U.S. Marine Corps Advisor Training Impact System (MATIS) · (MATIS) Narrative Report . OEF Advisor Teams . 1st Battalion, 8th Marines . 3. rd. Battalion, 5. th. Marines . Prepared

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Technical Report 0911 September 2011

U.S. Marine Corps Advisor Training Impact System

(MATIS)

Narrative Report

OEF Advisor Teams

1st Battalion, 8th Marines 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines

Prepared for: Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command

Advisor Training Group Twentynine Palms, CA

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Point of Contact: Thomas D. Affourtit, Ph.D. Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (Ret) [email protected] | www.irism.com (703) 978-0313 | 1.800.STATMAN

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Table of Contents

1/8 Afghan National Army ETT ............................................................... 1

1/8 Police Advisory Teams ................................................................... 11

3/5 Police Advisory Team ..................................................................... 18

Marine Advisor Training Impact System Interview 5 May 2011

1

Team: 1/8 ETT

Deployment Period: September 2010 - March 2011

Team Type: ETT

Rank: Major

Training: ATG

Billet: Team Leader

What did not go well?

The first operation we did was called: “Eastern Expansion”. The bottom line up front here was

to get the Afghans buy-in. The battalion rolled in and did a RIP; they wanted to get off on an

aggressive foot right away.

The RIP was one week, a normal RIP. As soon as we got there we got the Afghan leadership

buy-in and asked; "Hey, we are going to be here six months, like every other battalion you‟ve

seen. What do you think we should accomplish?" When I say the Afghan leadership, I‟m

talking the Chief of Police, the Kandak Commander they are partnered with, the NDS chief, and

basically the Chief of Police that was the local guy. He said; "You need to go into De Karez.

You need to go out East, we‟re having trouble there. You need to go down South, we‟re having

trouble there, and there‟s trouble up North. But first, I think we need to take care of this thing

out East."

Basically they had an ink blot. They had a sphere of influence and right outside of their security

bubble, the enemy built defenses. So, here‟s our line of post (our security bubble), the village

right outside is going to be abandoned, and trenches dug, IED obstacle belts put in, loop holes

built, pill boxes, fighting positions, and no kidding defenses.

We built a Campaign plan based off of what the Afghan Leadership was telling us, what the

Afghan Police and NDS were telling us. The ANA Commander was just uninterested with

anything tactical or operational; he just sat back and would go along.

It was our first operation, and we got all the American toys involved. A big American presence

and a big build up. We went through and cleared it. I led a supporting attack with the Afghan

Army to support this clearing of a town to the East, and the village just North of that, because

there were logistic supplies there that the enemy was using. We took the ANA (who we hadn‟t

worked with yet) to do a supporting attack, clearing this little village while the Marines cleared

the main objective. And, it didn't go well because of the response from the Afghan Army. Their

commander was uninterested in anything tactical or operations.

We involved them in the joint rock, but they were uninterested. It was very much an American

force fed type of thing. They had Afghan leadership buy-in so to speak, because it was the

Afghan Police Chief that kind of told them to go this way. So we led 30 Afghan soldiers in this

clearing out, this supporting-attack to the North, and they were horrible. We took fire, and they

sat down behind buildings and put the butt of their rifles on the deck. I had to take over and get

up there and personally position their machine guns covering the danger areas, so we could get

across. Their leadership and their aggressiveness crumbled very quickly.

As soon as we took fire they went in all different directions. So the advisors (and there were

eight of us there), took over, and led them, got them together and we took charge and basically


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maneuvered on the enemy and pushed them out of there. After about an hour, we stopped and

regrouped all the Afghans and got their squad leader back in charge. Showed him the map,

showed him where we were and tried to push him out in front, and he did alright after that. No

motivation or enthusiasm at all. This was our first experience with them.

What went well?

A couple weeks later with the same unit. The advisors had spent some time with them and built

a relationship. The enemy had moved. Once we cleared out De Karez, and they cleared Abu

Naga, but they didn‟t stay there. That was just like a supporting attack, like a diversion. It was

to make sure the enemy wasn't going to be able to reinforce De Karez while we were clearing it.

So once the Afghans and us cleared this little village in Abu Naga, we left it. Well, the enemy

from De Karez, they built their defenses right there in Abu Naga and the ANA that we used in

this assault had a post, an un-partnered ANA only company post there.

The advisors (just eight of us), we went back and did some patrolling with them, because all of a

sudden they started taking contact a lot, every day. When we went back, we saw that when they

would leave their company post, they would split their squads, they would basically have

satellite patrolling, controlling with just a walkie-talkie. They were proficient, almost like a

completely different group than we worked with just two weeks before. But it was us coming to

help them.

So, they took us out on patrol, and they showed us where an IED was. The supporting half of the

squad took contact, so we went out to support them. Next thing we know, these guys were

following the Afghans who are aggressing and attacking a deliberate defense. We had no idea

the enemy had built a defense in depth in Abu Naga. And this squad, reinforced with eight

Marines was all about going after it. They were leading support by fire positions, they kept

attacking through. They blocked off the avenues of approach towards their defense with IED's,

basically forcing us to go into their engagement area. And they were dropping off support by

fire positions to cover us to cross the danger areas. We got in their engagement area, and there

were only a couple of us left, but they were all about going after these guys. It was like a

completely different people, in just a couple of weeks. Basically, it was a big fire fight. We

marked a building with an RPG, so air could come in. The enemy had human shields. They

took off and we went in and mapped out their defense. We were able to map out their defense so

we could later come back for a decisive act. Then we returned that night in an ambush position,

they never returned.

Same village, same soldiers now armed with this information. We got all the information from

them. We said; "You tell us what you saw, tell us what you have on your patrols, and give us

your story". And then we went and turned the story into those crazy things that Marines do,

maps with arrows, power points, etc. And we came back and give them these products based off

of the information they had. We told them this was generated from your information, you told us

about the loophole over here and how it covers this avenue of approach, it's that simple. So they

really saw the affects of their involvement.

The second time going in to Abu Naga for operation Strong Resolve, it was a huge success. We

killed seven bad guys, we captured eight guys including a Taliban sub-commander and we

established a new post. It was decisive. We took the town back. But it was us helping them as

oppose to us making them come along and do a supporting mission.


3

They will be more than happy to say; “Okay Captain America, go ahead.” And I am telling you,

when there is heavy machine gun fire coming in, and you're looking for your SAW gunner and

he takes his SAW behind a compound, and puts the butt of the rifle on the ground and just squats

and looks at you like "Huh!" You‟re like; “What the f---?”! That happened when we did it our

way. When we came in and were manipulative so to speak. We wanted to do the OP and

wanted to go and find the bad guys. But we said; “Hey we found the bad guys, Captain America

come and roll over them”.

The second time we went out with those guys and let them show us where the bad guys were.

Even stuff we already knew, and stuff they were talking about ten times over and talking in

circles. Patiently we listened to them, we took notes, and we showed interest. And then we

created our products and our style for our fire support coordinators to look at. I took their squad

leader (who gave us all the information), brought him to the DC. When we had our big meeting,

this gave the squad leader a chance to explain what he had seen and his ideas. Some of his ideas

were kooky, but he got to express them, which gave us a buy-in. They fought like lions. It was a

complete turnaround. It was the same area, same enemy, same soldiers, but a completely

different result.

When we show up with all the big guns, it looks like we are in charge. A lot of what they were

saying was nonsense. But by putting up with a lot of that and just kind of going along with it to

empower them and give them that feeling that they are important. They are important; they are

our ticket out of there. Not necessarily saying; "You are going to do this our way.”, but "How

can we support you?" By presenting that question; "How can we support you?", the first thing

they are going to ask for is stuff, but you have to get beyond that. The biggest challenge is

keeping them focused on the operation. Because if we say, "How can we support you in this?",

they are going to say; “We need rocket ships and astronauts and money and firewood and all

kinds of other things. Keeping them on; "How do you want to take down this problem, knowing

we have limited resources. And, we're going to find out where your holes are, and reinforce

where you think you need reinforcement?" This had decisive results.

How would you compare that reaction and response to the Iraqis when you were an

advisor there?

The Iraqis were completely, one hundred percent different. You asked what was beneficial.

Well, I was on I & I duty first with the reservists. I did an Iraq Tour as an I & I, basically adult

supervision with a reserve company. Then I did a MIT with the Iraqi‟s. Then I did an ETT with

the Afghan‟s. I and I duty with the reservists prepared me for Iraqi‟s. Iraqi‟s prepared me for

Afghans.

If you give an Iraqi soldier a vehicle, he will tear all the parts apart, and he will make three

vehicles run and he'll have two generators fixed. If you give an Afghani a vehicle, he'll open it

up, move his family inside and he will never figure out how to turn the thing on. When I showed

up to that camp in Afghanistan, there were fourteen brand new completely broken generators that

they didn't put oil in and things like that.

The Iraqis would have turned those fourteen generators into some way of making money out in

town. The Iraqis that I advised, over the course of the years (this General) had eighty-nine

generators he had gotten from us, or other contractors. He had them positioned out in town

producing cheap supplemental electricity for the people of Ramadi, which would make him a

rock star. It got him involved, and gave people cheap electricity so they could do more than just


4

power their light, they could power a refrigerator and air conditioning. So people wanted to get

to know him. It gave him an incredible amount of money, because sixty homes he could give

supplemental power with one generator from a KVR Contractor. So those sixty homes, paying

even just a little bit of money, he got the generator for free he was fueling it with fuel that was

supposed to be going into his humvees. So, it was corrupt. It was their version; however, it

made him stinking rich; which he was able to provide for his soldiers. He was getting thirteen

dollars a day for quality of life for his soldiers and he was spending fifteen dollars a day quality

life for his soldiers. So, his soldiers didn't steal every shiny object when they searched a home.

They were very satisfied and they were loyal to him.

Do you think that the Afghans were more primitive?

They are more primitive, and they are not literate. There is a ten percent literacy rate, but those

ten percent are not held in province. If you‟re Kandak, only ten percent of them can read and

write. Some of them are reading and writing in Pashto, and some of them are reading and

writing in Dari. Most of them are reading and writing in Dari (of the ten percent that can read

and write).

It‟s nice to have a literate person as an S1, or an S4, if you want to order stuff. All your officers

should be literate. All the guys that are taking notes from the radio should be literate. So, if you

only have ten percent and you want to make sure the officers are part of that ten percent, and the

guys you have on the radio taking notes, and the guys that are in the different shops, we say; “In

order to go to these schools, you need to be able to read and write.”

When we say we need a guy to go to this school and that school, they wind up being the same

guys, because there are only five guys left in the Kandak that are literate. Those guys never

come back to the Kandak. Because as soon they get done with the driver training course at

Leatherneck, they go to the Medical Training course at Leatherneck. We have a whole group of

guys that just stay at Del Ramen Leatherneck going to these schools, because they are the only

population we are allowed to send, because they have to read and write. So what we have done

by sending them to school is take away the only people who can read and write.

So when we get on to them about; “Well how many radios do you have here?” The guy says

“fifty”, but yesterday you had sixty. So you ask them; “Do you know how many pens you have

over there?” And he says “eight,” and there are three pens there. There‟s a problem.

The Iraqis were educated. Saddam was cruel and vicious and all those other things, but a lot of

people went to college, a lot of people went to high school. They are both Muslim. The Afghans

are more devout in terms of they stop what they are doing five times a day, face west instead of

east and pray to Mecca. The Iraqis, a lot of them pray five times a day, but it's not a do or die

thing. You don't look at the street and see everyone stop at the same time and face Mecca.

Where in Afghanistan everyone you see stops and prays.

There is also the cognitive ability; communicating with the soldiers. The Iraqis, some of them

have gone through high school, some of them have gone through college, even if they are just

privates. The Afghan soldiers never made it to school, which means they have never sat around

in a group and listened to an instructor. They don't receive information that way. They'll get

information their way.

They built a conference room to look just like our conference room; they do things to humor us,

because we give them a lot of money. I learned early on that if we wanted to talk about


5

improving their personal accountability or improving anything, and I did it in the boardroom

which is where they tend to want to have it, because they want to appease us. They would have

difficulty understanding and retaining.

When I took the same conversation to their Shura room (which means we are sitting on the

floor), and two guys are over there playing dominos and there is a miniature TV on in the

background. Everyone is sipping chai and eating peanuts and we are sitting cross legged with

couches. The conversation goes circular and it doesn't go as structured and as formal as we are

used to receiving information. But, they are going to retain it and act on it much more than if we

put them in the boardroom where we are used to conversing and transmitting and receiving

information.

And that is much different than the Iraqis who sit in circles and talk all day too, but they at least

had gone to school, and were used to the lecture type. The Afghan‟s whole cognitive ability to

be able to reason is so different from ours. And you don't realize that until half way through

your deployment. Then you think; “They are either completely retarded, they are working

against me, or there's something else.”

How long did it take to build a rapport?

I think that the longer we are there, the more advisors that they have come and go, the quicker

you are going to build rapport. They are still looking at me as “A Marine”, but it was relatively

quickly. In Iraq it was very quick because I was the sixth advisor there, so they accepted me

right away. In Afghanistan (Sha Kala), we were the second advisors there. They knew we were

there for their interest. It's your personality and your openness and willingness to work with

them. The rapport was built quickly, but it got better after the first couple months. It took like a

month before you really figured out how their brains are working, and how and what they are

willing to tell you, and what you've got to kind of get out of them, and when they talk in circles,

what they mean by it.

I'll give you an Iraq example because it opened my eyes to how they take machoism to the

extreme. In Afghanistan, I can't be in an argument with you because if I am in an argument with

you, you are either going to put a bomb in my car or we are going to have to fight to the death

over something stupid. I was in a meeting in Mosul with the Three Star Iraqi General (Ninawa

Commander), talking to a Two Star (the First Division Commander). At this time it is important

for the advisors to be shadows. It was more important for the two Iraqis to talk, than for me to

talk. I just want to get them talking and provide a back stop, and figure out what is going on.

When a two star and a three star are talking, I want to know word for word what is going on.

Usually I am just talking wave talk, because the interpreters get caught up in individual words.

Well, I knew the Ninawa Operations Commander wanted all of First Division up to Mosul in that

area. And I knew that the First Division Commander wanted the Third Brigade out of Ninawa

and back down to Al Anbar, where they had built Habbaniyah and all this infrastructure for

them. And right now he is a division commander, but his brigades are all attached out and he

wanted to get them back. The Ninawa guy wanted the two other Brigades that were servicing

someone else to come up and help him out, because he is very prestigious. The first brigade was

the QRF and Malaki‟s pet division, and they had access to crazy amounts of money back then.

I knew going into this conversation kind of what they were going to say. They exchanged

pleasantries, I'm expecting that. Then the two star starts talking to the Division Commander


6

about how it would be nice if the country needs a national QRF to mass their combat power in

Anbar, and be able to quickly respond to any hotspot that punches out throughout the battalion.

And also get reinforced with tanks to defend their borders from Iran. And what a great thing it

would be and how intimidating to our enemies it would be to have this force concentrate in one

spot, ready to pounce.

The three star doesn't disagree with him. He asks like one or two questions to be polite, and

make sure he's paying attention. Then before he agrees or disagrees, they start talking about

squad level tactics. And I'm like; “What just happened?” I got a three star and two star talking

about fire team squad level tactics. And then they start talking about the color of the car that his

aunt bought last week, just crazy stuff. So they go through about ten minutes of absolute

nonsense, where one sentence isn't really even connected to the other. They're just talking. Like

one is talking and the other one's response has nothing to do with what he's talking about. So I

don't know what just happened. And then the three star comes up with; "You know what would

be great? Is if the whole First Division were to mass their combat power up here in Ninawa, then

we could get rid of these nasty Kurds that are up at the north. And we could reinforce our

borders, and Mosul would be the First Division's town." And, so he gave his sales pitch. The 1st

division commander (after the Americans had built Habbaniyah and some awesome places and

were turning over American Marine Camps to the Iraqis down there). He didn‟t like that idea at

all, but he wasn‟t going to say that to the three star. So now the three star gives his sales pitch,

and instead of getting confrontational, because you have got two one hundred percent one

hundred and eighty degrees opposing views right now. Instead of it getting confrontational, it

went to platoon level, squad level, and fire team level tactics. So while they start talking this; it

goes back to his cousins‟ car and then it goes crazy.

This happens in like, every conversation, but it's so subtle. In most conversations, I don‟t know

both parties before going in the conversation. So in this one particular instance I knew what one

wanted, I knew what the other wanted. I heard one sales pitch, I heard the nonsense. Then I

heard the other sales pitch then I heard the nonsense. And I saw how two guys, two powerful

generals with completely opposing wills, didn't get the least bit confrontational or insulting. The

three star outranks the two star, but the two star is Malaki‟s right hand man, he is the First

Division Commander. He may have more power than the three star, but he is definitely

connected and not somebody you want to mess with. When I figured this out, it was like an

epiphany. They are talking about squad level tactics and they are not even responding

coherently. And I'm thinking I'm about to take a chair and beat my Interpreter with it, because

he cannot possibly be translating this correctly. Then I realize I've seen this in a Tony Soprano

movie, where the two mobsters talk and they give no indication, but as soon as they leave they

whip out their cell phones and cuss out each other.

The Second Division Commander, (I followed him out the door) and we no sooner got through

the first doorway, his cell phone was out and he was calling Bagdad, "This mother f*cker wants

to get the whole division up here? Absolutely not!" And you knew that was going to happen.

They are very calm and collected and not confrontational, but I guarantee you, as soon as the

Second Division Commander was on the phone, that the Ninawa Operations Commander was on

the phone with somebody “mother f*cking the other guy.

That was something that was so pronounced, that I was able to pick up on it as a freaking “white

guy” and say; “Wow! That's how they interact.” They can't get confrontational because of all

their macho cultural stuff. And, so I started seeing deluded lesser versions of that in all these

conversations where they are not going to say „no.‟ When was the last time you heard an Afghan


7

and an Iraqi say 'no'? They don‟t. They agree with each other. They say they'll do it, but they

don't. And you wish they'd just say it; “Why didn‟t you tell me no? Instead, I‟m sitting here like

an idiot and you guys just didn‟t show up.

In Afghanistan, they won't tell you that the guy on the radio didn't take the message because he

can't write. You have to figure it out. You ask; “You called on the radio didn‟t you?” He

replies: “Yeah, we told them (the Afghan‟s) last night over the radio.” Then you go and get the

radio operator, and ask him if he remembers talking to so and so. He says “yes”, then you ask

“where‟s your notes?” Then you realize he probably can‟t read and write. So when he called at

two in the morning, and said that we have to be up at this time, or we are going to do a check

point at this time; he probably didn‟t write it down, because he doesn‟t know how to write. And

he probably didn‟t want to wake up the Commander up to tell him. So the Commander didn't get

the information. So it's probably not his fault that he wasn't at the VCP at eight o'clock when we

showed up. But they don‟t want to tell you that. It takes you a while to build a rapport and

figure this out for yourself.

What did you admire most about the Afghan counterparts?

Very similar to the Iraqis in terms of; “The soldiers are great.” In terms of motivated, they have

their issues in terms of literacy. They are a complaint based culture. We as Marines are going to

tell you what we can do with what we've got. They are only going to tell you what they can't do

and what they don't have. When you ask the Marine; “Hey, we are going to go into Abu Naga?”

They say: “Alright, you know what we can do? We have fourteen guys. If we want to take Abu

Naga, we'll set seven up here, we‟ll set seven down there, and I'll call my buddy and see if we

can get any javelin missiles or I'll call my friend that's a sniper and see if we can get that.” If you

ask an Afghan; “We are going into Abu Naga”. They say: “Well, we are not going to be able to

come in from the east and we are not going to be able to come in from the west, and I don't have

any vehicles or I don't have any firewood. And oh yeah, we haven't eaten in three days.” And

you want to know what that has to do with going into Abu Naga. Then they realize; “Oh, the

American wants something from me to go into Abu Naga. I am going to start off with: I need

firewood and three motorcycles.” We are like: “What do three motorcycles have to do with Abu

Naga?” This is interpreted as you want something from me, and I have to give you something.

It is insane for us, but natural for them.

An example I used for the guys on the team. When you pay a guy one thousand dollars for a

contract, and he gives two hundred dollars back. You are like this guy is corrupt, this is crazy.

He‟s obviously charging me two hundred dollars too much. But when we go to a restaurant we

leave a twenty percent tip. They don't understand that. It makes perfect sense to us, even though

you wouldn't be able to explain it in a way that would make sense to them. “Why do you tip

your barber?” He's charging you four dollars for a haircut. The sign says four dollars, so you get

a haircut, then you give him an extra two dollars because he did a good job. But try to explain

that to an Afghan. They can't explain to us why they do that type of stuff. They can't explain to

us why we ask them to go to Abu Naga and they ask us for three motorcycles when three

motorcycles have nothing to do with Abu Naga, it's just the way they are. They don't buy and sell

things necessarily with money. Sometimes they use weights of opium, sometimes they use

chickens, they use grains, they use services, they barter, but it's not necessarily with currency.

They are naturally going to think that every negotiation is barter. This happens more so in

Afghanistan than in Iraq because Iraq was a little more modern.


8

Most beneficial training:

Working and dealing with the interpreters; learning patience. Role playing activities, and having

them put you in stressful situations in terms of the interaction. Coming in there and having that

guy pissed-off before you build the rapport, great training, and having to calm him down. I went

to ATG and did a lot of this role playing and training while I was getting ready for Iraq. In Iraq

it was very helpful, there were situations where they tried to use their culture and our lack of

understanding. They know that we need them. We are asking them to do things that we ourselves

wouldn't do, because we need Afghan soldiers with us everywhere we go to interact with the

population. We are asking the Kandak; “We‟ve got fourteen different positions, because we

have the ink blot, we have to make that security bubble.” So we ask them to put a couple guys in

each one of these positions to help us interact. They are immature. They have only been around

for a couple of years. They don't have the military history that Iraq has in terms of organization,

so the Afghan Army organization can‟t reach back and say: “Oh ten years ago you were an

Afghan soldier or an Afghan Colonel. No, ten years ago there were no Afghan Colonels. There

were War Lords running around.” In Iraq we could reach back and get guys who had experience

with the republican guard, and some kind of knowledge of doctrine and organizations, and

getting ready for a parade. In Afghanistan, there were no parades ten years ago. There were War

Lords everywhere. So there is no person that you could reach back with experience.

Least beneficial training:

I can't answer that question here because I didn't go through the training this time around.

Whatever was not useful that prepared me for Iraq, I forgot about. This time around I got back

from CAX and I had a month before we deployed. So for two weeks I got with Major _____

(ATG), with whom I knew as an advisor in Iraq before. I just got culture and language for two

straight weeks. He worked with me with the interpreters and I cut out anything extra, so I didn't

really experience anything that was not helpful.

Additional training desired:

I would recommend Dari and only Dari. Even though I was in Helmand with Pashtuns, I wasn‟t

only dealing with locals. I was dealing with locals, but I used an interpreter. In terms of

everyday living with interactions, the Army is going to speak Dari. Now what makes it more

difficult than Iraq is; they are going to use this mixture of Farsi, Dari, and Pashto. It's almost like

local. In the unit, different guys are using different words. Some, guys are saying “tashikur”,

and other guys are saying “deyra manana”. And you are thinking; “Wait! I thought this guy was

Pashtun, why is he speaking Farsi?” They interchange. But that unit lives together, talks among

each other, they understand each other, and they probably come up with new words. Our

interpreters have a hard time keeping up with them.

But I would focus on Dari for the Marines. Even though when I saw I was going to Helmand

Province, I saw that I was going to have a problem with some of them, the Army guys don't look

like the Pashtuns. They look like Chinese. They are Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks, they are from the

north. They have a disadvantage in town because they don't speak the local language and they

look so different. They don't have beards, because half of the Hazaras can't grow beards. They

try, but it is like three little things. Kind of like Asian types of beards.

The Pashtuns grow very thick long beards, so they even look different. Sometimes they are

viewed as an outside invader, because they live off the local population. In Hazara, they give


9

locals money, they get along with them very well because they are feeding the economy. Now

that the economy is switching, the Afghans need to find some customers. They get away with

much more than us, because they are still Muslims.

What characteristics do you think are most important for an advisor to have?

I think that I&I Duty is fantastic training to be an Advisor, because you are acting with

populations. The key I think is when you are on I&I duty, it is not about you. You‟re I&I, he‟s

the Company Commander or Battalion Commander. He‟s not going to do ten percent of the

work, because he is only there two days a month. But, you are going to make sure that that

Battalion Commander or that Company Commander doesn't fail. So, you are going to look out

for where your single points of failure are. If we have everybody show up at this point and the

buses aren‟t there or the trucks aren‟t there, then we stop. So you are going to look ahead of that

as an I&I, and say: “Even though it is not my job to make sure the buses are there, I am going to

put an I&I back stop to getting the buses there, because I know if they don‟t show up we are

totally screwed. So as an I&I you are constantly doing that, because your success or failure

depends on this reservist who is there two days a month.

My Company Commander was a Physician‟s Assistant. He wrote prescriptions and stuff. He

was like a doctor. If two days a month I went to a hospital and followed him around and wrote

prescriptions and checked people out, would I be any good? So, why am I expecting him, two

days a month to be a Company Commander with all of this done? I have no problem helping

him, and managing my expectations as long as he understands what I've done. You are not

holding the reserve Company Commander to the same standard that you would hold an active

duty Company Commander.

When you go to Iraq or Afghanistan, you know your counterpart is not as good as a guy in the

Marine Corps. But, he‟s an Afghan, and he is doing it his Afghan way. For example: We got

this Battalion Commander fired, because he was an obstacle to development. We didn't get him

fired for his incompetence; we got him fired the Afghan way. The Afghan way was, he wasn't

kicking enough money up, so we exposed him, so to speak, and the Afghans took care of it. It

was much more politically correct than the Americans coming in and crossing him off.

I would say, personality-wise or temperament-wise or demeanor-wise, I and I duty was great

preparation, because it's not about you. It's about making that guy succeed, and making him

succeed without doing everything for him. A lot of times they say: “Put an Iraqi face on things”.

That means: you do everything, and at the last moment you throw an Iraqi guy up there. Now he

can't speak intelligently about what the hell he just did, and he looks like a moron. It's actually

putting an Iraqi face on everything you do and doing some things the Iraqi way. Putting an Iraqi

face on things is much different than doing it the Iraqi way.

I've read that Easter Offensive book, and that stuff motivated the shit out of me. I went to Iraq

with a very non risk adverse attitude. It's going to be two of us and a radio, and the Iraqis doing

it. The radio will have the Medevac and the EOD and the QRF. But when I show up with eight

MARAPS and thirty Marines armed to the teeth, you can‟t tell me that that Afghan in three

different types of uniform with an old Russian pistol and a beat up jeep is in charge. We just

level the town and we put an Afghan up there and say that he's in charge. But I think the guy

with the tank is in charge.


10

When I was in Iraq, I would just go with two vehicles. When we went into the meetings, it was

just me and a Terp. My two MRAPs would usually stay outside of the compounds. I had a radio.

In all those meals, and all those meetings, and all that stuff, I am usually the only “white” guy

there. It was more important for me to be a shadow and to support the Afghan even if he was

saying something completely ridiculous and stupid. I would discuss it with him after. And he

knew and appreciated me not bringing things up in this forum, and that was part of the rapport

building. That has to be put in the training.

Other brigades that had Army teams came to meetings in a different way. We would be sitting in

a Shura room and in comes the Lieutenant Colonel in full battle rap. There is a time and a place

for that, but inside a meeting where everyone is wearing man dresses probably isn't the spot to

have knee pads, elbow pads, you look like a football player or a storm trooper. I would be there

in my frog suit or camis with just a pistol, and my little walkie talkie in my pocket to kind of give

them support. I'm not threatening you and I'm not so paranoid that you are going to turn on me.

I've got to assume some risk. But they show in with the Colonel, and the Colonels two body

guards, a whole stream of Majors, a couple Captains, and then a bunch of radio guys. All of a

sudden you're looking in the room and there's six Sheikhs and four Iraqi Army guys meeting, and

ten Army guys that are dressed like storm troopers, and me and my Terp. It‟s like; “Who is in

charge here?” All the Army guys that show up are just sitting around.

I know the Lieutenant Colonel wants to get everybody involved (because they are on the team

and he feels they need to be involved in the meeting). But to me the meeting is not about him.

He is supposed to support the outcome of that meeting. So, let the Afghans have their meeting

and if you've got one guy that's in there, let that one guy go back and brief your team and let the

team work with their counterparts. But bringing them into those meetings, no matter how you cut

it, especially in their culture, the storm troopers with all the guns around me are going to be

perceived to be the ones calling all of the shots, and perceived to be in charge.

So, if there is one direction we have go with is when working with a handful of guys, you have to

assume a lot of risks, because we need to force them to do it. If we show up with all these gun

trucks, we are in charge. And we give them that perception. They are never going to have that

perception of being in charge. Just like you don‟t really feel you are in charge unless you are in

front of the company, and then you turn around and the company is behind you. And you think;

“I guess I have to make a decision here”.


11

Teams: 1/8 PAT 1 & PAT 2

Deployment Period : Aug 2010 – Mar 2011

Location : Now Zad & Musa Qala

Team Type : District PAT

Rank : Captains (2)

Billet : Team Leaders

Training : ATG Twentynine Palms

Background:

Their teams were from one of the first battalion sourced teams. They were formed late and

received only the ATG pre-deployment training package. One team had 21 members, the other

had 10 members. The teams replaced PATs from surge battalions that were stood up in theater.

What went well:

Building ANSF capacity, allowing us to begin steering towards self-sufficiency and an exit

strategy. This was the top battalion priority, using the Task Force Leatherneck six phase

development plan. The general assessments reporting the Afghan National Army more capable

than the Police was not the case in our districts. Both districts had a good District Chief of

Police (DCOP).

The previous USMC advisor teams relieved the British, who operated differently and had made

little progress. The previous USMC teams were too busy trying to figure everything out to do

much advising. When we first started, we showed the ANP how we conducted patrols. At first,

we led and they followed. Next, they led all the patrols. After about three months, they went out

on their own and conducted all the patrols. By the time we left, they had planned and executed

operations completely on their own.

What did not go well:

1. We got off to a slow start, with a Relief in Place (RIP) of only three days with one team

member. The teams we replaced weren’t set up for success. They were formed in theater

without pre-deployment training. They didn’t even have a Terp for the last three months. We

developed a comprehensive RIP for the 3/2 teams that replaced us. Too long of a RIP (e.g.,

more than 10 days) becomes an inhibiter to rapport development with the new team.

2. Radical swings in ANSF personnel numbers. The daily on-hand numbers ranged from 44-90.

This was due to leave cycles and personnel changes. The manning document (Now Zad) stated

147 when we arrived, about 100 over.

Major barriers to your mission:

1. The sheer volume of redundant reporting. The same information was requested in different

formats from different members of the RCT Headquarters Element. It never got overwhelming,

but it was certainly a distraction. It takes away our time for building capacity. It also confirmed

that people you’d expect to be talking to each other are not talking to each other.


12

2. Developing institutional capacity. You can take a Police District, and have a reasonable

amount of stability in their personnel for about 12 months and make some significant gains. But

as soon as you disrupt that, you can see a regression, a significant regression if certain people are

removed. That created issues for us sometimes, trying to get them to interact with their higher

headquarters.

3. The lack of logistical support to the districts. There was no mechanism in place to push

logistics to the district. Often the level of support received was not dependent on doing the

process right, but instead on whether the person at headquarters liked them. It could be based on

tribal dispute differences. The ultimate goal to develop their institutional capabilities requires

bureaucracies and processes that would be followed irrespective of the involved personnel.

There will invariably be some deviation from institutional processes. It’s a matter of degree.

But it some cases, they would radically depart from the process, because they did not like the

person making the request.

4. Team size (Now Zad). We needed eight members to go out. Our 10 man size limited our

ability to travel.

5. We inherited our Interpreters from the Battalion. Some only spoke Dari. After a while, we

were blessed with a Terp who spoke the dialect of the area. He was very tight with the Police

Chief.


1. Scenarios with role players.

2. Good overview of MOI and MOD processes.

3. Our primary instructor (GySgt Robertson) developed and embedded the positive attitude and

proper mindset as an advisor. I had Marines that walked into ATG with a negative mindset

about being an Advisor. Within 21 days, it was night and day.

4. Kudos to Gunny Robertson for the Advisor 1 and 2 courses at ATG.

Least beneficial braining:

Language training received at ATG. It’s different for the team that replaced us. They had a full

seven months to prepare. Language training cannot be an ancillary duty or a collateral task. If

you really want somebody to have language capability before deployment, training has to be

persistent. You can’t gain much from working an hour or so with a Pashto computer program.

That’s why I told my guys if you spend time with your counterparts, you’ll learn more in the first

two weeks of being around them for 8-10-12 hours a day than you ever would in a language lab.


1. The main thing we needed was more time. These were the cards we were dealt. We had

three weeks prior to going out to ATG. We did as much as we could in three weeks. I was

envious of the team that replaced us. They were getting a lot of information that we never

received and were more prepared with their seven month work-up.


13

2. More detail on MOI and MOD processes. We got baseline introductory training at ATG, but

it just scratched the surface - their systems for sustainment and logistics and administrative

procedures. We needed more detail, everything from when a guy goes UA, gets killed in the line

of duty, or transfers to a different unit. We had to figure it out when we got there, while

simultaneously trying to figure out how these guys actually deal with this stuff in reality. There

is the ideal which is outlined in directives which we were ignorant of, and how our counterparts

actually did it. We’re trying to advise them on getting in line with national policies and

procedures. We don’t know whether they are deviating from it, ignorantly or intentionally, until

we know the process itself. It really slowed us down. We could have decreased our learning

curve significantly if from day one, we knew they were not doing it technically by the book the

way they were supposed to. Now why is that? Do they know the process to use, or is because

the entity in the next higher chain of command isn’t following the process either?

Team dynamics:

1. There were a couple of marginal disruptions, nothing that jeopardized the team. The

Millennium generation. Some of the young guys would throw a temper tantrum if they did not

have some of the things they experienced in previous deployments, for example, the internet.

There were no Staff NCOs on the team. Highest rank was a Sgt until the last month. They were

mostly young guys, some on their first deployment as an Advisor. The OICs have to assess their

strengths and weaknesses to match that with their tasks. You can’t put a 19 year old kid in front

of a 50 year old warrior who is a former Taliban and has been fighting his whole life.

2. The command relationship within a team is personality based. You have to make it a priority

that everyone is reading from one sheet of music.

3. We interviewed our team members to make sure they had the mindset coming in. We put that

to the test during the ATG package. We advised the instructors which ones we were on the fence

with, because we did not want to take them over if they were a liability.

Globally sourced versus Battalion sourced teams:

I expressed my skepticism about some of the faults people always pointed to for globally sourced

teams. A globally sourced team can work well together if formed early enough to build

camaraderie and cohesion. We had team members that were not from 1/8, 6 MPs, Marines from

each of the line companies and weapons companies, and a couple of Communicators and Docs

from H&S company. There was some mini-cohesion that was built in, but by and large, you had

people coming together that didn’t know each other. It is the responsibility of the OIC to help

build cohesion. Circumstances permitted this for us, for some of the things we did prior to going

to ATG. We had about three weeks before we flew out to California for the ATG training.

During that time we did essentially a PME program. We put together articles and vignettes and

had discussions.

Counterpart characteristics admired most:

1. The most hospitable people I’ve ever met in my entire life.

2. They are politically savvy. They understand how to be manipulative and get what they want.

But they have very little formal education.


14

3. Their bravery always impressed me. They would take risks we consider foolish or stupid, and

they would do it without an ounce of hesitation, whether it is a full on direct fire engagement or a

suspected IED. In that respect, as a group, they were markedly different from the Iraqi Security

Forces, who were more likely to let us take the risk because we had more protection.

Counterpart characteristics most difficult to understand / admired least:

1. On the flip side of being the most hospitable, they were the most selfish.

2. Their willingness to work. We kind of spoiled that to a certain extent, at least locally where

we worked.

Recommended Advisor characteristics:

1. Not to have the typical Marine Corps mindset. For example, a 50 year old Afghan man grabs

your hand. The typical Marine would shy away from that. Need a willingness to be

uncomfortable. The guy I RIPed with had the personality of an advisor. He came into the room

after dinner playing bagpipes. It was instant rapport building. All the Afghans were fascinated

with the music and the instrument. It got his foot in the door.

2. Flexibility, patience, the ability to empathize.

How long does it take to build rapport?

1. One to one and a half months. The previous team did not have good rapport, so we had to

start from scratch. It requires an investment of time hanging out and drinking Chai. We spent

75-100% of our time with our counterparts. But there were some occasions when only ten

minutes of work related discussions occurred during a 12 hour period.

2. There are little things you can do to build rapport. When they were painting henna on their

hands and feet, I did it with them. They were shocked that a tall white guy would do this. But it

instantly got my foot in the door. They were impressed that a Westerner would have done this.

Got some negative feedback from Marines. Both of us immersed ourselves into the culture,

wearing the clothes on a normal basis with them. Again, that helped build the rapport, along

with the support we provided. They knew we were there to help them, and genuinely cared

about them. Everything we did was through the Police and ANA, operations or decisions. I had

complete cooperation, based on the rapport that we built. Again, you have to be willing to be

uncomfortable. I slept with the guy, things like that. Our primary instructor said your number

one weapon is going to be your counterparts. We took it to heart. We worked with the Police

not as inferiors. We worked for them. We got permission from them for everything we did.

These guys saved my Marine’s lives on numerous occasions. They would risk their lives doing

so.

3. I asked at the get-go “What are your top three priorities for me?” Got together with my team

to ensure that these top three things happened. Within two months they were done. It built

credibility.


15

What were the three priorities?

More vehicles and weapons, logistics, and he wanted his guys to be trained. And when I asked

what were his next three priorities, he replied: “For you to get a good night’s rest.” Not the

typical request for a hand-out.

Was corruption difficult to handle?

The corruption was nowhere near the extent we thought, based on the public narrative. In my

case, the battalion and the Police in my district were distinctly different from what almost

everybody else’s was. The public narrative talks about the corruption and ineffectiveness of the

Police Force: resented and feared by the population they protect, wholly corrupt, inept. The only

thing that held true was that they are illiterate. All but about five were functionally illiterate,

they couldn’t read or write. So that has, obviously, long term implications for their development.

Most of the Police force in Now Zad were from the area. We had a small cadre from Mazar-e-

Sharif up North. It’s amazing how they grew. When one would go home on leave, he’d come

back with a couple of other guys. By the time I left, there were seven. So everybody knew each

other, and there was the dynamics of the district. Now Zad is now de-populated because so

many people left when the Taliban took over and fighting was intense in 07 and 08. There has

been a slow return. It spiked initially when Marine Forces went in and cleared the district, but

since then it has been slow. So it has that small home town feel. You can’t go anywhere and not

have everybody know. Everybody knew each other. So the guy who was in a position of power

as a corrupting influence – we just didn’t see a whole lot of it. The fact that we didn’t see it

stemmed from the District Chief of Police (DCOP). He was very different from the other

DCOPs in the Province. He was the youngest one (about 30). It was his first time being

appointed as a Chief. He was from that District. He had his own personal investment in that

area and wanting to do it right. I can give you a couple of stories about things he did that

impressed all of us, because he was going against the natural tide. Ultimately he understood that

it was a reflection on him, and he wanted very much to stay in that position. He would die a

happy man if he was 65 or 70 years old and still a Police Chief. So if anybody did anything to

compromise his position, he was very deliberate about getting to the bottom of it, using basic

routine police work. “Who saw it? Ok, bring them in here. Who else saw it?” Tying

everything together until he could validate or refute a claim. If it was ever validated, he would

beat the hell out of somebody, and they wouldn’t do it again.

It was the same in Musa Qala. The Police Chief was also from the district. We never had any

shaking people down. The Chief of Police ruled with an iron fist. He would threaten to

physically harm his Police if they did. If he found out that they did, he would physically hit

them and put them in jail for a period of time. He took care of his people and the people in the

district thought very highly of him. Over time, there were things he became more comfortable

doing things in my presence. He would punish his guys with me there. I just trusted that he

wasn’t doing things behind my back. My Police Chief has a history. He was former Taliban,

and there were things that happened during the British time. I know there is a dossier on this

guy. There are people at higher headquarters that wanted him removed because of issues

reported. It was a lot of hearsay, but nothing was ever confirmed, so he stayed in the position.

Under him, there was a lot of development because he had a strong grasp and understanding of

the people. He pushed governance and economic growth. His people are very loyal to him, both

the Police and the locals. I don’t know if he is the answer five years from now, but he is for


16

now. It was a constant battle to make sure that he did not get removed. At ATG, they teach you

what to look out for. I kept this in mind. Was he taking from his own? Were the Police building

illegal checkpoints and shaking people down? Never saw it. When he hit his Police, that was

the closest he came to corrupt leadership. But again, I would describe it as ruling with an iron

fist. He would hug you with his right and punch you in the face with his left. It worked, because

his guys were loyal. Headquarters wanted to move him to Sangin because they needed a

stronger Police Chief down there because of what was happening, but also because of the

previous reports on him. Of the 270+ guys, I think 95% would have gone with him. We had

meetings with PATs from other districts and there was talk of corruption. A lot of that stems

from the commander. If you have a weak commander, you have a weak outfit. I was blessed to

have the counterpart that I worked with.

Would you volunteer again?

Yes (both Captains answered yes). I miss the job and my counterpart. I miss working with him.

Again, you work with him for so long. Generally he wanted to make his police force better.

Miss the daily banter with him, just sitting along side, and watching something that started from

zero. The product wasn’t complete. It was hard to hand over something that you know if you

had another seven months or a year, you could have finished the product, or at least get it to the

point where they could run with it. But it was hard to hand that product over and the hard work

that you did, when you knew the job wasn’t done.

What is the optimal tour length for an advisory tour?

More than seven months, which in reality when the chop off the fat in the front and back getting

in and out of country, is really only six months. Then learning the job the first month and a half

or so, you’re looking at maybe four months of operating. Then part of that last couple of weeks

is the RIP which you’re planning ahead of time, so you really have three solid months of my

priority is this individual.

There are so many facets of your job. You have to learn not just your local area (e.g., the names

of the towns and individuals in each place), but also about your counterpart as an individual,

leader, or whatever function he serves in. You have to learn about his guys who work for him.

You have to learn their system, and how that system actually functions in reality, in order to help

them get what they need to be sustainable, efficient. Balance all that with echelons above reality

trying to take them at the same time. You have to put some semblance of sanity on everything,

because a lot of whacky stuff comes down to you.

You know there is always a possibility that the deployment will be extended, but when you get

towards the end, you know you’re going home pretty soon. But if it was a year long. I just can’t

imagine if I were to stay in that district for 3/2’s time, I know the area and the police, how much

progress they could have made.

It’s not just internally focused on how much better you could be. The disruption is felt on their

side significantly too, considering how hospitable they are, genuinely, I believe. Certain things

are universal. But they are very affectionate, in terms of what they’ll tell you and their actions;

how they treat you and things they will do for you – unprompted, unasked, unsolicited, they’ll

just do something nice. You rip that away from them every six months, and then restart again

and again. And especially if you get a bad team. It’s just like going back to when you were a 2nd


17

Lieutenant and you get a bad Platoon Sergeant right off the gate. It is going to be difficult for

any Staff NCO that comes behind that first guy to influence you and have you have the proper

appreciation for what a good Staff NCO does. So it is disruptive to your counterparts just as

much as you feeling “If we could have just had a few more months, we could have made …”

Because you’re just starting to get in stride to where you’re becoming more proficient and

efficient in what you’re doing, both day to day and getting a feel for where we want to be three

months from now. Having a realistic understanding of what it is going to take to get there, and

whether we can be there three months from now. Maybe it will take four months.

Final recommendations:

1. The battalion came in with no campaign plan. We handed over a campaign plan for the next

seven months, with the goals by month. For example, if I was still here with this Police force, by

May this NCO/Officer Leadership Academy would be established. Now there are certain tasks

that you’re going to have to accomplish such as building the POI. He had my understanding and

mindset going in. I told him he could refine it or throw it out the window. But, for someone

who has been here and understands their capability, this is where I envision them going in the

next six months. He was very grateful for that because it gave him something to start thinking

about.

2. In my eight years in the Marine Corps, the advisory tour was the highlight of my career. I

second that.

Marine Advisor Training Impact System Interview 25 Jul 2011

18

Team: 3/5 PAT 1

Deployment Period : Sep 2010 – Apr 2011

Location: : Sangin

Team Type: : District Police Advisor Team (PAT)

Rank: : GySgt

Billet: : PAT-1 SNCOIC

Training: : I MEF ATC, MAGTFTC ATG

Background:

PAT 1 was a 20 man team located in a very kinetic district. The team began with 88 police.

When PAT 1 was replaced, there were about 320 members on the police force.

What went well:

I‟ll use the same example for what went well and what didn‟t. We focused a lot on trying to get

these guys to conduct their own operations. They need their independence, instead of us just

guiding them. So when we first got there we did everything. Then we started pushing it and

forcing it to them, with the end state being that they could conduct their own operations without

us being there. That was our goal and it worked well, but it took a long time. How long? About

four or five months before they could actually go out and start doing it. We set up a four day

training package for them. A lot of them went to basic training and that was it. We didn‟t do

very much policing in our area. It was still fairly kinetic. So most of our focus was on combat

patrolling and that type of stuff. It worked after a while, especially when they started seeing they

could develop their own results. They would go get a few bad guys, maybe bring in some bad

guys, or find IEDs. It really took off. It was a confidence booster. The more they did, the more

they wanted to act independently. So that was great. Certain groups of them had decent

leadership, for the ANP.

The Police didn‟t have any SNCOs. The District Chief of Police was a Colonel. His XO was a

Lieutenant, who was my counterpart. There were two other officers. One was a supply guy who

was completely illiterate and worthless. Another officer headed up one of the other patrolling

sections we had. The rest were just police and a very small number of NCOs. Even when we

had our numbers up the 300, we only had nine NCOs, and they were ineffective.

Going back to the independent operations, it also backfired on us. You get guys out there that

weren‟t as professional and they start stealing from the locals. We weren‟t there to watch them.

They wouldn‟t do it if we were there. It is good that they are acting independently, but what are

they really doing out there? What percentage? About 20%. Were there any repercussions

that you could identify? When we found out, there was really nothing we could do to them, but

we definitely would address it with their leadership. The District Chief of Police was pretty

heavy handed. So it we had any problems with his guys, we would just let him know. He would

throw the guys in jail with the bad guys and let them hang out for a couple of days.

What was the population’s reaction? When we first got there, they absolutely despised the

police. They would tell us they liked the Taliban better than the local police force, because the

police force was just a corrupt gang just running amuck all over the place. Within a few months,


19

the population started changing their outlook, once we got them to stop stealing and extorting

people in the bazaar. We were actually able to help them to start doing positive things for the

people. The people started “singing” a little more, giving us tips, giving the police tips.

What do you think will happen when the Marines pull out? Do you think the sense of

being honorable policemen will stay with them? I think it will with a few of them. But those

guys will probably get pulled and moved up to higher levels and be in Kandahar or Kabul or

somewhere. No one really wants to be in Sangin. If they have good leadership there, they could

still do positive things. But unless there is a hand to guide them and kind of push them, I don‟t

have much faith.

Were you replaced by another team? Yes we were. Another team replaced us. They continue

to do the same type of things.

So regardless of the situation, they are getting better and better. Sounds like they are

growing. They are. I‟ve seen other units work like police units. They do it well unsupervised

without us there. I just think that the program was so new to our AO. It‟s going to take a long

time to get all those guys … A lot of them were younger men just looking for a job with really

no direction. So you take a group of guys like that anywhere, it is going to take a little while.


I think it was probably the introductory cultural training. Where was that? We got that back

here (Camp Pendleton)pretty much even within our companies, but most of it was at ATG

Twentynine Palms. That prepared you for what? Just gave us the understanding of some of

the what to do and what not to do, and this is the way they do this. Maybe these two people

don‟t talk to each other because they are from different tribes. That helped give me a good

understanding. That was probably the most beneficial. Was this in classroom training or the

scenario events with the role players? Both, as long as the role players maintained character, it

was helpful.

Least beneficial training:

To me, it was the language classes. We focused heavily on Pashto. We did a couple of weeks

here (Camp Pendleton). Everywhere we went there was language, language. I got on deck out

there and we had our interpreters. We used them. A lot of the AUP guys can communicate in

broken English. There are so many dialects among the 300 guys that were pulled from all over

Afghanistan. I had three different Pashto dialects. None of them could talk to each other. I got

Dari speakers from the North that can‟t talk to the Pashto guys, and I had some Turkish speakers.

They couldn‟t talk to anybody. The focus on one specific language – we could have been doing

other things during that six hours a day for two weeks. The language wasn‟t helpful. They were

more eager to learn English. With interpreters, it‟s fine. What I did pick up, I didn‟t get in the

classroom. It was just from spending everyday with them.


20


For me on my level, I remember we got a thirty minute PowerPoint slide show on AUP

processes. I had to deal with not only the operations, but personnel accountability for the AUP,

because their leadership was absolutely zero. They didn‟t care. They just wanted it handed to

them. They didn‟t want to do the leg work. I went in there completely unaware of the whole

AUP process, chain of the command, the district, the province, how it goes up like that, the

numbers, the Tashkiel, the rosters – that type of stuff. How they managed their TO&E. How

they get their supplies, where does it come from, the logistical aspects of it. I ended up having to

do all of that, and I had absolutely no clue what I was doing when I got there. I think there was a

thirty minute class or something that showed examples of types of rosters. When we first got

there, there was no driving. Everyone had to be flow in. So learning how many escorts you need

for this many AUP translators, where you are going to pick them up, how you are going to move

them. That would have been helpful, because I really had to wing it. That I say is more for the

leadership. And the reporting procedures that the provincial level wants for the AUP. We were

working at the battalion level and reported to the Regiment that works with the Provincial level.

There were numerous reporting requirements that I was completely unaware of. Didn‟t think I

was going to be doing computer work over there, but I was.

Major barriers to your mission:

There was obviously the language barrier. But also the cultural barrier. Just our work ethic. We

really had to focus on not using our egos and how we work as Marines. Don‟t expect this out of

these Afghans. So we really had to, I don‟t want to say break it down dummy style because

that‟s insulting, but we had to really make everything basic, slow it way down. If they

accomplished one task in a period of time, “Good for you. You did it.” That caused us to have

a lot of tension, cause they wouldn‟t want to do stuff. “Well, you‟re doing it.” “No, we‟re not

doing it.” “OK, we will shut off your generator and you won‟t have power. Are you going to do

it now?” “Yes, we are going to do it now.” Having to resort to that type of stuff was tension that

wasn‟t needed.

What characteristics did you admire most about your counterparts?

Some are crazy. I enjoyed the company of the counterpart I spent the most time with. Part of the

reason he was crazy, I just couldn‟t believe that he just went out and did something that

produced these results. That kind of crazy. Unpredictable? Yes. How are they pulling this

stuff off? We did spend a lot of time with them in the team building that we did. We lived with

them. We didn‟t share sleeping quarters with them, but we shared the same building. We ate

chow with them 2-3 times a day everyday, so that was really good. That built trust on both sides,

especially after we got into a few gun fights out in town. It wasn‟t just that we are here to train

these people. We are all fighting together and working together, and we live together. I think

that was a good result of being out there with them.

What characteristics did you like least about your counterparts?

Just some of the cultural differences between us, like their chai boys, little teenagers that the

commanders kept around them. Stuff like I wasn‟t very fond of that. Was it a sexual


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relationship? I assume there was. I don‟t want to know for sure, but we‟re pretty sure that was

what was going on. The boys did the chores and all that. That was kind of strange. The basic

value of human life. It just didn‟t matter. We would get a hurt woman and would want to search

her. They said, “No, you can‟t touch her.” We‟d reply, “Are you just going to let her perish

right there?” “Yea.” Of course we intervened. But then again that goes to fights and

arguments. “Why are you doing that?” We were honor bound. We had to so we could save her

life.

How long did it take to develop rapport with your counterparts?

It took a couple of weeks, I think. Marines working and patrolling with them on a daily basis,

theirs went a little quicker than mine, working with the leadership. One of the things they taught

me in training that I kind of later frowned upon was be careful not to offend them. Be nice, be

respectful. So I spent the first month pretty much kissing their ass to get them to do stuff. And

they just took complete advantage of that. So finally I felt this just isn‟t working. I hit them with

the iron fist type of rule. “You‟re doing this and I don‟t care. I‟m going to offend you and it

doesn‟t matter.” That actually worked better for me with my counterparts. I think they

understand authoritative leadership more than kissing their butt and stuff. So the rapport for me

took about a month, a month and a half before it really got good. One of the things I did, I

wouldn‟t carry my weapon around the leadership, just as a trust thing. „OK, here I trust you.‟

After that, there were a couple of times I did put one on. They asked, “Why are you doing that?

We have weapons for you.” Then they would start giving me weapons. So the rapport started

getting really good. I‟d stay the night with them in the commander‟s room. It got good once it

started. It just took a little longer.

Characteristics most important for an advisor to have:

I definitely believe they should have a couple of years in the Marine Corps, preferably combat

deployment or any type of deployment, so we don‟t have to focus on training the basic Marine

skills. We could focus on how we‟re going to train the people we are advising. We ran into that

problem. We got sent a very young Marine. He‟d been in like three months. We had to tell him

to leave the team, because we were focusing too much on training him on basic skills, as

opposed to working on the advising. He was young, a great guy. He wanted to be there, but it

was just wasting our time. So I think individuals should preferably be an NCO. They need to be

outgoing, not someone who is quiet and has issues standing up in a class teaching. They need to

be outgoing, knowledgeable, smart, and just basically have some background and some

experience. Great social skills. The easily agitated, if they get mad and impatient, then it‟s just

going to cause more problems. So level headed is what we look for.

How was the cohesion within your team?

I was actually really surprised, it went really well. Our team was fairly tight within our twenty

guys. There were four sub-teams, and me and the Captain. The four sub-teams working with

their specific AUPs most of the time when teaching a class. Within our Marines and Corpsmen,

I think the cohesion was really good. We had a fight within the team the last week and a half

there. That was just because we were short.


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Final recommendation:

I do think that what they are doing in Twentynine Palms with the integrated role players and

everything helped us out. It kind of got the Marines to understand what they were going to be

dealing with, people like this. My recommendation is to know what the senior advisors are

going to be doing with the Afghan leadership and police leadership, and how they operate.

You mentioned that an Afghan female was wounded and needed to be searched. Did you

have any Female Engagement Team members assigned?

Not at that time. We actually had to track one down and have her brought down so she could do

stuff. We did have Female Engagement Teams on our little base that we ran out of. They went

out with us when they could to do their work. We were kind of their vehicle for going out into

the bazaar area when they were around. The police loved them. So they embraced them as an

asset? No, they just liked them because they were women. We had to keep sharp eyes on them

to make sure they weren‟t doing anything crazy. But they didn‟t. They would invite them for

dinner. It was interesting to me, because they would treat their women so bad, but they would

treat the American women well. They would invite them for dinner and spend hours talking with

them.

Documents

U.S. Marine Corps Advisor Training Impact System (MATIS) · (MATIS) Narrative Report . OEF Advisor Teams . 1st Battalion, 8th Marines . 3. rd. Battalion, 5. th. Marines . Prepared