U.S. firmswill remain on the outside looking in. “We’re kind of frozen out for the next

three to five years,” he said.

Multiple checks to oil shocksThe Economist ‘11 [March 3, 2011, “The 2011 oil shock,”http://www.economist.com/node/18281774]

So far, the shocks to supply have been tiny. Libya’s turmoil has reduced global oil output by

a mere 1%. In 1973 the figure was around 7.5%. Today’s oil market also has plenty of

buffers. Governments have stockpiles, which they didn‟t in 1973. Commercial oil stocks are more

ample than they were when prices peaked in 2008. Saudi Arabia, the central bank of the oil market, technically has

enough spare capacity to replace Libya, Algeria and a clutch of other small producers. And

the Saudis have made clear that they are willing to pump.

Venezuela Currently Investing in Oil InfrastructureCesar J. Alvarez, and Stephanie Hanson (Writers for Council on Foreign Relations) February 9,

2012 “Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy”

PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.), Venezuela’s state-owned petroleum company, oversees the

exploration, production, refinement, and export of oil as well as the exploration and

production of natural gas. It is the world's third-largest oil company, behind Saudi Aramco and

ExxonMobil. According to Tinker-Salas, after the nationalization of Venezuala’s oil in 1976, PDVSA was very much like a “state

within a state.” It “insulated itself from the government” and functioned largely as its own entity with control of the nation’s wealth.

In 1980, PDVSA acquired CITGO, a U.S.-based refinery, and it is now one of the world's largest

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/03/06/us_need_for_foreign_oil_falls_dramatically_100597.html


http://realclearworld.com/topic/around_the_world/united_states/?utm_source=rcw&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=rcwautolink



http://www.economist.com/node/18281774

http://www.economist.com/node/18281774



http://realclearworld.com/topic/around_the_world/united_states/?utm_source=rcw&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=rcwautolink





refiners.¶ Under Chavez, however, the company's mandate has drastically expanded. In 2002,

Chavez redefined PDVSA’s role to include the government’s social priorities. PDVSA must now spend at least 10 percent of its annual

investment budget on social programs. This money is funneled through the National Development Fund, or Fonden, an investment

fund set up in 2005 that is not included in the government's budget. Peter Hakim, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a

Washington-based center for policy analysis, says that Chavez’s gradual takeover of PDVSA has given him an enormous bankroll to

pursue his political and economic ambitions.¶ Yet Chavez has also moved to expand PDVSA’s role in Venezuela’s oil ventures. In

the 1990s, Venezuela opened its oil industry to limited private investment and allowed foreign

companies to manage specific oil fields. Such “strategic associations” made up roughly 23 percent of total oil

production as of 2006. In April 2006, Chavez announced the government would take a majority stake in such projects, increasing its

share from 40 percent to 60 percent. Though this partial nationalization is expected to burden PDVSA with investment costs in the

billions, in 2007 the president created seven new subsidiaries of PDVSA, including services, agriculture, shipbuilding, construction

and industry. The head of PDVSA, Rafael Ramirez, told the New Yorker in June 2008 that Chavez plans to use the oil company to

transform Venezuela from an "oil sultanate to a productive society within a socialist framework."¶ The financial crisis and o il price

drop has had some impact on the oil company. In particular, PDVSA lost a $5 billion line of credit in October 2008. In early

2009, Chavez signaled the government would be open to more foreign investment in its oil

resources, but analysts say there is little trust (Bloomberg) contracts would be honored over the long term. "Chávez is

celebrating the demise of capitalism as this international crisis unfolds," Pedro Mario Burelli, a former board member of PDVSA, told

the International Herald Tribune. "But the irony is that capitalism actually fed his system in times of plenty."¶ Spending the Oil

Money¶ It is difficult to determine how Venezuela has been spending its oil windfall, given the lack of government transparency (the

country ranks 162 out of 179 countries ranked on Transparency International's corruption index). However, from the few official

figures the government has released and its stated pledges of aid to foreign countries, it is possible to glean a picture of billions of

dollars dispersed on activities not directly related to PDVSA's core business. Analysts express frustration that these reports lackdetail, and efforts by news organization to obtain further information from government agencies have been rebuffed (NYT).¶ PDVSA

has transferred billions of dollars to Fonden, the off-budget investment fund many experts say is financing Chavez's social projects.

According to International Oil Daily, an energy trade publication, PDVSA spent $14.4 billion on social programs in 2007 (as compared

to $6.9 billion in 2005). These programs include projects such as medical clinics providing free health care, discounted food and

household goods centers in poor neighborhoods, indigenous land-titling, job creation programs outside of the oil business, and

university and education programs.¶ Increased oil revenues have also given Chavez the ability to extend assistance programs

outside Venezuela’s borders. For example, he provides oil at a preferential price to many countries in the Caribbean through the

Petrocaribe initiative. In 2009, a Venezuela-backed home heating program to low-income households in the United States was

briefly halted, a sign that low oil prices may be forcing Chavez to reconsider (TIME) some of his social programs. In August 2007, the

Associated Press calculated that Chavez had promised $8.8 billion in aid, financing, and energy funding to Latin America and the

Caribbean between January and August 2007, a figure far higher than the $1.6 billion of U.S. assistance for the entire year. Though it

is impossible to determine how much of that funding was actually dispersed, the difference in aid is striking. Chavez is also

suspected of funneling money to the FARC, a Colombian guerrilla group, as well as providing funds to Argentine President Cristina

Kirchner’s election campaign in 2007—though he denies both charges.¶ Military expenditures are also funded by the government's

flush coffers. Between 2004 and 2006, Venezuela spent roughly $4.3 billion on weapons, according to a January 2007 Defense

Intelligence Agency report. As part of deals signed with Russia in 2006, Venezuela purchased 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, twenty-four

Sukhoi-30 fighter planes, and fifty-three Russian helicopters. In March 2008, it hired Belarus to build an air defense system.¶ Critics

of Chavez think he should be pouring money into infrastructure to ensure a sustainable oil industry rather than allocating so much

for social and foreign policy initiatives. According to the Wall Street Journal, PDVSA “spent just $60 million on exploration in 2004,

compared with $174 million in 2001.” But Vicente Frepes-Cibils, the lead economist for Venezuela at the World

Bank, says “investment is increasing” and Venezuela has an accumulation of reserves

including outside funds ranging from $10 billion to $15 billion that it is planning to use for oil

infrastructure.¶



A2: Oil Shocks

Energy producers are interested in wealth maximization and behave

rationally—takes out risk of supply shocks

Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren, Cato Institute, “The Energy Security Obsession,” LIMES:THE ITALIAN JOURNAL OF GEOPOLITICS, 11-23-07, www.cato.org/pubs/articles/energy-

security.pdfWhen foreign policy elites encounter these arguments in public forums, they tend to dismiss them as overlytheorized economics that assume perfectly informed rational actors and, moreover, are divorced fromgeopolitical reality. Energy producers, we are told, are not first and foremost wealth maximizers. They pursueforeign policy ends and demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice money to secure those ends. Ideological regimes,moreover, have not always acted rationally in the past and cannot be counted upon to do so in the future. Thepossibility that producer states might become economic suicide bombers – immolating their own economies in

order to inflict great economic pain on the West – cannot be lightly dismissed. The facts, however, indicatethat the above narrative is fundamentally at odds with observable reality. Energyproducers have thus far demonstrated a keen interest in near-term wealth maximization – cover stories to the contrary notwithstanding. International actors rarely if ever actirrationally as an economist would define the term (e.g., they do not act in a manner that would frustrate their

self interest as they perceive it). Fears of “economic suicide bombing” by anti-Western

producer states are greatly exaggerated by an overly pessimistic view of the harm saidbombing could do to Western economies. And worry over embargoes demonstrates afundamental ignorance of how international oil markets work. There are plenty ofthings for foreign policy elites to worry about. Energy security, however, is not one ofthem.

Even a massive supply shock would only have mild economic effects, followed

by efficiency gains and a crash in oil pricesJerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren, Cato Institute, “The Energy Security Obsession,” LIMES:

THE ITALIAN JOURNAL OF GEOPOLITICS, 11-23-07, www.cato.org/pubs/articles/energy-security.pdf, Regardless, the departure of Saudi Arabia from world crude oil market would probablyhave about the same effect on domestic oil prices as the departure of Iran from worldcrude oil markets in 1978. The Iranian revolution reduced oil production by 8.9 percent,whereas Saudi Arabia accounts for about 13 percent of global oil production today.13 Oil prices increased

dramatically after the 1978 revolution, but those higher prices set in motion market supply anddemand responses that undermined the supply reduction and collapsed world priceseight years later. The short term macroeconomic impacts of such a supply disruptionwould actually be less today than they were then given the absence of price controlson the U.S. economy and our reduced reliance on oil as an input for each unit of GDP.14

Suppliers know they cannot strong-arm us—means there is no real embargo

risk because of interdependenceSebastian Mallaby, journalist, “What „Energy Security‟ Really Means,” WASHINGTON POST ,

7-3-06, p. A21.What about U.S. relations with energy suppliers ; surely here the model of nationalistic competition is relevant?

The Arab oil embargo of 1973 demonstrated the danger of a conflict between suppliers and consumers, andRussia's withholding of natural gas from Ukraine last winter shows that embargoes remain possible. But

suppliers know that strong-arm tactics are the surest way to accelerate the search foralternative fuels, which is why Russia plays politics with energy more by giving outsubsidized supplies than by refusing to sell any. The threat of an embargo by oil statesis therefore smaller than the threat of violence by non-states -- rebel attacks in Nigeria's oil delta, an al-

Qaeda strike in Saudi Arabia. In this sense the energy security of producers is not incompetition with that of consumers. They are interdependent. If the G-8 summit can spread

the word about this interdependence, it will do some good. But the nationalistic conception of energy security is

http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/energy-security.pdf










worse than useless. By encouraging a competitive scramble for resources that could spiral into conflict, this sortof security talk only creates insecurity.

No supply shocks—producers are more dependent on the oil trade than are

consumersJerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren, Cato Institute, “The Energy Security Obsession,” LIMES:

THE ITALIAN JOURNAL OF GEOPOLITICS, 11-23-07, www.cato.org/pubs/articles/energy-security.pdfSo while it is possible that a radical oil-producing regime might play a game of chicken with consumingcountries, producing countries are very dependent on oil revenue and have fewer degrees of freedom to

maneuver than consuming countries. Catastrophic supply disruptions would harm producersmore than consumers, which is why they are extremely unlikely. The best insuranceagainst such a low-probability event is to maintain a relatively free economy wherewages and prices are left unregulated by government. That would do more to protect the West

against an extreme production disruption than anything else in government’s policy arsenal.







A2: China Advantage



China Advantage Answers: General

Oil investment upsets ChinaLevi and Clayton ’12 [Michael Levi is the Michael A. Levi is the David M. Rubenstein SeniorFellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security andClimate Change at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Blake Clayton is a Fellow for Energy

and National Security at the CFR, “The Surprising Sources of Oil‟s Influence,” Survival , Vol. 54, No. 6, online]

What about fights over investment? There is no question that cross-border investment in oil

production is often politically charged. In many ways, though, this does not make oil special. China, for example,

discriminates between domestic and foreign firms, and among foreign companies too, in determining when to allow investment in a

host of industrial sectors, from telecommunications to banking. That said, in some cases, oil investment is particularly touchy. In

Latin America, for example, oil is typically seen as a country’s patrimony, and selling it to

foreigners is something that triggers deep emotional reactions.6 Oil investment decisions can

thus take on a special cast. ¶ 3 ¶ It is important, though, not to push this too far. In some cases where one would expect

international politics to play a major role in shaping oil investment, it does not. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, for example, allappear to select foreign firms for inward oil investment more on the basis of contract terms and technological potential than on the

bilateral relationship with those firms‟ home countries.7 ¶ Chinese oil companies, meanwhile, appear to select theirtargets for outward investment primarily based on assessments of commercial

attractiveness, with foreign policy objectives taking a decisive back seat. But that does not

mean that politics has not have not affected where these companies have deployed their

capital. Chinese national oil companies have opportunistically taken advantage of

investment opportunities in places like Sudan and Burma, where Western sanctions have kept

Western oil majors at bay.

US and China compete through oil investments – U.S. engagement with

Venezuela upsets China’s market access Tania ’12 [Maxime, Master of Science (M.Sc.), International Relations and Affairs from theUniversity of Amsterdam, master‟s thesis on China‟s energy security in Venezuelan politics,

“China‟s energy security ¶ strategy towards Venezuela,” July 1,http://epa.iias.asia/files/Maxime%20Tania%20-%20Chinas%20energy%20security%20strategy%20towards%20Venezuela%20-

%20Transnationalization%20and%20the%20geopolitical%20impact%20of%20the%20Sino-Venezuelan%20relationship.pdf] In furtherance to what is discussed above, it is interesting to illustrate whether the constraints to expanding ¶ the Sino-Venezuelan

relations stems from the fact that, both for China and Venezuela, the U.S. is a more ¶ attractive option. With regard to the U.S.-

Venezuelan relations, the advantages of geographical proximity ¶ and processing Venezuelan oil in the U.S. has previously been

discussed and concludes that, despite ¶ Venezuela´s political friction, doing oil business is quite lucrative. But why is China likely to

benefit more ¶ from a benign U.S. than a strategic partnership with Venezuela? The Sino-U.S. relations are the final

factor ¶ requiring discussion in order to assess the geopolitical impact that the relationship between China and ¶ Venezuela have on

the world. ¶ Some would assess China‟s oil diplomacy and its quest for overseas energy resources as a negative ¶ component to its

relations with various countries. As China is strengthening its relations with oil-producing ¶ and exporting countries, constituting agreat competitor for other countries that rely on oil imports, China is ¶ likely to undermine their oil security and contravene their

policies towards oil-producing countries ¶ (Hongyi, 2007: 530). In scrambling for energy resources, both Chinaand the U.S. as the world’s major ¶ powers want to project their influence on the world’s

geopolitical regions. Although Latin America may be ¶ the backyard of the U.S., for both

China and the U.S. Latin America is turning into another geopolitical ¶ region. China’s

relations with Latin American countries in general and Venezuela in particular, have ¶

primarily emphasized on their economic relations in terms of trade and investments. Along

these lines, ¶ China could be reducing U.S.‟ opportunity to have trade relations and make investments in the region ¶ instead. The factthat China‟s military relations with countries would affect the U.S., could be construed as ¶ an upcoming threat to U.S. national

security. Although China‟s power projection on the world can ¶ generally be characterized as „soft power‟, China is also growing

security relations with its international ¶ partners. China claims that its militarization in these countries is a natural

http://epa.iias.asia/files/Maxime%20Tania%20-%20Chinas%20energy%20security%20strategy%20towards%20Venezuela%20-%20Transnationalization%20and%20the%20geopolitical%20impact%20of%20the%20Sino-Venezuelan%20relationship.pdf










consequence of the need it has to ¶ protect its interests from potential rivals. It is hard to tell whether or not the

U.S. should be keeping a close ¶ eye on this, still, minor threat to preserve its national security. Also, the consolidation of

China’s political ¶ relations with U.S. opposing parties, fuels tensions between the U.S. and

China whether this is justified or ¶ not.



A2: Democracy Impact

Democracy wont spill over – New democracies are too weakLarry Diamond, March/April 08, “The Democratic Rollback,” Foreign Affairs, Democracy expert (duh)

Before democracy can spread further, it must take deeper root where it has already sprouted. It is

a basic principle of any military or geopolitical campaign that at some point an advancing force must consolidate its

gains before it conquers more territory. Emerging democracies must demonstrate that they can

solve their governance problems and meet their citizens' expectations for freedom, justice, a better life, and a fairer

society. If democracies do not more effectively contain cr ime and corruption, generate economic growth, relieve economic inequality, and secure

freedom and the rule of law, people wil l eventually lose faith and turn to authoritarian alternatives. Struggling democracies must be

consolidated so that all levels of soc iety become enduringly committed to democracy as the best form of government and to their country's

constitutional norms and constraints. Western policymakers can assist in this process by demanding more than superficial elec toral democracy. By

holding governments accountable and making foreign aid contingent on good governance, donors can help reverse the democratic recession.

Leaders would hold elections to appease the world but not implement true

democracyFareed Zakaria, November 1997, “The rise of illiberal democracy” Foreign Affairs, Editor of FA

A PROPER appreciation of constitutional liberalism has a variety of implications for American foreign policy. First, it suggests a certain humility.

While it is easy to impose elections on a country, it is more difficult to push constitutional liberalism ona society. The process of genuine liberalization and democratization is gradual and long-term, in

which an election is only one step. Without appropriate preparation, it might even be a false step. Recognizing this, governments and nongovernmental organizations are increasingly promoting a wide array of measures designed to bolster

constitutional liberalism in developing countries. The National Endowment for Democracy promotes free markets, independent labor movements,

and political parties. The U.S. Agency for International Development funds independent judiciaries. In the end, however, elections

trump everything. If a country holds elections, Washington and the world will tolerate a greatdeal from the resulting government, as they have with Yeltsin, Akayev, and Menem. In an age of images and

symbols, elections are easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the rule of law?) But there is life after

elections, especially for the people who live there.



A2: Credibility Advantage

Chavez’s Death Won’t Change US Relationship with Venezuela Much Jay Nelson Small (Writer for Time) March 7, 2013

http://swampland.time.com/2013/03/07/u-s-hopes-chavezs-passing-could-smooth-relations-with-venezuela/#ixzz2XRpr3Pj2

U.S. officials are cautiously optimistic that the death of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez could

improve relations between the two countries, but they aren’t holding their breath.¶ “One of the

things that happens over 14 years in a government like Venezuela is it really did revolve around one man. So while I’m hesitant to

say that the change in an individual, or the passing of an individual, completely changes a relationship,” a State Department official

told reporters Wednesday, “he played an outsized role in that government and therefore his absence can have outsized

implications.”¶ That said, Venezuela is now facing elections, as mandated by its constitution. “And all of us know electoral

campaigns are not times to break new ground on foreign policy,” the official said.¶ (PHOTOS: Rise of Chávez: The Late Venezuelan

President’s Path to Power)¶ Not to mention that hours before Chávez’s death was announced, Venezuelan

Vice President Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s anointed successor, accused the U.S. of working to

destabilize Venezuela and of causing Chávez’s illness in a rambling 90-minute press conference. Two U.S. State

Department officials were expelled from Venezuela following the allegations. Chávez died Tuesday of cancer.¶ The U.S. reserves the

right to reciprocity under the Geneva Convention to expel Venezuela’s diplomats, though no such move has been made, the officialsaid.¶ The State Department made an attempt at mending U.S.-Venezuela relations after Chávez stepped away from office to focus

on his health last year. Chávez had often campaigned on anti-U.S. rhetoric, and relations between the two countries have been

strained almost since he took office 14 years ago. A senior State Department official spoke with Maduro by phone in November and

a couple of follow-up meetings were held. “To be honest, we didn’t get much of a response,” the official said. “We really

hadn’t gotten very far and were not sure whether the government of Venezuela wanted to go down that road.”¶ (MORE:

After Chávez’s Death, Venezuelans Mourn and Look to an Uncertain Future)¶ The official said that State will wait until after the

elections to reach out again, though the White House does plan to send an official delegation to the funeral.¶ “The *coming

presidential+ campaign itself may raise issues, may be a difficult campaign for many,” the official said. “We will probably

continue to hear many difficult things about the U.S. that will not improve this relationship.

It’s very hard for us to tell right now if the current government or the next government will

either continue or stop the momentum to a better relationship.”¶

Credibility badStephan M. Walt, Professor at Kennedy's School of Government, Foreign Policy, September 11,

2012, "Why are U.S. leaders so obsessed with credibility?"

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/11/the_credibility_fetish

What's the biggest mistake the United States has made since the end of the Cold War? Invading

Iraq? Helping screw up the Israel-Palestine peace process? Missing the warning signs for 9/11, and then overreacting to the actual

level of danger that Al Qaeda really posed? Not recognizing we had a bubble economy and a corrupt financial industry until after the

2007 meltdown? ¶ Those are all worthy candidates, and I'm sure readers can think of others. But today I want to propose another

persistent error, which lies at the heart of many of the missed opportunities or sins of commission that we made since the Berlin

Wall came down. It is in essence a conceptual mistake: a failure to realize just how much the world

changed when the Soviet Union collapsed, and a concomitant failure to adjust our basic

approach to foreign policy appropriately. ¶ I call this error the "credibility fetish." U.S. leaders have

continued to believe that our security depends on convincing both allies and adversaries that

we are steadfast, loyal, reliable, etc., and that our security guarantees are iron-clad. It is a

formula that reinforces diplomatic rigidity, because it requires us to keep doing things to keep

allies happy and issuing threats (or in some cases, taking actions) to convince foes that we are

serious. And while it might have made some degree of sense during the Cold War, it is

increasingly counterproductive today. ¶ One could argue that credibility did matter during the Cold War. The United

States did face a serious peer competitor in those days, and the Soviet Union did have impressive military capabilities. Although a

direct Soviet attack on vital U.S. interests was always unlikely, one could at least imagine certain events that might have shifted the

global balance of power dramatically. For example, had the Soviet Union been able to conquer Western Europe or the Persian Gulf

and incorporate these assets into its larger empire, it would have had serious consequences for the United States. Accordingly, U.S.



leaders worked hard to make sure that the U.S. commitment to NATO was credible, and we did s imilar things to bolster U.S.

credibility in Asia and the Gulf. ¶ Of course, we probably overstated the importance of "credibility" even then. Sloppy analogies like

the infamous "domino theory" helped convince Americans that we had to fight in places that didn't matter (e.g., Vietnam) in order

to convince everyone that we'd also be willing to fight in places that did. We also managed to convince ourselves that credible

nuclear deterrence depended on having a mythical ability to "prevail" in an all-out nuclear exchange, even though winning would

have had little meaning once a few dozen missiles had been fired. ¶ Nonetheless, in the rigid, bipolar context of the Cold War, it

made sense for the United States to pay some attention to its credibility as an alliance leader and security provider. But today,

the United States faces no peer competitor, and it is hard to think of any single event thatwould provoke a rapid and decisive shift in the global balance of power. Instead of a clear

geopolitical rival, we face a group of medium powers: some of them friendly (Germany, the UK,

Japan, etc.) and some of them partly antagonistic (Russia, China). Yet Russia is economically linked to our NATO

allies, and China is a major U.S. trading partner and has been a major financier of U.S. debt. This not your parents' Cold War. There

are also influential regional powers such as Turkey, India, or Brazil, with whom the U.S. relationship is mixed: We agree on some

issues and are at odds on others. And then there are clients who depend on U.S. protection (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan,

Taiwan, etc.) but whose behavior often creates serious headaches for whoever is in the White House. ¶ As distinguished diplomat

Chas Freeman recently commented, "the complexity and dynamism of the new order place a premium on diplomatic agility. Stolid

constancy and loyalty to pre-existing alliance relationship are not the self-evident virtues they once were. We should not be

surprised that erstwhile allies put their own interest ahead of ours and act accordingly. Where it is to our long-term advantage, we

should do the same." ¶ What might this mean in practice? As I've noted repeatedly, it means beginning by recognizing that the

United States is both very powerful and very secure, and that there's hardly anything that could happen in the international system

that would alter the global balance of power overnight. The balance is shifting, to be sure, but these adjustments will take place over

the course of decades. Weaker states who would like U.S. protection need it a lot more than we need them, which means our

"credibility" is more their problem than ours. Which in turn means that if other states want our help, they should be willing to do a

lot to convince us to provide it. ¶ Instead of obsessing about our own "credibility," in short, and bending over backwards to convince

the Japanese, South Koreans, Singaporeans, Afghans, Israelis, Saudis, and others that we will do whatever it takes to protect them,

we ought to be asking them what they are going to do for themselves, and also for us. And instead of spending all our time trying to

scare the bejeezus out of countries l ike Iran (which merely reinforces their interest in getting some sort of deterrent), we ought to

be reminding them over and over that we have a lot to offer and are open to better relations, even if the clerical regime remains in

power and maybe even if -- horrors! -- it retains possession of the full nuclear fuel cycle (under IAEA safeguards). If nothing else,

adopting a less confrontational posture is bound to complicate their own calculations. ¶ This is not an argument for Bush-style

unilateralism, or for a retreat to Fortress America. Rather, it is a call for greater imagination and flexibility in how we deal with

friends and foes alike. I'm not saying that we should strive for zero credibility, of course; I'm merely

saying that we'd be better off if other states understood that our credibility was more

conditional. In other words, allies need to be reminded that our help is conditional on their compliance with our interests (at

least to some degree) and adversaries should also be reminded that our opposition is equally conditional on what they do. In both

cases we also need to recognize that we are rarely going to get other states to do everything we want. Above all, it is a call to

recognize that our geopolitical position, military power, and underlying economic strength give us the luxury of being agile inprecisely the way that Freeman depicts. ¶ Of course, some present U.S. allies would be alarmed by the course I'm suggesting,

because it would affect the sweetheart deals they've been enjoying for years. They'll tell us they are losing confidence in our

leadership, and they'll threaten to go neutral, or maybe even align with our adversaries. Where possible, they will enlist Americans

who are sympathetic to their plight to pressure on U.S. politicians to offer new assurances. In most cases, however, such threats

don't need to be taken seriously. And we just have to patiently explain to them that we're not necessarily abandoning them, we are

merely 1) making our support more conditional on their cooperation with us on things we care about, and 2) remaining open to

improving relations with other countries, including some countries that some of our current allies might have doubts about. I know:

It's a radical position: we are simply going to pursue the American national interest, instead of letting our allies around the world

define it for us. ¶ The bottom line is that the United States is in a terrific position to play realpolitik on a global scale, precisely

because it needs alliance partners less than most of its partners do. And even when allies are of considerable value to us, we still

have the most leverage in nearly every case. As soon as we start obsessing about our credibility, however,

we hand that leverage back to our weaker partners and we constrain our ability to pursue

meaningful diplomatic solutions to existing conflicts. Fetishizing credibility, in short, is one of

the reasons American diplomacy has achieved relatively little since the end of the Cold War. ¶



A2: Relations Advantage

Venezuela-US Relations will improveNeuman and Archibold 2013 *“Kerry Meets With Official of Venezuela to Set Talks,”

William Neuman and Randal C. Archibold, June 5, 2013,http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/world/americas/venezuela-frees-tim-tracy-jailed-us-

filmmaker-and-expels-him.html?_r=0]

After months of tensions between the United States and Venezuela, Secretary of State John Kerry

met on Wednesday with the Venezuelan foreign minister, Elías Jaua, in Antigua, Guatemala, and

announced the start of talks aimed at improving relations between the two countries.¶ The

overture came after another hopeful sign, Venezuela’s release from jail and subsequent

expulsion of an American documentary filmmaker who had been accused of seeking to undermine

the government. The filmmaker, Tim Tracy, was put on a commercial flight to Miami on Wednesday

morning.¶ “We agreed today, both of us, Venezuela and the United States, that we would like

to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive

relationship,” Mr. Kerry said after meeting with Mr. Jaua on the sideline of a session of the GeneralAssembly of the Organization of American States. American officials said Venezuela had requested the

meeting.¶ Appearing separately, Mr. Jaua said, “We have faith and confidence that this meeting

marks the start of a relationship of respect.”¶ The two men were photographed shaking hands in

what a senior Obama administration official said appeared to be the first public meeting of top officials

from the two countries since President Obama and the Venezuelan president at the time, Hugo Chávez,

shook hands in a brief encounter at a regional summit meeting in 2009.¶ Mr. Kerry said the countries

had agreed “that there will be an ongoing and continuing dialogue at a high level” between

the State Department and the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry.¶ He expressed hope that the

countries could “quickly move to the appointment of ambassadors.” Mr. Chávez expelled the

American ambassador in 2008, accusing the United States of backing a group of military officers plotting a

coup against him. In response, the United States expelled the Venezuelan ambassador.¶ The two

countries quietly began similar talks aimed at improving relations late last year, but they ground to a halta few weeks after Mr. Chávez, a socialist who often made the United States out to be a villain, flew to

Cuba in early December for cancer surgery. Mr. Chávez died in March. In April, his handpicked successor,

Nicolás Maduro, narrowly won an election to replace him.¶ In the previous round of talks, the two

countries agreed to focus on topics of potential cooperation, including the fight against drug trafficking,

and to have the regional head of the Drug Enforcement Administration meet Venezuelan counterparts in

Caracas — a meeting that never occurred.¶ Mr. Maduro, who is struggling with economic problems and

faces great pressures from within Mr. Chávez’s movement and from a re-energized opposition, has

repeatedly used the United States as a political punching bag and accused it of ties to purported plots to

undermine or overthrow his government.¶ Last month, Mr. Maduro called Mr. Obama “the big boss of

the devils” and said Mr. Obama planned to provoke violence in Venezuela to have an excuse to

intervene.¶ On the day Mr. Chávez died, Mr. Maduro expelled two military attaches at the American

Embassy, saying they were trying to destabilize the country. He has speculated that the United States may

have found a way to cause Mr. Chávez’s cancer.¶ In April, the Maduro government arrested Mr. Tracy,the filmmaker, accusing him of being a spy seeking to set off a civil war in Venezuela by funneling money

to student protesters. It never made public any evidence to support the charges against Mr. Tracy, who

said he had come to Venezuela to make a documentary about the country’s political divide.¶ In a

television interview last month, Mr. Obama called the accusations “ridiculous.” Mr. Kerry on

Wednesday called Mr. Tracy’s release “a very positive development.”¶ The Venezuelan interior

minister, Miguel Rodríguez Torres, said Mr. Maduro had ordered Mr. Tracy’s expulsion.



Documents

Venezuela Negative - MSDI 2013