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Prof. George Conk Adjunct Professor and Senior Fellow, Stein Center for Law & Ethics Fordham Law School [email protected] Product Liability spring 2014 Vaccines Bruesewitz v. Wyeth (2011)

Vaccine Product Liability

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Page 1: Vaccine Product Liability

Prof. George ConkAdjunct Professor and Senior

Fellow, Stein Center for Law & Ethics

Fordham Law [email protected]

Product Liabilityspring 2014VaccinesBruesewitz v. Wyeth (2011)

Page 2: Vaccine Product Liability

cmt. k Unavoidably unsafe products (1965) There are some products which, in

the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.

These are especially common in the field of drugs.

Page 3: Vaccine Product Liability

Comment k An outstanding example is the

vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected.

Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve.

Page 4: Vaccine Product Liability

Comment k Such a product, properly prepared,

and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.

The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.

Page 5: Vaccine Product Liability

Comment k It is also true in particular of many

new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.

Page 6: Vaccine Product Liability

Comment k The seller of such products, again with the

qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.

Page 7: Vaccine Product Liability

Did those who go vaccine associated paralytic polio suffer a wrong?

In 1999 the CDC recommended a switch from IPV killed virus (Salk) polio vaccine from live attenuated virus (Sabin) oral polio vaccine. France and Scandinavian countires had made that change in/about 1980. A few people each year developed paralytic polio due to the OPV.

Is the NCVIA remedy adequate?

Page 8: Vaccine Product Liability

Ch. 8 Product Liability - Failure to Warn 8

Product Liability Restatement § 2 Categories of Product Defect A product: (c) is defective because of inadequate

instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.

Page 9: Vaccine Product Liability

NCVIA - 42 USC § 300aa-22(b)(1) (1986)

"No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, if the injury or death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings.“

What might “properly prepared” mean?

What is the significance of the 1988 date?

Page 10: Vaccine Product Liability

Drug product liability 10

§ 6 (c) Design defects (c) A prescription drug or medical

device is not reasonably safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.

Page 11: Vaccine Product Liability

Scalia – majority opinion What does unavoidable mean in

Justice Scalia’s mind? Do you find Justice Scalia’s textual

analysis persuaive? The “floodgates” argument? Is it relevant that for twenty five

years nobody suggested the NCVIA preempted vaccine design defect claims?

Page 12: Vaccine Product Liability

What place does this have in Sotomayor’s argument? "The FDA does not claim to review

products for optimal design . . . . FDA review thus asks less of drug . . . manufacturers than the common law of products liability asks of other kinds of manufacturers"

Page 13: Vaccine Product Liability

Sotomayor, dissenting in Bruesewitz

"[A] side effect is 'unavoidable' . . . where there is no feasible alternative design that would eliminate the side effect of the vaccine without compromising its cost and utility."

Page 14: Vaccine Product Liability

Scalia – majority opinion We doubt that Congress would

introduce such an amorphous test by implication when it otherwise micromanages vaccine manufacturers.

We have no idea how much more expensive an alternative design can be before it "compromis[es]" a vaccine's cost or how much efficacy an alternative design can sacrifice to improve safety. Neither does the dissent.

Should we treat vaccines differently from other products?

Page 15: Vaccine Product Liability

Bruesewitz – Breyer, concurring To allow a jury in effect to second-

guess those determinations is to substitute less expert for more expert judgment, thereby threatening manufacturers with liability (indeed, strict liability) in instances where any conflict between experts and nonexperts is likely to be particularly severe -- instances where Congress intended the contrary.

What determination? Who is the designer?

Page 16: Vaccine Product Liability

Policy preferences Justice Breyer finds the textual

question to be very close. Policy preferences come to the fore in the case of statutory ambiguity.

What are the policy preferences that can be gleaned from each of the three opinions?

Page 17: Vaccine Product Liability

Is the split among courts relevant to gleaning Congress’s intent? As Scalia states - courts were divided

about comment k in 1986. A plurality proceeded on a case by case basis to decide if the side effects of a drug or vaccine or other biologic are unavoidable.

The California Supreme Court - held that drugs as a category are unavoidably unsafe and therefore cannot be defective (other than warning or mfg defects).

Page 18: Vaccine Product Liability

Is fear of groundless tort actions relevant to how the NCVIA should be construed? In recent years many people have

blamed vaccination for causing autism and other ill health effects.

The scientific consensus is that there is no relationship between vaccines and autism.

Recent outbreaks of measles and mumps have been attributed to parents who have refused to vaccinate their children.

Page 19: Vaccine Product Liability

FDA’s Limitations

Is it relevant to the question before the Court that the FDA is “chronically underfunded” as Justice Sotomayor observes, and the Court noted in Wyeth v. Levine?

Page 20: Vaccine Product Liability

Vaccine injury compensation options Swine flu model: U.S.A. insures all

vaccines under FTCA No fault compensation for all side-

effects of mandatory vaccines NCVIA (tort option for warning or mfg

defect only) Administrative compensation

preempting all tort actions as in smallpox vaccine

Leave it to state tort actions

Page 21: Vaccine Product Liability

Is European experience relevant to drug or device liability?

Professors Twerksi and Henderson argue that plaintiff should have to prove that the FDA would have approved the alternative safer design.

Should a jury be allowed to consider evidence of approval and use in Europe where strong databases allow sophisticated analysis of the safety and effectiveness of drugs and medical devices?