„ UUHt i Lf LI ¥ i S U P R E M E H E A D Q U A R T E R S A L L I E D POWERSjkbEUROPE

B T f l P A R

IS January 1955

HEMCRANDUM FCE GENERAL SCHUÏLSR

SUBJECT; Liddell Hart Article (3 January 1955)

1. Attached, !BlB A, is my view on the Liddell Hart theory. TAB B takes Mr. Hart's main points individually and comments on them. TAB C is an analysis by Capt. H^y-Fetersen (Nor.) of the article which was arrived at independently.

/ 2. Bie staff planners' view is critical of the Hart theory. It

has just enough logic to be dangerously effective. I recommend that General Gruenther adopt a position along the following lines:

a. "Atomic weapons exist. We can't wish them away. A weapon is only used to achieve some objective or end desired by, and hence favorable to, the user. We must assume, therefore, that nations will not intentionally commit suicide, but rather adapt the weapon to serve their ends regardless of its theoretical possibilities."

b. "The trouble with Mr. Hart's article is that it assumes that the strategy and target systems of conventional war—World War I I— are necessarily valid in the era of atomic plenty. Biis is highly unlikely, especially where the results would be obviously disadvantageous to both sides as in the suicide thesis. Most of these articles make the same mistake on the strategic level that we made initially in our plans— i.e., introduce new weapons into the game without changing the posture of forces. The result, as you recall, catastrophic loss rates and erron-eous conclusions on duration and outcome."

c. "Atomic plenty will cause many changes in methods of con-flict. We agree that certain forces will become obsolete, while new requirements will also occur. The evolution must be gradual, and we should not jump to conclusions, especially with extreme ideas."

d. "The important thing is to maintain flexibility in our military forces. We must be able, in so far as money and circumstances will permit, to cope with a major atomic exchange or with a local situa-tion. If we lose the ability to handle a local situation without its

IiffiTEl

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expanding into a world war, we will invite the development of these situations. Our deterrent ability, therefore, must deter world war and local wars as well."

e. l1

Ihe real constraint against any cataclysmic results, even in a major hydrogen conflict, will be the self interests of the users. In the last analysis, we must assume that nations—if not individuals—are sufficiently intelligent not to 'cut their nose off to spite their face.'"

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, III Colonel USAF

3 Incls : A . RCR Analysis B. Point by Point Analysis C. H^y-Petersen Analysis

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_ — ., . t

MEMORANDUM FOR

SUEJECT

REFERENCE

» XLIED POWERS" EUROPE PARIS . FRANCE

17 January 1955

: General Donnelly

: Comments on Liddell Hart's Article, "Planning for Defence"

t The Times of London, 3 Jan 1955, article on "Planning for Defence."

1. Please find attached comments on the article by Liddell Hart under reference.

I do not agree with the article because the premises are misleading and therefore confuse the issue in certain fundamental respectsr these are the maint

The author fails to consider that there must be some purpose in starting an rtomic war, other than total destruction which implies self-destruction.

He has not considered the basic nature of atomic war.

3. Consequently, it serves little purpose to discuss in detail the various statements made in the article but rather it is necessary to examine the premises.

-ÊK^Ay H0T-PETERSEN Captain, R Nor N

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S t t O T T O I T H I ! T E D ~ Richardson

VIEWS OM THE LIDPELL HART THEORY

IN HE LQHDON TIMES UEOTER OF 3 JANlIAffif 1955

1. In br ie f , the Liddel l Hart theory seems to be that we no longer

need conventional forces {or even theater type f o rces )—wi th or without

atomic weapons—because a massive hydrogen capability on both sides w i l l

in a l l l ikelihood act as a deterrent to war, or, should war occur, would

resolve the conf l i c t in a suicidal manner while making such forces useless

fcy destroying their homeland sources of supply. In either event, there-

fore , NATO armies and tact ica l air farces w i l l be of l i t t l e value.

2. This l ine of reasoning seems to stem from two assumptions which

may or may not be wholly val id. First , that a l l atomic devices are typi-

f i ed by the largest and most destructive of known modele, and, second,

that nations at war w i l l invariably strive f o r a maximum of destruction

whether or not this serves their war and post-war objectives. I think we

should challenge both of these assumptions before accepting a thesis which

claimed that the tact ica l or strategic use of atomic weapons w i l l invar-

iably lead to al l-out war, and this in turn would result in mutual suicide.

3. Whenever a new weapon enters the f i e l d , i t is the mi l i tary 's

responsibil ity to readjust their tactics and strategy so as to best explo i t

i t in achieving the national objectives in war or in peace. In the last

war our objectives seemed to be well served by employing conventional

munitions in a strategic ro le against the homeland sources of supply of

the enemy. The objective in this case was to weaken the ab i l i t y of German

and Japanese forces to res is t and/or force their evacuation from conquered

areas. Had i t been possible to accomplish this objective by the direct

destruction of those forces rather than through interdiction and the

indirect attack of their base of support, i t seeme reasonable to suppose

that this method would have been considered^ i f not adopted.

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4- In other words, i t is by no means certain that the most e f f ec t i ve

use of atomic weapons in a future war w i l l be f o r the mass destruction

of population and cultural centers or of homelands. This, not because

the capability does not exist , but rather because the very capability f o r

massive destructive!»ss may for the f i r s t time permit both sides to

achieve their objectives by more direct and profitable means, whereas

errors in judgment in war are frequent, i t is seldom that weapons have

been used, or targets destroyed, in cases where the instigator knew that

the destruction would work to his disadvantage.

5. Bie readjustments vhich the advent of atomic plenty ca l l f o r

w i l l not only be physical changes in the posture of forces or in tactics

and doctrine, but must also eventually include reconsideration of the

overal l war strategy and target complexes which w i l l best serve to accom-

plish any set of war objectives. For instance, i f i t is found possible

to destroy the armed forces of an enemy direct ly , there would seem to be

l i t t l e purpose in concurrently destroying his " rea l estate." Ife have

already seen some tendency in strategic targeting towards active forces,

such as atomic delivery forces and major offensive formations. I would

agree with Mr. Hart that the presence of a hydrogen capability may well UT-

result in deterring i t s massive use against Uie homelands,^not because of

the suicidal or moral implications, but rather because of a real izat ion

on both sides that regardless of the power relationships between the adver-

saries, this type of employment is neither necessary to accomplish the

objective nor the best way to do so. I t might, in fac t , work to the dis-

advantage of the user even though he night achieve victory in the military

sense thereby.

6. Another consideration which w i l l act as a constraint in the indis-

criminate use of atomic weapons stems from the probability that the active

phase of an atomic war w i l l be of re lat ive ly short duration. I f both sides

are faced with even the possibi l i ty of having to cope with a post-host i l i t ies

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IfiICTED situation in a matter of days or weeks a f ter D-day, i t i s certain that

more and more attention w i l l be given to the post-hosti l i t ies objectives,

and this w i l l have a feed-back e f f e c t tending to restrain destruction

during the active phase, wherever i t would make the achievement of these

objectives more d i f f i cu l t .

7. I have given a great deal of consideration to this problem as a

result of our Capabilities Plan. I am inclined to believe that the end

result of the hydrogen or atomic age, at least f o r some years to come,

w i l l be to enhance the worth of the regular existing mil itary peacetime

establishment in war as being the decisive factor . Wè may wel l return to

the era where active wars are fought by regular armies. I f these can be

destroyed by one side or another, victory ensues. Biis would therefore

seem to be the primary objective now that weapons are available that can

reach the active forces in almost any posture that they might adopt. As

this capability is developed and improved, there w i l l be less and less of

a requirement to attack target complexes which w i l l have only an indirect

e f f e c t on the active forces, particularly where the indirect e f f e c t has

a long-term pay-off. Ihe hydrogen bomb target of the future may well be

the air wing or division, in any location, posture, or degree of dispersion

which i t might choose to adopt, rather than the aneray's homeland. Ihere

seems to be no reason to change the basic principle that wars are fought

and won by the process of destroying the armed forces of the enemy.

8. The above does not mean that we may not have to recognize a

certain amount of va l id i ty to the argument that conventional f o r c e s —

particularly where these do not use or assist in the use of atomic weapons

may be hard to jus t i f y . Both the concept of a short conf l ict rather than

a war of attr i t ion, and the survival problem mitigate against the need *

f o r mass in the conventional sense. In addition, the concentrated destruc-

t ive power of atomic munitions eliminates the mass factor for their del ivery.

I f , therefore, a technique of employing these munitions to handle problems

of in f i l t ra t ion , such as an e f f ec t i ve barrier use, employing radioactivity,

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e t c , , can be devised, there i s undoubtedly a good case f o r the reduct ion—

i f not e l iminat ion—of sizeable elements of our conventional forces of

a l l Services in favor of e l i t e , highly mobile and e f f e c t i v e str iking forces.

9. In ths Capabilit ies Plan i t was only because we could not r e l y

upon the certainty of the air/land atomic tac t i cs we envisioned on the

obstacle l ine that we provided, f i r s t , counterattack forces j seconi, corps

in reserve j and, l as t l y , a mobilized back-up on the Rhine/ijssel . Ihe

same l ine of reasoning caused us to establish our conventional a i r require-

ments on the basis of the enemy's tank Order of Battle without degrading

i t in the least f o r losses he might suf fer due to atomic attack. In other

words, we set up a doctrine and a method of employing atomic weapons to

destroy the active of fensive forces of the enemy, but did not, in fac t ,

r e l y upon the ir destruction to arrest their advance.

10. As we gain more experience through maneuver, a va i l ab i l i t y of

weapons, e t c . , we should be able to place greater rel iance on the e f f e c -

tiveness of atomic destruction in accomplishing our defensive object ive .

This opens up the interesting poss ib i l i t y of withdrawing from forward

areas, f i r s t , the mobilization back-up; and, second, some of the corps

in reserve with a view to creating air/ground task forces as a strategic

reserve. Under the concept of the Capabilit ies Plan the formations not

actually on the forward barrier are so disposed that they can f i l l only

one ro le that of plugging holes in the forward barrier i f and when i t

f a i l s . I f , however, we could re ly upon the barrier forces, combined with

the atomic weapon, to hold the f ront and withdraw some forces f o r a

strategic reserve, such a reserve with proper mobi l i ty—obtained in

exchange f o r some reduction in quantity—could then be used in any one

of three ro les j

a. Exploitation;

b. Bush f i r e s (without weakening the defense); and

c. Back into the l ine i f a gap did develop,

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11. In summary, I think we have to grant the fact that the advent

of atomic weapons has reduced the requirement for massive conventional

forces in the classical sense and as normally associated with HlTO

defenses. This does not mean, however, that there are not other roles

f o r this manpower and equipment—roles which have to be developed

gradually and which they w i l l evolute into. Any possible reductions in

quantity w i l l have to be, and should be, transformed into improved readi-

ness, increased mobility, and such other special materiel or qualif ications

as the new roles ca l l f o r ,

12. In support of Mr. Hart's thesis, the only real danger is the

possibi l i ty of a hydrogen or atomic war in the immediate future when

inadequate quantities of weapons and insuff icient study on both sides

might lead to indiscriminate use of these weapons, or, rather, an attempt

to use the new weapon in an old way to the disadvantage of both sides. In

other words, both sides would overplay their hand fo r lack of having given

adequate stm^y to the problem. This danger would, however, be compounded

by any attempt to avoid planning and studying the problem.

13. I think we should take the general l ine that i f the weapon exists,

i t w i l l be used. I t therefore behooves us to see that i t is used in the

most e f f e c t i v e manner for the benefit of our cause, and even to try and

see to i t that the enemy's use of i t is at least suf f ic ient ly inte l l igent

so as not to be disadvantageous to both of us, ï am sure that a l i t t l e

research would show that when gunpowder was f i r s t introduced, there were

similar predictions that i t would result in the destruction of c i v i l i za t ion .

]

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i h f ^ r ^ ^ T r r s ^M [kaisi "/ÎÈÔfjfii'îiîcll

COMMENTS ON MR. LIDDSLL KARTtS ARTICLE IM THE LONBOM TIMES, 3 JAM 55,

on

"PLANNING FÜR DEFENCE, IMPLICATIONS OF THE HYÎKOGEN BOMB»

THE PURPOSE OF VfAR

1. nThe supreme fact of the hydrogen bomb ere i s that war hes become

palpably suicidal . " This statement made by Llddell-Hart i s apparently based

on the assumption that H-weapons wi l l be used unrestrictedly by both b e l l i -

gerents. Furthermore, i t may be concluded from his ar t ic le that the purpose

of war i s either total destruetIcai or that there i s no purpose in conducting

war in our H-bomb era.

Neither is concurred with.

2. Admittedly, there i s always the possibi l i ty that someone may start

a war of mutual destruction in despair. This, i t i s considered, i s e possi-

b i l i t y that becomes less and less probable as people learn more of the e f f ec ts

of atonic weapons. However, i f i t remains a poss ib i l i ty that "an atomic war

might develop unintentionally," the aggressor would s t i l l need to adopt a

strategy that would serve same useful purpose to him.

3. I t i s true that in the past some considerable purpose has been seen

in destruction as a military means of winning or at l east terminating war, but

destruction has never been the purpose of war. When the c i v i l power became

more and more an essential part of a nation's war-making capacity, i t became

Increasingly essential to include certain parts of the c i v i l power in the

target l i s t s for destruction. However, when considering the tremendous destruc-

t ive powers, now available' to both sides and the d i f f i cu l t y in controlling these

powers once they are unleashed, the reasoning so val id in the past may now be

inadequate or misleading. I f the purpose of war i s the winning of the peace,

then the very purpose of the war might well be negated i f destruction be so

heavy that i t becomes impossible to >vin the peace". Thus, while the principle

s t i l l is val id, the application of the principle has changed.

Overshooting the aim might result, therefore, i f H-weapons are used

to the extent that nations, at least European nations, w i l l be completely or

even substantially destroyed, unless such complete destruction i s the war aim

i t s e l f . That is barely conceivable. The USSR w i l l be in urgent need of the

European, including UK, industrial and manpower resources f o r the exploitation .

of the period subsequent to winning the war in Europe, Furthermore, mass

destruction of peoples and nations may prove to be a serious deterrent to the

Soviet f ina l aim, which they insist is "world communism through the l iberation

of the working dosses " . Whilst there are ideological reasons f o r destroying

the "plutocrats and Imperialists", such reasons do not exist to condone the

destruction of the working classes as we l l .

5. In consequence, i t is maintained that the statement quotedabove

f a i l s to recognize that there s t i l l must be some purpose in war other than

DiOTICfS a ILU

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that of total destruction» Hydrogen weapons should not therefore be used un-

restrictedly but should be employed in view of the post-war situation, or —

the winning of the peace. Hence, while i t may be true that some ten hydrogen

bombs dropped over Britain would most certainly be fata l to that country, i t

seems very improbable th?t an fttack of such magnitude would actually be made.

A statement describing the scale of destruction which would fol low, therefore

serves only to provide a useful frame for discussion of the extreme though

unlikely impliestions of hydrogen bomb warffire,

THE BftSIC NATURE OF THE ATCMEC WAR

6. I t i s agreed that " i t i s very hard to relate warfare as known in

the past with warfare where atomic bombs, missiles end shells can be employed

in hundreds or thousands " Yet the further conclusions in the art ic le

following that statement, seem to be too quickly drawn. As stated above, the

author does not recognize a purpose in starting the war. Also, the inadequate

handling of the nature of that war i t s e l f has led to confused thinking.

7. With respect to the nature of the atomic war, i t appears to me that

the basic distinction between the conventional war and the atomic war i s a

large difference in the rstio'between the time required for a certain destruc-

tion and the corresponding time required to rebuild or replace whet was

destroyed and bring i t to bear Against the enemy. The factors we are prlmcriIy

concerned with thus are the war-meking capacity and the time element. The

"resultant" force of these two factors is Wiat which produces the war potential

at any one time,

P. The nature of atomic w i l l be found by studying these two factors

separately. We wi l l see that war-making capacity consists of two inter-related

elements, namely, a military portion and a c iv i l ian portion. They both have a

cr i t ica l minimum level below which they cannot exist as organised unities. The

c iv i l ian power i s perhaps the most important since i t s collapse may well force

a nation to sue for peace regardless of the size of the armed forces of that

nation.

9. The importance of maintaining the c iv i l ian power can, therefore,

hardly be overestimated. In most European nations, the centre of leadership

is concentrated in certain speci f ic areas l ike the c i t ies of London, Psris,

Copenhagen, etc . , which could easily be destroyed. At the present time, *

destruction of these places would result most l i ke l y in paralysis of the whole

nation. The c iv i l ian populations would hardly be prepared to receive such a

blow and s t i l l go on f ight ing. However, the Bituatlon could largely be improved

by pre-planned decentralization of the administration and by education of the

c iv i l ian population. Secondly, the fee t that the enemy w i l l , in a l l probab-

i l i t y , have his major towns destroyed in retal iat ion, might prove to assist

maintaining the w i l l to f ight in our own nations. Yet, there undoubtedly

remains £ risk of collapse of the c iv i l ian power unless "outside" forces l ike

our own armies are brought in to assist and help maintain the functioning of + A I t «n «t At.« AW

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10. The time factor i s the time required and the abi l i ty to bring the

var-msking capacity to bear against the enemy.

As presently planned, the time required before substantial resupplies

can reach Europe i s f a i r l y f ixed as far as the A l l i es are concerned. The f i r s t

major resupplies w i l l start arriving at about D * 50 and only start beccming

e f f ec t i ve et about !) + 75. We do not know the corresponding tijnes f o r the

enemy, but we must anticipate that his "lead time" would be somewhat shorter

unless disrupted by the A l l i es , I t w i l l be seen then that whilst the i n i t i a l

atomic exchange has largely been completed by D * 15, we shall not be able to

improve our situation substantially before some time after D 4 50. I f this be

so, we may be unable to take f u l l advantage of the results of the in i t i a l

onslaught ahead of the enemy, in which case the war may be l os t as far as Surope

is concerned,

11. I t w i l l be seen then that the time element is the vulnerable provided

the war-making capacity is not brought below the c r i t i ca l l e v e l . In this respect

i t does not matter whether the military or the c iv i l ian portion is brought

below that l eve l but i t does point out that we are faced with a tremendous

problem of ensuring the "survival" of both the military and c iv i l ian power,

1?. From the standpoint of the purpose of the war, i t was found not to

be desirable to destroy completely or substantially the c i v i l power of a nation.

The question now is whether such mass destruction is necessary in order to

terminate the war, i . e . , make the continuation of war impossible. The answer

seems to be "no". Apart from complete destruction of the c i v i l power there are

other possib i l i t iest

a. Prevent the enemy from using his war-making capacity for the

conduct of war ( i so la t ion ) .

b . Destroy the enemy's armed forces.

c . Any combination of a , and b.

13. Because of the mass destructive character of our weapons, i t i s l ike ly

that even though concentrating on courses a. and b. , considerable damage would

be in f l i c ted on the c i v i l power, mainly as a result of actions under a." However,

the destruction caused for the purpose of isolation i s of a less lasting nature

than i f thesource i t s e l f were destroyed. Isolation has the e f f e c t of neutraliz-

ing temporarily rather than destroying completely. This is of paramount import-

ance since in order to "win the peace" we shall require the production f a c i l i t i e s

of both bell igerents. However, time i s of equal importance since in order to

take advantage of the neutralization, we shall be forced to exploit immediately,

14. The eventual transition from war into "peace" w i l l then i n i t i a l l y be

characterized by:

a. Restoration of communications and distribution f a c i l i t i e s .

b. Maximum uti l izat ion of every means of production to restore

normal l i v ing conditions.

15. In consequence, I cannot agree that the H-bomb war need be suicidal to

both bell igerents since for the winning of the war and "peace" i t is neither

necessary nor desirable to i n f l i c t mess proportions. ITJ

f , « ^ S H b IÏ L[

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FLANMIMG IMPLICATIONS f i n I U s U L w I B i B l t f B L i

16, I t follows from the above considerations that the planning implications

with respect to defence w i l l stem from, f i r s t , the f ina l purpose of 'the war, and

a. The employment of our weapons must not v io late the purpose of the

wer. Hence, destruction of the industrial basis of the enemy, i , e . , i t s manpower

and production f a c i l i t i e s , should be kept at B minimum. There i s , however, an

apparent need for isolating the industrial resources, thus preventing theBe from

supporting the continued war e f f o r t . The principal mil itary method available to

this end would be interdiction in depth of LOCs.

b. The basic nature of the atomic war points out the need fo r t

(1) Destroying (or neutralizing) the enetrçy forces and concurrently

protecting own forces from being destroyed,

(2) Immediate exploitation of whatever results have been achieved.

Here again the time factor i s of overriding importance since

the one who i s capable of exploiting immediately may even with

comparatively small forces be able t o prevent the opponent

fi*ora exploiting the situation and reorganising his forces for

continued- war.

¢3) Immediate e f f o r t t o recover where required the c iv i l ian and

military war-making potential including, i f need be, the w i l l

to go on f ight ing.

FORCES REftHIflED

17, The planning implications outlined above point at the need for an

all-out e f f o r t of a l l three services. The tasks of air forces are self-evident

in this atomic war. In the case of land forces, they are required to:

a. Prevent i n i t i a l penetration and in f i l t ra t ion in depth by the enemy. b. Exploit ijiinediately as stated under 16.b.(2) above.

c. In esse of emergency assist in maintaining the functions of

the c i v i l power.

18. Naval forces are required tot

a . Assist in the isolation of the enemy.

b. Exploit as mentioned under 16.b.(2) above.

c. Prevent the enemy from cutting o f f our build-up fo r exploitation *

and recovery,

COMCLUSIONS

19. I do not, therefore, f ind myself in agreement with Liddell Hart with

respect to the defence planning and the need for forces . A l l three services w i l l

s t i l l be essential for successful conduct of war,

20. I do, on the other hend, fee l that we have not been radical enough in

respect to preparing from the outset offensive action during the cr i t i ca l period

second, the basic neture of the atomic war i t s e l f .

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of exploitation. Failing to do so may even result in losing^the war, I also

think that the strategic e f f o r t should be more spec i f ica l ly directed towards

"interdiction of LOCs in depth" rather than destroying production f a c i l i t i e s ,

21, More emphasis should be given to the survival of the c i v i l power of

A l l ied nations,' This l e t ter would have to include measures to protect the

nations against paralysis end collapse produced by the demoralizing e f f e c t of

the nuclear weapons,

22, There w i l l certainly be colossal destruction, but destruction w i l l

t fke place on both sides and does not necessarily imply defeat or that the war

may not be continued.

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