USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening · USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Legislatures are the people™s branch of government, the institution

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE�...promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world.�

USAID HANDBOOK ONLEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING

February 2000

Technical Publication Series

Center for Democracy and GovernanceBureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research

U.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC 20523-3100

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ABOUT THE TECHNICAL PUBLICATION SERIESThe USAID Center for Democracy and Governance Technical Publication Series was launched in March1998. The series includes publications intended principally for USAID personnel; however, all personsinterested in the sector may benefit from the series. Authors of individual publications may be USAIDofficials and/or other individuals from the public and private sector. The Center for Democracy and Governancereserves the right to review and edit all publications for content and format and all are subject to a broadUSAID review process. The series is intended in part to indicate best practices, lessons learned, and guidelinesfor practitioner consideration. The series also includes publications that are intended to stimulate debate anddiscussion.

A list of other relevant publications and ordering information are included at the back of this document.

ABOUT THIS PUBLICATIONThis handbook is intended to help USAID field staff make informed decisions with regard to legislativestrengthening strategies. It outlines a framework for assessing the needs of legislative bodies and designingappropriate responses to those needs, and describes legislative strengthening work carried out by USAID andothers.

Comments regarding this handbook and inquiries regarding USAID�s ongoing work in the area of legislativestrengthening should be directed to

Pat Isman-Fn�Piere, Governance Team Stephen Brager, Governance TeamTel: (202) 712-4238 Tel: (202) 712-5668Fax: (202) 216-3232 Fax: (202) [email protected] [email protected]

Center for Democracy and GovernanceBureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and ResearchU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC 20523-3100

More information, including electronic versions of the Center�s Technical Publication Series, is availablefrom USAID�s Internet site at www.info.usaid.gov/democracy/

ABOUT THE CENTERThe Center for Democracy and Governance is the U.S. Agency for International Development�s focal pointfor democracy and governance programming. The Center�s role is to provide USAID and other developmentpractitioners with the technical and intellectual expertise needed to support democratic development. Itprovides this expertise in the following areas:

C Rule of LawC Elections and Political ProcessesC Civil SocietyC Governance

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Center for Democracy and Governance, Governance TeamIn addition to the primary authors, the Center for Democracy and Governance would like to acknowledgethe contributions of a number of other people. Stephen M. Brager, a Democracy Fellow who acts asadvisor on legislative strengthening for the Center, guided the day-to-day production of the handbook andmade contributions that strengthened its structure and deepened its content. Stephen has worked on issuesof politics of authoritarianism and democratization for over 15 years. He received his master�s degree inpolitical science from the University of California, San Diego, where he studied the politics of develop-ment, political development, and political institutions. Stephen has written papers on the role of institu-tions and their effect on political outcomes and done a considerable amount of work on how USAIDprogramming can take into account differences in presidential and parliamentary political systems. Alsodeserving of special mention is Pat Isman-Fn�Piere who was involved with the handbook from its incep-tion. Others at the Center who made noteworthy contributions to the handbook include Karen Farrell,Diana Swain, and Jennifer Windsor.

Finally, the Center would like to acknowledge and thank those USAID Missions, implementing partners,and other donor organizations who read one or more drafts in whole or in part and provided input, sugges-tions, ideas, and examples of case studies for inclusion in the handbook.

John K. JohnsonJohn K. Johnson is a legislative/parliamentary development specialist with the State University of NewYork, International Development Group (SUNY/IDG). He has served as project director for majorUSAID legislative strengthening projects in Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Uganda, and has consulted withUSAID, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), U.S. Information Agency, and theOrganization of American States (OAS) for legislatures in Latin America and Africa. John is projectdirector for the Legislative Strengthening Activities Analysis project, in collaboration with the USAIDCenter for Democracy and Governance of the Global Bureau and was also project director for the 1996Conference on Legislative Strengthening held in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. He is the U.S. member of theUNDP Expert Panel on Legislatures. John has lived in Kenya, served as a U.S. Foreign Service officer inMexico, and was a committee director for the New York State Senate. He has a B.A. in government fromSt. Lawrence University, and two M.A.s, one in political science and one in African studies, from SUNY-Albany, where he completed coursework for a Ph.D. in political science.

James D. KentJames D. Kent is a member of the public administration faculty at Marist College in New York. Prior tohis academic career, he had more than 20 years of experience as a senior staff member with thelegislatures of Illinois, Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Ohio. He has lived in the Philippines andAmerican Samoa, and has consulted with legislatures in Hungary, Kazakhstan, and Uganda, amongothers. James has been active in the National Conference of State Legislatures throughout his career,serving on its Legislative Management Committee and as a member of the board of the NationalLegislative Program Evaluation Society. Legislative staff, auditors, and others frequently call upon him asa consultant or trainer. James has a B.A. in political science from the University of Florida, and an M.P.A.and Ph.D. from SUNY-Albany.

Robert T. NakamuraRobert T. Nakamura is professor of political science and public affairs at the Rockefeller College ofSUNY-Albany. He is co-author of five books, including The Politics of Policy Implementation (St.Martin�s Press) and Cleaning Up the Mess (Brookings). He has received grants and contracts from a

number of sources, including the National Academy of Public Administration, National Endowment forthe Humanities, Ford Foundation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Institute of Education,Clean Sites, and the Business Roundtable. Robert has been a consultant to the U.S. General AccountingOffice, New York State Assembly, National Science Foundation, USAID, UNDP, and the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank in Bolivia, Bulgaria, Peru, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In addition, he hasconducted policy studies in Denmark, Germany, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, and in the offices of theEuropean Community.

State University of New York, International Development Group (SUNY/IDG)SUNY/IDG served as the primary contractor to develop this handbook. The SUNY/IDG home office inAlbany, New York is an integral part of the SUNY System Administration; it reports directly to theSUNY provost. As a system-wide office, SUNY/IDG draws on the considerable resources of all theSUNY campuses as well as a wide network of outside consultants and partner institutions. SUNY is thelargest completely integrated university system in the world. SUNY�s many academic-basedorganizations and institutes support SUNY/IDG�s efforts worldwide. In addition to the SUNY system�sconsiderable technical and intellectual resources, SUNY/IDG works with partners worldwide to ensuresuccessful fulfillment of its projects. Since its inception in 1986, SUNY/IDG has designed andimplemented more than $68 million of international development projects on four continents focusing onthree major areas: environment, health, and education; democracy and governance; and private sector andeconomic development.

USAID HANDBOOK ON LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 1

I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 3

II. UNDERSTANDING LEGISLATIVE BODIES ......................................................................... 7

A. The Functions of a Legislature ........................................................................................... 7B. Varieties of Legislative Structures and Processes .............................................................. 9

III. ASSESSING DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND PRIORITIES ............................. 13

A. Assessing the Host Country Context ................................................................................ 13B. Assessing Legislative Strengths and Weaknesses ............................................................ 17C. Prioritizing Assistance ...................................................................................................... 24

IV. DESIGNING LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES ........................................................................... 27

A. Political Will and Domestic Support ................................................................................ 27B. Representation .................................................................................................................. 31C. Lawmaking ....................................................................................................................... 40D. Oversight .......................................................................................................................... 47E. Management and Infrastructure ....................................................................................... 50

V. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................... 57

A. Implementation Considerations ........................................................................................ 57B. Emerging Issues ............................................................................................................... 59

APPENDIX A: Sample Legislative Needs and Priorities Assessment Questions

APPENDIX B: Presidential and Parliamentary Legislatures Compared

APPENDIX C: Useful Publications

USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Legislatures are the people�s branch of government, the institution where citizen interests and preferencesare expressed and transformed into policy, and the point at which, at least potentially, people most closelyengage their national government. As such, legislatures are key to achieving the democratic potentialembodied in free and fair elections. While legislatures are central to democracy, they tend to inherit aposition of weakness relative to the executive. Moreover, legislatures must function effectively toreinforce democracy and make public policies effective. If the voices of those most affected bygovernment policies are not heard in the policymaking process, those policies will not be as successful asthey can be.

Legislatures fulfill a number of important functions in a democracy: they represent people and groups,reflecting and bringing their needs, aspirations, problems, concerns, and priorities to the policymakingand policy-amending process; they make laws, the rules that govern a nation; and they practice oversight,assuring that laws and programs are carried out legally, effectively, and according to legislative intent.The representation function is fundamental, for it shapes the democratic character of the other twofunctions. Legislatures can legislate and conduct oversight, but without effective mechanisms ofrepresentation, they cannot be democratic, and are not likely to act in the interest of society as a whole.

When a legislature is ineffective in carrying out its functions, society suffers. There can be a number ofreasons for an ineffective legislature. If legislative links and communication with society are weak, thenthat legislature performs its representation function poorly. Electoral systems and political parties mayprovide little incentive for legislators to reach out to civil society and constituents; legislative rules andfacilities may discourage citizens and groups from dealing with the legislature; and civil society may notbe organized and equipped to interact successfully with the legislature. Political rules and traditions maydiscourage the legislature from playing effective lawmaking or oversight roles. Inadequately preparedlegislators and staff, and insufficient control over resources also combine to limit legislative lawmakingand oversight performance.

This handbook is designed to assist USAID Missions in developing strategies to help legislatures functionmore effectively and to perform their functions more democratically and representatively. It explains theimportance of legislatures in a democracy, describes structural and other factors that influence legislativebehavior, and enumerates problems legislatures commonly face. It then presents an assessmentframework that is designed to help USAID field officers pinpoint the weaknesses and understand thecapabilities of their host-country legislature. The following section identifies various assistance activitiesdesigned to address the weaknesses and take advantage of strengths discovered in the assessment. Thehandbook concludes with a number of considerations for implementing legislative programs and apresentation of emerging issues in legislative strengthening.

The legislative assessment framework, in conjunction with the overall democracy and governancestrategic assessment framework (Conducting a DG Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development[Advance Copy], December 1999), will help determine when USAID might conduct a legislativestrengthening program and what the program should look like. The timing of making the investment tosupport a legislature will depend on the nature of the principal democratic problems faced by a country, asfound in the DG strategic assessment framework, and the opportunities that arise that have a strongpotential for impact. Whatever the rationale for working with a legislature, the design of an effective

USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening2

program will take into account the unique institutional and societal conditions of the country, interests ofstakeholders, and the specific legislative weaknesses and capabilities in each of five areas: political willand domestic support, representation, lawmaking, oversight, and infrastructure and management. Asummary chart on page 55 provides an overview of the activities described in the handbook, organized bythe areas they are intended to support.

In recent years, legislative strengthening programs have come under fire with questions about the strategicinvestment of resources when providing assistance to legislatures. The handbook responds to thosecriticisms by providing a strategic framework for program design. To this end, it makes a number ofimportant points.

First, political institutions�the structure of the legislature, the distribution of power and authoritiesbetween the executive and legislature, the electoral system, and the structure of political parties and theirfragmentation within the system�not only shape political outcomes but have important implications forprogramming, affecting both the design and the targets (party caucuses, committees, individuallegislators, legislative leaders, staff, etc.) of the programs. As a result, USAID programming must givegreater consideration to these institutions so programs reflect the particular conditions within a country.

Second, support for legislatures needs to be given with the objective of promoting democraticdevelopment. Institutional development�creating a better organization, standardizing processes, havingbetter infrastructure and equipment, and increasing staff�while sometimes essential, is not sufficient.Because one of USAID�s explicit development goals is the promotion of democracy, missions have thelatitude�if not the obligation�to work on the more political, and more inherently democratic, functionsof representation, lawmaking, and oversight. In particular, political parties, as central actors within alegislature, deserve greater attention as targets of assistance for helping legislatures developdemocratically.

Third, programming needs to take greater advantage of synergies between legislative strengthening andother democracy and development sectors. Legislatures play�or, in a democratic political system, shouldplay�a central role in all areas of policymaking and governance. As a result, the potential for cross-sectoral linkages and programming is tremendous. Activities that strengthen the legislature can, in fact,principally aim toward results in other sectors. For example, a mission assisting a government to pass orimplement health reform may help develop expertise among pertinent legislative members and staff in theissues relevant to health reform by training them in techniques that foster public input and sound,empirical policy analysis, or in methods of executive oversight. Missions can improve the democraticeffectiveness of the legislature as well as increase the likelihood of attaining results under a mission�sformal strategic objective.

The emphasis on strategic programming notwithstanding, legislative strengthening programming is an art,not a science. Carrying out assessments and understanding the proper roles of legislatures and theirconstituent parts (parties, members, staff), the factors that affect legislative performance, and the purposesof specific programming activities will not inexorably lead to certain results. Like in art, however, thereare principles, skills, and knowledge that define guidelines for making informed judgment calls that willlikely result in effective programming. The purpose of this handbook is to contribute to that end.


I. INTRODUCTION

U.S. support for strengthening legislatures is notnew. The United States has supported thedemocratic development of legislatures off andon for much of the 20th century. After WorldWar II, the United States, with the expertassistance of the U.S. Library of Congress,supported the development of both the GermanBundestag and the Japanese Diet. During the1970s, USAID funded a number of U.S.universities, which conducted legislative studytours, exchanges with legislatures in othernations, and comparative research onlegislatures.

It was not until the late 1980s and early 1990sthat USAID programming in legislativestrengthening began in earnest. Initial legislativesupport programs focused on redressing thebalance of power between the legislature andthe executive by building the technical capacityof legislatures. Perhaps best exemplified by theFrost Task Force/Congressional ResearchService program in Eastern Europe, theseefforts introduced computer technology inlegislatures, and trained professional library,research, and committee staff.1 They weredesigned to help legislatures acquire the toolsthey needed to function more effectively and toperform their lawmaking/policymaking role.

USAID legislative programs expanded in themid- to late-1990s to emphasize relationsbetween the legislature and civil society. Newerprograms, while also supporting institutionaldevelopment, sought to assure that legislaturesbecome more open and more responsive to theneeds and desires of citizens and groups insociety.

As with programs in other democracysubsectors, the changes in level and emphasis oflegislative strengthening programs coincidedwith the spread of democracy globally andUSAID�s adoption of democracy promotion asone of its priority principal goals of developmentin 1994. Over the years, USAID has had to makedifficult decisions about which of the variety ofthe democracy and governance needs to supportwithin any given country. Why, then, should aUSAID Mission consider investing programresources in strengthening a legislature? Thereare a number of good reasons USAID Missionssupport legislative development:

Effective, representative legislatures bringbenefits to the large majority of citizens.Ideally, in democratic societies, governmentsconsult with citizens about their preferences andreceive their consent for collective decisions.Legislators and parties whose political futuresare more closely linked to satisfied voters thanare those of executive bureaucrats are oftenmore attentive to constituent concerns. Politicalscientist Nelson Polsby has characterizedlegislatures as the �nerve ending� of the polity.2

As representative institutions, legislatures are thearena where the democratic potential of electionsis transformed into reality.

In addition to enhancing the performance ofdemocracy in developing countries, assistance tolegislatures furthers overall nationaldevelopment. Amartya Sen�s frequently citedfinding, that no modern democracy hasundergone a famine, suggests that democraciescannot easily insulate themselves from popularsuffering.3 As a result, elected representativesand their parties, if they are to continue in office,

1 The Frost Task Force was a U.S. House of Repre-sentatives special task force on the development ofparliamentary institutions in Eastern Europe. It was namedafter the task force�s chairman, Rep. Martin Frost (D-TX).

2 Nelson W. Polsby, �Legislatures,� in Handbook ofPolitical Science: Government Institutions and Processes,eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA:Addison Wesley, 1975).

3 Amartya Sen, �Democracy as a Universal Value,�Journal of Democracy 10:3 (July 1999): 7-8.


must be especially sensitive to the needs andinterests of their constituents. Effectivelegislatures should listen to and be able torespond to constituent concerns.

Effective legislatures support additional goodgovernance objectives and U.S. foreign policygoals. Governance trends that the U.S.supports�reducing state control overeconomies, devolving power closer to people,and requiring greater governmenttransparency�develop best with input fromsociety, and legislatures are uniquely equippedto play the role of mouthpiece of the publicinterest. Effective legislatures improve goodgovernance when they formulate clear laws thatrespond to the needs of citizens and ensure theirimplementation through oversight.

For example, the United States supports thedevelopment of free economies, which requireclear, consistent �rules of the game,� to reducegovernment discretion and encourageinvestment and economic growth. As the branchof government responsible for listening topopular concerns and amending public policy torespond to them, legislatures can pass newproperty, contract, and penal codes thatencourage investment and growth and, at thesame time, take into account the human costs ofthese changes.

For decentralization programs to be effective,statutes should be developed in consultation withthose affected by them, and the nationallegislature has great potential to serve as themechanism for that consultation. Publichearings, informal meetings between legislatorsand constituents, and political party input at thelocal level can assure that this consultation takesplace.

Finally, the growing demand for effective,transparent government requires legislatures toplay their oversight role successfully.Legislatures can help reduce corruption and

improve government performance as theypractice effective oversight and enact laws toimprove government performance.

USAID legislative strengthening activities canmake a difference. For a variety of reasons,legislatures almost always inherit a position ofweakness vis-à-vis the executive. Executiveresources, even in very poor nations, tend todwarf those of the legislature; legal powers oftenfavor the executive; political party structuresundermine the ability of legislatures to play theirrepresentative function; and so on. In addition,as this handbook will illustrate, legislativeweaknesses, in terms of staffing, memberpreparation, outmoded rules and traditions, andweak links with citizens also contribute toundermining legislative effectiveness.

Many of the examples contained in thishandbook illustrate how USAID legislativeprograms have helped legislatures carry out theirrepresentation, lawmaking, and oversightfunctions more effectively. Following are a fewspecific examples:

� After USAID provided funding for two ofMalawi�s parliamentary clerks to participatein a �staff attachment� program with theMaryland State Legislature, severalprocedural changes were made based on theirobservations of the United States. Thechanges resulted in two first-timeoccurrences: adopting a procedure thatreferred all bills to committees and holdingpublic hearings, which included testimony of�outside� witnesses, by a committee.

� USAID provided the funding for �NCOPOnline!,� which uses the Internet and othercommunications technology to link SouthAfrica�s National Council of Provinces(NCOP) to the provincial legislatures andlocal government associations. NCOP,established as the second chamber of theSouth African Parliament in 1997, is a unique


body created to facilitate provincial and localgovernment participation in the nationallegislative process. NCOP Online!simultaneously allows public access to theinformation provided to the subnationalbodies. Citizens can also use NCOP Online!to submit comments directly to NCOPcommittees.

� USAID assistance to the Congreso de Boliviain the early 1990s enabled it to introduceprofessional budget staff. The new staffidentified more than $100 million in errors inthe executive�s proposed budget over a two-year period, which forced the executive torevise its budgets to get them enacted.

� USAID assistance to the Congreso de laRepdblica de Guatemala in the late 1990senabled it to establish a center that conductedresearch necessary for the implementation ofthe nation�s peace accords.

� In Romania, USAID assisted legislators withan innovative program of establishing districtoffices, despite the fact that legislators wereelected by party list. District offices havemade legislators and their parties moreaccessible to the citizens they represent.

� USAID helped establish or provided supportto legislative modernization groups in suchcountries as Bolivia, Mozambique,Nicaragua, and Uganda. These groups helpedbuild support for legislative strengthening andreform efforts, in some cases bringing sharplydivided political parties together to work todevelop their legislature.

The Role of USAID�s Center for Democracyand Governance

One of the roles of the Center for Democracyand Governance is to collect and analyzeUSAID�s experience (particularly over the lastdecade and a half) in the democracy and

governance field. Based upon its specificexperience in assisting legislatures, the Center isworking to develop a more strategic approachfor deciding how best to allocate scarceresources for greatest democratic impact. Thishandbook, along with other publications andconferences on legislative development,supports this goal.

Purpose of the Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to assist USAIDMissions and their partners as they design andimplement legislative programs. It contains thefollowing sections:

� An overview that provides a generalunderstanding of legislatures and discussestheir importance, their functions, and how andwhy legislative structures and processes vary(Section II)

� An assessment framework designed to helpfield officers understand the particularcapabilities and weaknesses of the host-country legislature (Section III)

� Specific programming activities that addressthe weaknesses identified in Section III(Section IV)

� A conclusion that provides practicalconsiderations for conducting successfullegislative strengthening programs, as well ascomments on emerging issues in legislativestrengthening (Section V)

� Appendices that provide sample legislativeassessment questions, an outline of howdifferences between parliamentary andpresidential regimes affect the behavior oflegislatures, and a select bibliography



II. UNDERSTANDINGLEGISLATIVE BODIES

Even autocratic regimes often have some sort ofcollective institution to debate and ratify publicpolicies. Legislative bodies with institutionalself-awareness and independent authority,however, carry out much more than consultationand ratification. They actively shape policy andoversee its implementation in ways thatrepresent the values and interests of thecitizenry.

While each legislature is different, this sectionpresents an overall framework for understandinglegislative bodies, what they do, and the varietyof legislative structures and processes.

A. The Functions of a Legislature4

Legislatures are complex and multi-facetedorganizations. Analysts have identified aplethora of purposes and functions thatlegislatures fulfill. This handbook organizes thisvariety into three basic functions: representation,lawmaking, and oversight. These functions arefacilitated by effective self-management and aninfrastructure that meets the needs of thelegislature.

1. Representation

Representation is central to the democraticfunctioning of a legislative body. A legislaturethat is not representative of and accountable tothe people undermines the nature of democracyin a country.

Democracy can only be realized whenlegislators have the will, ability, and informationto make decisions that reflect the interests andneeds of society. Likewise, the people must havethe will, ability, and information to transmit theirneeds and interests to the legislature, to evaluatethe performance of legislators and their parties,and to reward or sanction their actions.

Legislatures can represent citizens in differentways, depending on their laws and traditions.Election systems may be designed so legislatorsreflect their constituents� demographiccharacteristics and/or share their political andsocial views. Legislators may be expected tovote exactly as their own constituents wouldprefer, to follow their party and vote strictlyalong party lines, or to assess and vote for thelong-term interests of all citizens�even if theirown constituents disagree. In some situations,the legislative body is expected to supportvirtually all proposals of the executive or at leastof the member�s political party. In other cases,legislators want to develop their own positionsand to negotiate actively with the executive toreach agreement. In still others, the legislaturemay oppose virtually all executive proposals.

Citizen expectations may be voiced, sometimesimplicitly, through the electoral process.Elections, however, are only one entry point forcitizens into the political process; they do not inthemselves constitute full citizen participation ingovernance. After elections are held, the degreeto which individuals and groups have access tothe legislative body, or at least a legislator�s ear,helps determine the legislature�s degree ofrepresentation. Is access restricted, either by lawor in practice, to certain groups of citizens, orcan all individuals approach the body? To whatextent and by what means can citizens get theirconcerns onto the legislative agenda? Arecitizens able to find out what is currentlyproposed in the legislature? To what extent canthey influence legislative outcomes?

4 The handbook uses the generic term �legislature� toavoid confusion between types of legislatures. In thisdocument, �parliament� refers to a legislature in aparliamentary system.


To some extent, representation is an end in itself.If the legislature is truly representative, itsdecisions are given social legitimacy, enhancingpolitical stability. However, representationclearly supports the other two legislativefunctions as well: an open, representative bodywill make laws that are more broadly accepted incontent and process, and will also be moreeffective in its oversight of governmentprograms.

2. Lawmaking

When people are asked what legislatures do, themost common and immediate response is �Theymake laws.� In practice, this simple statementencompasses a wide range of activities. Mostlegislatures have ample lawmaking authority intheory, under their national constitution, charter,or other foundational documents or traditions. Inpractice, though, broad ideas must be turned intospecific proposals that can be analyzed,deliberated, and then drafted into formallegislation. For this to be done effectively,legislators and their constituents need to trackproposals at various stages of the legislativeprocess, and to be given an opportunity toinfluence them before final adoption. Thisordinarily must occur within some specifiedtimeframe.

The legislature may not, however, be able tomobilize the resources needed to participateactively in the lawmaking process. Weak legalauthority, ineffective leadership, cumbersomeand non-existent committee processes, poorlytrained staff, or lack of information may causeproblems. Because lawmaking is the mostvisible activity of legislatures, effectivelawmaking may mean more than the passage ofspecific legislative initiatives; it can alsocontribute to the strengthened legitimacy of thelegislative body itself.

3. Oversight

Laws and public programs often do not turn outas expected or intended, whether due to designflaws, implementation problems, or social oreconomic changes. Further intervention by thelegislature may be needed to detect and correctproblems. Thus, oversight of executive programsand activities is critical to an effective legislatureand to effective democratic governance.

Oversight includes investigation to detect wasteand corruption, formal audit or evaluation toassess program effectiveness or efficiency, andhearings to air issues or concerns. Legislaturesvary in their ability and willingness to undertakethese activities, depending on constitutionalstructure, access to budget information, powersto review and amend budgets, power to confirmand remove executive appointments, and therelationship of parties in the legislature to partiesin the executive. Conducting oversight of theexecutive may be less politically rewarding thansponsoring legislation or serving constituents,and may even be politically dangerous.However, vigorous oversight promotesaccountability of the executive more effectivelythan any other mechanism, and, thus, is basic toa strong legislature.

Associated Operations

In order to facilitate the performance of itsdemocratic functions, a legislature must alsotend to issues of internal management. As withany organization, management and infrastructureproblems can hinder a legislature fromperforming its core democratic functionseffectively. Some problems are clearlyadministrative and organizational; others may bepolitical. In any case, a legislature withoutadequate space, computers, or records has aninfrastructure problem. Needed resources mayinclude staff, physical facilities, or equipment;timely access to useful information; or adequateorganizational structures and processes. The


breadth of this list of needed resources suggeststhe complexity of assessing such needs.

Rarely is there an instance when programmingshould focus wholly, or even mostly, onadministrative or infrastructure support. Thepoint of strengthening internal management or ofproviding commodities is to support specificefforts to improve a legislature�s democraticfunctions. In other words, the objective is notjust to make a legislature operationally effective;ultimately it is to help to strengthen democracy.Results of operational efficiency are insufficientto justify continued support.

B. Varieties of Legislative Structures andProcesses

An effective legislative body brings to its workthe values and preferences of all its constituentsand then negotiates policies that reflect thebroadest possible negotiated consensus amongthem. Each legislature is unique, since the set ofvalues and preferences of each body politic isunique. In addition, each legislature is constantlychanging, as both its membership and itsconstituents� preferences shift. Patterns,however, can still be discerned.

1. Presidential, Parliamentary, andHybrid Systems

People raised in the United States are quitefamiliar with the presidential form ofgovernment, where the executive and thelegislative branches are elected separately andoften for terms of different duration. Thepresident and members of the cabinet are notmembers of the legislature. Thus, the executivemay not have majority support in the legislativebranch, which may be controlled by other partiesor factions. Even when the executive and themajority of the legislature are of the same party,the legislative branch is somewhat independentof the executive, owing to its differentconstituencies and the fact that tenure of the

president does not depend on the confidence ofthe legislative branch.

In a parliamentary system the chief executiveand cabinet are also members of the parliament,selected from the majority party or coalitionwithin the legislature. All members ofparliament are elected simultaneously for termsof the same length. The legislature is expected tosupport the executive, whose loss of legislativesupport on a key issue can trigger a crisis andoften the formation of a new government. Overtlegislative-executive conflict is rare, andlegislative influence in policymaking andoversight is more subtly exercised via processesdifferent from those in presidential systems.

Many national systems are actually a hybrid ofsome sort. In most hybrid systems, a president iselected separately and has primary responsibilityin certain policy areas, while the prime minister,often appointed by the president from thelegislative majority, exercises jurisdiction inother matters. In hybrid systems, thepolicymaking process and forms of inter-branchconflict are determined largely by the specificdistribution of formal authority and by thetraditions and history of the particular polity.

These differences in regime type necessarilyhave an effect on the role and power of alegislature and its constituent parts (individualmembers, political party caucuses, theleadership, committees, staff, etc.), which in turnaffect the choice of objectives, approaches,targets, and results of programming. Forexample, because in a purely parliamentaryregime the viability of the government dependson the continued confidence of the parliament,political parties and their leadership play aparamount role and individual members�particularly backbenchers�have less power andless opportunity to affect the policy processdirectly. Because of the fusion of the legislatureand executive, committees have less of a role toplay, for policy decisions tend to be made within


the ruling party or coalition and the ministries ofgovernment.5 In addition, committees have lessof a role in parliaments because oversight of theexecutive is carried out by the party or parties inthe opposition. Another consequence of aparliamentary constitutional structure is thatconflict over policymaking is played out withinthe ruling coalition and between the governmentand opposition parties.

In a presidential system, on the other hand, theseparate election and sources of legitimacy ofthe legislature and the executive imply differentroles for political parties, individual members,and the legislature as a whole. Coalitions tend tobe more ad hoc for the purpose of passingspecific pieces of legislation, instead of forminga government. This institutional arrangementcreates the potential for an important role forcommittees. Moreover, while conflict amongparties is important in a presidential regime, thecentral locus of conflict over policymakingusually resides between the legislature and theexecutive. Hence, legislative-executive relationstake on greater significance. (For morecomparisons between legislatures ofparliamentary and presidential regimes, seeAppendix B.)

Many newer governments and constitutions arepresidential or mixed in nature, so USAIDMissions are more likely to encounter theseforms than the pure parliamentary form. Inaddition, U.S. staff and contractors will tend tobe more familiar with presidential systems.However, many of the principles laid out in thishandbook apply to legislatures in all three types

of governments. Practitioners in the field canpoint out where sharper distinctions should bedrawn.

2. Parties, Factions, and ElectoralSystems

The strength and composition of political partiesand factions interact with the presidential-parliamentary dimension and with the nature ofthe electoral system to yield distinctive patternsof legislative form and behavior. For example,the presidential system of the United States andits states is characterized by bicamerallegislatures, relatively small electoral districtswith frequent elections, and diminishing partyauthority within two overwhelmingly dominant,but highly competitive, parties. Sophisticatedanalysis is not required to surmise that such asystem has considerable inter-branch andpartisan conflict leading occasionally, or evenfrequently, to deadlock. On the other hand,Mexico was until 1997 a presidential systemwith one dominant party. This mitigated theconflict-producing effects of the presidentialstructure, and resulted in a low degree of inter-branch conflict, but also little competition.

Among parliamentary systems, the absence of asingle dominant party, as in Israel in recentyears, leads to a high level of political conflict,resulting in frequent coalition changes and evennew elections. With a single party dominant in aparliamentary system, as in Japan until recently,the very lowest level of conflict would beexpected, although intra-party disputes can befrequent and of great consequence.

Another key issue in party or faction strength isthe reward system. For example, can the partyeffectively withhold campaign funding and otherresources from a candidate? Is party structureand strength affected by clientelism or ethnicity?The party structure�s level of centralizationaffects party discipline, both in general andwithin the legislature, determining whether

5 Over the last quarter century, committees in maturedemocracies in Western Europe have increased inimportance. See Lawrence D. Longley and Roger H.Davidson, eds., The New Roles of ParliamentaryCommittees, The Library of Legislative Studies (London:Frank Cass, 1998). Despite this recent evolution, however,committees still play significantly less important roles inparliamentary systems than they do in presidential ones.


members of the legislature are more beholden totheir national party or to local groups at home.

Electoral laws and practices, such as size andcomposition of constituencies, frequency ofelections, and methods of getting onto the ballotalso affect legislative behavior. For example,members who must live in and be electeddirectly by their districts (especially small,single-member districts) will generally be moreresponsive to their constituents than those whocan live elsewhere. Local residence will tend toundermine party discipline, even in aparliamentary system. The same is true whenelections are more frequent; when formalendorsement from party leadership is notrequired to get onto the ballot; where there areprimary elections; or where it is relatively easyto run as an independent. (Some systemscombine geographic constituencies with interest-group representatives, as in Uganda, or withparty national lists, as in Hungary. In such cases,legislators� behavior will be most influenced bywhoever, party leaders or electorate, has thegreatest ability to return them to their seats.)

Campaign finance laws and practices alsomediate legislators� behavior. Where individualfundraising is permitted and important, influencewill migrate to those members most able to raisemoney, sometimes at the expense of both partydiscipline and constituency interests.

Clearly, the permutations are virtually endless.Within these permutations, however, there arepatterns and structures which can be understood,and which make it possible for a person withoutspecialized training to look at the whole packageof conditions and reach plausible conclusionsabout expected legislative behavior. Many ofthese patterns and structures are discussed in thisdocument.

Developing reasonable expectations based onactual conditions is important in decidingwhether a particular legislature, at a particular

time, is in need of strengthening and whether itis worth the risk of investment. For example, ifthe U.S. Congress suddenly started passingeverything the president proposed, it would raisequestions, but for the British Parliament to do sois perfectly normal. In addition to establishingexpectations, understanding how these factorsaffect the behavior of legislatures can help in themaking of strategic decisions about the type ofactivities to fund and to whom or where to targetthem.

In designing legislative strengthening programsand activities where party or faction disputes areprofound and acrimonious, it is important toensure that all or virtually all parties or factionsrepresented in the legislature are activelyengaged in the planning process. Every party orfaction will need to have its share of participantsin any further activity. In some places, this maysignificantly increase the cost of the programs.

3. Internal Power Distribution

In some legislatures, power is highly centralized.A select few leaders decide on agendas, workassignments, and the fate of most proposals. Inother bodies, power is more dispersed tocommittee chairs, and in some cases evenindividual members may have more say in whatgets discussed, who gets to discuss it, and how itturns out. One of these situations is notnecessarily better than any other. A centralizedbody can act more quickly. In addition, highturnover is less disruptive in a centralizedlegislature where fewer individuals are involvedin major decision-making. On the other hand,decentralized legislatures provide more accesspoints for legislators and citizens to influencethe government�s policies. Most legislatures, ofcourse, fall somewhere between these twoextremes.

A key issue is the role of opposition parties,factions, or coalitions. In some legislatures, suchblocs are treated almost as equal partners. Law


or tradition may guarantee them a certainnumber of seats on committees, and minoritymembers� bills may receive genuine hearingsand even be passed. This tends to occur wherethe balance of power between blocs can shiftquickly�the majority treats the opposition wellin the hopes of reciprocity when they reversepositions. In this situation, it is important toinclude opposition parties in a legislativestrengthening program to the same degree theywould be included in any other legislativeprocess, for at least two reasons. First, it willencourage buy-in to the process ofinstitutionalization of the legislature by all ormost parties. Second, legislative competition isan essential element to how democraticlegislatures function, and guaranteeing theviability of parties to play a constructiveopposition role is critical.

In other legislatures, the opposition istraditionally ignored or abused. There, theminority�s role is more often to obstruct, delay,or discredit the legislative process, knowing thatits preferences will never receive seriousconsideration. Deciding first whether toundertake a legislative strengthening programand, if so, how to incorporate such blocs into theprogram is more difficult. On the one hand,democracy is better served if more people areinvolved. On the other hand, full inclusion ofthis kind of opposition may cause the majority towithhold support, or may simply provide theopposition with yet another enterprise toundermine. It may mean working withgovernment or opposition parties separately, orit may mean involving opposition parties in atleast some legislative programs in numbers thatoutstrip their proportional strength.

Understanding a legislative body�s internalpower distribution will enable needs assessmentquestions to be directed to the right people andwill minimize the likelihood of misinterpretingthe answers. A legislature whose juniormembers are unhappy with their share of power,

which is often the case, is not necessarily inneed of attention on that score. However, a bodymaking a conscious transition to a moredecentralized mode of operation may needsignificant development opportunities for itsjunior members so they can participate morefully in the new structure. Legislativestrengthening, in any case, calls for somesizeable or influential bloc of members who areaware of the importance of the legislature as aninstitution, jealous of its constitutionalprerogatives, and anxious to see it succeed.


III. ASSESSINGDEVELOPMENTOPPORTUNITIES ANDPRIORITIES

Accurately defining the problem a legislaturefaces is basic to selecting and designingactivities that will provide sustainable andmeasurable results. This section begins with anoverview of the ways in which the host-countrycontext affects the legislative institutions andhow the context influences decisions on whetherto support the legislature. It then suggestsassessing needs in five programming areas basedon external conditioning factors (i.e., politicalwill and domestic support), democraticfunctions (i.e., representation, lawmaking, andoversight), and internal management concerns(i.e., infrastructure and management). Table 1provides a summary of the legislativestrengthening assessment framework that ispresented in the following pages. The sectionconcludes with suggestions for setting priorities.

All government entities, to a greater or lesserextent, reflect their social and politicalenvironment. This is especially true oflegislatures, since it is their explicit institutionalrole. Therefore, beyond the broad, commonfunctions noted in Section II, legislatures are notall alike. Legislatures differ more across nationalor even subnational boundaries than do othergovernmental bodies. Factors ranging from theirformal powers and their relationship to otherbranches of government to their internalorganization, formal and informal rules,information flows, and methods of reachingagreement are all tightly bound to the historyand norms of their societies. It is first necessaryto survey this macro-political environment inorder to improve both the accuracy of needsassessments and the possible effectiveness ofactivities.

If legislative strengthening has been decidedupon through a formal priority-setting exerciseat the USAID Mission, much of the work of themacro-political survey has presumably alreadybeen done. In such cases, simply verifying thatinformation is still current may be all that isneeded. In other cases, a more thoroughassessment process will be called for.

A. Assessing the Host-country Context

Because each legislature and its political cultureare distinctive and dynamic, each mission shoulddetermine how to weigh answers to thequestions below in making decisions aboutlegislative strengthening in the host country.Consulting with local academic and practitionerexperts may be useful to the DG officer.

1. Basic Democracy and GovernanceQuestions

The USAID manual Conducting a DGAssessment: A Framework for StrategyDevelopment lays out issues that define thebroad context of the legislative body.6 Answersto the questions detailed in the strategicassessment framework and outlined below willhelp determine the basic DG problemsconfronting a particular country. They will alsohelp weigh the relative advantage of investing inlegislative strengthening vis-à-vis otherdemocracy subsectors. If questions from theframework have not been asked, they should be.If they have been, it should be confirmed thatthere have not been significant recent changes inthese areas.

Consensus: Is there broad fundamentalagreement about the nature of the state and its

6 Gerald F. Hyman, Conducting a DG Assessment: AFramework for Strategy Development (Advance Copy),Technical Publication Series (Washington, DC: USAID/Center for Democracy and Governance, December 1999).


relation to individuals and associations in civilsociety? Is there agreement about the rights andresponsibilities of citizens, organizations, andgovernmental entities? Do the major playersagree on the rules of the political game?

Rule of law: Are rights to life, liberty, andproperty generally subject to the rule of law?Are state officials and partisan political activitiesgenerally constrained by law? Are personalsecurity and freedoms adequately protected? Isthere judicial independence and integrity?

Inclusion: Even if inclusion of all citizens in thepolitical process is formally or legallyguaranteed, are elements of the populationeffectively excluded from political participation?Are people excluded from social or economicparticipation? Is there exclusion based ongender, geography, race, class, religion,ethnicity, language, or party?

Competition: Is there meaningful competitionamong ideas and persons in elections andthroughout the policymaking system? Arepeople effectively allowed to organize to pursuetheir interest and ideas? Is there a reasonablebalance of power among voting blocs, levels ofgovernment, and its branches? Are partiescompetitive within the legislature? Does a singleparty have overwhelming dominance?

Good governance: Do the political institutionswork, or do they at least have the capacity towork? If they can deliver on legitimateexpectations, do they? Is there reasonabletransparency and accountability? Can thelegislature, even if strengthened, have an impacton the most important problems the country isfacing?

Each of these questions must be asked of thenational context and then again in the context ofthe legislature.

2. Specific Legislative Questions

The DG strategic assessment framework, whichaddresses the question of relative advantage ofinvesting in legislative strengthening vis-B-visother DG subsectors, only advances the questionof where and how to spend scarce resources sofar. It relies on manuals such as this one andexpertise in the field to continue where thatdocument leaves off. Once the decision has beenmade to invest in developing the legislature, thefollowing questions specific to the legislativebody should be addressed in the planningprocess:7

What are the legislature�s formal powers andrelationships to other political institutions?The variety of structures and processes ofpolitical institutions in relation to the legislatureare discussed in Section II(B). The implicationsof the unique configuration of regime type andelectoral and party systems should be consideredwhen formulating a program strategy. Manylegislatures, even in the United States, areconstitutionally powerful but institutionallyweak. It is critical, however, to distinguishformal authority from common practice.

A legislature with substantial, well-definedformal powers is ordinarily a stronger candidatefor mission investment, since the body�s role innational policy is or can be more central. If thelegislature has relatively few formal powers,other changes in society and law shouldprobably precede legislative strengtheningefforts.

Some legislatures that are quite powerful onpaper have by tradition acceded to the wishes ofthe executive (such as Mexico prior to 1997).Such institutional weaknesses are discussedbelow, in �Causes of Legislative Problems.�Surprisingly, this can also work the other way�

7 Appendix A includes a broader set of assessmentquestions.


COUNTRY MACROPOLITICAL CONTEXT¨ Priority country issues¨ Importance of legislature for addressing key problems

MACROASSESSMENT OF THE LEGISLATURE¨ Constitutional powers of the legislature¨ Regime type (presidential, parliamentary, hybrid)¨ Electoral system¨ Structure of political parties and balance of power among parties¨ Executive-legislative relations¨ Problems facing the legislature and their causes

ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL WILL OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS¨ Level of support inside legislature for institutional strengthening¨ Evidence that legislature has desire to reform itself (modernization cmte., efforts at reform)¨ Level of support outside legislature for institutional strengthening

FUNCTIONS

REPRESENTATION¨ Degree of openness, accountability, and accessibility of legislature to citizens and media¨ Interaction between the legislature and society¨ Degree of openness of political parties to public input¨ Electoral system (single-member district vs. party list/proportional representation)¨ Organization of civil society and ability to play advocacy and watchdog role

LAWMAKING¨ Parliamentary, presidential, or hybrid structure (distribution of powers)¨ Legislative powers of the executive (decree power, ability to submit bills for consideration)¨ Ability of legislature to access information¨ Roles of committees and of party caucuses¨ Power and capability to develop, amend, or review budget and to levy taxes

OVERSIGHT¨ Power to question ministers, hold hearings, call witnesses¨ Ability to access information about executive expenditures and program implementation¨ Power to sanction those responsible for malfeasance, misconduct, corruption, or

mismanagement¨ Power of appropriations or control over the budget

ASSOCIATED OPERATIONS: MANAGEMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE¨ Clarity, transparency, and simplicity of legislative rules of procedure¨ Degree of transparency of legislative actions¨ Adequacy in skill and number of legislative staff and administration

PRIORITIZATION OF ASSISTANCE NEEDS

IDENTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATE PROGRAMMING ACTIVITIES

TABLE 1: LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK


a few legislatures have over time garnered morepower than they are officially entitled to (e.g.,the Palestinian Legislative Council, which playsa significant role in the budget process, eventhough it lacks formal authority to do so).

Whatever the formal situation, does thelegislature have effective autonomy? Extremesare possible here. A legislature that rubber-stamps every executive initiative withoutsignificant debate is not fulfilling its function,even in a parliamentary system; a legislature thatimpedes or denies every executive initiative is,at the least, frustrating democratic processes,and may be inviting dissolution (if theconstitution permits it) or military intervention(if it does not).

The distribution of parties in the legislatureshould also be considered. In a presidentialsystem, is the president�s party dominant in thelegislature? Does it rule by a slim majority?Does it face a dominant opposition? Whenconsidering parliamentary regimes, is there aone-party ruling majority or a government madeup of a coalition of parties? Does a party rule bya bare majority? Are there safeguards forstability, such as the constructive vote of noconfidence that allows a government to fall onlyif a new one is simultaneously approved by theparliament?

An effective legislature is one that has sufficientself-awareness and self-confidence to engage inmeaningful negotiation with the executive. Alegislature that is either utterly supine orcompletely recalcitrant may first need to change.Whether supine or recalcitrant, a legislature thatwants to strengthen itself may face strongresistance from the executive branch, andwithout executive acquiescence it will lack thepolitical leverage to proceed. Legislativestrengthening can be impeded by the executivein various ways, such as through the budgetprocess. If policy debate and adoption areadversely affected by legislative-executive

relations, it may be especially important to beginactivities to help build support for legislativestrengthening.

What are other donors doing?An increasing number of outside donors�national development agencies, regional andmulti-lateral development banks, and private andpublic international organizations�havebecome interested in legislative strengthening.Before deciding to invest USAID resources, it isworth investigating whether other donors arealready planning or conducting similar efforts. Ifthey are, donor coordination is essential beforebeginning legislative assistance.

What are the mission�s priorities?How would a stronger legislature be helpful inachieving the mission�s other objectives�forexample, legal or regulatory reform, economicrestructuring, privatization, or environmentalprotection? Where possible or relevant, amission should consider objectives thatcomplement the rest of the mission�s portfolio,either through general legislative enhancementprogramming or through promoting specificlegislative reforms. Indeed, to the degree that alegislative assessment does not result in veryspecific areas to work in, the other strategicobjectives of a mission�s portfolio can helpfurther define options or target assistance.

In addition, the budget available for providingsupport to the legislature may help determine theapproach. On the one hand, limited budgets willconstrain the types of activities that areimplemented. On the other hand, a higher levelof investment in one area may be a prerequisiteto a smaller investment in another, so if theformer is not possible and is not being carriedout by another donor, then the mission shouldredirect its resources.


3. Causes of Legislative Problems

Even well established legislatures canexperience difficulties in performing theirfunctions. Newly developing legislatures areespecially likely to experience them. A weaklegislative branch may result from problems inany or all of the following areas:

Formal authority: Does the legislative branchhave the constitutional, legal, or politicalauthority to carry out its mandate?

Legislators: Do legislators realize the full scopeof their authority, responsibilities, andopportunities? Have they been informed of moreeffective ways of organizing or conductingbusiness? They may need strengthenedmanagement skills to oversee staff or to managethe many demands on their own time.

Perceptions by society: Do citizens understandwhat the legislature does? Are they properlyequipped to make their preferences and desiresknown to the legislature through elections andcontact? Misunderstandings can lead to a lack ofpublic and political support for legislativeinitiatives, or even to fundamental issues oflegitimacy.

Access to information: Analyzing policyproposals requires information. Suchinformation includes arguments for executiveproposals, specific information on the problemsthe proposal addresses, and existing policy. Thisinformation often comes from the executive,from sources external to the government, andeven from sources outside the country. Can thelegislature get this information in time? Does itlack the expertise to analyze the information?Delays and omissions can constrain alegislature�s effectiveness.

Organizational structures and processes:Does the executive control the legislativeprocess? Are committee and floor procedures

cumbersome? Is it needlessly difficult to amendbills? Are there adequate mechanisms forinforming the public on what the legislature isdoing or how the public can make its concernsknown to the legislature? Do the party systemsimpede effectiveness?

Staffing: Is there enough staff to assist thelegislators? Does staff have knowledge neededto carry out duties? Staff may change sofrequently that they do not have the time todevelop expertise.

Physical facilities and equipment: Are theresufficient office spaces or equipment such asphones, filing cabinets, or computers for thelegislative body to conduct its work? Wheredistrict offices for members are warranted orappropriate, do these offices have the physicalfacilities and equipment to carry out their work?

B. Assessing Legislative Strengths andWeaknesses

Every legislature, even in more developednations, is deficient in some area or another.USAID legislative assistance programs arerarely able to address every need of a legislature,and choices about what areas to support, andwhat not to support, must be made. The aim oflegislative assistance is to improve democraticprocesses. It is, therefore, necessary to makedecisions about types and amounts of assistancebased on this objective.

In some circumstances while it may be relativelyeasy to provide commodities and infrastructuresupport, it is more difficult to transfer and adaptskills, knowledge, and values that will help alegislature actually function in a morerepresentative or democratic manner.

In terms of sustainability, USAID does not wantto provide assistance that a country is incapableof continuing to sustain by itself after theassistance program has ended. Technical


assistance, research centers, etc., should have abudget that reverts to host-country support.

The next several pages outline the five areas thatan assessment of the legislature should examineand provide examples of the types of questionsan assessment should answer. To a large extent,the first area (political will and domesticsupport) will determine the extent to which alegislative strengthening program can besuccessful. The next three areas are organizedaround legislatures� primary functions ofrepresentation, lawmaking, and oversight. Thefifth and final area (management andinfrastructure) facilitates a legislature�sperformance of its three primary functions.

1. Political Will and Domestic Support

Legislative programs are inescapably political.No amount of expertise, technology, or work canmake a legislative strengthening programsuccessful if legislative and other leaders are notprepared to bear the political costs of reform.Successful programs build on a base oflegislative support, which may come fromformal leaders or a cadre of informal opinionleaders interested in the legislative institution.

A minimum level of support, or at leasttolerance, from key stakeholders outside thelegislature is also important, particularly whensupport for reform within the legislature is weak.Such stakeholders include executive branchleaders, influential media, recognized academicexperts, and interest groups. However, there arelikely to be pockets�sometimes significantones�of resistance. This is because the inter-branch balance of power is often perceived as azero-sum game, where a more powerfullegislature means a less powerful executive.

If problems seem to stem from the legislature�srelationships with society, perceived legitimacy,or formal authority, these would be appropriateneeds assessment questions:

� Does a support base for legislativestrengthening exist? Is there a good chanceit can be developed?

Are there legislative leaders (from a dominantpolitical party or a major opposition party), orsome other sizeable or influential bloc oflegislators, who are aware of the importance ofthe legislature as an institution, jealous of itsconstitutional prerogatives, and anxious to see itsucceed? If no one is interested in strengtheningthe legislature, or if those interested areregarded as dangerous or merely amusing, basicsteps to build political will are needed. USAIDprograms to build political will may not evenfocus initially on legislators, but instead on otherkey stakeholders, such as civil groups andprofessional associations.

� Have there been recent attempts to reformthe legislature to make it more powerful oreffective?

Has there been an infusion of new professionalstaffing, reorganization of committees, rulesreform, or attempts to exert more authority inthe budget process? Attempts at self-reform arestrong evidence of political willingness tostrengthen the institution from within.

� Have legislative leaders formed amodernization group, committee, or othergroup responsible for institutionaldevelopment? If they have, did they do itat their own initiative, or was it at theurging of an outside donor?

Self-generated efforts to create an organizedgroup of legislators to guide legislativedevelopment are an excellent indicator ofpolitical will within the legislature. Even ifprompted by self-interest or a donor, such agroup provides a locus of interest and formaljurisdiction for strengthening the legislature.However, its absence is not necessarily anegative sign, since a great many legislatures do


not have such a body despite members� desire forreform.

If the �modernization group� is serious aboutstrengthening its institution, it will be willing tohold regular meetings, to discuss itsrecommendations with the larger legislativebody, and to be open to comments and criticismby groups outside the legislature.

� Is there significant support outside thelegislature for strengthening it?

Are there movements for reform of thelegislature and for electoral or regime reform?Strong national support is fundamental tosustaining any gains a program makes, so if littleor no support exists, the mission shouldreconsider entering into legislative strengtheningprograms since their likely impact on democraticchange will be low. At minimum, efforts to buildsupport for legislative reform will be necessaryprior to initializing a legislative strengtheningprogram. If some level of support forstrengthening the legislature already exists,appropriate activities might help strengthen thebase. (See Section IV.)

2. Representation

Representation is the fundamental function of ademocratic legislature. Indeed, it informs theprocesses and functions of the other legislativefunctions. Representation in the context oflegislatures involves legislators listening to,communicating with, and representing the needsand aspirations of citizens in policymaking;overseeing the implementation of laws andgovernment programs; and, at times, intercedingwith government on behalf of citizens.Legislative strengthening is often undertaken toenable the legislature to perform itsrepresentation function better. Building theinternal capabilities of the legislature is oflimited value if the legislature is unable orunwilling to listen to and respond to its society,

so investing in representation where it is notperformed well is very important. As civilsociety becomes better mobilized to putdemands on the legislature, the institution�scredibility will suffer if its performance does notimprove. If citizens do not know about or haveaccess to the legislature, or if the body hasshown itself unwilling or unable to beresponsive, its effectiveness is impaired and itslegitimacy may be called into question.

Questions to help formulate conclusions aboutrepresentation include the following:

� Does the legislature promote a two-wayflow of information?

Does the debate in the legislature reflect thetopics of debate in other political fora? Does thelegislature or political parties solicit publicopinion through polls, hearings, or other ways?Do members have district offices, and do theyhave the incentive to create district offices? Dothey only visit their districts during elections?Do legislators, their staffs, and their publicationsexplain the legislature to citizens? Are publicrecords of legislative actions available, includingthe status of pending proposals?

The answers to these questions can be signs thatthe legislators are making a conscious effort tobe representative. Again, not all indicators maybe present for every legislature, but the more alegislature is intentionally seeking public inputand actively explaining its actions to the people,the more successful it is likely to be inrepresenting them.

� How open and accountable is thelegislature to citizens and the media?

Are votes in committee or in the plenary openand public? Can citizens and reporters visit thelegislature, including plenary and committeesessions? Is its building open for tours or visits?Do reporters and editors have access to and


understand the legislature�s processes andfunctions?

If citizens and the media neither have access tothe legislative building nor understand how thelegislature conducts its business, they are likelyto doubt the body is able to represent the peopleeffectively, and they are likely to be right.

� Do committees hold public hearings?

If hearings are held, can anyone register tospeak, or must all testimony be invited? Aremeeting notices published? Are meeting placesaccessible? A relatively open hearing process isan important sign of transparency andaccessibility. No legislature opens all itsmeetings all the time, but a higher percentage ofopen and accessible sessions suggests a higherlevel of representativeness.

� Are political parties open to public input?

In some political systems, political partiesexercise tremendous power, often making majorpolicy decisions before proposals are sent to thelegislature. In such systems it is especiallyimportant that political parties be open to publicinput. Do the political parties permit orencourage such input (through surveying partymembers, for example)? Are citizen concernsthen somehow factored into party platforms andinto policy proposals?

� Do most organized interest groupseffectively interact with the legislature?

Most important, even if citizens do have access,do they have an impact on policy? Are interestgroups organized, and do they interact with thelegislature? Are they able to fulfill their roles asadvocates and watchdogs? Do organized interestgroups have more or less equal opportunity toaccess the legislature? Are some groupsprevented from equal access? Are there thinktanks and universities that regularly provide

information and analysis to the legislature,invited or uninvited?

A legislature that has information and influencecoming in from many channels is more likely tobe broadly representative than one that restrictsthe number or types of groups to which it willprovide access. Political parties within thelegislature play an important role inrepresentation, so activities to help makepolitical parties more representative andeffective may also be considered. A legislatureopen to input from diverse interests is also betterable to fulfill its role as a forum for theresolution of societal conflict. Ideally, increasedaccess to the legislature will be matched byimproved legislative performance in lawmakingand oversight.

3. Lawmaking

Legislatures must be able to shape laws inpractice, not just in theory. Effective lawmakingrequires specialized skills, notably the ability toblend technical and legal competence withuseful political knowledge so that laws can beboth well written and truly reflective of theirintended substance. At the same time, thedecision to develop these skills carries politicalbaggage, and may encounter resistance fromother stakeholders, such as the executive branch.Perhaps even more important is the ability of alegislature to simultaneously deal withcompeting and diverse priorities, to engage inpolitical negotiation, and to compromise to reachmajority approval of legislative packages.

Questions in this area require analysis of boththe legislature�s formal authority and its actualperformance, which are not always fullycongruent. In researching and thinking aboutanswers to these questions, bear in mindconstitutional-level issues, such as the differencebetween presidential and parliamentary systemsand the differing expectations associated witheach. For example, legislatures in pure


parliamentary systems are less likely tointroduce legislation or to make major changesto executive proposals than are their presidentialor hybrid counterparts.

Some relevant questions follow:

� What is the power balance in lawmakingbetween the legislature and the executive?

In a presidential system, is the executive allowedto veto legislation? Can the legislature overrideexecutive vetoes? Must the legislature give itsapproval for all or most executive appointments?In all types of legislatures, under whatcircumstances can the legislature be dissolved?Can the legislature dismiss or remove theexecutive? Under what circumstances can theexecutive rule by decree? Equally important,how often does each of these events actuallyoccur, and has there been a recent change in thetrend?

If the legislature has considerable formal powerbut is not exercising it, the mission should askwhether this is a political decision, a culturaltradition, or a lack of legislative capability.

� How independent is the legislature?

Is the legislature allowed to introduce legislationindependently, or must all proposals emanatefrom the executive? Can the legislature amendexecutive branch proposals? Are staff, includingbill drafters, legislative or executive employees?Does the legislature control its own budget?Statistics on the sources, number, and types ofbills originating or amended in the legislaturegive some indication of the actual situation.

In parliamentary systems, legislative andexecutive powers are united in a single branch ofgovernment. The dominant party coalition formsthe administration. If the ruling party is votedout of the legislature, the executive necessarilyalso changes. Cooperation between the

executive and a majority in the legislature isrequired for the government to survive.Parliament and the executive will, therefore,operate less independently of each other than ina presidential system, so the concept oflegislative independence applies more tolegislatures in presidential systems than inparliamentary systems. Nevertheless, effectiveparliaments need some level of independence.They must, for example, be able to pursue anoversight function without fear of reprisal fromthe executive.

� Does the legislature have informationsources of its own?

Are committee and plenary records adequate andretrievable? Is there an adequate legislativelibrary? Does the legislature receive itsinformation primarily from political parties,internal research, and/or outside sources? Doleaders, committee chairs, and staff remain inposition long enough to develop expertise?

Having its own sources of information meansthat the body�s decision-making process dependsless on lobbyists or the executive. Lack ofinformation is relatively common, and a varietyof ways to respond to this particular need exist.

� Is lawmaking infrastructure adequate?

Is there a system of consolidated laws? Is there a�supremacy clause� in the constitution orelsewhere that defines the order of laws? Manynewly independent countries have severalsystems of law overlaid on one another, apatchwork of traditional laws, colonial laws,transitional laws, and later legislation. At times itmay not even be possible to determine what lawsare in force. Without codified laws, thelegislature must, in effect, guess what the formerpolicy was and hope that the new law will fix theproblem.


If the legislature lacks computers and trainedstaff, retrieval of old laws and tracking of newproposals are difficult. Are computer systemsadequate for research, bill tracking, and otherprocesses? It is important to keep in mind,however, that equipment and new systems, inand of themselves, do not change legislatures.Investment in this sort of support should be usedto facilitate more substantive changes andreforms.

Funding activities to help the legislature betterfulfill its lawmaking responsibilities is probablymost useful for those legislatures that have theauthority and desire to play a stronger role inlawmaking, usually presidential and hybridsystems. Nevertheless, in pure parliamentarysystems the legislature is responsible forreviewing and commenting on legislation.Furthermore, a great many of the activities thatstrengthen lawmaking capabilities (e.g.,strengthening committees and building researchcapabilities) also strengthen legislative oversightof governments.

4. Oversight

Virtually all legislatures have at least someoversight authority, even though in differentsystems it will take different forms. Inpresidential systems this function will oftenreside in committees, while in parliamentarysystems it is the role of the opposition. Iflegislative leaders are willing to use the powersthey have, investing in oversight may help makegovernment more accountable and effective.

Citizens throughout the world increasingly insiston government�s accountability for both themanner in which it conducts the public�sbusiness and the outcomes it achieves.Legislatures often have been the locus ofengagement for this purpose. In many instances,legislative oversight has focused on executivecorruption and incompetence or on misuse ofgovernment funds and power. Other oversight

deals with efficiency or effectiveness ofgovernment operations with an eye towarduncovering administrative and othershortcomings. Ideally, oversight findings arecombined with lawmaking to reshape the lawsgoverning a program or issue area wheredeficiencies are exposed.

Two sets of powers are very important for thelegislature to exercise its oversight role. First,many legislatures have the power to confirmappointments made by the executive. This caninclude cabinet and sub-cabinet positions,ambassadorships, judicial appointments, andsubnational positions. Confirmation procedurescan include reviews of job histories, backgroundchecks of the nominee, or testimony hearingsfrom groups with an interest in the nomination.A related power is the ability to remove politicalappointees for wrong-doing, malfeasance, orineptitude.

Second, oversight is facilitated if a legislaturehas some powers related to the budget. Thesepowers�like the power to confirm or removepolitical appointees�can range from weak ornon-existent to formidable, from the power toreview and comment to the power to amend orto specify exactly how the budget will beallocated. Because budgets are the ultimateindicators of a government�s policies andpriorities, it is not surprising that conflicts over alegislature�s exercise of its powers emerge mostoften and most strongly in the budgetaryprocess. Budgetary issues are included in thissection, even though legislative control overgovernment taxing and spending combinesoversight and representation with lawmaking.

Questions that will help assess the oversightfunction include the following:

� Can the legislature collect information foreffective oversight?

Does the legislature have subpoena power, either


directly or through officials such as an auditorgeneral? What reports are executive agenciesrequired to file? Is there a tradition or legalrequirement where government ministersrespond to inquiries by legislators (such asparliamentary question time), whether in apresidential, parliamentary, or hybrid system?

The basic first step in oversight is gatheringdata. A legislature that cannot do this ishampered from the outset.

� Can the legislature sanction those who donot cooperate with its oversight or whorefuse to implement legislative wishes?

Can the legislature censure, fine, or removeuncooperative ministers or other officials? Canexecutive failure to cooperate prompt a no-confidence or impeachment vote? A legislaturewith more tools to compel cooperation is morelikely to get cooperation. The use of sanctionscan be complicated. Even sanctions that havenever been applied may still be effective as athreat, while excessive use of sanctions maydilute their efficacy. Also, while a legislaturemay not have legally codified powers, informalsanctions�such as exposure in the press�areoften available.

Interviews with expert observers may be helpfulin discerning how the sanctioning system worksin particular situations.

� What are the legislature�s budgetaryprerogatives?

Can the legislature make changes to proposedbudgets? Has the legislature any role inpreparing the budget and setting taxes? To whatextent can the legislature increase or decreaseappropriations, or transfer funds across agenciesor programs? When, and how much, can theexecutive spend without legislative approval?Does the legislature have full access to allgovernment financial information?

The budget is an excellent vehicle forimplementing recommendations resulting fromoversight efforts and lawmaking, as well as animportant overall policy tool for setting nationalpriorities and limiting administrative action. Alegislature that cannot influence budgetaryallocations will find it more difficult to influencethe policies of the executive.

� Does the legislature have adequateunderstanding and resources foroversight?

Do most or many members understand theimportance of oversight? Do the legislature�sprocesses, rules, and internal structure supportan oversight function? Are committeesspecifically structured to support an oversightfunction? Is professional staff knowledgeableabout oversight skills? Does the legislature havean adequate budget for its oversight activities?

A full panoply of formal oversight powers willbe of no use if the body has not mobilized itshuman, financial, and political resources to carryout these activities vigorously.

5. Management and Infrastructure

Deliberative bodies must be able to managethemselves. If they cannot, they will not be ableto perform their representation, lawmaking, andoversight functions. They will also be unable tocapitalize on political will or garner domesticsupport. To be fully effective, a legislative bodyneeds not only adequate space and equipment,but also such management capabilities aseffective organizational structures, processes,and rules.


Issues to be considered in assessing thisdimension can include the following:

� Do rules and procedures expedite businessbut still permit debate?

Do legislators understand the rules? Are therules comprehensible? Do most citizens andreporters understand them? Do rules requiretime-consuming voting procedures or permitactively dilatory tactics? Are minority parties orfactions able to participate in debate? Do plenarysessions and committee meetings usually finishtheir agendas on time?

Like statutes, rules and procedures have oftenbeen built up over a long period and may beoutmoded, especially if they do not allow takingadvantage of newer technology, such aselectronic voting systems.

� Is there transparency regarding legislativeactions?

Are accurate records of legislative proceedingskept? Are they available to the media andpublic? Are there formal policies for staff hiring,pay, purchasing, and other aspects of legislativeadministration? Is there a formal code of ethicsfor legislators and staff, and is it enforced?

In many ways, this aspect of legislativemanagement completes a full circle, back to theissue of transparency in the macro-politicalsurvey. Occasionally the lack of these elementsis caused by a lack of desire for them. Often it issimply a matter of the absence of resources orskills needed to put them in place.

� Are the physical facilities adequate?

Are meeting rooms and other spaces physicallysafe, large enough, well lighted, and adequatelyventilated? Is there enough furniture? Areinternal communication and data systemsadequate? Are sound systems and voting

tabulation systems present and workingproperly? Answers to all these questions areeasy to determine.

While investing in legislative infrastructure andmanagement usually is not a prerequisite toaccomplishing other program objectives,addressing deficiencies here often can haveimportant effects on the likelihood of success ofany other strengthening efforts that may beundertaken. Indeed, commodity transfers shouldbe avoided unless these links are clear and apositive impact on democratic processes islikely. Developing infrastructure, however,should generally not be given priority unlessclearly linked to other democracy-relatedreforms. In recent years, USAID has de-emphasized investments in infrastructure, in partbecause resources are available from othersources, such as multi-lateral banks, and in partbecause USAID has emphasized promotingchanges in procedures, knowledge, and skillsthat encourage greater democracy. It isimportant to look for investments ininfrastructure and management that accomplishas many objectives as possible. Improvedrecord-keeping, for example, is goodmanagement and can improve lawmakingperformance, while making the legislature moretransparent and accessible to citizens.

C. Prioritizing Assistance

Responses to assessment questions will helpUSAID officers better understand thecharacteristics, strengths, and weaknesses of thehost-country legislature in the context ofachieving broader-level democratic change, andwill suggest several activities to address thoseweaknesses. (See Section IV.) After reviewingthe assessment data, missions should setpriorities regarding which areas to address basedon the national situation. While no tidymathematical formula exists to set priorities, theinformation about the macro-politicalenvironment and specifically about the


legislature will provide guidance. In addition,the following factors should be considered tohelp determine prioritization of activities:

� Will addressing the problem make thelegislature a more effective democraticinstitution?

If resolving a problem has a relatively minorlong-term or overall impact on legislativefunctioning, it can probably have lower priority.If it is significantly disrupting or obstructing thelegislature�s ability to fulfill its constitutionalrole, it has a higher priority.

� How urgent is it to address this problem?

Sometimes a less important problem may needto be taken care of first; for example, a leakyroof in the legislative chamber is not�important�, but may be �urgent.� Sometimes animportant problem must wait for some otherproblem to be solved first, and so the lessimportant one is more urgent in terms of timing.

� Are efforts to solve this problem likely tosucceed?

Are both the political will and the technicalcapacity in place or at hand? Even if a problemis urgent and important, there may beintransigent opposition to addressing it. Such anissue is likely not to be a good application ofmission resources. On the other hand, even if itis not urgent or important, a problem with thehigh likelihood of resolution might be worthaddressing, if success helps build momentumand create an environment conducive to futuresuccess.

� Is it necessary for USAID to address thisproblem?

If the host-country government or some otherdonor is already working on it, or planning to,mission resources might be better applied to

some other need that complements the workbeing done by others. If others are notaddressing the issue, then as part of its donorcollaboration effort with the host country,USAID should ask why they are not.

In applying these criteria after collecting andthinking about this information, usually a fairlysmall set of items will emerge as high priority.Making a final decision among this smallergroup will be highly situation-specific, requiringconsultation with host-country politicalpractitioners, civil society group, academics, andothers, as well as with mission and embassystaff. The Center for Democracy andGovernance is also an excellent resource in thisprocess. It is critical to keep in mind whetherassistance will in fact promote democracy oralter the democratic nature of the legislature,while being wary of being lured into followingthe most familiar, easiest, or most visible route.


IV. DESIGNINGLEGISLATIVEACTIVITIES

Having assessed the strengths and weaknesses ofthe legislature, and having made somedeterminations regarding program priorities,what activities can a mission conduct to helpbuild legislative capabilities in the fiveassessment areas? This section is intended toguide officers as they plan activities to (1) helpbuild the political will to strengthen thelegislature; (2) build the legislature�srepresentation, lawmaking, and oversightcapabilities; and (3) improve its infrastructureand management so that it can carry out itsresponsibilities. Suggested activities in each areafollow, along with some examples andimplementation suggestions. Examples areenclosed in text boxes. Note that some activitiescould have been listed under more than onecategory (e.g., public hearings can help alegislature fulfill its representation, lawmaking,and oversight functions) but were only presentedonce. As with the assessment questions, thissection has been organized using the fiveprogramming areas: political will and domesticsupport, representation, lawmaking, oversight,and management and infrastructure.

A. Political Will and Domestic Support

The assessment section above discusses theimportance of political will and domesticsupport for successful legislative strengtheningand presents questions designed to helpdetermine the level of political will that existsfor strengthening the legislature. This sectionpresents specific activities that have been used inUSAID programs to help build support forlegislative strengthening initiatives.

1. Building a Support Base

Successful programs build on a base oflegislative support, which may come fromformal leaders or a cadre of informal opinionleaders interested in the legislative institution.Sometimes that base must first be nurtured.Select activities to support this include thefollowing:

a. Establish a legislative modernization group

Modernization groups in legislatures are multi-party boards of legislative leaders responsiblefor the institutional development of theirlegislature. Such groups typically directinstitutional strengthening, serve as advocatesfor reforms, and handle political problemsrelated to institutional development. As a forumfor reform-minded legislators, modernizationgroups have at times become advocates for otherreforms as well.

If a USAID Mission is planning a substantialprogram with the legislature, and there is nomodernization group in place, one option is tohelp establish and later assist one. If this tactic isfollowed, it is advisable to make sure thatmembers remain in place for the full term of thelegislature (rather than changing every year) sothey can become effective advocates for reformand make long-term commitments on behalf ofthe legislature. As a way to gauge the politicalwill, a mission can encourage establishment of amodernization group and see who becomes amember of it and how much the legislature iswilling to do, before deciding to invest moreheavily. Because of the utility of amodernization group, donors can suggest thatsuch a group be established, whether a programis just beginning or has already been launched.


b. Expose legislative leaders to successfullegislative modernization groups in othernations

Providing the opportunity for critical decision-makers in the legislature to observe how anothermodernization committee functions and the

impact it has had on reforming the legislaturecan encourage the legislative leaders to formsimilar groups in their own legislatures.

The first vice president of the AssemblJia deRepdblica of Mozambique was so impressedwith Bolivia�s group (which he witnessed at

Comisión para la Modernización Legislativa: Bolivia

USAID program activities with the Bolivian Congreso began in 1992, under the auspices of the precursororganization of the Comisión para la Modernización Legislativa (CML). Founded by the vice president andchaired by the president of the congress, it comprised legislative leaders from both houses. Thecommission approved program plans and participated in regular meetings and annual study tours. Thecongress formally established the CML in 1995. By 1999, the CML survived three national elections andthree changes in the parties in power. It spearheaded constitutional and rules reforms establishing directelection for half of the lower house and requiring legislative committees to conduct public hearings.

Comisión Accidental: Colombia

The Inter-American Development Bank made establishing a legislative modernization committee aprerequisite for Colombia�s receipt of a $4.7 million legislative modernization loan in 1999. The ColombianCongreso responded by setting up a two-house Comisión Accidental, comprised of leaders from eachhouse. Unlike any other congressional committee, this commission remains intact for the four-year life ofthe congress. In addition, each year the retiring president of each house automatically becomes a memberof the commission. The commission brought members from both houses and all parties together for thefirst time to plan activities. Having just been established, results are only now starting to be observed.

Comisión para la Modernización Legislativa: Nicaragua

Established through the USAID-funded legislative strengthening program in 1997, the Comisión para laModernización Legislativa (CML) in Nicaragua became the steering group for all legislative strengtheningactivities. Sandinistas and Liberales, who had been engaged in bitter political strife, began to meetregularly to discuss and direct the committee. A study tour to Peru in 1998 helped members develop acollective vision for their congress, and helped them coalesce as a group. To date, the CML has overseenthe development of a legislative information system, web page, and bill-tracking system. Sharply dividedpolitical parties are meeting and agreeing on the future of their legislature.

Parliamentary Commission: Uganda

The private-member bill establishing the Parliamentary Commission, the joint parliamentary-executiveboard that oversees the management and modernization of the Ugandan National Assembly, became lawin 1997. This board created and is overseeing the implementation of a plan establishing permanent,professional non-partisan staff for parliament. Under the authority of the commission, the parliament hired50 professional non-partisan staff (using its own resources), oversaw the development of a parliamentaryinformation system, and gained authority over its own budget. Members of parliament recognize thecommission as responsible for institutional development of parliament. It acts as the steering committeefor activities funded by USAID and other donors.


USAID�s international legislative conference in1996) that he established a similar group inMozambique�s assembly.

c. Strengthen the modernization group

It is likely that the modernization group willneed support, which could include secretarialhelp; regular group meetings with program staff;assistance to members to understand, oversee,and direct activities; and study tours, which canhelp members develop a vision for theirlegislature and coalesce as a group. Anyoperational support should have a decliningbudget to assure host-country buy-in.

d. Organize a legislative leader study tour

It is difficult to envision what one has neverseen. Observing well-functioning legislatures, inwhich many members have a vision of theirlegislature as an effective institution, can helplegislative leaders develop goals for their ownlegislature. Missions should consider aleadership study/observation tour early in theprogram to help develop the necessary supportfor long-term activities. Once legislators havetogether observed effective legislative services,or members working together to strengthen theirinstitution, especially in a legislature in a state ofdevelopment similar to their own, they may bemore willing to support activities to strengthentheir legislature.

Study or observation programs should aimtoward the following:

Seek to accomplish specific objectivesIf the goal is to develop a base of support in thelegislature for legislative reform, participantsshould have the political strength to influencethe legislature. The tour location and programshould be selected with the goals in mind.Exposing legislative leaders to successfulmodernization groups that have transformedtheir legislatures may inspire visitors to do the

same, for example. Do participants need to seehow a modernization group functions, to talkwith its members, to see professional centralizedstaffing systems, or to consider other aspects ofa modern legislature?

Be chosen carefullyMany countries, for varying reasons, can begood site visits for host-country legislators.Neighboring countries that have had successdealing with similar issues often provide themost relevant examples with which legislatorscan relate. Similarly, other countries whereUSAID has had similar programs can be usefulto visit so legislators can see the aim of theprogram. Issues such as the type ofconstitutional structure (presidential,parliamentary, or hybrid), the powers of thelegislators, and the electoral system should alsobe taken into account.

Study tours to the United States have bothadvantages and disadvantages. The majoradvantages are the level of institutionaldevelopment at both the national and statelevels, and the fact that implementing partnerorganizations will usually be more familiar withthe various U.S. examples. Disadvantages derivefrom the fact that the U.S. case is an exceptionalone; the U.S. political institutions (presidentialsystem with powerful national and statelegislatures, the electoral college, and the degreeof federalism) often make it far less relevant toother countries.

In any case, program designers should both takeinto consideration which countries are the mostappropriate, and also consider the timing of thestudy tour. Legislative leaders should not betaken out of the country when they are neededfor political reasons at home. In addition,because study tours are so popular amongdonors, they should be closely coordinated toavoid having too many host-country legislatorstravelling at the same time.


Involve appropriate participantsMember study tours usually show legislators aset of generalized options for programs, and thetime leaders spend together studying legislaturesoften helps build support for positive change inthe legislature. Staff study tours are generallymore specific, providing staff with more hands-on training. Also, staff do not generally havetenure, so investment in them is less likely tohave important impact. When investing in studytours, consider how long participants are likelyto remain with the legislature and how strong aninfluence they exert inside and outside thelegislature.

Include discussion timeLegislators are generally very busy; when theyreturn home they might not have time to discusswhat they have seen. Use of facilitators canguide synthesis and evaluation discussionsperiodically during the tour. Planning toincorporate findings back home is useful.

e. Hold workshops/conferences

Workshops that provide information about howother legislatures function are less expensivemeans of exposing more leaders to legislativestrengthening ideas. Listening to experts,however, is not likely to have as powerful aneffect as seeing for oneself, and workshops heldin-country do not take legislators away fromtheir daily responsibilities to allow them to focusexclusively on ways to improve their legislature.The advantage is their lower cost and greaterlikely number of participants.

2. Laying the Foundation withDevelopment Planning

a. Convene decision workshops

Decision workshops, which allow legislators agreater voice in assessing needs of thelegislature, are another tool for giving clients astake in the desired changes.

b. Assist drafting of legislative developmentplans

Legislative development plans arecomprehensive statements addressing alegislature�s physical, organizational, andmembers� needs, in some cases estimating costsand delineating steps to meet those needs.Legislative development plans

� Put the legislature�s own internal goals onrecord

� Assist the legislature to determine prioritiesfor spending its own resources

Decision Workshops

BeninUSAID/Benin conducted a two-part legislativestrengthening program with the BeninAssemblJe Nationale in 1997 and 1998. Theprogram was designed to give Beninoislegislators a voice in possible follow-upactivities. Step One included a needsassessment, publication of results, anddistribution of the findings to legislative leaders.In Step Two, assembly members discussed thefindings and then worked to prioritize needs, sothat member preferences would be factored intofuture legislative strengthening activities.

South AfricaIn South Africa, the National Council ofProvinces (NCOP) held its first nationalconference, which brought together for the firsttime all of its constituent members andstakeholders. These included local governmentmembers, department directors-general,ministers, members of parliament, and NCOPdelegates. In addition to evaluating the NCOP�sperformance during its first year, conferenceparticipants identified the areas most critical forimproving the legislative capacity of the body.These focused on the NCOP�s budget oversightrole.


� Help donors consider which needs they mightsupport

� Provide well-conceived blueprints for doingwhat needs to be done

If legislators do not have such a plan in place,consultants who have expertise in differentaspects of the legislature�s needs may meet withlegislators, staff, donors, and others to help draftand then facilitate agreement on a developmentplan. Plans are most useful early in alegislature�s life, and they should be reviewedand updated periodically. These plans areinherently political, so in working with alegislature to develop one it is important toensure that the process involves politicalprocesses and actors.

The planning activities above can helpcrystallize political will for change within thelegislature. Some activities designed tostrengthen relations between society and thelegislature (discussed in further detail below)may also build support for legislative changes.

c. Administer legislative questionnaires

Questionnaires on needs and goals can beadministered to legislators as one way to includethem in the design of a program. As withlegislative development plans, they are bestadministered early in the life of a legislature, orprior to initiating assistance. Negotiateddevelopment plans can also help ensure greaterprogram continuity when legislative leaderschange, especially if the major parties in thelegislature have participated in theirdevelopment. Such questionnaires can also serveas a source of information for establishingcommon understanding of anticipated programresults. USAID has funded the development andadministration of legislative questionnaires inColombia and Bolivia.

B. Representation

The assessment section explains that alegislature with first-rate technical capabilities,yet that does not represent the needs andaspirations of its constituents, is not an effectivelegislature. That section also presents a series ofquestions to help one determine how well thelegislature represents constituents. The activitiesthat follow have been used to strengthenconnections and understanding betweenlegislatures and constituents.

1. Helping Civil Society Understand andInteract with the Legislature

This section presents program activities to helpthe domestic civil society to better understandand interact with the legislature:

a. Encourage public interest fora

Public interest fora are meetings where citizengroups can discuss and try to resolve communityproblems. USAID has funded local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that bringlegislators and citizens together to discusscitizen concerns. Assistance includes advice andtraining for NGO representatives, operational

Public Interest Fora:Argentina, Uganda, and Philippines

In Argentina, Poder Ciudadano conducts citizenworkshops to discuss public concerns andpossible solutions to issues such as corruptionand poor relations between representatives andthe electorate.

The Forum for Women in Development inUganda and the Center for LegislativeDevelopment in the Philippines both sponsorpublic events on topical issues dealing withunder-represented groups and legislative policyand process. Legislators, citizens, andrepresentatives of the media participate.


support, and commodity procurement for theNGO operations.

b. Train citizen organizations and advisorygroups

Organizations formed to promote particularinterests (e.g., education, environmentalconcerns, and women�s rights) can be a meansto promote participation in a democracy. Theseorganizations can provide legislators and theirstaff with information and suggestions, organizeconferences on specific legislation, and holdmeetings to explain the predicted impact of laws.To be considered legitimate, this lobbyingprocess should be transparent. Advisory groupscan be useful sources of information and provideinput and feedback on proposed legislation.

c. Prepare citizen groups to testify at publichearings

Citizens and organizations often have littleknowledge of the purpose of public hearings orhow they are conducted. As a result, hearingscan provide legislators with less informationthan they expected if the discussions are toowide-ranging, lack focus, or are disorganized. Inaddition, citizens often take an aggressiveposture toward the legislature or government,which can lead to acrimonious attacks instead ofa useful exchange of information.

The Mozambican experience with publichearings on legislative and constitutionalchanges, cited on page 35, is a good example.NGO representatives received a publicationexplaining proposed constitutional changes andwere trained in presenting oral and writtentestimony. Sector programs with civil societycomponents could incorporate this training toinfluence sector policies.

d. Help candidate information programs

Citizens in many nations do not have muchaccess to information about their legislators, orhow they voted on particular issues. Informationon candidates running for office may be evenmore difficult to obtain. NGOs that publish suchinformation have been established in somenations. NGOs such as these, which are able toobtain funding from multiple sources, may provesustainable in the long run.

In addition to reporting on legislators and howthey vote, groups can monitor and report on theactivities of the legislatures. They can coveractivities such as which bills are before thelegislature, the debates that occur, and thesuccesses (and failures) of the legislature incarrying out its functions.

Educating Citizens:Guatemala and the Philippines

In Guatemala, Acción Ciudadana monitors andreports to the general public on Congreso de laRepdblica de Guatemala activities.

In the Philippines, the Center for LegislativeDevelopment publishes Legislative Alert, amonthly newsletter that reviews, summarizes,and comments on recently enacted and pendinglaws of national importance.

Advisory Groups: Mali and Bulgaria

In Mali, the legislature requested that theNational Organization of the Regional WestAfrica Enterprise Network review all proposedlegislation on business policy.

In Bulgaria, the parliament has begun to turn tomunicipal groups and professional associationsfor information on the impact of proposed laws.USAID programs have trained such groups onthe legislative process, and on how to work withthe legislature.


While assistance to NGOs that publish candidateinformation is permissible, missions need to becareful that these groups are non-partisan innature and do not promote specific electoraloutcomes.

e. Finance public opinion polling

Public opinion polling can play a critical role toinform legislators about the perceived needs and

interests of voters, the status of the legislature,and the direction that public opinion says policyshould take at a given point in time. In someways, polls can play the role of aggregatinginterests that parties are supposed to play butoften are not well organized to do. If nothingelse, these polls can stimulate debate onimportant issues. At the same time, a drawbackcan be that they act as a disincentive for partiesto perform this interest aggregation, which canthen undermine efforts to strengthen thelegislature.

f. Train journalists

The quality of journalism worldwide variesdramatically, and journalists covering thelegislature may not have a good understandingof how it functions. USAID-funded programshave trained journalists to report on how thelegislature functions, to read proposedlegislation and anticipate its impact, and toreport accurately on legislative action.

Before investing in training journalists, however,missions should ascertain the likely payoff of theactivity: How long are journalists likely tocontinue in their careers? How long are theylikely to continue covering the legislature orother issues important to democratic progress?

Public Opinion Polls:West Bank/Gaza

USAID�s program in West Bank/Gaza contractswith an NGO that conducts public opinion pollsto determine citizen concerns, the perceivedimportance of various laws, and attitudes towardcorruption. Strong citizen reaction againstexecutive corruption revealed through pollsencouraged the legislature to take action toconfront it. The polls also revealed that thePalestinian Legislative Council�s approval ratingis the lowest of all branches of government, andthis has encouraged members to find betterways to communicate with the public.

Candidate Information:Argentina and Colombia

Prior to each national legislative election, PoderCiudadano in Argentina gathers, publishes, andnationally distributes data on all candidates,including their academic, political, professional,financial, and legal backgrounds, as well as theirelectoral platforms. According to PoderCiudadano, publishing this information hasenhanced the image of the congress and hashelped improve the quality of legislativecandidates. Realizing that candidates muststand the scrutiny of a published in-depthinterview, parties have begun to field bettercandidates.

In Colombia, inspired by Argentina�s PoderCiudadano�s Politician Data Bank program, theUniversidad de los Andes (UNIANDES) ofBogota developed a �virtual candidate� program,which published information on each legislativecandidate prior to the most recent congressionalelections. USAID, individual citizens, and citizengroups concerned about the quality of legislativecandidates helped fund this program.UNIANDES distributed the biographicalinformation nationwide through a network ofColombian universities so that every area of thecountry was covered.

Candidate information programs may be mosteffective in single member districts, where voterstend to exercise closer control over theirrepresentatives. But closer scrutiny ofcandidates can also encourage party leaders tofield better-qualified candidates.


Who controls the media and will journalists bewilling to provide relatively objective coverage?If objectivity is not likely, are a variety ofviewpoints possible?

2. Facilitating Legislative Openness andResponsiveness

This section presents several activities to helplegislatures improve their communication andinteraction with citizens:

a. Provide rules reform assistance

Legislative rules govern the workings and powerrelationships of a legislature. Some rules reformscan help open a legislature to the public andgrant citizens and groups in society greateraccess to legislators and legislative meetings.Specific reforms may allow for public hearings,grant rights to opposition parties to be heard,allow the opposition to be represented oncommittees, and establish systems to encouragegreater communication with constituents.

USAID legislative strengthening programs haveprovided legislators and staff with copies of

legislative rules from other nations, conductedworkshops on rules reform, and providedconsultants to assist host countries inresearching and developing proposals to openthe legislature to new views.

b. Provide exposure to other electoral systems(electoral reform)

In geographic districts, citizens vote directly forthe legislators who represent them. The directcontrol that citizens exercise over a politician�sre-election in geographic districts encourageslegislators to pay close attention to localconcerns. In party-list electoral systems, votersvote for a presidential candidate or a party, andlegislative seats are apportioned based on theoutcome of that vote. Party-list systemsencourage legislators to be especially responsiveto their political party�s national platform,presumably representing their supporters�concerns.

In attempting to strengthen direct ties toconstituents, some legislatures have changedtheir electoral system from a closed-list systemto an open-list or alternative vote system, whichallows greater citizen choice for their party�scandidates on the party list.8 Other legislatureshave changed the electoral system from pureparty-list systems to a combination of singlemember constituencies and party-list electoral

8 In a closed-list electoral system, nominees to the listpresented by a party, and the order they appear on the list,are decided by party leaders; voters have extremely limitedinput into the decision of which individuals represent themin the legislature. In an open-list electoral system, votersdetermine the order that candidates appear on the list and,in some cases, who the candidates are. For example, a partymay present a list of candidates for a set of seats in adistrict, but instead of voting for a party, voters select theirpreferred party candidates (limited to a maximum number),and the votes count twice: once for the party and once forthe candidate(s). Order on the party list and, thereby, whofills seats are determined by the number of votes individualcandidates receive.

Advisory Group on Electoral Law:Kyrgyzstan

Togorku Kenesh (Supreme Assembly) receivedassistance from a group of expert advisorsregarding proposed legislation, submitted by theCentral Election Committee, to amend theelectoral law. The group analyzed the proposals,which included a change to indirect election of ElOkuldor Palatasy (Assembly of People�sRepresentatives). The advisory grouprecommended several changes. Despite aneffort by the president to bypass the parliamentby issuing a decree and ratifying it byreferendum, the legislative assembly was able toincorporate a number of recommendations intothe final draft of the law, which it subsequentlypassed.


systems. For example, Bolivia changed itsC<mara de Diputados (lower house) electionsfrom pure party list to a mixed electoral system.Some Bolivians worried that under the newsystem, party discipline, and therefore theeffectiveness of the legislature, would suffer.Preliminary results indicate that the self-discipline of the legislature has not diminished.Moving in the opposite direction is alsopossible: New Zealand recently changed itssystem from one of all single-member districtsto a mixed system, so that representation in the

parliament would better reflect the range ofpolitical parties.

Encouraging changes in electoral systems is notnormally a goal of donors, but study tours,roundtables, or advice from international expertsexposing legislators to alternative electoralsystems may interest leaders in such changes.

c. Assist with public hearings

Public hearings provide opportunities for experts

Conducting Public Hearings

BoliviaIn Bolivia, the new professional research staff conducted a series of hearings in 1994-1995 to elicit expertopinion on major reforms proposed for the country�s political system. Expert testimony was used to makesignificant changes to executive proposals; the changes have since become law.

KyrgyzstanIn Kyrgyzstan, the legislative support program promoted the development of the committee process byencouraging the formation of parliamentary �working groups,� several of which solicited experience andguidance from local and international NGOs. In addition, roundtables with numerous government officials,experts, and civic groups were held and they afforded public access to the policy debate. These workinggroups and roundtables created a means by which legislators could develop support for their initiativesand established a dialogue between the legislature, and citizens and NGOs, and ultimately for moreresponsive legislation. Subsequently, the parliament held its first official legislative hearing on draftlegislation to reform political parties.

MozambiqueIn Mozambique, the USAID program provided the AssemblJia de Repdblica with training and logisticalsupport in conducting public hearings. The first hearings were held to gauge public reaction to draftlegislation setting age limits for admission to nightclubs. The USAID program assisted assembly staff inscheduling, publicizing, managing, and analyzing two days of public hearings held in July 1998. More than150 Mozambicans attended, and many spoke. Members were so pleased with the response that they heldnationwide public hearings on ratifying a new constitution in late 1998 and early 1999. Assembly staffassisted in

� Publishing and distributing a summary of the proposed constitutional changes

� Training citizen groups nationwide to prepare testimony and to testify before the assembly committee

� Managing travel and all logistics for legislators and staff

Legislators were surprised at the useful information they received from the public, and a number statedthat they would suggest changes to the new constitution based on these comments. Legislators havesince conducted public hearings on proposed legislation addressing environmental damage to coastalareas.


and citizens to express their views on publicpolicy issues, and for legislators to explain andpromote their agendas. Hearings open thepolicymaking process, and encourage moreresponsive policies. Public hearings held outsidethe capital involve a greater cross-section of thecountry in making the laws that affect them.Public hearings play an important role inlawmaking, and also fulfill a public educationrole as citizens get to hear their legislature inaction and to meet or at least see and hear theirrepresentatives. If legislators hold publichearings, they should be willing and able toamend legislation based on the input received.

Assistance with public hearings may includestudy tours that allow legislators to observeother legislatures� public hearings. Developmentof manuals and operational support forconducting public hearings can be provided.

Legislators may be apprehensive about publichearings because they might expose them tounhappy constituents who may want toembarrass a particular legislator or the party inpower. USAID experiences with public hearingssuggest the following advice, which may helpallay concerns and indicate the value ofovercoming the apprehension:

� Start small with a less controversial issue;do it well; build upon this experience

� Manage hearings well and have a well-defined agenda

� Realize that, once politicians recognize thebenefits of opening up the political process,they may start holding regular publichearings

� Coordinate with other interested donors andall democratic political parties

d. Assist legislatures to provide adequatenotice of meetings

Legislative meetings may be open to the public,but if the public is unaware that the meetings areopen, when meetings are scheduled, or thecontent of agendas, attendance will be low andunrepresentative. Technical assistance can trainand fund staff, recommend improved proceduresfor meetings, and fund systems to helplegislatures provide meeting information in amore open and timely manner.

e. Develop bill-status systems

Bill-status or bill-tracking systems provide arecord of every bill introduced in the legislature.Individuals with access to the system can usuallyview the bill�s text, or a summary, as well asfind out where the bill has been in the legislativeprocess, and what amendments have beenintroduced and by whom. Tracking systems areobviously a useful tool for legislators and staff;some legislatures allow public access as well.

Assistance may include consultation on thedesign and installation of the system, equipmentprocurement, training in the use of the system,and even operational support. Host legislaturesneed to assume the costs of providing training tostaff who will keep the information up-to-dateand accurate, and maintain the system.

A bill-status system is less important in a nationwhose legislature neither introduces nor amendslegislation (and indicates little likelihood that itwill in the near future) than in a nation whoselegislature does both.

Constituent Software: Chile

How do legislators keep up with constituentcontacts? The Center for Legislative Studies andAssistance in Chile developed a constituentsoftware program in the early 1990s to helpChilean legislators and their staffs trackcorrespondence and contacts with constituents.


f. Improve the quality, distribution, andtimeliness of legislative records

In developing nations, the legislative record issometimes many months late. Arcanemethodologies for producing the record and alack of personnel can contribute to these delays.Improving the legislative record has bothmanagement and transparency benefits.

Specific activities may include the following:

� Procedural improvements to reduce delaysin production and release of the legislativerecord

� Funding to help cover production,distribution, and, in multi-lingual nations,translation costs

� Equipment and training to speed upproduction of records

� Technology and training for the productionand distribution of records

g. Conduct media relations programs

Legislators and their staffs are not always adeptat dealing with the media or at conducting pressconferences. Training programs in pressrelations and drafting press releases can beuseful and popular for legislators and staff; theycan be conducted by legislators, ex-legislators,or experts in media relations from that nation orabroad.

Journalists can also be helped to understand andreport on the legislature better, and politicianscan learn to understand the views and concernsof the media. Meetings between legislators andmedia have often served to meet this aim.

h. Conduct constituent relations programs

Maintaining good relations with constituents isonly partly a matter of finding out their policypreferences. Often a legislator�s most importantconstituent relations tool is effective casework,particularly in single-member districts.Resolving and expediting constituents� relationswith government arise from the legislature�srepresentation function�a constituent is notreceiving a service because of an unresponsivebureaucracy, for example, and asks a legislatorto intervene. If many requests are received aboutthe same agency or policy, this constituentservice can also become an oversightmechanism, to point out problems that needformal legislative solutions.

In countries with closed-list electoral systems, itis not generally advisable to work withindividual legislators on constituent relations orset up district level offices because a legislator isaccountable primarily to party leaders, and not tovoters in a particular district. Further, several

Media Relations

ChileFor a number of years, the Center for LegislativeStudies and Assistance (CEAL) in Chileconducted programs in legislative-mediarelations. CEAL sponsored regular off-the-recordbreakfasts at the Catholic University ofValparaiso for legislative leaders and thecongressional press corps. Working through theuniversity, held in high regard by the legislature,helped make these meetings possible.

KyrgyzstanThe USAID program in Kyrgyzstan sponsoredthe participation of legislators on two televisionbroadcasts of a weekly call-in show, in order toserve as platforms from which legislators couldinform the public about legislative ethics and thebudget process. This experience inspireddeputies to turn to television as a medium toinform the public of issues in an importantreferendum, and subsequently resulted in theinitiation of a public affairs show that lasted for20 weeks.


legislators, and usually more than one party,represent districts, obscuring the tie betweenlegislator and constituent, thus diminishing theincentive for individual legislators to take thisrole seriously. Exceptions do occur (e.g., ifparties make constituent relations by legislativemembers a requirement for them to advancewithin the party), but the rule still holdsgenerally. This does not mean that constituentrelations do not matter in a closed-list system.Rather, it means that the role belongs to theparties to carry out, as opposed to the membersof the legislature.

One type of activity to strengthen constituentrelations is workshops on constituent relationsand casework to provide legislators and theirstaff with ideas and strategies for moresuccessfully dealing with and responding toconstituents. Successful politicians from othernations often make good speakers and trainers inthese workshops, but workshops must conformto the realities of the host nation. Look toinclude national legislators especially adept atconstituent relations.

A constituent relations manual developed withboth national and international input may blenddomestic needs and know-how with useful ideasfrom abroad.

i. Help develop facilities for meetings withconstituents

Many legislatures lack facilities in the capitaland the districts where legislators andconstituents can meet. While a district office foreach legislator might be beyond the budget ofmany deliberative bodies (and also somewhatless important in multi-member systems than inthose with single-member districts), regionalparliamentary offices, with staff shared by thelegislators of the region, might be feasible.

In Poland, some legislators maintain office spacein local party offices. In West Bank/Gaza, on the

other hand, the presence of legislators from anumber of different parties in regional legislativeoffices has caused some confusion as to whichrepresentative to approach (a problem inherentin party-list systems). There may also beconcerns about citizen confidentiality or privacy.

j. Develop legislative web sites

A growing number of legislatures makelegislative information available to citizens on-line through legislative web sites. Some systemsare interactive, enabling citizens to write on-lineto their legislators. Developing a web site couldrequire technical assistance in system design,procurement of computer equipment andcabling, training in the use and maintenance ofthe system, and even operational support to keepit functioning.

Web sites must be maintained and updated toremain useful, and program officers should getsuch a commitment from legislative leadersbefore supporting initial development.Developing a legislative web site would not be agood investment in nations where few citizenshave computers or where access to the Internetis very limited. In such cases, economic elitesare the only ones likely to benefit from theinvestment. Also, where monopoly telephonecompanies charge excessively for Internet use, itmight be worth considering support conditionedon regulatory changes that make theenvironment more favorable. Greater numbersof citizens might benefit, however, ifnewspapers make use of the web site and use itsinformation in their reporting on the legislature,and if sites are established where individualswho do not own computers are able tocommunicate with their legislators. (See Peruexample, p. 39.)

k. Produce publications on the legislature

A number of USAID programs have funded theproduction of documents about the legislature.


USAID has funded the production anddistribution of directories that include legislatorresponsibilities, background information, andphotographs. Typically such directories alsodescribe the legislative process and the overallresponsibilities of the legislature, and providephone numbers for contacting legislators.

Such publications may be produced by thelegislature or by an outside organization

depending on willingness, resources, and ability.Of course, these publications will vary in theirperspective on the institution and becomeoutdated as changes take place in the legislature.In some countries these are sold and becomeeconomically viable (e.g., Bulgaria in text boxnext page).

Legislative Information

PeruIn Peru, with funds from the Inter-American Development Bank, the congress was able to expand citizenaccess, speed up production of its daily journal, and provide the media with legislative news at the end ofeach day. The Congreso de Peru maintains a web site containing daily legislative agendas and the text ofbills before the congress. Within an hour after plenary and committee meetings are completed each day,the congress publishes a summary on the Internet. Within two hours of the close of each day�s plenary,the daily Diario de Debates is available on the Internet. Sessions are also carried on cable TV. The cost ofmaintaining the system is high, however, as a team of data input specialists is required to keep it up-to-date.

The system is interactive, and citizens are invited to (and do) comment on legislation under consideration.Their comments are forwarded to legislators. In additional to permanent access sites, staff set upmultimedia kiosks at events around the country where citizens are invited to use the web site to learnabout the congress and to send messages to legislators. Legislative staff participate in university andcollege computer fairs where they solicit participation on the web. Between November 1996 and April1998 the system received 40,000 e-mails from within Peru and from 21 other countries (most foreign e-mail was from citizens residing abroad).

Peru�s experience shows that legislatures developing new systems may at times leap ahead oflegislatures in more developed nations. The obvious question is whether these new levels of citizenawareness and contact with the legislature have had an impact on what the legislature actually does. Theanswer is not yet clear.

Eastern EuropeIn Eastern Europe, technical assistance introduced through the Frost Task Force has accelerated thecapacity of parliaments to produce draft bills and legislative records, and to make them available tolegislators and to the public. In Poland, the time required for production of printed texts of dailyproceedings was reduced from between three and six months to the very next morning. In the Ukraine,technology provided by Congressional Research Service has enabled the Verkhovna Rada (SupremeCouncil) to distribute legislation within ten days of enactment. The Lithuanian Seimas (Parliament) nowtransmits documents by e-mail, and laws and regulations are published in the biweekly State NewsBulletin. The parliament publishes minutes of sessions and compilations of adopted laws at the end ofeach session. Eastern European legislatures also provide space and facilities to enable the press to coverlegislative activities: Ukraine provides office space and a computer, and the Romanian Senat and CameraDeputatilor provide a room and desks for the press.


l. Develop visitor information centers

Many nations restrict citizen access togovernment buildings, including the legislature,often with good reason. While security concernsand the need to conduct business in an orderlymanner may limit citizen access, legislaturesseeking to be more open to citizens must findways to permit as much access as they safelycan, including programs to open up thelegislature and legislative proceedings to morecitizens. Another option is to develop alegislative information office or visitor centerthat conducts tours for the public and studentgroups and that can schedule meetings withrepresentatives.

Assistance may include training for staff whomanage these centers and funds for preparingmaterials. Programs may rely on voluntary labor(e.g., from universities), but should work towardthe legislature�s paying ongoing staffing andmaintenance costs itself. Plans for how the

legislature will eventually fund these costsshould be in place from the beginning. Facilities,construction, and repair are expensive. In recentyears USAID has tended to emphasize thetraining of personnel and the transfer of skillsand knowledge, and to discourage underwritingconstruction, maintaining facilities, and payingsalaries. Any facility construction requires anenvironmental impact assessment. A more openand accessible legislature should lead to morefrequent contact between legislators and citizens,and, hopefully, to increased citizen input in thepolicymaking process. Be aware, however, thatincreased access, particularly in low resourcecountries, could burden legislators with so manyindividual requests for assistance that they maynot be able to carry out their other functions.

C. Lawmaking

Lawmaking assessment questions presentedearlier are intended to serve as a tool indetermining the lawmaking potential andperformance of the legislature. The activitiesdescribed below are designed to help thelegislature reach that potential:

1. Helping Legislators Understand TheirInstitution Better

Design orientation programs for legislators

Turnover in some legislatures is rapid, and newmembers sometimes arrive not understanding

Publications on the Legislature:Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mozambique,

West Bank/Gaza, and Bulgaria

USAID programs in Bolivia, Costa Rica,Guatemala, Mozambique, and West Bank/Gazahave produced and distributed simple, clearbooks and pamphlets (even coloring books forchildren) explaining the workings of thelegislature.

In Mozambique, a USAID program publishedand distributed a regular newsletter on theactivities of the AssemblJia de Repdblica, whichincluded interviews with assembly members andinformation on the status of proposed legislation.

Bulgaria�s legislative directory came about notthrough a legislative strengthening program butbecause businesspeople interacting with thelegislature needed this information, and thelegislature developed it to respond to theirneeds.

Public Affairs Office: Guatemala

USAID�s program in Guatemala helped establisha public affairs office in the congress, whichconducts tours of the legislature and mocksessions where students work together to enactlegislation. Visitor centers may also provideinformation on the roles and responsibilities oflegislators, as well as on the legislative process.They can also serve as outlets for legislativedirectories.


their responsibilities very well or even how tolocate information and facilities. Orientationprograms can help; they should beinstitutionalized to help new legislators at theirinduction. Consider drawing on experts fromsimilar types of legislatures to conductorientation programs.

Orientation workshops may utilize the servicesof current or former legislators from the hostnation and abroad, as well as legislativeadministrators who can explain the institution�sfunctions, services, products, systems, andprocedures. These workshops are most useful ifvideos, tapes, and handouts produced for theorientation programs remain accessible in thelegislative library or other location wherelegislators can refer to them as needed.Moreover, if they are kept readily available, theycan be used with future legislatures.

2. Improving Mechanisms for Debate andDecision-making

a. Strengthen committees

Legislatures, like other complex institutions,accomplish more when they divide their workamong smaller, more specialized units.Committee leaders and members become moreexpert in the committee�s area of responsibility.Committees often do not play a major role for avariety of reasons, such as rapid turnover ofcommittee members, lack of professional staff,and decisions being made unilaterally or withoutconsultation by legislative leaders, executivesand their agencies, or political parties.Committees tend to play lesser roles inparliamentary systems or where a single partydominates the legislature. It should also be notedthat less formal groups than committees canbenefit from similar activities, such as workinggroups, commissions, or caucuses that deal witha certain subject or that bring together certainindividuals with similar interests (e.g., women orethnic groups).

Given the constraints that often exist withinpolitical systems, what tactics have USAIDprograms tried in helping make committeesmore effective? They include the following:

� Workshops and conferences on comparativecommittee roles and functions

� Study tours for legislators to examine theresponsibilities and performance of legislativecommittees in other nations

� Consultants to advise on reforming legislativerules and revising committee structures andprocesses (specialization, staffing, recordkeeping, etc.)

Issues of the structure and function oflegislatures are power issues; there are winnersand losers with every change that takes place.Donors should, therefore, exercise caution inpushing for specific reforms. Presentations oncomparative committee systems and structuresare usually well received; they allow legislatorsto consider a number of options for theircommittees.

Examples from Africa in the second half of the1990s illustrate that, particularly in periods ofpolitical transformation, committee systems canundergo significant development.

b. Strengthen political party caucuses

In a number of situations (e.g., in parliamentarysystems or in legislatures where parties arecentralized and well-disciplined), party caucusestake on several, if not most, of the functions oflegislative committees. As a result, specificactivities to strengthen party caucuses in thelegislature can mirror those that strengthenlegislative committees. Care should be taken tobe as inclusive among the democratic parties aspossible. Agency policy states that assistance topolitical parties be non-partisan in nature andthat it not overtly benefit one party over others.


3. Supporting Committee Staff andInfrastructure

A growing number of legislatures enlist thesupport of professional committee staff, both inmanaging the committee�s business and inproviding members with information. Incentivesfor developing strong, well-staffed committeesare generally greater in presidential and hybridsystems in which the legislature and theexecutive are elected separately. However, evenin parliamentary systems committees serveseveral important functions and may benefitfrom program activities. Program activitiesmight include the following:

· Encourage the development of more

professionally trained staff (box next page)

· Train staff in committee administration,research, computer use, record keeping, andreport writing

· Organize study tours in which committee staff�shadow� their counterparts in legislatures ofother nations. These programs can beexpensive, and are best done as a part of anoverall program of staff development.

· Arrange opportunities for staff to study abroadand intern in foreign legislatures. It may benecessary for the legislative staff person tosign a formal agreement with the legislaturepromising to return and work a certain number

Developing Committee Systems: Ethiopia

Leaders of Ethiopia�s newly created lower house, Yehizib Twekayoch Mekir Ena (House of People�sRepresentatives), faced difficult choices in deciding how to structure its committees. With more than 500members, the council is among the largest legislative houses in the world. Leaders wanted to make fulluse of the membership, so they considered rotating committee leaders and members. A competingconcern, however, was that committees could not develop sufficient expertise to play their policy andoversight roles if they were too large and if leaders and members changed too frequently. After reviewingthe experience of other national legislatures, council leaders in 1995 chose a system of small committeeswith more permanent membership, a system more likely to produce stronger, more expert committees.

Active Committees: Uganda

Uganda�s parliamentary committees developed rapidly in the late 1990s, becoming the workhorse bodiesof the institution, processing legislation, making recommendations, and usually prevailing in plenary votes.This is a remarkable record, since changes of this nature can take decades to evolve. Why haveUganda�s parliamentary committees developed so rapidly? The Ugandan National Assembly�s rulesassign committees a very important policymaking role. The legislator responsible for these provisionscites his U.S. study tour, on which he examined legislative committees. Legislators wanted Uganda�scommittees to play a similar role. The prospect that committee recommendations will prevail on the floorcauses members to take committee work seriously.

Encouraging Caucuses: Malawi

As a result of training they received, members of the Women�s Parliamentary Caucus became animportant legislative actor. The caucus proposed several bills, of which at least two have become law: theMarriage Act, which established age of consent, and the Affiliation Act, which provided support for childrenborn out of wedlock. In addition, the caucus provided key support in the passage of the Wills andInheritance Amendment Bill, protecting women after the death of a husband or father.


of years after completing training. If staffmembers are not guaranteed tenure, thisoption could be problematic.

· Develop internship programs with localuniversities. Interns may supplement theservices of committee staff.

· Purchase computer and other equipment,which committee staff can use for improvedrecord-keeping and research. If this is done,missions need to assure an equipment controlprocedure to minimize loss.

Grafting relatively highly paid, professional staffonto a political body may threaten lessprofessional staff members already in place. Itshould be done carefully, with the support oflegislative leaders and, to the extent possible, ofcurrent staff. Factors encouraging staff tosupport (or at least not oppose) these changescan be clear backing by legislative leaders,assurances that new services do not duplicatecurrent ones, and guarantees that any replacedstaff will be retrained for other positions andopportunities.

4. Improving Information and ResearchCapabilities

Legislatures need reliable information if they are

to fulfill their lawmaking responsibilities.Legislatures depend on the executive to supplymuch of this information, but in many countriesthey also look to other sources (both inside andoutside the legislature, partisan and non-partisan) to provide the information they need.Legislative research is distinct from academicresearch, especially in its presentation.Legislators lack the time to wade through in-depth research; they need only sufficientinformation upon which to base decisions, and itneeds to be presented clearly. In addition toproviding members training on how to obtaininformation, where can legislators go for thisinformation, and what can be done to assist inthis process?

a. Consolidate laws

Consolidated laws are national records of extantlaws, collected, organized, and indexed for easyuse. Without them, the legislature must, ineffect, guess what policies have been codifiedand hope that new laws will fix their problems.Consolidating the laws can be slow andcumbersome, but it is extremely important.USAID funded law consolidation activities inCosta Rica in the 1970s, and included similaractivities in its Uganda program. Programactivities that consolidate laws also benefitjudicial systems and rule of law programs.

b. Train committee and research staff

Committees, especially in larger legislatures inpresidential systems, may have research staffs oftheir own. The U.S. Congress and legislatures insome of the larger U.S. states enjoy access tocentralized, non-partisan research services, andto partisan research staff at the committee level.Legislative strengthening programs often assisttheir development by training, and sometimesproviding temporary funding for professionalcommittee staff. This latter would require aformal waiver from USAID.

Introducing Professional Staff:Chile

Staff of the Center for Legislative Studies andAssistance (CEAL) faced opposition fromcongressional staff concerned for their own jobs.CEAL had to meet with the professionalcongressional staff union to provide assurancesthat it was not seeking to replace current staff.Good relations with congressional staff becameespecially important when CEAL began aninternship program in the congress, bringingdozens of new lawyers into the congress to workas unpaid interns.


c. Develop expert databases

Legislative staff or outside research groups maymaintain lists of experts in different functionalareas. They use these databases to solicitappropriate specialists to testify in publichearings, to speak at seminars, to comment ondraft legislation, and to draft reports. USAIDlegislative programs in nations as diverse asChile, Costa Rica, and Mozambique havedeveloped and maintained these kinds ofdatabases.

d. Establish or strengthen legislative libraries

Most legislatures have some sort of library.Especially in nations where the legislature hasnever played a significant policymaking role, thelibrary tends to be less well prepared to respondto legislators� needs. Legislative libraries shouldprovide accurate, current information, and aclear record of past legislative actions anddecisions for their legislative clients, and, whenpossible, for the public. Legislators need accessto an orderly institutional memory (i.e., so thatthey can know what laws govern their nation)and current local, national, and internationalinformation. Useful library holdings include theconsolidated laws of the nation, daily legislativedebates and summaries of laws, previous years�budgets, statistical information on the nation andits districts or regions, newspapers from aroundthe nation, and newspaper clippings by regionand by theme (e.g., agriculture and foreignaffairs). Current statistical and policyinformation available through periodicals,databases, and the Internet are useful. TheInternet and databases available for purchase canprovide laws and regulations from other nations;few problems are unique to a specific nation,and nations can learn from others as theyrespond to their own problems.

Library and research capabilities should bedeveloped based upon a thorough analysis oflegislative information needs. Purchases of

equipment, databases, and library holdings, aswell as additions to library staff, staff training,and all other aspects of library developmentshould be justified in light of legislativeinformation needs. Increasing the size andholdings of the library affords the legislature nobenefit if it does not help legislators better fulfilltheir representation, lawmaking, and oversightfunctions. They also provide little benefit if newservices are not used (as occurred in theUkraine). Major investments in new or enhancedlegislative services should not be made unlessthe users of the services are involved in theirdesign, are provided training in their use, anduse them to ends which improve the democraticclimate in the country.

Legislative development programs can provide avariety of services to help strengthen legislativelibraries. Consultants can help by studying theinformation needs of legislators andrecommending specific services andenhancements to meet those needs. Programscan also organize training initiatives for librarypersonnel. An internship in a legislative libraryabroad may be a good idea if the host nation hasno adequate domestic programs for library andinformation science training. Short, in-countrytraining programs by outside legislativelibrarians are less expensive and can cover manyneeds.

e. Develop research centers

There are a variety of institutional arrangementsfor conducting legislative research. Party-basedinstitutes and think tanks in Latin Americaconduct ideological or party-oriented research.A growing number of legislatures havedeveloped centralized research services,however, which provide committees andmembers with non-partisan studies.

Is it better to develop research services within oroutside the legislature? What are the advantagesand disadvantages of each? Each nation and


each legislature is different, but the followingconsiderations may be helpful:

Inside: Professional research services inside thelegislature can empower the legislature to play amore significant role and increase its standing inthe nation. The legislature may be more likely touse capabilities it controls. Staff workingdirectly for legislators may be more responsiveto legislators� needs than staff working forexternal institutions.

Special difficulties associated with insideprograms include the following:

· Sensitivities that are inherent in a donorsupporting work inside the legislature of asovereign nation

· High turnover rate of legislative leaders oftenmakes it difficult for programs to developlong-term relationships with leadership

· Integrating new, highly paid staff into alegislature and getting the legislature tosupport these higher salaries

· Keeping services non-partisan

If the plan is to develop research services insidethe legislature, a mission should seek to establisha multi-party management group, and involvelegislators and staff in designing the programactivities and determining how costs will beabsorbed by the legislature.

Outside: It may be easier to establish researchservices outside the legislature, because theywill tend not to involve the program as directlyin legislative politics. Outside centers, with theirindependent status, may also be able to bringlegislators and non-legislative groups together inways inside services cannot. They must makespecial efforts to stay in close contact with thelegislature, however, if they are to be responsiveto its needs.

Legislative Research Centers Within the Legislature

BoliviaUSAID assistance to the Bolivian Congreso from 1992 to 1998 helped develop and sustain a permanent,professional legislative staff office, the Congressional Research Center (CICON), which providedresearch, bill-drafting, and budget analysis services. CICON�s success rested in large measure on thesupport of the legislative modernization committee (CML). CML helped CICON obtain congressionalfunding, used its influence to keep CICON neutral, and institutionalized the entity through congressionalregulation. The �inside� approach was selected because the congress� president requested assistance tobuild non-partisan research capabilities inside the congress. USAID phased out direct funding of CICONfrom 100 percent in year one to zero in year three. As USAID support ended and congressional leadersnot involved in the creation of CICON came to power, pressure to politicize CICON grew.

GuatemalaBeginning in 1996 and continuing today, USAID funds have supported CEDEL, a non-partisancommission of the Congreso de la Repdblica de Guatemala that provides research assistance tolegislators. University students conduct research on policy proposals for the legislature, and many ofthese proposals are developed into legislation. Many of the students go on from CEDEL to becomeprofessional staff for legislative committees. Conditions were right for an �inside� approach in Guatemalain 1996. The legislature was new, the president of the assembly actively solicited the creation of theprogram, and the effort was undertaken with few opposing interests. USAID paid the costs of operating thecenter and a stipend for students.


Outside groups (e.g., universities) may haveother priorities or find it difficult to understandand respond to legislative timetables. Withoutinstitutional and financial support from theirprimary client, the legislature, such centers maybe difficult to sustain. Outside programs tend tobe easier to manage and are less risky, but areoften less successful in capacity strengthening.

f. Develop bill-drafting services

The capacity to draft its own legislationstrengthens the independence and potential

power of a legislature, but the need for andinterest in developing this capacity varies, basedat least to some degree on regime type.Legislatures in pure parliamentary systems, forexample, introduce little or no legislation, sohave little need for bill-drafting services. Thiscapacity tends to be located in one or moreexecutive ministries and within political partiesso, as opposition, they can propose alternativebills. Legislatures in presidential and hybridsystems, which are more independent of theexecutive, will tend to have a greater need todraft and amend legislation.

Legislative Research Centers Outside the Legislature

ChileInitiated in 1989, the Center for Legislative Studies and Assistance (CEAL) has provided researchservices to the congress, drafted more than 100 studies on legislation, trained hundreds of legislativestaff, developed budget and constituent-relations software, drafted more than 100 studies on legislation,published numerous books and manuals, set up congressional internships, trained the media in coveringcongress, held legislative press breakfasts, and trained new local government staff. CEAL was createdprior to Chile�s new congress being seated in 1990. Today CEAL is a self-funded institute of the CatholicUniversity of Valparaiso (UCV). Factors that have helped CEAL succeed include the following:

· Its university base. This provides CEAL with institutional prestige and some university support.

· Its �ownership� of the program, and its excellent indigenous leadership. Although established with U.S.support and guidance, CEAL has always been a Chilean institution.

· Its ability to adapt to changing needs and opportunities. Increasingly, CEAL assists Chile�s local andregional governments, and other legislatures in South America.

Initially, USAID funded an unsolicited proposal to establish a university-based assistance center inValparaiso, the site of Chile�s new Congreso Nacional. The congress had not yet been elected when theprogram began in 1989; at that time there was no �inside� option. USAID covered all of CEAL�s costs earlyin the program, with UCV�s contribution gradually increasing. USAID funding ceased in 1995, and fees forCEAL services supplement the university�s contribution.

Costa RicaIn Costa Rica, USAID supported the development of a legislative assistance center, Programa para elDesarrollo Legislativo (PRODEL), from 1992 to 1996. PRODEL was established outside the legislatureand was affiliated with the University of Costa Rica, which functioned as a source of expertise, mentors,and student interns. The external structure was chosen because the Asemblea Legislativa of Costa Ricaalready had a sufficiently large staff, and there was concern that a legislative technical assistanceprogram managed in-house might compete for legislative resources and influence in conflict withestablished interests. USAID support covered all project costs. When USAID support ended, the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights in Costa Rica purchased PRODEL. The institute continues to providelegislative services, covering legislative elections and assisting political parties in Latin Americanlegislatures.


A professional bill-drafting capability allowslegislators� preferences in legislation to be putinto proper legislative language. Clear, accuratedrafts of bills are necessary if legislation is tofulfill the intent of legislators. Impreciselanguage muddies legislative intent, and allowsministries more latitude in interpretation.

A variety of bill-drafting arrangements can befound, and range from ad hoc systems, wherelegislators might have friends and associatesdraft the bills, to systems in which politicalparties and party-based think tanks draftlegislation, to centralized bill-drafting systemsservicing the whole legislature. Bill-draftingreform efforts have generally moved towardinstitutionalizing and professionalizing theprocess. The various methods for building bill-drafting skills and services are similar to therange of those used to develop research services.

4. Strengthening the Legislature�s Role inBudget-making

If the legislature does not have the authority toaffect the budget, its role in establishing nationalpolicy and representing citizen interests islimited. Efforts can be undertaken to establish agreater role for the legislature in budgetformulation and oversight.

D. Oversight

Effective legislative oversight can help makegovernment more accountable and effective.This section suggests activities that can help alegislature practice oversight more effectively.

1. Improving Knowledge of Factors thatEnhance Oversight Capacity

a. Provide exposure to other systems offormal oversight authority

Legislatures acquire oversight power at theexpense of the executive, which may not

willingly give it up. This power varies fromnation to nation.

The ability of legislatures to keep track ofactions of the executive (and other branches ofgovernment) is enhanced tremendously if theyhave the formal authority to do so. Criticalfactors here are the electoral system and thelegislature�s authority and willingness tomonitor the executive, and its ability to force anunwilling executive to report to the legislature, ifsuch authority exists. Regime type is alsoimportant. Legislatures in parliamentary systemsare likely to have less formal oversight authoritythan their counterparts in presidential systems,and what powers they have will likely beexercised by the opposition.

Legislatures in many nations have createdagencies similar to the U.S. General AccountingOffice, which investigates the activities of theexecutive branch to help improve programperformance. There is an internationalassociation of audit agencies, which individuallyreport to their respective legislative bodies.These agencies� staffs are almost always largerand more professional than other legislativestaff. A challenge for legislatures is to learn tomake the best use of these agencies� findings.

An example of a legislature increasing its formaloversight authority is the British House of Lordswhich, while it no longer has much impact onlegislation, does have a good deal of oversightauthority. (It is significant, here, that theselection process for the House of Lords isdifferent from the House of Commons, and thatmembership in the House of Lords isindependent of party affiliation.) A legislaturethat lost oversight power is the EcuadorianCongress, which can no longer remove thepresident from office, since the constitutionalreform of 1998.

Legislation or constitutional reform thatincreases legislative oversight powers is


9 For additional information, see NDI Workshop,Legislative-executive Relations: Governing in Partnership.A Workshop for the Members of the PalestinianLegislative Council, May 17-18, 1997.

generally not within the purview of developmentassistance. Study tours, conferences, andconsultancies that expose leaders to othersystems, however, may encourage such changes.

b. Provide exposure to legislative systemswith longer committee terms

In political systems where committee chairs andmembers change yearly (or even more often)there is never sufficient time or motivation formembers to develop subject-area expertise.Longer terms for members would encouragesome to become more expert, which wouldcontribute to their ability to conduct oversight.However, there are political reasons for shortcommittee terms. Short tenures tend to keeplegislators conscious of the interests of partyleaders, who can reward or punish legislatorseach year by granting or withholding goodassignments. If they develop expertise andindependent power, strong committees may also

be a threat to party leaders and the executive.Action supporting longer committee tenuresshould probably build on already existingsupports rather than trying to generate initialsupport for legislative committee tenures.

c. Providing technical assistance onstrategies to enhance oversight

Many of the tactics and activities forstrengthening lawmaking capabilities, such asbuilding research and analysis capabilities,developing staff, and strengthening committees,will also strengthen a legislature�s capabilities toconduct oversight of the executive. What otherspecific strategies can legislators employ toincrease their capacity to conduct oversight?In 1997, a USAID-supported workshop held inWest Bank/Gaza discussed, in part, the issue ofhow legislatures can get the executive to provideinformation, to respond to legislative requests,and to abide by the will of the legislature.9

Legislators and former legislators from differentpolitical systems who spoke at the workshopsuggested the following strategies:

� Request meetings with the executive todiscuss important issues over the next year

� Find ways to improve access to governmentministries, which is often easier whenministers are also members of the legislature

� Develop sufficient expertise in order tounderstand what the executive is doing withthe budget

� Request on-line access to governmentaccounts

Defense Budget Program:Georgia

As a follow-on to a conference on the role of themilitary in democracy, the USAID-supportedprogram brought a former Latin Americanminister of defense to speak to members ofparliament, representatives of the Ministries ofDefense, Finance, and Security, and of NGOs.Participants discussed the parliament�s role inoverseeing the defense budget and theexecutive, in general, as well as the benefitsobtained due to greater transparency andaccountability in the defense budget process. Asa result, the Parliamentary Defense Committeehas been able to increase its oversight of themilitary and cooperation has significantlyimproved between the committee and theministry. For example, the ministry reorganizedthe defense budget, providing line iteminformation, and submitted it to theParliamentary Defense Committee. The newlyorganized budget has increased the committee�sability to conduct oversight.


� If there is a public accounts committee,engage it in a continual audit process

� If the legislature has taxing and spendingauthority, consider withholding what thegovernment wants in order to get its attention

� Use public committee hearings and meetingsto focus attention on issues requiringgovernment response

� Learn to apply interest group pressure on theexecutive

� Encourage the development of citizenmonitoring groups, which will follow andreport on inappropriate government activities

� Make strategic use of executive questionperiods, including enlisting the media. If theexecutive anticipates seeing its answers inprint, it may decide to change its responses

� Select a few issues of special importance, andwork with the media and public to get theadministration to focus on these

� Enlist the support of the internationalcommunity, through groups such asTransparency International, to exposeimproper government activities

� Examine oversight systems in other nations,and attempt to incorporate those strategiesthat might be effective

2. Strengthening Budget-making andBudget Oversight

Legislatures have used many of the followingmethods to strengthen their budget-making andbudget oversight capacities:

a. Increase legislative budget authority

Legislatures that have broad budget authority(i.e., reviewing the budget, requesting moredetails and greater justification, revising thebudgets submitted by the executive, formulatingnational budget priorities, and developing theirown legislative budgets) can exercise greateroversight of the executive. Exposure to politicalsystems in which the legislature exercisessignificant budget authority can catalyzelegislators to push to expand their own authority.

b. Amend budget adoption provisions

A legislature may require that the executive giveit sufficient time to study the budget before ithas to vote. Other legislatures pressure theexecutive to bring them into the budget processearlier.

c. Improve legislative access to budgetinformation

Access to information on program spending andits results helps a legislature more effectively

Legislative Accounting Information: Bolivia

The president of Bolivia granted the BolivianCongreso on-line access to the executiveaccounting system as soon as a new,professional budget office was established in1993. The congress quickly set about exercisingits new rights. Members used this budgetinformation to question ministers and othergovernment leaders, who had to begin preparingmore thoroughly for congressional questioningperiods.

The Bolivia example illustrates, however, thataccess given can also be taken away. Asubsequent administration, less willing to sharethis information with the congress, cut offlegislative access to the accounting system. Itwas later reestablished.


practice oversight. Members of the governmentadministration are often reluctant to share thisinformation, so the legislature may need to usepressure to get it. (For specific examples, seecomments from NDI workshop, above).

Some legislatures have on-line �read only�access to government accounting systems thatenable them to observe government spending ona daily basis, and, therefore, to better overseegovernment spending. Exposure to other nationswith such access, particularly for those at asimilar level of development, may encouragemembers to push for similar authority.

d. Simplify budget formats

Executive budgets (sometimes by design) can beconfusing and difficult for legislators tounderstand and use. Consultants can recommendchanges in the budget format that make it easierto understand. The legislature may request orrequire (depending on its power and relationshipwith the executive) that the budget be presentedin that format.

e. Introduce budget hearings

Many legislatures conduct public hearings orother public airing of budget issues. Informationobtained can help legislators refine the budget tomake it more responsive to citizen needs.Hearings can also be a means of applyinginterest group pressure on the executive.

f. Provide expert input

Legislatures may develop means of tapping theknowledge and expertise of budget specialistsoutside the government. Staff can assist bymaintaining address and phone lists of budgetexperts. Appropriate experts can then be invitedto participate in public hearings or seminars, tocomment on the executive budget, and toprovide budget assistance.

g. Train professional budget staff

Professional budget staff can simplify complexbudget information so that busy, non-specialistlegislators are better able to understand and useit. In some systems legislators use staff toinvestigate executive spending and programperformance.

h. Provide legislative budget software

Budgets are notoriously difficult to read andanalyze, even in the most simplified andstraightforward format. Software can beprovided that can help legislators and legislativestaff analyze the content of budgets. In addition,software can both store and be used to analyzedata on an ongoing basis, so members can trackchanges over periods of years more easily,identify errors, and raise issues that need to beaddressed and resolved.

E. Management and Infrastructure

Inadequate legislative management andinfrastructure hinder the ability of a legislatureto carry out its responsibilities. Strategies forimproving representation, lawmaking, and

Legislative Budget Software:Chile

In 1991, staff of the new Center for LegislativeStudies and Assistance (CEAL) in Chilesurveyed Chilean legislators about their needs inthe budget area. The new legislators were tryingto evaluate the executive�s proposed budgeteach year without knowing how previous years�funds were budgeted and spent. CEALdeveloped software that showed, by line item,what was budgeted and what was spent (and thepercentage change from year to year) over eachof the previous three years. The budget softwareenabled legislators to develop more informedquestions for ministers during the budget-questioning periods.


oversight have often incorporated a number ofspecific infrastructure and management activities(e.g., making legislative buildings moreaccessible); this section addresses many of them.

1. Improving the AdministrativePerformance of the Legislature

a. Enhance record-keeping systems

In some nations, the record of the legislature�sactions is provided so late or is so inaccessible itis of little value to legislators, the media, or thepublic. Improved record-keeping systems mayrange from accurate and timely paper recordsand publication of votes in plenary andcommittee, to sophisticated systems such asPeru�s legislative web page. Consultants canhelp design improved systems for recording andreporting legislative activity; training andfinancial assistance can help the legislatureimplement such programs.

b. Standardize administrative procedures

Both legislative performance and publicconfidence in the legislature are likely to beincreased if the legislature establishes andfollows regular administrative procedures. Suchprocedures include rules that standardize jobdescriptions and salary levels for staff and thatestablish consistent standards for such actions ashiring, promoting, and firing personnel andpurchasing equipment and supplies.

Expert consultants can help produce draftstandards and procedures, which can bereviewed, amended, and put into practice.National service rules may provide a startingpoint in developing personnel practices for thelegislature. Program designers need to regard thesituation of each legislature (long hours, littlejob security), with a few special considerations:

· While the legislative personnel system can bepatterned on the executive civil service, it

should be legally separate to maintain theindependence of each branch.

· Legislative work is likely to be quiteirregular, involving long hours at some timesand a relatively light workload at others.

· Many legislative jobs, especially thoseinvolving policy formulation, should bepolitically responsible and accountable.Others, including technicians such as billdrafters or purely administrative staff such assecretaries, should have more tenure andprotection.

Effects of Introducing New Technologies:

West Bank/GazaAlthough the new Palestinian Legislative Councilin West Bank/Gaza had procedural rules, theywere not always followed; at times, there wasconfusion in the chamber. A complete voting,sound, and transcription system was installed inthe plenary chamber. This has helped createmore order and closer adherence to the rules.When the speaker recognizes an individual, onlythat individual�s microphone is turned on andonly that individual can be heard, effectivelyestablishing who is to speak.

LebanonExperience in Lebanon provides an interestingcontrast. The USAID program there installed acombination voting and sound system in theLebanese Majlis al-Nuwaab (Chamber ofDeputies), but the new technology raisedunforeseen procedural issues. The new systemautomatically recorded when a member was andwas not present for plenary sessions. It alsoeliminated the custom of being able to speakfrom the floor without being recognized by thechair. (These issues are not unique to Lebanon,but are factors for any legislature to considerwhen adopting similar systems.) The newtechnology has changed the politicalenvironment in the legislature. Members havenot been comfortable with these changes andhave been reluctant to fully utilize this newtechnology.


c. Draft manuals of administrative procedures

Standardized procedures in printed form canhelp institutionalize administration procedures,reduce corruption by limiting favoritism andnepotism, and thus increase confidence in thelegislature.

Administrative manuals describe standardpurchasing, accounting, and employmentpractices. They may also include standard formsfor evaluating employees and keeping accounts.Consultants, working with legislative staff todefine these practices, might be contracted todevelop such manuals. Administrative staff inthe Congreso de la Repdblica de Guatemalamake regular use of the administrative manualsproduced under the USAID program.

2. Reforming Rules of Procedure

Legislative rules of procedure govern all aspectsof legislative management: how a bill becomeslaw, procedures for questioning ministers,division of leadership responsibilities, and eventhe basic administrative housekeeping of thelegislature. Often developed in a haphazardfashion over many decades, they may resemble acomplicated and confusing maze that undulycomplicates the business of legislating.

Rules reform is a constant, or at least frequent,process, as legislatures adjust to their changingenvironments. Rules reform is a complicated anddelicate activity because legislative rulesdetermine who does, and who does not, havepower, and how and under what conditionspower is exercised. Rules reform generally seeksto simplify and streamline legislativeprocedures, so that the rules help, rather thanhinder, the legislature in conducting its business.

By definition, rules institutionalize thelegislative process. In so doing, they

· Facilitate the work of the legislature

· Reduce the amount of non-controversiallegislation discussed in the plenary

· Limit debate time, and shift work from theplenary to committees

· Address legislative ethics

· Ensure opposition parties and groups a voicein legislative proceedings

· Address resource allocation procedures

3. Improving Physical Facilities andEquipment

Developing legislatures typically suffer frominadequate facilities and equipment. Meetingrooms, sound systems, phones, copy machines,and offices all tend to fall short of what isrequired for the institution to be effective.Ideally, the physical plant should featureadequate space for plenary and committeemeetings, heat/air conditioning, and at leastsome minimal equipment.

While physical improvements are probablyneeded and are often high on any wish list, theyalso tend to be very expensive. Two suggestionsare offered here on investing in physicalimprovements in legislatures. First, physicalimprovements and equipment should be meansto specific ends, not ends in themselves.Improvements in infrastructure and equipmentshould, at a minimum, help the legislatureperform its basic democratic functions and,preferably, be a component of a largerlegislative strengthening program that is clearlylinked to strengthening democracy at the macrolevel. Also, care should be taken that new itemsare dispersed equitably among political partiesand in a manner which assures accountabilityand prevents theft and personal use.Administrative reforms stalled in the Assemblyof El Salvador, for example, because copiers and


other equipment were not being allocated tominority parties.

Second, if equipment such as computerhardware or software is to be purchased,missions should plan training for current andincoming legislators and staff, and take intoaccount future maintenance, upgrading, andtraining needs.


¨ Establish/strengthen a legislative modernization group¨ Expose leaders to successful groups in other nations¨ Organize a legislative leader study tour¨ Hold workshops/conferences on comparative legislative strengthening¨ Convene decision workshops¨ Assist in drafting of legislative development plans¨ Administer legislative questionnaires

¨ Encourage public interest fora¨ Train citizen organizations and advisory groups¨ Prepare citizen groups to testify at public hearings¨ Help candidate information programs¨ Finance public opinion polling¨ Train journalists¨ Provide rules reform assistance¨ Provide exposure to other electoral systems (electoral reform)¨ Assist with public hearings¨ Assist legislatures to provide adequate notice of meetings¨ Develop bill-status systems¨ Improve the quality, distribution, and timeliness of legislative records¨ Conduct media and constituent relations programs¨ Help develop facilities for meetings with constituents¨ Develop legislative web sites¨ Produce publications on the legislature¨ Develop visitor information centers

¨ Design orientation programs for legislators¨ Strengthen committees and political party caucuses¨ Develop committee staff and infrastructure¨ Consolidate laws¨ Train committee and research staff¨ Develop expert databases¨ Establish/strengthen legislative libraries¨ Develop research centers¨ Develop bill-drafting services

¨ Strengthen the legislature�s role in budget making¨ Provide exposure to other systems of formal oversight authority¨ Provide exposure to legislative systems with longer committee terms¨ Provide technical assistance on strategies to enhance legislative oversight¨ Increase legislative budget authority¨ Amend budget adoption provisions¨ Improve legislative access to budget information¨ Simplify budget formats¨ Introduce budget hearings¨ Provide expert input¨ Train professional budget staff¨ Provide legislative budget software

¨ Enhance record-keeping systems¨ Standardize administrative procedures¨ Draft manuals of administrative procedures¨ Assist in reforming rules of procedure¨ Improve physical facilities and equipment

TABLE 2: LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING ACTIVITIESP

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V. CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing sections have discussed thefunctions that legislatures perform, means fordetermining the strengths and weaknesses oflegislatures, and activities and approaches thathave been used to help address legislativeweaknesses. This final section will present moregeneral points on implementation, and concludewith comments on where legislativestrengthening assistance may be heading overthe next few years.

A. Implementation Considerations

· Provide �flexible options.� Legislatures areall different, and they do not respond well to�one size fits all� approaches. In practice, thismeans providing a legislature a variety ofalternatives for improvement and workingwith members to determine what should bedone.

· Expect only incremental changes. Whilethere may be occasions when rapid progresscan be made, expectations should be realistic.Benchmarks and milestones should beestablished accordingly.

· Begin with something tangible. Producingvisible results, such as a specific legislativeservice, early in the program may help buildsupport for long-term efforts with thelegislature, the mission, and the generalpublic.

· Seek synergies. It is important to keep inmind the interrelationships among capacity-building activities. The legislative functionsof representation, lawmaking, and oversightcan reinforce one another to produce a moreeffective institution. Conversely, unless alegislature develops minimum capacity torepresent citizens, to consider laws, and towatch over what the executive branch is

doing, then no capacity-building effort islikely to produce macro level democraticchanges. In addition, given the legislature�scentral role in a democracy, strengthening thelegislature may contribute to politicalobjectives within other democracy subsectors(e.g., civil society or rule of law) or othereconomic and social development sectors(e.g., education or environment).

· Leverage activities. Use study tours toexpose members to different systems and tobring together members with different pointsof view to achieve shared objectives.

· Get leadership support. Legislative leadersmust agree with any program to strengthen thelegislature, and they must be an integral partof activities within the legislature if theactivities are to succeed. If legislators are notin agreement, consider making smallinvestments in activities such as study tours orconferences that may help them develop aninterest in reform.

· Work for cooperation and allegiances.Getting to the point where at least someobjectives can be worked on cooperatively bya variety of parties may be an important firststep.

· Balance political participation. Balancingthe participation of the various politicalparties in program events is important.Determining who participates in study tours ortraining events is quite often a sensitive issue.It is also a good idea to balance politicalparticipation of those whom visitinglegislators meet. For example, when visitingthe United States, visiting delegations shouldhave an opportunity to meet with bothDemocrats and Republicans.

· Never forget that �It�s all political.� Nearlyeverything done in a legislative program canbe considered political. There will be both


winners and losers. Rules reforms that reduceambiguities in the legislative process alsoreduce discretion. Procedural changesinfluence information and resources flows,thus changing the access to power. New orupgraded professional staff may threatenexisting legislative staff or party-based staffthat develop party policy positions.

· Expect outsiders to be the first to use newcapacities. Opposition groups, which do notenjoy the same access to governmentministries and resources that legislators fromthe governing party do, may be the first totake advantage of enhanced legislativecapabilities. As a result, there may beresistance from the party in power.

· Consider the timing of activities. It is notnecessary to try to do everything at once.Indeed, in many instances it is inadvisable. Inmulti-year programs especially, missions maybe better able to accomplish objectives if theyare pursued in a particular order, notrandomly. The frequent political changes in alegislature mean that reforms not possibletoday may be possible tomorrow, and viceversa. Programs must constantly keep an eyeon macro-level democratic impacts ofprograms to gauge success.

· Use outside pressure for reform. Considerworking with NGOs and other interest groupsoutside the institution to build pressure forinternal reform or for enacting a specificpiece of legislation.

· Pursue third-country linkages. Other,particularly neighboring, countries, whoselegislatures may have much more in commonwith the host legislature than do those of theUnited States, may be appropriate sites forstudy tours and as a source of advisors.Legislatures at a similar stage of developmentor whose systems are similar to those of thehost nation may be most appropriate.

· Seek multi-donor support. Support frommore than one donor may make it much easierpolitically for legislatures to acceptdevelopment assistance, and can reduce costsfor each donor. Donor coordination, whileessential, can be complicated. While multiple-donor participation may enrich programactivities, working with other donors willrequire flexibility. Regular donor coordinationmeetings help. If mission plans are dependenton programs by another donor, be preparedwith alternative plans in case activities do notproceed as planned.

· Consider regional programs. Links withother USAID Missions in the region may be acost-effective way to develop exploratoryregional responses to legislative programneeds.

· Pursue sustainable strategies. Start workingtoward sustainability from the beginning. Allof the following tactics for maintainingmomentum have been tried in legislativeprograms:

Create national ownership. Iflegislative leaders are involved in theprogram from the beginning, and if theyplay a significant role in shaping thedevelopment of new services, they arelikely to be more willing to fund themonce donor funding ends.

Support new services on a limited basis.If they have never seen specificlegislative services, legislators may atfirst be unwilling to commit themselvesto continuing the service once it is inplace. Consider creating the service orcapability on a limited basis with theexpectation that once legislators havehad an opportunity to use it, they willuse and support it in the future andcommit their own funds to it.


Build capacity outside, then move itinside. In some cases, it may beadvisable to create certain types ofcapacity (e.g., research or bill drafting)outside and then move it into thelegislature once legislators appreciate it.This may be a useful technique when thelegislature lacks sufficient capacity orwhen staff is highly partisan or tenure isuncertain. While this may be a goodidea in theory, keep in mind that thosewho have a vested interest in keepingthe capacity outside the legislature mayresist the move from �outside� to�inside.�

Set up maintenance agreements.Design a maintenance plan forinfrastructure improvements and requirelegislative leaders to agree to that planbefore new equipment is installed. Thisis required by law for U.S. assistance.

Figure out how services from outsidecan fund themselves. Service-providinginstitutions from outside the legislaturewill need to develop their own strategiesfor long-term sustainability.Organizations will need to consider theirclients, other funding organizations, andpossibly their own governments insecuring long-term funding.

Establish phase-out funding. Makeefforts to get the host legislature to agreeto pay for new services on a staged basisas a condition for continuation after aninitial start-up.

Make some changes permanent.Establishing permanent status formodernization groups increases thelikelihood that they will continue toexist once donor support ends andcontinue to function for the purposes forwhich they were designed.

· Understand that legislative development ismore like engineering than physics: there ismore than one right answer. Given thepolitical uncertainties associated withdemocratic development, even well conceivedplans are often frustrated by events. It istherefore useful to consider alternatives and toturn to them rather than waiting forcircumstances to become optimal.

Finally, keep in mind that legislativedevelopment is a combination of loftyambitions, a lengthy list of mundane activities,and a persistent and focused effort. It is a long-term indigenous process, which donors can helpstimulate. Objectives, targets, and expectationsneed to be kept realistic and meaningful todemocratic change. Development takes place inan environment that is characterized bylegislators jockeying for position and temporaryadvantage, discussing topics that constantlychange, and responding to forces beyond theirown control. It is this very susceptibility tooutside influences, the ever-changing array oftopics and behavior, that in fact can makelegislatures democratic, representativeinstitutions.

B. Emerging Issues

Considering the changes emerging inlegislatures throughout the world, USAID fieldstaff should keep an eye on several key trends.These will not be evident everywhere at once,and there may be places where they do notappear at all. New issues not presented here arealso sure to surface. The Center for Democracyand Governance welcomes missions�perspectives on these issues to ensure that itstechnical leadership strategy best reflects theissues that the field faces in this area.

1. Increasing Citizen Involvement

Legislative strengthening efforts at thebeginning of the 1990s, best exemplified by the


USAID-funded Frost Task Force/CongressionalResearch Services programs in Eastern Europe,focused almost exclusively on building technicalcapacity within national legislatures. During thedecade, however, the focus broadened, with anincreasing emphasis on helping the legislaturebecome more representative of and responsive tocitizen needs. USAID has worked to increase therepresentative role of legislatures throughoutreach programs, the promotion of greatertransparency in procedures and structures, andthe creation of more points of access by citizens.In addition, the Agency has provided support tocitizens, NGOs, and the media to enhance publicparticipation in policymaking.

2. Cross-sectoral Programming

Increasing responsiveness to citizens� needs mayencourage greater involvement of legislatures inother issues important to sustained democraticdevelopment, such as decentralization, anti-corruption, civil-military relations, or rule oflaw. Other, non-DG specific areas includeeconomic restructuring and privatization.

For example, many countries in the throes ofdemocratic transition are already decentralizing.As power is ceded to lower levels ofgovernment, at least formally, legislatures intheir oversight role may be called upon topressure national governments to devolvepower. In addition, what powers can be spun offand how fast, what level of residual control mustbe maintained at higher levels, and whatresources will be allocated to subnational levelsand how are all questions that will continue toconfront most legislative bodies. Also, as poweris devolved to subnational levels of government,local deliberative bodies (i.e., provincialassemblies or municipal councils) also need todevelop their democratic roles. What �legislativestrengthening� means�and how it can besupported�will not be identical with national-level legislative development. This latter area isone in which USAID does not have extensive

experience and where there is limited practicalknowledge.

Similarly, legislatures, through theirrepresentative, lawmaking, and oversightfunctions, can play a critical role in curbinglevels of government corruption. As aninstitution, the legislature has an importantsymbolic value. By developing codes of ethics, alegislature not only helps institutionalize itspractices but can take the lead in promotingintegrity and transparency in government. Someof USAID�s implementing partners have, in thelast several years, made an effort to work withlegislatures along these lines. Codes of ethicsalso add greater credibility to the legislatures asthey formulate anti-corruption laws. In addition,by reviewing the national budget and monitoringexpenditures and implementation, legislaturescan take an active role in ensuring greaterintegrity within government as a whole.

Finally, as expertise in various issue areasincreases, legislatures develop the capacity toarticulate laws that respond to citizen concernsabout justice, personal security, and militarybudgets and expenditures. Greater knowledgewithin the legislature of the security needs of thenation, the budget constraints a country faces,and the alternative roles the military can performmeans a greater pluralism of opinions andperspectives on these issues and a greater abilityto offset the military�s dominance.

3. Developing Professional Legislatorsand Staff

Many legislatures that have not had manyprofessional staff in the past are moving rapidlyto acquire them. Even in parliamentary systems,where the executive branch generally doesanalysis and bill-drafting, legislative bodies havefound that they need independent analytic andmanagement capabilities.


Where there is staff, the need for continuing skilldevelopment is clear, and legislatures are oftenwilling to devote resources to this. The world isincreasingly more complex and subject to rapidchange; since public policy must keep up, thelegislature�s job is also more complex andmercurial. Continuous enhancement of staffingis one way to meet this challenge, and legislatorsknow it. Donors can play a role here, but musttread lightly.

More legislators are also becoming aware thatthey themselves need continuing education. In afast-changing world, they need to keep abreastof developments in substantive policy areas, ofprograms being attempted in other countries, andof new legislative management tools andtechniques.

4. Using Information TechnologyAdvances

As in practically all arenas, computers arebecoming pervasive in legislatures. Moretechnically advanced legislatures are workingwith the Internet, Intranets, web pages, budgetsimulations, and constituent databases. Evenlegislative bodies with less access to technologyare moving toward computerized bill-tracking,statute retrieval, and payroll systems. All areaware of the reality and the potential ofinformation technology for the legislativeprocess.

Legislative leaders with whom USAID workswill almost certainly request assistance indesigning and installing computerized legislativeinformation systems. Proposed informationsystems should be scrutinized to avoid quickfixes or upgrading that does not directly addresslegislative needs or further develop thelegislature�s democratic nature. Also, given therapidly changing world of technology, majorexpenditures should be avoided. One solution isto let the host government purchase thehardware and have donors assist with softwareand technical assistance/training.

The Internet dramatically increases the ability oflegislators and constituents to communicate witheach other and with others throughout the world.The Internet�s impact on legislative processes,however, will not become clear for years. It isvery likely that every legislature already hassome Internet connections, but more likely thannot there will be requests for more legislators, orat least for every committee, to be connected tothe Internet. This is a growing demand beyonddonor capacity to respond and assistance shouldbe avoided unless it can be strictly delimited.

For the foreseeable future, Internet connectionsare likely to promote access inequality andunknown political impact, as only well-off andwell-educated members of society and moreaffluent organizations will have access to them.This disadvantage may be offset by the increasedability of legislators to gather information fromother countries, with the possibility of improvingpolicy analysis and decision-making.

5. Confronting Ethical Dilemmas

Related to the role that the legislature can play inpromoting greater transparency and integrity arethe ethical dilemmas legislators face as theirability to shape policy, write laws, and influencethe budget and its allocation increases. Contraryto common belief, ethical standards for electedofficials are higher than at any time in the past�that is, more types of behavior are judged to beunethical, and in general elected officials arecomplying with these higher standards.However, more rigorous standards increase thelikelihood that elected officials will face ethicaldilemmas in their daily work. Actions that wereformerly acceptable may no longer be so, and notall legislators will understand the new standards.This is in part because ethics laws do not usuallypertain to ethics in any comprehensive way, butinstead tend to focus on the special ethical caseof financial conflicts of interest. Thus, a widerange of unethical acts may not violate specificethics law, further complicating ethical choices.


Many ethical dilemmas arise in the realm ofconstituent services. When a legislator helps acitizen who has a complaint or request, at whatpoint is the legislator no longer a legitimateombudsperson but a corrupt influence peddler?When does assistance to the district cross theline and become graft? From a differentperspective, when a legislator accepts a studytour is this perceived as a sell-out to foreignpowers? Money need not change hands for thisto become a significant ethical question.

As legislators, the public, and the media havebecome more sensitive to and vigilant aboutthese issues, legislative assistance efforts willneed to take them into consideration. However,ethical expectations are highly culture-specific,so outside experts cannot provide definitiveguidance. Local academics and practitioners aremore likely to have the appropriate backgroundfor advising legislative programs.

6. Assessing Growth in the Field

An increasing number of donors and NGOs areinvolved in assisting legislatures. Nations suchas Australia, Canada, and Great Britain arefunding legislative strengthening activities. TheInter-American Development Bank has providedloans for a number of large Latin Americanlegislative infrastructure development programs,and the Organization of American States hassponsored several conferences and smallprojects. The World Bank gave Chile a majorloan for legislative strengthening, and the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP) hascoordinated multi-donor funding for largelegislative programs in Ethiopia, Indonesia, andMozambique. UNDP is also funding severalsmall legislative programs with a three-yeargrant from Belgium. Legislative associations,including the Inter-parliamentary Union, theNational Conference of State Legislatures, andregional associations in Latin America areinvolved in legislative strengthening indeveloping nations, generally with outside

funds. The National Democratic Institute forInternational Affairs, the InternationalRepublican Institute, The Asia Foundation,universities, and regional groups are also quiteactive. Each donor must plan assistance in thecontext of all of these efforts and institutions.

Where legislatures were once an unusual targetfor donor assistance, they have become morepopular. Donors do not all have the same viewof the legislature�s role and they may differabout the aims of legislative assistance. Donorscome with different political and developmentpriorities and others from different perspectiveson the likely impact of assistance. Otherdifferences come from the type of system that aparticular donor itself has (i.e., parliamentary vs.presidential constitutional structure, single-member district vs. proportional representationsystem; and open- vs. closed-list electionsystem). Conflicts could arise not so much frompolicy differences but misunderstandings. Theother side of this is that donors from somecountries have experiences that give themcomparative advantages over other countries,and this should be recognized. USAID field staffwill face the challenge of seeking to integrate itsprograms with others whose basic programmaticgoals may not always be congruent with U.S.policies and preferences. The host country mustactively participate in dealing with thesedifferences.

7. Changing Nature of LegislativeAssistance Programs

As was noted in the introduction, in the late1980s and early 1990s, USAID legislativestrengthening assistance focused largely onredressing the balance of power betweenlegislatures and executives by building thetechnical capacity of legislatures. Legislativeprograms expanded in the mid-late 1990s toemphasize relations between the legislature andcivil society. What will legislative strengtheningprograms look like in the next decade?


The dual emphasis on legislative institutionbuilding and responsiveness to civil society islikely to continue. At the same time, a thirdemphasis is emerging: the roles of politicalparties in the legislature. While some ofUSAID�s implementing partners (as well asother donors) have worked with parties indefining their roles within the legislature andhave sometimes done so with USAID funding,this has not, until recently, received priorityattention as part of mission programming.

Depending on the nation and the politicalsystem, political parties in legislatures makepolicy proposals, set legislative agendas, andnegotiate policies, often before proposals evenreach the legislature. In some electoral systemsparty coalitions within the legislature negotiateto put a government in power, and can render itineffective by removing their support. Partycaucuses deliberate and make policy and partyleaders and officers (whips) enforce discipline.Assisting legislative parties, however, raises anumber of issues with which policymakers willneed to grapple, and assistance in this area maytherefore proceed slowly.

8. Evaluating Results

Many USAID and other programs were firstmounted five or ten years ago, and fundingsources, such as the U.S. Congress, are nowasking what results have been achieved. It willbecome more and more necessary, for bothexisting and proposed activities, to articulatemeasurable (or at least observable) programoutcomes at both the legislative and nationaldemocratic change levels. The measures need togo beyond merely counting events or attendanceto describe what actual changes in the behaviorof political institutions are attributable tospecific legislative strengthening programs.

USAID needs quantitative and qualitative data todetermine whether scarce resources areproducing intended benefits. Measurement of

concrete results not only needs to confirm thatAgency programs are indeed effective; it alsoneeds to serve as evidence to the public thatlegislatures around the world are changing andimproving. These results also can play abeneficial role by demonstrating to legislativeleaders and members that they can makeprogress in strengthening their institutions andstrengthening democracy in their countries.They can then turn around and use the results togain greater support from political parties,voters, civil society organizations, and otherimportant stakeholders who initially werereticent to support legislative reforms.

The purpose of this handbook has been toprovide USAID Missions and theirimplementing partners an understanding of thefactors that influence programming decisions tosupport legislatures in their democratic roles.For that reason, it has focused on a generaldiscussion of those factors, their incorporationinto legislative strategic assessments, and thespecific programmatic approaches and activitiesthat will help address the needs of a host-countrylegislature.

How these activities ultimately lead tomeasurable results is a critical issue, but one thatis not addressed here specifically. In part, this isdue to the fact that the desired results (increasedcitizen participation in decision-making, a moreinfluential legislative role in establishingnational policy and budget priorities, greater rolein reconciling societal conflict, more democraticinternal management processes) do not fit neatlyinto the structure of the handbook. In addition,the specific activities listed often address two ormore results that might be anticipated.

The next step for the Center for Democracy andGovernance is to analyze more thoroughly howthese activities that support legislatures lead tomeasurable results, at both the IntermediateResult and Strategic Objective levels. In themeantime, USAID�s Handbook of Democracy


and Governance Program Indicators provides aset of possible indicators for measuring results.10

10 Handbook of Democracy and GovernanceIndicators, Technical Publication Series (Washington, DC:USAID/Center for Democracy and Governance, October1998).

APPENDIX A:Sample Legislative Needs and Priorities Assessment Questions

POLITICAL WILL AND DOMESTIC SUPPORT

Institutional vision· Do legislative leaders express specific goals for their institution?· Do they express concern for the strength and performance of the legislature?· Are legislative leaders attempting to reorganize the institution to increase its power, and to make it

more effective?· Is there at least one group of reform-minded legislators seeking to strengthen the institution?· What is the party affiliation of reformers? Are reformers of both the majority and the opposition?· Does the legislature have the political will to practice the oversight powers it possesses?· If the legislature does not control its own budget, is it making efforts to do so?

Leadership modernization groups· Have the legislators established a group within the legislature responsible for institutional

development?· If yes, what is its mandate? What are its formal and informal powers?· Is it ad hoc, or is it established by rule or regulation as a permanent legislative committee?· Does the group meet regularly?· Are group members important political actors?· Do they enjoy the support of legislative leaders?· Is representation in the group reflective of the parties in the legislature?· Does the group reflect the different parties or factions within the legislature?· Do members remain on the committee between elections? Or do they turn over each year?

REPRESENTATION: INTERACTION BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE AND SOCIETY

Citizens� observation of activities· Are citizens allowed to visit the legislature, and to attend plenary and committee sessions?· Are plenary and committee meetings open to the media? Are legislative sessions accessible to citizens

via radio, television, or the Internet?· Is their adequate notice of meetings and agendas?· Does the legislature allow or encourage tours by the public (e.g., by the general public, tourist groups,

and school groups)?· Does the legislature have a visitor�s center?· Do legislators hold press conferences and interact with the media?

Citizens� access to accurate, timely information· Are records of legislative meetings accurate, timely, and available to the public?· Does a bill-status information system exist? Does the public have access to it?· Does the legislature make available publications such as member directories, pamphlets, and

brochures?· Does the legislature maintain a web site? Are citizens able to use it to contact their legislators?

Citizen interaction with legislators· Do citizens meet regularly with legislators in the capital and/or in legislative districts?· Do legislators have district offices?· Does the legislature schedule time for members to travel to their districts to meet with constituents?· Do legislators or parties have staff representation in electoral districts?· Does the legislature hold public hearings in the capital or electoral districts?· In party-list systems, do parties assign legislators constituent relations responsibilities and provide them

incentives to maintain strong constituent relations?· Do legislators and staff return telephone calls, faxes, and e-mail?· Is there regular public opinion polling, and are results publicized?

Electoral laws and the party system· What type of electoral system (e.g., single-member, multi-member, party-list) does the legislature use?· Is party discipline strictly enforced?· Do members ever vote against their party?· What are the rights of opposition parties in the legislature?· Are political parties open to public input? Are primaries held?

Civil society, constituencies, and the media· Are citizen groups organized, and do these interest groups communicate and interact with the

legislature?· Are civil society organizations internally democratic and do they represent their membership?· Do universities and think tanks communicate their policy-related research to the legislature and the

public?· Do civil society groups conduct public fora on the legislature and provide candidate information?· Do the media provide accurate, objective reporting on the legislature?

LAWMAKING: AUTHORITY AND PERFORMANCE

Formal lawmaking powers· Is the system presidential, parliamentary, or hybrid?· Does the legislature have sufficient time and other resources to adequately review budget and policy

proposals of the executive?· How many bills were adopted in the previous session?· Does the legislature have the power to amend legislation it receives from the executive?· Can members themselves introduce legislation?· Do other branches of government, or groups in society (e.g., executive, courts, universities, the public

through referendum) have the authority to introduce legislation?· Can the executive veto legislation? Can the legislature override executive veto?· Does the chief executive have the power to rule by decree? Under what conditions?

Formal budget-making and tax-setting powers· What powers does the legislature have in formulating the national budget and in determining taxes?· Can the legislature amend the budget? Can it increase or decrease the total amount or adjust specific

items?· Does the legislature have the power to determine its own budget?· Does the executive have a line-item veto?

Committees· Do committees hold public hearings? Are their own deliberations open to the public?· Do committees obtain expert input on proposed legislation or on the budget through· testimony or reports?· Do committee leaders, members, and staff turn over on a yearly basis, or do they stay on long enough to

become more expert in their areas of responsibility?· Do committees keep adequate records?

Access to information· Does the nation have a system of consolidated laws?· Does the legislature have adequate information upon which to base policy decisions (through in-house

or external research capabilities)?· Is there a legislative library, and does it respond adequately to legislators� requests for information?· Are computer systems adequate for conducting legislative research?

Professional staff· Is there a corps of permanent legislative staff to assist members in their policy and budget-making roles?

Is it adequately trained? Are they legislative or executive employees?· Do legislators have their own research staff (partisan, non-partisan, inside or outside the legislature)?· Does the legislature have a legislative intern program?· Are bill drafting services available? By whom?

Budget-making and taxation activities· Do legislators understand and participate in the budget-making and tax-setting process?· Is the budget structured in such a way as to allow the budget to be analyzed in a timely fashion?· Are budget hearings held? Is there any other public input into the process?· Does the legislature employ professional staff to analyze the executive budget?

OVERSIGHT: AUTHORITY AND PERFORMANCE

Formal oversight powers· What specific constitutional powers does the legislature have to oversee executive spending and policy

implementation?· Can the legislature compel the government to provide information? What specific powers does it have?· Is there a public accounts committee?· Is there a question period or hearings requiring executive ministers� attendance?· Can the legislature investigate program activities of ministers and ministry officials?· Does the legislature have the authority to appoint or confirm cabinet members?· Does the legislature have the authority to dismiss or censure cabinet members?· Can the legislature remove the chief executive? Under what conditions?· Can the chief executive dissolve the legislature? Under what conditions?

Oversight technical capabilities and performance· Does the legislature have adequate procedural and staff resources to carry out its oversight

responsibilities effectively?· Does the legislature have on-line access to government spending information?· Does the legislature utilize the services of a government investigation unit (such as the GAO)?

· If it exists, is the public accounts committee used effectively?· Does the legislature have adequate enforcement tools if the executive withholds information or nullifies

legislative intent?· Does the legislature make use of public hearings and the media to apply pressure on the executive?

MANAGEMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Management· Do plenary sessions and committees function in an open and orderly manner? Are the rules clear?· Do legislative rules permit the adequate airing of views? Do they allow for timely conduct of business?· Are accurate records of legislative activities kept, and are they available to legislators, the public, and

the media?· Does the legislature have in place regular policies regarding legislative staff pay, hiring, promotion and

firing, procurement and its other regular administrative matters?· Do procedure manuals describe these practices? Are they used? Do they need to be updated?· Are there codes of ethics defining acceptable behavior for legislators?

Infrastructure· Are the physical facilities adequate to allow the legislature to conduct its business (e.g., public access

meeting rooms, member and party offices, heating, air-conditioning, etc.)?· Does the legislature have appropriate equipment (e.g., furniture, telephones, copy machines,

computers, sound systems, etc.)?· Is staff adequate (both in number and quality) to handle the administrative needs of the institution?· Are there training programs for administrative staff?

APPENDIX B:Presidential and Parliamentary Legislatures Compared

The following chart summarizes the institutional effects on the legislature caused by regime structure.

PRESIDENTIAL REGIMES

Less incentive for party discipline

Power may be concentrated in hands of partyleaders, but individual legislators tend to havegreater influence

Incentives exist for a strong committee system

Individual legislators have some incentive todevelop policy expertise

Policymaking functions tend to be concentrated inthe legislature (specifically within the committeesystem)

Greater amount of lobbying directed towardindividual members of the legislature, includingmembers of minority parties

Individual legislators can influence policy, evenwhen not a member of a larger party or the partycontrolling the executive

Coalitions for passing legislation tend to be ad hocand temporary

Bargaining over legislation occurs among partiesin the legislature and between the legislature andthe president

Minority parties are not necessarily excluded froma policymaking role

Government and legislation tends to be lessresponsible; they may be more responsive

PARLIAMENTARY REGIMES

Greater incentive for party discipline

Greater concentration of power in hands of partyleaders

Less of a need for committee structure

Less of a need for rank-and-file legislators todevelop policy expertise

Policymaking functions tend to be concentrated inparties or ministerial bureaucracy

Lobbying (by individuals or groups) tends to focuson party leaders in government, the partyorganization, and/or bureaucracy

Little influence over policy by lower-than-cabinet-level legislators, even for those who belong to theparty or coalition of parties in government

Coalitions for passing legislation set at beginningof legislative term

Bargaining over legislation occurs between partiesthat form the government

Opposition parties are excluded frompolicymaking role; their role is one of oversight.

Government and legislation tends to be moreresponsible than responsive11

11 Responsible government or legislation occurs when policies are efficiently and coherently turned into laws without extraneouscosts due to riders and amendments. Responsive government or legislation occurs when policies and laws reflect the parochialinterests and needs of voters.

APPENDIX C: Useful Publications

USAID Related Resources

Bernbaum, Marcia and John Anderson. 1996. CDIE Impact Evaluation: Modernizing Bolivia�sLegislature. U.S. Agency for International Development. PN-ABS-537.

Calavan, Michael. 1996. CDIE Impact Evaluation: Strengthening the Legislature and Democracy in thePhilippines. U.S. Agency for International Development. PN-ABS-535.

Emmert, Jan. 1996. CDIE Impact Evaluation: Parliamentary Assistance in Nepal. U.S. Agency forInternational Development. PN-ABY-218.

Hansen, Gary. 1995. Pathway or No-Way to Reform: CDIE Assessment of Legislative AssistancePrograms. U.S. Agency for International Development.

Johnson, John K., 1997. Best Practices from the International Conference on Legislative Strengthening.Research Foundation of the State University of New York. Produced under Legislative StrengtheningAssistance to G/DG, AEP-5468-I-00-6004-00.

Jutkowitz, Joel. 1997. Influences of Parties and Election Systems on Legislative Accountability/Responsiveness. Research Foundation of the State University of New York. Produced under LegislativeStrengthening Assistance to G/DG, AEP-5468-I-00-6004-00.

Kurtz, Karl T. 1997. Legislatures and Citizens: Communications Between Representatives and TheirConstituents. Research Foundation of the State University of New York. Produced under LegislativeStrengthening Assistance to G/DG, AEP-5468-I-00-6004-00.

Kurtz, Karl T. 1997. Legislatures and Citizens: Public Participation and Confidence in the Legislature.Research Foundation of the State University of New York. Produced under Legislative StrengtheningAssistance to G/DG, AEP-5468-I-00-6004-00.

Lijphart, Arend. 1984. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-OneCountries. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lippman, Hal and Jan Emmert. 1998. Assisting Legislatures in Developing Countries: A Framework forProgram Planning and Implementation. USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 20. PN-ACA-902.

Lippman, Hal and Joel Jutkowitz. 1996. CDIE Impact Evaluation: Legislative Strengthening in Poland.United States Agency for International Development. PN-ABY-213.

Mauro, Frank. 1997. Legislative Strengthening and the Separation of Powers. Research Foundation of theState University of New York. Produced under Legislative Strengthening Assistance to G/DG, AEP-5468-I-00-6004-00.

Ogle, David. 1997. Management and Organization of Representative Assemblies. Research Foundation ofthe State University of New York. Produced under Legislative Strengthening Assistance to G/DG, AEP-5468-I-00-6004-00.

Other Resources

Close, David, ed. 1995. Legislatures and the New Democracies in Latin America. Boulder, CO: LynneRienner Publishers.

Copeland, Gary W., and Samuel C. Patterson, eds. 1994. Parliaments in the Modern World. Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press.

Global Democracy Network Parliaments of the World. (http://www.gdn.org/parliaments.html).

Huntington, Samuel. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman:University of Oklahoma Press.

Inter-parliamentary Union. (http://www.ipu.org).

Kurian, George Thomas and Lawrence Longley, eds. The World Encyclopedia of Parliaments andLegislatures. 1998. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.

Miko, Francis. 1995. The Congressional Frost Task Force Program to Assist the Parliaments of Centraland Eastern Europe. Paper presented at the APPAM Conference, November 3, 1995, Washington, D.C.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 1996. Presiding Officers: Speakers and Presidentsof Legislatures. Legislative Research Series Paper #1.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 1996. Committees in Legislatures, A Divisionof Labor. Legislative Research Series Paper #2.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 1998. One Chamber or Two? Deciding Between aUnicameral and Bicameral Legislature. Legislative Research Series Paper #3.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 1999. Legislative Ethics: A Comparative Analysis.Legislative Research Series Paper #4.

National Endowment for Democracy, Democracy News (http://www.ned.org).

Olson, David. 1994. Democratic Legislative Institutions: A Comparative View. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe.

Reyes, Socorro, and Ma. Lourdes J. Brillantes. 1994. Legislative Support Services in Asia: AnIntroductory Survey. Quezon City, Philippines: Congressional Research and Training Service.

Robinson, William, and Janice Hyde. �A Framework for Assessing Legislatures and InformationCapabilities in Emerging Democratic Nations,� Paper presented at the APPAM Conference,November 3, 1995, Washington, DC.

Robinson, William. 1991. �Building a Parliamentary Research Capability,� IFLA Journal 17,(International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions), no. 4.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1996. Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives,and Outcomes, 2nd Edition. New York: New York University Press.

OTHER DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCEPUBLICATIONS FROM USAID

PN-ACB-895Alternative Dispute Resolution Practitioners Guide

PN-ACC-887Civil-Military Relations: USAID�s Role

PN-ABS-534 Special EvaluationConstituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Civic Advocacy Programs

PN-ACD-395Democracy and Governance: A Conceptual Framework

PN-ACC-390Handbook of Democracy and Governance Indicators

PN-ACE-070A Handbook on Fighting Corruption

PN-ACF-631Managing Assistance in Support of Political and Electoral Processes

PN-ACE-630The Role of Media in Democracy: A Strategic Approach

PN-ACE-500USAID Political Party Development Assistance

PN-AAX-280Weighing in on the Scales of Justice

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USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening · USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Legislatures are the people™s branch of government, the institution