US Strategy for Dealing with a Nuclear-Arming North …...CGSR WORKSHOP BIBLIOGRAPHY 2016 2 US Strategy for Dealing with a Nuclear-Arming North Korea BIBLIOGRAPHY November 2016 Kim

US Strategy for Dealing with a Nuclear-Arming

North Korea

Bibliography

November 2016

CGSRWORKSHOPBIBLIOGRAPHY2016

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USStrategyforDealingwithaNuclear-ArmingNorthKorea

BIBLIOGRAPHY

November2016KimJongUn’sGrandStrategyandRegionalPartnersGoalsCarlin,R.andR.Jervis(2015),“NuclearNorthKorea:HowWillItBehave?”NorthKorea’s

NuclearFuturesSeries.US–KoreaInstituteatSAIS.<http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/CarlinJervis-final.pdf>.

CarlinandJervissharetheviewexpressedinmanyotherpapersinthisbibliographythatPyongyangisunlikelytoreverseitsnuclearweaponsprogram;theauthors,however,arguethatNorthKorea’sbehavior(thusfar)hasnotbrokendramaticallyfromitspre-nucleardiplomatictraditions.ThisUSKINorthKoreanNuclearFuturesentryprovidesvaluetotheacademiccorpusbyaddressing,headon,themorepessimisticcommentariesthatforeseedireandimminentconsequencesofanuclear-armingNorthKorea.

Pollack,J.,T.Dalton,J.Lewis,S.Terry,andS.Y.Lee(2012),“NoExit:NorthKorea,Nuclear

WeaponsandInternationalSecurity,BookReviewRoundtable,”AsiaPolicy13.<http://nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Free/AP13/AP13_NoExitBRRT.pdf>.

ThisJanuary2012bookreviewroundtable,whichalsofeaturesPollack’sresponsestothereviewers,providesaconciseanalysisoftheNorthKoreannuclearissueatthedawnoftheKimJong-Unera.Pollackandthereviewerssharealess-than-sanguineassessmentoftheefficacyofcontinueddisarmamenttalks.Accordingtothesereviewers,Pollack’sbookprovidesmuchofthenecessaryintellectualbackstoppingnecessaryforthisassessmenttogaintraction.

Wit,J.S.andS.Y.Ahn(2015),“NorthKorea’sNuclearFutures:TechnologyandStrategy,”

NorthKorea’sNuclearFuturesSeries.US–KoreaInstituteatSAIS.<http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/NKNF-NK-Nuclear-Futures-Wit-0215.pdf>.

WitandAhn’s2015contributiontotheNorthKorea’sNuclearFuturesseriesprovidesanexcellentoverviewofthreeexpansionscenariosKim’sarsenalcouldtakeinthecomingdecade.Thescenarios—summarizedasminimal,steady,andmaximummodernization—aredefinedfromoneanotherbyboththenumericalgrowthofthestockpileaswellastheintroductionofnewdeliverysystems.TheauthorsthenforecastthreeNorthKoreannuclearstrategyparadigms,basedontheforcemodernizationscenarios,Washington,Seoul,andTokyocanexpectfromNorthKoreaasaresultofthechangedandchangingNorthKoreannucleararsenal.

NorthKorea’sNuclearMilitaryStrategyAlbright,D.(2015),“FutureDirectionsintheDPRK’sNuclearWeaponsProgram:Three

Scenariosfor2020,”NorthKorea’sNuclearFuturesSeries.US–KoreaInstituteatSAIS.<http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF_Future-Directions-2020.pdf>.


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DavidAlbrightexaminesthreepotentialscenariosforthefutureofNorthKorea’snuclearweaponsprogram,whichconsistofalow-end,medium,andhigh-endnuclearfuture.Indoingso,hehelpstodiscoverthefullbandofpossibleoutcomes,includingboththebestandworst-caseoutcomes.Takentogether,thethreescenariosprovideafocalpointforthinkingaboutthefutureofNorthKoreannuclearpolicy.

Bermudez,J.(2015),“NorthKorea’sDevelopmentofaNuclearWeaponsStrategy,”North

Korea’sNuclearFuturesSeries.US–KoreaInstituteatSAIS.<http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF_Nuclear-Weapons-Strategy_Bermudez.pdf>.

JosephBermudezanalyzesthedevelopmentofNorthKorea’snuclearweaponsstrategy.HethensummarizesthehistoryoftheNorthKoreannuclearweaponsprogramupthroughthepresent.HecontinuesbydiscussingAlbright’spotentialscenariosforthefutureofNorthKorea’snuclearweaponsstockpileanddeliverysystems,andconcludesbynotingtheramificationsofeachscenario.

Mansourov,A.(2014),"KimJongUn’sNuclearDoctrineandStrategy:WhatEveryoneNeeds

toKnow,"NAPSNetSpecialReports.<http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/>.

Inthisreport,publishedabouthalfwaybetweenNorthKorea’sthirdandfourthnucleartests,AlexandreMansourovdissectsNorthKoreanofficialstatementsandtextstoofferhisownconclusiveanalysis,inagreementwithseveralWesternanalysts,thatNorthKoreaisunlikelytodenuclearizeintheforeseeablefuture.HearguesthatsinceintroductionofthePyongjinLineinMarch2013,officialshavesolidifiedtheprominentrolethatnuclearweaponsplayinthecountry’snationaldevelopment,security,anddefensestrategies;theyalsomadeanefforttosecuretheinternationalimageofaresponsiblenuclearpowerduringpeacetime.However,nuclearweapondevelopmentisameanstoensureanend,asettingconducivetoregimesurvivalandnationaldevelopment,anddoesnottakeprecedenceovereconomicdevelopment.

Narang,V.(2015),“NuclearStrategiesofEmergingNuclearPowers:NorthKoreaandIran,”

TheWashingtonQuarterly38:1.https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Narang.pdf>.

Inthisarticle,VipinNarangpresentsatypologyofnuclearstrategiesthatareavailabletoregionalnuclearpowersandpresentshistheoreticalframeworkforwhythesepowerschooseonepathwayoveranother.HeappliesittoNorthKoreaandIran,providinginsightintohoweachmightapproachdecisionsabouttheirnuclearposture.HisframeworksuggeststhatNorthKorea’snuclearstrategydependsheavilyonthefutureroleofChinaasapatron,andthattheUnitedStatesshouldencourageChinatocontinueplayingsucharole.

Smith,S.(2015),“NorthKorea’sEvolvingNuclearStrategy,”NorthKorea’sNuclearFutures

Series.US–KoreaInstituteatSAIS.<http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF_Evolving-Nuclear-Strategy_Smith.pdf>.

InthisadditiontotheNorthKorea’sNuclearFuturesSeries,ShaneSmithbuildsfromVipinNarang’sworkincategorizingnuclearstrategies.SmithhelpfullyincludesafourthnuclearstrategyandrefinesthedefinitionofoneofNarang’sstrategies.TheapplicationofthesefourstrategiestoNorthKorea’snuclearevolutionprovideskeeninsights,includinghelpfulindicatorsthatNorthKorea’snuclearstrategyhasmigratedfromonestrategytothenext.


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DeterrenceandAssuranceinaChangedandChangingSecurityEnvironmentJackson,V.(2015),“AllianceMilitaryStrategyintheShadowofNorthKorea’sNuclear

Futures,”NorthKorea’sNuclearFuturesSeries.US–KoreaInstituteatSAIS.<http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF-Jackson-Alliance-09151.pdf>.

VanJacksonconsiderstheramificationsofNorthKorea’snuclearpostureonalliancemilitarystrategy.HelooksatsomeoftheearlierworkdonebyVipinNarangonNorthKoreannuclearstrategyandquestionssomeofitsconclusions.HeexploresthevariouschallengestocombinedmilitaryoperationsontheKoreanpeninsulaandattemptstointroducepotentialsolutions.Jackson’smainproposalsaretoexpandanddiversifybasesandportaccesses,conducttailoredoperationstoavoidescalation,findwaystofightalimitedconflictwithoutout-of-theaterforceflow,andtoleverageJapanmorethanKoreancontingenciescurrentlydo.

Jackson,V.(2016),“TheTroublewiththeUSBomberOverflightAgainstNorthKorea,”The

Diplomat.<http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-trouble-with-the-us-bomber-overflight-against-north-korea/>.

Inthisarticle,VanJacksonbuildsonargumentsfromhisrecentbook,RivalReputations:CoercionandCredibilityinUS–NorthKoreaRelations,toexplainwhydispatchingaB-52bombertoSouthKoreainresponsetoNorthKorea’sself-proclaimedhydrogenbombtestactuallydiminishestheimageofAmericanresolvethatNorthKoreansperceive,doesnotboostSouthKorea’sperceptionofAmericanreliability,andinviteswar.HoldingthatnuclearconfrontationwithNorthKoreaisavoidable,JacksonadvisestheUSandSouthKoreatoillicitcrediblethreatsandmeetconventionalprovocationwithconventionalretaliation.Jackson’sworkservesasacounterweighttoargumentsformorecautiousactioninresponsetoNorthKoreanprovocativeattacks,duetotheNorthKoreanregime’sunpredictability.

Kang,C.(2014),“BreakingtheMythofMissileDefense,”AsanInstituteforPolicyStudies.

<http://en.asaninst.org/contents/breaking-the-myth-of-missile-defense/>.

ChoiKanglaysouthisargumentinAugust2014foramorerobustSouthKoreanmissiledefenseposture,includingtherecommendationtohostTHAADmissiles.Hisperceptiveanalysiscontinuestoholdlessonsforfuturedevelopmentsonthepeninsula,includingthediplomaticuseofTHAADdeploymentsasleverageagainstChina’ssupportofNorthKorea.

Park,C.K.andV.Utgoff(2013),“OnStrengtheningExtendedDeterrencefortheROK-U.S.

Alliance,”JointForcesQuarterly68,Q1.<http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-68/JFQ-68_84-90_Park-Utgoff.pdf>.

ChangKwounParkandVictorUtgoffexplainthestepstakenandstepstobetakentostrengthentheWashington–Seoulallianceinthis2013paper.TheauthorsofferupaseriesofscenariosthatresultinNorthKoreannuclearchallengestotheallianceandaseriesofdesirabletenetsinfutureextendeddeterrenceposturesthatwouldhelpsalvethePyongyang’sprovocations,likeflexiblestationingofUSnuclearweaponsintimesofcrisis,enhancedmissiledefenseandconventionalstrikeoptions,andjointcontrolofthenewlydevelopedconventionalstrikecapabilities.


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Santoro,D.andJ.Warden(2015),“AssuringJapanandSouthKoreaintheSecondNuclearAge,”TheWashingtonQuarterly38:1.<https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf>.

Inthispaper,DavidSantoroandJohnWardendiscusseffortstoassureJapanandSouthKoreaofUSextendeddeterrence.Theyanalyzethecurrentsecurityenvironmentinthepost-ColdWarera,andsummarizetheinitialstepsthattheUShastaken.Theyalsoexplorethecurrentassuranceagendaandmentiontheimportantchallengesandopportunities.Amongtheimportantthemestheydiscussarethedivergenceinthreatperceptionsbetweenthetwoallies,alongwithafearofAmericanlong-termcommitmentinEastAsia.

Smith,S.(2015),“ImplicationsforUSExtendedDeterrenceandAssuranceinEastAsia,”

NorthKorea’sNuclearFuturesSeries.US–KoreaInstituteatSAIS.<http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NKNF-Smith-Extended-Deterrence-Assurance.pdf>.

SmithassertsthatNorthKorea’sincreasingnuclearcapabilitiesputcriticalstrainonUSextendeddeterrenceandsecurityassurancerelationshipsintheAsia-Pacificregion.HechallengesKennethWaltz’sargumentthatnuclearproliferationgenerallyensurespeacebyassertingthatnuclearweaponscouldemboldenNorthKoreatoadvancetheintensityofitsprovocativebehavior.ThispieceisespeciallyusefulinconjunctionwithWitandAhn’s“NorthKorea’sNuclearFutures:TechnologyandStrategy,”asSmithconsiderstheauthors’threeproposedscenariosforthenuclearcapabilitiesofaNorthKoreafiveyearsintothefutureinhisanalysisofextendeddeterrenceandassuranceimplications.

Takahashi,S.(2012),“BallisticMissileDefenseinJapan:DeterrenceandMilitary

Transformation,”InstitutFrançaisdesRelationsInternationales,CenterforAsianStudies,SecurityStudiesCenter.<http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp44av59takahashi.pdf>.

Inthis2012paper,SugioTakahashipresagestheimpactthatgrowingNorthKoreanmissileswouldholdforJapan.HepointstothesalienceandfutureimportanceofballisticmissiledefenseintheJapan–USallianceandwalksthroughtherelevantchangestoJapanesedefensethinkingviahishistoricalanalysisofJapan’sQDRequivalent,theNationalDefenseProgramGuidelines(NDPGs).HealsoprovidesaprescientcatalogueoffuturechallengestomissiledefenseinNortheastAsia,includingaNorthKoreanICBMdecouplingtheUSfromJapanandF-35deploymentspotentiallydrivingPyongyangtowardafirst-strikeincentive.

ExtendedDeterrence,Escalation,andConflictManagementBennett,B.(2012),“DeterringNorthKoreafromUsingWMDinFutureConflictsandCrises,”

StrategicStudiesQuarterly.<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA571012>.

Inthiswork,BruceBennettoffersconcretepolicyoptionstheUSanditsalliescouldtakeinacrisistodeterNorthKoreanprovocationsandactions.Hispolicyprescriptionsfollowthemajorcategoriesindeterrenceliterature,clusteringarounddeterrence-by-punishmentanddeterrence-by-denialoptions.Further,heunderlinestheobservationthatdeterrenceoperatesinthemindoftheadversary;Pyongyang’sthinkingcanbeunpredictableandthestatusquocansometimesbelessattractivethanrollingthediceduringacrisis.


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Utgoff,V.andM.Wheeler(2013),“OnDeterringandDefeatingAttemptstoExploitaNuclear

TheoryofVictory,”PaperNo.4978,InstituteforDefenseAnalyses.

Inthisarticle,VictorUtgoffandMichaelWheelerdescribethetheoryofnuclearvictoryandexplainhowsuchawarwouldbeexpectedtoevolve.Theypresentseveralscenariosthatmightleadtosuchawarandexplaingeneralapproachesforstrengtheningdeterrencepriortothatevent.TheyofferaspecificlistofrecommendationsfortheUnitedStatestodeterattemptstoexploitthetheoryofnuclearvictory.TheauthorsconcludebynotingthattheUSdoesnotcurrentlyhavethenecessarysurvivableC3Icapabilitiestofightarestrainednuclearwar,somethingthatshouldbeofconcerntopolicymakers.

DeterringNorthKoreanVerticalProliferationCarlson,J.(2016),“DealingwiththeNorthKoreanNuclearThreat,”TheNationalInterest.

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/dealing-the-north-korean-nuclear-threat-16102>.

JohnCarlsonemphasizesthenecessityoffindinga“circuitbreaker”fortheNorthKoreansituationbeforeitescalatesintoaregionalcrisis.Hedescribesthelimitedefficacyoffurthersanctionsandpointsoutthatevenaresumptionofthesix-partytalkswouldbedependentonNorthKoreangoals.Hementionsthatastartingpointinfuturenegotiationsshouldbethesettlementofapeacetreatytoendthe1953ArmisticeAgreementbutthatdifficultiesremainwithNorthKoreanacceptanceofverificationarrangements.

Klinger,B.(2016),“ShowingMoreResolveonNorthKorea,”WarontheRocks.

<http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/showing-more-resolve-on-north-korea/>.

BruceKlingerarguesthatcongressionalactiononsanctionshasincreasedUSleveragewithregardtoNorthKoreaandChinaandcriticizestheObamaadministrationforbeingreluctanttoseekstrongersanctions.HemakesthepointthattheresultingstepsfromtheEU,SouthKorea,andthePhilippineswillcollectivelyincreasepressureontheKimregime.Heconcludesbyarguingthattheinternationalcommunityhassufferedfroma“collectivelethargy”inthefaceofNorthKoreanbelligerenceandcautionsthat“sheepishnessiscontagious.”

Walsh,J.andJ.Park(2016),“ToStoptheMissiles,StopNorthKorea,Inc.”

<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/opinion/to-stop-the-missiles-stop-north-korea-inc.html?_r=0>.

ThisMarch2016NewYorkTimesOp-EdpresentstheargumentthatsanctionsandinterdictionareinsufficienttohaltingNorthKorea’scontinuedadvancementsintheirnuclearandmissileprograms.TheauthorsarguethatdiplomacywillbenecessarytotrulycurtailtheNorthKoreaissue,butarobusteffort—necessarilyundertakenwithChineseandAmericancooperation—todismantleNorthKorea’soverseasbusinesses,shellcompanies,andjointventuresistheonlywaytomakethesanctionsregimework.

Yoon,S.(2016),“StoppingNorthKoreanMissiles:AnAlternativetoTHAAD,”TheDiplomat.

<http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/stopping-north-korean-missiles-an-alternative-to-thaad/>.

Theauthor,aretiredSouthKoreanNavyCaptain,questionstheideathattheTHAADsystemisthebestandonlychoiceforSouthKoreainresponsetoNorthKorea’smissileprogram.He


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arguesthatsea-basedBallisticMissileDefense(BMD)isabetteroptionforseveralreasons.HepointsoutthatitwillbecostlyforKAMDtodevelopaTHAAD-likecapacityforthebrieftimewindowrequiredtointerceptNorthKoreanmissilesintheclosegeographyoftheKoreanPeninsula.Healsohighlightsthattheplanforland-basedKAMDisunprovenintheUSandintheMiddleEastandthatsea-basedBMDprogramshavealongertrackrecord.HeconcludesbynotingthattheROKandUSmilitarieshaveexperiencewithhigh-intensityairdefenseatseaandsaysthatjointBMDcoordinationprovidesalearningopportunity.

TowardsanIntegratedStrategicApproachBrechtol,B.E.Jr.(2011),"PlanningfortheUnthinkable:CounteringaNorthKoreanNuclear

AttackandManagementofPost-AttackScenarios,"NAPSNetSpecialReports.<http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/planning-for-the-unthinkable-countering-a-north-korean-nuclear-attack-and-management-of-post-attack-scenarios/>.

Thisarticle,firstpublishedintheKoreanJournalofDefenseAnalysis,grantsclaritytotheoccasionallyfoggydebatesovertheNorthKoreannuclearcapacity.BruceE.BechtolJr.seekstoanswerthequestionsthatremainaboutNorthKorea’snuclearcapabilitiesandarguesfortheUS–ROKalliancetoemphasizepreventionanddeterrenceofanuclearwarwithNorthKorea.ThecasualtiesfromaNorthKoreannuclearattackalonewouldbeinthetensofthousandsatleast,hereasons,andapreemptivestrikeonNorthKoreawouldlikelyunleashawarontheKoreanPeninsula.

Cronin,P.(2014),“IfDeterrenceFails:RethinkingConflictontheKoreanPeninsula,”Center

foraNewAmericanSecurity.<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/if-deterrence-fails-rethinking-conflict-on-the-korean-peninsula>.

PatrickM.Croninoffersadenseanalysisoftheimplicationsformilitaryplanningofthecountry’sgenerallyincreasinginstabilityandtheheighteningsenseofuncertaintythatsurroundsNorthKoreanactions.Inlightofthesesituationalelements,CroninjoinsfellowstrategistinarguingthatthepossibilityofwarontheKoreanPeninsulainthenextonetofiveyearscannotberuledoutandthattheUS–ROKalliancemustfocusnotonlyondeterrence,butalsoonbuildingdefensiveandoffensivewartimecapacities.ThehighlevelofdetailinhisconcludingrecommendationsgreatlysupplementstheliteraturemeanttoassistUSandSouthKoreandecisionmakers.

Cronin,P.,ed.(2016),“BreakthroughonthePeninsula:ThirdOffsetStrategiesandthe

FutureDefenseofKorea,”CenterforNewAmericanSecurity.<https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Report-BreakthroughonthePeninsula-Finalb.pdf>.

Inthiseditedvolume,academicsandexpertsoffertheirviewsontheThirdOffset’simplicationsforthestabilityoftheKoreanPeninsulaandthesecurityofSouthKorea.ThefivekeyrecommendationsfortheUScenteraroundenhanceddialogueamongalliesanddevelopingnewconventionalstrikeandmissiledefensetechnologiesviatheSouthKoreanandAmericanadvantagesoverNorthKoreaininnovation,research,anddevelopment.MiraRapp-Hooper’schapteronextendeddeterrenceeffectivelycapturedmanyofthethemesidentifiedintheCGSRworkshop,includingstrengthenedintelligencesharing,crediblelimitedwaroptions,andhardenedbasingoptionsinSouthKorea.


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Lieber,K.andD.Press(2013),“TheNextKoreanWar,”ForeignAffairs.<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2013-04-01/next-korean-war>.

Withoutelaboratingin-depthmilitarystrategy,thispieceprovidesaclear,conciseoverviewofwartimeconcerns.KierLieberandDarylPressdelvequicklytowhattheyseeastheheartofthedeterrenceissuefortheUSandSouthKoreavis-a-visNorthKorea:inthecaseofaconventionalwarontheKoreanPeninsula,NorthKoreamaybepreparedtoemployaversionofNATO’sColdWarstrategyandthreatenanuclearstrikeinordertobringthewartoaceasefire.TheirrecommendationstotheUSandSouthKoreastresswaravoidanceandmeansofdeterringnuclearescalation.

Manzo,V.andA.Miles(2016),“TheLogicofIntegratingConventionalandNuclear

Planning,”ArmsControlToday.<https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_11/Features/The-Logic-of-Integrating-Conventional-and-Nuclear-Planning>.

InthisNovember2016article,theauthorsarguethattighterintegrationbetweenconventionalandnuclearoperationswillenhancedeterrenceandreducethelikelihoodofnuclearemploymentbyanadversary.Theyofferthreeconcretesuggestionstostrengthenintegration:a)buildingconventionaloperationsthatshapetheenemy’sescalationdecisionmaking,b)strengtheningthemilitary’sresiliencetonuclearoperations,andc)providingintegratedresponseoptionsthatarelimitedandcredible.ThepieceisnotdirectedspecificallyattheKoreanpeninsuladeterrenceproblems,butitsbroadpolicytreatmentandrecommendationsareapplicableandinstructivetotheworkshop’sendeavor.

Roberts,B.(2013),“ExtendedDeterrenceandStrategicStabilityinNortheastAsia,”National

InstituteforDefenseStudies,VisitingScholarPaperSeries,No.1.<http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf>.

BradRobertslaysouthisthinkingontheimportanttrendsintheNortheastAsiansecurityenvironmentinthis2013paper.Hepointstoaseriesofvexingpolicyquestionsthatremainsalienttoday,includingappropriatelevelsofinvestmentinmissiledefense,alliedcontributionstoNorthKorean-centricconventionalstrikecapabilities,andthedegreeoftailoringnecessarytobolstertheUSextendeddeterrenceandassurancepostureintheregion.Thepaper,commissionedbytheJapaneseNationalInstituteofDefenseStudies,focusesprimarilyontheUS–JapannexusbutalsotouchesonUSandJapaneseinteractionswithChina,SouthKorea,andNorthKorea.

This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. LLNL-CONF-716421