veberian legacy

13

2 The Weberian legacyPeter Barberis

Max Weber (1864–1920) was one of the founding fathers of modern social

science. His intellectual arc was a generous one, embracing aspects of phi-

losophy, research methodology, history, religion, politics and law. He was

the quintessential ‘polymath’, though certainly no dilettante. In today’s

universities he is most commonly encountered by students of sociology

and, if they are lucky, public administration and management. Perhaps

the most tangible and durable product of his thought as it engages with the

contemporary world is that associated with bureaucracy. It is this aspect

of Weber’s legacy that is featured in the present chapter – in particular his

observations about state bureaucracy.

The very term bureaucracy is full of connotations, often negative ones.

In popular parlance it has become almost a byword for all that is stub-

bornly infl exible, inhuman, impervious to change, self- serving. It is seen by

critics as highly imperfect if not downright perverse in its apparent inabil-

ity to meet the needs of those it is supposed to serve, be they the democrati-

cally elected political masters of the day or the common citizenry (Osborne

and Gaebler 1992). It has been defended by those who claim such images

to be mere caricature, its virtues overlooked by the critics (Du Gay 2000).

Others have adduced empirical evidence to show that bureaucracy is not

inherently dysfunctional, that it has sometimes been more adaptable and

fl exible than is commonly supposed (Britan 1981; Goodsell 2004; Page and

Jenkins 2005, p. viii).

Implicitly and sometimes explicitly, it is invariably Weber’s ‘ideal

type’ that provides the benchmark for students of bureaucracy, critics

and advocates alike. The fi rst section of this chapter therefore provides

a sketch of the ideal type bureaucracy as presented in his writings. It is

important to remember that Weber himself entertained doubts about

the effi cacy of bureaucracy: at any rate he identifi ed some of the inher-

ent tensions and the conditions that were necessary to avert or minimize

malfunctioning. These tensions and conditions, embracing the relevant

political, constitutional and cultural aspects of Weber’s thought, will

be featured in the second section. In diff erent senses, these two perspec-

tives about bureaucracy – the ‘ideal type’ and its imperfections – provide

points of reference for the third and fourth sections. Here the focus will be

more upon the bureaucratic phenomenon as it has been manifest in state

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14 International handbook on civil service systems

systems across the world. The third section will consider to what extent

and in what senses the Weberian legacy served as a benchmark for state

bureaucracies during a substantial part of the twentieth century; while the

fourth section examines the challenges that began to predominate from

the later decades of that century. Bearing in mind that Weber foresaw at

least some of the features that have given rise to an apparent loss of faith

in state bureaucracies, the chapter will conclude with a discussion about

the extent to which recent trends have diminished the Weberian legacy.

2.1 WEBER’S IDEAL TYPE BUREAUCRACY

In using the term ‘ideal’ Weber did not imply any moral superiority.

Rather, the ideal type is an analytical tool. It should have some recogniz-

able connection with the real world yet without being submerged into any

particular reality, neither narrowly descriptive nor a caricature. Rather it

is an extrapolation of certain elements of reality presented as a generaliza-

tion in terms of what Weber called ‘rational properties’. Thus the ideal

type bureaucracy is at once the product in part of observation, part reason

and part of what may be called ‘structured imagination’. This was so of

all Weber’s ideal types. They provide benchmarks against which and by

which ‘real life’ examples may be compared and understood.

Weber (1978, p. 956) saw bureaucracy as a phenomenon of the modern

state alongside the advancing capitalism of the late nineteenth and early

twentieth century. It was a function of what he saw as the modern legal-

rational type of polity, as distinct from those based upon charisma or

upon traditional/patrimonial rule. For Weber, bureaucracy went hand-

in- hand with rational capitalism and representative democracy (ibid. pp.

983–4).

The classic Weberian ideal type bureaucracy may be characterized

under three headings: structure; procedures; personnel. Structures within

the typical bureaucracy are hierarchical – ‘levels of graded authority . . .

a fi rmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is

a supervision of the lower offi ces by the higher ones’ (p. 957). There is

horizontal diff erentiation, predicated upon defi nition of task, function

or specialist knowledge. As Weber put it, such organization yielded ‘the

optimum possibility for carrying through the principles of specializing

administrative functions according to purely objective considerations’

(p. 975). Such considerations are above persona, so to speak. People fi t

into the organization; the organization is not shaped around the people

who run it. Structures may change. They do so when objective needs, goals

or other conditions change. Bureaucracy itself is notable for its durability,


The Weberian legacy 15

providing a mainstay, a veritable repository. The fact of organization

gives it this quality.

Weber said that bureaucracy works best, technically, to the extent to

which it is ‘dehumanized’ (p. 975). Here was a comment about bureau-

cratic procedures. Bureaucracy is thus a counterweight to the high degree

of personal discretion and arbitrariness typical of regimes founded upon

tradition or charisma. Ideal type state bureaucracies work within the

constitutional context of the ‘rule of law’ before which all citizens are held

equal, at least in juridical terms. Bureaucracy operates on the basis of

‘calculable rules’ ensuring consistency of application. The textual docu-

mentation of procedures ensures such consistency whosoever’s hand is

on the tiller, so to speak. In the ideal type bureaucracy there are therefore

many detailed rules, regulations, codes of practice – in a sense the more

the better. It is no less important that they be upheld and adhered to.

Weber allowed for some ‘creative administration’, so long as it was neither

arbitrary nor the product of personal whim or favour (p. 979). As with

structure, the procedures adopted by bureaucracy must of necessity be

fi rm, even rigid, if they are to yield their potential benefi ts.

The personnel of the ideal type bureaucracy are to be recruited by objec-

tive criteria and educational qualifi cations – the quintessential meritocracy

(p. 960). They will be professionals, their experiences honed by appropriate

training (pp. 998–1003). They receive a fi xed salary, determined according

to the strict requirements of the job rather than the characteristics of a

particular incumbent; whoever does the job gets the same pay and condi-

tions of employment. Weber further opined that the personnel of the ideal

type state bureaucracy would be career offi cials – that is people who spend

their entire working lives in the service of one employer (the state), enjoy-

ing security of tenure save in the event of fraud or rank incompetence.

Such, he argued, serves to guarantee ‘a strictly objective discharge of spe-

cifi c offi cial duties free from all personal considerations’ (p. 962). A career

service engenders collegiality and a certain esprit de corps, at least in the

early stages. Collegiality, said Weber, recedes with the growing deperson-

alization of administration. And it is depersonalization that becomes the

dominant feature, along with a separation of public and private spheres

(p. 998). Thus offi cials in a state bureaucracy subjugate their private selves

to the public role that they discharge: they are cogs in a larger mechanism;

they act out a role, they are team players.

Although the ideal type was not conceived by Weber in evaluative

terms, he was emphatic about its virtues. It is, he says, technically superior

to other organizations as is the machine to non- mechanical modes of pro-

duction (p. 972). There are similarities here with Marx’s acknowledgement

of industrial capitalism’s superiority as an economic system over feudal



and other pre- capitalist forms of production. And just as Marx identi-

fi ed the inner tensions and contradictions that would bring capitalism’s

destruction, so Weber saw within the logic of bureaucracy certain tensions

and imperfections that could lead to its malfunctioning, though not its

demise. Before looking at some of the worldly examples of state bureauc-

racies it is therefore necessary to know something about the tensions and

imperfections that he identifi ed.

2.2 WEBERIAN BUREAUCRACY – TENSIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS

It is useful to distinguish between, on the one hand, Weber’s notion of

bureaucracy at the technical level as an instrument of delivery and, on the

other hand, his observations about the role played by state bureaucracies

within a set of political institutions. The distinction is in some ways a false

one but it nevertheless serves to highlight some of the tensions.

One interpretation of real world bureaucracy is that it works best to the

extent to which it approximates to the ideal type. Yet even with ideal type

characteristics writ large, bureaucracies may malfunction by their own

weight, as it were. Too much of a good thing may be counterproductive.

There may be procedural sclerosis, lack of innovation, self- serving ten-

dencies and so forth – even and especially where the career offi cial holds

dominion. Weber observed that the career offi cial seeks a fi xed salary

(according to status) and a good pension (p. 963). Here he seems to have

prefi gured some of the concerns of the public choice theorists, discussed

below, who have seen state bureaucracy as an obstacle to meeting the

needs of the citizen. The key to this aspect of Weber’s thinking – and in

striking similarity to the later public choice theorists – lies in his uphold-

ing of competitive market capitalism. Weber held state bureaucracy to be

at its best when the role of government was relatively limited, checked by

the institutions of private capital and civil society. Where the balance gets

out of kilter, when state bureaucracy and its values come to dominate,

then its ill eff ects will be manifest (p. 1402). For Weber was an unabashed

supporter of capitalism, though he feared that, like bureaucracy, it was

a potential threat to individualism (Mommsen 1980). He saw something

ineluctably destructive about bureaucracy within any milieu. Once fully

established, he noted, it was ‘among those social structures which are

the hardest to destroy’ (Weber 1978, p. 987). Of course it does not follow

that durability means lack of change; but the logic of bureaucracy implies

an infl exibility that makes for diffi culty in adapting to a change agenda

emanating from an external source.



Weber recognized a tension between bureaucracy and democratization

– or at any rate the institutions of representative government in a liberal

democracy. The closer to the ideal type bureaucracy, the more piquant the

tensions. As Beetham (1974, p. 54) points out, there was in Weber’s think-

ing a tension also between the nationalistic and the liberal democratic

elements. The former would give greater latitude to bureaucracy’s natural

tendencies, while the latter would have it more vigorously controlled in the

belief that it is a good servant but a poor master.

Two further points arise. The fi rst is whether or not bureaucracy is in

essence an inanimate instrument in the hands of whomsoever is elected or

appointed to rule – or whether it is an active agent, perhaps in pursuit of

its own goals, more or less impervious to the democratic or representative

impulse. If it is essentially inanimate, then we need to look to those who

give it direction in order to understand its eff ects – the political masters.

But if it is an active agent, then we must look within the bureaucracy itself.

And it is such a view that Weber seems to have taken. He emphasized the

importance not only of constitutional checks and balances, replete with

liberal rule of law precepts, but also the social and cultural relationships

between state bureaucracy and the socio- political order. Such concerns

are central to those who have attached importance to the notion of rep-

resentative bureaucracy. The second issue, then, is about the relationship

between state bureaucracy and the socio- political institutions. Does the

bureaucracy have – and should it have – a measure of independence from

the polity and from the wider society that it is supposed to serve? Does

it matter if the bureaucracy is staff ed by an insular, lofty social or edu-

cational elite corps so long as it is effi cient? Indeed is it necessary for its

proper functioning that the senior echelons of the bureaucracy are fi lled

with functionaries drawn to a higher moral calling in the manner of the

Platonic philosopher king? Much depends upon the polity and the nature

of the society in question. In an advanced liberal democracy there may be

greater concern to limit the latitude given to bureaucratic discretion: the

more closely supervised the better it is likely to serve society. Conversely,

a measure of independence may be necessary in order for its potential

superiority to have purchase. In any event, there is a dilemma about the

technical wisdom for which state bureaucracy is a repository. Does state

bureaucracy, bound or unbound, really make for better government; does

the proverbial man in Whitehall usually know best?

These dilemmas have a bearing upon any discussion about concrete

examples of Weberian ideal type state bureaucracies. Just as perfectly com-

petitive markets are to be found only on the intellectual drawing board of

the economist, so nowhere in the real world would we expect to experience

the ideal type bureaucracy. Some cases will exhibit closer approximation



than will others – and in some respects, though not in other respects. As

we have seen, Weber acknowledged complexities and fault- lines that make

the ideal elusive. Nor is it always easy to say for certain that this or that

example of state bureaucracy conforms more closely to the ideal type.

2.3 THE WEBERIAN HIGH- TIDE?

It is sometimes only when a phenomenon recedes that its full signifi -

cance becomes apparent. And then, because we are no longer under its

shadow, we are apt to exaggerate its signifi cance in days gone by, if only

to underscore the importance of recent changes. Such has been the fate

of the Weberian model of bureaucracy. It is often assumed that the so

called New Public Management (NPM) and other reforms of the last

two or three decades have been pitched against a pre- existing tide of

state bureaucracy that was the antithesis of the current reform agenda;

and that the unreformed state bureaucracies were essentially Weberian

in character. Thus the period from roughly the late nineteenth to the

third quarter of the twentieth century is seen as the Weberian high tide.

In general and by comparison with certain of the more recent trends (in

certain places), such characterization has some validity. When subject

to closer scrutiny, it is defi cient and misleading. This is evident from a

survey of state bureaucracies in the industrial world during the supposed

Weberian heyday.

Finer (1995, p. 63) criticized Weber for grounding his ideal type too

heavily in the Prussian experience. Yet Weber was careful to identify

those aspects of the Bismarck regime that were not conducive to the

proper functioning of bureaucracy. In particular, while offi cials showed a

laudable ‘sense of duty, impartiality and mastery of organizational prob-

lems’ Weber considered them to have failed completely in dealing with

political problems when not properly supervised by the Reichstag (Weber

1978, p. 1417). As a near contemporary of Weber’s noted, the Prussian

bureaucracy was effi cient if not strictly impartial and that its offi cials were

not excessively tied down by routine but were willing to act on their own

responsibility (Lowell 1904, p. 293). In other countries, too, state struc-

tures were rarely neat, orderly or even always strictly hierarchical during

the Weberian heyday. And where, as in most cases, a formal hierarchy

pertained, there remained many irregularities and loose ends. In Britain,

the most senior mandarins maintained a fairly tight rein within their

departments (Barberis 1996, pp. 45–9). But the shape of the state appara-

tus was anything but orderly (Greenleaf 1987). Even in France, despite the

Napoleonic imprint and the obsession with uniformity the state machine



became increasingly fragmented (Wright 1990, p. 120); while in the USA

there was always a good deal of fragmentation (Peters 1995, p. 35).

In other cases patterns seem to have been more tightly structured. In

Italy, there developed during the nineteenth century structures that were

‘strongly hierarchical and centralized’ (Lewansky 2000, p. 214) while the

Norwegian civil service had structures of the classic Weberian character

(Christensen 2000, p. 105). Of course, Weber (1978, p. 1393) allowed for

variations, both past and present. He saw a contrast, though, between

the ancient forms to be found in China, Egypt, late Roman or Byzantium

and those of the modern world as lying with the rational training and

specialization of the latter. And, along with these characteristics, went

the notion of a career corps, recruited on merit with an emphasis upon

formal examinations. The French and German bureaucracies were prime

examples. By the late nineteenth century France had a corps of offi cials

recruited ‘not only for a position or a job but for a career’ (Meininger

2000, p. 199). It developed its elite training schools to feed the grand corps,

later (1945) establishing the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA) to

become perhaps the most famous of all such schools. In Germany well

before the First World War, merit recruitment had been established.

There was never anything to compare with the ENA but there was a long

established tradition of legal training provided by the universities, later (in

the Federal Republic post- 1949) regulated by statute (Derlien 1995, p. 69).

The Meiji state in Japan (1868–1913) was deliberately modelled on the

Prussian bureaucracy and featured a training school for public adminis-

trators (Krauss 1995, p. 119). In Belgium during the 1930s, Commissioner

Louis Camu was charged with establishing a civil service inspired partly by

British and French example. It has been described by Hondeghem (2000,

p. 123) as the ‘Weberian model of a neutral apolitic and competent civil

service based upon an objective selection system with competitive exami-

nations and a career system of promotions’. The principle of recruitment

by competitive examination had been established in Britain by the late

nineteenth century. The universities of Oxford and Cambridge provided

a quality control mechanism of sorts, though it is misleading to portray

these universities as an equivalent of the French écoles. They provided

a reservoir of talent and, in the process, fostered a fairly high degree of

cohesion within the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. But the British

system also remained notable for the absence of systematic post- entry

training for its future leaders, the emphasis being placed upon ‘learning

by doing’. It ties in with the British aversion to any scientifi c, mechanical

or theoretical approach to administration (Thomas 1978). It also connects

with the dominion of the ‘generalist’, not incompatible with but less easily

reconciled to the Weberian notion of technical expertise. Defenders of



the British administrative elite always insisted that the lack of technical

expertise among its senior members did not imply a lack of professional-

ism. There was indeed not only a highly conscious professionalism but

also a strong public service ethic and sense of esprit de corps (Chapman

1988). A strong esprit de corps was no less evident in France, Germany,

Norway and Sweden (Torstendahl 1991, p 228; Meininger 2000, p. 189).

In the USA despite the lack of a European tradition of a strong, autono-

mous civil service, there developed a distinct esprit de corps – at least in

terms of the management of the state and of goal achievement (Peters

1995, pp. 18–19). In Italy, by contrast, there was almost no esprit de

corps, though a sense of professionalism, a concern for performance and

the employment of well- qualifi ed technical staff s featured from the 1880s

(Lewansky 2000, p. 229).

A word should be said about representative bureaucracy. It may mean

one of at least two diff erent things. First, the bureaucracy should to some

extent be a microcosm of the society it serves; second, that it should

conduct itself in accord with public opinion (Krislov 1974, p. 37). The

latter implies some sort of symbiosis between its senior personnel and

those of the political executive – or at any rate, a bureaucratic elite in

which the democratically elected political classes have confi dence. It was in

this sense that Kingsley (1944, pp. 261–83) famously asserted that Britain

had a representative bureaucracy. The essential ingredient is attitudinal, a

mutual understanding of complementary but separate roles and a sharing

of values between members of the administrative and political elites. In

Britain as in most other state bureaucracies of the period (the Weberian

heyday) there was a clear demarcation not only of roles but also of person-

nel and of respective career paths. But in France, the grand corps system

promoted partially integrated careers among civil servants and ministers;

so too, to a lesser extent, in the German Federal Republic. The patterns

in Britain, France and Germany were all compatible with the Weberian

model inasmuch as the primary criterion of appointment remained that

of competence in the broadest sense. It will be more diffi cult, though not

impossible, to meet this condition where there is a deliberate attempt to

contort appointment to public offi ce to achieve representation as a micro-

cosm. For the most part this dimension of representative bureaucracy

remained either silent or was played out in minor key among the state

bureaucracies of industrialized nations during the Weberian heyday – and

then usually where there prevailed a high degree of social heterogeneity.

In Italy, the issue arose from the late nineteenth century in connection

with geographical origins, a high proportion of senior personnel coming

from central and southern regions, though the factors involved were quite

complex (Melis 2005). In Belgium and in Canada, linguistic divisions have



long been prescient (Krislov 1974, pp. 92–7), while ethnic diversity in the

USA has long given the issue of representative bureaucracy a particular

signifi cance (Peters 1995, p. 27).

The second dimension of representative bureaucracy is closely linked

with the wider issue of relationships between the state bureaucracy and

politics. As we have seen, Weber was concerned that state bureaucracies

should not exceed their due role in a liberal democracy; that they should

not be perverted; nor that they should become instruments in the hands

of a particular ruler or faction. Thus the notion of a properly functioning

constitutional bureaucracy requires a nice balance between responsiveness

to the political will of the democratically elected government of the day

and a measure of independence that will keep it free to place its expertise

and accumulated experience at the disposal of a similarly elected govern-

ment of the future. It is a diffi cult balance to achieve and, while insisting

upon the virtue of diff erent roles for politicians and bureaucrats, Weber

saw that the line could be drawn in diff erent places (Du Gay 2000, pp.

120–21). In the USA, openly partisan appointments to fi ll the most senior

positions in the federal bureau were in part a way of dealing with the spoils

system of the nineteenth century. It nevertheless established a distinction

between the political and the ‘neutrally competent’ civil service (Peters

1995, pp. 28–9). In Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands there have

been traditions of impartiality at all levels with arrangements to insulate

the recruitment process from any taint of political interference (Page and

Wright 1999, pp. 270–71). In fact even during the Weberian heyday some

trace of ministerial interference occasionally crept into senior appoint-

ments in Britain, though not such as to disturb the principle of impartiality

(Barberis 1996, pp. 119–24). Similarly in France, Sweden and Germany

appointments were subject to ‘more direct political infl uence’ (Page and

Wright 1999, p. 271) though the bureaucracies were able to retain their

non- partisanship.

Diff erent traditions as regard to the wider role and competence of the

state also have some bearing. Pierre (1995, p. 8) contrasts Rechtsstaat

systems with public service models. Rechtsstaat systems involve the legiti-

mization of a strong centralized state operating as an integrating force

with a heavy administrative law tradition. In the public service model,

the state has a more circumscribed role, its powers, sometimes extensive,

often being granted more grudgingly. The strong state tradition in France

accords more readily with the Rechtsstaat system, while the public service

model is exemplifi ed by Britain where bureaucratic power grew by steady

accretion, accompanied by periodic outpourings of indignation born of a

fear that it was exceeding its role (Thomas 1978). In many ways the British

case refl ects some of Weber’s injunctions about the ills of unharnessed



bureaucracy, though the French system has, by comparison, exhibited

more classical features of structure, legalism and technical expertise.

What this discussion shows, fi rst and above all, is that there existed quite

a variety of bureaucratic forms. There was never a one- size- fi ts- all pattern

among state bureaucracies of the capitalist world during the supposed

Weberian heyday. Second, while some variety is quite compatible with the

Weberian legacy, we must be careful not to explain away the ‘misfi ts’ or

‘deviant traits’ as mere exceptions that confi rm the generality. Some of the

characteristics in some of the state bureaucracies always rested uneasily

within the Weberian skein. Certain bureaucracies at certain times down

to the 1970s came closer and in more respects than did others; none con-

formed to a literal reading of the Weberian ideal type, even allowing for a

certain amount of ‘play’. This is not to say that it is entirely wrong to talk

about a heyday of the Weberian state bureaucracy; rather that we should

be aware of the many qualifi cations. Third, we must remember that no

country consciously modelled its state bureaucracy upon Weber’s ideal

type; no one copied from the pages of Weber, so to speak. That was never

the nature of his legacy. And fourth, we should resist the temptation to

describe as ‘Weberian’ any aspect of a state bureaucracy that has been in

retreat during more recent times or is at odds with the conscious designs

of the reformers.

2.4 RETREAT FROM THE WEBERIAN LEGACY?

Whatever the baseline, there undoubtedly developed during the last

quarter of the twentieth century a perceptible shift in prevailing assump-

tions about the role of state bureaucracies, about the way that they should

be run and about the values they were expected to enshrine. There have

been varying chronologies with considerable diff erences of emphasis

in diff erent countries. But signifi cant changes have taken place in most

industrial nations. Four principal driving forces may be identifi ed: fi rst,

a demand for more eff ective political control; second, a wish to make

bureaucracies more effi cient, better able to ‘deliver’; third, an underly-

ing trend that may be loosely described as ‘postmodernism’; and fourth,

internationalism or ‘globalization’.

There is no conspiracy. These driving forces refl ect disparate and some-

times unconnected if not confl icting movements. But they have often been

mutually reinforcing. For example, the demand for more eff ective political

control is born of a view shared by radical elements of both left and right

that old- style state bureaucracies had self- serving tendencies. But it is from

the radical right that such forces were expressed perhaps most elegantly in



the shape of public choice theory. Here, then, is a denial of the special role

and status accorded to senior mandarins who helped to steer the ship of

state for the common good. It is necessary therefore to rein back the role of

the state, seeking wherever possible to introduce market- orientated mech-

anisms in whatever remained of the public sector. This view has to some

extent coalesced with the second force for change – a desire to make the

state more effi cient. The import of business methods is seen as one way to

achieve this objective, accompanied by a heavier emphasis upon ‘manage-

ment’ as an instrument of salvation. For convenience this is usually called

the NPM. The third and fourth forces – postmodernism and globalization

– are of rather a diff erent order. They are abstractions, though they refl ect

‘real world’ changes. Postmodernism implies the break- up of orderly

social, economic and political patterns associated with (pre- post) modern

industrialism. Relative order, structure, regularity and stability have been

replaced by comparative disorder, fragmentation, irregularity and inher-

ent instability. Such at least is the apparent trend. It relates partly to the

fourth driving force – globalization. Here is a phenomenon which, in

extremis, could render meaningless or far less signifi cant the notion of the

nation state upon which that of state bureaucracy is predicated.

Three questions arise. First, what are the specifi c manifestations of these

four driving forces – what bearing do they have for state bureaucracy?

Second, to what extent do they constitute a denial of the principles asso-

ciated with Weberian bureaucracy? Third, how much bite have they had

within state bureaucracies of the industrial world and, most importantly,

to what extent has the Weberian legacy been thereby diminished?

These four driving forces yield a number of characteristics. Rhodes

(1994, 1996) has referred to a ‘hollowing out’ of the state and a shift from

‘government to governance’. It means that the state has lost functions both

above and below – above, to international and supranational institutions;

below, to non- state and quasi- state institutions through programmes of

privatization, contracting out and delegation. The so- called enabling or

regulatory state may retain many responsibilities – but it seeks wherever

possible to regulate those who deliver on its behalf rather than to deliver

directly itself. There is thus a process of fragmentation – a more jumbled

tapestry of organizations with diff ering responsibilities, more complex pat-

terns of interaction and lines of accountability. Within many public sector

organizations there are fl atter hierarchies; polycentric relationships have

replaced linear chains of command. The postmodern bureau is output

rather than procedure orientated, refl ecting a more utilitarian concern for

ends rather than means. The output culture has embraced target setting,

performance assessment, league tables and payment by results. Citizens

and clients are, in the business tradition, customers. Citizens’ charters,



mission statements, codes of practice and the like provide ‘benchmarks’

against which the performance and adequacy of bureaucracy may be

tested. There is greater transparency and concern about open government.

Senior mandarins are more accessible and more visible. More information

is provided about them (including ‘human’ disclosures such as the football

team they support) and they answer in public not only to explain the tech-

nical detail of policy but also, on occasion, to defend its substance. There

has been a shift away from careers for life and towards job- specifi c con-

tracts, periodically renewable subject to satisfaction. Collective bargaining

and collective reward systems have given way to individually negotiated

contracts, at any rate for senior and mid- ranking offi cials. More fractured,

localized patterns of recruitment and promotion make for less homogene-

ity. Greater diversity of personnel makes state bureaucracies less elitist,

less cohesive and with less of an esprit de corps.

The above picture is, in eff ect, an alternative ideal type. No more does

it exist in pure form than did the ideal type bureaucracy in the apparent

Weberian heyday. And no more could it. It takes no account of inner ten-

sions and contradictions. For example, greater fragmentation may well

render more diffi cult the transmission of the democratic impulse. Or the

desire, say, of a locally managed school to attract better pupils in order

to lift itself up the achievement- orientated league table may negate the

government’s wish to engineer a broader social intake.

These and numerous other tensions, then, would make it almost

impossible anywhere or at any time to activate a full- blown programme

of ‘reformed’ bureaucracy. Our concern for the moment is whether, in

principle, the alternative ideal type constitutes a total denial of Weberian

bureaucracy.

There is no simple answer to the question. In some ways, the two models

are compatible – to a certain point. The greater emphasis upon making

bureaucracy more sensitive to political direction is, as we have seen, not

only compatible with but is indeed central to Weber’s ideas about state

bureaucracy. Similarly, the infusion of ‘outsiders’ need not destroy the

Weberian principle of a career service so long as they are recruited on

merit and that careerists remain preponderant. But politicization is an

assault on Weberian principles, be it the intrusion of party colours when

making appointments or the loss of objectivity by mandarins in order to

please the political leaders of the day. The modern penchant for transpar-

ency is in one sense an intrusion. Weber noted the tendency of bureaucrats

to maintain secrecy wherever they could. Some secrecy he saw as neces-

sary, especially in diplomatic exchanges (Weber 1978, pp. 992–3; 1431–8).

But he did not see it as the sine qua non of the eff ective bureau. A measure

of transparency and open government may also therefore be compatible



with the Weberian legacy – so long as it genuinely serves the cause of

better government and does not become a fetish. Privatization, downsiz-

ing and perhaps even contracting out may be in line with Weber’s ideas

about a state that would not become too dominant a force; he might well

have endorsed a prospectus for a state more modest in scope and reach

(though no less eff ective) than had become common by the fi nal quarter

of the twentieth century. On the other hand, he would have been uneasy

with any tendency to make public agencies behave as if they were private

businesses. Thus the limited and judicious use of appraisal and other

performance- related techniques may be compatible provided they remain

within the compass of proper public administration objectives. When

used inappropriately or to excess, though, they can become corrosive of

traditional bureaucratic values. They can induce a ‘performance game’

necessitating the exercise of managerial discretion that is the antithesis of

the Weberian concern to uphold the consistent application of rules and

procedures. There may also be a corrosion of the public service ethos and

sense of esprit de corps.

The new reforms do not, then, imply the inevitable denial of every

aspect of the Weberian legacy. In moderation and in themselves, certain

features may be compatible. But in combination, even when in mod-

eration and certainly when rendered with full force, the result would be

a retreat for the Weberian model of bureaucracy. To establish the extent

to which these reforms have brought the Weberian legacy into retreat we

must now briefl y survey some of the most notable changes in various state

bureaucracies since the 1970s.

If there are diff erent base lines of proximity to the ideal type in the

Weberian heyday, we should expect diff erent patterns of movement away

from traditional civil service systems. In terms of the rhetoric of reform,

Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, p. 102) make a threefold distinction: fi rst, the

pro- NPM Anglo- America- Australasian states; second, the early and par-

ticipating modernizers of northern Europe; third, the later, more manageri-

ally orientated modernizers in central Europe and the EU. The latter two

are variants of what they call the neo- Weberian state. They involve, inter

alia, a shift towards meeting citizens’ wishes, though not necessarily by

market mechanisms; a supplementation though not the replacement of rep-

resentative democracy by mechanisms for direct participation; an emphasis

upon results while not abandoning questions of procedure; and an endorse-

ment of professional management in place of the reliance upon legalism.

So much for the rhetoric; what about the reality? The Anglo- Saxon

countries have moved furthest, sometimes feeding upon each other’s

reforms (Halligan 2007, p. 56). There has been some downsizing in

these countries and in those of Western Europe and beyond, including



programmes of privatization, decentralization, and agencifi cation. Such

has been the experience since the 1980s, even to an extent in France where

there has been little enthusiasm for the NPM (Meininger 2000, p. 208).

Across Europe there has emerged a more managerially orientated profes-

sionalism and a questioning of the effi cacy of the public sector (van der

Meer et al. 2007, p. 47).

In the Anglo- Saxon countries and in certain other nations there has

been some distinct movement away from traditional methods of recruit-

ment and reward (Laegreid and Wise 2007, p. 173). In the UK, the Civil

Service Commission has been abolished, its commissioners given new

roles and recruitment for all save the elite stream eff ectively decentralized;

partisan special advisers have been enlisted in greater numbers; people

with outside experience are with greater regularity than before fi lling the

senior permanent positions; performance- related reward systems have

intruded at all levels. These developments are, if nothing else, a challenge

to the Weberian legacy; they could become its nemesis. Yet merit remains

the touchstone even amidst decentralized recruitment; the use of partisan

advisers, while destabilizing and occasionally pernicious in the central

departments (and then under prime ministerial tutelage) has had less direct

purchase in the delivery departments; and most of the senior mandarins

have spent most of their careers in and around Whitehall. Elsewhere and

despite the introduction of more fl exible service conditions, the Weberian

ideal of a meritocratic career service remains equally prominent – for

example in France (Meininger 2000, p. 131), Germany (Goetz 2000, p. 66),

and Japan (Krauss 1995, p. 127) as well as in Belgium, Ireland and the

Netherlands (Bekke and van der Meer 2000, pp. 279–80). Performance-

related reward systems may be a more serious threat. Much depends upon

the attitude that they have fostered, for which little evidence is available to

compare with that of an earlier period (Dogan 1975; Aberbach et al. 1981).

As suggested above, the implications for the Weberian model of

bureaucracy cannot be assessed along any one coordinate in isolation.

The creation of a senior civil service in the UK and in the Netherlands

during the 1990s and of a senior executive service in the USA following

the Civil Service Reform Act 1978 may look like the consolidation of a

Weberian principle. But these were really attempts to counteract the threat

of fragmentation and loss of cohesion. In a wider sense, too, there is a

duality, refl ecting tensions between Weberian and post- Weberian values.

Thus in the UK, senior mandarins continue to proclaim the virtues of the

public service ethic while becoming increasingly immersed in the manage-

rialism that is allegedly its antithesis (O’Toole 2006). Here and elsewhere,

bureaucrats have adopted the creed of managerialism, sometimes as

self- professed agents of change (Du Gay 2000, p. 137).



Uneven and patchy as it is and unconfi rmed by systematic fi eld

research, there seems to have been some sort of attitude change among

senior mandarins of the industrial world that rests uneasily with the

Weberian legacy. Conversely, there is little indication of any serious dis-

mantling of the Weberian ideal of a politically impartial corps. It may

be, as Pierre (1995) says, that in countries such as the UK, USA, France,

Germany, Sweden and Japan ‘neutral competence’ has been replaced by a

‘politico- administrative relationship characterized by more complex pat-

terns of interaction and interdependence’. In normative terms, though,

the Weberian ideal remains predominant (Bekke and van der Meer 2000,

p. 281). And there is little evidence of political intrusion beyond that which

has in diff erent ways always existed – not at any rate such as to render any

state bureaucracy incapable of transferring its loyalties to a newly elected

government. There has been some blurring of the lines. Bureaucrats have

by stealth become more publicly associated with certain policies; less

widely noticed, politicians have become more concerned with the tech-

niques of management, partly in order to inject their hue to the adminis-

trative process. But the NPM has been by no means universally embraced.

Outside the pro- NPM states (UK, USA, New Zealand) many of the tradi-

tional assumptions and practices have survived what has been described as

the ‘modernization of the Weberian tradition’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004,

p. 100). What is more, many of the post- communist central east European

states are trying to move towards the creation of unifi ed, professional and

impartial bureaucracies (Verheijen and Rabrenovic 2007, p. 18).

2.5 CONCLUSIONS

Where does all this leave the Weberian legacy? In the fi rst place, we must

remember the nature of the legacy, as bequeathed by Weber. His ideal

type state bureaucracy was more than an inert instrument of effi ciency,

though he upheld its virtues partly on account of its claims to greater

effi ciency. It was in fact part of the constitutional apparatus for a properly

functioning liberal democracy – a state strong in authority and demo-

cratically grounded legitimacy but not overbearing in role, a product of

the age of reason to husband the institutions of industrial capitalism and

civil society. Second and unsurprisingly, no state bureaucracy ever came

close to fulfi lment of the ideal type in all its characteristics. Even in the

advanced industrial states and during the apparent Weberian heyday,

there never existed more than an approximation to the ideal. In many

of these countries there was nevertheless a recognizable approximation,

especially in terms of merit recruitment, employment of expertise, a career



service and some sort of esprit de corps among senior personnel, together

with the crucial ingredient of political impartiality. For all the caveats and

imperfections, there is enough to sustain the notion of a Weberian heyday,

so long as our purpose is a comparative one, relative to other periods, and

not a statement of the absolute.

Third, movement away from such as ever existed of the Weberian

heyday has been partial and patchy, though more pronounced in certain

Anglo- Saxon countries, where there has been a more concerted embrace

of post- Weberian reforms. The most visible manifestation is in the use of

modern management methods. Not all the reforms of the last two decades

are inherently incompatible with the Weberian legacy. Put crudely, more

of the Weberian legacy survives than was ever adopted and subsequently

abandoned.

Weber understood as well as anyone the durability of bureaucracy. In

the longer term, though, the dynamic forces that it has so far been largely

able to absorb in the form of a modernized Weberianism may eat into its

soul. How would we know? It will be clear that this had happened when

merit is no longer the touchstone for recruitment and promotion; when

it becomes necessary routinely to look beyond the bureaucracy for the

expertise necessary to sustain the state in its role; when the bureaucracy

is no longer able comfortably to transfer its loyalties to a newly elected

government; when there is no longer any sense of esprit de corps or public

service ethos – in other words when the hired hand supplants the good

shepherd. These things have not yet happened in their fullness. There is no

compelling evidence of their inevitability, though there are some distinct

signs in that direction. If they come to pass, it will be end of the Weberian

legacy. It will be a legacy very diffi cult to retrieve if, once lost, its virtues

(or some of them) are judged worthy of redemption.

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