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USING MARKETING IN ADVOCACY
A TOOLBOX FOR POLITICAL PROGRESS
IN BURMA AND OTHER LOCKED CONFLICTS
JENS LINDBERG JENSEN
MAY 2013
Copyright © Jens Lindberg Jensen 2013
ABSTRACT
This research project aims to analyze the positive impact of using marketing principles for pro-
democracy Burma advocacy groups based in Thailand. This endeavor is based on the theoretical
assumption that both disciplines at their core are about the same thing: Selling. In marketing
firms are selling a product while in advocacy people are selling a social cause. Considering that
these two disciplines therefore have very significant theoretical similarities, it could be
interesting to analyze whether the theories that have brought success in the business sector –
modern marketing – also can bring success for advocacy groups lobbying for a social cause.
The methodology is based on a mixed-method approach comprising of 35 surveys and 26
interviews with people who are working or have worked for Burma advocacy groups in
Thailand. Furthermore, 24 exploratory interviews have been conducted with Burma advocacy
groups not based in Thailand; NGOs dealing with Burmese migrants and refugees in Thailand;
Burma scholars; diplomats, human rights advocates and humanitarian workers who previously
worked in Burma; and three Burma documentary film makers.
In terms of the findings, this study tentatively confirmed the utility of marketing theory in
advocacy. This happened first of all because advocacy groups who used techniques resembling
modern marketing theory also tended to have a higher advocacy impact.
Secondly, a clear difference was seen between advocacy groups who used a conflict based style
and advocacy groups with a more accommodating style, which resembled the customer-driven
approach known from modern marketing. In this regard, advocacy groups with a more customer-
driven approach towards the Burmese government and its supporters tended to have a more
positive impact in a pro-democratic direction. Compared to this, while advocacy groups with a
more conflict based approach may also have had an impact, this was in most cases not likely to
be positive, because it would make the Burmese government even less inclined to engage with
other parties domestically and internationally. This further indicates the utility of marketing
theory in advocacy and warrants further research into this area.
TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... viii
Chapter 1 ....................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Introduction to the thesis ..................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Overview and objectives of the study ................................................................................................. 2
1.3 Significance and contribution of the study ......................................................................................... 3
1.4 Limitation of the study ........................................................................................................................ 4
1.5 Definition of terms used in this study ................................................................................................. 4
1.6 Organization of the study .................................................................................................................... 5
Chapter 2 ....................................................................................................................................................... 7
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 7
2.2 Theoretical review .............................................................................................................................. 7
2.2.1 Advocacy – the traditional solution ............................................................................................. 7
2.2.2 Marketing – the new solution ..................................................................................................... 12
2.2.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 16
2.3 Empirical review: Background about Burma .................................................................................... 17
2.3.1 Target audience analysis ............................................................................................................ 17
2.3.2 The Burmese exile advocacy movement .................................................................................... 31
2.4 Exploratory research ......................................................................................................................... 37
2.5 Conceptual framework ...................................................................................................................... 38
2.5.1 Theoretical framework ............................................................................................................... 38
2.5.2 Development of hypotheses ....................................................................................................... 41
2.5.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 44
Chapter 3 ..................................................................................................................................................... 45
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 45
3.2 Research design ................................................................................................................................ 45
3.3 Target population, sample size and sampling methods ..................................................................... 46
3.4 Development of interview guide and survey .................................................................................... 47
3.5 Data collection .................................................................................................................................. 49
3.6 Advocacy impact measurement ........................................................................................................ 50
3.6.1 Change ....................................................................................................................................... 50
3.6.2 Impact on relevant target audiences ........................................................................................... 51
3.6.3 Techniques used ......................................................................................................................... 52
3.6.4 Individual and not cumulative impact ........................................................................................ 53
3.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 53
Chapter 4 ..................................................................................................................................................... 55
4.1 Summary of data collection .............................................................................................................. 55
4.1.1 Overview of the collected data ................................................................................................... 55
4.1.2 Data validity ............................................................................................................................... 59
4.1.3 Data reliability ........................................................................................................................... 60
4.1.4 Conservative statistical analysis ................................................................................................. 61
4.2 Hypothesis 1...................................................................................................................................... 61
4.2.1 Environmental analysis .............................................................................................................. 62
4.2.2 Goals .......................................................................................................................................... 64
4.2.3 Targeting .................................................................................................................................... 64
4.2.4 Positioning ................................................................................................................................. 65
4.2.5 Marketing strategies ................................................................................................................... 66
4.2.6 Action plan ................................................................................................................................. 69
4.2.7 Budgeting ................................................................................................................................... 70
4.2.8 Evaluation .................................................................................................................................. 71
4.2.9 Summary of findings .................................................................................................................. 71
4.2.10 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 72
4.3 Hypothesis 2...................................................................................................................................... 73
4.3.1 Environmental analysis and goals .............................................................................................. 73
4.3.2 Goals and Target audiences ....................................................................................................... 74
4.3.3 Targeting and Positioning .......................................................................................................... 75
4.3.4 Positioning and Marketing strategies ......................................................................................... 76
4.3.5 Marketing strategies and Action plan ........................................................................................ 77
4.3.6 Action plan and Budgeting ........................................................................................................ 78
4.3.7 Evaluation and the rest of the steps ............................................................................................ 78
4.3.8 Summary of findings .................................................................................................................. 79
4.3.9 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 80
4.4 Hypothesis 3...................................................................................................................................... 81
4.4.1 Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 81
4.4.2 Impact measurement .................................................................................................................. 81
4.4.3 Impact and the marketing plan ................................................................................................... 89
4.4.4 Positive or negative impact ...................................................................................................... 103
4.4.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 105
Chapter 5 ................................................................................................................................................... 107
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 107
5.2 Thesis topic and methodology ........................................................................................................ 107
5.3 Hypotheses testing .......................................................................................................................... 108
5.3.1 Hypothesis 1 ............................................................................................................................. 108
5.3.2 Hypothesis 2 ............................................................................................................................. 108
5.3.3 Hypothesis 3 ............................................................................................................................. 109
5.3.4 Summary of findings ................................................................................................................ 110
5.4 Lessons learned ............................................................................................................................... 111
5.5 Generalizability ............................................................................................................................... 113
5.6 Final comments ............................................................................................................................... 115
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... 117
APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................................... 134
Appendix 1: Interview guide ................................................................................................................ 134
Appendix 2: Survey .............................................................................................................................. 137
LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Top-10 Burma trading partners in 2010 ....................................................................................... 28
Table 2: Level of influence on Burma's political situation ......................................................................... 51
Table 3: Demographics of the collected data .............................................................................................. 56
Table 4: Overview of the interviewed groups ............................................................................................. 57
Table 5: Educational background of the Burma groups’ management team .............................................. 58
Table 6: Professional background of the Burma groups’ management team ............................................. 58
Table 7: Number of employees and volunteers in the Burma groups ......................................................... 58
Table 8: Years with an office in Thailand for the Burma groups ............................................................... 59
Table 9: Info gathering about how relevant target audiences understood Burma’s political situation ....... 62
Table 10: The Burma groups’ advocacy target audiences .......................................................................... 64
Table 11: Internet channels used ................................................................................................................. 68
Table 12: Direct lobbying channels used .................................................................................................... 68
Table 13: How long time ahead was the advocacy planned? ...................................................................... 70
Table 14: Budget size .................................................................................................................................. 70
Table 15: How often did the Burma groups evaluate their advocacy work? .............................................. 71
Table 16: Burma groups making the Burmese government change its behavior ........................................ 82
Table 17: Burma groups strengthening non-government actors in Burma ................................................. 83
Table 18: Getting Asian countries to put pressure on or engage in dialogue with Burma’s government ... 83
Table 19: Getting Western countries and UN to put pressure on or engage in dialogue with Burma’s
government ................................................................................................................................................. 84
Table 20: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on the Burmese
government and the environmental analysis on a certain group ................................................................. 90
Table 21: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on the Burmese
government and the choice of target audience ............................................................................................ 90
Table 22: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and making the Burmese government
engage with the domestic opposition .......................................................................................................... 91
Table 23: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and making the Burmese government
implement more democratic policies .......................................................................................................... 91
Table 24: Insignificant correlations between a positioning based on pressure and having an impact on the
Burmese government (BG) ......................................................................................................................... 92
Table 25: Significant correlations between a positioning based on dialogue and having an impact on the
Burmese government (BG) ......................................................................................................................... 92
Table 26: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on Burma’s civil
society and the environmental analysis on a certain group ......................................................................... 93
Table 27: Significant correlations between the environmental analysis and strengthening the general
public .......................................................................................................................................................... 93
Table 28: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on ethnic populations
and the environmental analysis on a certain group ..................................................................................... 93
Table 29: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on Burma’s civil
society and the choice of target audience .................................................................................................... 94
Table 30: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and strengthening the domestic
opposition .................................................................................................................................................... 94
Table 31: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on ethnic populations
and the choice of target audience ................................................................................................................ 95
Table 32: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on ASEAN and Asian
countries and the environmental analysis on a certain group ..................................................................... 95
Table 33: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on ASEAN and Asian
countries and the choice of target audience ................................................................................................ 96
Table 34: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on Western countries
and UN and the environmental analysis on a certain group........................................................................ 97
Table 35: Significant correlations between environmental analysis and making the United States put
pressure on the Burmese government ......................................................................................................... 97
Table 36: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on Western countries
and UN and the choice of target audience .................................................................................................. 97
Table 37: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and making USA put pressure on the
Burmese government .................................................................................................................................. 98
Table 38: Degree to which the Burma groups had an advocacy impact and followed the marketing plan
(MP) in general ......................................................................................................................................... 100
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Framework for advocacy groups working for democratic change .................................. 39
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction to the thesis
Change is over Burma with democratic reforms happening on a scale and with a speed
that very few people outside Burma anticipated before the 2010 elections. Compared to this, the
20 years preceding these elections were characterized by a highly repressive military government
that was very reluctant to implement or even consider discussions about democratic reforms.
This difference between the two periods is interesting considering that many of the decision
makers are the same and that the new government, although less overtly than before 2010, is still
backed and to a large extent controlled by the Burmese military (Linkewich et al, 2011: 4;
Callahan, 2012: 120).
In addition to this, Burma is one of the cases, where the most people outside the country
have been lobbying for political change. In numerous countries all around the world, for up to 20
years Burma advocacy groups were criticizing the Burmese government in strong words and
lobbying foreign governments and international organizations to put pressure on the generals.
Despite this, it took 20 years before the first new election was held since the annulled 1990
elections (ICG, March 2011: 1, 11-13).
Considering these peculiarities, it is reasonable to analyze more closely the degree of
effectiveness of the Burma advocacy groups. First of all, we should analyze whether the
advocacy groups were right in focusing on the outside world rather than on people and groups
inside Burma. Secondly, it should be examined whether the international political pressure that
the advocacy groups were supporting, actually had a positive or perhaps even a negative impact
on the Burmese government’s attitude to democratic reforms (Bynum, 2011: 11).
The traditional way to analyze the advocacy groups’ performance would be through an
advocacy framework. Doing this is a problem though primarily because using advocacy theory to
analyze advocacy groups is not likely to create much new knowledge. Furthermore, much
advocacy has a tendency to focus more on the social mission (i.e. democracy and human rights in
2
Burma), rather than the feelings of the people involved in the conflict. While this may be a
general problem with much advocacy theory, a mission-driven approach may have been a
particular problem in relation to emotionally entrenched conflicts such as Burma. In this regard,
the main decision makers in the Burmese government and military felt strongly about their own
understanding of the conflict and were not likely to respond in an accommodating way to blunt
and hard-nosed criticism – especially if it came from foreigners or Burmese advocates residing
outside the country (Arendshorst, 2009: 103-105).
For those two reasons, this research paper will not adopt a theoretical advocacy
framework. Instead, the work of the Burma advocacy groups will be analyzed through a
marketing framework.
This is done first of all, because marketing constitutes a possible alternative framework
for how to analyze and think about advocacy. 30 years ago G.D. Wiebe pointed out that there is
no reason why selling soap and a social cause should be fundamentally different in nature.
Similarly, there is no obvious argument why this should not also be the case, when attempting to
sell democracy to people in- and outside of Burma (Graham, 1993: 3). Secondly, not only does it
seem possible to analyze advocacy with marketing theory, but it is potentially also a better tool
than traditional advocacy theory. In this regard, modern marketing has a track record of creating
business success by uncovering the customers’ needs and wants through market research and
then subsequently developing products satisfying these desires.
Compared to this, much advocacy tries to “sell” an already existing social cause
(democracy, human rights etc.). The consequence of this is that advocacy groups often neglect
the needs and wants of their target audience, which in turn results in a diminished chance of
gaining this audience’s support. As this shows, a customer-driven approach has clear intuitive
advantages over a mission-driven approach and justifies the attempt to analyze the Burma
advocacy groups through a modern marketing framework (Kurtz, 2006: 9-12; Kotler, 2005: 19-
20).
1.2 Overview and objectives of the study
The topic of this thesis is to assess to what degree Burma advocacy groups based in
Thailand had an impact in terms of changing Burma in a pro-democratic direction. Furthermore,
3
this thesis wishes to test whether marketing theory can explain whichever level of impact that the
Burma advocacy groups are found to have.
In testing this correlation between marketing and impact, three primary objectives have
been developed for this thesis. First of all, this thesis wishes to determine to what degree the
Burma advocacy groups followed all the steps in the marketing plan, which is known as one of
the most important tools in modern marketing (Andersen, 2007). Secondly, this project aims to
examine whether the Burma advocacy groups adequately connected the steps in the marketing
plan with each other. Finally, this project wishes to determine if the advocacy groups that did
follow the steps in the marketing plan and were able to connect them, also were the groups who
had the highest impact on Burma’s political situation.
1.3 Significance and contribution of the study
This research project provides significant contributions in three areas. Firstly, the
research project will deal with a case (the Burmese exile advocacy community), which is
relatively under-researched academically. A substantial amount of literature exists about
Burma’s relations to other countries and international organizations in the 1990-2010 period.
However only a small amount of academic literature exists explicitly about the work of the
Burma advocacy groups, and what direct or indirect impact they had on Burma’s political
situation (Hadar, 1998).
Secondly, this research project is significant due to its originality in trying to apply
marketing theory in advocacy. While the technique of using marketing to solve social problems
has existed for decades in social marketing, there seems to be little research done in terms of
using marketing in advocacy1 (Kotler et al, 2009: 51). Furthermore, in the cases where marketing
has been used in advocacy literature, it has not happened in the comprehensive and rigorous way
that this thesis attempts to do (Bob, 2005; O’Shaughnessy: 2001).
Thirdly, this thesis is significant, because marketing with its focus on meeting customers’
needs and wants seems particularly useful in locked conflicts such as Burma. One of the main
reasons why the Burmese conflict has continued for decades has been a tendency for the
1 For the writing of this thesis, no previous studies about this subject were found. There may be some studies in
languages other than English, but it would appear that the use of marketing in democratic change processes up until now is a relatively under-researched area.
4
government and its opponents to go for absolute victories without compromise and without
trying to understand the feelings and desires of their counterparts. This inevitably made
negotiated conflict resolution unlikely in most cases. In this matter, marketing’s emphasis on
mutually beneficial exchanges based on an understanding of other people’s needs and wants
appears to be a useful tool to make progress in emotionally very tense conflicts (Callahan, 2003:
226-227).
1.4 Limitation of the study
This research paper has a number of limitations. First of all, this is a case study focusing
exclusively on Burma with the limitations in generalizability that this implies (Bryman, 2004:
51).
Secondly, the thesis focuses on the period between the 1990 elections and the 2010
November election. This time frame is chosen because it was in this period that the international
Burma advocacy movement really started to develop (Bynum, 2011: i, 10). Furthermore, the
period after the 2010 election has not been included, because of the markedly different behavior
of the new government compared to the previous, all-out military government which was in
place before the election (Callahan, 2012: 125-126).
Thirdly, the thesis is limited to Burma advocacy groups based in Thailand. The Burmese
exile movement is a worldwide phenomenon, but this will be too much to cover in this thesis.
Instead the research is limited to Thailand, which hosts more Burma advocacy groups, than any
other country outside Burma (Dudley, 2003: 9)2.
Finally, this thesis specifically addresses the democracy groups working in exile and will
not discuss the work of the democracy movement inside Burma.
1.5 Definition of terms used in this study
In this section, the two most important concepts of this thesis – advocacy and marketing –
are defined. In terms of advocacy, this covers a very wide array of practices and has both narrow
as well as very wide definitions, where advocacy sometimes simply is defined as a person who
2 Furthermore, the author lives and studies in Thailand, which makes data collection much easier.
5
speaks or writes in support of something. The definition, which will be used in this thesis, is
within the area of public policy advocacy and is as follows: Advocacy is the “process by which
individuals and organizations attempt to influence public policy decisions” (Snowdon, 2004: 6).
While many other definitions exist3, this one is particularly useful for this thesis, which aims to
measure the Burma groups’ ability to specifically create public policy progress in a pro-
democratic direction4.
In terms of marketing, then again multiple definitions exist. In this regard, a simple yet
straightforward and powerful definition has been made by Kotler et al (2010), who describes
marketing as “the process by which companies create value for customers and build strong
customer relationships in order to capture value from customers in return” (p. 29). This
definition will be used in this thesis, because it without any fluff pinpoints the central ideas and
mechanisms behind modern marketing.
1.6 Organization of the study
This thesis consists of five chapters with the motivation and goals being introduced in
chapter one.
In chapter two a theoretical and empirical literature review is provided, where the
theoretical review discusses how marketing can be utilized in advocacy. In addition to this, the
empirical review provides background information about Burma’s political situation and
discusses the work of the Burmese advocacy movement. At the end of chapter two, a conceptual
framework with three hypotheses are developed.
In the third chapter, the thesis methodology is presented. This chapter especially
discusses the choice of using mixed-method, non-probability sampling and snowballing.
In the fourth chapter, the findings of the data analysis are discussed. This discussion tests
the three hypotheses, and whether the advocacy groups that followed the marketing plan to a
higher extent also had a generally higher advocacy impact.
3 For example in relation to social justice advocacy or media advocacy (Klugman, 2010: 2; Staples, 2009: 175).
4 Often, for example, advocacy definitions do not require that change happens formally and officially through
public policy reform, but can also happen informally and unofficially through a strengthened civil society, companies adopting better practices etc. (Mayoux, 2003: 4).
6
Finally, in chapter five the findings of the hypotheses testing are summarized, and
whether marketing is a viable tool in advocacy. Furthermore, this concluding chapter discusses
to what extent the findings of this case study can be used under other circumstances, where
NGOs are engaged in pro-democratic advocacy.
7
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
As explained in the previous section, chapter 2 consists of a theoretical and empirical
literature review. In the theoretical review, the concept of marketing is introduced and how it can
be an effective tool for advocacy groups.
Following this, an empirical review is conducted, which provides background
information about the political situation in Burma and the work of the Burma advocacy groups5.
Finally, at the end of Chapter 2, a conceptual framework with three hypotheses is developed,
which aims to test to what degree marketing is a credible alternative framework for how to
analyze the work of the Burma advocacy groups.
2.2 Theoretical review
2.2.1 Advocacy – the traditional solution
In the following section advocacy and some of its major trends are introduced. In
particular, focus is given to the mission-driven approach of much advocacy. In this regard, the
implications of such an approach are examined and how it can be a problem, if the advocacy
goals have to be achieved over a prolonged period of time involving repeated interactions with
the target audience (Norrell, 1999: 9).
Focus on change
Advocacy is a very varied field both theoretically, and in terms of how advocacy is
performed in ‘the real world’. However, a common theme that seems to drive both advocacy
academics as well as practitioners is the focus on changing an existing unfair or undesirable
situation (Laney, 2003: 1).
5 In this thesis, the terms “Burma advocacy groups” and “Burma groups” are used interchangeably.
8
In this regard, VeneKlasen et al (2007) for example defines advocacy as “an organized
political process that involves the coordinated efforts of people to change policies, practices,
ideas and values that perpetuate inequality, prejudice, and exclusion” (p. 1). Furthermore, the
World Bank has written that “advocacy is about influencing or changing relationships of
power,” while the United Kingdom’s well-known Department of International Development
(DFID) has an advocacy goal of using “our influence in the multilateral system to increase
international commitment to poverty eradication” (Mayoux, 2003: 5).
As these and numerous other examples show, the focus of much advocacy is on the issue
and achieving the political or social change that will resolve the issue. In other words, a mission-
driven approach that places primary importance on the advocacy group’s social cause and
therefore also is willing to accept various costs in the pursuit of this cause6 (Kimberlin, 2010:
165).
Change justifying the use of means
As a logical consequence of a mission-driven approach focusing on change, both
advocacy scholars as well as practitioners take a generally quite open approach to how political
and social change can be achieved. Jane Covey, for example, writes that NGOs are free to
choose between five different strategies in order to influence public policy: Collaboration,
education, persuasion, litigation and confrontation (Sibanda, 1994: 6).
In this regard, which particular strategy is chosen is of lesser importance, as long as the
desired change is achieved. One of the implications of this flexible approach is that many
advocacy scholars and practitioners do not rule out the possibility of achieving advocacy
objectives through conflict. Mayoux (2003) for example distinguishes between adversarial
advocacy and negotiated advocacy, where adversarial advocacy “uses actions that express
opposition, protest and dissent,” while negotiated advocacy “engages stakeholders with
decision-makers, and emphasizes consensus-building, negotiation and conflict management” (p.
18).
6 Kimberlin (2010) here talks about that “advocacy organizations make public interest claims either promoting or
resisting social change that, if implemented, would conflict with the social, cultural, political, or economic interests or values of other constituencies and groups.” As this quote shows, the emphasis is on achieving the social cause if not despite all costs then at least with a willingness to accept some costs, which in this case would be a conflict about which values should be prevalent in a society (p. 165).
9
Underscoring the point that no strategy is necessarily better than another, Mayoux (2003)
goes on to say that “advocacy campaigns may simultaneously employ elements of both
adversarial and negotiated advocacy, or may use the approaches sequentially. Adversarial
advocacy often serves as prelude to negotiated advocacy as the campaign gains momentum and
shifts its focus from problems and causes to solutions” (p. 18).
As this and other examples show, the center of attention is political or social change with
a flexible attitude to how this change can come about (Norrell, 1999: 10). The underlying reason
for this attitude often seems to be a belief that the pursuit of the advocacy group’s social mission
is just beyond dispute and therefore takes preeminence ahead of all other considerations. This
opinion is prevalent both among advocacy scholars as well as practitioners.
In this regard, Kimberlin (2010) for example notes that “many political theorists have
argued that advocacy is one of the most important roles played by nonprofit organizations in a
democracy. By representing the viewpoints of minorities and disempowered groups, and by
critically monitoring and pushing for changes in public policies, nonprofit organizations serve
as vital intermediary institutions that help maintain the quality of a democratic government and
its responsiveness to the needs of all its constituents” (p. 166).
As this shows, advocacy is often considered to occupy a moral high ground lobbying for
causes that are inherently good. This at the same time provides advocacy groups with a
justification of the work that they are doing, as well as a more or less free hand to choose
whatever means available to attain their morally just social cause in the interest of their
constituents or society more generally (Kudo, 2005: 12).
Target audience needs and wants
As the above section shows, social and political advocates usually feel that they are
justified in pursuing their mission, even though there may be collateral costs associated with it.
The danger however, both theoretically and in practice, of a mission-driven approach is that less
attention is given to the advocacy target audience. This is problematic, because it is ultimately
the target audience’s behavior that is sought to be changed (Wilson-Grau, 2007: 8).
In this regard, it is important to emphasize that much advocacy theory do place a large
emphasis on understanding the target audience. Krisch (2012) for example states that a
“systematic research phase needs to constitute the first step of any planning process for lobbying
10
and campaigning. (…) Conducting a stakeholder analysis of relevant intermediates and decision
makers will not only provide a better understanding of the socio-political environment, but also
help in establishing contacts to potential supporters and possible adversaries” (p. 14).
In addition to this, it is not uncommon to see advocacy literature using terminology that is
quite similar to customer oriented terms known from modern marketing. Wolf (2009) for
example in this regard talks about the need of “audience identification and segmentation” (p. 5).
Furthermore, and much resembling modern marketing, Wolf goes on to say that “motivating
(advocacy) messages need to hit an emotional chord. People are busy. They resist change. In
order to get their attention and support for change, you have to connect with people by plugging
into their belief system, not trying to rewire it” (p. 8).
However, while there clearly is a focus on understanding the target audiences in much
advocacy literature and among many practitioners, this focus is certainly not nearly as strong as
it could be. Coates et al (2002) in this respect write that “the deepest pitfall of advocacy is failing
to understand the nature of the work it involves. This is scarcely surprising, given the paucity of
systematic research and analysis into its diverse forms, methods, institutional structures, and the
dynamics of decision-making processes it seeks to influence” (p. 531).
This lack of environmental analysis described by Coates et al (2002) leads many
advocacy scholars as well as practitioners if not to ignore, then at least to underestimate the
importance of their target audience’s needs and wants. This, in turn, will often lead to problems
with achieving the advocacy groups’ mission, and especially if this mission has a long time
frame (p. 531).
Longer time frame complicates a mission-driven approach
The likely consequence of not focusing enough on the target audience is, that advocacy
groups often will use methods which will further their mission in the short term, but without
fully compensating the target audience for its change of behavior. The unfortunate consequence
of this is that it will be harder to achieve longer term advocacy objectives, because of the target
audience’s increased hostility (Schoon, 1995).
Teles et al (2011) in this regard talks about that “problems fight back” and that
“advocacy efforts almost always involve a fight against a strategic adversary capable of
learning and adapting over time” (p. 13-14). This shows that while a mission-driven strategy can
11
be effective in the short run, it becomes increasingly difficult to implement in the long run, and
especially when repeated interactions with the target audience are needed.
A relevant example in this matter is Greenpeace, who over the years has had an almost
unparalleled ability to bring environmental issues on the media agenda using strongly
confrontational and provocatory tactics. However, while Greenpeace often has had short run
advocacy success7, it may have hurt the organization in the long run to alienate the politicians
and business people that they were trying to influence. An indicator of this is the numerous times
that Greenpeace has been sued by the very companies and governments, which you would
expect that Greenpeace wanted to influence in a positive direction (Schoon, 1995; CBC, 2009;
BBC, 2002; ENS, 2004; Los Angeles Times, 2004).
Another relevant example is the NGO Invisible Children, who called for military action
against the war criminal Joseph Kony in a YouTube video (Kony 2012) on March 2012. Kony
2012 became a worldwide phenomenon almost overnight and as of March 2013 had nearly a
billion views. However, Invisible Children in their advocacy failed to consider the geopolitical
interests of Sudan, Congo and Uganda. These interests were some of the most critical,
underlying reasons why Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army could continue their operations, and
why a public call for military action was likely to be futile (Izama, 2012).
As this shows, a mission-driven approach for both of these prominent organizations led to
a superficial understanding of complex conflicts and the needs and wants of the parties involved.
While this gave them publicity in the short run, it also significantly decreased Greenpeace and
Invisible Children’s ability to come up with realistic, long term strategies to attain the social and
political change that they were claiming to be pursuing (Izama, 2012).
An example in the opposite direction is the think-tank Myanmar Egrees, which has
exerted significant influence on Burmese politics without the same “do-or-die” mentality that
characterized many of Greenpeace and Invisible Children’s strategies. Instead, Myanmar Egrees
has lobbied for its points of view through informal and cordial relationships with key players in
Burmese politics, in a way that if did not meet these key players’ needs and wants at least did not
hurt them either (Moe, 2010).
7 With the campaign against the dumping of Shell Oil’s Brent Spar oil platform as a famous and notorious example
(Schoon, 1995).
12
A similar example is found in Elliot-Teague’s PhD dissertation about Tanzanian
advocacy. In this paper, Elliot-Teague concludes that advocacy groups with a more
accommodating approach had a higher impact than groups with a more confrontational approach
(Elliot-Teague, 2007: v). As these and other examples show (Raynor et al, 2009: 15), there
seems to be considerable justification for incorporating a higher focus on the target audience’s
needs and wants in modern advocacy theory and practice.
Supplement and not supplant the mission-driven approach
Finally, it is important to emphasize that building in a higher focus on the target
audience’s needs and wants would not necessarily entail supplanting the mission-driven
approach, but simply to complement it. In this regard, social marketing is an example of a
discipline that has been able to maintain a focus on achieving social change, while at the same
time basing any change efforts on an understanding of the target group’s needs and wants, and a
willingness to serve these needs rather than to work against them. This shows that mission-
driven and target audience-driven approaches are not mutually exclusive, but can actually work
hand-in-hand (Kotler et al, 2009: 48).
Conclusion
In the previous section, the dominant ideas in current advocacy thought were reviewed.
In this regard, much literature and practice is based on the idea that advocacy is and should be
mission-driven. However such a focus, while often useful in the short run, may also be a problem
in the long run due to a lack of attentiveness to the needs and wants of the target audience.
2.2.2 Marketing – the new solution
In the following section a brief overview of the most important elements of modern
marketing is provided. Furthermore, this section will explain how these techniques can be
incorporated in advocacy to secure a higher focus on the target audience’s needs and wants and
thereby increase the effectiveness of advocacy groups especially in the long run.
13
Customer-driven approach
Modern marketing is characterized by being customer-driven, where the point of
departure of the company’s work is its customers’ needs and wants. Unlikely much mission-
driven advocacy and especially conflict-based advocacy, this is founded on the assumption that a
company can only be successful, if it can satisfy its customers’ needs and wants through the
products that the company is offering (Kotler et al, 2010: 35).
In this sense, marketing does not try to change the customers’ needs and wants or sell
them products that do not match with the customers’ preferences. Instead, modern marketing
seeks an equitable exchange, where value is created – and not taken away – from the customer.
The goal with this is to build long term relationships with the customer, which through repeated
sales over time is more profitable than one-shot sales, where the customer is tricked, pressured or
otherwise forced or manipulated into buying a product that does not sufficiently satisfy his/her
needs and wants (Kotler, 2005: 19-20).
In addition to this, the company’s value proposition must be better than those of its
relevant competitors. In other words, the company’s aim should not just be to create value, but to
create more value than its competitors. If that does not happen, the target market will likely
select a competing product over yours (Kotler et al, 2010: 237).
To incorporate this customer-driven approach in advocacy is significant because the
point of departure would not be the NGO’s mission and the belief that any mean – conflict or not
– would be justified in attaining this mission. Instead, rather than using pressure or flashy, but
hollow communication strategies to get the target audience’s support, the outlook of the
advocacy groups should be how best to serve the target audience’s interests more genuinely
(Kotler et al, 2010: 35).
In line with marketing’s focus on an “exchange of value”, this would happen through a
compromise that would create value for the target audience by meeting its needs and wants.
Furthermore, the value of this compromise should be greater than what the target audience
otherwise could have attained through alternative arrangements or courses of action. Finally – as
in marketing – the advocacy groups should ask the target audience for something in return that
would further their own social cause (Kotler et al, 2010: 19-20).
The benefit of this compromise would first of all be that the advocacy groups
immediately would get closer to reaching their overall goals. Secondly, the fact that the advocacy
14
groups were able to meet its target audience’s needs in this first exchange would make it more
likely that they could agree on more mutually beneficial “deals” later on. This incremental
progress through one compromise at a time could over time result in the more substantial and
fundamental political and social change that the advocacy groups desired (Kotler et al, 2009: 48).
Customer research
As a consequence of marketing’s focus on providing customers with what they need and
want, marketing has a very high emphasis on customer research. The goal with customer
research is to understand the customers’ needs and wants, and how they can be fulfilled through
certain products or services. This research to a large extent happens by collecting data directly
from the customers through a variety of means (interviews, surveys, observations, experiments,
focus groups etc.) (Kotler et al, 2010: 125).
In addition to customer research, marketing also puts heavy emphasis on competitive
analysis, which entails analyzing competitors and other external forces that could influence the
company. Same as with customer research, this can happen through a variety of tools such as a
SWOT analysis, BCG matrix, GE/McKinsey Matrix, PEST analysis, micro and macro analysis,
Porter’s Five Forces analysis and more. Finally, the company also analyzes its own strengths and
weakness to ensure, that they have the capacity to deliver the products which will meet their
customers’ needs and wants (Kotler et al, 2010: 77).
As the above paragraphs show, marketing research is a highly rigorous process, where
the company tries to foresee all environmental factors that may affect the company’s ability to
sell its products. If the same approach was taken in advocacy, this would entail collecting as
much information as possible about the needs and wants of the advocacy group’s target
audience. Furthermore, as in marketing research, this should preferably be primary data and not
just secondary data (Kotler et al, 2010: 125).
In addition to their target audience, the advocacy group should also analyze existing
competitors, and whether these actors can offer the target audience better arrangements than the
advocacy group itself. ‘Competitors’ in this regard refers to all actors in addition to the advocacy
group that are able to influence the advocacy target audience. For example, in case of the
Burmese government being the target audience, relevant competitors could be Tatmadaw8,
8 The Burmese national army, officially named Myanmar Armed Forces.
15
business tycoons, USDA9, domestic opposition, general public, ethnic armed groups, China,
Thailand, India, ASEAN10
and others with something “to offer” to the Burmese government
(Bergen et al, 2002: 160).
Finally, as in marketing research, the advocacy groups should also remember to evaluate
their own organization’s strengths and weaknesses to ensure, that they have the capacity to offer
their target audience a better deal than anybody else (Kotler et al, 2010: 77, 78).
Planning and implementation
In terms of creating a successful marketing campaign, carefully gauging customer needs
and wants is only the first step. The second step is designing and implementing a plan for how to
satisfy these desires. The favored tool for this task in marketing is the marketing plan. The
marketing plan in this regard lays out a highly structured and sequential plan starting with an
analysis of the company’s environment and ending with the ability to profitably promote and sell
a product in that environment (Kotler et al, 2010: 79).
In the marketing literature, the marketing plan exists in slightly different versions, even
though the majority of them follow the same overall pattern. In this thesis, the following
marketing plan model has been chosen, because it is very structured and flows logically from one
step to another:
1) External PEST analysis: Analyzing the political, economic, socio-cultural and
technological environment.
2) SWOT analysis: Analyzing the company’s strengths and weaknesses and the
opportunities and threats of the surrounding environment.
3) Goals & Objectives: Develop goals and objectives based on the environmental analysis.
4) Segmentation, targeting and positioning: Segment the market; find the target market; and
position the company relative to its competitors.
5) Marketing strategies: Implement marketing strategies that work hand-in-hand in meeting
the needs and wants of the target market.
6) Action plan: Develop a plan for implementing the marketing strategies.
7) Budgeting: Set a budget to implement the action plan.
8) Evaluation: Set up performance evaluation measures.
9 Union Solidarity and Development Association, a government controlled mass organization (Win, 2010: 27).
10 Association of South East Asian Nations.
16
9) Contingency plan: Have an alternative plan if the marketing campaign is unsuccessful.
10) Executive summary of the marketing plan: Make a short summary of the marketing plan
to be shown to board of directors; upper management; shareholders; investors etc. (Kurtz,
2006: 66-68).
If the marketing plan was to be used in advocacy, it is important that the advocacy groups
carefully follow each step of the plan. In this regard, the marketing plan is a general framework
intended to be used for any company engaged in the selling of any kind of product11
(Berry et al,
2001: 7). Considering that advocacy groups also engage in selling12
, all marketing plan steps can
be expected to be necessary components of a successful advocacy campaign as well.
In addition to this, it is crucial that the advocacy groups carefully connect the individual
steps with each other. As the above summary should show, all marketing steps are systematically
linked to one another, where one step logically leads to the next. Because each step is
interconnected, the company will eventually end up with a cohesive and holistic marketing plan,
which will minimize uncertainty and maximize chance of success (Kotler, 2005: 95-97). For
advocacy groups engaged in selling a social cause, the same can be expected to be the case.
2.2.3 Conclusion
In this section advocacy both among practitioners and in academia was examined. In this
regard, much advocacy was shown to be mission-driven. However, while a mission-driven
approach may help bring short term advocacy wins, it will often complicate goal achievement in
the long run, because it does not pay enough attention to the target audience’s needs and wants
(Izama, 2012; Schoon, 1995).
Considering these limitations of a mission based approach, advocacy could likely benefit
from incorporating elements of modern marketing. The focus of this marketing-inspired
approach would first of all be to understand the target audience’s needs and wants. Subsequently,
the advocacy group would then try to “manufacture” a deal or a compromise that would satisfy
the target audience’s desires, while at the same time furthering the advocacy group’s social cause
(Kotler et al, 2010: 35). In doing so, the advocacy group would also have to perform competitive
11
Although the marketing plan may be customized to some extent, depending on which industry the company is in (Berry et al, 2001: 7). 12
Even though the currency is political progress and not money.
17
analysis to ensure, that their deal fulfills the target audience’s needs to a higher extent than any
alternative arrangement. Finally, advocacy groups could likely also benefit from using the
marketing plan as a method to plan and implement their advocacy campaigns (Kotler et al, 2010:
77, 125).
2.3 Empirical review: Background about Burma
The following section will consist of background information about the political situation
in Burma. The first part provides a target audience analysis describing the most important
players in relation to Burma’s political situation, and what the needs and wants of these
audiences were.
In the second part of this empirical review, the work of the Burma groups – and how they
tried to influence Burma’s political situation – is described. In doing this, it will be evaluated to
what extent the Burma groups had chosen the right target audiences and whether they were
successful in winning over these audiences by offering deals fulfilling their needs and wants.
2.3.1 Target audience analysis
In the following sections, the advocacy target audiences with the highest potential
influence on Burma’s political situation are described. This target audience analysis is conducted
to determine, which audiences the Burma advocacy groups should have targeted in order to
change Burma in a pro-democratic direction. In addition to this, the following sections will also
analyze the needs and wants of these target audiences in order to find out, which desires had to
be accommodated, when lobbying these audiences to become more supportive of democratic
reform in Burma.
2.3.1.1 Most important target audience: Burmese government
Being the only actor with the means to immediately and singlehandedly start to
implement democratic reforms, the Burmese government was the group with the most power to
change Burma’s political situation. Furthermore, the Burmese government firmly controlled the
most important institutions needed to maintain political and social control. This included the
18
Tatmadaw, USDA13
, the police force, intelligence service as well as keeping a tight rein on the
Burmese media.
All these factors made the Burmese government by far the most important advocacy
audience and should have been targeted by anybody with a genuine interest in changing Burma
in a pro-democratic direction (Clapp, 2007: 4). In this regard, the Burmese government had at
least three important needs that had to be considered, when approaching them with ideas of
promoting democratic reforms.
Personal interests
When lobbying the Burmese government, the first need that had to be considered was the
personal interests of the highest ranking generals and officers as well as their immediate
families. In this regard, many officers feared democratic reforms, because of the risk of
maltreatment or being retroactively sentenced for war crimes and human rights abuses.
Furthermore, the officers likely also feared what would happen to their wives, children and other
immediate family in the event of democratic reforms (Pedersen, 2000: 206).
Secondly, during the SLORC/SPDC14
era, the officer corps had become “a privileged
upper class (…) with superior access to everything from consumer products to education and
healthcare.” Losing these privileges in the event of democratic reform likely was a serious
obstacle against the officers even contemplating a quick transition of power (Pedersen, 2000:
206).
Thirdly, many officers had been able to get involved in lucrative business ventures
through their positions in the army and government. In this regard, many officers in all
likelihood feared that some or all of their assets would be taken away from them with a new
democratic government that represented the people that the generals had brutally repressed for
decades (Bunte, 2011: 11).
13
The USDA was a mass movement founded in 1993 with the purpose of establishing further governmental control over the Burmese people. In 2006 USDA counted 22.8 million members – little less than half the population – and constituted a formidable way to establish a government presence almost everywhere in Burmese society (Network for Democracy and Development, 2006: 18-19). 14
In the thesis period (1990-2010), the military government operated under two different names. From 1988 to 1997, the official name of the government was State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). From 1997 and to 2010, the official name of the government was changed to State Peace and Development Council (Callahan, 2003: 210; 217).
19
As this show, the Burmese generals had significant personal interests intimately linked
with their own rule. Therefore, in order to have a realistic expectation that Burma’s leaders
would consider ideas of democratic reforms, they had to be assured that these interests would not
be seriously threatened, if they were to relinquish power (Pedersen, 2000: 206).
Security
The second need of the Burmese government was security on both an international and
domestic level. Internationally, security was sought to be achieved through a neutralist foreign
policy. This policy entailed, that Burma did not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, and
expected other countries to adopt a similar position towards Burma (Steinberg, 2010: 93-94).
A more active line was taken domestically, where security was tried to be attained
through a constant repression of dissidents and the general public. Furthermore, the Burmese
government in several ways15
tried to neutralize the domestic threat of the dozens of ethnic
armed groups operating along Burma’s borders (Steinberg, 2000: 100; Pasch et al, 2009: 37).
In terms of the government’s security concerns, it is important to note that they were
coupled with a significant fear and suspicion towards the motives of both domestic and
international actors. This fear especially existed towards Western countries16
and led the
Burmese government to consistently overestimate the West’s hostile intentions towards Burma.
This included an unrealistic, but deeply felt concern of a Western military invasion of Burma,
and a fear that Western countries wanted to strengthen the domestic opposition and ethnic armed
groups in their work to overthrow the Burmese government (Selth, 2008: 15-17).
Considering these feelings, it would be of utmost importance that reform proposals did
not appear threatening and were not seen as gambling with the generals’ security. If these
conditions were met, proposals for democratic change would have had a notably higher chance
of being considered by the generals.
15
The Burmese government used various tactics to deal with the ethnic armed groups. This included: 1) Armed conflict (for example with KNLA and SSA-South). 2) Agreeing to ceasefires (for example with KIA and NMSP). 3) Turning the ethnic armed groups into allies (for example with DKBA) (Core, 2009: 96). 16
Which in part can be traced back to Burma’s traumatic period as a British colony (1824-1948) with the subjugation of the Burmese kings and the proud Burmese people that this entailed (Money, 2012: 102).
20
Respect
The third need of the Burmese government was a significant desire for respect and to be
accepted and treated as equals by the international community. This showed itself primarily
through a notable inferiority complex especially towards Western countries. This complex
among other things was related to Burma’s underdevelopedness and perceived backwardness as
well as a lack of legitimacy and acceptance of the government’s rule by the Burmese population.
(ICG, 2001a: 4; Callahan, 2000: 35; Pedersen, 2000: 205).
In addition to this, the Burmese government’s need for respect was shown in the leaders’
always very proud attitude in dealing with domestic, but perhaps in particular international
actors. This pride was among other things evident in a hypersensitivity towards foreign criticism
and the assertion that Burma’s problems were too complex and uniquely Burmese to be
understood by foreigners. Furthermore, this pride was expressed in the generals’ consistent
refusal to bow to outside pressure and in their emphasis on the unique “Burmese way” of doing
things (ICG, 2001a: 7, 9; Pedersen, 2000: 209; Stern, 2009: 5).
Considering this insecure and inferior, but also proud worldview of Burma’s generals, it
was very important to have a high focus on appearing respectful, when approaching the Burmese
government with proposals for democratic reforms. This would first of all entail showing respect
to the generals’ leadership and their “Burmese way” of governing. Secondly, too strongly
worded criticism tapping into the generals’ inferiority complex should be avoided. If this method
of respectfully approaching the Burmese government was followed, the likelihood that they
would view foreign proposals for democratic reform in a if not accommodating, then at least not
completely hostile way would be substantially improved.
Conclusion
In the previous section, the three most important needs of the Burmese government were
presented: Security, respect and protection of personal interests. For advocates hoping to
persuade the generals to implement democratic reforms, these needs had to be accommodated. If
that happened, the ability of maintaining some dialogue and even apply slight pressure on
21
Burma’s leaders would be improved (as for example was the case with the International Labor
Organization17
) (Wilson, 2010: 298).
2.3.1.2 Second most important target audiences: Civil society and ethnic armed groups
In addition to the government, two other very important target audiences were Burma’s
civil society and ethnic armed groups. Even though they were not as important as the
government, they still had a very significant influence on Burma’s political situation and were
obvious target audiences for pro-democratic advocacy groups.
Civil society
In this section the opportunities of lobbying the very influential Burmese civil society are
examined. In this regard, it is preferable to split the civilian population up into the following
groups, because of their differences in needs and wants: The general population, the National
League for Democracy (NLD) and Aung San Suu Kyi, monks and international NGOs
(INGOS)18
(Restrepo, 2003: 1).
NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
Having won the annulled 1990 elections with a landslide victory, the NLD and Aung San
Suu Kyi had tremendous moral power within the general population. Even though the NLD from
the mid-1990s became increasingly marginalized by the Burmese government, the party
maintained its huge popularity among ordinary people. Furthermore, Aung San Suu Kyi at least
for the Burman population continued to be the country’s uncontested beacon of democracy,
justice and hope. This made both NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi very legitimate advocacy target
audiences (Zaw, 2000).
17
Wilson here explains how the ILO by dealing with the Burmese government in a respectful and largely non-threatening manner was able to create small, but notable progress over the years vis-a-vis forced labor. Furthermore – perhaps exactly because of this accommodating and engaging approach – ILO was one of the very few cases, where an outside agent could apply pressure on Burma’s government without alienating the hypersensitive Burmese leadership at the same time (Wilson, 2010: 298). 18
In relation to students, then they are often considered a powerful and possibly subversive force in dictatorships. In Burma, however, during the SPDC period universities were closed, distance learning emphasized and the education system centralized. This to a large extent meant that students as political force from 1990-2010 were mostly eliminated (Lall, 2008: 132).
22
For most of the 1990-2010 period, NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi’s political objectives
centered on especially three points: 1) A recognition of the 1990 elections. 2) Three-way
dialogue between the Burmese government, NLD and ethnic groups. 3) A relatively speedy
transfer of power to a civilian government. The Burmese government was opposed to all three
objectives, which were therefore not realistically attainable, unless the government was
overthrown (Hlaing, 2011: 5; Pasch et al, 2009: 28).
That these goals therefore were clearly too ambitious also meant that people engaged in
pro-democratic advocacy should not have supported the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi in
maintaining these policy goals19
. Instead, foreigners should have tried to persuade NLD and
Aung San Suu Kyi that engaging in constructive dialogue, rather than making strong demands,
was the best way to influence a Burmese government hypersensitive to criticism. Furthermore,
the Burmese government had a most negative and strongly condescending view of both NLD and
Aung San Suu Kyi, which meant that pro-democracy advocates should advise NLD and Aung
San Suu Kyi to approach the government in a very considerate way that did not seek to
antagonize them further20
(Hlaing, 2007: 16).
General population
As in any society, the general population was one of the groups with the largest potential
influence on Burma’s political situation. During the 1990-2010 period however, the general
population remained mostly politically passive, because of the dangers involved in being
politically active. Therefore, any attempt to approach the general public to be more active in
promoting democratic reforms had to accommodate ordinary people’s need of not exposing
themselves or their families to too much risk by doing so (Linkewich: 6-7; Huxley, 2007: 15;
Dudley, 2003: 12).
Monks
A third civil society group with influence on Burma’s political situation was the Burmese
monkhood the Sangha with over 300,000 monks and novices. In a devoutly Buddhist country,
19
Which however many of the Burma advocacy groups still did (Farmaner, 2009). 20
Towards Aung San Suu Kyi, this often was reduced to a level of personal attacks and even name calling implying that she was working for Western powers as well as being a Burmese “race destructionist”, because of her marriage with the British scholar Michael Aris (Callahan, 2000: 35).
23
the Sangha was a hugely influential moral force that the Burmese generals had to treat with great
care (Steinberg, 2000: 101).
Except for the 2008 Saffron demonstrations, monks did not participate much in politics
directly. Still, monks listened to political news21
and discussed politics among themselves and
with trusted civilians. Furthermore, eminent monks on several occasions publicly called for
national reconciliation between the government and pro-democratic groups. Finally, many ex-
activist monks had close relations with senior military officers. All these factors meant that
Burmese monks were a legitimate and important potential target audience for advocacy groups
(Hlaing, 2007: 19-20).
However, in engaging with the monks – as with the general population – the risk of
government crackdown on political activity had to be considered. Therefore, any attempt to
approach Burmese monks, monasteries or the Sangha as such to be more active in promoting
democratic reforms had to accommodate the monks’ need to work discreetly and informally and
without engaging in direct confrontation with the Burmese government (ICG, 2001b: 18).
INGOs
The last prominent civil society group with influence on Burma’s domestic situation was
international NGOs. Since the mid-1990s several INGOs and UN agencies worked in Burma,
which gave them a direct channel into Burmese society, economy and politics. Even though
INGOs predominantly dealt with humanitarian issues22
, their direct access to military officers,
bureaucrats and government agencies gave the INGOs a certain amount of leverage in
influencing Burma’s political situation (ICG, 2001b: 21-22). These factors made INGOs and UN
agencies working inside Burma highly valid target audiences for advocacy groups
Still, obtaining permission to work in Burma was difficult and once there, the Burmese
government would watch these INGOs and UN agencies closely to prevent them from engaging
in anti-government activities. Therefore, as with the monks, any attempt to approach INGOs and
UN agencies to be more active in promoting democratic reforms had to accommodate their need
of working informally as well as not jeopardizing their cordial working relationships with the
Burmese government (ICG, 2001a: 22).
21
Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and BBC (Hlaing, 2007: 19). 22
HIV, malnutrition, clean drinking water, micro loans etc.
24
Ethnic armed groups
In addition to Burma’s civil society, the populations in the ethnic areas – and especially
the ethnic armed groups – were another target audience with a very considerable influence on
Burma’s political situation. From 1990 to 2010 however, the ethnic armed groups steadily lost
power compared to the central government. This happened primarily because of shrinkage in
territory, resources and recruits as well as numerous ceasefires, which significantly reduced the
number of groups actively engaged in armed struggle against the government. Still, any national
reconciliation had to include the ethnic armed groups, which represented the populations in the
ethnic areas, and who the Tatmadaw despite overwhelming resources were never able to
completely root out of their territories (Rudland et al, 2000: 10, 14). These factors made the
ethnic armed groups a most important advocacy target audience for anybody involved in
transforming Burma’s political landscape.
In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the ethnic armed groups had substantial
differences in terms of outlook and political goals23
. These differences had to be taken into
account, when the ethnic armed groups were approached by pro-democratic advocates (Pasch et
al, 2009: 8). Still, a number of common interests for most of the ethnic armed groups can be
identified.
Local authority
One of the things that nearly all of the ethnic armed groups wanted was some level of
local authority over their own areas within a greater Burmese union24
. This would include
political authority and a right to maintain ethnic armies. Furthermore, it should entail a right to
promote their own ethnic languages and culture as well as various business concessions (Pasch et
al, 2009: 8; Steinberg, 2000: 104).
Considering that many of the ceasefires had included special privileges and some local
authority, the ethnic armed groups’ desire for local authority on a more permanent basis did not
seem completely unrealistic or farfetched (ICG, 2003: 8). This also meant that pro-democratic
advocates approaching the ethnic armed groups could be supportive of their wish for local
23
For example was the Karen National Union under the rule of strongman Bo Mya “unlikely ever to compromise” with the Burmese central government (ICG, 2003: 5). 24
Originally, many of the ethnic armed groups still wanted independent states for their people. At the end of the 2000s however, nearly all ethnic armies had “accepted the Union of Myanmar as a fact and merely seek increased local authority and equality within a new federal state structure” (Pasch et al, 2009: 8).
25
authority. This accommodating attitude would then in turn have improved the ability of engaging
in more serious discussions with the ethnic armed groups about national reconciliation and
finding a more permanent resolution with the Burmese government rather than engaging in
unwinnable armed struggle.
Cultural respect
A second need common for all ethnic armed groups was a desire for cultural respect. In
this regard ethnic armed groups, and the populations which they represented, felt discriminated
against by the Burmese government. In addition to political and economic factors, this feeling
extended to cultural and religious discrimination including an attempt of the Burmese
government to ‘Burmanize’ the ethnic areas and its people (Pasch et al, 2009: 8).
In dealing with the ethnic armed groups, pro-democracy advocates therefore needed to
appear highly respectful of ethnic cultures. Furthermore, advocates should be supportive of the
necessity of the Burmese government treating ethnic cultures with dignity and respect. If the
advocacy groups adopted this strategy, it would increase their chance of maintaining a cordial
dialogue with the ethnic armed groups and perhaps even to make them more inclined to engage
in a more constructive political dialogue with the Burmese government about peace and
reconciliation.
2.3.1.3 Third most important target audiences: Domestic power bases, ASEAN and
Asian countries
In addition to the Burmese government, civil society and ethnic armed groups a number
of other groups had some, although less power to influence Burma’s political situation. The most
important of these groups were the Burmese government’s domestic power bases, ASEAN and
Asian countries generally.
Domestic power bases
In terms of the government’s domestic power bases this included groups such as the
Tatmadaw, police force, intelligence service, civil servants, legislative system and local media.
All these power bases were needed to remain control with the population; fight off the ethnic
26
insurgents; and enable the government to carry out its day-to-day tasks (Chachavalpongpun,
2010: 171). This made these groups very valid target audiences.
In this regard, it is important to mention that the members of these groups were not
uniformly in support of the way that the government was managing the country and would not
have been opposed to some political reform. In this regard, Selth (2000) for example writes that
“many members of the Tatmadaw appear to retain a hidden sympathy for Aung San Suu Kyi and
the idea of a return to democratic government. While the regime is always watching for signs of
dissent in its ranks, a split may still occur, triggering a wider crisis that would alter the entire
power balance in Burma” (p. 67).
This hidden dissent and dissatisfaction indicates that individuals employed within these
power bases indeed could be approached with ideas of democratic reform. However in doing so
it had to be considered, that it would be very difficult or even impossible for these individuals to
become openly engaged in politics. For example in the case of the civil servants, they had to stay
largely politically inactive, because they were not allowed to join political parties, unions or any
other organization not approved by the government (ICG 2001: 7, 25).
Instead, any attempt to approach members of these groups had to accommodate their
need to work discreetly and informally and without engaging in direct confrontation with their
immediate superiors or the Burmese government more generally. If these conditions were met, it
would not have been impossible to work with these groups as indeed several INGOs, foreign
human rights advocates and local pro-democracy NGOs actually did in the 1990-2010 period
(Wilson et al, 2007: 370-371).
ASEAN
An international organization with some potential influence on the Burmese government
was ASEAN, who Burma became a member of in 1997. In this regard, ASEAN was well aligned
with the Burmese government in favoring non-interference in other states’ domestic affairs as
well as in preferring non-confrontational engagement rather than sanctions and further isolation
of Burma. In addition to this, ASEAN countries and leaders came from the same region as the
Burmese government, which made Burma’s leaders feel better understood than with Western
27
governments. Finally, ASEAN countries constituted some of Burma’s most important trading
partners25
(Bunyanunda, 2002: 123; Than, 2000: 155-156).
All these factors combined gave ASEAN some, although still limited influence on the
Burmese government’s position towards democratic reforms. This at the same made ASEAN a
valid advocacy target audience, which may especially have been the case in the period after the
1998 Asian financial crisis.
From 1990-1998, ASEAN did not show any particular interest in promoting a serious
dialogue with the Burmese government about democratic reforms. Since the 1998 crisis and
onwards however, ASEAN started to take a markedly stronger interest in promoting democracy
in Burma26
. Especially in this second period, pro-democracy advocates would have had some
leverage to lobby ASEAN leaders to accelerate their already existing push for democratic
reforms in Burma (Pedersen, 2000: 196-197; Malik, 2000: 261-262).
Asian countries
In addition to ASEAN, Asian countries more generally constituted other important target
audiences with some level of influence on the Burmese government. This influence was first of
all cultural, where the Burmese government harbored less distrust towards culturally more
similar Asian countries compared to Western countries (ICG, 2004: 21). Secondly, the Asian
influence was economical, where Burma’s trade was heavily skewed towards other countries in
the region, which is evident from the below table showing Burma’s top-10 trading partners in
2010.
25
In 2010 ASEAN countries Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam made up 45.1 % of all Burma’s foreign trade (European Commission statistics, 2011). 26
This shift in attitude was among other things caused by: 1) The Burma policy was costly for ASEAN’s international image. 2) Frustration with the slow pace of reforms in Burma. 3) Growing Chinese influence in the country despite Burma’s ASEAN-membership (SIGUR Center for Asian Studies, 2012).
28
Table 1: Top-10 Burma trading partners in 2010
Trade partners Mio. Euro %
Thailand 3,681 30
China 3,548 28.9
Singapore 1,019 8.3
India 997 8.1
South Korea 507 4.1
Japan 484 3.9
Malaysia 463 3.8
Indonesia 255 2.1
EU 235 1.9
Vietnam 111 0.9
Source: European Commission statistics, 2011
As Table 1 shows, 9 out of Burma’s top-10 trading partners were from Asia, which is one
of the most important reasons why Asian countries generally had much more influence on
Burma’s political situation than Western countries. In the following paragraphs there is a more
narrow focus on the three Asian countries with the highest influence on the Burmese
government: China, Thailand and India.
China
During the 1990-2010 period, the by far most important country vis-à-vis the Burmese
generals was China, who served as Burma’s international patron and provider of much needed
loans. For China’s part, their interest in Burma consisted of import, export, substantial
investments in development and energy projects as well as using their influence in Burma to
counterbalance their longstanding rival India (Chenyang, 2010: 114, 120; Than, 2010: 129).
These geo-political and economic interests meant that China would not be in favor of
promoting a quick and uncertain replacement of the Burmese generals. Still, China was not
known to be particularly fond of the unpredictable and “troublemaking” generals either; rarely
took extraordinary measures to protect them internationally27
; and had several border disputes
with the Burmese government28
. Furthermore, China always maintained a dialogue with NLD
and ethnic groups in opposition to the generals. This indicates that China would not have been
27
Except for the blocking of a 2007 Burma resolution in the UN Security Council (Haacke, 2011: 115). 28
For example in 2009, where China was upset by the huge number of refugees running across the border after Tatmadaw’s attack on ethnically Han Chinese Kokang militias (Branigan, 2009).
29
opposed to gradual governmental reform towards a more reliable partner than the SPDC, as long
as their economic and geopolitical needs were not jeopardized (Haacke, 2011: 128-126).
Thailand
Another important country for Burma in the 1990-2010 period was Thailand. Politically,
Thailand was one of the Asian countries with some ability to approach the Burmese leaders, even
though the reception would often be reserved and tentative29
(Stern, 2009: 5). Economically,
Burma supplied Thailand with up to 40 percent of its energy consumption, while Thailand
exported cars, electronics and other industrial products and consumer goods to Burma (Rieffel,
2010: 10-11; Mizzima, 2012). This interconnectedness between the two countries made Thailand
an obvious advocacy target audience.
Furthermore, same as China, the Thai government showed no particular love for the
generals and had a number of running disputes, which included: Ethnic minorities on the Thai-
Burma border in opposition to the Burmese government; presence of Burmese troops and
artillery on the Thai-Burma border; Burmese refugees and refugee camps in Thailand; illegal
Burmese migrants; and the constant flow of vast amounts of drugs from Burma into Thailand. As
with China, this indicates that Thailand would not have been opposed to political reforms in
Burma, as long as Thai commercial interests were not hurt in the process (Chongkittavorn, 2001:
122, 124-125; Pedersen, 2000: 199).
India
A third very important country during the 1990-2010 period was India, who were
Burma’s fourth largest trading partner; imported Burmese oil and gas; invested in Burmese
hydropower projects; and provided substantial development aid. Furthermore, India and the
Burmese government had a joint agreement to help apprehend anti-government militias hiding
on each other’s territory. Finally, India maintained a relatively good political relationship with
the Burmese government in order to balance off China (Rieffel, 2010: 15, Chenyang, 2010: 116-
117). These factors gave India some ability to influence the Burmese government, which at the
same time made India a relevant advocacy target audience.
29
This would especially be the case with Thai military leaders and less so with Thai civilian-political leaders, who in the eyes of the Burmese leaders had let their country fall victim to decadent Western influence (Chongkittavorn, 2001: 120).
30
When that is said, India did not have the same notable, disgruntling issues with the
Burmese government as was the case with China and Thailand. Furthermore, India was
significantly less critical towards the Burmese government from the early 1990s and onwards
than Thailand and China were (Yhome, 2008:19). These factors indicate that while India may not
have been opposed to political reforms, they may not have been as actively supportive of them as
China and Thailand possibly would have. Still, it is possible that India could be convinced to
promote political reforms in Burma in a slightly more assertive way as long as their financial,
geopolitical and security concerns were taken into consideration.
2.3.1.4 Fourth most important target audiences: Western countries and UN
Finally, our attention turns to Western countries and the United Nations, who both had
only a small potential influence on Burmese domestic politics in the 1990-2010 period. For
Western countries, this was among other things caused by a lack of economic interdependence
especially due to the economic sanctions (Hlaing, 2011: 21). In addition to this, the West’s
highly critical approach likely further reduced their influence, because it reinforced the Burmese
government’s mistrust towards the motives of Western countries (Nyun, 455: 492; ICG, 2001a:
13-14).
For the United Nations, their lack of influence was primarily caused by having very
limited direct powers to impact Burma’s government, politics, society and economy (Pomfret,
2010). In addition to this, the strongly worded criticism in important forums such as the General
Assembly, Security Council and Human Rights Council likely made the hypersensitive, but
proud Burmese government even less willing to engage with UN about democratic reforms
(DVB, 2007).
2.3.1.5 Conclusion
In this section, the most important target audiences in terms of Burma’s political situation
were examined. In this regard, the Burmese government was the most powerful and therefore
also the most important target audience par excellence. In addition to this, Burma’s civil society,
ethnic armed groups as well as the government’s domestic and regional supporters were other
important target audiences. Finally, Western countries and the United Nations only had a small
31
possible influence on Burma’s political situation and focusing on these audiences was not likely
to create substantial political change in Burma.
Finally, this section also showed that all target audiences had certain needs that had to be
accommodated in order to make progress. If these needs were met, it seems likely that political
progress could be made with the majority of the most important target audiences, when
considering the widespread frustration with Burma’s government and the general state of affairs
in the country.
2.3.2 The Burmese exile advocacy movement
In the following sections, the work of the Burma advocacy groups in exile is discussed.
In this regard, the Burma groups’ pro-democratic advocacy was mostly limited to countries,
international organizations and audiences outside of Burma. In relation to targeting audiences
inside Burma – according to the existing literature at least – this only happened to a small extent
by distributing government critical news and materials through shortwave radio and the websites
of news groups such as Irrawaddy Magazine, Democratic Voice of Burma, Radio Free Asia,
Mizzima News, BBC and Voice of America (Zaw, 2002; Dudley, 2003: 17).
2.3.2.1 International advocacy
In terms of the Burma groups’ international advocacy, there is little doubt that the
Burmese exile movement succeeded in raising the global awareness of the conflict in Burma
(Hlaing, 2007: Page 21). Furthermore, most Burma scholars believe that the Burmese exile
movement was one of the key factors in influencing especially Western governments to maintain
economic sanctions and political pressure on Burma (Hlaing, 2011: 21; Dudley, 2003: 9).
However, whether this increased awareness, political pressure and economic sanctions actually
had any beneficial effect on the political situation in Burma is a heavily disputed question
(Hadar, 1998; Roughneen, 2011).
In the following section, this dispute will be attempted to be settled by looking at how
well this international pressure matched with the three main needs of the Burmese government
stated in section 2.3.1.1: Security, respect and safeguarding the government and army leaders’
personal interests. This in turn will provide a more clear impression of the success or failures of
32
the Burma groups, which will be necessary when developing a strong conceptual framework at
the end of this chapter.
Personal interests
First of all it is examined how the international pressure correlated with the Burmese
leadership’s personal interests vested to their own rule. In this regard, there can be little doubt
that the generals were concerned what would happen to them, their families and their assets in
the event of the relatively speedy democratic transition that the Burma groups as well as the
international community were advocating for (Pedersen, 2000: 206).
To make matters worse, the Burmese government’s concerns were likely heightened by
the fact that this reform message was communicated in a way that resembled pressure more than
it did dialogue. This tapped into the government’s fearful and paranoid worldview and likely did
little but to increase the mistrust towards the motives of the Burma advocacy groups and Western
countries. This in turn reduced the chance of getting the Burmese government to accommodate
to demands for a quick democratic transition, because Burma’s leaders were not convinced that
their assets and physical safety would be protected (Pedersen, 2000: 206).
Security
The element of the international pressure that most significantly tapped into the generals’
need of security was the use of economic sanctions. In this regard, the idea of the sanctions was
that it would make it more difficult and costly for the Burmese government to maintain control
over the country. This – in theory – would increase the generals’ level of insecurity, which at the
same time would give them an incentive to implement democratic reforms in order to get the
sanctions lifted (Pedersen, 2000: 203, 205).
The sanctions in this regard took on many forms and covered a wide variety of issues.
For the European Union, sanctions included an arms embargo, cancellation of trade preferences
and suspension of all kinds of aid except for humanitarian aid. For the United States, sanctions
included freezing Burmese assets, an import ban, an investment ban and a financial services ban
(US Embassy, 2011; Rieffel, 2010: 22). Furthermore, both EU and United States had an arms
embargo against Burma and a visa travel ban preventing Burma’s leaders and their closest
relatives to travel into EU or the United States (SIPRI, 2011; Martin, 2012; Selth, 13: 2008).
33
Over the years, sanctions hurt the government’s revenue sources to some extent as well
as making both exports and imports more difficult30
(Maung, 2006). Still, government revenue
was never significantly affected either, and the generals were able to make up for it by increasing
trade with China, India, Thailand, Singapore and other Asian countries (Dudley, 2003: 9).
Because of that, economic sanctions were not an imminent threat to the security of the Burmese
government, which at the same meant that the generals were unlikely to implement democratic
reforms to get rid of them (Dudley, 2003: 13; ICG, 2004: 17).
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the generals’ may have perceived a democratic
Burma without trade restrictions as constituting a much larger security threat than a military led
Burma under economic sanctions, because of the heightened insecurity that a democratic
transition would entail. In this view, the Western idea of trading sanctions for democratic
reforms did not constitute a good bargain for a Burmese leadership preoccupied with security
and not with economic development (Pedersen: 203, 205; Pasch et al, 2009: 38).
Respect
Finally, it is time to examine how international pressure impacted on the Burmese
government’s strong need for being treated with respect internationally. In this regard, the often
very strong Western criticism would on many occasions – at least in the eyes of the
hypersensitive Burmese government – send the opposite message. Instead, rather than showing
respect such criticism would often question the leadership of the Burmese government and
thereby tap into the generals’ inferiority complex (ICG, 2001: 12).
Furthermore in the eyes of the Burmese government, Western countries unfamiliar with
Burma and Asia had little moral authority to criticize and make moral judgments about Burma’s
political situation. These two factors likely resulted in a hardened attitude of the highly insecure,
but also very proud and nationalistic Burmese government against international engagement
with Western countries (Nyein, 2008).
30
For example by making it difficult for Burmese companies to attain the needed foreign currency to trade internationally (Maung, 2006).
34
Conclusion
In this section it was examined how well the international political and economic
pressure – supported by the Burma advocacy groups – matched with the Burmese government’s
needs. In this regard, most of the pressure did little to fulfill the needs of the Burmese
government. Furthermore, many things indicate that accommodating to Western pressure and
rolling out democratic reforms in most cases – in the eyes of the generals at least – would have
compromised their needs in terms of security, respect and safeguarding personal interests
(Pedersen: 203, 205). From a needs-based perspective, this made it unlikely that the generals
would start to implement democratic reforms on account of the pressure from Western countries.
2.3.2.2 Alternative approaches and target audiences
In the previous section the target audience strategies of the Burma advocacy were
examined. As this section showed, the Burma groups made some questionable choices by
targeting predominantly UN and Western countries with a limited influence on Burma’s political
situation. Furthermore, promoting pressure did not seem like the optimum strategy to influence
the Burmese government. Because of these factors, the following section will examine if the
advocacy groups could have chosen alternative approaches and target audiences with a higher
chance of creating political change in Burma.
Alternative approaches with UN and Western countries
In terms of the Burma groups’ existing target audience, then they mainly focused on
supporting the critical message of Western countries and the United Nations. However as already
explained, strongly worded criticism was not likely to create much progress with the Burmese
government (Nyein, 2008). Instead, the Burma advocacy groups should have tried to persuade
UN and Western countries to take a more accommodating and engaging line with the Burmese
government (Allan, 2010: 251).
This shift indeed seemed possible, because it would predominantly focus on the way the
message was delivered, rather than the content of the message itself. In this regard, UN and
Western countries would still be delivering a pro-democracy message with the only difference
being that they would be careful not to tap into the government’s inferiority complex and their
fearful and paranoid worldview. That this different message was not supported by the Burma
35
groups – despite freely available information attesting to the dubious benefit of pressure31
–
indicates serious issues with their environmental analysis in terms of how best to influence
Burma’s leaders (Clapp, 2007: 14).
Alternative target audiences in Burma and Asia
In addition to promoting a more accommodating approach with UN and Western
countries, we also need to consider, if the Burma advocacy groups could and should have chosen
to target other audiences. In this regard, considering that Western countries and UN had little
economic power or moral authority to influence Burma’s leaders, they were obviously a
questionable target market in the first place (Nyun, 2008: 483).
Instead, the Burma groups to a higher extent could have targeted audiences in Burma,
who much more directly could impact the country’s political situation. This was primarily the
case with the Burmese government, but also included ethnic armed groups, domestic opposition,
general public, monks, INGOs, civil servants, Tatmadaw, USDA, Burmese media as well as
business tycoons on favorable terms with the government (Hookway, 2011).
Working with advocacy inside Burma would undoubtedly have been immensely difficult
and in most cases dangerous too (DVB, 2009; Evans, 2008; AP, 2010). However, several
examples show that advocacy performed by foreigners as well as Burmese nationals actually was
possible in Burma in the 1990-2010 period, as long as a generally accommodating and non-
confrontational approach was taken (Wilson et al, 2007: 369). Also, most of these target
audiences had a number of relatively clear needs, and if they were met, it is not unlikely that
these audiences could have become more actively supportive of democratic reforms32
(Selth,
2000: 67).
31
In academia, the limited positive impact of pressure was well described by many of the most prominent Burma scholars including Pedersen, Wilson, Callahan, Steinberg, Selth and others. Furthermore, foreigners who were working or had worked in Burma were also quite outspoken of the likely futility of blatant pressure on the Burmese government (Wilson, 2010). Read for example Pedersen, Morten (2007): Promoting human rights in Burma: A critique of Western sanctions policy. 32
It is important to note that the advocacy groups would have been free to choose the most effective and safe method of engagement. This thesis does not suggest that the advocacy groups should have engaged in very public advocacy. In fact, people that did perform advocacy in Burma in the 1990-2010 period did so in an informal, non-public and non-confrontational manner often based on personal connections (this finding is based on several interviews with people who worked in Burma in the 1990-2010 period). The advocacy groups could likely have benefited from taking a similar approach – perhaps not doing the advocacy themselves, but working through foreigners or Burmese nationals already living in Burma.
36
Furthermore, in addition to target audiences in Burma, the advocacy groups should also
have focused more on China, Thailand, India, ASEAN and other important regional countries
and organizations with a fair amount of economic and moral influence on the Burmese
government. In this regard, especially China, Thailand and ASEAN showed no particular
fondness for the generals and would likely not have been opposed to incremental democratic
progress. This made these actors obvious target audiences that it would have been possible for
the advocacy groups to work with, as long as they were assured that their economic interests
would not be jeopardized in the event of democratic reforms in Burma. That the Burma groups
did not choose to do so again indicates quite serious issues with their environmental analysis
(Pedersen, 2000: 199).
2.3.2.3 Conclusion
In this section, the work of the Burma advocacy groups has been examined. In this
regard, the majority of the Burma groups focused their advocacy on lobbying UN and Western
countries to take an even more critical line towards the Burmese government (Hlaing, 2007: 21).
However this was a quite serious problem, because the hypersensitive Burmese
government was not likely to respond well to Western criticism. Instead, the Burma advocacy
groups could and should have lobbied Western countries and UN to adopt a more
accommodating position with higher chances of creating small, but at least incremental progress
with the Burmese government in a pro-democratic direction (Nyun, 2008: 512).
Furthermore, UN and Western countries only had a marginal influence on Burma’s
political situation, which questions the Burma groups’ choice of focusing on these audiences in
the first place. Instead, the Burma advocacy groups should have focused more on target
audiences inside Burma and in particular the Burmese government. Furthermore, the Burma
groups should also have devoted more resources to lobby important regional players like
ASEAN, China, Thailand and India, who likely would not have been opposed to gradual political
reform in Burma, as long as their interests were considered (Haacke, 2011: 128).
37
2.4 Exploratory research
To build a stronger conceptual framework based on a better understanding of the Burma
groups, an exploratory research was conducted to support the literature review. This research
took place from January to July 2012 and consisted of 6 interviews.
The method used to find interviewees for the exploratory research was snowballing
(Handcock et al, 2011: 2). In this regard, the six interviewees in the exploratory phase were: 1
former volunteer from a Christian relief aid organization with advocacy as a secondary purpose;
2 employees from a human rights organization with advocacy as a main purpose; 2 Myanmar
scholars; and 1 employee from a Burma development aid organization with no focus on
advocacy.
In terms of empirical findings, the exploratory research for the most part confirmed our
preliminary expectations. In this regard, the most important finding was that the interviews
corroborated the view that the Burma groups’ advocacy approach was not fully systematic. This
seemed in particular to have been the case with the environmental analysis, which for several of
the interviewed groups was not carried out in a very thorough manner. Furthermore – and
perhaps related to shortcomings in the environmental analysis – some of the interviewed groups
seemed to have difficulty explaining, why they had chosen certain target audiences over others.
One example of this was a human rights organization, who had focused on lobbying the
United Nations for several years. However, when asked why their organization was focusing on
UN, the founder/director could not provide a clear answer. An opposite example was a Christian
relief organization, who had never lobbied United Nations, because they considered UN unable
to change anything in Burma. This opinion has some justification (Horn, 2009), but the decision
not to focus on UN seemed more to be based on the organization’s leader’s dislike of UN rather
than on a thorough analysis.
In addition to the empirical findings, the exploratory research also provided a couple of
methodological findings. The most important finding here was that the exploratory interviews
validated the choice of a mixed-method approach (Agresti et al., 1997: 3). During the interviews
it became clear, that many of the simple and straightforward questions33
could just as easily have
been asked through a survey format. This in turn supported using surveys in addition to
33
Target audience, marketing strategies, budgeting, action planning, evaluation etc.
38
interviews, because of the ability to reach more groups and thereby increase the generalizability
of the study.
2.5 Conceptual framework
Based on the literature review and the exploratory research, a conceptual framework has
been developed. The first part of this is a general, theoretical framework about how advocacy
groups could work for democratic change. In the second part of the conceptual framework, three
hypotheses have been developed about how the Burma advocacy groups have performed in
relation to this general theoretical framework.
2.5.1 Theoretical framework
The theoretical structure for the conceptual framework is the marketing plan. The
justification for this is first of all that marketing and advocacy both have the same overarching
focus on selling.
Furthermore, considering that the marketing plan is the preferred technique to structure
product launches in modern marketing theory, there is reason to believe that this logical,
systematic and holistic business tool can also be useful, when planning and doing advocacy
(Young, 2011; Alter, 2000: 117). The version of the marketing plan, which is recommended to
be used by advocacy groups, is shown in the below figure34
.
1) External analysis
2) SWOT analysis
3) Goal & Objectives
4) Segmentation, targeting and positioning
5) Marketing strategies
6) Action plan
34
Most marketing plans follow the same overall pattern, even though there are often also small differences. This marketing plan for this thesis is based on the model presented at marketing lectures at Payap University in 2011 by D.Phil. Wilert Puriwat. For the sake of simplicity, the first step – internal analysis – has been omitted. Furthermore, Porter’s Five Forces has not been included in step two alongside the SWOT analysis, which is otherwise often seen in this part of the marketing plan.
39
7) Budgeting
8) Evaluation
9) Contingency plan
10) Executive summary
Figure 1: Framework for advocacy groups working for democratic change
As Figure 1 shows, the marketing plan is a highly rigorous and extensive planning tool.
In the following section, a short overview of the individual steps is presented.
Environmental analysis (step 1 and 2)
The external analysis in step one is a general analysis trying to capture the broad picture
of an organization’s environment. Typical tools used in marketing for the external analysis are
PEST analysis, micro-macro analysis and similar techniques. In advocacy, the focus in this step
should be on getting an overall understanding of which target audiences have the most power to
create democratic change, as well as what the needs and wants of these audiences are (Downey,
2007 : 6).
The SWOT-analysis in step two takes the environmental scanning one step further. This
happens by not simply describing the different important groups, but also examining what
opportunities and threats these groups represent in relation to furthering the advocacy group’s
social cause. Furthermore, the advocacy groups should in this step also assess their own
strengths and weaknesses to find out how they most effectively can contribute to the process of
creating democratic change (Dyson, 2002: 632).
Goal and objectives (step 3)
In step three, advocacy groups should state certain goals for how they can contribute to
the democratic transition process. In this regard, whatever advocacy goals are chosen, they must
be consistent with and indeed be derived from the findings of the environmental analysis35
. If
not, the advocacy groups risk going off course by pursuing goals not clearly based on the
35
A good example of this is DVB’s mission statement, which is clearly derived from the organization’s understanding of Burma and its problems (i.e., the environmental analysis): “To provide accurate and unbiased news to the people of Burma; to promote understanding and cooperation amongst the various ethnic and religious groups of Burma; to encourage and sustain independent public opinion and enable social and political debate; to impart the ideals of democracy and human rights to the people of Burma.” (http://www.dvb.no/about)
40
findings in the environmental analysis, about how they most effectively could and should work
for democratic change (Higgs, 2006: 52).
Segmentation, targeting and positioning (step 4)
In terms of targeting, advocacy groups should generally focus on those target audiences
that were identified in the environmental analysis to have the highest potential influence on the
political situation. Secondly, advocacy groups should have a realistic expectation, that they will
be able to fulfill the needs and wants of these target audiences36
. Finally, this needs fulfillment
needs to happen to a higher extent, than if the target audience had chosen any other course of
action (Restrepo, 2003: 1).
Marketing strategies (step 5)
In relation to marketing strategies, it is essential that advocacy groups have the same
holistic approach as is recommended for commercial businesses. This first of all includes having
carefully designed strategies for the advocacy groups’ product, price, channel and integrated
marketing communication. Secondly, all these strategies must work hand-in-hand in order to
deliver the same consistent and compelling message to the advocacy target audience (Keelson,
2012: 38).
Planning, budgeting, evaluation, contingency plan and executive summary (steps 6-10)
The last steps of the marketing plan can be implemented by advocacy groups more or less
straightforwardly, in the same way as they would have been in a commercial business. In this
regard, great care must be taken in each of these steps in order to ensure that sufficient
budgeting, planning and evaluation mechanisms are in place to effectively implement the
advocacy group’s marketing strategies (Naik et al, 2003: 2).
Marketing plan specifically designed for advocacy groups
Finally it is important to note that the above steps only serve as a first attempt for using
the marketing plan in advocacy. While the overall structure can be expected to be the same as in
commercial marketing, it will in all likelihood be necessary to adapt the specifics of the
36
One example of this was the Australian government’s human rights workshops held in Burma in 2001. These workshops happened in full cooperation with the Burmese government. This made the generals an equal partner and fulfilled the Burmese leaders’ need for international respect (Wilson et al, 2007: 369).
41
marketing plan to the unique nature of advocacy work. In Chapter 4 some adaptations are made,
but these are only tentative and further research is needed into developing a marketing plan
specifically for advocacy groups.
Conclusion
In this section, a theoretical framework for how advocacy groups could work for
democratic change was presented. This framework is based on the marketing plan, which is
expected to be just as holistic and rigorous a planning tool in advocacy as it has been in
marketing. In this regard, it is the expectation of this framework that advocacy groups need to
follow and link each step of the marketing plan in order to be successful.
2.5.2 Development of hypotheses
In the previous section, a generic theoretical framework for how advocacy groups could
work for democratic change was developed. Now – and based on the literature review – three
hypotheses about how the Burma advocacy groups performed according to this framework are
developed.
Hypothesis 1
In the literature review and exploratory research, numerous indicators were found
pointing towards that the Burma groups did not carry out all the marketing plan steps thoroughly
enough. In this regard, the Burma groups seemed to have had particular issues in the early steps
of the marketing plan in relation to their environmental analysis, goal setting and target market
strategies. Among other things, this was indicated in the fact that the Burma groups focused on
UN and Western countries, which a thorough environmental analysis would have revealed were
of only very small importance to Burma’s domestic political situation (Clapp, 2007: 14).
Furthermore, the fact that the Burma groups continued to favor pressure – even though many
factors indicated that this was an ineffective way of influencing the Burmese government – also
strongly indicates a lack of environmental analysis37
(Allan, 2010: 251).
37
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that information concerning the ineffectiveness of pressure was freely available. This information came first of all from foreigners working inside Burma or who in other ways worked with the Burmese government. Secondly, the ineffectiveness of pressure was quite well described in Burma
42
In relation to the later steps of the marketing plan however, most of the Burma groups
seemed to have done well or even very well. This is shown in that the Burma advocacy groups
were one of the – in all likelihood – most powerful forces in getting the international spotlight on
Burma (Hlaing, 2007: 21).
This indicates that the Burma groups were good at designing the actual advocacy work,
but were not doing enough to base their goals and choice of target audience on a strong
environmental analysis. Because of this, hypothesis 1 is that the Burma advocacy groups did not
carry out all the steps in the marketing plan thoroughly enough when planning and
implementing their advocacy.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 deals with the degree to which the marketing plan steps were connected
with each other. In this regard, it would be necessary for the advocacy groups not just to follow
the steps in the marketing plan, but also to connect them, so that one step logically led to the
next. In this regard, the literature review and exploratory research showed that many Burma
groups seemed to connect the steps at least to some extent.
However the Burma groups also seemed to have difficulties in certain steps of the
marketing plan, and especially when it came to connecting environmental analysis, goals with
target audience. In this regard, many advocacy groups had very ambitious mission statements
with far-reaching goals about influencing Burma’s political situation38
. Still, by focusing on
especially UN and Western countries, the Burma groups had chosen target audiences with very
little potential influence on Burma (Hlaing, 2007: 22).
This first of all constitutes a mismatch between goals and target audience. Furthermore,
this also indicates a mismatch between target audience and the environmental analysis, which
should have detected that Western countries and UN were not target audiences that could be
expected to bring significant change to Burma. Because of this, hypothesis 2 is that the Burma
academia. That the Burma groups – one must assume – did not seriously take into consideration this freely available information is another factor indicating a general lack of environmental analysis into how best to influence the Burmese government (Allan, 2010: 251). 38
Some examples of ambitious mission statements include: “To protect political prisoners from harassment and intimidation by the military government upon their release from prison“; “A free and democratic Burma that upholds the principles of human rights, equality and justice”; “Improving the human rights situation in Burma”.
43
advocacy groups did not consistently follow the logical, sequential framework of the marketing
plan.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis three deals with advocacy impact and whether any differences can be
explained by the degree to which the Burma groups followed the marketing plan. In this regard,
the literature review and exploratory research indicated that not all Burma advocacy groups had
the same advocacy impact.
In this regard, especially larger groups39
with advocacy as a primary purpose seemed to
have had some impact on Burma’s political situation. Typical for these groups was that they
were able to consistently bring up the “Burma issue” – especially with UN and Western
countries. Furthermore, many of these groups would often be quoted in respectable international
media as well as in official publications by Western governments and international
organizations. Because of this high exposure to policy makers and general audiences in the West,
these advocacy groups likely had some, although still small influence on Burma’s political
situation, considering the limited importance of Western countries (UNHCR, 2012; UK Home
Office, 2012; Amnesty International, 2011; US Department of State, 2009; Fuller, 2009).
Compared to this, the smaller Burma groups – or groups who did not have advocacy as a
primary purpose – likely only had a negligible advocacy impact. Compared to the larger
organizations, these smaller Burma groups would not often have the opportunity to lobby
governments and international organizations40
, and they would seldom appear in international
media or government publications41
. Because of this lack of exposure to important target
audiences, these advocacy groups likely had only a very small, if any impact on Burma’s
political situation.
In this regard, it is the expectation of hypothesis three that these differences can be
explained by looking at to what extent the Burma advocacy groups followed the marketing plan.
This expectation is first of all based on the proven utility of the marketing plan in commercial
business. Secondly, the exploratory research and literature review on several occasions indicated
39
In terms of human, financial, physical and institutional resources. 40
Because of a lack of resources to undertake large scale advocacy. 41
And if they did appear in the media, it would often be in Burmese news agencies’ publication. These agencies had a solid readership, but not nearly the same reach as international news agencies like, say, New York Times or The Times (Mizzima, 2012).
44
that Burma groups who performed advocacy in accordance with marketing techniques also
seemed to have had the largest impact42
. This strengthens the preliminary relationship between
following the marketing plan and level of advocacy impact and justifies examining this
relationship further (Kotler et al, 2010: 79). Because of this, hypothesis 3 is that the advocacy
groups that followed all steps in the marketing plan in a logical, sequential manner also had a
significantly larger impact than the advocacy groups that did not.
2.5.3 Conclusion
In this section a conceptual framework based on the literature review and the exploratory
research was developed. The first part of this was a generic theoretical framework about how
advocacy groups should work for democratic change. This framework was based on the
marketing plan, which is expected to be a good structure considering that both marketing and
advocacy have the same overarching focus on selling (Young, 2011).
In the second part of the conceptual framework, three hypotheses were developed
specifically about how the Burma advocacy groups performed according to this general
framework. In this regard, the first two hypotheses will test to what extent the Burma groups
followed the marketing plan steps. In continuation of this, the third hypothesis will test whether
the groups that followed the marketing plan to a higher extent also had a higher advocacy
impact.
42
One example of this was Human Rights Watch (HRW), who also worked on Burma. HRW over the years showed an almost unparalleled ability to frame issues towards certain target audiences. This at the same time resembled the marketing skill of effective product positioning. Furthermore, HRW’s systematic approach to planning and implementing advocacy has many similarities with the holistic nature of the marketing plan (HRW, 2011: 4; Roth, 2004: 71).
45
Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Introduction
In the following sections the research methodology for this thesis is presented. The
methodology is based on a mixed-method approach using a non-probability sampling technique
known as snowballing to collect the data (Handcock et al, 2011: 2).
The mixed-method approach for this thesis entails using both surveys and interviews to
gather information from people working in Burma advocacy groups based in Thailand. A mixed-
method approach has first of all been chosen to acquire in-depth knowledge through the
interviews – especially in relation to advocacy impact. Secondly, surveys will be used to increase
the number of participating Burma groups, which in turn will strengthen the generalizability of
the study (Talib, 2007: 34-35; Agresti et al., 1997: 3). Finally, the mixed-method approach is
chosen, because it improves the credibility of the findings by measuring the same hypotheses
through two different techniques43
(Bryman, 2004: 454).
3.2 Research design
In selecting a research design, it is possible to choose between exploratory, descriptive or
causal research designs. For this project, a descriptive research design has been chosen.
The reason for choosing a descriptive over an exploratory research design is that the
author already has extensive knowledge about the work of the Burma advocacy groups44
.
Furthermore, while we already have substantial knowledge about the subject, we still do not have
a sufficiently clear understanding of which groups had a higher impact on the political situation
in Burma than others and why. This means that this thesis cannot use a causal research design
(i.e. the ‘highest’ level of research design), but has to limit the scope to a descriptive research
design (Zikmund, 1994: 54-55, 57).
43
Known in business research as triangulation (Bailey-Beckett et al, 2009: 2). 44
The author has acquired extensive knowledge about Burma advocacy through a variety of sources, which include: 1) Being a former volunteer for a Burma advocacy group in London. 2) Following the literature on Burma closely since 2008. 3) Conducting 6 exploratory interviews in 2012.
46
3.3 Target population, sample size and sampling methods
The target population refers to the individuals, groups or societies that a research project
is concerned with (Zikmund, 1994: 69). For this research project the target population is Burma
advocacy groups based in Thailand. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the target
population does not include groups or organizations working for better conditions for Burmese
people (refugees, migrant workers, students etc.) living in Thailand or other third countries.
Instead, the target population only includes groups, who are trying to affect the political situation
in Burma. However, some groups are doing both, in which case they have been included in the
target population.
The data was collected through interviewing and surveying people who are working or
have worked in Burma advocacy groups based in Thailand. In this regard, it is important to note
that the information of interest was not the interviewees and survey respondents’ personal
opinions or acts of advocacy, but how their organization worked with advocacy. This mismatch
between the data collection unit (an advocacy group employee/volunteer) and the level of
aggregation (the advocacy group) could be a problem, because the participants may have
confused their own personal advocacy with their organization’s advocacy. This problem was
sought to be alleviated by stressing to the participants that the interest was in the organization’s
advocacy and not the participants’ personal views on or acts of advocacy.
For the interview sample size, the well known principle of continuing to interview new
people, until the interviews no longer yield significant new information, was followed. For the
surveys, the original hope at the start of the data collection process was to collect around 100
questionnaires (Andersen, 2005).
In relation to sample methods, this thesis uses non-probability sampling rather than
probability sampling. Non-probability sampling usually results in some issues with sample bias
and a lack of generalizability. Still, non-probability sampling is chosen, because the research
topic is sensitive. In that case, using probability sampling could result in a very low response
rate, because the prospective participants would not like to talk to somebody they do not know or
have not been referred to them by somebody they know. In this situation non-probability
sampling is the best, although imperfect solution (Faugier et al, 1997: 793; Zikmund, 1994: 395).
As a relevant case in point justifying the use of snowballing, Linnea Beatty chose snowballing
47
for this exact reason for her PhD dissertation about political resistance in Burma (Beatty, 2011:
28-29).
3.4 Development of interview guide and survey
The following section explains how the interview guide and survey format were
developed. The design of the interview guide happened in July-August 2012. The interview
guide was designed based on the literature review and exploratory research. While the interview
guide was adjusted to some extent as the interviews progressed, the basic model stayed the same.
The design of the survey format took place in October 2012. As with the interview guide,
it was based on findings from the literature review and exploratory research. However, the
survey was also able to benefit from the information gathered from the 35-40 interviews that had
already been conducted45
.
Step-by-step measurement
Both the interview guide and the survey asked how the Burma groups performed in each
step of the marketing plan. This format was straightforward and easy for the respondents to
understand. Furthermore, this method made sure that the needed information was captured –
especially in terms of hypothesis one (Malhotra, 2006: 177).
In order to not overcomplicate things, very few questions were asked about how well the
Burma groups linked the marketing plan steps, which hypothesis two is concerned with. This
means that the confirmation or disconfirmation of hypothesis two will not be evident directly
from the data. Instead, a more qualitative way of analyzing are used to find out, whether the
marketing plan steps were indeed linked well with each other or not.
At the end of both the interview guide and the survey, the more sensitive questions about
the Burma groups’ advocacy impact were asked (Malhotra, 2006: 181). These impact questions
pertained to hypothesis three and were developed according to the framework outlined in section
3.6.
45
While 43 interviews were conducted between August to December 2012, not all of them were conducted before the survey format was finalized.
48
For the survey, hypothesis three is tested by looking at, whether there is a correlation
between high performance in the marketing plan and a high advocacy impact. This will be done
by using common statistical techniques such as One-Way ANOVA and correlation analysis46
(Agresti et al, 1997: 320, 439).
For the interviews, a more qualitative approach is used, where we will see if the degree of
advocacy impact can be traced back to the performance in individual steps of the marketing plan.
This requires careful judgment and greater skill on behalf of the researcher and therefore is also
associated with a greater risk of making faulty interpretations. Still, this qualitative approach
may also be a more valid measurement technique considering the fuzzy nature of advocacy
impact (Patton, 9: 2008).
Semi-structured interviews
The interviews for this thesis were conducted in a semi-structured manner. Semi-
structured interviews were chosen over very structured interviews in order to draw out in-depth
information. Secondly, semi-structured interviews were preferred over unstructured interviews,
because there are certain questions that must be asked in relation to the 10-step marketing plan
(Bryman, 2004: 113).
Furthermore, the interviews had a particular high focus on measuring hypothesis three
concerning advocacy impact. The reason for this is that advocacy impact is a complex subject
that is much easier to explore in interviews than in a simplistic and rigid one-size-fits-all survey
format (Patton, 9: 2008).
Surveys
In developing the survey, there was an important trade-off between the need of asking all
the necessary questions, while avoiding asking too many questions to prevent respondent fatigue
(Bryman, 2004: 135). The marketing plan consists of 10 separate steps and measuring how the
advocacy groups fared in all 10 steps could easily have produced a much too long survey.
The chosen solution to this was a survey with only a few questions to each step of the
marketing plan. This minimized the threat of respondent fatigue, while still leaving considerable
room to design a meaningful survey. Based on pre-tests, the survey was estimated to take
46
Either Chi-square, Pearson or Spearman correlations depending on which variables we are dealing with.
49
between 10 and 20 minutes to fill out. This meant that the survey did not exceed the critical time
limit of 20 minutes after which research shows that problems with respondent fatigue become
particularly pronounced (Cape, 2010: 10).
Furthermore, most measurements in the survey are built around a 7-point Likert scale.
This is done because the Likert-scale provides more detailed answers than ordinal and nominal
measures. Secondly, the Likert scale is an easy-to-understand format that should not be
complicated or confusing for the respondents (Zikmund, 1994: 318-319).
Finally, nearly all survey questions were based on tick-boxes in order to enhance the
ability of making quantitative, statistical analysis. The only step of the marketing plan that was
not based on tick-box questions – and therefore cannot be quantified in the statistical analysis –
was goal setting in step 3. The reason for this was that the interviews had shown that the goals of
the individual Burma groups were usually very unique, which at the same time made it difficult
to put these goals into rigid categories.
3.5 Data collection
The first part of the data collection process was the in-depth interviews. The original idea
was to tape record and then transcribe the interviews. However, it quickly became apparent
during the interviews that using a tape recorder would be counterproductive due to the sensitive
nature of the subject. Because of this, early on in the interview process it was decided to focus on
taking notes, and then later on write up extensive summaries. These summaries would then later
be sent back to the interviewees for approval47
(Bryman, 2004: 330-331).
The second part of the data collection consisted of surveys, which were distributed by
email to Burma advocacy groups based in Thailand. The drawback of email surveys is that they
may not be filled out as accurately as surveys handed out in person, because the respondents do
not have as good a chance of clarifying confusing or unclear questions with the researcher. Still,
email distribution was chosen because this method would shorten the time needed to collect the
surveys (Schonlau et al, 2001: 20).
47
Not in all cases did the interviewees send back revised summaries. When that was the case, data analysis took place based on the initial summaries.
50
3.6 Advocacy impact measurement
Finally, it is important to discuss the impact measurement of the Burma groups’ advocacy
work in hypothesis three. Among advocacy scholars, impact measurement is almost universally
recognized as being extremely difficult. The main reasons for this seem to be a lack of
transparency and unclear relationships between dependent and independent variables. As
Chapman et al (2001) notes, the difficulty of measuring advocacy impact is caused by “the
complexity of issues (which) makes it difficult to determine cause and effect between NGO
advocacy initiatives and outcomes” (p. 7).
In this regard, it is important to note the lack of a commonly accepted framework for
impact measurement in the advocacy literature. Reisman et al (2007) for example write that
“there are no standards of practice, acknowledged best practices, nor commonly used methods
or tools” (p. 2). Reisman et al (2007) even goes on to say that many advocacy groups have a
“cynical but widely held opinion” that “their work cannot be measured and that any attempt to
do so diminishes the power of their efforts” (p. 7).
This, to some extent, reluctance even to consider measuring the effect of advocacy shows
that advocacy impact measurement so far is a discipline without a silver bullet or even anything
coming close to it. Still, it is this thesis’ position, that some kind of advocacy impact
measurement technique must be established, imperfect though it may be (Reisman et al, 2007: 2,
7; Kelly, 2002).
3.6.1 Change
In terms of advocacy impact, one of most standard ways of measuring it is by focusing on
the change that the advocacy efforts have caused. Considering that this was also the goal of the
Burma advocacy groups, this research project will focus on change as the strongest indicator of
advocacy impact (Chapman et al, 2001: 18).
In the advocacy literature, change is defined in many different ways with citizen
empowerment, a stronger civil society and policy change being some of the typical categories
that change has been divided into (Chapman et al, 2001: 18). For this thesis however, a more
narrow focus will be taken by only looking at political change in a pro-democratic direction.
This narrowing should make impact measurement easier compared to the often quite broad
definitions of change in the advocacy literature (Krisch, 2012: 9-11).
51
3.6.2 Impact on relevant target audiences
While change should be the overall focus, there are many different ways to measure it. In
the advocacy literature, a typical distinction exists between stage models and dimensions of
change models. A stage model looks at how far progressed the change is, while a dimensions of
change model focuses on more thematic areas of change that the advocacy impact can be
separated into48
(McGuigan, 2003: 7).
For both the interviews and the surveys, a combination of these two different approaches
is used. This simultaneous use of the dimensions of change model and the stage model is
expected to increase the credibility of the findings by measuring advocacy impact using two
different techniques (i.e. triangulation).
First of all, a dimensions of change approach is used by looking at the different
dimensions, or target audiences, that the Burma groups could hope to influence. Based on the
literature review in Chapter 2, the different target audiences – as well as their importance in
terms of influencing Burma’s political situation – are shown below.
Table 2: Level of influence on Burma's political situation
Very high influence High influence Some influence Little influence
Burmese government Civil society and
ethnic armed groups
Asian countries49
,
ASEAN and the
government’s domestic
sources of power50
Western countries
and UN
As Table 2 shows, the more influential the target audience, the higher the chance that the
advocacy groups will have had an impact in terms of influencing Burma’s political situation in a
pro-democratic direction.
In addition to this dimensions of change approach, a stage approach is also used by
looking at to what degree the Burma groups were able to influence any of the above target
audiences. This can especially easily happen in the surveys, where questions are based on a 7-
point Likert scale, which will allow us to identify the exact level of advocacy impact towards a
certain target audience. Similar questions are asked in the interviews, but will not have the
specificity in the answers as in the survey.
48
Policy change, private sector change, civil society change, democracy change etc. (Laney, 2003: 3-6). 49
Especially China, Thailand and India. 50
Especially Tatmadaw, the police force, intelligence service, civil servants, legislative system, local media and business tycoons
52
3.6.3 Techniques used
Data collection
In the above sections, a reasonably tight framework for how to measure advocacy impact
was presented. This framework is supported by different techniques, both in terms of collecting
the data and when analyzing it.
In relation to data collection, the impact questions were as specific as at all possible –
both for the survey as well as the interviews. Advocacy impact is a fuzzy subject, but one of the
ways to overcome this is by asking very narrow questions that leaves limited room for alternative
interpretations (Bryman, 2004: 323).
Furthermore, during the interviews a heavy emphasis was on using probing in measuring
advocacy impact. Probing in this regard refers to the interviewer using follow-up questions and
asking the interviewee to expand on or clarify the answer that he/she just gave. In dealing with a
sensitive and highly fuzzy issue such as advocacy impact, probing is very important in order to
find out the exact and true information about the research area (Bryman, 2004: 122-123).
Flexible analysis
As already explained, the impact measurement will have some structure in focusing on
the degree of impact on relevant target audiences. However, beyond this model it is crucial that a
high level of flexibility is maintained in the data analysis.
The reason for this is that advocacy, due to its fuzzy nature, is very ill-suited for rigid
methodologies. Teles et al (2011) in this regard notes that “advocacy evaluation should not
aspire to being formalized into a method, in the sense of a series of techniques that could be
replicated by any individual with the same training. Advocacy evaluation is, instead, a craft, one
in which tacit knowledge, skill and networks are more useful than the application of a rigid
methodology. It is an exercise in trained judgment” (p. 31-32). This position – among many
others – is supported by Patton (2008), who writes that advocacy impact evaluation “does not
follow some recipe or formula, like determining statistical significance. It is a matter of reasoned
judgment, weighing the evidence” (p. 9).
Furthermore, in addition to advocacy being a generally fuzzy subject, the environments
within which it operates are also very different and change from case to case. Mayoux (2003) in
this matter explains “the numbers, diversity and geographical dispersal of stakeholders, the
53
confidentiality/secrecy of decision-making processes and other factors make any standard
methods of sampling unreliable and often inappropriate” (p. 10). This strong trend in the
advocacy literature indicates that a quite flexible approach must be used, when trying to estimate
the Burma groups’ impact.
Secondly, as Mayoux indicated, special attention must be given to the unique nature of
the environment, that the Burma advocacy groups were supposed to impact: Burma’s political
situation. In other words, rather than using standardized formulas, impact measurement must be
sensitive to the special traits of Burma’s political culture and the unique outlook, desires and
feelings of the most relevant target audiences.
3.6.4 Individual and not cumulative impact
Finally, it is important to note that this thesis focuses on measuring the advocacy impact
of the individual Burma group and not the cumulative impact of the whole Burma movement.
This is an important limitation, because the combined efforts of an advocacy community are
often considered one of the most important elements of the advocacy impact (Krisch, 2012: 12;
Mayoux, 2003: 13).
However, measuring this cumulative impact would have been hugely difficult and outside
the scope and human resources of this thesis. As Wilson-Grau (2007) notes, the relationships in
an advocacy community is “massively entangled”, where “change is constant” and
“participants enter and exit with sufficient fluidity so that commonly it is difficult to identify at
any given moment all who are involved” (p. 2-3).
Considering these difficulties when dealing with advocacy networks, this thesis will be
limited to the impact measurement of individual groups. Furthermore, this approach is also more
in line with this thesis’ theoretical approach, which rather than being concerned with network
theory wishes to test the utility of the marketing plan for individual advocacy groups (Borgatti et
al, 2011: 1).
3.7 Conclusion
In this section the research methodology of this thesis was presented. The methodology
for this research is based on a mixed-method approach using both surveys and interviews. Data is
54
collected through the non-probability sampling technique snowballing, which is preferably when
dealing with sensitive issues (Handcock et al, 2011: 2). The target population is Burma advocacy
groups based in Thailand, with the data being gathered from people who are working or have
worked for these groups.
In terms of advocacy impact, this will be measured by looking at to what degree the
Burma advocacy groups were able to impact relevant target audiences. What degree of pro-
democratic change this amounted to overall, will then be determined by looking at how much
potential influence the chosen target audience had on Burma’s domestic political situation.
55
Chapter 4
Research Findings
4.1 Summary of data collection
First two stages: Interviews
Data collection for this thesis was separated into three stages with the first exploratory
stage lasting from January to June 2012. In the second qualitative stage, 43 interviews were
conducted from August to December 2012. Out of these, 26 interviews were with people who are
or have been working for Burma groups based in Thailand with advocacy as a primary or
secondary purpose. These interviews covered 21 Burma groups and included 29 people.
The remaining 17 interviews were with people working for Burma groups overseas;
NGOs dealing with Burmese migrants and refugees in Thailand; Myanmar scholars; diplomats,
humanitarian workers and human rights advocates who had worked in Burma; Burma
documentary film makers; and two psychologists specializing in conflict resolution. Furthermore
in this stage, emails were exchanged with two Myanmar scholars, one Asia scholar, one
prominent marketing scholar and people who had worked in Burma at a senior level in the 1990-
2010 period. Finally, a number of unrecorded talks were conducted with people active in the
Burma advocacy community.
Third stage: Surveys
In the third quantitative stage lasting from November 2012 to January 2013, 39 surveys
were collected from people previously or currently active in Burma groups in Thailand. Out of
the 39 surveys, 4 surveys were excluded because of too many unanswered questions (more than
15 percent) (Acuna et al, 2004: 1). This in total leaves us with 35 surveys for the quantitative
analysis.
4.1.1 Overview of the collected data
In the following table, an overview of the data is shown. This table provides information
about the Burma groups as well as the data collection techniques used.
56
Table 3: Demographics of the collected data
Number of groups Percentage
Organizational cause
Ethnic rights 13 32.5
Democracy 7 17.5
Human rights 6 15
Relief aid 5 12.5
Development 4 10
News 4 10
Education 1 2.5
Main office
Chiang Mai 24 60
Mae Sot 9 22.5
Bangkok 4 10
Kanchanaburi 1 2.5
Mae Sariang 1 2.5
Mae Hong Son 1 2.5
Participants
Director51
16 40
Managerial position52
17 42.5
Non-managerial position53
7 17.5
Data collection techniques
Interviews + surveys 16 40
Surveys 19 47.5
Interviews 5 12.5
As Table 3 shows, the Burma groups came from a wide range of backgrounds, both in
terms of cause and office location. Furthermore, the table also shows that the vast majority of the
participants were holding positions at a director or managerial level in their respective
organizations, which improves the validity of the data.
Finally, the table shows that both interviews and surveys were used. Out of the 40
participating groups, 16 were both interviewed and filled out a survey; 19 were only surveyed;
and 5 groups were only interviewed. Especially for the 16 groups who were both interviewed and
surveyed, we can be quite confident about the findings considering the high level of triangulation
(Bailey-Beckett et al, 2009: 2).
51
People in the position of executive director, editor in chief, general secretary etc. 52
Not at the director level, but still having managerial responsibilities. 53
Office staff, volunteers etc.
57
Interviewed groups
In the following table, a brief overview of the interviewed Burma groups is provided. The
Burma groups are in this regard labeled with a “G” for Group and an identifying number.
Table 4: Overview of the interviewed groups
Cause Education Background Volunteers/
employees
Years in
Thailand
G1 Human rights Law Law Employees 3
G2 Democracy Bachelor/master Mixed Employees 17
G3 Human rights Master NGO Employees 3-4
G4 Ethnic development54
No info Activist No info 2-4
G5 Relief aid Health Health Employees 16
G6 Ethnic development Bachelor NGO Mixed 3-4
G7 Ethnic news Bachelor/master Activist Employees 11
G8 Ethnic rights High school NGO Employees 20+
G9 Ethnic rights Law Law Employees 10-14
G10 Ethnic development High school NGO Mixed 5-9
G11 Relief aid Mixed Mixed Employees 17
G12 Human rights Master/PhD Human rights Employees 10+
G13 Human rights Bachelor NGO Employees 10-14
G14 News training Bachelor/master Mixed Employees 10
G15 Burma news Mixed Journalism Employees 20
G16 Human rights Bachelor Politics Mixed 10-14
G17 Ethnic news High school Politics Employees 15-20
G18 Ethnic rights Mixed Social work Employees 15
G19 Ethnic rights High school Mixed Employees 17
G20 Relief aid Mixed Mixed Employees 30
G21 Democracy Monkhood Monkhood Volunteers 3-4
As Table 4 shows, the Burma groups both had similarities as well as differences. In terms
of causes and level of education, the Burma groups varied quite a lot. In relation to professional
background, most Burma groups had backgrounds in socially conscious work related to human
rights, politics, activism or NGO work. Finally, the vast majority of groups relied on employees
more so than volunteers and most Burma groups had had an office in Thailand for more than five
years.
54
“Ethnic development” refers to Burma groups working for sustainable economic development in Burma’s ethnic areas.
58
Surveyed groups
In this section, a similar overview of the surveyed Burma groups is provided. First we
will look at the Burma groups’ educational background, where the following answers were
provided in the survey.
Table 5: Educational background of the Burma groups’ management team
High school Bachelor Master Law Healthcare
Frequency 15 16 1 2 1
Percent 42.9 45.7 2.9 5.7 2.9
Table 5 overall shows a less mixed picture than for the interviewed groups. In this regard,
most surveyed groups were led by people with a high school or bachelor degree.
The second thing to consider is the Burma groups’ professional background. In the
survey, the Burma groups provided the following answers.
Table 6: Professional background of the Burma groups’ management team
NGO Student Politics Healthcare Activist Media Other
Frequency 15 7 6 2 1 1 3
Percent 42.9 20.0 17.1 5.7 2.9 2.9 8.6
As with the interviewed groups, Table 6 shows that the majority of the Burma groups
came from backgrounds relating to various socially conscious work. In this regard, the absence
of Burma groups with a background in the Burmese government, military and business is
noticeable.
Thirdly, it is important to know whether the Burma groups relied mostly on employees or
volunteers. In the survey, the following answers were provided.
Table 7: Number of employees and volunteers in the Burma groups
Number of employees
0-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 More than 60
Frequency 9 7 10 3 2 4
Percent 25.8 20.0 28.6 8.6 5.7 11.4
Number of volunteers
0-5 6-10 11-20 41-50 51-60 More than 60
Frequency 23 2 3 1 1 5
Percent 65.7 5.7 8.6 2.9 2.9 14.3
As with the interviewed groups, Table 7 shows that the surveyed Burma groups relied to
a higher extent on employees rather than volunteers. This indicates that the Burma groups had a
structured and formalized approach to their work.
59
Finally, it is important to examine how many years the Burma groups had had an office
in Thailand. The answers to this question are displayed below.
Table 8: Years with an office in Thailand for the Burma groups
1-2 3-4 5-9 10-14 15-20 More than 20
Frequency 1 8 4 14 6 2
Percent 2.9 22.9 11.4 40.0 17.1 5.7
As with the interviewed groups, Table 8 shows that the majority of the groups (22) had
spent many years in Thailand (10 years or more). Together with Tables 6 and 7 this leaves us
with a quite strong impression of the commitment of the Burma advocacy groups to their cause
as well as the structured nature of the work they were doing.
4.1.2 Data validity
In assessing the data validity, it is necessary to look both at the internal and external
validity. Internal validity refers to whether the collected data about each Burma group actually
measures, what we are interested in (Persson et al, 2012: 2-3). In this regard, significant time was
put into designing both the interview guide and the survey. Furthermore, the author is an
experienced interviewer with substantial knowledge about the research area55
. These factors
increase the likely internal validity. Still, the sensitive nature of the subject may have limited the
validity to some extent56
(Bryman, 2004: 119).
In terms of the external validity, this refers to whether the sample is representative of all
Burma groups in Thailand (Bryman, 2004: 2-3). In this regard, the use of non-probability
sampling limits the representativeness of the sample (Bryman, 2004: 104-105). Still, the large
number of participating organizations (40) means that the study is representative to some extent.
Furthermore, no obvious systematic bias was found towards groups being very willing or
unwilling to participate, which otherwise could have been a problem in terms of non-response
bias (Bose, 2001). In addition to this, it improves the external validity that the participating
organizations came from quite different backgrounds, as was shown in Tables 4-8 (Bryman,
2004: 87).
55
The author in 2009 as a researcher on a book publication for a London-based Indian human rights group conducted roughly 20 interviews with elders from the Indian community in England. 56
Because of a higher tendency of the respondents not being completely truthful with sensitive issues.
60
4.1.3 Data reliability
Another important question is how reliable the data is (Greener, 2008: 37). For the
surveys, it increases the data reliability that most respondents seem to have taken care filling out
the surveys accurately. This is indicated through most surveys not having issues with too many
similar and/or extreme answers57
, but has kept a good amount of variability, when filling out the
survey.
Furthermore, there were only few issues with missing values58
. Here, 59 questions had no
missing values; 19 questions had 1 missing value (2.8 %); 12 questions had 2 missing values
(5.6 %); and 10 questions had 3 missing values (8.3 %). The amount of missing values was low
to begin with, but was brought down even further by following up with the respondents and
asking them about questions, which they had left out.
For a few questions, there were more serious issues with missing values. 7 questions had
5 missing values (13.9 %) and 1 question had 6 missing values (16.7 %). All these questions
were about advocacy impact and interpretations of these questions should be conservative
(Acuna et al, 2004: 1).
To replace missing values, the statistical technique known as expectation maximization
was used, which is considered the second best method for this task. Furthermore, as opposed to
replacing missing values with mean values, expectation maximization is better at maintaining the
variability of the data (Hill, 1997: 41).
In terms of the interviews, the reliability is expected to be generally lower, because not
the same exact questions were asked in each interview. This was the case first of all because of
the impossibility of maintaining the exact same wording from interview to interview. Secondly,
the interviews had a limited length (60-90 minutes mostly) and many issues to cover, which
meant that the researcher to some extent from interview to interview had to prioritize certain
topics while de-prioritizing others.
57
I.e. answering all questions with one value, for example the most negative value ‘1’, the middle value ‘4’ or the most positive value ‘7’. 58
Acuna et al classifies less than 1% missing data as trivial and 1-5 % as manageable. 5-15 % requires more sophisticated methods to handle, and “more than 15% may severely impact any kind of interpretation” (Acuna et al, 2004: 1).
61
4.1.4 Conservative statistical analysis
Interpretation of data from the surveys will be conservative using mostly descriptive
statistics. More sophisticated techniques like One-Way ANOVA and correlation analysis (Chi-
square, Spearman and Pearson correlations) will only be used to a small extent. The reason for
this is the small sample size (35), which results in significant uncertainty, when using more
sophisticated statistical techniques. In this regard, descriptive statistics are preferable, because
they present the data with as little uncertainty as possible (Agresti et al, 1997: 3-4).
4.2 Hypothesis 1
In the following section hypothesis one will be tested. Hypothesis one in this regard says
that the Burma groups did not carry out all the steps in the marketing plan. This hypothesis will
be tested by going through each individual marketing plan step, where the performance of the
surveyed and interviewed Burma groups will be analyzed.
The purpose with this – as well as with hypothesis two – is to test the assumption that the
Burma groups had less-than-perfect advocacy strategies and that this would become apparent by
analyzing their work through a marketing plan framework. Secondly, any findings made in
hypotheses one and two will then be used to test, whether the Burma groups that followed the
marketing plan to a larger extent ultimately also had the largest advocacy impact. Should that be
the case, it will strengthen the assumption that marketing theory could and should be used in
advocacy.
The steps of the marketing plan, which will be used to structure the analysis in the
following sections, are as follows: 1) Environmental analysis. 2) Goals. 3) Targeting. 4)
Positioning. 5) Marketing strategies. 6) Action plan. 7) Budgeting. 8) Evaluation (Kurtz, 2006:
66-68).
62
4.2.1 Environmental analysis
Opportunities and threats
The first step in examining hypothesis 1 is to look at, how good the Burma groups’
external analysis was. In the survey, the Burma groups were asked, if they had tried to find out
how various potential target audiences understood Burma’s political situation. The results based
on a 1-7 scale are shown below, where 1 means that the Burma groups never gathered this
information and 7 means that they always gathered it.
Table 9: Info gathering about how relevant target audiences understood Burma’s political
situation
(1) Country or international organization
UN USA EU ASEAN Thailand China India
4.83 4.8 4.63 4.57 4.43 3.60 3.23
(2) Government controlled areas of Burma
General
public
Domestic
opposition
SPDC Local
media
Tatma-
daw
Civil
servants
USDA Tycoons
5.49 5.11 4.57 4.40 4.29 3.83 3.54 3.31
(3) Ethnic areas of Burma
Civil society groups General public Armed groups
6.09 5.63 5.31
Table 9 here shows that the Burma groups especially did an external analysis on the
general Burmese public, the domestic opposition and the ethnic groups. Also some energy went
into understanding Western countries, international organizations, Thailand, the Burmese
government and Tatmadaw. Finally, little time was spent doing an external analysis on China,
India and various domestic groups supporting the Burmese government59
. These findings
indicate that an environmental analysis was done at least to some extent, even though it clearly
was not perfect.
This impression was for the most part corroborated in the interviews. In this regard, only
a few groups (4) did little environmental analysis; most groups (11) performed some analysis;
59
USDA, civil servants and business tycoons.
63
and a small number of groups (4) had strong analysis that went quite far in finding out relevant
information about their environment60
. One example of this was the human rights group G13,
who was targeting Burmese civil servants and who used careful environmental analysis61
to find
out which civil servants had “a secret interest in helping us with our work”.
Strengths and weaknesses
Following the external analysis our focus turns to the internal analysis. In the survey the
Burma groups were asked, if they evaluated their own strengths and weaknesses. On a 1-7 scale
the average answer was 5.6 for both strengths and weaknesses. This indicates quite frequent
evaluations62
.
This finding was partly backed in the interviews. In this regard, only 3 groups did little
internal analysis; 10 groups did some analysis; while 7 groups had strong internal analysis. One
example of such strong internal analysis was the ethnic news agency G17, who consciously had
chosen to focus on their strengths in reporting about “politics, drugs and border issues”, while
leaving it up to partner organizations to deal with “human rights and the environment”, which
were not G17’s areas of expertise.
However, the interviews also – as opposed to the surveys – indicated, that while the
Burma groups generally were good at focusing on their strengths, many of them also had a
tendency to expose themselves to their weaknesses.
One notable example was the human rights documentation group G1, whose goal was to
“support the cause for a UN Commission of Inquiry and to help build up pressure for a
Commission of Inquiry”. In doing so, G1 worked with human rights documentation from a legal
standpoint, which precisely was G1’s area of expertise. However, at the same time G1 did not
put enough thought into how this data was going to be used afterwards, because advocacy –
unlike research – was not an area, where G1 staff neither had the sufficient education nor
experience.
60
In this regard, only 19 out of the 21 interviewed groups were asked about their environmental analysis. 61
The director of G13 used two techniques to seek out friendly civil servants: Personal connections as well as getting help from other NGOs who worked in the same area as G13 and was supportive of its cause. 62
Although it may also indicate some issues with the validity, because the Burma groups gave the same answer, whether they were being asked about strengths or weaknesses.
64
4.2.2 Goals
After the environmental analysis comes the goal setting stage of the marketing plan. A
common way of measuring goals is through the SMART framework, which says that goals must
be specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and timely (Oracle, 2012: 4).
For the most part, the surveyed Burma groups lived up to these criteria quite well by
having ambitious, but still relatively clear-cut objectives for their advocacy work. One example
of this is the following group’s advocacy goal, which appears reasonably specific, measurable,
attainable, relevant, and timely:”Focus is on supporting local communities' strategies for
protecting themselves from abuse. Advocacy ideally should generate international attention (…)
that can help make additional space for communities facing abuse.”63
This generally positive impression was confirmed in the interviews, where 20 out of 21
groups had clearly established advocacy goals, which to a high extent were in line with the
SMART framework. One example of this was the human rights organization G19, whose
“advocacy goal is to promote and protect rights” in one of Burma’s ethnic states. In this regard,
out of the 21 interviewed groups only one group – G5 – stood out by stating that they had no
specific advocacy goal as such and only wanted to “spread our information”.
4.2.3 Targeting
After goal setting comes the time to scrutinize the audiences, which the Burma groups
targeted in order to attain these goals. In the table below, the target audiences of the Burma
groups are displayed on a 1-7 scale64
.
Table 10: The Burma groups’ advocacy target audiences
(1) Country or international organization
USA UN EU Thailand ASEAN India China
5.51 4.88 4.77 4.43 4.23 2.94 2.66
63
Nearly all survey questions were quantitative. However, the initial questions about organizational focus and goals were qualitative, due to the difficulty of putting these topics into pre-determined categories. 64
1 means that the Burma groups never tried to contact these countries, groups and organizations while 7 means that they tried to contact them a lot.
65
(2) Groups in government controlled areas of Burma
General
public
Domestic
opposition
Local
media
Civil
servants
SPDC Tatma-
daw
USDA Tycoons
5.31 5.14 4.06 3.03 2.79 2.21 2.09 2.06
(3) Groups in the ethnic areas of Burma
Civil society groups General public Armed groups
6.03 5.71 5.20
Table 10 here shows that the Burma groups had quite specific target audiences especially
focusing on the general Burmese public, domestic opposition, the ethnic groups and the United
States. In addition to this the Burma groups also targeted international organizations, EU and
Thailand to some extent. Finally, the Burma groups did little to target the Burmese government
as well as some of its most important domestic and international supporters65
.
This impression was supported in the interviews, where all groups (20) but one had
relatively clearly defined target audiences. As with the surveys, the interviewed groups
predominantly focused on UN, Western countries and other actors in opposition to or at least
critical of the Burmese government66
. One example was the human rights group G16, who in
their advocacy had “a focus on the international community and foreign governments” and put
particular energy into “lobbying USA and EU to maintain their Burma foreign policy.” In
addition to this – and as in the surveys – the interviewed Burma groups also had some focus on
targeting Thailand, ASEAN as well as current or prospective investors in Burma.
4.2.4 Positioning
Following targeting, it is necessary to examine how well the Burma groups positioned
themselves towards these target audiences. In this regard, the survey asked whether the advocacy
groups’ focus was on engaging with or building up pressure on the Burmese government. On a
1-7 scale, the average answer was 5.94 for pressure and 2.29 for dialogue, which shows a clear
positioning in favor of pressure.
65
Civil servants, Tatmadaw, USDA, business tycoons, India and China. 66
Especially UN and Western countries, but also in part ethnic NGOs, populations and armed groups.
66
The same was found to be the case in the interviews, although it was slightly more mixed
in that some groups – and especially news agencies – had a more engaging attitude towards the
government. One example of this was the news agency G15, who wanted to “report events as
accurately and unbiased as possible without any kind of hate speech in our publications. (Group
15) may criticize what the past government did in Burma, but we do this objectively without
being biased and without making undocumented personal attacks.” Still, the overall impression
remained the same in that the majority of the interviewed Burma groups had quite clear
positioning strategies for the most part in support of pressure rather than engagement.
4.2.5 Marketing strategies
Following targeting and positioning, the Burma groups marketing strategies are
examined. Here, the Burma groups are analyzed according to the (1) advocacy products offered;
(2) prices of these products; and the (3) channels and (4) integrated marketing communication
techniques used.
In this regard, channel and integrated marketing communication will be merged into one
category (Goi, 2009: 2). In business, there is usually a separation between talking about and
selling a product. In advocacy, however, when an advocate is delivering his advocacy message
he is also selling it, which makes the distinction between communication and sales channel have
little value (WHO, 2006: 12).
Product
First of all, the Burma groups’ product strategies are scrutinized. In this regard, the
product strategy relates to the messages that an advocacy organization is trying to “sell”. For the
Burma groups, the main message of especially the surveyed groups was that their target
audiences could contribute to changing Burma in a pro-democratic direction – predominantly by
applying pressure on the Burmese government67
. This was a specific and clear advocacy message
67
This was especially clear for the surveyed groups, while the picture was more mixed with the interviewed groups. For the surveys, the focus on international pressure is seen in the following quote from one of the surveyed groups. According to this group, the goal of their advocacy work was to “influence policy of governments on Burma. Pressure the Burmese regime through governments, regional and international organizations to
introduce reforms, improve human rights situation, etc.”
67
– or product – offering both practical and emotional benefits68
especially for Western countries
and others critical of the Burmese government. This at the same time shows that the Burma
groups had generally quite well developed product strategies, at least towards government-
critical target audiences.
Price
In this paragraph the Burma groups’ price strategy is examined. In advocacy, price can be
equated with the total cost for the target audience in doing what an advocacy group is suggesting
them to do (Kotler et al, 2010: 314).
In this regard, most of the Burma groups’ focus on pressure entailed a low price towards
Western target audiences and other SPDC-critical audiences, who themselves were in favor of
pressure on the Burmese government. One example of this was G1, whose focus on human rights
documentation was well attuned with the human rights element in Western’ countries Burma
policy. In addition to this, G1 attempted to reduce their price even further by ”tailoring the
(human rights) report to whatever the current needs were” among target audiences in the US
Congress, State Department and the UN.
However towards Asian countries, ASEAN and especially the Burmese government, an
advocacy message based on pressure entailed a significantly higher price, as described in the
literature review (Ewing-Chow, 2007: 160). As this shows, the Burma groups clearly had well-
defined price strategies, but whether they entailed a high or low price depended on which target
audience they were addressing.
Channel/Integrated marketing communication
Finally, our attention turns to the Burma groups’ integrated marketing communication
(IMC) strategies. In marketing, IMC is separated into 5 categories, which will be analyzed one
by one: Direct marketing, personal selling, advertising, public relations and sales promotion
(Kotler et al, 2010: 426).
68
Practical benefits: Democratic change in Burma. Emotional benefits: The target audience improving their self-esteem; acquiring a higher social status etc.
68
First of all, in terms of advertising69
, the Burma groups were asked about internet
channels used to promote their message. The results based on a 1-7 scale are show below.
Table 11: Internet channels used
Group website Email lists Social networks YouTube
6.31 6.06 4.62 3.85
As this table shows, the Burma groups did a good job of advertising their advocacy
message, especially through their website and email lists. The same overall impression was
found in the interviews, where most of the Burma groups did a good job of pushing out their
message to their target audiences.
Secondly, direct marketing entails communicating directly to individual customers
(Sarvary et al, 2009: 1). As with advertising, this technique was used heavily by the surveyed
groups. This is indicated in the table below.
Table 12: Direct lobbying channels used
Burma-related
meetings
Burma
conferences
Send info to interna-
tional organizations
Send info to foreign
governments
5.69 5.31 5.46 4.83
As this table shows, the surveyed Burma groups had a high focus on attending Burma
related events and sending information directly to their target audience. The same impression
was found in the interviews, where most groups emphasized direct lobbying through a variety of
methods. This would often be based on networking and personal relationships and by “keeping
in touch with established contacts” as G16 for example did “on a day to day basis”.
Thirdly, personal selling happens when companies phone or show up at their customers’
doorstep to sell their products (Kotler et al, 2010: 426). In this regard, both the surveyed and
interviewed Burma groups had a high focus on personal selling. Among other things, this was
indicated in their emphasis on attending Burma related events; sending information directly to
governments and international organizations; and keeping in touch with already established
contacts, as was explained in the previous paragraph.
69
Advertising is characterized by promoting a product to the target audience without customizing the message to the individual customer (Kotler et al, 2010: 426).
69
Fourthly in terms of public relations70
, the surveyed Burma groups answered 5.97 on a 1-
7 scale in terms of whether they allowed news agencies to use their information. This indicates
that the Burma groups had a high focus on positive public relations71
(Kotler et al, 2010: 472).
The same impression was found in the interviews, where many groups would stress the
importance of maintaining good relationships with the media. One example of this was G2, who
had “developed contacts with (regional and international journalist) since 1996”. As another
example, the news agency G15 would often be quoted, re-published or appear in interviews in
Bangkok Post, The Nation, New York Times, CNN, Asia Sentinel, BBC, Al Jazeera and other
major news agencies.
Finally, sales promotion entails short term incentives to encourage buying a product or a
service (Kotler et al, 2010: 426). While neither the survey nor the interviews dealt with this
subject sufficiently, indications are that the Burma groups did not have a high emphasis on
offering short term incentives. Still, due to lack of data on this parameter, no firm conclusions
will be made.
Conclusion
Overall, the majority of both the surveyed and interviewed Burma groups had generally
well developed marketing strategies in terms of advocacy message, price and marketing
channels. Still, it is important to remember that these marketing strategies were predominantly
well attuned to the needs of Western audiences and others critical of the Burmese government.
Towards the Burmese government and its domestic and international supporters, these marketing
strategies were generally a lot less well suited.
4.2.6 Action plan
In this section we will look at, whether the Burma groups had developed good enough
action plans to implement their marketing strategies. In this regard, the surveyed Burma groups
70
Public relations is to “build knowledge, create goodwill, and correct misunderstanding (…) to maintain beneficial mutual relationships” between an organization and the general public (Satawedin, 2005). 71
Although media exposure may also just express a wish of reaching as wide a target audience as possible and not a wish of a good public image per se.
70
were asked how long time ahead they planned their advocacy. The answers to this question are
shown in the below table.
Table 13: How long time ahead was the advocacy planned?
Time ahead
planned
Less than
1 month
1 month 2-6
months
7-12
months
13-23
months
2-3 years 3+ years
Number of groups 2 4 11 12 2 4 0
% 5.7 11.4 31.4 34.3 5.7 11.4 0
As Table 13 shows, just 6 groups did short term planning up to 1 month; 23 groups did
medium term planning 2-12 months ahead; and only 6 groups did long term planning 1-3 years
ahead. This shows that planning was emphasized to some extent for most groups.
The same somewhat mixed impression was found in the interviews. In this regard, a
number of groups clearly spent too little time planning with advocacy happening on an ”ad-hoc”
(G11) or ”day to day” basis (G19). Furthermore for some Burma groups the writing of human
rights reports would be a ”very well planned process”(G20), while a lot less planning went into
the launch of these reports. These points aside, it is also important to note, that a large number of
Burma groups did spend substantial time both in planning the production of advocacy materials
as well as how to launch them. These significant differences between the interviewed Burma
groups in relation to planning confirm the mixed impression from the surveyed groups.
4.2.7 Budgeting
As in marketing, action plans need sufficient financing (Berry et al, 2001: 8). In this
regard, the surveyed Burma groups were asked about the size of their annual budgets. The
answers to this question are shown below.
Table 14: Budget size
Budget size/Baht 200,000-
499,000
500,000-
999,000
1-1.9 million 2-4.9 million 5 million or more
Number of groups 5 4 6 7 11
% 14.3 11.4 17.1 20 31.4
As Table 14 shows, 9 groups worked with less than 1 million Baht annually; 13 groups
had between 1 and 4.9 million Baht annually; and 11 groups had more than 5 million Baht to
71
spend every year. This shows that the majority of Burma groups did have reasonable funding to
conduct advocacy. The same impression was found in the interviews. In this regard, most Burma
groups expressed that they did not have an unlimited amount of financial resources, but that the
inflow of money was nevertheless stable year by year and that this amount was enough for them
to carry on their work.
4.2.8 Evaluation
The last step of the marketing plan is to implement rigorous evaluation practices. In this
regard, the surveyed Burma groups were asked how often they evaluated their advocacy work.
The answers to this question are shown in the table below.
Table 15: How often did the Burma groups evaluate their advocacy work?
Evaluation Never 1 time per
year
2 times per
year
3-4 times
per year
+4 times per
year
Every
month
No. of groups 2 9 10 8 1 5
% 5.7 25.7 28.6 22.9 2.9 14.3
As this table shows, evaluation was prioritized to some extent for most Burma groups.
The same rather mixed impression was confirmed in the interviews, where 7 groups rarely did
evaluations; 6 groups did it to some extent; while 7 groups did evaluations of their advocacy
work very often.
4.2.9 Summary of findings
In the previous section we evaluated the Burma groups’ performance in each of the
marketing plan steps. In terms of the surveyed Burma groups, we first of all found that they
performed some degree of (1) environmental analysis, even though the analysis clearly omitted
many of the most important target audiences.
Following the environmental analysis, the surveyed Burma groups did well in terms of
(2) goal setting and (3) targeting, where the large majority of them had clear objectives as well
as more or less well-defined target audiences. Furthermore, the Burma groups generally had
clear (4) positioning strategies as well as well-developed (5) marketing strategies. Finally, in
relation to (6) planning, (7) budgeting and (8) evaluation the impression was more mixed, with
72
the Burma groups falling into three different categories, depending on whether they followed
these steps to a high, medium or small extent. However, most of the Burma groups still did
relatively well in these three steps.
The impression from the surveys was for the most part corroborated in the interviews. In
this regard, the interviewed Burma groups generally followed the marketing plan to a quite high
extent. As with the surveys, this was especially the case in the first half of the marketing plan in
terms of having clear (2) goals, (3) target audiences and (4) positioning strategies. Also the steps
concerning (5) marketing strategies, (6) planning, (7) budgeting and (8) evaluation were carried
out well, although to a slightly smaller extent. The only step where the majority of the Burma
groups seemed to have more serious issues was with the (1) environmental analysis.
4.2.10 Conclusion
In this section we tested hypothesis 1, which stated that the Burma groups did not follow
all the steps in the marketing plan. This hypothesis was confirmed to some extent, because the
majority of the Burma groups followed the marketing plan steps to some or even a high degree.
In this regard, the Burma groups especially performed well in terms of having clear goals,
target audiences, positioning strategies and marketing strategies. Also planning, budgeting and
evaluation were generally carried out reasonably well, although to a slightly smaller extent.
Finally the only area, where the majority of the Burma groups had more serious issues, was in
terms of the environmental analysis in step 1.
73
4.3 Hypothesis 2
In the following section hypothesis two is tested, which says that the Burma groups did
not sufficiently link the marketing plan steps with each other. This linking of the marketing plan
steps is important in order to create a holistic plan, where all activities are working hand in hand
(Pophal, 2009: 8). In the following sections, we will test hypothesis 2 by examining each link
individually, starting with the link between the Burma groups’ environmental analysis and their
goals.
4.3.1 Environmental analysis and goals
In hypothesis one, it was examined to what extent the surveyed Burma groups performed
an environmental analysis. Here, the main finding was that the Burma groups did a quite
thorough environmental analysis on the Burmese public, domestic opposition and ethnic groups.
Furthermore, some energy was devoted to Western countries and UN, while a little less time was
invested on the Burmese government, Thailand and ASEAN. Finally, a lot less time was spent
understanding the Burmese government’s domestic and international supporters72
.
In terms of goals, hypothesis one showed that nearly all of the surveyed Burma groups
wanted substantial change in Burma73
. To attain these ambitious goals, it is understandable that
the Burma groups did a good environmental analysis on its most important potential allies in
Burma as well as in the West (Than, 2010: 127, 136). However, it was a serious problem that the
Burma groups did little to understand the outlook of China, who had more political and
economic leverage on the Burmese government than any other country74
(ICG, 2004: 21).
Furthermore, while the Burmese public, domestic opposition and ethnic groups were all
important players, pro-government forces like Tatmadaw, civil servants and the USDA were
similarly important, if not even more so (Than, 2010: 127, 129; Selth, 2010: 8). Considering that
some or all of these groups had to be involved if political change was to happen in Burma, the
lack of environmental analysis in this area constitutes a serious mismatch with the Burma
groups’ for the most part ambitious advocacy goals.
72
USDA, civil servants, business tycoons, the Tatmadaw, China and India. 73
Examples include: 1)“Protecting and promoting the rights of local communities impacted by natural resource projects” 2) “To promote and protect the human rights of the people of (X) State” 3) “Pressure the Burmese regime through governments, regional and international organizations to introduce reforms”. 74
USDA, civil servants, business tycoons, Tatmadaw, China and India.
74
This picture was generally supported in the interviews. When that is said, the interviews
also contained a minority of Burma groups, who did a better job of analyzing the government’s
supporters than most of the other groups. Two examples of this were G4 and G6. These two
groups worked with sustainable development in Burma and had previously been following a
“confrontation strategy” calling for a “complete stop” for development projects.
Over time however, G4 and G6 realized that large foreign companies eventually could
not be stopped from coming to Burma, and G4 and G6 adapted their advocacy strategies to the
more realistic goals of “mitigating negative impacts” of these development projects. These two
examples show that G4, G6 and a few other Burma groups did a good job of matching their
environmental analysis and goals, which is also the reason why these groups are expected to
have had a higher advocacy impact.
4.3.2 Goals and Target audiences
In this paragraph, focus is on examining how well the Burma groups’ goals corresponded
with their choice of target audience. In hypothesis one, it was shown that the surveyed groups
especially targeted the Burmese public, domestic opposition, ethnic groups, United States and
UN. Furthermore, the Burma groups had some focus on EU, ASEAN and Thailand, while doing
little to target the Burmese government and its most important domestic and international
supporters75
(Arendshorst, 2009: 103-104).
In this regard, it made sense to target the Burmese public, domestic opposition and ethnic
populations, because they were some of the most influential groups in Burma (Ekeh, 2007).
Also, it was understandable to focus on Western countries and UN, where the Burma groups
could find international support. However, not to target the single most important actor – the
Burmese government – as well as its most powerful international supporters and domestic power
bases is highly questionable (Than, 2010: 132; ICG, 2004: 21). This shows a serious mismatch
between very ambitious advocacy goals and a target audience with only a limited influence on
Burma.
This impression was in large part supported in the interviews, where the majority of the
Burma groups targeted audiences of a lesser importance. One example of this was the advocacy-
75
China, India, civil servants, Tatmadaw, USDA and tycoons.
75
relief organization G11, who sent out news updates from Burma’s warzones to a predominantly
Christian-American network who already knew the organization. However, by targeting a mainly
Western audience with few vested interests in Burma, G11 drastically reduced their chance of
having any impact on Burma’s political situation (Niksch, 2007).
When this is said, a small number of groups still had a strong match between ambitious
advocacy goals and their target audiences. One example was G13, who targeted Burmese civil
society groups, the country’s middle class, civil servants and the most important ethnic armed
group in the area. This “zooming in” on important target audiences gave G13 and a few other
Burma groups a higher chance of influencing Burma’s political situation in a pro-democratic
direction.
4.3.3 Targeting and Positioning
In this section, the connection between the Burma groups’ target audience and
positioning strategies is scrutinized. As was seen in hypothesis one, pressure towards the
Burmese government was the main positioning of the large majority of the surveyed Burma
groups. Towards Western countries, UN and other audiences critical of the Burmese government
this was a good positioning, because they were already in favor of pressure themselves (Ewing-
Chow, 2007: 159). However, towards the Burmese government and its domestic and
international supporters, this was not a good positioning and therefore unlikely to create much
political change in Burma (Steinberg, 2000: 100).
The interviews supported this impression in showing that the Burma groups generally did
well in positioning themselves towards their immediate target audience. However, this favorable
position towards a mainly government-critical audience also meant, that the position became
largely misaligned with the Burmese military rulers (Steinberg, 2000: 100). One example of this
was G11, whose positioning as reporting as accurately as possible from Burma’s warzones
corresponded well with its morally very conscious, mostly Christian-American target audience.
However, this American organization’s very “blunt” style of communicating was not likely to be
the best way to influence paranoid, fearful and proud Burmese generals hypersensitive to foreign
criticism (ICG, 2001a: 4).
Still as before, a small minority of groups stood out with a more accommodating position
towards the Burmese government and its supporters. One example of this was G14, who was
76
willing to provide training and education for journalists based in Burma, which were otherwise
often criticized as being nothing but a political tool for the government (Buck, 2007: 52-53). In
this regard, G14 and a few others like it with a more accommodating, engaging and non-
confrontational position in all likelihood had a significantly higher chance of influencing
Burma’s political situation.
4.3.4 Positioning and Marketing strategies
In this section we will look at, if the Burma groups’ had developed proper marketing
strategies to support the implementation of their positioning. Here, the first point of interest is the
match between positioning and product. In this regard the advocacy message – i.e. product – of
most Burma groups was that their target audiences could help changing Burma by supporting
political pressure on the Burmese government, economic sanctions, a UN Commission of
Inquiry, a stop for development projects and similar initiatives. The intention of these initiatives
was to “raise the costs of authoritarian rule”, which was well-aligned with an overall
positioning favoring pressure rather than engagement (Petersen, 2000: 203).
In terms of price, most of the Burma groups’ position based on pressure entailed a low
and favorable price for Western governments, UN and other audiences critical of the Burmese
government. However for Asian governments with economic ties to Burma and favoring
constructive engagement; companies with profitable investments in Burma; and the
hypersensitive generals themselves, the price of accommodating to pressure was much higher
(Takahashi, 2012: 72-73; Boyle, 2010). As this shows, there was a very good match between
positioning and price towards the Burma groups’ immediate audiences, but a very serious
mismatch towards the most important target audience – the Burmese government – as well as its
supporters.
Finally, in terms of channel strategies, the Burma groups used a variety of channels to
distribute their advocacy messages. However, these channels were generally better suited
towards target audiences critical of the Burmese government76
. Here, especially the interviews
76
One example of this was the human rights group G16, who did not lobby the Burmese government or its supporters, but who focused primarily on lobbying the United States Congress by using personal connections to key policy makers as the main channel strategy. Another example was G8, who for two decades had worked with community based organizations in Burma’s ethnic areas through personal contacts. However, these personal
77
indicate that the large majority of Burma groups did not spend enough time to also develop
channel strategies for how to influence the Burmese government and its domestic and regional
supporters77
.
In conclusion, the Burma groups’ marketing strategies generally matched very well with
their attempt to influence their immediate target audience to apply pressure on the Burmese
government. However, in terms of reaching the Burmese government and its supporters, these
marketing strategies generally did not constitute a good match and in some cases may even have
been counterproductive78
.
4.3.5 Marketing strategies and Action plan
The next step is to see how the Burma groups linked their marketing strategies with a
plan for how to implement them. Here, the majority of the Burma groups planned 2-12 months
ahead. This is a quite short timeframe and partly constitutes a mismatch, because it would be
difficult to connect marketing strategies planned one year ahead with long term goals of more
fundamental political change in Burma (Castro et al, 2010: 49).
In the interviews, this impression is mostly confirmed. While a small number of Burma
groups had very strong links between marketing strategies and planning, most of the groups did
not match marketing strategies and planning sufficiently. This would often involve a not
completely holistic planning process, where some tasks would receive a heightened attention,
whereas other similarly important jobs would be neglected. This was for example the case with
contacts were mostly relevant and valuable to G8’s work with these ethnic groups and not with making contact with the Burmese government as G8 in fact never did. 77
An example of this was the network organization G2, who focused especially on lobbying ASEAN. In this regard, G2 on a few occasions met with representatives from the Burmese government during ASEAN’s civil society gatherings. However, interacting directly with Burmese representatives seemed to happen out of coincidence more than anything else, considering that G2 was participating in these civil society gatherings to influence ASEAN and – at least not directly – the Burmese government. 78
One example of this was the human rights organization G3. In the last years leading up to the 2010 elections, G3 – an internationally famous human rights NGO – limited their work to external advocacy without trying to lobby the Burmese government directly. This may have been a problem, because it could have made the Burmese government more wary of G3’s motives. Secondly, multiple interviews carried out with people who had worked and lived in Burma in the 1990-2010 showed, that the best way to create progress with the Burmese government was to engage in non-formal and non-public advocacy based on good personal relations with Burmese officials. These conditions for good advocacy were violated by G3 in limiting themselves to external advocacy.
78
G1 and G20, who both would engage in “extensive planning” (G20) for the report production
process, but who spent much less time planning for the actual report launch79
.
4.3.6 Action plan and Budgeting
In terms of matching action plans with sufficient budgeting, most surveyed groups had a
reasonable connection between what they wanted to do and the financial means available. Here,
only 9 Burma groups had less than 1 million Baht per year, which obviously would not be
enough to implement any large scale advocacy activities. For the rest of the Burma groups, they
did have substantial financial resources available to carry out advocacy work.
In this regard, 13 groups had budgets from 1 to 5 million Baht, which provided the
financial means to launch advocacy on a significant scale. Furthermore, 11 groups had 5 million
or more annually at their disposal, which gave these groups good opportunities to implement
quite ambitious advocacy action plans. In the interviews the same picture emerges, where most
Burma groups had reasonable – even though usually not abundant – levels of financial means
available for their advocacy work80
.
4.3.7 Evaluation and the rest of the steps
The last step of the marketing plan is evaluation81
. Whereas the other steps only connect
with the previous step, that is not the case with evaluation, which relates to all the steps in the
marketing plan. In this regard, out of all surveyed groups 11 of them evaluated their advocacy 0-
1 times per year; 18 groups 2-4 times per year; and 6 groups more than 4 times per year. This
indicates that for most Burma groups, evaluation was quite well integrated with their advocacy
activities.
79
The G20 employee in this regard explained that their staff had been producing human rights report for many years and that it was “a very well planned process”. Distribution of these reports however was not the strength of G20 and little planning went into this part of the advocacy process. 80
Furthermore, many of the groups with smaller budgets – such as G16, G17 and G19 – mitigated the limitations that this posed by having relatively stable donor relationships. This meant that while these groups did not have large budgets at their disposals, at least they knew that they in all likelihood also would have money the coming year to maintain operations on the same scale as the past year. 81
If we omit the contingency plan and executive summary, which have not been included in this study because of research and paper length considerations.
79
In the interviews, there was a slightly less emphasis on evaluation, where 7 groups had a
high focus; 6 groups some focus; and 7 groups a low focus on evaluation. Still, these numbers
indicate, that the majority of Burma groups prioritized evaluation at least to some extent.
4.3.8 Summary of findings
In the previous section we evaluated the Burma groups’ ability to link the individual
marketing plan steps with each other. In terms of both the surveyed and interviewed Burma
groups, we first of all looked at how well they linked their (1) environmental analysis and (2)
goals. In this regard, the Burma groups’ environmental analysis was mainly done on target
audiences in opposition to the Burmese government, while not enough research was done about
pro-government audiences. The same problem was found in terms of matching (2) goals with (3)
target audience, where the Burma groups mainly targeted audiences in opposition to the
government.
In relation to matching (3) target audience and (4) positioning, the Burma groups’ focus
on pressure was a good positioning towards Western target audiences and others critical of the
Burmese government. However, towards Asian countries and the Burmese government, this was
in most cases not a good positioning in terms of making them more supportive of democratic
reforms. Much the same picture existed in relation to matching (4) positioning and (5) marketing
strategies, where an advocacy message based on pressure was a good product with a favorably
low price for audiences who were critical of the Burmese government, but was a significantly
less attractive product for the Burmese government itself and its domestic and international
supporters.
In terms of matching (5) marketing strategies and (6) action planning, then most Burma
groups planned up to one year ahead. Although this constitutes some level of planning, it does
not seem to be a long enough timeframe to plan for substantial change in Burma. Furthermore, in
terms of matching (6) action planning and (7) budgeting, most of the Burma groups had
sufficient budgets available to implement relatively substantial advocacy work. The same
impression was found in relation to evaluations, which were quite well integrated with the rest of
the advocacy activities for most Burma groups.
80
4.3.9 Conclusion
In this section, we tested hypothesis two which said, that the Burma groups did not
sufficiently link the marketing plan steps with each other. As with hypothesis one, this hypothesis
was confirmed to some extent.
In this regard, the Burma groups had quite serious issues in the beginning of the
marketing plan in terms of matching environmental analysis with goals and goals with target
audience. For the rest of the marketing plan, most groups did well in matching the steps in their
attempt to influence target audiences critical of the Burmese government.
However, this well-linked, effective and well-aligned advocacy towards government-
critical audiences in many cases also meant, that the Burma groups’ advocacy became similarly
misaligned with the feelings and desires of the much more important Burmese government as
well as its supporters. This at the same time made it difficult to expect that the Burma groups’
advocacy would have a significant, positive impact on Burma’s political situation.
When that is said, there were still a number of groups – especially in the interviews –
who were able to work in ways, which did not go directly against the interests of the Burmese
government or people and groups supporting it from inside or outside the country. For these
Burma groups, a higher level of advocacy impact can reasonably be expected.
81
4.4 Hypothesis 3
Finally, it is time to test hypothesis three, which says that the Burma groups who
followed and connected the steps in the marketing plan also had the highest advocacy impact on
Burma. This hypothesis has significant theoretical value and – if confirmed – will support more
research into the intersection between marketing theory and advocacy.
4.4.1 Methodology
As described in section 3.6, impact measurement will happen by looking at whether the
Burma groups were able to impact target audiences with an influence on Burma’s political
situation. In this regard, the level of impact is determined first of all by to what extent the Burma
groups influenced certain target audience. Secondly, the level of impact is determined by how
much influence this target audience had on Burma’s political situation. Here, the relevant target
audiences in ranked order of importance are: 1) The Burmese government. 2) Civil society and
ethnic armed groups. 3) Asian countries, ASEAN and the Burmese government’s domestic
sources of power. 4) Western countries and UN.
Furthermore it is important to stress, that the following sections are discussing likely
impact rather than certain impact. The reason for this is that advocacy impact generally is
difficult to measure (Patton, 2008: 9). Furthermore, impact measurement is made even more
difficult due to the notoriously secret nature of the Burmese generals (Selth, 2010: 3). These
factors limit the ability to make very confident conclusions about the impact on the Burmese
government and Burmese politics in general.
4.4.2 Impact measurement
In this section the impact of the Burma advocacy groups on Burma’s political situation is
examined. This will be done by looking at the surveyed Burma groups followed by the
interviewed groups.
82
4.4.2.1 Surveys
In the following section the impact of the surveyed Burma groups is examined. In this
regard, the Burma groups’ answers indicated only a very small impact on Burma’s political
situation.
Burmese government
Despite being the most important target audience by far (Selth, 2010: 2), the Burma
groups’ believed that they only had a very small influence on the Burmese government. This in
turn significantly limited any impact that the Burma groups could expect to have had on Burma’s
political situation.
This lack of impact was evident – for example – when the Burma groups were asked to
what extent, they had succeeded in making the Burmese government less authoritarian and more
democratic. The answers for these questions are shown below based on a 1-7 scale.
Table 16: Burma groups making the Burmese government change its behavior
Changed
behavior
Considering
democratic reforms
Commit less human
rights abuses
Adopt more
democratic practices
Call for 2010
elections
Impact 3.27 3.15 2.88 2.38
As Table 16 shows, the Burma groups clearly did not think, that they had had a big
impact on changing the Burmese government’s behavior. The same pattern was found, when the
Burma groups were asked, if they had succeeded in getting the Burmese government to engage
with domestic and international counterparts. In this regard, on a 1-7 scale the Burma groups
answered 3.25 in terms of making the government engage with the international community;
3.19 for ethnic armed groups; and 3.03 for the domestic opposition. As with Table 16, this
underscored the general impression that the Burma groups did not believe that they had had a
significant impact on the Burmese government’s outlook or behavior.
Civil society and ethnic populations
In terms of the second most important target audiences – Burma’s civil society and its
ethnic populations – the Burma groups felt that they had had a somewhat higher impact. This is
83
shown in the below table, where the Burma groups were asked to what extent, they had been able
to strengthen these mostly government-critical audiences on a 1-7 scale.
Table 17: Burma groups strengthening non-government actors in Burma
Target
audience
Ethnic civil
society groups
Ethnic general
public
Domestic
opposition
General public Ethnic armed
groups
Impact 4.97 4.65 4.00 3.79 3.47
As Table 17 shows, the Burma groups felt that they had some, although not too high an
impact on these target audiences. This was especially the case with ethnic civil society groups
and the ethnic general public and less so with ethnic armed groups, Burma’s domestic opposition
and the general public.
Asian countries, ASEAN and the government’s domestic sources of power
In terms of the third most important target audiences, the Burma groups believed that
they only had had a small impact. In this regard, the Burma groups gave the following answers
on a 1-7 scale in relation to getting Asian countries to put pressure on or engage in dialogue with
the Burmese government82
.
Table 18: Getting Asian countries to put pressure on or engage in dialogue with Burma’s
government
ASEAN Thailand India China
Pressure 3.15 2.91 1.94 1.61
Dialogue 2.50 2.21 1.67 1.60
As is clear from Table 18, the Burma groups believed that they only had a very small
impact on these Asian audiences. This was especially the case with Burma’s by far most
important trading partner and political ally, China. This further reduced the Burma groups’ likely
impact on Burma’s political situation.
Western countries and United Nations
Finally towards Western countries and the UN, the Burma groups felt that they had had a
slightly higher impact. This is shown in the table below in relation to the Burma groups’ ability
82
Questions about the Burma groups’ impact on the Burmese government’s domestic sources of power (Tatmadaw, USDA, local media, civil servants and tycoons) were not included in the survey.
84
to make the United States, EU and UN put pressure on or engage in dialogue with the Burmese
government
Table 19: Getting Western countries and UN to put pressure on or engage in dialogue with
Burma’s government
USA EU UN
Pressure 4.76 4.18 4.09
Dialogue 3.67 3.33 3.27
This table shows that the Burma groups believed that they had had some influence on
making the United States, EU and UN exert pressure on the Burmese government. Despite of
this, considering that Western countries and UN were not among the most important target
audiences, they were not likely to have had a very high ultimate impact on Burma’s political
situation (Nyun, 2008: 512).
Conclusion
In the previous section, we saw that the Burma groups generally believed to have had
only a very small impact on Burma’s political situation. This was especially the case because of
a lack of influence on the Burmese government and its supporters. In addition to this, the Burma
groups did believe to have had some influence on the country’s important civil society and ethnic
populations, but not to an extent that could be expected to have had a large ultimate impact on
Burma’s political situation.
4.4.2.2 Interviews
In this section, the impact of the interviewed Burma groups is examined. As in the
previous section, this will happen by looking at to what extent the Burma groups were able to
influence the most important target audiences in Burma.
Burmese government
As with the surveys, the interviewed Burma groups had only a very little – if any – focus
on lobbying the Burmese government. In this regard it is notable that out of the 21 interviewed
85
groups, none of them mentioned that the Burmese government had been among their target
audience.
In this matter, many of the Burma groups seemed to be of the opinion, that it was not
possible to do advocacy directly targeting the Burmese governments. Instead, help should –
predominantly – be asked from the international community and other outsiders. In this regard,
the attitude of the director of the ethnic human rights organization G19 was highly illustrative:
“People cannot do anything inside, so instead we are shouting to the outside world, calling ‘help
help’”.
While G19 certainly was one of the groups with the most emphatically negative attitude
towards the Burmese government, the opinion that it was not possible to directly lobby the
government was widespread among the Burma groups. However, this tendency to either
unconsciously overlook or purposely ignore dealing directly with the Burmese government
significantly reduced any impact that the advocacy groups could expect to have with their work83
(Allan, 2010: 251).
Civil society and ethnic populations
In addition to the government, Burma’s civil society was another very important target
audience that the Burma groups did little to lobby. In this regard, only in a couple of cases did
the interviewed Burma groups mention that they had attempted to target hard-to-reach, but very
important civil society groups. Some of the few examples of this included the human rights
group G13, who were involved in clandestine advocacy towards ethnic civil society groups in
government-controlled areas of Burma. Furthermore, the women organization G18 kept a branch
office secretly open in an area controlled by the Burmese government, while the news agency
G17 distributed a limited number of news- and advocacy-related materials to people from their
own ethnic group living in government controlled areas.
In all likelihood, there were other cases in addition to the few ones mentioned in the
interviews (Zaw, 2002; Dudley, 2003: 17). However, the fact that the advocacy groups did not
themselves state that they were targeting Burma’s civil society indicates, that this was not an area
83
It is important to note that while the Burma exile movement generally did almost no direct lobbying, there are a couple of examples on record. For this thesis, one individual was interviewed who with notable success had been engaged in direct lobbying towards the Burmese government. This individual, who was lobbying the government to stop using landmines, was however representing an NGO based in Europe and not Thailand.
86
with a high focus. Therefore, it is also reasonable to assume that the Burma groups’ overall
impact on Burma’s civil society was very small, if having any impact at all.
In terms of the ethnic populations, a much different impression emerges with ethnic
groups being some of the target audiences that the Burma groups had the highest influence on. In
this regard, 13 (62 %) out of the 21 interviewed Burma groups were heavily intertwined with
ethnic populations. This was the case either because the Burma groups were actively operating in
ethnic areas and/or because the groups originated from these areas84
.
In this regard, many Burma advocacy groups – despite having offices in Thailand –
maintained strong and long-running relationships with people and organizations in the ethnic
areas85
. This gave these Burma groups a substantial leverage to perform advocacy towards ethnic
people in general and leaders of powerful ethnic armed groups and ethnic political organizations
(Steinberg, 2010: 110-111).
Asian countries, ASEAN and the government’s domestic sources of power.
In addition to the above groups, Asian countries were another important target audience
(Rieffel, 2010: 13-14). As with the majority of the above audiences however, this was an area
that the interviewed Burma groups mostly had only a small focus on – especially in relation to
China and India86
. Towards Thailand there was a higher focus, which is not surprising
considering that this was the “home base” of the Burma groups87
.
In addition to this, some of the Burma groups focused on ASEAN to some extent. This
focus was usually not as strong as their focus on UN and Western governments, but some
resources were devoted to lobbying ASEAN nonetheless. An exception to this was the pro-
democracy group G2, who had a particular focus on ASEAN and who over the years had a
continued presence at ASEAN meetings and its Burma-related events. This consistent advocacy
84
Examples of the former includes groups like G5 and G11, who were distributing relief aid, providing medical services and reporting on human rights abuses in Karen State and other of Burma’s ethnic areas. An example of the latter was G4, who was an Arakanese advocacy group focusing on sustainable development for Arakan State 85
This was probably especially the case with groups who still had a presence in the ethnic areas, while less so with groups who had relocated completely to Thailand. Groups like G17 and G19, for example, had relocated entirely to Thailand in 1996, which likely limited their influence on their constituents in Burma. Compared to that, G18 – an ethnic advocacy group for women – in addition to their office in Thailand kept two offices open in the ethnic state where they came from. 86
Although there also were exceptions to this. For example was G4 cooperating with Indian-based Burma groups in influencing the Indian government, while G10 did advocacy towards the Chinese government. 87
This was for example the case with G7 and G17, who had Thai readers as part of their target audience.
87
work at a quite senior level – together with the work of likeminded NGOs – possibly had some,
although a very limited role to play in the ”socialization of the Burma issue”, that took place in
ASEAN in the decade leading up to the 2010 election (Haacke, 2010: 97).
Finally, only few attempts were made by advocacy groups to influence the Burmese
government’s domestic sources of power (Tatmadaw, USDA, civil servants, local media,
business tycoons etc.). One significant exception to this was G14, who before the 2010 elections
had trained several hundred journalists writing on Burmese issues. Out of these, roughly 50 were
working inside Burma for local news agencies. Through their articles and their presence at news
houses, in newsrooms and as members of the news industry, these 50 journalists could have had
a substantial influence on how Burmese media dealt with political issues. This in turn could have
impacted Burma’s political environment in a pro-democratic direction, when considering that
media is the “fourth power in a country” as one employee from G14 put it88
(Buck, 2007: 52-
53).
Same as G14, the ethnic human rights organization G13 was one of the few interviewed
groups, who had succeeded in influencing some of the government’s domestic sources of power.
In their advocacy targeting the middle class and civil society groups, G13 maintained a “secret”
dialogue and ”shared relevant information” with civil servants. These civil servants were
working for the government in areas controlled by the government, but were at the same time
supportive of G13’s work. Such direct advocacy helped G13 and a few other groups to impact
target audiences inside Burma to a higher extent than what was usually seen with the Burma
groups.
Western countries and United Nations
Finally we turn to UN and Western countries, which were the target audiences that the
Burma groups – together with the ethnic populations – targeted most extensively and most
successfully (Rieffel, 2010: 19-20). This success was especially caused by the fact that the
Burma groups’ message focusing on pressure resonated particularly well with Western
governments, who for the most part were in favor of pressure themselves (Nyun, 2008: 458).
88
It is a legitimate question whether G14 should have been included in this research at all, since they were not doing advocacy as such. However, G14’s work was indirect advocacy in the sense that they tried to make Burma journalists adopt professional standards for objective and balanced journalism, which are important in relation to creating democratic change.
88
While both large and small Burma groups targeted Western audiences, especially the
larger advocacy groups can be expected to have had an impact due to their more abundant
resources. An example of this was the internationally very well-known human rights
organization G12, who continuously was involved in high level advocacy towards Western
governments over the years. In this regard, G12 benefited tremendously from having plenty of
financial, human and institutional resources allowing them to plan and implement effective
advocacy. In the words of one of G12’s employees, “getting financing for work trips is not too
difficult a process and if you end up spending an extra 100 Dollars that is usually not a big
deal.”
When that is said, there were also a few examples, where smaller Burma groups had a
noticeable advocacy impact on Western countries. The best example of this was G16, who had
few financial and human resources, but made up for this by having very direct access to key
Burma policy makers in the US Congress89
. This direct channel is likely to have given G16 some
influence on the US Congress’ Burma policy and certainly much more influence, than would
have been expected from a small advocacy group with limited resources at its disposal.
Conclusion
In this section the interviewed Burma groups’ advocacy impact has been examined. As
with the surveyed groups, the main finding was that the Burma groups only had a small likely
impact on Burma’s political situation. This was especially caused by a lack of contact with and
influence on the Burmese government and its domestic and international supporters. Still, the
Burma groups did have some likely impact on the ethnic populations, Western countries, UN and
to a smaller extent Thailand and ASEAN, which may have resulted in some, although still very
limited impact on Burma’s political situation.
89
Sometimes this contact was direct and sometimes it happened through a sister organization based in Washington DC.
89
4.4.3 Impact and the marketing plan
After the above overview, the following section will test whether there was a correlation
between advocacy impact and the degree to which the Burma groups followed the marketing
plan90
. As before, this analysis will start by looking at the surveys.
4.4.3.1 Surveys
In terms of the surveyed Burma groups, the statistical analysis confirmed hypothesis
three to quite a large extent. This was especially the case with the environmental analysis,
targeting and positioning, and special attention will be given to these steps91
in the following
analysis.
Burmese government
In this section, the relationship between the marketing plan and impact on the Burmese
government is examined. The statistical analysis in this regard mostly supported hypothesis
three, apart from the findings concerned with the environmental analysis.
Environmental analysis
The findings in relation to the environmental analysis overall did not support hypothesis
three. This is shown in the below table which tallies all the statistically significant correlations
between a strong environmental analysis and the seven questions in the survey relating to
advocacy impact on the Burmese government.
90
This analysis was done by looking at how well the Burma groups’ performance in each step correlated with their advocacy impact. This analysis was carried out using the Pearson correlation for interval-ratio variables; Spearman correlation for ordinal variables; and Chi-Square
90 for nominal variables (Chok, 2010: 4-5; Lowry, 2000: 1; Bolboaca
et al, 2006:184, 187). 91
The rest of the steps – marketing strategies, planning, budgeting and evaluation – were difficult to treat statistically, because they mostly would neither prove nor disprove hypothesis 3. For example, no statistical correlations were found between planning and advocacy impact. This is not surprising considering that two groups may have had the same focus on planning, but could have a different impact on a certain audience, if one group targeted it and the other did not.
90
Table 20: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on the
Burmese government and the environmental analysis on a certain group
Strong environmental analysis
Burmese
government
Domestic
supporters
Civil society Ethnic
populations
ASEAN &
Asian countries
UN & Western
countries
0 0 4 2 8 2
As Table 20 shows, a strong environmental analysis on the Burmese government was not
correlated with a higher impact on it. Instead, higher impact more seems to be correlated with a
strong environmental analysis on especially Asian countries. This is an interesting finding that
does not conform to the expectation of hypothesis three.
Target audience
Unlike the above section, the Burma groups’ targeting strategies supported the link
between impact and the marketing plan very well. In this regard, Burma groups who targeted the
Burmese government – or other audiences close to it – generally also had a higher impact on the
government. This is shown in the table below.
Table 21: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on the
Burmese government and the choice of target audience
Chosen target audience
Burmese
government
Domestic
supporters
Civil society Ethnic
populations
ASEAN &
Asian countries
UN & Western
countries
2 12 8 0 7 6
As Table 21 shows, Burma groups who targeted the Burmese government, its domestic
supporters (Tatmadaw, USDA, civil servants and local media) and Burma’s civil society all
tended to have a higher impact on the government.
One concrete example of this was seen in relation to the impact question about making
the Burmese government engage with the domestic opposition. The significant correlations for
this question are shown below.
91
Table 22: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and making the
Burmese government engage with the domestic opposition
Target audience Domestic
opposition
Tycoons Civil
servants
Local
media
Tatma-
daw
SPDC ASEAN EU
Pearson
correlation ,406* ,432
** ,459
** ,435
** ,388
* ,376
* ,584
** ,366
*
Notes: * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
** correlation is sig. at the 0.01 level. N: 35
As Table 22 shows, the Burma groups who targeted audiences in Burma or Asia tended
to have the highest influence on the Burmese government. A similar impression is found in
another example about making the Burmese government implement more democratic policies.
This is shown in the below table.
Table 23: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and making the
Burmese government implement more democratic policies
Target audience General public Domestic
opposition
Civil servants Local media Thailand
Pearson
correlation ,337* ,370
* ,367
* ,350
* ,333
N: 35
As with Table 22, Table 23 shows that Burma groups who targeted audiences close to the
Burmese government also had a higher chance of influencing Burma’s leaders. This finding at
the same time supports hypothesis three because it shows that strong targeting strategies are
necessary in order to have a high advocacy impact.
Positioning
Hypothesis three was also supported in relation to positioning strategies. In this regard,
no statistically significant correlations existed between a positioning based on pressure and a
higher impact on the Burmese government. This is shown in the below table and conforms to our
expectations about how best to address Burma’s leaders.
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Table 24: Insignificant correlations between a positioning based on pressure and having an
impact on the Burmese government (BG)
Impact
Make BG
engage
international
community
Make BG
engage
domestic
opposition
Make BG
engage
ethnic
armies
Make BG
consider
democratic
reform
Make BG
implement
democratic
policies
Make BG
commit less
human rights
abuses
Pearson
correlation ,211 ,234 ,159 ,308 ,192 ,192
N: 35
As Table 24 indicates, pressure was not a useful strategy to create progress with the
Burmese government. This finding is supported by the fact that three statistically significant
correlations were found for Burma groups, who rather than pressure wanted to promote dialogue
with the government. This is shown in the below table.
Table 25: Significant correlations between a positioning based on dialogue and having an
impact on the Burmese government (BG)
Impact
Make BG engage with the
international community
Make BG engage with
the domestic opposition
Make BG engage
with ethnic armies
Pearson correlation ,397
* ,404
* ,364
*
N: 35
As this table indicates, Burma groups promoting dialogue had a higher chance of
influencing the Burmese government. This was also expected and shows that a good positioning
was vital for the Burma groups in terms of having an impact on Burma’s leaders.
Civil society and ethnic populations
In this section the relationship between the marketing plan and impact on Burma’s civil
society and ethnic populations is examined. As with the Burmese government, the statistical
analysis mostly supported hypothesis three.
Environmental analysis
Partial support for hypothesis three was found first of all in the environmental analysis. In
the survey, two questions were asked about impacting Burma’s civil society. The statistically
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significant correlations between these questions and the Burma groups’ environmental analysis
are shown in the table below.
Table 26: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on
Burma’s civil society and the environmental analysis on a certain group
Strong environmental analysis
Burmese
government
Domestic
supporters
Civil society Ethnic
populations
ASEAN & Asian
countries
UN & Western
countries
1 4 3 0 3 2
When looking at Table 26, it is clear that it does not have a perfect relationship.
However, the table does have a trend, where Burma groups with a strong environmental analysis
about Burma’s civil society – or audiences close to it – also felt that they had the highest impact
on the civil society. One example of this was the impact on Burma’s general public – which was
part of the civil society – where the following significant correlations were found.
Table 27: Significant correlations between the environmental analysis and strengthening
the general public
Environmental analysis
General
public
SPDC Tatmadaw USDA Local media ASEAN
Pearson correlation ,596
** ,461
** ,371
* ,344
* ,427
* ,388
*
N: 35
Table 27 in this regard shows that Burma groups with a good environmental analysis
about the general public – as well as some of the groups close to it – also believed to have had a
higher impact on it. Supporting hypothesis three, this underscores the importance of a thorough
environmental analysis in relation to advocacy impact.
A similar picture was found with the three questions relating to the impact on Burma’s
ethnic populations. The statistically significant correlations for these questions are shown below.
Table 28: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on
ethnic populations and the environmental analysis on a certain group
Strong environmental analysis
Burmese
government
Domestic
supporters
Civil society Ethnic
populations
ASEAN & Asian
countries
UN & Western
countries
0 0 1 3 0 0
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As Table 28 shows, the Burma groups that had done a strong environmental analysis on
Burma’s ethnic groups also felt, that they had the highest impact on them. As with Burma’s civil
society, this supports hypothesis three.
Target audience
In relation to targeting, much the same impression is found as in the above paragraph. In
this regard, the number of significant correlations for the two questions about having an impact
on Burma’s civil society is shown below.
Table 29: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on
Burma’s civil society and the choice of target audience
Chosen target audience
Burmese
government
Domestic
supporters
Civil society Ethnic
populations
ASEAN & Asian
countries
UN & Western
countries
0 4 4 0 2 4
Although the relationship is not perfect, Table 29 at least partly shows, that Burma
groups who targeted Burma’s civil society – or groups close to it – generally also had the highest
impact on it. One example of this is displayed below, which shows the statistically significant
correlations between choice of target audience and strengthening Burma’s domestic opposition.
Table 30: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and strengthening the
domestic opposition
Target audience
Domestic
opposition
General
public
Local
media
Civil
servants
ASEAN EU UN
Pearson correlation ,657
** ,560
** ,397
* ,359
* ,459
** ,394
* ,372
*
N: 35
As this table displays, Burma groups who targeted the domestic opposition – or audiences
close to it – also had a higher impact on the opposition. In this regard, Table 30 shows that
advocacy impact on Burma’s domestic opposition was created mainly by targeting groups in
Burma and Asia (with the exception of EU and UN).
A similar picture was found for the three impact questions about Burma’s ethnic
populations. The significant correlations with these questions are shown below.
95
Table 31: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on
ethnic populations and the choice of target audience
Chosen target audience
Burmese
government
Domestic
supporters
Civil society Ethnic
populations
ASEAN & Asian
countries
UN & Western
countries
1 4 1 7 5 3
As with Burma’s civil society the relationship is not perfect. Still, there is a trend
pointing towards Burma groups targeting ethnic populations also having the highest impact on
them. This supports hypothesis three, because it shows the importance for advocacy impact of
having the right target audience.
Asian countries, ASEAN and the government’s domestic sources of power.
In this section, the relationship between the marketing plan and impact on ASEAN and
Asian countries is examined. Questions about the impact on Burma’s government’s domestic
sources of power were not included in the survey due to space considerations and therefore
cannot be examined here. As before, the statistical analysis mostly supported the link between
the marketing plan and advocacy impact.
Environmental analysis
In terms of the environmental analysis, no clear picture emerged. In the survey, 8
questions were asked about the impact on ASEAN and Asian countries. The significant
correlations with these questions are shown below.
Table 32: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on
ASEAN and Asian countries and the environmental analysis on a certain group
Strong environmental analysis
Burmese
government
Domestic
supporters
Civil society Ethnic
populations
ASEAN & Asian
countries
UN & Western
countries
2 6 7 2 5 0
This table shows that the Burma groups who did an environmental analysis on ASEAN
and Asian countries also had a higher impact on them. However, the same seems to be the case
with Burma groups, who performed a good environmental analysis on Burma’s civil society and
the government’s domestic supporters. This finding does not conform to hypothesis three. Still,
the explanation to this could be that the Burma groups, who targeted Burma’s civil society and
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the government’s supporters also targeted ASEAN and Asian countries92
. Because of that, we
cannot determine whether Table 32 supports or goes against hypothesis three.
Target audience
A clearer picture in support of hypothesis three is found in terms of the Burma groups’
target audiences. The significant correlations between choice of target audience and advocacy
impact are shown below.
Table 33: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on
ASEAN and Asian countries and the choice of target audience
Chosen target audience
Burmese
government
Domestic
supporters
Civil society Ethnic
populations
ASEAN & Asian
countries
UN & Western
countries
1 6 0 4 7 2
As in the previous sections, the relationship is not perfect. All things considered however,
there seems to be a quite clear trend towards Burma groups targeting ASEAN and Asian
countries also being the groups with the highest impact on them.
Western countries and United Nations
Finally, the relationship between the marketing plan and impact on Western countries and
UN is examined. As with the previous sections, most findings supported hypothesis three.
Environmental analysis
Hypothesis three was supported first of all through the environmental analysis. In the
survey, six questions were asked in relation to advocacy impact on UN and Western countries.
The statistically significant correlations with these questions and the environmental analysis are
shown below.
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This possibility is supported, when running a correlation analysis between the target audiences’ civil society and ASEAN/Asian countries. In this regard, Burma’s civil society had significant correlations with China, India, ASEAN and almost Thailand. This indicates that Burma groups who targeted the civil society also targeted countries and international organizations In Asia.
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Table 34: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on
Western countries and UN and the environmental analysis on a certain group
Strong environmental analysis
Burmese
government
Domestic
supporters
Civil society Ethnic
populations
ASEAN & Asian
countries
UN & Western
countries
2 3 5 3 6 12
Table 34 in this regard shows a very clear relationship between performing a good
environmental analysis about UN and Western countries, and then having an impact on them.
This was for example seen in the question about influencing the United States to put more
pressure on the Burmese government, with the results shown in the below table.
Table 35: Significant correlations between environmental analysis and making the United
States put pressure on the Burmese government
Environmental analysis
USA EU UN General
public
Ethnic
NGOs
Ethnic general
public
Pearson
correlation ,548** ,481
** ,384
* ,390
* ,346
* ,336
*
N: 35
This table shows that a strong environmental analysis on Western countries and UN also
resulted in a higher advocacy impact. Although the significant correlations of the Burmese
general public, ethnic NGOs and ethnic general public show that also other factors need to be
considered – possibly in relation to multicollinearity (Agresti et al, 1997: 397) – the trend is
present nonetheless.
Target audience
In addition to the environmental analysis, hypothesis three was also supported when
looking at the Burma groups’ target audiences. The statistically significant correlations between
choice of target audience and questions relating to impact on UN and Western countries are
shown below.
Table 36: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on
Western countries and UN and the choice of target audience
Chosen target audience
Burmese
government
Domestic
supporters
Civil society Ethnic
populations
ASEAN & Asian
countries
UN & Western
countries
0 2 1 0 3 8
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Table 36 here shows a clear relationship between targeting the UN and Western countries
and then having an impact on them. One example of this is shown in the below table about
influencing the United States to put pressure on the Burmese government.
Table 37: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and making USA put
pressure on the Burmese government
Target audience
USA EU UN ASEAN
Pearson
correlation ,552** ,415
* ,606
** ,360
*
N: 35
As Table 37 shows, the groups who targeted the United States – or EU or UN – also
thought that they had a higher impact on the Americans. Supporting hypothesis three, this
indicates that advocacy impact to a large extent depends on choosing target audiences, that are
identical or very close to the people or groups that an advocacy group wishes to influence.
Reliability and validity of the quantitative findings
Before proceeding the reliability of the above findings is examined. This happens by
using Cronbach’s Alpha, which is “the most widely used objective measure of reliability”
(Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). In this regard, all Cronbach-values for the impact questions were
well above the commonly accepted threshold of 0.7 (see specific values in Appendix 3) (Tavakol
and Dennick: 54). This shows that we can be fairly sure that these variables all measure the same
underlying construct (i.e. a reliable measurement).
In terms of the validity, it is important to note that – as previously mentioned –
substantial resources were put into developing the advocacy impact questions. This increases the
likely validity of these questions.
The thorough design notwithstanding, the impact questions still suffer from the serious
limitation that they are based on the Burma groups’ self-assessment of their impact. This can be
a problem, because the measurements gauged the Burma groups’ own opinion more so than the
actual impact itself. Furthermore, self-assessment can be a problem because the respondents may
be biased in assessing their own impact (Brener et al, 2003). Finally, advocacy impact is a
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complex subject that should be covered in a rigorous and systematic process and not in a matter
of seconds in a survey (Patton, 2008: 9).
Because of this, the above findings are only tentative. This is especially the case, when it
comes to Burma groups assessing the impact on people and groups who were not part of their
main target audience. However, in terms of the Burma groups’ more immediate target audiences,
the chance that their impact assessment is correct is higher, because we can expect that the
Burma groups’ generally had a better understanding of the people and groups that they were
targeting on a regular basis.
Conclusion
In the previous sections, strong links were found between the marketing plan and
advocacy impact. In this regard, high advocacy impact seemed in particular to be related to
strong environmental analysis and good targeting strategies. Furthermore, having the right
positioning strategies towards the Burmese government also seemed very important. Still, these
findings are based on the not necessarily true assumption that the Burma groups’ self-assessment
is correct, which means that interpretations of the above numbers should be conservative (Brener
et al, 2003: 436).
4.4.3.2 Interviews
In this section we turn to the interviewed Burma groups. In this regard – as with the
previous section – there seemed to be a clear correlation between how well the groups followed
the marketing plan and how big an advocacy impact they had. This impact appeared to be
correlated with how well the marketing plan was followed in general as well as how well the
Burma groups performed in each individual step.
Following the marketing plan in general
First of all, impact seemed to be quite closely correlated with how well the Burma groups
generally followed the marketing plan. This is shown in the below table, which tallies the
advocacy impact and the degree to which the Burma groups in general followed the marketing
plan.
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Table 38: Degree to which the Burma groups had an advocacy impact and followed the
marketing plan (MP) in general
Follow MP to
which extent
Level of
advocacy impact
G1 Medium-High Limited info
G2 High Medium-High
G3 High High
G4 High Limited info
G5 Low Low
G6 Low-Medium Low
G7 Medium-High Low
G8 Limited info Limited info
G9 High Medium-High
G10 Medium-High Limited info
G11 Medium-High Medium
G12 High High
G13 High High
G14 High High
G15 High High
G16 Medium High
G17 High Medium
G18 Medium-High Medium
G19 Low Low
G20 Medium-High Medium-High
G21 Low-Medium Low
The impact in this table is based on section 4.4.2.2, which described the advocacy impact
of the interviewed groups (the terms ‘High’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’ should not be taken as these
groups’ absolute impact on Burma, but are predominantly a way of distinguishing the Burma
groups from each other). In addition to this, the degree to which the Burma groups followed the
marketing plan is based on findings from the testing of hypothesis one and two previously in this
chapter.
When these two different kinds of data are put together, a relatively clear picture
emerges. In this regard, Table 38 shows that there seems to have been a clear correlation between
advocacy impact and following the marketing plan. For 17 out of the 21 interviewed groups,
sufficient information was gathered both about their degree of impact and following the
marketing plan. Out of these 17 groups, 8 had the same level of impact as their degree of
101
following the marketing plan would suggest, while another 6 only diverged slightly93
. Compared
to this, just three groups – G7, G16 and G17 – diverged more significantly.
As is apparent from Table 38, the data is quite uniform in its support of hypothesis three.
This impression was confirmed across the entire impact spectrum, regardless of whether the
Burma groups had some or almost no likely impact.
For the groups with the lowest impact, they in most cases only followed the marketing
plan to a small extent. Two examples of this were G5 and G19, who had almost no visible
impact, because of strong difficulties getting in touch with relevant target audiences both in
Burma, Asia and among Western countries on a regular and systematic basis.
Supporting hypothesis three, these difficulties can then relatively easily be traced back to
the many severe “gaps” in G5 and G19’s marketing plan. In this regard, both G5 and G19 had
serious issues with their environmental analysis and goal setting. Furthermore, G5 and G19 also
had severe problems with the more practical tasks by having only a few and underdeveloped
marketing strategies and suffering from a lack of planning, funding94
and evaluation practices. If
all these steps are summed up, we are left with an impression of two groups, who had
fundamental difficulty in designing and implementing marketing-inspired advocacy, which in
turn resulted in predictable and easy-to-explain issues with attaining any advocacy impact.
If we look at the Burma groups with some, although not too high advocacy impact, then
they generally – and as expected by hypothesis three – followed the marketing plan to some
extent. One example of this was the combined advocacy-and-relief organization G11, who
followed the marketing plan to a much higher extent than G5 and G19, but who still had serious
issues in several important steps of this plan. In this regard, G11 generally positioned themselves
very well towards their target audience. However, this was not backed up with neither a strong
environmental analysis nor rigorous evaluation practices, which led G11 to target a
predominantly Christian-American audience with only a very small potential influence on
Burma’s political situation (Bynum 2011: 11). This in turn limited G11’s ultimate impact even
though the vigor and consistency with which they approached their existing American audience
likely meant that G11 still had some, although very limited impact.
93
For example G18 who followed the marketing plan to a medium-high extent, but only had a medium degree of impact. 94
Funding was especially a problem for G19, while G5 had substantial financial resources. Still, most of G5’s financial resources were used on relief aid and not advocacy.
102
Finally, the same impression was found for the “top tier” groups, who followed the
marketing plan to a high extent, and who also had a relatively high advocacy impact. One
example of this was G14, who had trained around 50 Burma-based journalists. G14 in this regard
had a high emphasis on all steps in the marketing plan, including a strong environmental
analysis, precise goals, clear target market as well as strong marketing strategies. Furthermore,
G14 showed diligence in also doing rigorous planning and having sufficient funding and
extensive evaluation practices.
When all these different factors are summed up, we arrive at an overall impression where
it is quite easy to see why G14 was one of the Burma groups with the highest impact, and one of
the few groups who were able to impact some of the most important target audiences inside
Burma. Furthermore, rather than depending on individual steps, this more than anything else
seems to be related to G14’s very holistic and rigorous approach to advocacy, regardless of
whether G14 was dealing with the research, design or implementation phase of the marketing
plan.
Performance in individual steps
As explained above, the testing of hypothesis three showed a strong correlation between
following the marketing plan in general and the degree of advocacy impact. When that is said,
there were also 6 groups, who – as earlier mentioned – deviated to some extent by having a
slightly larger or smaller impact, than what their level of following the marketing plan would
have indicated.
Furthermore, at least three groups had a more noticeable difference between their likely
impact and the level to which they followed the marketing plan. Common for these groups was
that they either did something very good or very bad in one particular step of the marketing plan,
which significantly influenced their overall advocacy impact.
One example of this was human rights group G16, who was a “positive mover” in the
sense that they had a much higher impact than would have been expected, when taking in
consideration, that they only followed the marketing plan to some extent. This can however by
explained by G16’s exceptional marketing channels, which gave G16 more or less direct access
to the relatively small group of people in the US Congress that traditionally had dominated the
US Burma policy (Steinberg, 2006: 225-226). Despite being a small advocacy group with limited
103
funding, this direct channel gave G16 a real and quite extraordinary influence on the United
States’ foreign policy line towards the Burmese government.
Another example was the news agency G17. G17 was in this regard a “negative mover”
in the sense, that they had a less likely impact than expected, when considering that G17
followed the marketing plan to a very high extent. G17 however was in a “niche market” only
focusing on news from one of Burma’s ethnic states. This narrow scope in topic – and
consequently in terms of target audience – significantly limited G17’s likely influence on
Burma’s general political situation.
Finally, the news group G7 was another “negative mover”. In this regard, G7 followed
the marketing plan to some extent, but only had a very small likely impact. This in particular
seems to have been caused by G7’s positioning issues in trying to distribute Burmese ethnic
news to a South East Asian readership generally disinterested in these affairs. As this and the two
previous exceptions show, impact was not only decided by whether the Burma groups in general
followed the marketing plan, but also whether they did very well or very bad in one single step.
4.4.3.3 Conclusion
In this section the correlation between advocacy impact and the marketing plan was
examined. In this regard, an overall close correlation was found both in the surveys and
interviews. Even though caution must be taken especially in relation to the survey findings, the
indications in favor of correlation are numerous and overall give a persuasive impression in
support of hypothesis three.
4.4.4 Positive or negative impact
In the previous section, a strong correlation between advocacy impact and the marketing
plan was found. What the previous section did not discuss however, was whether this likely
impact had a positive or negative effect on Burma’s political situation. A positive effect in this
regard can be equated with influencing relevant target audiences to become more supportive of
democratic reforms. A negative effect on the other hand would be the case, if the Burma groups
made various target audiences become less supportive of democratic change.
104
4.4.4.1 Surveys
In terms of the surveys it is all in all not easy to determine, whether the impact was
positive or negative, due to the limited information about this in the questionnaire. Still, one
factor that comes close to determine this seems to be whether the Burma groups were promoting
pressure or dialogue with the Burmese government.
In this regard, the large majority of Burma groups were favoring pressure, which was a
positioning that was effective towards Western countries and UN. However pressure was ill-
suited towards Burma’s generals and in most cases would not have been the best way to create
progress with them (ICG, 2001: 12; Nyein, 2008).
Furthermore, assuming that pressure may still have worked occasionally, any positive
impact was further reduced by the fact that the surveyed Burma groups were mainly able to
persuade UN and the Western countries to apply this pressure95
. This was problematic, because
while the Burmese government was generally sensitive to criticism and had difficulty responding
to it in a constructive way, this was in particular the case with criticism from Western countries
(Selth, 2008: 4).
Therefore, we are left with a quite strong overall impression that while the surveyed
Burma groups may have had some limited impact on Burma, this did not seem to have been a
highly positive one. How slightly positive or even negative this impact was is difficult to
determine accurately. However, the focus on pressure and targeting government critical
audiences meant that any progress with the Burmese government was going to remain very
challenging or even become more difficult (Selth, 2008: 10).
4.4.4.2 Interviews
For the interviews a more mixed impression emerges, where the Burma groups seem to
be more or less equally divided between groups with a positive, negative and “neutral” effect
(neither positive nor negative). Furthermore, there is no apparent pattern, when looking at which
groups had a positive or negative effect. For example, Burma groups who appeared to have a
high likely impact did not generally have a more positive or for that matter negative influence
than groups with a low impact. This shows that while the marketing plan has been found to be a
highly useful tool to create advocacy impact, this impact is not necessarily positive.
95
And to some extent engage in more dialogue too, according to the answers in the survey.
105
An illustrative example is here found by looking at the six groups with the highest likely
impact. In this regard, some of them appeared to have had a negative impact while others a
positive impact. Rather than the extent to which they followed the marketing plan, this
discrepancy seems to be caused by differences in their more fundamental approach to advocacy.
For the three groups with a likely more negative impact (G3, G12 and G16), they all had a focus
on pressure, which in most cases would not be a good approach vis-à-vis working with the
Burmese generals (ICG, 2001a: 4). Compared to this, the three groups with a likely more
positive impact (G13, G14 and G15) had a focus on compromise and addressing issues in a non-
political and non-threatening manner, which were particularly important techniques when
dealing with Burma’s leaders (Pasch et al, 2009: 26-27).
To frame it theoretically, the approach of the Burma groups with a likely more positive
impact had strong similarities with the customer-driven approach of marketing (Kotler et al,
2010: 35). This indicates that while the marketing plan seems to be a very useful tool to
influence an advocacy target audiences, it needs to be backed up with a customer-driven
approach in order for any impact to be positive. If this customer-driven approach was not used,
then the Burma groups could still have had an advocacy impact, but this may not necessarily
have been a positive one.
4.4.5 Conclusion
In this section, we have tested hypothesis three, which said that the Burma groups who
followed the marketing plan to a higher extent also had a higher impact. This hypothesis testing
relied mainly on the interviews, but also to some extent on the surveys.
In terms of both the interviewed and surveyed Burma groups, then they overall had some,
although still very limited impact on Burma’s political situation. Furthermore, both interviews
and surveys tentatively confirmed hypothesis three, because the Burma groups’ likely advocacy
impact was quite closely correlated with the degree to which they followed the marketing plan.
In terms of whether the impact was positive or negative, the results are however much
more mixed. In this regard, there was no clear picture in terms of groups with a higher impact
also necessarily having a positive or for that matter negative impact. This indicates that while the
marketing plan may be a good framework to create advocacy impact, it does not necessarily
create an impact that it positive.
106
Instead, the “direction” of the impact seems more to be related with the underlying
approach of the Burma groups’ advocacy. If the Burma groups had a customer-driven approach
towards the Burmese government and its supporters, their likely impact had a higher chance of
being positive. Compared to that, if the Burma groups had a focus on pressuring the Burmese
government, their likely impact would tend to be more negative (Pasch et al, 2009: 40).
107
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, the research topic and methodology of this thesis is summarized.
Furthermore we will review the findings, which overall were highly supportive of the utility of
using marketing theory in advocacy.
In addition to this, Chapter 5 looks at why most of the Burma advocacy groups had a
relatively limited impact, despite that many of them showed a very obvious talent for advocacy.
Finally, we will examine whether the findings of this study can be used in other countries, where
political activists are engaged in pro-democratic advocacy.
5.2 Thesis topic and methodology
In this thesis, the possible utility of Burma advocacy groups adopting methods known
from modern marketing was examined. This innovative and cross-disciplinary approach was
inspired first of all by the curious phenomenon that the advocacy groups’ impact on Burma’s
political situation appeared to be smaller than expected, when considering the existence of
hundreds of Burma advocacy groups worldwide for up to two decades (ICG, March 2011: 1, 11-
13). Secondly, considering that both marketing and advocacy have the same overall focus on
selling, this research study wanted to test, whether marketing could help to explain this lack of
impact as well as why some groups had a larger impact than others (Graham, 1993: 3).
To find out whether marketing indeed is a useful approach to evaluate the Burma
advocacy groups’ degree of effectiveness, three hypotheses were developed. In this regard, the
first two hypotheses looked at to what extent Burma advocacy groups based in Thailand
followed advocacy techniques in accordance with the marketing plan. In addition to this, a third
hypothesis tested, whether the Burma groups who followed the marketing plan to a higher extent
also had a higher impact in terms of making target audiences in- and outside of Burma become
more supportive of democratic reforms. These three hypotheses – when combined – could be
108
expected to give a relatively clear answer either in support of against the utility of marketing
principles in advocacy.
Methodologically, the three hypotheses were tested by interviewing and surveying 40
Burma groups based in Thailand between August 2012 and January 2013. Furthermore, 24
exploratory interviews were conducted with a wide range of people knowledgeable about Burma
or marketing. Finally, a very substantial amount of secondary literature on Burma advocacy and
Burma’s political conflict was also incorporated as part of the hypotheses testing.
5.3 Hypotheses testing
5.3.1 Hypothesis 1
In the following sections, the findings of the hypotheses testing is summarized. In this
regard, hypothesis one stated that the Burma advocacy groups did not carry out all the steps in
the marketing plan. This hypothesis was partly confirmed, because most of the Burma groups
actually carried out the majority of these steps reasonably well.
In this regard, the Burma groups especially did well in terms of having clear goals, target
audiences, positioning strategies and marketing strategies. Also planning, budgeting and
evaluation were generally carried out reasonably well, although to a slightly smaller extent. The
only area, where the majority of the Burma groups had more serious issues, was in terms of the
environmental analysis in step 1 of the marketing plan.
5.3.2 Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis was that the Burma advocacy groups did not sufficiently link the
steps in the marketing plan with each other. As with the first hypothesis, hypothesis two was
only partly confirmed although to a slightly higher extent.
In this regard, the Burma groups had quite serious issues in the beginning of the
marketing plan, when it came to matching environmental analysis with goals and goals with
target audience. For the rest of the marketing plan, most groups did well in matching the steps in
their attempt to persuade a predominantly Western target audience.
109
However, this well-linked and well-positioned advocacy towards a Western target
audience in many cases also meant, that the Burma groups’ advocacy became similarly
misaligned with the feelings and desires of the Burmese government and its supporters.
Considering the much higher importance of the generals and their allies, this misalignment
drastically limited any positive influence on Burma’s political situation.
When that is said, there were still a number of Burma groups, who had an advocacy
approach that did not go directly against the interests of the Burmese government or people
supporting it from inside or outside the country. For these Burma advocacy groups, a higher
level of advocacy impact can reasonably be expected.
5.3.3 Hypothesis 3
Correlation between marketing plan and advocacy impact
Finally, hypothesis three tested whether the Burma advocacy groups that followed and
properly linked the marketing plan steps (in hypothesis one and two) also had a higher impact on
Burma’s political situation. Findings in this regard were limited to likely impacts rather than
certain impact, because of a limited amount of information about each individual Burma group96
.
Furthermore, advocacy impact is a notoriously hard-to-measure topic, where interpretations and
conclusions in most cases are best kept conservative (Patton, 2008: 9).
Despite these methodological limitations, the data nevertheless clearly indicated that the
Burma groups seemed to have had some, although a very limited impact on Burma’s political
situation. Furthermore, largely confirming hypothesis three, there seemed to be a quite close
correlation between the degree of likely impact and the degree to which the groups followed the
marketing plan. In this regard, groups who followed the marketing plan closely generally also
had a higher likely impact compared to groups who followed the marketing plan to a smaller
extent.
When that is said, there were also a small number of groups who had a larger or smaller
impact, than would have been expected, when looking at the extent to which the groups followed
the marketing plan. Typical for these groups was that they either did something very good or
very bad in one single step of the marketing plan. This over- or underperformance would then
96
With the information being limited to data gathered from either 1) one 60-90 minute interview; 2) one 8-page survey; or 3) one interview and one survey.
110
significantly change their ultimate impact in a positive or negative direction. This does not
disprove hypothesis 3, but only shows that advocacy impact was decided both by the overall
performance as well as in the individual steps.
Positive or negative advocacy impact
In addition to impact measurement, hypothesis three also looked at whether the impact
was positive or negative. Here, unlike the previous section, a very mixed picture emerged, where
high advocacy impact was not necessarily positive or for that matter negative.
In this regard, groups with a likely negative impact were characterized by having a focus
on pressure and confrontation. Compared to this, groups with a likely positive impact had a
more compromising and non-political approach, which was particularly important when dealing
with the Burmese government (Allan, 2010: 251). This gave these groups a more customer-
driven approach and a generally higher chance of changing Burma’s political situation in a
positive direction (Kotler, 2005: 19-20).
This very important finding indicates that the marketing plan indeed is a very useful tool
to create advocacy impact. However, as the above discussion showed, this impact is not
necessarily positive, but can also be negative. Instead, the nature of the impact at least in Burma
seemed to depend more on the underlying approach to advocacy. If the approach was customer-
driven, the impact was likely to be positive, and if the approach was pressure-driven, the impact
would often be negative, because pressure ran against the feelings and desires of the most
influential target audiences in terms of Burma’s political situation (Callahan, 2003: 226-227).
5.3.4 Summary of findings
In the previous sections, the findings of the hypotheses testing were listed. In this regard,
the most important finding was that marketing theory at least tentatively was confirmed as a
highly useful tool in advocacy.
This was the case first of all because of marketing’s ability to explain why some Burma
groups had a higher impact than others. Furthermore, apart from the performance of the
individual groups, marketing also helped to understand why the Burma advocacy movement’s
111
overall positive impact on Burma’s political situation has been relatively small (Hlaing, 2007:
21; Haeri, 2008: 33-34).
In this regard, the Burma groups overall did well in terms of finding a target audience and
developing and implementing a compelling set of marketing strategies to influence this audience.
However, most of the Burma groups also had serious shortcomings in their environmental
analysis, which led them to turn to predominantly friendly, but not crucially important Western
target audiences (Selth, 2010: 1). The ironic point in this regard is that while the Burma groups
generally did well to meet to needs of their target audience, these audiences were usually not
very important in terms of creating political change in Burma.
When this is said, a limited number of Burma groups did have a strong environmental
analysis and were able to use this to direct their advocacy towards some of the more important
target audiences. This shows that the Burma advocacy movement was not monolithic and that a
few groups were able to exert a stronger influence on important groups inside Burma. However,
even for these groups this influence was not necessarily positive and depended on, whether they
used a customer-driven advocacy approach or not.
5.4 Lessons learned
The overall recommendation of this paper is that more research is warranted into the use
of the marketing theory in advocacy. In this regard, this paper in particular indicates that the
Burma advocacy groups could have benefited from adopting a more customer oriented mindset
and doing stronger environmental analysis. Furthermore, this paper also indicates the utility of
strong positioning and marketing strategies, which indeed was one of the most important reasons
why the Burma groups were so effective in raising the Burma-issue especially in the West.
However, simply to recommend that the Burma advocacy groups should support their
skilful positioning and marketing strategies with better environmental analysis and a customer-
driven mindset is not likely to change much. Even though people make mistakes, they in most
cases will have good reasons to do so, that make sense according to the way they view the world
(Rasborg, 2007: 43). The same can be expected to have been the case with the Burma advocacy
groups and any effort to guide or coach these groups must take into consideration why these
mistakes were committed in the first place.
112
Reasons behind the Burma groups’ behavior
As the above section showed, most of the Burma groups had issues with a lack of
environmental analysis and a mission-driven advocacy approach based on pressure and
confrontation. These shortcomings seem first of all to have been created by the fact that the
Burma groups were based outside of Burma, where they had very little – if any – direct contact
with people in the Burmese government (Pasch et al, 2009: 54). This greatly limited the Burma
groups’ chance of doing a proper environmental analysis and acquiring a sophisticated
understanding of the Burmese leaders’ feelings and motives.
In addition to this, this lack of understanding made it much harder for Burma groups to
have any empathy with the Burmese government. This lack of empathy in turn made it mentally
much easier to only have a negative view of the government and favor pressure and
confrontation rather than a customer-driven advocacy approach (Esteban et al, 2005: 2).
Furthermore, it is important to remember that many of the Burmese nationals in the
advocacy movement had extremely traumatic personal experiences from dealing with the
Burmese government97
. This understandably made it highly difficult, and in many cases nearly
impossible, for these people to have a customer-driven approach to the Burmese government and
to conduct thorough and unbiased environmental analyses into the needs and wants of the
generals. This highly negative view of the Burmese government, however, also made it very
difficult for these people to support the accommodating strategies, which were needed to have a
realistic chance of persuading the generals to implement democratic reforms (New World, 2012).
Finally, it is relevant to note that the many Westerners working in Burma advocacy
groups often seemed to have an only limited understanding of Burma, its culture and its conflict.
For the majority of these Westerners, they undoubtedly had the best of intentions. However,
coming from a very different culture and in most cases having never lived in Burma, many of
them did not have a deep understanding of neither Burma nor the country’s very complex
conflict. Together with the Burmese nationals’ negative view of the government, the lack of
knowledge on the part of Western advocates put natural limitations on the quality of the Burma
groups’ environmental analysis.
97
With either themselves or their loved ones suffering terrible human rights abuses at the hands of soldiers, intelligence officers, police officers, prison guards or others working for the government.
113
Furthermore, the Westerners’ incomplete knowledge of the Burmese government made
them vulnerable to quickly accept the notion, that the best way to create democratic change was
through applying pressure. The position in favor of pressure was pervasive among the advocacy
groups and in international media and could easily be believed by foreigners, who had spent little
time in Burma and only on a few occasions – if ever – had met and talked to representatives from
the Burmese government (Kudo, 2005: 12).
Recommendations for future advocacy
Considering the above insights, a number of important lessons come to mind, which will
make the Burma groups’ advocacy more effective. In this regard, the first lesson seems to be that
advocacy must be done as closely as possible to the people that advocates wish to influence. The
further away an advocacy group is from its audience, the less chance these advocates will have
of understanding their audience and coming up with realistic change strategies.
Secondly, it is of crucial importance that human rights advocates understand their own
feelings and are able to use them proactively rather than to be controlled by them. For some of
the Burmese nationals, their advocacy work seemed to be driven by their own negative feelings
towards the Burmese government – at least to some extent. This was very understandable, but
also limited their ability to come up with realistic strategies for political change in Burma.
Thirdly, human rights advocates need to be aware of their own limited knowledge.
Burma and its conflict are hugely complex and some of the Westerners working with Burma
advocacy overestimated their knowledge about the country. As in marketing with consumer
research, this shows the importance of humility in acknowledging the limitations to ones
knowledge and the need to attain as much information as possible directly from the target
audience (Kotler et al, 2010: 146-147).
5.5 Generalizability
Needs and wants assessed on a case by case basis
The generalizability of this thesis is naturally limited due to it being a case study. This
lack of external validity is however not a weakness, but a strength of the chosen marketing
inspired framework.
114
In marketing, different target markets have different needs and wants. With authoritarian
governments, the same can reasonably be expected to be the case98
. In their work, pro-
democracy advocacy groups and policy makers should be sensitive to these unique feelings and
desires and should be very cautious about making analogies from one case to another.
In the Burma debate, the utility of sanctions was often justified by referring to South
Africa, where sanctions played an important role in ending Apartheid. In a number of important
ways however, the Apartheid regime was markedly different from the military government in
Burma99
. This made the South African analogy a fallacy to a large extent and shows the need of
very careful analysis of the unique characteristics of the authoritarian government that an
advocacy group wishes to reform (ICG, 2004: 20).
Proud, fearful, hypersensitive and isolationist regimes
As the above section notes, the generalizability of this thesis is very limited. When that is
said, the thesis may still give some clues about how to approach autocratic governments similar
to the former SLORC/SPDC government in Burma. In other words, proud, fearful and
isolationist authoritarian rulers that are hypersensitive to criticism home and abroad. At the time
of writing (March 2013), fresh UN sanctions have been approved against North Korea following
a third nuclear test. However, when looking at the trajectory of pressure against this rogue state,
it is difficult to see very much tangible progress with a North Korean leadership visibly
extraordinarily sensitive to foreign criticism (Levs et al, 2013; Branigan et al, 2013).
In this matter, relatively obvious similarities seem to exist between the two decades long
international pressure on Burma and the current apparent lack of success of trying to force
change upon North Korean leaders, who seem determined not to bend to the Western world.
While we do not recommend to use our findings on North Korea, these peculiar similarities
should spark further research into how the leaders of the North has perceived international
98
Different historical backgrounds; government organization; culture; exposure to the outside world etc. 99
Three of the most important differences were: 1) South Africa was deeply integrated with Western economies. 2) Ethnically white South African leaders felt a cultural relationship with the Western countries implementing sanctions against then. 3) Sanctions substantially reinforced internal pressure for change among a broad array of important actors (underground resistance, open opposition, union leaders, white liberals and businessmen) (ICG, 2004: 20-21).
115
pressure, and what concessions they might be willing to offer in exchange for something that
they need from the international community100
(Noland, 2008: 2).
Some dictatorships do not want to reform
Finally, there may be cases where an authoritarian government at all cost does not want
to implement any democratic reforms. In those cases, a focus on the government’s needs and
wants may not be useful since the government is closer to being a “competitor” rather than a
“target audience”, to remain in the marketing terminology. When this happens, alternative
frameworks designed to forcible remove an authoritarian government may be a better option than
the ‘needs and wants’ approach suggested here (Helvey, 2004: 9).
In this regard, the benefit of the ‘needs and wants’ approach is, that it creates a slower,
but also more stable and sustainable political progress. Compared to this, more forceful measures
(no matter whether they use violence or not) will usually result in a more sudden change of
government, which can cause significant instability and regression to previous patterns of
conflict and violence. This has been evident in Iraq since the 2003 military invasion and has also
partly been the case in Egypt since the 2011 non-violent overthrow of the Mubarak government
(Reuters, 2013; Ollivant, 2012: 1).
Still, a ‘needs and wants’-based approach is built on the premise that it is possible to
work with the current government. If that cannot happen, then alternative frameworks for change
might be preferable, despite a considerable social and political instability following the fall of the
old government.
5.6 Final comments
In marketing, successful selling is based on the principle of being willing to give people
what they need and want. If you are ready to do that, then your customers will be prepared to
provide you with something of value as well (Kotler et al, 2010: 31). In this thesis, we found
many indications that the same techniques can be used to create political progress when engaging
in pro-democratic advocacy.
100
National security; economic aid; diplomatic relations etc. (Saeed, 2010:12; Bailey: 2003: 3-4).
116
The implications of incorporating customer-driven marketing techniques would be far-
reaching considering the traditional mission-driven approach of advocacy. While a mission-
driven approach indeed can lead to considerable short run advocacy successes, a very narrow
focus on the social cause risks alienating important target audiences over time. Compared to this,
a customer-driven approach focuses on short run equitable compromises and building up positive
relationships between advocacy groups and their advocacy target audiences in the long term
(Stern et al, 2009: 7). This, in theory, takes the conflict out of advocacy and improves the
advocacy groups’ chance of creating small, but stable incremental progress that over time will
amount to more significant changes for the people that they represent.
Furthermore, on a more normative level, customer-driven advocacy is a decidedly
positive approach in its emphasis on seeing the opportunities and unfulfilled potential in people
rather than focusing on their weaknesses and shortcomings. In this regard, customer-driven
advocacy same as social marketing believes that it in most cases is better to work with people
rather than against them (Kotler et al, 2009: 48). This in turn leads to a focus on solutions rather
than problems and in the process keeps physical and verbal violence at a minimum. Because of
this, more research is needed about using marketing in advocacy and in relation to marketing’s
ability to bring progress to otherwise locked conflicts in Burma and elsewhere for the benefit of
people on both sides of the table.
Chiang Mai, Thailand
May 2013
117
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Interview guide
Warm up question
Question (Q): Can you tell me a little bit about your organization and what you work with?
Goals (step 3 of the marketing plan)
Q: What goals is your organization trying to achieve in terms of advocacy? Why do you have
these goals?
Q: When were these advocacy goals determined? Have they ever been revised?
Environmental analysis (steps 1-2 of the marketing plan)
Q: How do you get updated information about the situation inside Burma?
Q: How do you get updated information about countries and international organizations that
your advocacy group is lobbying?
Q: In general, to what extent does your organization analyze your own strengths and
weaknesses, before you decide on your advocacy strategies?
Q: If your organization ever analyzed its own strengths, what strengths did you find?
Q: If your organization ever analyzed its own weaknesses, what weaknesses did you find?
STP (step 4)
Segmentation:
Q: How do you determine which parts of the international community it is important to address?
Targeting:
Q: Do you try to focus your efforts on influencing a few decision makers or do you try to
influence as many as possible?
Q: Do you try to customize your advocacy to the individual government or int. org.?
Positioning:
Q: How important is it, that the people, governments or international organizations you are
lobbying are genuinely happy to help you?
Q: Is it important that in the areas you focus on, there are no – or only a few – other Burma
advocacy groups doing the same thing as you? (Positioning)
Q: What countries and int. organizations are you trying to lobby?
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Marketing strategies (step 5)
Marketing strategies:
Q: What methods do you use, when you try to influence your target audience? (Product)
Q: In what different ways do you try to reach your target audience with your message? (Place)
Q: Do you charge anything from the people using your publications? (Price)
Q: Do you release your publications at a certain time? (Promotion)
Q: What do you do to create a good public image of your organization? (Branding)
Q: Is it important, that you have a good image with the governments and international
organizations that you are trying to influence? (Branding)
Q: Do you try to establish personal connections within the governments and international
organizations that you are trying to influence? (Branding)
Q: In advocacy, you can reach your goals either through ‘becoming friends’ with key decision
makers or through building up pressure on the decision makers. Which technique does your
organization favor? (Advocacy vs. Marketing)
Q: To what extent do you try to build coalitions and coordinate your efforts with groups and
decision makers who share your point of view? (Keiretzu networks + Supply chain management)
Action plan (step 6)
Q: How do you plan your work in your organization?
o Do you have an action plan?
If yes: How is it structured (in terms of tasks, deadliness and people
responsible)? How often do you evaluate your action plan?
If no: What do you have instead?
o How many months or years ahead do you plan your work?
Budgeting (step 7)
Q: What is your organization’s yearly budget in Baht?
Q: How do you make sure that you have a sufficient budget to reach your goals?
Q: Is lack of a funding a problem for your organization?
Q: Where do you get your funding from?
Q: Where are the main funders based?
Q: Does the funding often come with requirements about what your organization needs to work
with? If yes, how does your organization respond to such requirements?
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Performance evaluation (step 8)
Q: How do you measure the impact of your work? How often does this impact measurement take
place?
Q: What do you do, if you find out that you are not reaching a particular goal?
Q: How often does your organization evaluate your overall strategy?
Achievements Q: In what way has your organization helped change Burma? What has been the impact of your
work?
Background information about respondents
Q: What is the level of education of your organization’s management team?
Q: What is the professional background of your organization’s management team
Q: What is the average age of your organization’s management team?
Q: How many years have your management team been in your organization?
Q: From what ethnic group do most of your members, volunteers and employees come from?
Q: Are there any foreigners (non-Burmese) working for your organization?
If yes, how many foreigners and are they part of the management team?
Q: How many years have you had an office in Thailand?
Q: Do you have offices in other countries than Thailand? If yes, where?
Q: Have anybody in your management team been stationed outside Thailand? If yes, where and
for how long?
Q: Does your organization have a religious influence?
Q: Does your organization mainly consist of volunteers or paid employees?
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Appendix 2: Survey
Research Survey Chiang Mai, November 25
th 2012
Dear respondent
My name is Jens Lindberg Jensen and I am a graduate student at Payap University in Chiang
Mai. For my final project I am conducting a study about Burma advocacy groups based in
Thailand. Because you are an active member of this community, I am inviting you to participate
in my study by completing the attached survey.
The attached survey will take 15-20 minutes to finish. All respondents are confidential, so please
do not include your name.
For all the questions, it is important that you answer based on your organization’s actions in
relation to advocacy. In other words, in the survey you need to state the actions of your
organization and not your own thoughts about advocacy.
Furthermore, all questions relate to what your organization was doing before the 2010 elections.
In other words, the questions are not about what your organization is doing right now. The
reason for this is that the time frame of my study is the SLORC/SPDC period from 1990 to 2010.
Upon completion, please return the survey to me.
Finally, I would like to sincerely thank you for participating in my research project. I would not
be able to finish this project without your help and I value your participation immensely.
If you have any questions or feedback in relation to this study, please do not hesitate to contact
me.
Yours sincerely –
Jens Lindberg Jensen
IMBA-program
Payap University, Chiang Mai
[email protected] – 0846-1276-25
138
1 Organization cause
What kind of cause was your organization mainly working with in relation to Burma? Please
only tick one box.
Democracy Human rights Ethnic issues Environmental issues Relief aid Community development Other
If other, please specify:
2 Advocacy
2.1 Does your organization mainly work with advocacy?
Yes, advocacy is our main priority No, advocacy is a secondary priority
If no, what is your main priority:
2.2 What was the goal with your organization’s advocacy work? What were you specifically
trying to achieve? Please explain.
3 Advocacy target audience
3.1 What, if any, countries were the target audience for your organization’s advocacy? Who
did you try to get in contact with? 1 is did not try to contact and 7 is tried to contact a lot.
Did not try to contact Tried to contact a lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
USA
EU
China
Thailand
India
Russia
Other
If other, please specify:
139
3.2 What, if any, international organizations were your advocacy target audience? Who did
you try to get in contact with?
Did not try to contact Tried to contact a lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
UN
ASEAN
Other
If other, please specify:
3.3 Who, if any, in government controlled areas of Burma were your advocacy target
audience? Who did you try to get in contact with?
Did not try to contact Tried to contact a lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SPDC government
Tatmadaw
USDA
Local media
Civil servants
Business tycoons
Domestic opposition
The general public
3.4 Who, if any, in the ethnic controlled areas of Burma were your advocacy target audience?
Who did you try to get in contact with?
Did not try to contact Tried to contact a lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The general public
Civil society groups
Ethnic armed groups
4 Advocacy methods
4.1 To what extent did you use the following methods to spread your information?
Did not use Used a lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
News releases
Regular news letters
Reports
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4.2 What format was your information in?
Did not use Used a lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Written text
Video
Radio
4.3 To what extent did you use the internet to make your information available?
Did not use Used a lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Organization website
Email lists
YouTube
Social networks (Facebook etc.)
Online Burma databases (Altsean etc.)
4.4 To what extent did you distribute your information through the below channels?
Did not use Used a lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Attending Burma related conferences
Attending informal meetings
Sending information to foreign governments
Sending information to international organizations
Allowing other Burma roups to use your info
Allowing news agencies to use your information
4.5 Evaluate whether the following statements accurately describe your organization.
Not true True
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Our info depended on what people would be interested to hear about
We tried to make the people we were lobbying like us
We tried to develop personal relationships with the people we lobbied
We coordinated our work with other Burma advocacy groups
The focus of our work was to build up pressure on the government
The focus of our work was to engage with the government
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5 Planning
5.1 Did your organization spend a lot of time planning your advocacy work, before you went
out and did it?
Spent little time planning Spent a lot of time planning
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5.2 How much time ahead did your organization plan its advocacy work?
Less than 1 month 1 month 2-6 months 7-12 months 13-23 months 2-3 years 4 years or more
6 Financial resources
What was your organization’s yearly budget in Baht?
99,000 or less 100,000 to
199,000
200,000 to
499,000
500,000 to
999,000
1 million to
1.9 million
2 million to
4.9 million
5 million
or more
If more than 5 million, how much:
7 Evaluation
7.1 How often did your organization evaluate its advocacy work?
Never Less than 1
time per year
1 time
per year
2 times
per year
3 to 4 times
per year
More than 4
times per year
Every
month
7.2 How often did your organization re-evaluate whether your target audience should be
people outside of Burma or inside of Burma?
Never Often
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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8 Information gathering
8.1 The next 4 questions will ask how often you gathered background information about how
various countries and international organizations thought about the political situation in
Burma. What were their views and opinions? 1 is never gathered information and 7 is always
gathered information.
How much time did your organization spend gathering background information about how other
countries thought about the political situation in Burma?
Never gather info Always gather info
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
USA
EU
China
Thailand
India
Russia
How much time did your organization spend gathering background information about how
international organizations thought about the political situation in Burma?
Never gather info Always gather info
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
UN
ASEAN
How much time did your organization spend gathering background information about how groups
in government controlled areas of Burma thought about politics in Burma?
Never gather info Always gather info
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SPDC government
Tatmadaw
USDA
Local media
Civil servants
Business tycoons
Domestic opposition
The general public
How much time did your organization spend gathering background information about how groups in
ethnic controlled areas of Burma thought about politics in Burma?
Never gather info Always gather info
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ethnic civil society groups
Ethnic armed groups
The general public
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8.2 How frequently would your organization analyze its own strengths and weaknesses, when
you were planning your advocacy work?
Never analyze Always analyze
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Organization’s strengths
Organization’s weaknesses
9 Background information
9.1 What was the education level of most members of your organization’s management team?
Primary school High school Bachelor Master Other
If other, please specify:
9.2 What was the professional background of most members of your organization’s
management team?
NGO Student Politics Government employee Military Business Other
If other, please specify:
9.3 What is the average age of your organization’s management team? 19 or less 20-24 25-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61 or more
9.4 How many people in your management team were foreigners (i.e. not from Burma)?
9.5 How many times a year did somebody from your management team go abroad to do
advocacy?
9.6 How many paid staff did your organization have? 0-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 More than 60
If more than 60, how many?
144
9.7 How many volunteers did your organization have? 0-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 More than 60
If more than 60, how many?
9.8 Are you an independent organization only working on Burma or part of a multinational
organization (for example such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch)? Independent organization Part of an international organization
9.9 How many years have you had an office in Thailand? Less than 1 year 1-2 years 3-4 years 5-9 years 10-14 years 15-20 years More than 20 years
10 Impact
10.1 To what extent did your organization have an impact in making the following countries
and international organizations put pressure on the SPDC?
No impact Large impact
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
USA
EU
China
Thailand
India
Russia
UN
ASEAN
10.2 To what extent did your organization have an impact in making the following countries
and international organizations engage in dialogue with the SPDC?
No impact Large impact
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
USA
EU
China
Thailand
India
Russia
UN
ASEAN
145
10.3 To what extent did your organization have an impact on people in government controlled
areas of Burma? No impact Large impact
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Make the general public stronger politically
Make domestic opposition stronger politically
10.4 To what extent did your organization have an impact in the ethnic controlled areas of
Burma? No impact Large impact
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Make the general public stronger politically
Make civil society groups stronger
Make the ethnic armed groups stronger
10.5 To what extent did your organization have an impact in making SPDC more willing to…
No impact Large impact
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Engage with the international community
Engage with the domestic opposition
Engage with the ethnic armed groups
Consider democratic reforms
10.6 Overall, to what extent did your organization have an impact on SPDC?
No impact Large impact
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Make SPDC adopt more democratic policies
Make SPDC commit fewer human rights abuses
Make SPDC call for elections in 2010
10.7 Overall, to what extent did your organization have an impact on making the current
Thein Sein government implement democratic reforms? No Impact Large impact
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10.8 In your own words, what are the achievements of your organization? Please explain.
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