Hichem Karoui

US Foreign Policy in the Gulf After 9/11

The effect on US-GCC relations (Saudi Arabia in the focus)

2

HICHEM KAROUI

U.S. Foreign Policy In The Gulf

After September 11

The effect on US-GCC relations

Saudi Arabia in the focus

3

Thanks

I would like to thank a lot of people, whose help has been

essential for the completion of this research. I mention from the

Sorbonne University (Paris III), Department of English and American

studies: Mrs. Malie Montagutelli, along with .P.Schnapper, C.Bonafou-

Murat, and Jean Pierre Bourcier. I mention also the staff of the American

Library in Paris, with at its head M. Charles Trueheart. And of course, I

am much indebted to professor Burhan Ghalioun (Sorbonne-Nouvelle:

Department of Oriental studies), who has always advised and encouraged

me.

4

Books by Hichem Karoui

In French :

- Où va l'Arabie saoudite? L‘Harmattan . Paris . 2006.

- L‘après-Saddam en Irak : les plans, les hommes et les problèmes.

L‘Harmattan. Paris.2005.

In Arabic :

- Al nisr wal houdoud (prolegomenon For a Critique of the Arab

Policies ). مقدمت لىقد الواقع السياسي العربي: الىسر والحدود

Dar al Nawras. 1988.

- Al tawazun al duwali (International Balance, From The Cold War

To The Detente.) وفراجالب الباردة الى االتوازن الدولي مه الحر

Addar al Arabiyya lil Kitab. 1985.

- Amidatu al Junun al sabaa (7 Pillars Of Madness – A Novel) أعمدة

.Addar al Arabiyya lil Kitab. 1984الجىون السبعت

- Noun : وون A Novel. Déméter. Tunis. 1983.

In Progress:

- Bush America And the Middle East.

5

Contents

Introduction : Questions of Methodology………. 9

Chapter One : Political Ramifications……………… 23

- US and Western Critiques of Saudi Policy………… 26

- Islamism, Internationalism, Nationalism………… 33

- Identity Problematic and Nationalistic Irrationality 36

- Neo Fundamentalists…………………………….. 40

- Media War……………………………………….. 44

- PAX AMERICANA……………………………… 50

- Madrasas , problems of education………………... 52

- Living in the denial, adopting conspiratory theories or

losing identity…………………………………….. 54

- Another Pearl Harbour?………………………….. 58

- The Saudis react………………………………... 60

Chapter II : Economic Ramifications……………………. 69

- Complexity of a relationship……………………... 70

- Oil and Security…………………………………... 71

- Data rates and performances……………………... 73

- Trade relationship………………………………… 76

- Oil production……………………………………. 77

- The challenges of the Muslim nations……………. 79

- There is ally and ally……………………………... 81

- US Energy supply and demand – Base case……... 83

6

- Special Partnership……………………………….. 85

- Terror Funds……………………………………… 87

- Americo-American controversy………………….. 91

- Occult international financial network…………… 93

- The file against Saudi Arabia…………………….. 95

- Is bin Laden as wealthy as he is said to be?……… 98

- Arabs and Muslims charge Saudi Arabia………… 100

- Is Saudi Arabia worse than other Arab states?…… 102

- More questions to answer………………………… 105

Chapter III : Strategic Ramifications………………………

111

- The Gulf or the Peninsula?……………………… 116

- Democracy and interests………………………... 119

- Threats and concerns……………………………. 122

- Defense and Security……………………………. 126

- Elite change theories and American strategists…. 130

- Saudi elite positions…………………………….. 133

- Saudi Arabia, a piece in the ―machine‖…………. 141

- New concerns, self-criticism……………………. 144

Chapter IV : Impact on US Policy and the GCC Bilateral

Relations………………………………………………… . 147

- Of vital interests………………………………… 148

- Is it a turning point?…………………………….. 150

- US military and the Gulf………………………... 152

- Democracy for sail……………………………… 161

- Societies under stress…………………………… 164

- Handling the unrest……………………………... 166

- Power paradox and Empire nostalgia…………… 169

- Withdrawing troops……………………………... 173

Chapter V : Futuristic Assessment……………………… 179

- Anti-americanism………………………………. 181

- New time, new thought…………………………. 182

- Politics of identity………………………………. 185

- Islam and the West……………………………… 189

7

- The failure of romantic nationalism……………. 191

- Reason and individuality……………………….. 194

- Pioneers of Arab secularism…………………….. 195

- Muslim secularisers………………………………197

- Towards liberty………………………………… 201

Bibliography……………………………………………. .213

8

For: Nana and Mamia

The Essence Of Responsibility

“Anyone can hold the helm when the sea is calm…But in stormy waters it takes strength, commitment and

responsibility to stay the course. We cannot adjust the winds, but we can always adjust our sails, and when it comes our turn to hold the helm…we must be strong.”

9

Introduction

Questions of methodology

In a book published in Paris in 2003, two important French

scholars have undertaken to discuss the issue of 9/11 in its varied

dimensions and connections. Joseph Maila contested the idea that 9/11

responded to a thought event, which means ultimately that nothing or

almost nothing could change in the concepts and the notions of

international and national policies. Maila contended that since it cannot

be compared to the Soviet revolution, nor to the rise of fascism, nor to

the violence of decolonization, nor even to the downfall of the Berlin

wall, 9/11 has nothing of an event of thought (un évènement de pensée).

Maïla concedes however that it introduced some kind of interruption, but

he wouldn‘t go to the extension of considering it a major upsetting

phenomenon. For him, the event allowed ―the construction of a

phantasmagoric notion of conflict unduly generalized in a global

violence‖ 1. That‘s why the conflict between cultures (civilizations

shock) imposed itself as the core and the asset of the event. As to the

islamologist M. Arkoun, he argued that ―the occidental culture is prone to

build up the enemy in order to legitimate a frontal war‖. Thus, ―the

concomitant construction of two cursed characters‖, he says, ―Bin Laden

and Arafat, reached since 9/11 a perfection of the kind‖ 2. In Arkoun‘s

eyes, since 1945, and ―more conflictingly after the revolution so-called

Islamic of Khomeini, the words Islam and West polarized an intensive

work of imaginary construction of the Other: to the Islamic and arabo-

islamic demonization of the West (Al Gharb, with its intellectual/cultural

aggression, ghazw fikri) responds, in a controversial dialectic, the

1 Mohamed Arkoun et Joseph Malia, De Manhattan à Bagdad : au delà du bien

et du mal, ed. Desclée de Brower, Paris 2003, pp.12-13. 2 Op.Cit. P.15.

10

fanciful construction of the enemy Islam.‖ 3 M. Arkoun points out also

that the word West itself has two distinguished sides: ―There is on the

one hand, the inescapable West, ubiquitous, but ideologically built up to

nourish the Muslim imagination altogether, notably since the Iranian

revolution, and particularly the arabo-islamic imagination, because of the

numerous recurrent conflicts that tear up the geopolitical sphere called

Middle East in the American political science and scholarly lexicon. And

there is on the other hand the West dialectically built up by the Euro-

Americans themselves as soon as the matter is about making a unified

front against the enemy Islam. This latter West is that of the

―Civilizations shock‖ thesis, opposing a world of values summarized in

the war slogan ―unlimited freedom‖ to the non-values, or archaic values

dangerously reactivated by the Islamist militants staying outside the

unique and universal vocation incarnated by the historical itinerary of the

USA‖. 4

We retain two key-notions of this much interesting intellectual

debate: first, 9/11 as an ―interruption», and second, the ―build up of the

enemy‖. Two preliminary remarks must be noted here:

1 - Concerning the first notion, one must concede that although

9/11 is not a paradigmatic shift in the sense described by Thomas S.

Kuhn, as ―scientific revolution‖ 5, the re-conceptualization of

international and regional issues, it has introduced, sounds as a new

vision concerning these issues. It has not only upset the old conceptions

of international order, particularly those that have been used since the

end of the Cold War, but it has also brought up some new ―fields6 of

thinking‖ to the social sciences. Therefore, it would be much difficult not

to report to this event as a line of interruption, not only between two

times or eras (before 9/11 and after it) while studying the international,

the regional, or any local scene, but also between two worlds: Maybe

these worlds are the West and the arabo-islamic 7, and maybe the division

line concerns two notions of Mankind future: a democratic, modern,

humanistic one, open up on huge, rational, reasonable changes and

3 Op. Cit.P.23.

4 Idem.

5 Thomas S. Kuhn , The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of

Chicago Press, third edition 1996. He says for example : 6 We use the term ―field‖ with the connotation given to it by Bourdieu.

7 ―The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and

ideological boudaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed‖,

according to S.Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.

11

reforms, and an archaic, autistic, self-centered one, dominated on one

side by hegemonic policies and on the other side by authoritative

regimes and totalitarian thought.

There is perhaps not a revolution in the knowledge since 9/11, but

indeed there is a shift in the patterns of thought, 8 either in the USA or

outside it. And if we just ask what is a paradigm, the answer Kuhn

provides is: « in its established usage, a paradigm is an accepted model of

pattern‖9. It does not even require broad acknowledgment at its start.

―We must recognize how very limited in both scope and precision a

paradigm can be at the time of its first appearance‖, says Kuhn. Then

what happens? ― Paradigms gain their status because they are more

successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the

group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute‖ 10

. That‘s why we

may be more able to understand what‘s going on if we take in

consideration - even as a hypothesis - the ―paradigmatic shift‖ in the

American strategy, endeavour and conceptualization of the international

scene, than if we reject it out of hand.

2- As to the second notion, there are some works that have been

achieved by scholars on this topic, so that they deserve to be taken in

consideration while treating subjects related to war, conflicts and

confrontation. We cannot attain a meaningful progress while trying to

8 As early as September 30, 2001, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report

issued by the DOD (Department of Defense) talks of ―the paradigm shift in force

planning‖ , and of ―transforming America‘s defense for the 21st century. The report

stresses that ― this Quadrennial Defense Review was the product of the senior civilian

and military leadership of the Department of Defense. It benefited from extensive

consultation with the President of the United States. It was truly "top down" in that the

decisions taken on strategy, forces, capabilities, and risks resulted from months of

deliberations and consultation among the most senior Defense Department leadership.

This report outlines the key changes needed to preserve America's safety and security in

the years to come‖. In the chapter entitled Paradigm Shift, the report says :

―The new force-sizing construct specifically shapes forces to:

- Defend the United States;

- Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions;

- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for

the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts - including

the possibility of regime change or occupation; and

- Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations‖. Let‘s

observe that this is the first time an official document acknowledges the possibility of

changing foreign regimes by force. 9 T.Kuhn, op.Cit.P23.

10 Idem.

12

understand what is at stake, if we ignore such data. Social and political

research is different from diplomatic processes. The main object of any

scientific approach is the truth, not the embellished truth, but the truth as

the empirical knowledge can provide it. Concerning scholars like Samuel

Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and others while it would not be right to say

that they focused on ―the construction of the enemy‖ as an object of their

work, we have to recognize that we would not be able to understand

much of their theories without this notion in mind, though. The same

thing may be said concerning the intelligentsia in the arabo-islamic

world. That‘s why it is not accurate either to pretend that only

islamologists like M. Arkoun or political and social scientists with

particular focus on Islamists may be interested in such a notion. In fact,

even without ever mentioning the notion (construction of the enemy),

Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington may well be the most important

theoreticians in the West who made full use of its political, cultural,

social, and historic meaning while analyzing the relations between the

West and the Muslim world.

However, if this is to introduce us to the debate in social sciences

about new conceptions emanating from 9/11, we will have to recognize

that in all that concerns the Gulf region, the strains and the tensions are

much more felt than in any other region of the world. And this is so

because of varied reasons, among which – and this not the least – the fact

that the majority of the 9/11 terrorists were coming from that region.

As the problem of Islamic radicalism – especially its terrorist

brand – raises the questions of the relations to power and authority,

legitimacy, opposition, etc…in these societies culturally different from

those called Western democracies, we will have, first, to recognize that in

most cultures human relationships are greatly determined by irrational

authority. Paraphrasing Erich Fromm, we will say that people function in

the Western society as in most societies, ―on the record of history, by

becoming adjusted to their social role at the price of giving up part of

their own will, their originality and spontaneity‖. Fromm explains that

―while every human being represents the whole of mankind with all its

potentialities, any functioning society is and has to be primarily

interested in its self-preservation. The particular ways in which a society

functions are determined by a number of objective economic and

political factors, which are given at any point of historical development.

Societies have to operate within the possibilities and limitations of their

particular historical situation. In order that any society may function well,

13

its members must acquire the kind of character, which makes them want

to act in the way they have to act as members of the society or of a

special class within it. They have to desire what objectively is necessary

for them to do. Outer force is to be replaced by inner compulsion, and by

the particular kind of human energy which is channeled into character

traits‖11

. If we acknowledge these varied and vital particularities of

societies, civilizations and cultures, we would hold already a key to

understanding much of collective and individual behavior.

One of the consequences of such a statement is that the part of

individualities in the social processes is much more important than

people are prone to believe. This is indeed a part of the modernization

history in the West. The question about whether the same processes of

individualization and rationalization have also marked the history of

Arab and Muslim societies, albeit it is quite interesting, remains beyond

the scope of this study. However, we would need to digress a bit in some

theoretical works12

to understand the remark of Fromm that ―as long as

mankind has not attained a state of organization in which the interest of

the individual and that of society are identical, the aims of society have to

be attained at a greater or lesser expense of the freedom and spontaneity

of the individual. This aim is performed by the process of child training

and education‖13

. We will have to question the validity of this claim

(Habermas) in the course of this study, with a special focus on Saudi

educative system.

Both, George Herbert Mead and Norbert Elias pondered

extensively the individual-group dilemma currently faced by social

movement scholars. Elias states: ―An attentive reader of the classical

sociological literature will everywhere find traces of this awkward

problem of the relationship between individual and society. Max Weber

saw individuals as separate, disorderly, self-reliant and independent.

Society was viewed as orderly, structured etc. He would not reconcile the

two. Durkheim struggled with this as well viewing society as constitutive

of individuals, but viewing individuals as having an ―inner

consciousness‖ that may not be objective‖14

. Elias concluded that both

11

Erich Fromm, Individual and Social origins of neurosis, article, first published

in American Sociological Review (Vol. IX, No. 4, August 1944). 12

The works of Alain Touraine, Charles Taylor, G.H.Mead , Norbert Elias and

many others would be of much help for a good understanding of this topic. 13

E. Fromm, op.Cit. 14

Norbert Elias, What is Sociology? Columbia University Press, New York,

1978, p.117.

14

scholars could not reconcile the dilemma because they viewed the

relationship between the individual and society as static. He noted that

this is also the case in analyses of social change, which is often

conceptualized as a fixed state. Elias argued that sociologists must

―capture the processual nature of societies in all their diverse aspects‖15

.

His conception of the individual is that of a dynamic person, ―constantly

in movement; he not only goes through a process, he is a process. In this

regard, Elias viewed the individual as a part of a broad array of ―webs of

relationships‖ as is elaborated in his concept of ―figuration‖16

. Elias

develops this concept to correct a major shortcoming of sociological

theories that ―present a clear conception of people as societies, [but] …

fail to do the same for people as individuals‖17

.

Individuals, as he sees it, are interwoven into a network of people.

In clarifying his conception of figurations he writes: ―One‘s conceptions

of such figurations is a basic condition of one‘s self-conception as a

separate person. The figurations can change over the course of a lifetime.

One‘s view of ―we‖ and ―they‖ may shift‖18

.

Mead 19

, too, developed a concept of the individual as constitutive

of society, but acknowledged individuality. He states: ―Every individual

self within a given society or social community reflects in its organized

structure the whole relational pattern of organized social behavior which

that society or community exhibits or is carrying on, and its organized

structure is constituted by this pattern; but since each of these individual

selves reflects a uniquely different aspect or perspective of this pattern in

its structure, from its own particular and unique place or standpoint

within the whole process of organized social behavior which exhibits this

pattern since, that is, each is differently or uniquely related to that whole

process, and occupies its own essentially unique focus of relations

therein-- the structure of each is differently constituted by this pattern

from the way in which the structure of any other is so constituted‖20

.

Mead further distinguishes between the ―I‖ and the ―me‖ arguing

that the latter is mediated through the former. The ―me‖ ―is the organized

set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of the

others constitute the organized ―me‖ and then one reacts toward that as

15

Elias. Op.Cit.P115. 16

Elias. Op.Cit. Pp124-128. 17

Elias, op.Cit, p128. 18

Idem. 19

G.H.Mead, Mind, Self and Society, University of Chicago Press, 1934. 20

G.H.Mead, op.Cit, p 202.

15

an ―I‖‖21

. The ―I‖ is the place where novelty and values reside, though

the ―I‖ is dynamic and changes as it processes a variety of social

situations.

Social movement scholars‘ treatment of collective identity

processes has tended to preface the ―me‖ as opposed to the ―I‖. The ―I‖ is

where values and novelty reside. It constitutes individuality and is where

reflection takes place. To be certain, recent social movement theory has

dealt with values as in frame analysis, where frames are targeted to

resonate with existing group values. Here, too, ―me‖ aspects of collective

identity are prefaced and provide a barrier to understanding the processes

through which individuals interpret frames. Group values necessarily

reflect individual values, but they are not sufficient explanations of

collective identity processes. Thus, in social movement theory, there is

often the presumption that the potential recruit or social movement

activist is only a political/cultural heritage individual divorced from any

other identity of self. This perspective ignores the complexity of identity

construction that rests on multiple figurations that transcend time 22

. This

is just to underline how much difficult it is to understand the complex

relations between Islamist activists, either taken individually or as a

group, and the social and cultural environment wherein they grow up and

work. This is also to point out to the rapid, and in our eyes, unwise

summarizing of modern Islamic political trends in the West, and their

unreasonable linkage to terrorist activities.

We will rely mainly on what social scientists call ―Documentary

Observation‖, meaning that we will have to analyze in depth and

comment a varied array of documents issued by different institutions,

either in the USA or in Saudi Arabia and the GCC States, along with all

the parties concerned by the current developments: many of these

documents come from the public domain, archives, official statistics and

data, media and intelligence reports, US Congress publications, and

personal information.

In this context, the amount of documents issued in the wake of

September 11 and related to it directly or indirectly is merely astronomic.

We have no pretension of reading or examining much of it. Since the task

21

G.H.Mead, op.Cit, p 175. 22

Individuals constantly engage in self-verification, ―or seeing the self [―I‖] in

terms of the role [―me‖] as embodied in the identity standard.

16

is ostensibly out of proportion for a single person – and even for a large

group – we opted for a microanalysis circumscribed to the strict

minimum of ―pics‖ selected throughout our observatory sticking-up with

the event, day in and day out, for the purpose of informing. Even with all

the self-restriction and necessary caution, in choosing such or such

document rather than another, we should add that something personal and

even randomly would also enter in consideration, although unconsciously

most of the time. How can one justify, in effect, the option for analyzing

or commenting such a ―piece‖ emanating from such an institution rather

than another? There is indeed a rational and voluntary choice, aiming at

the verification of some allegations and hypothesis; yet, as in all work of

this kind, there is also a part of intuition and predilection. To cite

Habermas, ―one can gain clarity about the meaning of value judgments

by examining the dual, descriptive-prescriptive content of these

evaluative, need-interpreting expressions. They serve to make

predilection understandable. This component of justification is the bridge

between the subjectivity of experience and that intersubjective

transparency that experience gains in being truthfully expressed and, on

this basis, attributed to an actor by onlookers‖23

. Thus, insofar as my

personal experience – in the media - is involved, I will be able to gain

insight with respect to my object as far as I make of it (i.e. the

subjectivity of my experience) an integrative part of this scientific

project.

Events unfolded since September 11 in such a rapid development

that even the most experienced observer would find some difficulties to

follow up everything anywhere. Let us begin by some of the last

developments:

In early 2004, the Presidential study group, - a bipartisan

commission of statesmen, diplomats, legislators, scholars, and experts—

was conveyed to examine the state of the Middle East and the

effectiveness of U.S. policy in advancing U.S. interests in that region.

According to the report it has published 24

, ―the United States is facing an

extraordinary moment of challenge in the Middle East, one that demands

an integrated U.S. strategy built on a set of three pillars: security, reform,

and peace. The security agenda is the most pressing, but it alone is not

23

Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One,

Beacon Press, 1984, p.92. 24

2005 Presidential Study Group Report, Security, Reform and Peace : The

Three Pillars of U.S. Strategy in the Middle East, The Washington Institute for Near

East Policy.

17

sufficient. If the United States wants not just to combat the threats it

faces in the region but also to change the regional dynamic which

produces such threats, the administration should also pursue political,

social, and economic reform in Middle East countries and the promotion

of a secure Arab-Israeli peace‖.25

We can recognize the great lines of concern of the Bush

administration in the linkage between these ―three pillars‖, which has

never reached in previous administrations such systematization in the

thought. Indeed there is a particular focus on Iraq in the paper, but this is

only a result of a process that started just after 9/11, in which Iraq – like

Afghanistan- were seemingly the first experiences of change that have

involved a huge effort from the USA. Some topics are thus maintained

together in a kind of ―package‖ for the ―Greater Middle East‖, to use the

new expression:

* speeding the training and fielding of new Iraqi security forces

while building the structure of a free and representative Iraqi

government,

* coordinating strategy on Iran‘s nuclear program with key

European and Security Council powers,

* developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to fight

the ideological war against Islamist extremism,

* injecting presidential leadership into calls for political reform,

and

* investing in Palestinian political and security change and a

peaceful and orderly Israeli disengagement from Gaza…

Such are the ―Bush administration most pressing Middle East

priorities for 2005‖, as described by the report.

Prior to the U.S.-led war on Iraq, the September 11, 2001 terrorist

attacks in the United States had expanded the security challenges facing

the United States in the Gulf region, which has seen three Major wars in

the past two decades: the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), the Gulf war (1991),

and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003).

Moreover, it was almost established over a relatively long period

of time that The Gulf states face internal threats not attributable only to

Iran or Iraq. All six Gulf26

States — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the

25

Idem. 26

The reference simply to the Gulf is a convenience to avoid controversy over

the usage of the term "persian gulf" versus "arabian gulf". Thus we will use only the

term : the Gulf henceforth, except in the quotations of other writers.

18

United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and Qatar—are hereditary

monarchies. Like all the Arab states, they allow limited formal

opportunity for popular participation in national decision-making,

although several, particularly Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, are opening up

their political processes and earning U.S. official praise for doing so.

Kuwait has had a vibrant, elected parliament for over four decades,

although the parliament has periodically been suspended and female

suffrage was banned there27

. Some of the Gulf states, including Saudi

Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, are undergoing leadership

transitions; Bahrain‘s leadership passed to a new generation in March

1999 when the long serving prince died suddenly 28

. Recently, Saudi

Arabia‘s first held municipal elections proved at least how much progress

the idea of democratization has gained the Saudi mind, although it is

deemed to be the most conservative in the Arab world.

The Gulf has since the first part of the XXth century struck the

imagination of the Westerners as one of the most extraordinary regions of

the world with its cozy much intimate ambiance, both hospitable and

wild, its mysteries and legends, and its detachment from the historical

processes, which sounded to be resulting from the conservatism of its

population and so many long centuries of what the Arabs describe as

decadence under the Ottoman rule.

―The hazards of history and geography‖, says Peter Mansfield

―have combined to decide that Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Union of

Arab Emirates (formerly the Trucial Coast) instead of entering the

modern world as impoverished outlying provinces of one of the bigger

States in the area – Iraq, Saudi Arabia or Iran – have become independent

members of the United Nations with living standards which are among

the highest in the world. Two of them – Kuwait and the UAE – are major

financial powers‖ 29

.

The total land area of the GCC countries is approximately

2,475,190 square kilometers (approximately 28 percent of the United

States). In terms of size, Saudi Arabia is the largest GCC state (over 2.1

million square kilometers) and occupies nearly 87 percent of the total

area. The second largest GCC state is Oman (9 percent of total area),

27

Until 2005, when for the first time a lady is appointed member of the

Parliament, then Minister. 28

Kenneth Katzman, the Persian Gulf States, Post-war issues for US policy ,

2003, July 14, 2003, CRS report for Congress. 29

Peter Mansfield, The Arabs, Penguin Books, 1985, p.331.

19

followed by the UAE (3.4 percent) and Kuwait (0.72 percent). Bahrain,

with a land area of only 620 square kilometers, is the smallest.

The weather and soil patterns together with the lack of surface

water have meant great difficulties and high costs for economically

productive activities. One way to overcome these tremendous natural

odds is to learn to control the environment, to build infrastructure, and to

modernize with the help of physical capital and technology brought in

from outside. This is the background against which foreign economic

relations of he Gulf States must be understood.

“ The effect of great and sudden wealth on the tiny desert states

of the (…) Gulf has been remarkable‖, says P. Mansfield. ―In the

kingdom of Saudi Arabia it has produced one of the most extraordinary

phenomena of the twentieth century. It is not only that a state which was

one of poorest on the globe when it was created half a century ago is well

on its way to becoming one of the richest by any standards, with control

over a major part of the world‘s financial reserves, but that it should have

happened to a Bedouin tribal monarchy ruled on the most fundamentalist

and puritanical principles of Islam. The inescapable problem of how to

serve both Allah and Mammon has yet to be resolved‖30

.

Maybe never as since 9/11 this problem has been raised in more

an urgency, both to Americans and Saudis, because – particularly- of all

the connections between funds and fundamentalist terror, of all the

ambiguities and misunderstandings, of the stereotypes, the pre-

conceptions, and the false dialogue, the hypocrisy internationally

established.

For the historical background, albeit many people still think that

the GCC was a reaction against the Iranian revolution, some observers

have a different approach. Lenore G. Martin for instance, says that the

GCC " was not an automatic reaction to the revolutionary Iranian State.

Various collective security arrangements had been discussed among the

Gulf States after the Iranian revolution. For example, after the new

Iranian regime engaged in naval exercises in 1979, Oman reacted by

proposing an international Western force to operate sophisticated

surveillance equipment to counter superior Iranian naval forces, as well

as a coordinated Gulf states ground force to respond to potential Iranian

threats. Both Iraq and Saudi Arabia rejected the Omani proposal. Iraq

proposed instead a collective security force with a joint military

command composed of Gulf States (excluding Iran). The Saudis also

30

Op.Cit.P.348.

20

responded by pressuring Oman to avoid inviting American and British

forces into the Gulf and by conducting talks with South Yemen, Oman's

enemy. Saudi Arabia also offered Oman financial assistance for weapons

purchases" 31

.

In this view, it was after Iraq became embroiled in the war with

Iran, that Saudi Arabia proposed the formation of the GCC in the January

1981 meetings of the Third Islamic Conference. The GCC was

announced at a Gulf foreign ministers' meeting in February and its

inaugural session took place in May 1981. It is not clear what subjects

and priorities were privately discussed among the GCC states at these

initial sessions. It has been reported that ―their topics included

coordinating security efforts for oil fields and installations, as well as

collective efforts against subversion"32

.

Since 1991, the United States has developed an extensive network

of Gulf military bases (although Washington eschews that term, in favor

of ―access agreements‖ and ―facilities‖ and other such euphemisms,

everyone in the region calls these installations in their country ―the

American base‖) 33

. These cover much of the G.C.C.:

- Kuwait has hosted American troops on a regular basis since

1991, at a permanent facility north of Kuwait City (Camp Doha). The

U.S. has also prepositioned equipment for an armored brigade. With the

build-up of U.S. and allied forces in Kuwait for an attack on Iraq, nearly

one-third of the territory of the country has been declared a closed

military zone.

- The headquarters of the vastly expanded American naval

presence in the Gulf, the Fifth Fleet, is in Manama, Bahrain‘s capital.

There is normally at least one carrier battle group in the Gulf area at all

times. Approximately 4,000 U.S. military personnel are attached

regularly to the headquarters in Bahrain.

- Qatar signed an agreement in December 2002 to upgrade

American facilities in the country, which include a major airfield at Al

Udaid, a command and control center (duplicating facilities in Saudi

Arabia, in case the U.S. is denied access to them), and prepositioning

depots for the equipment of two armored brigades.

31

Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf, Threats from within, Lexington Books,

1984, P.26. 32

Idem. 33

F. Gregory Gause III, The Approaching Turning Point : The Future of U.S.

Relations with the Gulf States, Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic

World, Analysis Paper Number Two, May 2003.

21

- Oman provides access to American forces and prepositioned

material at airbases at Al Seeb and Thamarit and on Masirah Island in the

Arabian Sea.

- The port and airport facilities in the UAE provide vital logistical

support for American Forces, and that country hosts more recreational

visits by American troops than any other Foreign country.

Gregory Gause thinks that the United States policy toward the

Gulf Cooperation Council States has reached the point of an important

change. His thesis is that Saudi Arabia has served as the linchpin of

American military and political influence in the Gulf since Desert Storm.

It can no longer play that role. After the attacks of September 11, 2001,

an American military presence in the kingdom is no longer sustainable in

the political system of either the United States or Saudi Arabia.

Washington therefore has to rely on the smaller Gulf monarchies to

provide the infrastructure for its military presence in the region. The

build-up toward war with Iraq has accelerated that change, with the

Saudis unwilling to cooperate openly with Washington on this issue. No

matter the outcome of war with Iraq, the political and strategic logic of

basing American military power in these smaller Gulf States is

compelling. Therefore, he adds: ―In turn, Saudi-American relations need

to be reconstituted on a basis that serves the shared interests of both

states, and can be sustained in both countries‘ political systems. That

requires an end to the basing of American forces in the kingdom‖ 34

.

This is indeed an interesting view shared particularly by some

Saudi observers. Yet, we must note that it would remain a mere

hypothesis as far as it has not been validated by facts, most of all because

it seems to counter the orientation of successive American

administrations as regards settlement in the Gulf. Anyway, the crucial

question here is about the ability of the other states of the region not only

to cope with the changes, but also to form a viable, credible alternative to

Saudi Arabia in the long term. We are aware that some of these changes

have occurred recently on the occasion of the war against Saddam. But is

it not too soon to pretend that the relations between Saudi Arabia and the

USA have taken a new irreversible turn? Before advancing such a

suggestion, we should first answer questions like: how much of theses

changes should the region expect and how much welcome are they in the

smaller Gulf States? If some of these changes would ultimately find

alternative allies to USA among the States of GCC (others than Saudi

34

Idem.

22

Arabia) isn‘t this tide going to disturb the balance of powers and the

interrelations inside the GCC itself? What if the allies of Saudi Arabia

inside the GCC are not concerned to play the part of the alternative

option? Then, would it be better to understand first to which extent the

Saudi-US relations have been seriously disturbed by 9/11, and whether

the disturbance is fixable in the short term? How can we evaluate the

future prospects in regard of what happened, on the political, economic,

social, and strategic levels? What are the expected impacts of such

changes on the internal development of the Gulf societies?

These are some of the great questions people inside the GCC and

outside it are raising. The answers are neither obvious nor easy to find,

because of the complexity of the patterns of thought, the diversity of

reactions, and the double-edged problem: the fact that the attitudes are

neither only political, nor economical, nor strategic, but also cultural; that

religion, traditions, and political and economical interests mix up in an

explosive assortment; that some pending questions from outside the

region (like the Palestinian Israeli conflict, the relations with Iran, the

situation in Iraq, etc) further complicate the picture …All those little

details have , at one time or another, something to do with the Gulf,

Saudi Arabia, the USA, or all of them.

However, the main question stays : what is the real change

introduced by September 11 on both American thinking and projects and

the attitudes and responses of the elite and the ordinary people in the

Gulf- especially in Saudi Arabia?

23

Chapter One

_______________

Political ramifications

According to a poll by Zogby International, in January 2001, 56%

of Americans polled viewed Saudi Arabia favorably, 28% unfavorably.

In December 2001, those numbers had basically reversed, with only 24%

viewing Saudi Arabia favorably and 58% unfavorably35

. Similarly, much

of the American political and media elite, which had generally accepted

the US-Saudi relationship, now began to question the value for the

United States of a close relationship with Riyadh. For example, the New

York Times and the Washington Post both urged a new and more critical

American stance toward the kingdom. They even used the same title in

their editorials: "Reconsidering Saudi Arabia." The Times said those

relations are in an "untenable and unreliable state" because of "Saudi

Arabia's tolerance for terrorism." The Post said that Saudi Arabia's

"autocratic system…is itself one of the root causes of Islamic

extremism"36

.

35

Poll cited in Dr. James J. Zogby, ―New Poll Shows Damage Done,‖

December 24, 2001. Accessed via ―GulfWire‖ e-newsletter, www.arabialink.com. 36

The editorials can be found in New York Times, October 14, 2001 and

Washington Post, November 11, 2001.

24

What has changed most dramatically since the attacks of 9/11,

has been the attitude in the American right wing toward Saudi Arabia.

Both neoconservatives and the religious right had previously accepted the

close American relationship with Riyadh on strategic grounds, even

while opposing many aspects of Saudi politics and society. They have

since 9/11 become vocal critics of the relationship. Given the importance

of both of these groups in the Republican party, the American policy

toward Saudi Arabia can hardly avoid being marked by their ―updated‖

views.

A parallel shift in public opinion has occurred in Saudi Arabia.

The close relationship with the United States has always been a

controversial issue in the kingdom. For committed fundamentalists, any

dealings with non-Muslim powers are suspect. For most in that category,

the American presence in the kingdom is, at best, something to be

tolerated as a political necessity ordered by the government. For some,

though, it is a focus of violent opposition. ‗Usama bin Laden made the

American military presence in Saudi Arabia the centerpiece of his

indictment of the ruling family. Attacks on an American training mission

attached to the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh in 1995 and on an

apartment building in the eastern province housing American air force

personnel in 1996 took the lives of 24 Americans. The latter attack led to

the transfer of the American air wing from Dhahran, in the populated

Eastern province, to the Prince Sultan Airbase south of Riyadh, in the

desert.

Unprecedented polling in Saudi Arabia since the September 11th

attacks confirms the anti-American trend in public opinion. A Gallup

poll, conducted in late January-early February 2002, reported that 64% of

Saudi respondents viewed the U.S. either very unfavorably or most

unfavorably. Majorities in the poll associated America with the

adjectives ―conceited, ruthless and arrogant.‖ Fewer than 10% saw the

U.S. as either friendly or trustworthy.37

A Zogby International poll,

conducted in March 2002, reported similar results. Only 30% of the

Saudis polled supported American-led efforts to fight terrorism, while

57% opposed it. Moreover, only 43% had a favorable opinion of the

American people, and 51% an unfavorable opinion – the highest

unfavorable rating of the eight Muslim countries in which the poll was

conducted (the others were Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, the UAE,

37

Richard Burkholder, ―The U.S. and the West – Through Saudi Eyes,‖ Gallup

Tuesday Briefing, August 6, 2002, www.gallup.com/poll/tb/goverpubli/20020806.asp.

25

Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan). More recent polls, also confirmed this

trend on the eve of war with Iraq, conducted in Saudi Arabia in February-

March 2003. They found that 95% of those polled had either a very or

somewhat unfavorable attitude toward the United States, compared with

only 4% favorable 38

.

The polling also focused on specific sources of Saudi public

antipathy toward Washington. Majorities looked favorably upon

American science and technology (71%), American freedom and

democracy (52%), American movies and television (54%), and American

education (58%). However, fewer than 10% viewed US policy in the

Arab world or on the Palestinian issue in a favorably light. 64% of those

polled said the Palestinian issue was either the most important or a very

important political issue to them, and 79% said they would have a more

favorable view toward the U.S. if it ―would apply pressure to ensure the

creation of an independent Palestinian state.‖39

However, we need only to relativize such results, so that nobody

takes them for granted, invariable truths. On the one hand, because we

are talking here of a certain perception of the reality, which may be

formulated by Erving Goffman‘s concept of ―frames‖. A frame is the

shared definition of a situation that organizes and governs social events

and our involvement in them. It is the public surface of collective

schemas. ―A frame comes into being when its participants activate shared

schemas for it; if someone does not share the going schema, the results

can be embarrassing‖40

. The idea is close of William James‘s ―perception

of reality‖41

. While there are multiple realities, ―there is one that presents

itself as the reality par excellence‖, say Berger and Luckmann42

.

38

Shibley Telhami, ―A View from the Arab World: A Survey in Five

Countries,‖ March 13, 2002. Available at :

http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/analysis/survey20030313.htm 39

―The 10 Nation ‗Impressions of America‘ Poll Report,‖ Zogby International,

August 7, 2002, www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=610. 40

Daniel Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple Truths, Bloomsbury, London, 1998,

p.197. 41

James asks : ―under what circumstances do we think things are real?‖ In his

answer , W. James pointed to the crucial role of selective attention in creating

subworlds of reality, each with ―its own special and separate style of existence‖.

William James, The Principles of Psychology, New York, Dover, 1950. 42

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality,

Doubleday, NewYork, 1966, p22.

26

On the other hand, Bourdieu draws our attention to the fact that

―public opinion does not exist‖43

in itself, and that the polling is actually

―a tool of political action. Its most important function is to impose the

illusion that there is a public opinion as a sum purely additive of

individual opinions‖44

. However, the real impact of Bourdieu‘s remark

may be felt on the political level, since in his eyes, polling helps to

suggesting the idea that a certain public opinion is favorable or

unfavorable to such or such course of events…

U.S. and Western critiques of Saudi policy

It is now clear that the main critiques kindled in the USA about

Saudi Arabia in the wake of 9/11 concern two kinds of issues:

1 - The security one, that aroused questions about funding, and

assumed involvement from within Saudi connections.

2 - The political one, that aroused questions about the internal

(local) and external (international, or regional) process that permitted the

"making of" the networks that are in the background of 9/11, whether in

Europe and the USA, or in the Middle East.

There was much talk about " alleged Saudi involvement in

terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting against terrorist groups.

Commentators have pointed to the high percentage of Saudi nationals

among the hijackers (15 on 19). Others maintain that Saudi domestic and

foreign policies have created a climate that may have contributed to

terrorist acts by Islamist radicals. Critics of Saudi policies have cited in

particular a multiplicity of reports that the Saudi Government has

permitted or encouraged fund raising in Saudi Arabia by charitable

Islamic groups and foundations linked to Osama bin Laden‘s Al Qaeda

organization, which the U.S. Government has identified as clearly

responsible for the hijackings. An independent task force sponsored by

the Council on Foreign Relations, in a report published in October 2002,

asserted that individuals and charities in Saudi Arabia have been the most

important source of funds for Al Qaeda for some years, and that ―Saudi

officials have turned a blind eye to the problem‖45

.

43

Such is the title of one of his lectures in 1972, published in : Pierre Bourdieu,

Questions de sociologie, les éditions de Minuit, Paris, 1984, p. 222. 44

Bourdieu, op.Cit. P.224. 45

Alfred B. Prados, Saudi Arabia, Current Issues and U.S. Relations.

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress, April 3, 2003.

27

As Kenneth Katzman points out46

, over the past two decades, U.S.

attempts to contain the threats from Iran and Iraq have depended on

cooperation with the elites in power in the GCC. Those threats made the

Gulf States highly dependent on a military presence in the region. Yet,

the question is : are the Gulf States concerned - as Katzman put it - that

the United States might turn its attention away from the Gulf now that

Saddam Hussein has been removed?

Actually, the Gulf States are not alone struggling with such a

dilemma. We should not forget that the entire Arab world is facing the

problem of how much dependence a Sovereign State is expected to allow

in order to maintain some homogeneity and stability inside the country.

This is as well the problem of all the newly emerged States, since the

fifties of the XXth century, in Africa and Asia. Yet if it has grown to be

so sharp and even violent (considering some reactions) in the Gulf, it is

likely because of the energy resources, which have shaped the new

culture of the region. Here, unlike the subsaharean Africa, or the Asian

steppes, the religion (islam) is still playing the main role in the society. It

has created a habitus, which is still underlying the behaviors and shaping

the attitudes. In his writings, Bourdieu proposes that practice is neither

the mechanical precipitate of structural dictates nor the result of the

intentional pursuit of goals by individuals but rather ―the product of a

dialectical relationship between a situation and a habitus, understood as a

system of durable and transposable dispositions which, integrating all

past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions,

appreciations, and actions, and makes it possible to accomplish infinitely

differentiated tasks, thanks to the analogical transfer of schemata‖

acquired in prior practice.47

More to the point, the islamic puritanism - either sunnite, from

the Wahhabi school of thought or the Ikhwan, or shiite , from the

khomeynist doctrine - adds more a complicated feature to the situation,

because of the officially acknowledged influence it is exerting on both

societies and States. Yet, it is likely that the United States will remain

highly engaged in the Gulf, as Katzman observes,because the September

11 attacks added a new dimension to U.S. relations with the Gulf States

46

Kenneth Katzman, the Persian Gulf States: Post-war issues for US policy ,

2003. July 14, 2003, CRS report for Congress. 47

See Bourdieu : Esquisse d‘une théorie de la pratique, le Seuil 2000, and

Questions de sociologie, op.Cit.

28

beyond the need to contain longstanding threats from Iran or Iraq. He

notes also that after the September 11 attacks, the United States began

pressing the Gulf states for their cooperation against Al Qaeda activists

and financial channels located in the Gulf states themselves. The need for

the United States to deal with all the security threats emanating from the

Gulf gives the United States a stake in the political stability of the Gulf

regimes. It is noticeable that despite the threats they face, the GCC States

have proved more durable politically than some experts had predicted,

surviving attempts to subvert them by Iraq (1970s) and Iran (1980s and

1990s), the eight year Iran-Iraq war (September 1980-August 1988), the

Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait (August 1990-February 1991),

and post-Gulf war unrest and uncertain leadership transitions in a few of

the GCC States.

Since September 11, Katzman observes, the United States has

heightened its attention to public attitudes in the Gulf in light of surveys

and reports that many Gulf citizens are sympathetic to at least some of

the goals of radical Islamic movements such as Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda

leader Usama bin Laden is viewed by many Gulf citizens as a

revolutionary Islamic figure who is fighting to overcome U.S. influence

over the Islamic world, but bin Laden supporters and other Islamic

activists do not appear to pose a major challenge to the Gulf regimes at

this time, although they have started disturbing the civil peace with

recurrent terrorist operations in Saudi Arabia. Some U.S. officials are

concerned that Al Qaeda, defeated in Afghanistan, might turn its

attention to destabilizing pro-U.S. Arab governments in the Gulf or

elsewhere and to attacking U.S. forces based in the Gulf, from secret

basis in Iraq.

This is why the political issues in Saudi Arabia – and broadly in

the Gulf- seem in tight connection with the special focus on international

terrorism. This feature has probably appeared as a result of the failure of

American authorities – and their allies in Europe and the Gulf – to

prevent the tragedy of 9/11. The ultimate meaning of this feature is that

some of the social and political changes inside the latter countries will

bear the mark of the security necessities. On the short term, it is perhaps

not very affecting, but on the middle and the long terms, some options

dictated by security necessities would have to be dealt with to tune up

with requirements emanating from the civil society itself. A critical view

may assume that if under the pressure of the Americans, the Arab

regimes are hurrying up to show that they are moving towards some kind

of political reform, on the long-term, a change handled in such conditions

29

of fear and pressure would be very limited in its scope, as it is meant to

show to the exterior world that the state finally found a compromise with

its society . The consequence may be that in some years, the situation

would revert to the point Zero, because it has never been meant to go

further. Such a regression may be then equal in its results – or worse-

than any longstanding authoritative regime could lead to. This follows

from the general principle that social change cannot be forced over any

society from the exterior. If it does not emanate from it, then maybe it is

not necessary at all.

Nevertheless, if the political issues have always in these

surroundings a security side, we should not omit that the phenomenon

that has released this indigestible salmagundi, -i.e. 9/11- is related to

religion, not as dogma or ritual, but rather as political practice. No

wonder that one of the first reactions of the Americans – and the

Westerners – after 9/11 was to seek to understand who are ―they‖

(i.e.The terrorists). And it is in the answers they give to that question that

rely one of the aspects of the politics of post 9/11.

Let us however recall the historical background of such a

question in order to better understand who is actually the sponsor and the

leader of the hijackers :

Branded by the FBI as an "international terrorist" for his role in

the American US embassy bombings, well before he became prime

suspect in the New York and Washington terrorist attacks, Saudi born

Osama bin Laden was recruited during the Soviet-Afghan war ironically

under the auspices of the CIA, to fight Soviet invaders.

In 1979, the largest covert operation in the history of the CIA was

launched in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in support of

the pro-communist government of Babrak Kamal. With the active

encouragement of the CIA and Pakistan's ISI (Inter Services

Intelligence), who wanted to turn the Afghan jihad into a global war

waged by all Muslim states against the Soviet Union, some 35.000

Muslim radicals from 40 islamic countries joined Afghanistan's fight

between 1982 and 1992. Tens of thousands more came to study in

Pakistani madrasahs (schools) . Eventually more than 100.000 foreign

muslim radicals were directly influenced by the Afghan jihad. The

Islamic jihad was supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia with a

significant part of the funding generated from the Golden Crescent drug

trade : In March 1985, President Reagan signed National Security

Decision Directive 166, which authorized stepped up covert military aid

to the mujahideen, and it made clear that the secret Afghan war had a

30

new goal : to defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan through covert action

and encourage a Soviet withdrawal. The new covert US assistance began

with a dramatic increase in arms supplies…a steady rise to 65,000 tons

annually by 1987,…as well as a "ceaseless stream" of CIA and Pentagon

specialists who traveled to the secret headquarters of Pakistan's ISI on the

main road near Rawalpindi, Pakistan. There, the CIA specialists met with

Pakistani intelligence officers to help plan operations for the Afghan

rebels.

The CIA using Pakistan's military Inter Services Intelligence

played a key role in training the mujahideens . In turn, the CIA sponsored

guerilla training was integrated with the teachings of islam : Predominant

themes were that Islam was a complete socio-political ideology, that holy

Islam was being violated by the atheistic Soviet troops, and that the

islamic people of Afghanistan should reassert their independence by

overthrowing the leftist Afghan regime propped up by Moscow.48

Now the question « who are they » aroused in the mainstream

media after 9/11 was as much about Islam than about Wahhabism49

. Few

observers were concerned with linking it to the historical background

where the CIA appears to have the main part. People in America and

Europe, sought to know whether it was logical for Muslims to kill others

just because they are not Muslims. The fact that Usama bin Laden had

published a Fatwa legitimating such a behavior, was in itself

significant50

. A branch of Islam seems to be therefore bloodthirsty and

48

See : Michel Chossudovsky, Who Is Osama Bin Laden? 12 September,

2001,Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), Montréal. 49

The serious French newspaper Le Monde, on its October 4 issue, did not

hesitate to run a story full of suggestions and questions about a generation of Saudis that

even if it did not take part to the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan, feels an

admiration towards bin Laden. According to Le Monde, we must find the causes of

what happened on September 11 not in Afghanistan, but rather in the Saudi Kingdom

itself. (: L'hypothèse de la piste Saoudienne). Another example : For Mr. Stephen

Schwartz, it is the whole Wahhabism that must be singled out as the very cause of what

happened on Sept.11. " One major question is never asked in American discussions of

Arab terrorism", he writes; and this question is: " What is the role of Saudi Arabia?"

Then the answer he gives is quite amazing. In his view the question is not asked because

" American companies depend too much on the continued flow of Saudi oil, while

American politicians have become too cozy with the Saudi rulers"! (The Spectator -

U.K. September 22.) For more about this topic, see : Hichem Karoui, Pressure on the

House of Saud, October 13, 2001, Media Monitors Network.

http://mediamonitors.net/karoui26.html 50

The ―Jihad against Jews and Crusaders‖ was issued by the World Islamic

Front on February 23, 1998. It was signed up by the following : Shaykh Usamah Bin-

31

seeking war and destruction. People made a quick rapprochement with

what they thought knowing, which revealed to be rather the ignored part

of Islam. Yet the ignored could not be easily known. Thus, when the

French researcher Pascal Ménoret wonders what is meant by

Wahhabism , he finds that the term is being used to mean at least six

different phenomenons that wisdom as well as methodological caution

should advise us to distinguish. He mentions :

1- The traditional doctrine elaborated by theologians claiming to

defend the reform of Muhammad Abdelwahhab.

2- The official islam of the Saudi religious establishment.

3- The religious practices of the Saudis.

4- The influence of Saudi Arabia in the islamic world.

5- Some religious opinions preached by islamist groups.

6- Theological reference of a range of behaviour considered in Europe

deviant (such as the long beard, non-consumption of alcohol or porc,

segregation between women and men, etc) and even illegal (like the

head scarf for girls in the french schools) 51

.

Adherence to religion, though, carries with it the impetus to look

beyond the self in favor of that, which transcends the self. One of the best

descriptions of that side of religion rational has been pointed out by

Christian Smith52

. He explains how religion can encourage political

action by providing transcendent motivation. Religion provides ―sets of

beliefs and practices grounded not in the ordinary, mundane world, but in

the divine, the transcendent, the eternal, the holy, the spiritual. Religious

meaning-systems operate with reference to supernatural beings, timeless

truths, celestial realities. This is what sets religion apart from non-

religious cultural meaning systems‖ 53

. In this way, religious life is not

about satisfying personal preferences, but it is about living a life in

accordance with transcendent ideals.

Muhammad Bin-Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of the Jihad Group in Egypt , Abu-

Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group, Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of

the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, Fazlur Rahman, amir of the Jihad Movement in

Bangladesh. See the text of the fatwa here :

http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm 51

Pascal Ménoret , Le Wahhabisme , arme fatale du néo-orientalisme, Revue:

Mouvements, décembre 2004, n° 36. 52

Smith, Christian, Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement

Activism. New York: Routledge. 1996. 53

Idem.

32

. * Figure 1 presents a diagram of the transcendent motivation

approach. An oval represents the transcendent, while two rectangles

represent the actor, and the goal of religious behavior. The arrow from

the transcendent to the actor represents the source of the individual‘s

goal, the arrow from the actor to the goal represents the religious action

itself, and the arrow from the goal to the transcendent represents

completion of the religious behavior. While the rational choice

conception involves an actor producing ―religious satisfaction‖ to gratify

personal needs, the transcendent motivation perspective allows for the

end result of the action to be directed toward the completion of a

transcendent directive. In the pure form of the transcendent motivation

approach, the self is only a minor player in the act, and certainly not the

center of activity it is in the rational choice conception54

.

54

For more development of this topic, see: Matthew T.Loveland and Erik

K.Sartain, Bringing Sociology Back to the Sociology of Religion, University of Notre

Dame, Working Paper and Technical Report Series, n°2003-06.

33

Islamism, internationalism, nationalism

In the wake of 9/11 there was also a question related to Islam and

nationalism. If the American reaction emphasized the fact that this was a

―war against America‖, who could declare wars but nationals of other

countries, even if they were pariahs and mercenaries?

The point is that al Qaeda leaders never hid the pretention that

they are fighting to get the American troops out of Saudi Arabia and the

Gulf. However, as they found refuge in varied countries outside their

own birthplaces, and as they masterminded operations that crossed

borders and continents from African to Asian and American or European

shores, the observers were struck by the international aspect of this

activity which they labeled "international islamism", ―international

jihad‖, and ―international terrorism‖, while the regional and local aspects

became secondary. Such views have been issued for example, by – but

by no means exclusively- Israeli analysts, who, while confronted with

violent operations executed by Hamas and al Jihad al Islami activists,

have been interested in picturing a scene where local palestinian fighters

would be part of ― an Islamist Internationale‖. Nevertheless, this view

does not stand to the analysis, at least because the Palestinian islamist

activists have never executed any operation outside what they deem to be

a field of conflict : Israel itself and the palestinian territories.55

For R. Paz, the term Global Jihad marks and reflects the

solidarity of variety of movements, groups, and sometimes ad hoc

groupings or cells, which act under a kind of ideological umbrella of

radical interpretations of Islam. The Islamists saw the fall of the Soviet

Union as a direct result of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan at the hands

of Islamic warriors.The masses of Arab volunteers recruited to fight the

Soviets in the Afghan conflict led to the opening of Islamic fronts in

various local and national disputes with religious overtones: Bosnia,

55

See for example, Reuven Paz, Is there an Islamist Internationale? July 9,2000.

Institute for Counter-Terrororism (ICT), Herzliya, Israel, and Global Jihad and the

European Arena, by the same author (International Conference on Intelligence and

Terrorism, Priverno, Italy, 15-18 May 2002. Let us recall that from the Palestinian

radicalist point of view, all the territories claimed by the Israelis as theirs, since 1948

and even before, are Palestinian. Thus, when they operate inside Israël, they act inside

disputed territories.

34

Albania, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan and Kashmir. ―This involvement

has led many observers to view the phenomenon of ―Afghan Arabs‖ as a

kind of Islamist Internationale, similar to the International Brigades of

Socialist and Communist volunteers in the civil war in Spain in the

1930s‖56

.

Nevertheless, Paz fails to see the national – or even the nationalist

– dimension of the phenomenon, maybe because he was unable – like

many israelis – to view the activists of islamist organizations in Palestine

and the rest of the Arabo-Islamic world as mainly contesting the regimes

they are directly confronted with. That‘s why , there is a pre-Afghanistan

in their struggle and an after-Afghanistan. In the two periods ,we can

observe that the phenomenon fall back to its local (national) dimension.

And everything happens as if Afghanistan and all those wars of religious

overtones, were just a ―passage‖ paving the way to the main struggle

wich aims not at toppling the government of the USA – they know they

cannot do that – but rather at erecting ―islamist‖ regimes in Muslim

countries. This is actually the real challenge, and any confrontation with

Western powers, means in this context, a violent opposition to the

support given by the West to the concerned Muslim states. This is

actually an internal political struggle with an international interface.

This nationalistic dimension of the Islamist struggle, some

analysts have been unable to understand. Paz, for example, mixes up the

Wahhabism , the international terrorism, and the Jihad. He writes :

―Under the influence of the Arab Afghan phenomenon there has also

been an ideological consolidation of Wahhabi-Takfiri Jihadi ideology

and rhetoric that resulted in two main developments :

- A shift in the struggle , mainly through massive

terrorism, from the heart of the Arab world into the

‗Wild West‘ of Central Asia and to Western countries or

Western interests in the region.

- Better cooperation between various groups and

organizations. In the Middle East examples are Hamas,

the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and to some extent

Hizbollah. On the international scene, one can see this in

the case of the Egyptian , Pakistani, Kashmiri, Algerian,

Jordanian , Yemeni, and Sunni Lebanese groups‖57

.

56

Idem. 57

Idem.

35

Seemingly, there is some confusion in Paz‘s perception of the

Islamist phenomenon.

First point, one would ask : what is the link between

Wahhabism and Takfir? Were the Wahhabists – who are still a majority

in Saudi Arabia – takfiris, they would never have been able to maintain

any relationship with other Sunnite Muslims who do not share their

principles and who are also the majority in their respective countries.

After all, who launched the idea and founded a quite acknowledged

International Islamic Organisation acting on behalf of islamic states, but

the Wahhabist Saudis ? Takfir is a notion that asserts that the ―others‖ are

not believers, and as such they deserve to be considered as foes of God.

The most clear example of such an endeavour is that of the Egyptian

extremist group, labeled al takfir wal hijra, which ―executed‖ President

Sadate on these same grounds.

Second point, what Paz figured out to be a ―shift in the struggle‖,

was rather a parenthesis, imposed by two factors : a) the violence of the

repression against the Islamists – notwithsatnding their moderation or

their extremism- in some Muslim countries and their forced exile ; b) the

calling for islamic solidarity at the time of the soviet invasion of

Afghanistan. Many Mujahideens thought that an experience in an armed

struggle would be useful on the day they return home to deliver the

ultimate fight. That is exactly what happened.

Third point, if we take a close look at the groups Paz mentions,

we would see that each one of them is related to a determined country

and a localized struggle inside that country. If there is some kind of

solidarity between them, what‘s more normal? All political organisations

from the right wing to the left have some connections. Yet, it is too much

exceeding the real facts to deduce that because they are islamists they are

necessarily similar in their programs and aims, and as such they are also

– necessarily- involved with terrorism. Nothing is more wrong, for a

simple reason : terrorism is a thing, islamist political organisations are

another. There is not necessarily a connection between the two.

Moreover, terrorism is not always islamist. It is not even always

religious. We should not forget that the first ―terrorists‖ of the XXth

century were anarchists, marxists, and nihilists, well before the

nationalists of the liberation movements – often secularists – used these

same methods against the European colonialism.

However 9/11 set the clock on the islamist bundle, not without

some good reasons, though.

36

It was the first time since the wars of decolonization that notions

like ―jihad‖ and ―holy war‖ were broadly used to featuring some of the

most elapsing characters of our time. And the idea that some of these

islamist trends were marked by nationalism started getting some ground.

For indeed, before joining hands in Afghanistan, all those small

movements scattered over different Arab and Muslim countries have had

a national ambition : al Zawahiri was sentenced to death by an Egyptian

court because he was incriminated for his activity in Egypt ; and Bin

Laden has been spoiled from his saudi nationality because of his activity

against the Saudi government. These examples show that the people who

actually form al Qaeda networks are initially nationals with national

ambitions. If they changed tactics in course of their activity and aimed at

international targets, nothing proves that they rejected their initial

strategic goal : to overthrow the local elites from power and take over. In

the Arab world, the label "Arab Afghans" is synonymous of rebels. They

have been identified as key-elements in underground and/or terrorist

activities in many arab countries. They have had for instance a heavy

hand in the algerian civil war after the failed elections of 1992, in the

same measure that they have been active in Iraq since the collapse of the

Baath regime, and in Saudi Arabia as well.

Identity problematic and Nationalistic irrrationality

Obviously, it is the identity element, which we find missing in

some analysis, albeit this is an important key to understandig the

phenomenon. ―From the perspective of cultural criticism‖, notes Nilüfer

Gole, ―Islamism shares similarities with other contemporary social

movements that have introduced new categories of identity into politics,

such as sex, race, nature, and religion‖58

. Gole pointed to the question of

identity definition as one of the most important features of the Islamist

movement. ― The religiosity that Islamists recover‖, she says, ―is not

something that was there, a social reservoir waiting to be used ; Islam is

no longer transmitted by their social, family, and local settings that they

re-appropriate and revisit in order to elaborate a new religious self in

modern contexts. Islamism is the work of those Muslims who exist under

conditions of social mobility and uprootedness ; those actors who have

left their families and small towns to come to cities or to cross national

58

Nilüfer Gole, The Voluntary Adoption of Islamic Stigma Symbols, in : Social

Research, Vol.70, n° 3 , Fall 2003.

37

boundaries, becoming migrants in Western countries in search of work,

education, and better living conditions‖59

. Thus, Islam becomes in such

conditions of uprootedness and alienation the bond between them and the

expression of individuality. ―Muslim identity is transformed from a

‗natural‘ category into which one is born – a tradition handed down from

generation to generation – into a ‗social‘ category. Islamism is the name

given to this radical procedure, to this shift from Muslim to Islamist‖60

.

As a result, Muslim identity is revised and reconstructed to fit in with

that transformation.

Now, the question is about whether this has anything to do with

nationalism ? Is it new? Is it a reproduction of a past experience? When

and how?And at last, when and how does America enters into the

account?

Before going any further, let's look at an aspect of the 9/11 course

of events that has been seldom talked about. It is precisely because it is in

connection with that question of nationalism. Many people in America

wondered : Why they (the Arabs, or the Muslims) hate us? And when

they did not find an answer enough sound to stand critics, they began to

convince themselves that the real evil came from wahhabism, although

they have lived and coped with it for more than half a century.

But the amazing thing is that without these clues, 9/11, would

have appeared as perfectly detached from any relation to Wahhabism.

How that ? The reason is simple : Take a look at the messages issued by

al Qaeda . At no moment, there is any hint to Wahhabism , neither as an

adopted doctrine, nor as an ideological rival. Better : 9/11 as explained

by Bin Laden himself, has nothing to do with interpreting islam. The

point was not about Islam, but about the unbalanced relations between

America and the Arabo-islamic world in political and economical

matters. Otherwise, in matters that are not religious but political : Bin

Laden hinted several times to the Palestinian problem, and to the 12

years' long plight of the Iraqi people under the embargo. The message

was clear : He held America responsible for the death of thousands of

people in the Arab countries , in Palestine, in Iraq, in Lebanon, etc…

Because he thinks America's policy is egoistic, immoral and

unconditionally siding with the oppressors of the Palestinians. For him,

9/11 was a right response to a wrong policy. The matter was not about

hate or love, but about pride and respect. The USA as a superpower, in

59

Idem. 60

Idem.

38

his view, does not act out of the moral principles of a world conscience :

America does not even suspect the amount of pain its policy has caused

to the Arabs and Muslims. In this regard, it is labeled in the major

discourses of the islamic movements (and they are not all members of al

Qaeda or radicalists or jihadists) as " al istikbar al alami " , which means

: the world arrogance. Thus, 9/11 was intended to be a blow at the face of

that distasteful"world arrogance", precisely in order to make its people

feel pain and wonder : why ?

Is that a rational behavior ? To convince America that such or

such policy harmed some people, should it be better to slaughter 5000

innocents or to make speeches in the UN or a media campaign on CNN ?

Here, we should come back to our first hypothesis. If the brand of

islamism that Bin Laden has embraced is a nationalistic one, his

behaviour would be as much irrational as his argumentation to justify it

would try utmost rationality. About this latter particularity of the man,

there is little disagreement between observers. Bin Laden revealed to be,

in effect, very keen on media communications, since al Jazeerah channel

became his favorite instrument in this context. On the other hand, he

would not be able to escape the epidemic nationalist violence, since his

return to Saudi Arabia from Afghanistan. As we know, with the

withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to

Saudi Arabia to combat what he saw as an « infidel government ».

Further angered by the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia accompanying the

Gulf War, bin Laden became even more outspoken in his anti-regime

rhetoric.

There is nothing odd about that. In a study about nationalism and

rationality, Michael Hechter notes for instance that in 1994 "eighteen of

the twenty-three wars being fought were based on nationalist or ethnic

challenges to states. About three quarters of the world‘s refugees were

fleeing from, or were displaced by, ethnic or nationalist conflicts. And

eight of the thirteen United Nations peacekeeping operations were

designed to separate the protagonists in ethnopolitical conflicts".61

Yet, one may object that 9/11 is just a terrorist operation not a

war; but this is not true. The president of the United States himself, made

the remark that it was war declared against his country. A war that

necessitated a retaliatory action not only in waging a war against the

Taliban regime , followed by another against the Saddam regime, but all

61

See Nationalism and Rationality in : Festschrift for Immanuel Wallerstein,

Part One, Journal of World Systems Research, volume VI, n° 2, Summer-Fall 2000.

39

this was also a piece in a huge war strategy declared against international

terrorism. As to the other side, - al Qaeda that is - we should only

remember the fatwa of 1998 , which says : "The ruling to kill the

Americans and their allies — civilians and military — is an individual

duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is

possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy

mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move

out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.

This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God...We — with

God‘s help — call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to

be rewarded to comply with God‘s order to kill the Americans and

plunder their money wherever and whenever they find It".

No wonder. ―The uglier side of modern nationalism‖, says

Charles Taylor ―frequently combines a chauvinistic appeal to the national

personality or will with a drive to power which justifies recourse to the

most effective industrial and military means‖62

. Taylor holds nationalism

as a fruit of Romanticism in modern politics. In his view , the ―extreme

case of this repulsive phenomenon was Nazi Germany. Here was a

regime brought to power partly by appeals to expressive integrity against

instrumental reason.‖63

There is indeed an important level of irrationality in nationalism :

The accidental birth of a person in a certain country gives him the wrong

baseless idea that he may scorn others and consider them as enemies.

Born in Europe and having a white skin for example, he gives himself the

right to plunder the black Africans and refuses to employ towards others

the criteria he uses towards his own compatriots. Even a genius like

Einstein is disliked by a Nazi German because he is a Jew. Can anything

be more inhuman and unreasonable than to prefer a wicked, corrupt and

incompetent compatriot of the same race or language to an honest,

benevolent and competent person who is born beyond one's frontiers?

Nationalism of that kind inevitably ends in racism and racial prejudice. It

has been the cause of clashes, aggressions, and constant rivalry between

nations, causing much riot and bloodshed all over the world. When a

country thinks only in terms of its own interests and gives itself the right

to dominate others, the result will obviously be conflicts, aggressions and

hegemony.

62

Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self : the making of the modern identity,

Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 415. 63

Idem.

40

Neo fundamentalists

An interesting point of view that deserves to be compared with

what we have previously mentioned concerning Islamism, is held by the

French scholar Olivier Roy. For him, there is no such a thing as what

some observers call An "islamist internationale". A survey of the

mainstream Islamist movements in the 1990s showed that they have

failed in producing anything resembling an ―Islamist Internationale,‖

even if their ideological references remain similar. 64

Many people are convinced of the contrary , though. There has

been a wide debate about the internationalisation of the islamist

networks, which permitted to the cells of al Qaeda to be transplanted in

Iraq after losing their base in Afghanistan. Besides, whereas O. Roy

forward a new concept to help understanding the islamist phenomenon,

the important questions are therefore : why neo? Who is meant by this

word ? And in what is he different from other fundamentalists? Is the

difference lying in the means used, or in the content of the program, or

something else?

Through the reading he achieves of the islamist map, we can

hardly find a complete answer to these questions. Yet, Roy gives us a

shrewd description of the islamist networks. Thus, he talks about their

"nationalisation". For example, he says that ―this ―nationalization‖ of

Islamism is apparent in most countries of the Middle East. Hamas

challenged Arafat‘s (and today Abu Mazen) PLO not on points relating

to Islam, but for ―betraying‖ the national interests of the Palestinian

people. Hassan Turabi used Islam as a tool for unifying Sudan, by

Islamizing the Southern Christians and pagans. The Yemenite ―Islah‖

movement has been active in the re-unification of Yemen. The Lebanese

Hezbullah has always stressed the defense of the ―Lebanese people‖ and

has even established a working relationship with many Christian circles.

It has, apparently, given up the idea of an Islamic State in Lebanon, due

to consideration of the role of the Christians in defining the state. The

Turkish islamist Party (today in power), by stressing its Ottoman

heritage, was trying to affirm a kind of neo-Ottoman Turkish model in

the Middle East. By the same token, the Shiite radical parties of Iraq,

such as Da‘wa, stressed the need for national unity and appeared closely

64

Olivier Roy, Neo-Fundamentalism, Social Science Research Council. Essays.

41

working with non-Islamic national parties. The Algerian FIS – front

islamique du salut - claimed to be the heir of the National Liberation

Front of the anti-French war. The Tunisian Nahdha party wants to be

considered as the heir of the first destourian party founded in 1920 by

nationalists and Zeitounians65

like sheikh Abdelaziz Thaalibi. During the

Gulf War of 1991, each branch of the Muslim Brothers‘ organization

took a stand in accordance with the perceived national interests of its

own country (e.g., the Kuwait branch approved U.S. military

intervention, while the Jordanian branch vehemently opposed it)‖66

.

Roy notices in the same context another feature : the pacifism of

some of these movements : ―These movements are not necessarily

violent, even if, by definition, they are not democratic: the Pakistani

Jama‘at Islami and the Turkish Refah Party as well as most of the

Muslim Brothers groups have remained inside a legal framework, except

where they were prevented from taking political action, as was the case

in Syria, for instance‖. 67

There is even more an interesting feature observed by Roy. It

concerns the possible evolution towards democracy thanks to these

movements' activism : ―On the domestic scene, these parties brought

previously excluded social strata into the political process: the mostazafin

in Iran (the marginalized segments of the urban population); the Shi‘as in

Lebanon; recent city-dwellers and Kurds for the Refah; urban youth in

Algeria, shocked by the bloody repression of October 1988; Northern

tribes in Yemen, etc. In doing so they have helped to root nation-states

and to create a domestic political scene, which is the only real basis for a

future process of democratization. In this sense, the Islamist parties,

while they are not democratic, foster the necessary conditions for an

endogenous democracy, as is clearly the case in Iran. Khatami‘s election

expressed a call for democracy which is possible only because the whole

population has been brought into a common political scene by a popular

and deep-rooted revolution‖68

.

65

The Zeitounians are those who graduated from the Zeitouna university

(traditional education). The claim is disputed by the party in power (RCD) which

pretends also to be the heir of that first party. 66

Idem. 67

Idem. The same may be said about the Tunisian Nahdha party which, despite

it has been forbidden and despite it still have many militants in jail, never indulged into

violent struggle. Something very similar to the islamist Turkish party happened to the

Tunisian : under pressure it changed of name, but it did not change of strategy. 68

Idem.

42

The question is : how many people among the Western elite

would agree to Roy‘s views ? The point is there has always been an

inclination to consider the islamist movements as generally hostile and

agressive, if not irredeemably violent and as such unable to indulge in

political compromises. Yet, while not setting clearly the limits between

neo and conservative fundamentalists, Roy formulates the hypothesis that

the process of conservative islamization has been promoted by the

muslim states themselves as a reaction against islamist opposition in the

eighties . What is the result ? His answer is : " The first part of the

program was quite a success, but state control has never been effective".

This observation is not unaccurate, for it is known that many arab states

were forced to play the Islamist card (an official islamism, that is) in

order to prevent dangerous uncontrolled trends coming up from the

bottom of their societies. However, if in North Africa, the governments

played the card of The islamists to counter the left since the seventies

(like in Egypt under Sadate, Tunisia under Bourguiba, and Morocco

under Hassan II, or in Sudan under Numeyri,etc), in the Gulf region, the

stakes were quite different. In these conservative societies, the left has

never pressed of any real weight on the struggle for power as to

jeopardise or upset the other players. The game was then since the outset

between elites that took islam as an asset and used it in the race for

political power. However, some islamist movements before growing to

participate to a wider international network, have been first national

political organisations in their own countries. If they shifted to become

supranational, it was at least for two reasons : 1- They have been

forbidden or have undergone opression and were thus forced to exile, and

in exile, they had to survive through networking as an international

islamist movement. 2 - Some international events, have helped to make

of the local Movements a worldwide network, such as : the iranian

revolution, the occupation of Afghanistan, the Chechen problem, the

Balkans war, etc.

The neofundamentalists of O. Roy are anti-imperialists,

supranational, and may be even the product of contemporary

globalization than the islamic past. Undubitably, this is true. Yet, we

cannot deny to the Conservative islamists to be also anti-imperialists,

supranational, and reacting against globalization. So, What is the

difference?

May be it is lying in the details . For example : " The Islamists

(the conservative, that is) were not anti-Christians as such". The neo are

definitely anti christians and anti jewish. And he is right to notice that

43

―in Iran during the revolution there has never been any attack on

churches. The Egyptian Muslim Brothers never cracked down on the

Copts. The idea was that there is some common ground between true

believers. Now, however, the term ―religious war‖ really makes sense.‖

Indeed, we never heared more talk about New crusades than since 9/11,

which is according to this view a neo fundamentalist "achievement".

We may think that the second feature mentioned by Roy -

supranationality, that is - is also applicable to the conservative

fundamentalists, in fact to all the islamists, since Islam itself is

considered a universal religion that does not recognize boundaries. But

for Roy , the point is more about background than about ideologic

orientation and doctrine : "The second point is that these movements are

supranational. A quick look at the bulk of bin Laden‘s militants killed or

arrested between 1993 and 2001 show that they are mainly uprooted,

western educated, having broken with their family as well as the country

of origin. They live in a global world." More specifically he adds :

" While Islamists do adapt to the nation-state, neo-

fundamentalists embody the crisis of the nation-state, squeezed between

infrastate solidarities and globalization. The state level is bypassed and

ignored. The Taliban do not care about the state—they even downgraded

Afghanistan by changing the official denomination from an ―Islamic

State‖ to an ―Emirate.‖ And last but not least, " Using two international

languages (English and Arabic), traveling easily by air, studying, training

and working in many different countries, communicating through the

Internet and cellular phones, they think of themselves as ―Muslims‖ and

not as citizens of a specific country. "69

Here is the point where we join O. Roy in the analysis, for since

9/11, the observers are more concerned about a global network than

about activist movements that can be easily located and isolated. Bin

laden , al Zawahiri, or al Zarqawi were indeed citizens of arab countries

with specific goals and roots inside Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Jordan.

Nonetheless, by their activities they are no longer the concern of these

only countries. If the terrorist operations they masterminded could reach

America, Europe, or other countries and continents, they would be

considered thus as the negative side of the globalization. They represent a

phenomenon that goes beyond the question of religions, modernity,

West-East or North-South relations, etc, because they are part of that

unacknowledged quantity of risk that the game of Nations engender in

69

Idem.

44

times of particular tension and rapid transition. And it is now with that

risk that the leaders of the world have to play, to struggle, and to cope.

How much calculation , how much chance are left to them ? That is the

question.

Media war

« Each culture establishes in its language a relation to reality »70

,

says Jürgen Habermas. Yet, in a single culture we may also find several

varied relations to reality. May be this is so because ―whatever language

system we choose , we always start intuitively from the presupposition

that truth is a universal validity claim‖71

But this ―cognitive adequacy‖ in

Habermas‘s terminology is as he acknowledges himself sometimes

bypassed.

Critics of some media behaviour in the USA in the wake of 9/11

were not all Arabs or Muslims. We can also find among the American

writers and journalists many people who held similar positions. Susan

Sontag is one of them. In a series of essays conceived as responses to

9/11 and published in The New Yorker, she says for example :

"The disconnect between last Tuesday's monstrous dose of reality

and the self-righteous drivel and outright deceptions being

peddled by public figures and TV commentators is startling,

depressing. The voices licenced to follow the event seem to have

joined together in a campaign to infantilize the public. Where is

the acknowledgement that this was not a "cowardly" attack on

"civilization" or "liberty" or "humanity" or "the free world" but

an attack on the World's self proclaimed super-power, undertaken

as a consequence of specific American alliances and actions?

How many Americans are aware of the ongoing bombing of

Iraq?"

Better : in her eyes, if the word "cowardly" is to be used , "it

might be more aptly applied to those who kill from beyond the range of

retaliation , high in the sky, than those willing to die themselves in order

70

Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One,

Beacon Press, Boston, 1984,p.57. And he adds : ―to this extent, ‗real‘ and ‗unreal‘,

‗true‘ and ‗untrue‘ are indeed concepts that are inherent in all languages and not ones

that can, say, be present in this language and absent in that. But each culture draws this

categorial distinction within its own language system‖. 71

―If a statement is true‖, he says, ―it merits universal assent, no matter in which

language it is formulated‖.Op.Cit.P.58.

45

to kill others. In the matter of courage (a morally neutral virtue) :

whatever may be said of the perpetrators of Tuesday's slaughter, they

were not cowards" 72

.

There was indeed an intense debate between the American writers

and observers. Sontag's view represents a trend of the opinion inside the

country (and outside it, particularly in Europe). Similar positions may be

found for instance in the liberal and the left-wing media throughout the

USA (from the Nation, to Media Monitors Network , Z magazine, Anti-

war.Com, the Independent Institute, Palestine Chronicle, the progressive,

the Monthly Review, The Nation, Mother Jones, What Really

Happened,… etc). For the Monthly Review, ―the world changed on

September 11. That‘s not just media hype‖(…) ―The way some historians

refer to 1914–1991 as the ―short twentieth century,‖ many are now

calling September 11, 2001, the real beginning of the twenty-first

century. It‘s too early to know whether that assessment will be borne out,

but it cannot simply be dismissed.‖73

Among the ―myths‖ this magazine

tried to unveil, we may mention : ―The attack was like Pearl Harbor, and

therefore, as in the Second World War, we had to declare war or risk

destruction ; This was an attack on freedom ; You‘re with us or you‘re

with the terrorists ; The war on Afghanistan was self-defense ; The Bush

administration turned away from its emerging unilateralism (pulling out

of the Kyoto protocols, sabotaging the ABM treaty with Russia, etc.) to a

new multilateralism…etc‖.

Concerning the second point (freedom), the magazine notes :

―Whatever considerations exist in the mind of Osama bin Laden or

members of his network, his recently broadcast statements contain no

mention of any resentment of American democracy, freedom, or the role

of women. They mention specific grievances regarding U.S. policy in the

Middle East: the sanctions on Iraq, maintained largely by the United

States, which have killed over one million civilians; material and political

support for Israel‘s military occupation of Palestine and its frequent

military attacks, carried out with American weapons, on practically

unarmed Palestinians; and U.S. military occupation of the Gulf and

72

Susan Sontag, Reflections On September 11th, The New Yorker, September

24, 2001. 73

See New Crusade : The US War on Terrorism, the Monthly Review, February

2002. We cannot pretend that this magazine is pro-Bush, albeit as we see, it stresses the

existence of what we may call a ―paradigmatic shift‖, without claiming it. The point is

that such a statement has nothing to do with the political sensibility. It is rather a matter

of objective observation.

46

support for corrupt regimes that serve the interests of U.S. corporations

before those of the people.‖ 74

As to the third point, the magazine says

―This polarization, (you‘re with us or against us) foisted on the world to

frighten possible dissenters from America‘s course of action, is the logic

of tyranny, even of extermination. Anti-war protesters who condemn the

terrorist attacks of September 11 along with the criminal acts of the

United States in Afghanistan, and countries that do the same, don‘t fit

into this scheme, and certainly don‘t deserve to be tarred with the same

brush as the terrorists.‖75

Noam Chomsky‘s analysis of the media is also noteworthy . For

him, ―there are two categories of information that are particularly useful

because there are two distinct, though related, sources for the attack.

Let‘s assume that the attack was rooted somehow in the bin Laden

network. That sounds plausible, at least, so let‘s say it‘s right. If that‘s

right, there are two categories of information and of populations that we

should be concerned with, linked but not identical. One is the bin Laden

network. That‘s a category by itself. Another is the population of the

region. They‘re not the same thing, although there are links. What ought

to be in the forefront is discussion of both of those. The bin Laden

network, I doubt if anybody knows it better than the CIA, since they were

instrumental in helping construct it. This is a network whose

development started in 1979, if you can believe President Carter‘s

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. He claimed, maybe he

was just bragging, that in mid–1979 he had instigated secret support for

Mujahedin fighting against the government of Afghanistan in an effort to

draw the Russians into what he called an ―Afghan trap,‖ a phrase worth

remembering. He‘s very proud of the fact that they did fall into the

Afghan trap by sending military forces to support the government six

months later, with consequences that we know. The U.S., along with

Egypt, Pakistan, French intelligence, Saudi Arabian funding, and Israeli

involvement, assembled a major army, a huge mercenary army, maybe

100,000 or more, and they drew from the most militant sectors they could

find, which happened to be radical Islamists, what are called here Islamic

fundamentalists, from all over, most of them not from Afghanistan.

They‘re called Afghanis, but like bin Laden, they come from

elsewhere‖76

. The second part , according to Chomsky, is the people of

74

Idem. 75

Idem. 76

The United States is a leading terrorist state, interview with Noam Chomsky

by David Barsamian, Monthly Review, November 2001.

47

the region. He says : ―They‘re connected, of course. The bin Laden

network and others like them draw a lot of their support from the

desperation and anger and resentment of the people of the region, which

ranges from rich to poor, secular to radical Islamist. The Wall Street

Journal, to its credit, has run a couple of articles on attitudes of wealthy

Muslims, the people who most interest them: businessmen, bankers,

professionals, and others through the Middle East region who are very

frank about their grievances. They put it more politely than the poor

people in the slums and the streets, but it‘s clear. Everybody knows what

they are. For one thing, they‘re very angry about U.S. support for

undemocratic, repressive regimes in the region and U.S. insistence on

blocking any efforts towards democratic openings‖77

.

On the other side of the picture, there is also the opposite trend of

opinion, actually the one that took shape with the victory of M. George

W. Bush –twice- in the elections and dominated the media and political

scene thereafter. However, the writers of both trends may cross the

"lines" of the media making of them an open forum for controversial

exchanges insofar that those "lines" are fictive and not expressing a

doctrinary creed. We may thus, read samples of both opinion trends in a

single paper or online magazine, such as the Washington Post, the New

York Times, or -say - MMN. An example representative of the camp

opposing Sontag's opinion is expressed by Charles Krauthammer, who

writes commenting her essay as follows :

" What Sontag is implying, but does not quite have the courage to

say, is that because of these 'alliances and actions', such as the bombing

of Iraq, we had it coming. The implication is as disgusting as Jerry

Falwell's blaming the attack on sexual deviance and abortion, except that

Falwell's excrescences appear on loony TV, Sontag's in The New

Yorker"78

.

77

Idem. 78

Washington Post, September 21, 2001, Voices of Moral Obtuseness. Let‘s

note by the way, that C. Krauthammer is member of the Project for New American

Century established in the spring of 1997 as a nonprofit educational organization

"whose goal is to promote American global leadership". Its chairman is William Kristol,

who is the editor of The Weekly Standard. About PNAC we can say that On September

20, 2001, members of the PNAC, issued a document entitled : " Open Letter to

President Bush : Lead The World To Victory ". It is clear from the headline of this letter

that the PNAC identifies "The World" to the "USA", maybe even to the Bush

administration or merely to the New Conservative falcons supporting it. Anyway, in

their view, it seems there is not a shade of doubt that what is good for the USA is good

48

The American agressive strategy in the Middle East, which did

not start with the removal of Saddam Hussein from power and seems

unlikely to stop there, is not really a reaction to 9/11 ; the latter event has

only accelerated a process that was already in the making. A simple

glance at the 2000 Report of the PNAC, would persuade us . From the

first sentences, the Empire is present with its broad ambitions : ―As the

20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world‘s

most preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War,

America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States

have the vision to build upon the achievement of past decades? Does the

United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to

American principles and interests?‖79

These are the questions of the

beginning. It seems effectively that what C.Wright Mills defined as the

―industrial-military complex‖ has prevailed over the PNAC to make of

the American ambition in the XXIst century if not a military one, then at

least one quite supported by a strong military establishment. ―The

American peace has proven itself peaceful, stable and durable. It has,

over the past decade, provided the geopolitical framework for widespread

economic growth and the spread of American principles of liberty and

democracy. Yet no moment in international politics can be frozen in

time; even a global Pax Americana will not preserve itself », states the

report with these tones reminding us of the way historic textbooks talk of

PAX ROMANA. Then what? After that statement inducing that nothing is

durable, the report points out to an amazing ―paradox‖ of our time : Even

for the rest of the world, a view that has been widely opposed inside the USA, and to be

sure in Europe, as well as in the Arab world. In this open letter, the signatories address

M. Bush on five issues, encouraging him to adopt radical policies in order to fight

radical and hostile activities. 1- They support the "necessary military action in

Afghanistan" ; 2- they encourage him to undertake action to remove Saddam Hussein

from power ; 3- they support a war against terrrorism including Hezbollah as a target,

and "appropriate measures of retaliation" against Syria and Iran ; 4 - They consider the

Palestinian Authority responsible as to "the terrorism emanating from territories under

its control", no further assistance should be provided to the PA until these activities are

stopped ; 5 - They support an important increase in defense spending to meet the

requests of " a serious and victorious war on terrorism". See the full text of the open

letter in : The Iraq War Reader, History, Documents, Opinions, Edited by Micah L.Sifry

and Christopher Cerf, Touchstone, Simon & Schuster, 2003. 79

Rebuilding America‘s Defenses : strategy, forces and resources for a new

century, A report of the PNAC, September 2000.

49

if left alone as an unequaled Superpower on the international scene after

the demise of the former USSR, America would not stand the road if ,

like some sportive competitors of high level, it does not indulge in testing

some ―testosterone ‖ on its muscles. In other words, ―paradoxically, as

American power and influence are at their apogee,‖ says the report, ―

American military forces limp toward exhaustion, unable to meet the

demands of their many and varied missions, including preparing for

tomorrow‘s battlefield. Today‘s force, reduced by a third or more over

the past decade, suffers from degraded combat readiness; from

difficulties in recruiting and retaining sufficient numbers of soldiers,

sailors, airmen and Marines; from the effects of an extended

―procurement holiday‖ that has resulted in the premature aging of most

weapons systems; from an increasingly obsolescent and inadequate

military infrastructure; from a shrinking industrial base poorly structured

to be the ―arsenal of democracy‖ for the 21st century; from a lack of

innovation that threatens the technological and operational advantages

enjoyed by U.S. forces for a generation and upon which American

strategy depends. Finally, and most dangerously, the social fabric of the

military is frayed and worn. U.S. armed forces suffer from a degraded

quality of life divorced from middle-class expectations, upon which an

all-volunteer force depends. Enlisted men and women and junior officers

increasingly lack confidence in their senior leaders, whom they believe

will not tell unpleasant truths to their civilian leaders. In sum, as the

American peace reaches across the globe, the force that preserves that

peace is increasingly overwhelmed by its tasks‖80

.

Oddly enough, the author sounds convinced – and ready to

convince us – that the deployment of thousands of US military and

dozens of US bases around the world is normal. The question that this

very deployment may be contested in Europe , in Asia, in the Middle

East, etc, does not even dawn on him, as he takes it for granted that all

the peoples of the world are as persuaded as he is that all that military

―hula-hula‖ is for the sake of peace.

Why not, after all? This is also a matter of ―logic‖.

80

Idem.

50

PAX AMERICANA

When Jay Bookman - deputy editorial page editor of the Atlanta

Journal-Constitution - wonders for instance "why the administration

dismissed the option of containing and deterring Iraq, as we had the

Soviet Union for 45 years?", the answer he gives is : "Because even if it

worked, containment and deterrence would not allow the expansion of

American power. Besides, they are beneath us as an empire. Rome did

not stoop to containment ; it conquered. And so should we"81

.

Then, trying to find out who was really supporting these views or

working them out behind the scene, Bookman adds : " among the

architects of this would-be American Empire are a group of brilliant and

powerful people who now hold key positions in the Bush administration.

They envision the creation and enforcement of what they call a

worldwide 'PAX AMERICANA', or American peace. But so far, the

American people have not appreciated the true extent of that ambition".

Thus, if there is a homogeneous vision leading the American

strategy after 9/11, it has to be found in this report issued just a year prior

to that event (in September 2000) by the Project For the New American

Century (PNAC), a group of conservative interventionnists "outraged by

the thought that the United States might be forfeiting its chance at a

global empire", to use Bookman's expression. Behind the report, we find

people holding key positions in the first Bush administration, such as :

Paul Wolfowitz, deputy defense secretary ; John Bolton, undersecretary

of State ; Stephen Cambone , head of the Pentagon's Office of Program,

Analysis and Evaluation ; Eliot Cohen and Devon Cross, members of the

Defense Policy Board, which advises Rumsfeld ; I. Lewis Libby, chief

of staff to Vice President Dick Cheney ; Dov Zakheim, comptroller for

the Defense Department.

"Because they were still just private citizens in 2000, the authors

of the project report could be more frank and less diplomatic than they

were in drafting the National Security Strategy", says Bookman.

Thus, well before President Bush tagged Iraq, Iran and North

Korea as the Axis of Evil, the authors of the report identified these States

as primary short-term targets. To preserve the Pax Americana, the report

says US forces will be required to perform "constabulary duties" - the

United States acting as policeman of the world- and says that such

81

J. Bookman, The President's Real Goal In Iraq, the Atlanta Journal-

Constitution, September 29, 2002.

51

actions "demand American political leadership rather than that of the

United Nations".

To meet those responsibilities , and to ensure that no country

dares to challenge the United States , the report advocates a much larger

military presence spread over more of the globe, in addition to the

roughly 130 nations in which US troops are already deployed. In this

context, one may assume that in the Gulf for instance, the matter is more

about a global strategy dictated by the American necessities throughout

the world, than a policy targeting the region exclusively on the basis that

"it is good for invasion or colonisation", because of its oil wealth,

although it would be naive to discard the oil production from the

« American necessities ». Actually, American military deployment

concerns varied places of the world, some of which are considered

strategic even without oil or natural gas. Such is the case of Europe for

example, where the American troops have been stationed since the end of

the second world war. That is also the case for Japan, Korea, etc…82

Yet,

this is not meaning that all the regions of the world are similar, or equal

as regards the interests they represent. The Gulf, for example, is certainly

more a priority to the US global strategy than , say, the African horn.

More specifically, the authors of the report argue the USA needs

permanent military bases in the Middle East, in Southeast Europe, in

Latin America and in Southeast Asia, where no such bases exist. That

helps to explain another of the mysteries of American post-September 11

reaction, in which the Bush administration rushed to install U.S. troops in

Georgia and the Philippines, as well as American eagerness to send

military advisers to assist in the civil war in Colombia. Concerning the

82

Either in Europe or in Asia, there are movements contesting the American

military presence. We can mention for example the CAAB (campaign for the

accountability of the American bases) in the United Kingdom, whose web site is :

http://www.caab.org.uk . We counted in the sole UK no less than 23 groups contesting

the American bases. An American living in Japan writes in his blog what follows :

―Something that Americans do not often think about is what it would be like to have

foreign military bases in your country. Even living in Japan, knowing the bases are here,

it doesn't come to mind much, and though there are many who protest the bases in

Okinawa and sometimes elsewhere in Japan, the truth is, you don't hear about it often.

But then, most Japanese people will not complain about the obnoxious politicians

during campaign season with their all-day loudspeaker truck battles, so it doesn't mean

that nobody minds. I certainly know that Americans would mind if, say, England had

bases across the country‖. See ,The blog from another dimension : American Bases in

Japan, March 16,2004… http://www.blogd.com/archives/000512.html

52

Gulf itself, the PNAC report asserts that the presence of American forces,

along with British and French units, has become ―a semipermanent fact

of life‖. These forces represent the ―long-term commitment of the United

States and its major allies‖ to a region of vital importance. More

precisely, ― the need for a substantial American force presence in the

Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein‖.

The 2000 report acknowledges its debt to a still earlier document,

drafted in 1992 by the Cheney Defense Department in the waning days of

the Bush administration : the Defense Policy Guidance. That document

had also envisioned the United States as a colossus astride the world,

imposing its will and keeping world peace through military and

economic power. When leaked in final draft form, however, the proposal

drew so much criticism that it was hastily withdrawn and repudiated by

the first President Bush.

Madrasas, problems of education

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Islamic

schools known as madrasas have been of increasing interest to analysts

and to officials involved in formulating U.S. foreign policy toward the

Middle East, Central, and Southeast Asia.

Madrasas drew added attention when it became known that

several Taliban leaders and Al Qaeda members have developed radical

political views at madrasas in Pakistan, some of which allegedly were

built and partially financed through Saudi Arabian sources.

These revelations have led to accusations that madrasas promote

Islamic extremism and militancy, and are a recruiting ground for

terrorism. Others maintain that most of these religious schools have been

blamed unfairly for fostering anti-U.S. sentiments and argue that

madrasas play an important role in countries where millions of Muslims

live in poverty and the educational infrastructure is in decay83

.

83

Febe Armanios, islamic religious schools , madrasas : background. October

29, 2003, CRS report for Congress. On the global front, concern has been expressed

over the spread of radical Islam through Saudi-funded schools, universities, and

mosques, which exist in many countries including Bangladesh, Bosnia, Indonesia,

Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and even in the United States. Some view the teaching of Saudi

Wahhabism as threatening the existence of more moderate beliefs and practices in other

parts of the Muslim world. However, there are those who argue that a differentiation

should be made between funding to support charitable projects, such as madrasa-

building, and funding which has been channeled, overtly or implicitly, to support

53

In recent years, the dissemination of Saudi Arabian donations to

Islamic charities and the export of a Saudi educational curriculum have

received worldwide attention. Although in Saudi Arabia itself, schools

teach subjects beyond religious studies, conservative Islamic teachings

permeate the Saudi educational system structure. Viewing Saudi Arabia

with greater scrutiny following the events of September 11, experts have

maintained that Saudi school curricula foster anti-Western and anti-

Semitic sentiments. Saudi official textbooks also reportedly used to

―denounce Shi‘a Islam as well as any popular Islamic practices that do

not agree with Wahhabi beliefs‖84

.

In response to such allegations and following a review of

schoolbooks in 2002, the Saudi foreign minister stated that, in light of a

Saudi government survey, 5% of the material was considered ―horrible‖

and 10% questionable, while 85% called for understanding with other

religious faiths. Shortly thereafter, the government vowed to remove

objectionable parts and to train teachers in promoting tolerance, but

skeptics questioned the extent to which the government was willing or

able to instill reforms in its schools85

.

The second Forum for National Dialogue, held in Saudi Arabia in

late December 2003 under the patronage of Saudi Crown Prince

Abdallah Ibn Abdelaziz, brought more answers to these questions.

Attended by 60 intellectuals, researchers, clerics and public figures,

among them 10 women, the Forum, which focused on religious

extremism and moderation, ended with recommendations for :

accelerating political reform and expanding popular political

participation ; renewing the religious discourse in compliance with

modernity ; establishing a culture of dialogue in Saudi society ; allowing

responsible freedom of expression ; strengthening women‘s status in all

areas ; setting out a strategy to help keep Saudi youth away from

extremist teachings in these madrasas. Critics of Saudi policies allege that the Saudi

government has permitted or encouraged fund raising by charitable Islamic groups and

foundations linked to Al Qaeda, which the U.S. government has identified as

responsible for the September 11 hijackings. In 2003, the Saudi government announced

that it was banning private charities and relief groups from donating money overseas,

until new regulations are instituted to ensure that the money is not being channeled to

terrorist organizations. The extent to which these government regulations will be

effective remains to be seen . 84

Idem. 85

Idem.

54

religious extremism ; and improving the saudi school curricula so that

they spread a spirit of tolerance and moderation.86

Living in the Denial, adopting conspiratory theories

or losing identity?

Among the Arab reactions to 9/11 that may seem to the Westerner

amazingly irrational is the denial that Muslims were ever involved in the

tragedy. Dr. Nawwal Nur and her son Hazem Saleh Abu Isma'il, who

preach and teach Islam in the U.S., were interviewed by the Saudi-based

channel Iqra TV about September 11 on July 15, 2004. The host of the

program asked if the attacks impacted the image of Islam by Americans.

Nur explained : "Not at all, it has not even been proven that Muslims

committed it. There hasn't even been an investigation… They are

confused about what happened… That is why more people converted to

Islam."

Her son added: "I am one of those who believe these events were

fabricated from the outset as part of the global groundwork for the

distortion of Islam's image… Even before these events took place there

was preparation for them.

Maybe this is a kind of protection against what is deemed to be an

―aggressive world‖, pushing the Muslims in the West to the limits of

losing their identities . 9/11 indeed reinforced the stigmatisation against

Muslims in the West. In the USA, the Patriot Act, signed into law by

President Bush on October 26, 2001, stipulates among other provisions

that ―immigrants can be detained indefinitely, even if they are found to

not have any links to terrorism. They can be detained indefinitely for

immigration violations or if the attorney general decides their activities

86

Al Sharq al Awsat, London, January 4, 2004. One of the major studies

presented at the Forum concerned the religious curricula in boy‘s schools in the Saudi

state school system. The study conducted by former Saudi Judge Sheikh Abd al Aziz al

Qassem and Saudi author and journalist Ibrahim al Sakran, was based on an

examination and critical analysis of three curricula for Saudi middle and high schools : -

Al Hadith, a general curriculum on islamic traditions ; - al Fiqh, a curriculum on matters

of religious law and ritual ; and – al Tawhid, a curriculum on matters of belief. The

researchers found extremely grave defects in the curricula, particularly with regard to

attitude toward the ―Other‖- that is toward anyone whose views are not in line with the

Wahhabi islam that is dominant in the Kingdom. They stated also that the curricula

denigrate and show hatred toward and incitement against non-Muslims. The study may

be viewed on this site : http://www.alwihdah.com/print.asp?cat=1&id=711

55

pose a danger to national security. They never need to be given a trial or

even a hearing on their status‖ 87

.

The reactions towards such circumstances are varied.

Kay Deaux, professor of psychology in New York, mentions the

case of Anika Rahman , who says : ―I became a United States citizen four

years ago because of my long love affair with New York....I am a

Bangladeshi woman and my last name is Rahman, a Muslim

name...Before last week, I had thought of myself as a lawyer, a feminist,

a wife, a sister, a friend, a woman on the street. Now I begin to see

myself as a brown woman who bears a vague resemblance to the images

of terrorists we see on television....As I become identified as someone

outside the New York community, I feel myself losing the power to

define myself‖88

.

According to Deaux, ― the events of September 11 have without

question altered the context of identification for thousands of U.S.

citizens and for those immigrants, legal and illegal, whose citizenship is

still in flux‖.89

Deaux thinks that prior to September 11, the prevailing

stereotype of Arab Americans was somewhat negative but not

particularly well articulated and, indeed, that many Americans had given

little thought to the subject. On such a background, 9/11 had had an

overwhelming, indeed, terrific impact on Arab and Muslim immigrants :

―It is in this newly-defined context that the Arab American immigrant

must consider questions of identification of the kind that Anika Rahman

raised: What do I call myself? What does it mean to be that kind of

person? And how is that ethnicity valued, by me and by others?‖90

These

questions are central to the understanding of the ―processes by which

identity is negotiated‖.

To find a strong basis for the denial that Muslims perpetrated

9/11 crimes, a conspiracy theory was helping. Saudi Cleric Dr. Sa'd bin

'Abdallah Al-Breik spoke about Al-Qa'ida's role on Saudi Arabia's

87

San Francisco Chronicle, 9/8/02 88

Kay Deaux, Negotiating Identity and Community after September 11, Social

Science Research Council, Essays on Terrorism and Democratic Virtues. 89

Idem. The current estimate of first generation Arab-American immigrants in

the U.S. is 2,315,392. Current estimates of the number of Muslims in the U.S. are far

less certain, varying from 2 to 6 million. (It should be noted that Arab-Americans and

Muslims are far from overlapping sets. Many Arab-Americans are Christians; Muslims

in turn come from a variety of ethnic groups in the U.S., including African American,

Latino, and, as the highly-publicized case of John Walker Lindh illustrates, from Euro

American backgrounds as well.) 90

Idem.

56

Channel 1 on August 16, 2004 : " We must not inflate [the importance]

of Al-Qa'ida, to the point of claiming that it is the main and only

perpetrator of this large operation [September 11]. I'm not here to defend

[Al-Qa'ida], but we must not overstate this matter… It is a mistake to

ignore the possibility that the Zionist hands used some people who were

planted into one of the stages of this plan, from this issue. I have read

some books that were translated from English into Arabic in which the

Americans themselves call 9/11 'The Great Deception' or 'The Great

Game,' so why do we use all sort of names to avoid this subject? No, we

must be clear and not censor ourselves. These false accusations and the

rush to accuse Saudi Arabia, the judging of others according to the

guidance of the Zionists via the media which is owned by the Zionist‖.91

Al Breik was neither the first nor the last to hold such a conspiratory

theory. It was not even a Muslim-created myth, since we will find many

Westerners propagating it.

In the front page of its November 3, 2003 edition, Al-Watan

published an Arabic translation of an article from Glasgow's Sunday

Herald about the Mossad's involvement in the September 11 attacks:

"Israeli intelligence has been showing the Al-Qa'ida hijackers as they

move from the Middle East through Europe and into American, where

they trained as pilots and prepared to suicide-bomb the symbolic heart of

the United States. And the motive? To bind America in blood and mutual

suffering to the Israeli cause… If Israel's closest ally felt the collective

91

Such a picture would not be complete if we omit that on the other side, the

Israelis were reacting in the same manner. A typical reaction identifying Saudi Arabia

as the main support behind 9/11 hijakers is that of AIPAC , the powerful israeli lobby

in Washington. It is Dore Gold himself who wrote it. (Dore Gold is special adviser to

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon . He was also President of the Jerusalem Center for

Public Affairs and former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations. He testified before

the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs of July 31, 2003, saying for

example : ―Saudi Arabia‘s past involvement in international terrorism is indisputable.

While the Bush administration decided to retract 28 sensitive pages of the Joint

Intelligence Report of the U.S. Congress, nonetheless, Saudi involvement in terrorist

financing can be documented through materials captured by Israel in Palestinian

headquarters in 2002-3. In light of this evidence, Saudi denials about terrorist funding

don‘t hold water‖. But like other Israelis, he makes of the confusion between Palestinian

islamist activists and international terrorism (al Qaeda) the sense of his position,

although he was unable to prove that there is any connection between them. Yet, in his

eyes, since Saudi Arabia allocated $ 280. 000 to 14 Hamas charities, according to the

Mossad, it is enough to prove that the Saudiens are deeply involved with international

terrorism.

57

pain of mass civilian deaths at the hands of terrorists, then Israel would

have an unbreakable bond with the world's only hyperpower and an

effective free hand in dealing with the Palestinian terrorist, who had been

murdering its innocent civilians as the second Intifada dragged on

throughout 2001… There is more than a little circumstantial evidence to

show that Mossad – whose motto is 'By way of deception, thou shalt do

war' – was spying on Arab extremists in the U.S.A. and may have known

that September 11 was in the offing, yet decided to withhold vital

information from their American counterparts which could have

prevented the terror attacks… Mossad agents were spying on Muhammad

Atta and Marwan Al-Shehi, two leaders of the 9/11 hijack teams. The

pair had settled in Hollywood, Florida, along with three other hijackers,

after leaving Hamburg – where another Mossad team was operating close

by… Certainly, it seems, Israel was spying within the borders of the

United States and it is equally certain that the targets were Islamic

extremists probably linked to September 11. But did Israel know in

advance that the Twin Towers would be hit and the world plunged into a

war without end; a war which would give Israel the power to strike its

enemies almost without limit?"

The Mossad plot finds its roots in what is called the ―israeli spy

ring‖. The issue of Israeli foreknowledge of 9/11 is highly controversial.

The story is too complicated to go into detail here, but a number of

respected publications 92

have written about an Israeli ―art student‖ spy

ring operating in the US for several years before 9/11. The name ―art

student‖ is used because most of these scores of spies were posing as

college art students. There have been suggestions that some of these

Israeli spies lived close to some of the 9/11 hijackers. For instance, a US

Drug Enforcement Administration report from before 9/11 noted that

Israeli spies were living in the retirement community of Hollywood,

Florida at 4220 Sheridan Street, which turned out to be only a few

hundred feet from lead hijacker Mohamed Atta's residence at 3389

Sheridan Street93

. Israeli spies appear to have been close to at least ten of

the nineteen 9/11 hijackers. In fact, Forward, the most widely circulated

publication in the US targeting the Jewish audience, has admitted the spy

92

For instance, Fox News, 12/12/01, Forward, 3/15/02, ABC News, 6/21/02,

Salon, 5/7/02, Ha'aretz, 5/14/02, Le Monde, 3/5/02, Reuters, 3/5/02, AP, 3/5/02, AP,

3/9/02, Cox News, 3/5/02, Guardian, 3/6/02, Independent, 3/6/02, New York Post,

3/6/02, Jane's Intelligence Digest, 3/15/02 . 93

see the DEA report, 6/01

58

ring existed, and that its purpose was to track Muslim terrorists operating

in the US.94

Some have claimed that the existence of this spy ring shows that

Israel was behind the 9/11 attacks, an argument that is beyond the scope

of this essay. Nevertheless, if the mainstream media are to be trusted,

Israel gave the US several specific warnings of the 9/11 attacks. In the

second week of August 2001, two high-ranking agents from the Mossad,

the Israeli intelligence agency, came to Washington and warned the CIA

and FBI that 50 to 200 al-Qaeda terrorists had slipped into the US and

were planning an imminent ―major assault on the US‖ aimed at a ―large

scale target‖95

. Near the end of August, France, Russia and Germany

also gave similar warnings.96

Another Pearl Harbour?

The question that many observers raised in the wake of 9/11 is

about whether Saudi Arabia may be going through a dilemma much

similar to that of Iran , where reformists are facing the resistance of a

conservative clergy. This hypothesis, still requiring a validity

verification, actually concerns the role played by the religious elite in the

aftermath of 9/11. The term elite does not designate only those currently

in power (representative of the official Islam through institutions like the

Council of Ulamas theologists), but also those who are outside power and

struggling for it (in the opposition, that is) either inside the Kingdom or

in exile. For this is , as it seems, the political panorama that has emerged

from both the Gulf war in 1991 and, ten years later, the events of

September 11. We think that there is some kind of connection between

the two cases, if the latter is not merely an upshot of the former, although

not in the sense that it has been produced directly as a reaction against

the war and the presence of western troops in the country. It is not

plausible today that the 9/11 hijackers were instrumentalised by Saddam

Hussein, albeit they might have been acting on the behalf of the Iraqis

and the Palestinians as several messages of al Qaeda claimed. Yet, we

must keep in mind that neither the Iraqi nor the palestinian peoples asked

94

Forward, 3/15/02 95

Telegraph, 9/16/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01, Ottawa Citizen, 9/17/01 Fox

News, 5/17/02 96

Fox News, 5/17/02

59

them to strike America, as far as we know. The Palestinians in their

majority - even the Islamists like Hamas - have condemned 9/11, and the

Iraqi elite (ex-opposition in exile) has even profited from the American

anger to make the ultimate rapprochement with the Bush administration ,

which ended up in a full scale war against Saddam regime and his

overthrow from power.

Yet, despite this background, the relations between the Gulf

States and the USA suffered a lot and were put under a tremendous strain

after 9/11: The alliance was thus for the first time put in question, not by

those in the local opposition who, for some time, have been critical of it,

but rather by the officials themselves either in the USA or in the Gulf

States. The situation has no precedent, because of the amount of horror

and fear engendered in the USA by the terrorist operation that has been -

rightly or wrongly - compared to Pearl Harbour.

This is, for example, how the 9/11 Commission report describes

the event :

"The 9/11 attack was an event of surpassing disproportion.

America had suffered surprise attacks before—Pearl Harbor is one well-

known case, the 1950 Chinese attack in Korea another. But these were

attacks by major powers. While by no means as threatening as Japan‘s

act of war, the 9/11 attack was in some ways more devastating. It was

carried out by a tiny group of people, not enough to man a full platoon.

Measured on a governmental scale, the resources behind it were

trivial.The group itself was dispatched by an organization based in one of

the poorest, most remote, and least industrialized countries on earth. This

organization recruited a mixture of young fanatics and highly educated

zealots who could not find suitable places in their home societies or were

driven from them."

In other words, if Washington knew after Pearl Harbour exactly

who was the enemy and where to strike back at it, the picture is quite

different in 2001. Indeed Afghanistan's Taleban have been indicted as the

sponsors of this new kind of war performed by al Qaeda on the behalf of

the Muslims (who never asked for it) , and the second victim of the

American anger will be Saddam Hussein , who even without his weapons

of mass destruction, was considered enough harmful and dangerous to

deserve – after all – a just punishment. But everything since, happened

as if nothing would allay the wounded America .

60

The Saudis react

There is a belief in the USA that public sentiments of anti-

americanism in Saudi Arabia ― have both constrained, but also have been

encouraged, by the Saudi government‖, as writes Gregory Gause III, who

adds : ―The focus on Saudi Arabia in the American media immediately

after 9/11 led a number of Saudi officials, including Crown Prince

Abdullah, to complain publicly that the Kingdom was being targeted in a

―campaign‖ against it. The Saudi government very publicly denied

American forces the right to use Saudi bases for the air campaign in

Afghanistan, even while quietly allowing the U.S. to use the command

and control center at Prince Sultan Airbase, south of Riyadh, to

coordinate that campaign. In a public meeting with Saudis in November

2001, the Crown Prince revealed that in August 2001 he had sent a letter

to President Bush complaining of the American stand on the Arab-Israeli

issue. In that letter, he said that differences between the two countries on

that issue had grown so great that ―from now on, you have your interests

and the Kingdom has its interests, and you have your road and we have

our road.‖97

For the American analyst, ― Abdullah‘s revelation was part

of a defense of the value of the U.S.-Saudi relationship for the

Palestinians, because it gave Riyadh leverage with Washington on Arab-

Israeli issues. He went on to say that, because of his letter, the Bush

Administration shortly thereafter announced public support for the idea

of a Palestinian state. However, the fact that a Saudi leader publicly

acknowledged such a dispute with the United States was undoubtedly

meant to demonstrate that the government was reflecting the views of its

citizens on this issue.‖

The Saudi reactions to critics since 9/11 may be considered

mainly with regards to the inside front and to the exterior pressures. In

other words, in the same measure that the critics were not exclusively

exterior – Americans-, but also emanating from internal social forces ,

the reactions have had to deal with both sides.

Saudi Arabia has some features that distinguishes it from other

Gulf States. It was one of the few countries in the Middle East never to

be colonised or to have its borders defined by the imperial powers, either

because at the time it was not considered strategically important, or

97

Gregory Gause III, The Approaching Turning Point : the future of US

relations with the Gulf States, Brookings Project on US policy towards the Islamic

World, Analysis paper n° 2, May 2003.

61

because it hosts the holy places of Islam. We can hardly pretend that such

a privilege in an arab world that has been at a moment or another

completely invested by colonial powers, could not have any influence in

shaping the Saudi mind. We think on the contrary that it may cause a lot

of disturbance, insofar as it is not really reckoned as an important

element in the construction of regional strategies and other political

arrangements.

"The idea of the world's great powers landing half a million

soldiers on the peninsula in 1991/92 to defend this desert and secure the

freedom of the little neighbouring emirate of Kuwait would have

sounded like a very tall story in the first half of this century" 98

, says A.

Jerichow. And despite this author is not favorable to the Saudi regime

and does not hide it, he could not apparently occult some aspects of the

Saudi evolution. He does not deny for example that after all, elections are

not entirely new to the Saudis. Thus , he says : ―Between 1926 and 1963

regular elections were held to elect the town councils in Hejaz, in the

western part of the country. Royal power, however ended this custom.

But in 1977, the King issued a new law that looked like it would allow

for half of the members of the town councils to be freely elected. The

royal powers never passed this law. The idea behind it was, however,

difficult to eradicate. In december 1990, the demand for local elections

was again heard in a dramatic proclamation from Saudi Arabia

intellectuals"99

.

So, even if the Saudi reactions to increasing pressure and critic

take time to materialize , we should indeed distinguish between at least

two kinds of attitudes : the first emanate from the elite in power (the

royal family itself), and the second from the population or the civil

society.

In the first set of reactions and attitudes we would mention for

example, some royal initiatives like the advisory council, and the

municipal elections, and later the reform of the educative system, etc.

Whereas on the second set of reactions we would mention all the changes

that occurred in the civil society and the increasing demands that

followed up.

98

Anders Jerichow , Saudi Arabia, Outside Global Law and Order, Curzon

Press, 1997, P.18. In our analysis‘ context, we have also to find the articulations where

the present events join the past, or at least may be better explained under its light. This

is provided by two kinds of approach : the historic and the sociologic. When associated

in a homogeneous view, we have then a tool for more an accurate analysis 99

Op.Cit.P.7.

62

In the same context, , we should perhaps consider the municipal

elections , which have been recently organised and which, in spite of

their shortcomings and the exclusion of women, have been greeted as a

first step toward more a consistent reform. The advisory Council was

also the result of these demands: " King Fahad" says Jerichow " must

have realized that the time was ripe for a compromise with the modern

world in the shape of a move that could be interpreted as a move towards

democracy"100

. He emphasizes however that the Advisory Council could

appear similar to the affairs of State in all other parts of the world, "but

no one insists on changing anything or on carrying through any new

proposals"101

. The fact is the decisions of the Council have to be

presented to the head of the Council of Ministers - also the King - who

then presents them to the Council. If it happens that the Council of

Ministers and the Advisory Council do not agree, then, as it says in the

Royal Decree, Article 17, 'the King decides as he deems fit'.

There are indeed more limits of a reform coming from the top,

than when it is emanating from the civil society and imposed by it and

followed up by some mechanism of control. Yet, we must remember that

we are talking about a society deeply influenced by the traditional views

of the religious elite. What if the obstacles against liberal reforms come

from that elite? It would not be the first time 102

, and besides, resistance

to political and social reforms might be as powerful as the clergy deems

that its interests are threatened, in a conjoncture that is charcterized by a

deep suspicion about the kind of influence exerted by some top-religious

leaders over the framework that permitted not only 9/11 but also the

terrorism wave coming over in its wake and striking the kingdom itself.

If the real dilemma for the middle class is about material changes

and welfare, in a social and economical conjuncture more and more open

to the fluctuations of the free market and the neo-liberalism , for the

religious elite, the dilemma is different : it is not about power , but more

100

Op.Cit.P.6. 101

Idem. 102

During the the rule of King Abdelaziz : "The clergy found no sympathy for

cars, telephones, television or the computers of the modern age. All of it was conceived

as inroads by a faithless world outside into the islamism of the Saud family. But -

allegiance with the Wahhabi sect or no - the ruling Saud family was in no mind to miss

out on the possibilities the new world had to offer, neither in the form of weaponry to

defend borders the Saud family had set, nor in the form of the social development,

which the family was now able to buy with its oil money. The result was a compromise,

which turned out to be the dilemma of the Saud Wahhabi alliance ".

Jerichow.Op.Cit.P.19.

63

precisely about the degree of power allowed to the clergy in the affairs of

the society and the State . The fact is that in spite of all the past and

current amount of authority recognised to the religious elite, it sounds as

if there are more and more doubts about the usefulness of allowing such

an authority to a body that is much less necessary for the survival of the

state than in the first days of the Saudi kingdom.

As this is actually the core of the problem since 9/11 , - i.e. the

incontournable connection between religion and politics – it will never

appear as urgent and capital as in the educative matters, because

education is directly related to the elite, and thus opening the prospects of

the future of the society as a whole.

Reacting against the western biased media, Khaled al Maeena –

Arab News Editor-in-Chief- says " There was no critical thinking. There

was lazy journalism. Sometimes, they would hear something, some

rumors, that turned into myths and then into facts, and this was very

painful103

".

Al Maeena was particularly pained by "the demonization of the

Saudis" after 9/11. "We all became criminals" said he, and he noticed

that even those in America who tried defend the Saudis "found their

voices or their words drowned". What he noticed was a kind of

discrimination against writers and journalists talking from Saudi Arabia

or on its behalf that seemed to shape the media scene in the USA in the

wake of 9/11 : " I have seen lies in the print media and on TV here. I am

a liberal. I support criticism. I want the free press. I want the press to be

really free, but sometimes, you wonder if the press here is free enough to

tell the truth about other countries, other religions, especially about

countries that for years were allies of the United States."104

What upset al Maeena is also some media jargon, such as "islamic

terror". For him, "terrorism has no religion", and the use of such

expressions contribute only to more confusion about the Muslim world

creating an atmosphere of islamophobia.

There are also what we may call ―collateral damages‖, which

would go unnoticed on a broad scale, but not so on the local scene. On

May 27, 2003 , approximately two weeks after the suicide bombings in

Riyadh , the editor-in-chief of the Saudi daily Al-Watan, Jamal

103

Media, Terrorism, and Reality, Remarks by Khaled al-Maeena, 13th Arab-

U.S. Policymakers Conference, Washington DC, September 13, 2004. 104

He was talking in Washington.

64

Khashoggi, was fired, as it seems, by order of the Saudi Information

Ministry. At the time, no official reason was given for his dismissal.

Jamal Khashoggi served as the paper's editor-in-chief for only a

few weeks; his previous position was as editor of the Saudi English-

language weekly Arab News. Despite his brief tenure, he managed to

arouse the ire of Saudi hardliners, both establishment and opposition,

because of a series of articles condemning the Saudi government's

Authority for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (i.e. the

religious police). Following the publication of these articles, attacks were

launched against Al-Watan by several Islamist websites which support

bin Laden and oppose the Saudi regime. These websites also support the

Saudi religious police, even though it is a government body. The

websites featured a parody of the Al-Watan ("The Homeland") logo, that

read instead Al-Wathan – "The Pagan Idol."

The newspaper angered Islamists for other reasons as well. For

example, it discussed women's issues such as identity cards and the right

of women to drive cars. The result was a frequent turnover of editors-in-

chief – Khashoggi was the third, though the paper has been in existence

for less than three years. He was replaced by Tarek Ibrahim105

.

The last straw that led to Khashoggi's termination was reportedly

an op-ed on the Riyadh bombings that appeared in the May 22 edition;

the op-ed criticized Ibn Taymiya (1268-1328), the spiritual father of

Wahhabism, which is the Saudi kingdom's official stream of Islam, but

Khashoggi was not the author. Beyond the controversy and the scourge it

had led to, we think that it deserves to be cited, because it testifies of the

new frame of mind that terrorism paradoxically helped to shape in Saudi

Arabia. The Individual and the Homeland Are More Important than Ibn

Taymiya, is the title of the story, written by Khaled Al-Ghanami. The

author asks : ―Why did they wave the banner of Jihad?‖ -―The answer is

this: Ibn Taymiya... said… that if the ruler does not observe the

commandment of promoting virtue and preventing vice, this obligation is

105

We have to notice that Jamal Khashaggi was appointed recently advisor to the

Saudi ambassador to London. Al-Watan was founded in 2000, in the city of Abha in the

southern Saudi district of Asir, a district which is a major basis of support for Saudi

Islamists. The cornerstone of the paper's building was laid by Crown Prince Abdallah,

and its board of directors is headed by Prince Bandar bin Khaled Al-Faisal. The paper

takes an independent line and demonstrates a stance considered liberal by Saudi

standards. The newspaper's op-ed page reflects pluralism, and features articles

expressing diverse opinions.

65

incumbent upon the clerics… It is these words [of Ibn Taymiya] that are

the real problem. We must stop cajoling and say: These words are a

mistake, and a true disaster, that lead to anarchy, and to a threat to

national unity, and the return of the Jahiliya, because anyone who thinks

himself a cleric will try to remove everything he considers vice. Anyone

who thinks music is forbidden will blow up stores that sell tapes; anyone

who thinks smoking a Narghile is forbidden will blow up shops offering

them for sale, and so on. This is no exaggeration; the day is not far off

when they open fire on satellite dishes." Then he asks again : ―How did

they permit the blood of the non-Muslims? -―The answer is: Because

they attribute no value to human life if it is not Muslim, and because they

ignore the words of Allah: 'There is no coercion in Islam.' Another reason

is that they think that non-Muslims' presence in the Arabian Peninsula is

sufficient reason to kill them. They forget that the Jews were in the

Arabian Peninsula during the life of the Prophet and also after his death.

Proof of this is that his shield was left in the hands of a Jew from whom

he bought food. They ignored the words of Jabber bin Abdallah: '...None

must come near the Al-Haram mosque unless he be a slave or of the

Dhimmis [i.e. Jew or Christian].' Examine this tradition and you will see

that it permitted those with whom there was a protection agreement to

enter even the Al-Haram mosque." Then the author put another question :

―What is the reason for [their] hatred of humanity?‖ – ―The reason is that

they misunderstand the rule of 'loyalty and renunciation.' This rule is a

fundamental Islamic rule, but the meaning of 'renunciation' is to renounce

the attacking, fighting infidels, and to refrain from helping them [act]

against the Islamic state. Their claim that you must hate anyone who is a

non-Muslim cannot be true. The Prophet loved Abu Taleb, who died

while still clinging to idol worship… Proof that Islam came to spread

love among people is that Islam permitted a Muslim to marry a Jewish or

Christian woman‖. And again another question : ―How did these

murderers permit the blood of Muslims and children?‖ -―Answer : They

did this based on a Fatwa of Ibn Taymiya in his book 'The Jihad, 'that

says that if the infidels take shelter behind Muslims, that is, if these

Muslims become a shield for the infidels, it is permitted to kill the

Muslims in order to reach the infidels. Ibn Taymiya did not base this

Fatwa on an actual text from the words of Allah or from the words of His

Prophet. I do not think that this Fatwa leads to realization of the supreme

intentions of Islamic religious law; on the contrary, it is a mistaken Fatwa

that contradicts the way of the Prophet Muhammad, who is proven to

66

have recommended to the Jihad warriors: 'Do not kill a woman, a child or

an old man.'‖

There are indeed many other examples of the reactions and

attitudes of what we may call the reformist elite in Saudi Arabia, which

deserves to be better defined and kown. Another example we will take

here consists in an an article titled "Where Do We Start With Reform?"

His author is Rashed Al-Fowzan, columnist for the Saudi newspaper Al

Jazirah, He merely calls for a program of economic and social reforms.

He says :

―There is a desire by the government for economic reform and in

truth, some such reform is urgently needed. In talking about economic

reform, I am aware that so broad a subject cannot be dealt with in only

one article. What I will try to do then is to mention some things that need

reform because they cause problems for many of us.‖

• "Limited resources and our total dependence on oil. Our revenues are

80 percent derived from oil."

• "Hundreds of billions of riyals have been spent on education and yet

our students are still not up to international standards. Far too few of our

students concentrate on technical or scientific subjects."

• "Unemployment. A problem for both graduates and non-graduates, both

of whom suffer from a lack of job opportunities as well as opportunities

for training…"

• "There are plenty of local factories but we hear nothing about exporting

locally-made goods. We ought to expand local production because it

would produce substantial revenues…"

• "Our national debt is estimated at more than SR700 billion and there is

no plan in the near future for eliminating it or dealing with even a part of

it. Both our population and government spending are on the increase. Our

population is growing faster than our economy and it should be the other

way round…"

• "Many barriers to foreign investment. Attracting foreign investment is

important because it could provide technology, money, jobs and

experience. We all know Dubai has attracted enormous foreign

investment because of its willingness to scrap meaningless barriers and

pointless regulations…"

• "The importance of women in society and the economy. Women have

limited job opportunities in the Kingdom. Despite the fact that hundreds

of millions of riyals have been spent on women's education, there has

been no corresponding economic return. The nursing sector, for example,

67

needs more than 50,000 nurses and there are other specialties where

women's participation is needed."

"These are a few of the points that the government is addressing.

The solutions may be both unpopular and expensive with many Saudis

since increasing the price of some services and imposing higher prices on

others are likely to be among them. We need to be clear and honest if we

want to come up with solutions." 106

On the broader scale of Muslim nations, it is clear that 9/11

fostered a new political thinking with a particular focus on democracy.

The debate went on and is still continuing about the compatibility

between islamic culture and democratic values. A topic that the Algerian

thinker Malik Bennabi (1905-1973) was discussing half a century ago,

and he was not alone, - far from it. So, before going any further, let us

recall what Bennabi was saying about this subject : ―democracy ought to

be considered from three aspects: democracy as an attitude toward the

ego, democracy as an attitude toward the other, and democracy as the

combination of the socio-political conditions necessary for the formation

and development of such attitudes in the individual. These three aspects,

he explained, encompass the subjective and objective requirements of

democracy, which are the psychological propensities upon which the

democratic attitude is established and the assets upon which the

democratic system in any society depends. For democracy can never be

accomplished as a political reality unless its conditions are fulfilled in the

character building of the individual and in the norms and traditions of the

country‖.107

This is to raise the question about the individual dimension of

democracy and its relevancy to the current efforts of democratization in

the Arabo-Islamic world. Is it possible to achieve democracy without

lifting the tutelage tying the individual to traditional concepts about

106

This article was originally translated into English by Arab News on

Wednesday 13 August, 2003. 107

Algerian Malik Bennabi was born in 1905. Highly regarded as the most

eminent scholar, and thinker, of Post World War II Algeria, and one of the foremost

intellectuals of the modern Muslim world. Educated in Paris and Algiers in

Engineering, he later based himself in Cairo, where he spent much of his time toiling

through fields of History, Philosophy and Sociology. Among his works, let‘s mention :

Les Conditions de la Renaissance (1948) ; The Question of Culture (1954) ; Islam in

History and Society (1954)…

68

family, party, religion, State, and other social groups or institutions or

creeds relaying them?

69

Chapter II ___________

Economic ramifications

―The Bush administration‘s ties to the oil and gas industry are

beyond extensive; they are pervasive‖, says an essay by Michael Renner.

―They flow, so to speak, from the top, with a chief executive who grew

up steeped in the culture of Texas oil exploration and tried his hand at it

himself; and a second-in-command who came to office with a multi-

million dollar retirement package in hand from his post of CEO of

Halliburton Oil. Once in office, the vice president developed an energy

policy under the primary guidance of a cast of oil company executives

whose identities he has gone to great lengths to withhold from public

view‖108

. Renner notes that since taking office, the president and vice

president have assembled a government peopled heavily with

representatives from the oil culture they came from. These include

Secretary of the Army Thomas White, a former vice president of Enron,

and Secretary of Commerce Don Evans, former president of the oil

exploration company Tom Brown, Inc., whose major stake in the

company was worth $13 million by the time he took office. What is

worthy noticing too is the fact that as soon as May 2001, a report of the

National Energy Policy Development Group, led by Vice President

Cheney, acknowledged that U.S. oil production will fall 12% over the

next 20 years. As a result, U.S. dependence on imported oil which has

risen from one-third in 1985 to more than half in 2003 is set to climb to

two-thirds by 2020.

108

Michael Renner, The New Oil Order : Washington‘s war on Iraq is the

lynchpin to controlling Persian Gulf oil, Foreign Policy In Focus, February 14, 2003.

70

Complexity of a relationship

Oil is indeed the core of the Saudi-US relationship, even if both

parties pretend that the matter is more complicated ; and to be sure, it is

so. Nevertheless, the complication is also related to issues connected –

directly or indirectly - to oil and energy. There is no doubt about it.

Throughout the history of oil, sorting out who gets access to this highly

prized resource and on what terms, has often gone hand in hand with

violence. At first, it was Britain, the imperial power in much of the

Middle East, that called the shots. But for half a century, the US seeking

a preponderant share of the earth‘s resources has made steady progress in

bringing the Gulf region into its geopolitical orbit. In Washington

calculus, securing oil supplies has consistently trumped the pursuit of

human rights and democracy. That is to explain why the US policy

toward the Middle East has long relied on building up proxy forces in the

region and generously supplying them with arms.

In the wake of 9/11, the US-Saudi relationship has come under

considerable scrutiny , with some analysts questioning its centrality in

US foreign policy. Some analyzers have thus challenged the assumption

that Gulf oil remains vitally important to the United States.

Yet, the US-Saudi relationship is too much important, too much

intertwined, too much rich, and too much complicated to let itself being

summarized and reduced to some bad reactions about terrorism, though.

The interests at stake are huge compared to those prevailing between the

USA and other states of the Arab region. Yet, an objective evaluation of

the current situation cannot afford to ignore the ambiguous side of the

relationship and the attitudes and reactions trying to demonize this side or

the other of the relationship, in what we have called the construction of

the enemy’s frame of mind. The point here, as in any relationship

between two different entities, is that we should always consider its

unseen part. To borrow the lexicon of psychoanalysis, in any relationship

between two people – let‘s say a man and a woman, for instance- there is

not only these two persons, but also , their father and mother, their grand-

fathers and grand-mothers, their sisters and brothers, their children, etc.

So that when we see two people having a relationship, we should

consider what lay behind in any evaluation, according to the

psychoanalysts. This is also the case for States, for the latter do not

represent themselves , but all the diversity of peoples behind them. In our

case, we will not have only the USA and the Saudi Kingdom, but also all

71

those who – for a reason or another – identify theirs interests to one of

them and claim to have the right to advise and pressure as they claim the

right to support and side with or against. Hence, beyond the economic

ramifications of 9/11, which –as we see – cannot be summarized in

reactions and counter-reactions over the issue of terror funding, there are

the cultural background, with its variety of religious, ethnic, social, and

political hues. However, it is true that the US-Saudi relationship has

experienced its worst crisis in history. Americans and Saudis alike have

started to wonder about the meaning and the cost of such a cozy

relationship and whether their own governments have served them well.

Oil and Security

Oil and national security concerns have combined to produce a

close and cooperative relationship between the United States and Saudi

Arabia for much of the past century. Since the award of the first Saudi oil

concession to a U.S. company in 1933, both states have had an increasing

interest, respectively, in the marketing and acquisition of Saudi

petroleum supplies. As regional threats multiplied in the latter half of the

century, mutual concerns over the stability of Saudi Arabia and other

moderate regimes in the Arabian Peninsula engendered a significant

degree of defense cooperation.

US strategic priorities made of Saudi Arabia a key-piece for

American primary security interests. As shown by declassified

government documents, Washington has focused for half a century on

preventing hostile forces from seizing and establishing control of Gulf

petroleum. That is why Saddam‘s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 could not

be allowed : in the eyes of the American strategists, an ambitious and

ruthless dictator, hated in his own country, would be much more

emboldened if he was left in control of so much of the world‘s oil wealth.

The lesson from the Nazi adventure was being recalled in the media,

along with a hypothesis assuming that Saddam would not stop at Kuwait

anyway. No wonder that even the Arab states entered the international

coalition that gathered not only to liberate Kuwait, but also to warn other

candidates to military expansionism – under whatever slogans- in the

Gulf or elsewhere : for the first time, the Arab states have been unified in

a coalition that far from fighting against Israel, would oppose a ―brother-

72

regime‖. The arab solidarity would be the first victim of such a situation

created by Saddam‘s agression.

The fear that a powerful state – then the Soviet Union- could

control the dominant share of the world‘s oil supply has since 1949

pushed American policymakers to plan the destruction of regional oil

facilities. ―In coordination with the British government and U.S. and

British oil companies, but without the knowledge of local Arab

governments, President Harry Truman approved a detailed plan --

described in a National Security Council directive known as NSC 26/2

and later supplemented by a series of additional NSC orders -- to store

explosives near Persian Gulf oil fields. As a last resort in the event of an

imminent Soviet invasion, oil installations and refineries would be blown

up and the reserves plugged to keep the oil out of Moscow's hands‖109

.

Telhami reminds us that in 1957 too, ―in response to increased

instability in the wake of the Suez crisis, the Eisenhower administration

reinforced and expanded the logic of this strategy. With many friends of

the West threatened by the rise of pan-Arabism, championed by Egyptian

President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the United States grew concerned that

unfriendly governments would emerge in the region. This fear led

Eisenhower to expand the denial policy to include not only threatening

external powers, but also hostile regional regimes‖110

.

Although the US military presence is not solely about oil, oil is a

key reason. In 1999, General Anthony C. Zinni, then the head of the US

Central Command, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee

that the Gulf region is of vital interest to the US and that the country

(America, that is) must have free access to the regions resources. Bush

administration officials have, however, categorically denied oil is one of

the reasons why they pushed for regime change in Iraq.111

109

Shibley Telhami, Does Saudi Arabia still matter? Differing perspectives on

the kingdom and its oil, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2002. 110

Idem. 111

―Nonsense‖ Defense Secretary Ronald Rumsfeld told 60 minutes Steve Kroft

in mid-December 2002. ―It has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil‖ !

73

Data rates and performances

With oil export revenues 112

making up around 90-95% of total

Saudi export earnings, 70%-80% of state revenues, and around 40% of

the country's gross domestic product (GDP), Saudi Arabia's economy

remains, despite attempts at diversification, heavily dependent on oil

(although investments in petrochemicals have increased the relative

importance of the downstream petroleum sector in recent years).

Saudi Arabia ranks as the first largest crude oil producer in the

world, and is a leader in OPEC's production quota decisions. As such,

Saudi Arabia was a critically important player behind the oil price

collapse of late 1997 through early 1999, and also in actions taken by

world oil producers which have led to a tripling in oil prices by the fall of

2000. During 2004, Saudi Arabia produced an estimated 10.4 million

bbl/d of oil (32% of total OPEC oil production), with net export of

around 8.7 million bbl/d (the comparable figures for 2003 as a whole

were 9.9 million bbl/d and 8.3 million bbl/d, respectively). 113

Oil prices were strong during 2003, and even stronger in 2004.

Combined with the highest Saudi oil output ever, the country's oil export

revenues were up sharply in 2004, to more than $100 billion, compared

to $77 billion in 2003 (and more than triple the $34 billion earned in

1998, when Saudi oil prices fell below $12 per barrel). For 2005 and

2006, oil export revenues are expected to remain very strong once again.

Partly as a result of these strong oil export revenue increases, Saudi

Arabia's real GDP growth was an estimated 6.1% in 2004, up from 1.7%

average growth between 1995 and 2002. For 2005, Saudi real GDP

growth is expected to remain strong, at 6.2%.

112

Opec Revenues Fact Sheet, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/opecrev.html

113

Opec Revenues : Country Details,

http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/orevcoun.html

74

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW of Saudi Arabia

Currency: Riyal

Market Exchange Rate (12/21/04): US$1 = 3.75 riyals

Gross Domestic Product (GDP - market exchange

rate) (2004E): $247.2 billion

Real GDP Growth Rate (1995-2002 average): 1.7%

(2003E): 7.2% (2004E): 6.1% (2005F): 6.2%

Inflation Rate (consumer prices) (2003E): 0.6%

(2004E): 0.4% (2005F): 1.5%

Unemployment Rate (2004E): 14% (unofficial

estimates are higher)

Current Account Balance (2003E): $29.7 billion

(2004E): $11.6 billion (2005F): $13.1 billion

Major Trading Partners (2004): Japan, United States,

European Union

Merchandise Exports (2004E): $112.3 billion (mainly

crude oil and petroleum products)

Merchandise Imports (2004E): $36.6 billion (mainly

industrial goods, metals, food)

Merchandise Trade Balance (2004E): $75.7 billion

Oil Export Revenues (2003E): $77 billion (2004E):

around $100 billion

Oil Export Revenues/Total Export Revenues (2004E):

90%-95%

Public Debt (2004E): $176 billion (note: external debt

is estimated at $39 billion)

Reserves of Foreign Exchange and Gold (2004E): $23

billion (note the country has significantly more in

total "foreign assets")

* Source: DOE, USA. Country Analysis Briefs.

75

During fiscal year 2004, Saudi Arabia originally had been

expecting a budget deficit. However, this was based on an extremely

conservative price assumption of $19 per barrel for Saudi oil -- and

assumed production of 7.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d). Both of these

estimates turned out to be far below actual levels. As a result, as of mid-

December 2004, the Saudi Finance Ministry was expecting a huge budget

surplus of $26.2 billion, on budget revenues of $104.8 billion (nearly

double the country's original estimate) and expenditures of $78.6 billion

(28% above the approved budget levels). This surplus is being used for

several purposes, including : paying down the Kingdom's public debt (to

$164 billion from $176 billion at the start of 2004); extra spending on

education and development projects; increased security costs (possibly an

additional $2.5 billion dollars in 2004; see below) due to threats from

terrorists; and higher payments to Saudi citizens through subsidies and

other means. For 2005, Saudi Arabia is assuming a balanced budget, with

revenues and expenditures of $74.6 billion each.114

In spite of the recent surge in its oil income, Saudi Arabia

continues to face serious long-term economic challenges,

including high rates of unemployment (around 15%-20%), one of the

world's fastest population growth rates, and the consequent need for

increased government spending. All of these place pressures on Saudi oil

revenues. The Kingdom also is facing serious security threats, including

a number of terrorist attacks (on foreign workers, primarily). In response,

the Saudis reportedly have ramped up spending in the security area

(reportedly by 50% in 2004, from $5.5 billion in 2003).

Saudi Arabia's per capita oil export revenues remain far below

high levels reached during the 1970s and early 1980s. In 2004, Saudi

Arabia earned around $4,462 per person, versus $22,174 in 1980. This

80% decline in real per capita oil export revenues since 1980 is in large

part due to the fact that Saudi Arabia's young population has nearly

tripled since 1980, while oil export revenues in real terms have fallen by

over 40% (despite recent increases). Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has faced

nearly two decades of heavy budget and trade deficits, the expensive

1990/1991 war with Iraq, and total public debt of around $175 billion.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia does have extensive -- around $110

billion -- foreign assets, which provide a substantial fiscal "cushion."

114

Country analysis Briefs, Saudi Arabia, January 2005, Energy Information

Administration, Department Of Energy. US Government.

76

Trade relationship

Saudi Arabia was the second largest U.S. trading partner in the

Middle East in 2002. For that year, Saudi exports to the United States

were estimated at $12.2 billion and imports from the United States at

$4.3 billion. Comparable figures for Israel, the largest U.S. trading

partner in the Middle East, were $12.4 billion in exports and $5.3 billion

in imports. To a considerable extent, this high volume of trade is a result

of U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia and U.S. arms exports to that

country. The Saudis buy significant amounts of U.S. commercial

equipment, such as machinery and vehicles, as well. Also, a Washington

Post article of February 11, 2002, estimates that Saudi nationals have

invested between $500 and $700 billion in the U.S. economy 115

.

Saudi Arabia has applied to join the 128-memberWorld Trade

Organization (WTO) as a developing country, an arrangement that would

give it a special transition period to bring its commercial procedures in

line with WTO rules. The U.S. State Department notes that accession

will require the Saudi government to initiate substantial reforms,

including tariff reduction, opening up financial services (insurance and

banking), allowing competition in telecommunications and other

services, and better protection of intellectual property rights.

In recognition of its progress in protection of intellectual property

rights, Saudi Arabia was removed from the U.S. Trade Representative‘s

Priority Watch List in 1996, but remains on the basic Watch list pending

further progress. The U.S. Trade Representative reportedly has also cited

Saudi observance of the secondary boycott against Israel as an obstacle to

admission to the WTO. In March 2001, WTO officials reportedly

expressed disappointment over a recent list issued by the Saudi

government of activities off limits to foreign investment and predicted

that these restrictions could delay Saudi accession to the WTO. During

Crown Prince Abdullah‘s April 2002 visit, however, President Bush

expressed support for Saudi accession and said the United States is

making technical assistance available to Saudi Arabia to support the

Saudi application.

115

Alfred B. Prados, Saudi Arabia, Current Issues and US Relations, August 4,

2003, CRS Issue Brief for Congress.

77

Oil Production

With the world‘s largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 261.7

billion barrels in January 2001), Saudi Arabia produced an average of

9.145 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil during 2000.

Approximately 14% of U.S. oil imports and 8.46% of total U.S. oil

consumption came from Saudi Arabia during 2001. Formerly the largest

foreign supplier of oil to the United States, Saudi Arabia has been

exceeded in this role by Venezuela and/or Canada during recent years .

U.S.Oil consumption and imports

Category 1998 1999 2000 2001

Total US consumption

Total U.S. Imports

Imports from Saudi Arabia

Imports from Venezuela

Imports from Canada

18.917

10.708

1.491

1.719

1.598

19.519

10.852

1.478

1.493

1.539

19.701

11.459

1.572

1.546

1.807

19.649

11.871

1.662

1.553

1.828

* Source : U.S. Department Of Energy.

In recent years, Saudi Arabia has alternately supported cuts and

increases in production as oil prices on the international market have

fluctuated. Under a ―gentlemen‘s agreement‖ reached in June 2000,

members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

established a mechanism to adjust the supply of oil by 500,000 bpd if the

20-day average price of oil moved outside a $22 to $28 price band.

Members disagree, however, as to whether this mechanism is automatic

or requires separate action by OPEC to implement it, and Saudi Arabia

has spoken of a target price of $25 rather than a price band. Congress has

approved legislation to discourage price fixing by oil producing

countries116

.

116

Idem.

78

ENERGY OVERVIEW : Saudi Arabia

Proven Oil Reserves (1/1/05E): 261.9 billion barrels (includes half

of Divided/"Neutral" Zone)

Total Oil Production (2004E; includes NZ): 10.4 million barrels per

day (bbl/d), of which 9.1 million bbl/d was crude oil, 1.2 million

bbl/d was natural gas liquids (NGLs), and 80,000 bbl/d was "other

liquids" (including MTBE)

Total Oil Production (2003E; includes NZ): 9.9 million barrels per

day (bbl/d), of which 8.8 million bbl/d was crude oil, 1.0 million

bbl/d was natural gas liquids (NGLs), and 80,000 bbl/d was "other

liquids" (including MTBE)

OPEC Crude Oil Production Quota (effective 11/1/04): 8.775

million bbl/d

Crude Oil Production Capacity (12/04E): 10.5-11.0 million bbl/d

Total Oil Consumption (2004E): 1.67 million bbl/d

Net Oil Exports (2002E): 7.0 million bbl/d (2003E): 8.3 million

bbl/d (2004E): 8.7 million bbl/d

Major Oil Customers (8/04E; approximate exports): United States

(1.9 million bbl/d); OECD Europe (1.4 million bbl/d); Japan (1.2

million bbl/d); South Korea (838,000 bbl/d); India (345,000 bbl/d);

China (310,000 bbl/d); Taiwan (210,000 bbl/d)

Crude Oil Refining Capacity (1/1/05E): 1.745 million bbl/d

Natural Gas Reserves (1/1/05E): 235.0 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)

(includes half of NZ)

Natural Gas Production/Consumption (2002E): 2.0 Tcf

Electric Generating Capacity (2003E): 26.6 gigawatts (all thermal)

Net Electricity Generation (2002E): 138.2 billion kilowatt-hours

* Source: DOE, USA. Country Analysis Briefs

79

The challenges of the Muslim nations

If one of the most important consequences of 9/11 is the

accentuated demand on democratization and reform in the Arab world as

a way to preventing more Islamic radicalization in these societies, it is

noticeable that anyway even without those tragic events, the West was

still adamant on introducing some political reforms. The fact is that the

GCC being involved in international trade, its connections with the

western political notions have to be updated from inside. There is a

reason for that. Nowadays, the terms "democracy" and "market

economy" are often used interchangeably. Some kind of opening has thus

to be performed. In the former East-European states, the process has

conduced to joining the European Union, which was - and still remains-

an economic market before it became a political project. In Russia, we

see almost the same scheme, and even in China, there is an orientation

towards some sort of liberalization.

However, in America some priorities that were already working

in the background of the political scene well before 9/11 have hardly

changed after these events, whereas others occurred in the aftermath and

have renewed - or rather accentuated- the interest in the region .

In 1999, an article of the magazine "Brain Food" announces that

"America will soon lose the stability the framers worked so hard to create

because it is becoming wholly dependent upon inherently unstable

(authoritarian) oil-producing Muslim nations "117

. Indeed, the idea is

neither new nor genuinely original. Besides, it is not quite logical, either.

The question that such an idea raises is : can a Superpower like America

lose control over its own destiny just because it is relying for some of its

energy importations on ―unstable countries‖? Why should the instability

in some Muslim countries lead necessarily to a similar instability in the

USA? For Jay Hanson, it happened over twenty five years ago that

OPEC quadrupled world oil prices and plunged America into

"stagflation". Yet, maybe it would be more advisable to speak of unrest

instead of instability. To be sure, 9/11 caused unrest in America which

has become anxious about international terrorism and radical Islamism.

Either some like it or not, Islam is since then an asset in this game, and it

117

Jay Hanson, The Best-Kept Secret In Washington, Brain Food, Third Quarter,

1999.

80

happens that those who detain the main resources in energy are Muslim

nations.

" Muslim nations " writes J. Hanson " will soon control virtually

all of the world's oil exports. Since neither capital nor labor can create

energy, the next round of energy-shortage-induced stagflation will leave

central bankers helpless and they will seek military solutions to their

economic problems. It's the best-kept secret in Washington, Whitehall,

Brussels, and Jerusalem, but it's just a matter of time until word hits the

street"118

.

The market economy receives almost 80 percent of its energy

subsidies from nonrenewable fossil sources : oil, gas, and coal 119

. That

makes the struggle for energy a vital issue, not only for the consumers

(especially the Westerners) but also for the producers, for who the matter

is most of all of political survival. That's where the strategies of the

Western states intermingle with the local struggles for power between the

elites of the concerned regions, until it becomes hard to distinguish

between what is a local necessity and what is a priority dictated by the

foreign interests.

Oil is the highest quality energy today used throughout the world,

making up about 38% of the world energy supply, according to some

estimations120

. In 1977, Richard Duncan developed a new model to

forecast oil production called the "Numerate Empiric Model". In the

course of his research, it seems that Duncan discovered what J. Hanson

holds as the "best-kept secret", which is that Muslim nations would be

able to control market economies because they will control virtually all

of the oil export market. Writing to President Clinton and Senator Jessie

Helms in the same year, Duncan warned them that if an "alliance of

Muslim petroleum exporting nations" could see the day , this alone

―could cause World stock markets to fall 50 % in one day, and crucially

it could ignite both (1) a World Petroleum War, and (2) a World Holy

War (called Jihad by Muslims)‖.

Though these sentences are tainted with a highly emotional

dramatic tone, it seems that by an irony of the hazard the events gave this

118

Idem. 119

They are called nonrenewable because , for all practical purposes, they're not

being made any more. The reason they are called fossil is because they were produced

by nature from dead plants and animals over several hundred million years. 120

Studies show that nothing can replace oil : a recent review of the future

prospects of all alternatives has been published. The summary conclusion reached is

that there is no known complete substitute for petroleum in its many and varied uses.

81

apocalyptic vision some weight. Indeed, the Muslim nations did not

make any alliance with the clear purpose of striking at the heart of the

world economy, as Duncan imagined. Yet, what was the Desert Storm if

not a little World Petroleum War caused by the failed attempt of Saddam

Hussein to lay his hands on the Kuwaiti oil fields? And if one of the

consequences of that war consisted in implanting and broadening the

American military presence in the Gulf, what was the reaction of the

local opposition (or/and dissidence gathered in the radical jihadist cells)

if not starting the World Holy War (jihad) against the Westerners, as Bin

Laden put it? But in 1999, when he published his article, J. Hanson could

very well draw his own conclusions from the course of the Gulf War that

changed a lot in the political vista of the region. Never before that time,

the Saudi opposition could catch the ears and the eyes of the grand

public, and we can probably say the same of all those small groups of

militant jihadists which spread loosely all over the Arab region. It will

be 9/11 that brings to the limelight the connection between those who

are inside and those who are outside. Nothing will ever be similar after

that date.

There is ally and ally

Why 9/11 changed all the conceptions prevailing about the

relations between the USA and the GCC , and particularly Saudi Arabia ?

Because, it raised the question not only about the credibility of the

American allies in the Arab world, but also about America's own

credibility in regard of what justifies some of those alliances.

The Americans pride themselves for what they deem to be their

power and influence in the modern world. Some of that power and

influence is supposed to be reposing on a strong independence will. But

what the Americans discovered in the wake of 9/11 is that they are not as

independent as they have always figured to be. Not to be completely

independent means in this dramatic context not to be able to tackle

efficiently the calamity that hit America in the heart : the Islamist

terrorism. The problem is grave, or at least that's how it sounded the day

after 9/11, when America discovered to its horror that 15 on 19 hijackers

were Saudi citizens. Why Saudis? Why the Gulf States, which

Washington has always thought to be allies and friends in the same

measure that it considered itself as their protector ?

82

Nonetheless, behind the official message and the main stream

media discourse there are the truths that are neither new nor secret, if

only one could make sense of some signs that preceded those tragic

events of New York and Washington.

First, when Senator Helms replied to Duncan, he did not hesitate

to acknowledge that "the Commerce Department recently released a

report which found that US dependence on foreign oil has become a

threat to national security. The government should not have allowed its

national security to be placed in such a vulnerable position" said he. That

makes J. Hanson - and many others - shudder for "what if?" "The United

States", writes the latter, "is physically unable to produce enough oil

domestically to keep its economy alive and is forced to rely on its

imports. In 1998, the United States imported 53 percent of its oil needs.

This deficit is growing... and will continue to grow until the economy

collapses exactly like it did twenty five years ago" 121

.

However, maybe the core of the problem is not that America is

relying on imports for its needs of energy : would that have been really a

thorny problem if those imports of oil were coming from - say - Europe,

for instance ? The Europeans , in spite of their complicated controversies

with the USA are allies. And so are the oil producing Muslim states .

Then where is the problem? It is exactly in the cultural differences122

,

those « lines » of division and meeting assumed to be the « front » of

civilization shock in the thesis of professor Huntington. Islam is a peace

religion, though. Yet, what people could make of it , is another question,

particularly when there is on one part and another of the globe(i.e. in the

West and in the arabo-islamic world) a systematic, thorough construction

of the enemy. This is not just an intellectual polemic, as passionate as it

may sound to Western and Muslim scholars. This is now, and since 9/11

a matter of global challenge facing the American administration, as it is

facing - but with a different tone and on a different scale - the Muslim

states, either in the GCC or in the rest of the world 123

.

121

Idem. This was written in 1999. 122

See about this topic, Dispassionating the Debate about Modernization and

Westernization, Hichem Karoui, 11/15/03: http://www.hichemkaroui.com/archives.htm 123

We can talk of construction of the enemy each time we notice that the

discourse is based on a series of elementary dichotomies , such as : good/evil,

just/unjust, guilty/innocent, rational/irrational, civilized/uncivilized, which can be

defined as floating (or empty signifiers). These floating signifiers have no fixed

meaning, but they are (re)articulated before, during and after the conflict and placed in a

chain of equivalence. Both sides claim to be rational and civilized, and to fight a good

and just war, attributing responsibility for the conflict to the enemy. The construction of

83

Well before 9/11 , and even before the two Gulf wars ignited by

Saddam Hussein in 1980 and 1990, the couple "Islam and oil" has

already revealed to be quite explosive : the Iranian revolution of 1979

proved it. In those not so remote days, it was not only 63 Americans

taken as hostages at the embassy in Tehran, but America itself. The

whole regional system set up in the Gulf since the fifties was being

paralyzed. And here too, the issue was not just about oil interests, but

about the social project and the cultural shock. After all, the new regime

of the Mullahs did not stop pumping oil towards the West, and the West

did not stop buying it. The problem was elsewhere. It was in the

attitudes, the behaviors, the symbols, and to put it briefly, in the signs

released by the new regime in Tehran and in their interpretation in the

West.

So, does it really matter if we notice for example, following

Hanson's steps, that the Middle East alone has 64 % of the world's

proved oil reserves? Yes of course, it does. And this is not just because it

is the Middle East. Nobody would care if it were the Caribbean, the

northern pole, the Black Sea, or Southern America. The point is that the

contemporary Middle East is mainly a region deeply influenced by two

trends: religion (Islam) and nationalism. And that makes the difference.

Add to that 9 % (i.e., the FSU Muslim republics, 1.7 % ; Muslim African

nations, 6.7 % ; Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, 1%) and the Muslim

states would have roughly 73% of the total world's proved oil reserves.

Conclusion of Hanson : " By 2010, Muslim nations could control 60

percent of the world's oil production and, more importantly, 95 percent of

the world's oil exports. In short, the Muslim exporting nations have

Western economies by the throat"124

.

U.S. Energy Supply and Demand - Base Case

Energy Information Administration\Short-Term Energy Outlook

February 2005 :

the enemy is accompanied by the construction of the identity of the self, clearly in an

antagonistic relationship to the enemy's identity. In this process not only the radical

otherness of the enemy is emphasized, but the enemy is also considered to be a threat to

'our own' identity. In this fashion the enemy's identity becomes a constitutive outside,

supporting the identity construction of the self. 124

Idem.

84

Year Annual Percentage Change

2003 2004 2005 2006 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (billion chained 2000 dollars) 10381 10843 11228 11581 4.4 3.6 3.1 Imported Crude Oil Price

a

(nominal dollars per barrel) 27.74 36.12 39.13 37.19 30.2 8.3 -5.0 Petroleum Supply (million barrels per day) Crude Oil Production

b 5.68 5.43 5.62 5.89 -4.4 3.6 4.8

Total Petroleum Net Imports( million barrels per day) (including SPR) 11.24 11.84 11.94 11.98 5.4 0.8 0.3 Energy Demand World Petroleum (million barrels per day) 79.8 82.5 84.5 86.5 3.4 2.4 2.4 Petroleum (million barrels per day) 20.03 20.51 20.83 21.22 2.4 1.6 1.9 Natural Gas (trillion cubic feet) 22.36 22.20 22.86 23.46 -0.7 3.0 2.6 Coal

c

(million short tons) 1095 1102 1143 1170 0.6 3.7 2.3 Electricity (billion kilowatthours) Retail Sales

d 3488 3544 3664 3743 1.6 3.4 2.2

Other Use/Sales e 179 177 185 188 -1.0 4.4 1.4

Total 3667 3721 3848 3930 1.5 3.4 2.1 Total Energy Demand

f

(quadrillion Btu) 98.2 99.1 101.8 103.9 1.0 2.6 2.1 Total Energy Demand per Dollar of GDP (thousand Btu per 2000 Dollar) 9.46 9.14 9.06 8.97 -3.3 -0.9 -1.1

Renwable Energy as Percent of Total g

6.4% 6.5% 6.6% 6.6%

Sources: Historical data: Latest data available from Bureau of Economic Analysis and Energy Information Administration; latest data available from EIA databases supporting the following reports: Petroleum Supply Monthly, DOE/EIA-0109; Petroleum Supply Annual, DOE/EIA-0340/2; Natural Gas Monthly, DOE/EIA-0130; Electric Power Monthly, DOE/EIA-0226; and Quarterly Coal Report, DOE/EIA-0121; International Petroleum Monthly DOE/EIA-0520; Weekly Petroleum Status Report, DOE/EIA-0208. Macroeconomic projections are based on Global Insight Model of the US Economy, January 2005.

85

Special partnership

Yet, one is prone to say , the situation has not always appeared so

grayish. In fact, it could even have appeared the other way round. Thus,

in studying US-Gulf states relationship, one cannot help noticing the

moderating influence of Saudi Arabia - the most conservative state in the

Gulf. The underlying motivation behind Saudi Arabia's friendly policy

toward the United States has been ―the realization that its security and

government stability are inextricably tied to (1) moral and material

support of the United States and her industrial allies and, (2) economic

prosperity and stability of the industrial world , including the United

States. The fact that the Kingdom has and will depend very heavily on

US military supports for its external security cannot be

overemphasized‖.125

According to Vo Xuan Han, Saudi Arabia's economic dependence

on the outside world is no less obvious. Oil exports being her most

important source of revenue, Saudi Arabia's economic interests depend

heavily on the economic conditions in the most advanced and largest

industrial economies. ―Also as most of the Saudis' financial assets are

held in the currencies of these industrial countries, especially the US

dollar, her wealth would be adversely affected by economic recession

and depreciation of these 'hard' currencies. Last but not least, another

factor that may explain Saudi Arabia's cautious and generally pro-

Western stance has been her dependence on Western goods and

technology, which she sorely needs for her industrialization and

modernization efforts.126

‖

Saudi Arabia's perception of national interest would seldom

collide with the need to preserve solidarity with her exporting allies. At

the height of the oil shocks in the 1970s, it was Saudi Arabia that

counseled a moderation in price increases. "This kingdom had repeatedly

wanted to keep the oil price down out of a sincere concern for recessions

125

Vo Xuan Han (associate professor of Economics at Winthrop University,

Rock Hill, South Carolina) , Oil, the Persian Gulf States, and the United States, Praeger

Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, London, 1994. P. 113. 126

Idem.

86

in the global economy, particularly the advanced market economies",

writes Vo Xuan Han127

. During the OPEC price negotiations in 1976-77

and 1979, ―it was Saudi Arabia that had fought the other powerful

militant members, such as Iran, to keep the crude price from rising as fast

as they had wished. At this time, the kingdom's position was strong and

secure enough to force compromises. There was also evidence that Saudi

Arabia had acted out of political consideration to please President Carter

during 1976-77 when she resisted the pressure to increase oil prices from

other OPEC members. In 1981 , near the peak of OPEC crude price

hikes, by maintaining a high rate of production, Saudi Arabia was able to

put a halt - albeit a short- lived one- to the price escalation that had

started in 1979. Once again , in 1988 when the oil glut drove the price

down and oil exporters wanted to control production to keep the price

around $ 18 per barrel, the Saudis were accused of secretly trying to

undercut the producers' efforts and keep the price around $ 15 per barrel

by such scheme as giving discount to buyers. Differences between Saudi

Arabia and the OPEC members led to the most bitter confrontation at the

April conference‖.128

The same author notes that Saudi Arabia's foreign

policy toward the United States ―reflects a strong desire to push her own

interests as far as she can without having to break away from her historic,

mutually beneficial relations with the United States and other industrial

powers‖129

. Saudi's special ties to the United States , historically based on

investment security (for the oil firms), has evolved through times to

deeper levels ranging from oil to military security on the one hand and

economic and technical cooperation, on the other. On balance, ―Saudi

Arabia's oil policy has made her an invaluable ally of the industrial

powers. The kingdom's moderating influence has prevented the global oil

industry from becoming an oligopoly dominated by one firm."130

Yet, when 9/11 broke out, it was as if years and years of this

partnership vanished off the records and were almost erased from men‘s

memory, letting the way open to paranoid suspicion and mutual

accusations.

127

Vo Xuan Han. Op. Cit. P. 114. 128

Idem. 129

Idem. 130

Idem.

87

Terror Funds

According to press reports in mid-August 2002, families of more

than 600 victims of the September 11 attacks have filed a suit in the U.S.

District Court of Alexandria,Virginia against three members of the Saudi

royal family, seven banks, and eight charitable organizations. The

lawsuit, which also named Osama bin Laden, members of his family, and

the government of the Sudan, sought approximately $1 trillion in

damages from these individuals or organizations for allegedly helping

finance the Al Qaeda network.

According to excerpts reported in the press, the lawsuit states that

―the financial resources and support network of these defendants —

charities, banks and individual financiers—are what allowed the attacks

of September 11, 2001 to occur.‖ Saudi media and business spokesmen

have described the suit as an attempt to extort Saudi money deposited in

the United States and exert political pressures on Saudi Arabia; some

have called for withdrawing Saudi investments in the United States,

estimated by one media source at $750 billion and another at between

$400 and $600 billion. A London Financial Times article on August 21,

2002, quoted estimates that Saudi investors have withdrawn between

$100 billion and $200 billion from the United States in recent months,

but other sources quoted in the article expressed skepticism that a mass

exodus of Saudi money is under way 131

.

Since the outset, the question about the funds that helped opening

the way to the terrorists has been raised, and it was not so much because

the American intelligence ignored that al Qaeda has built a little financial

empire, but because assumably the CIA and other intelligence agencies

could not ignore it. Unfortunately, the reality did not match the

assumption : 9/11 has not been feasible only because of a severe gap in

the security measures and a grave failure in intelligence gathering and

analysis, but it was also a great lack of curiosity in all what concerns the

financial data of the terrorists. The fact that Usama bin Laden is a

millionaire is well known and almost pointless. Yet, the questions that

should have mattered since a long time for the intelligence and security

apparatus in any concerned country were about : what did he do of his

131

Alfred B. Prados, Saudi Arabia, Current Issues and U.S.Relations, August 4,

2003, CRS Issue Brief For Congress.

88

money? Where did he invest it? How did a man retaining and training

and entertaining thousands of militia-men and jihadists could do that

without the existence of a financial system and some accounts and

records? Even an ordinary family cannot afford to ignore budget and

accounts , so what about an organization like al Qaeda? Where did

money come from and where does it go? It is amazing that these

questions become crucial only after 9/11, although the previous

operations of Al Qaeda should have raised them.

In this context, we point out to the unconvincing opinion of the

Saudi dissident Saad al Fagih about the nature of al Qaeda and its

finances. In an interview with PBS Front Line132

, Al Fagih tried to reduce

the size and the importance of both Al Qaeda organizational structure and

finances, suggesting that it does not require a lot of money to planify and

execute terrorist operations. This is quite unlikely in our view, at least

because of all the international financial and human network necessarily

mobilized to sustain al Qaeda‘s activities. One must be very simple-

minded to believe that all those people (thousands) would survive only

thanks to prayers and fresh water. However, for Al Fagih, the reports on

Bin Laden assets are not serious. He told PBS : ―I read a few reports on

the American press about bin Laden's financial assets and the way

Americans are trying to ... trace them ... using satellites and Internet. It

made me laugh a lot. Because I know there is none of that. Bin Laden

does not use banks I was told. But bin Laden, in his personal capacity, is

supposed to be bankrupt now. He had three massive setbacks in his

financial story. ... First there was the freezing of all his assets ... around

250, 300 million dollars. It's inside Saudi Arabia and it is part of his share

in the company. It is under the microscope of the Saudi regime. It can't

go here or there. ... And then he had a big loss in Sudan. Because he

volunteered to do one of two projects [for] the Sudanese. The big road--

they call it the challenge road. And he spent something like 250 or 300

million dollars on that project. Assuming that the Sudanese would pay

him at one time, but they ... paid him hardly 10 or 20 million. So in

132

Interview with Dr. Saad al Fagih, Front Line , PBS, 2001. This question of

funding terror has been analyzed by numerous and varied observers. See for example :

Roland Jacquard, Au nom d‘Oussama Ben Laden, Editions Jean Picollec, Paris, 2001.

This author thinks that the Islamists have since the beginning relied on several sources

of funds instead of only one. Thus, even if we assume with Al Fagih that Bin Laden is

broke, this is not by any means the proof that the funds reserved for terror activities

have completely dried out. See particularly the chapter XIII, les milliards des réseaux

Ben Laden, in Jacquard‘s book.

89

practicality, he lost all this money. And then came the last, the set back.

When this man [Sidi Tayyib] defected to the Saudi regime. And he knew

quite a bit about his remaining small companies here and there. And he

told the Saudis about them. Now he knew that his man would defect. So

he prepared himself by selling those companies with significant loss

before the defection of [Sidi Tayyib] ...‖ And most interestingly, when

asked ―why does he survive now?‖, Al Fagih says ―Well, he survives for

two reasons. Number one, there is some other source, other than his own

money, ... his indirect family support and rich Muslims supporting him to

back up jihad. And the other reason that he survives is that neither he nor

his followers need money. They are living a very, very simple life. And

for their operations, they don't need a lot of money. You can buy a

[rocket propelled grenade] in Yemen for cheaper than foreign audio tape

recorders. You can buy TNT in Somalia cheaper than sugar. So

explosives are not that expensive and the [people] have already been

trained. And the logistics needed are very little. And people are

volunteers. They are not paid. They are not mercenaries. So the cost of a

big operation like bombing Riyadh or bombing Khobar could come to a

few thousand dollars. Very easily.‖133

So, they are volunteers and are not paid! Then, how do they live?

We are talking about thousands of people, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and

other regions. They have weapons because they are cheap! How do they

eat? Where do they live? What about their families? If there were no

funds backing them, would they really carry on fighting for so many

years? Even with the best good will in the world, with the deepest belief,

a man still behaves as a man: he needs to eat, to shelter himself and to

grant his own safety and survival (not to talk of his family if he is

married). How does bin Laden and al Fagih or anyone else propose to

make those thousands of jihadists survive if they have no money? What

about the Palestinian fighters who have preceded them on this field?

Does anybody think that those fierce patriots are not paid? This is indeed

easier to check out today with the Palestinian Authority. Yet, we do

know that the Fidayeens have always been paid by the PLO. This is a

fact. Therefore, to pretend that al Qaeda jihadists are not paid, is either a

naïve pretension or a misinformation.

Already in 1998, some American observers were speculating

about whether Bin Laden‘s personal fortune were funding his network

and comparing it to other sources of funds, but without detailed data,

133

Idem.

90

though. Katzman writes in this context : ―Bin Ladin's personal wealth

gives him options that other terrorist organizations lack. Not only can he

buy protection from state hosts but he can maintain a thriving network

without need of state assistance. In contrast, such groups as the Abu

Nidal Organization, the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Popular Front

for the Liberation of Palestine became inactive when state sponsors cut

their funding in the second half of the 1980s. Hezbollah maintains its

operations against Israeli forces in south Lebanon because it gets Iranian

aid, estimated at $80 million to $100 million per year; without this,

Hezbollah would likely not be able to raise enough money to sustain

those operations‖134

.

The same Katzman adds : ―Bin Ladin's wealth, in contrast,

appears sufficient to sustain his approximately three thousand fighters

spread out in east and north Africa, the Middle East, former Yugoslavia,

and parts of east and central Asia. His wealth also enables him to become

patron of Egypt's Islamist organizations, Islamic Group and Al-Jihad.

These groups had looked to Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman for leadership

but with him in jail in a medical facility in Missouri for plotting to

destroy New York landmarks, his residual network has had to turn

elsewhere for support, and bin Laden has filled the gap‖.

If such was the case, how come that neither the US government

nor its allies took measures in order to cut the terrorists from their source

of funds until the aftermath of 9/11?

Maybe the first answer of which one can think is that the

Americans were then focusing on several groups believed to have ties

with terrorism, and we should not omit also the fact that state-funded

terrorism was linked – directly – to the ―Rogue States‖ in the political

and strategic paradigm prevailing prior to 9/11. At that time, « Middle

Eastern terrorism »135

was divided into three categories : ―(1) State

terrorism, in which a government relies on its own agents or national

apparatus to conduct acts of terrorism; no organized terrorist groups are

involved, though foreign nationals might be subcontracted under certain

circumstances. (2) State-assisted terrorism, in which organized terrorist

groups receiving material assistance and possibly direction from

134

Kenneth Katzman, counter-terrorism policy, American successes, The Middle

East Quarterly, December 1998, Vol: V, n° 4. 135

Let us notice by the way that there is no agreement on a strict definition of

terrorism between the USA and the Arab and Muslim States. Despite the international

anti-terrorist campaign led by President Bush, with the declared support of the Arab

States, such an agreement about who is meant by the term « terrorist » is still lacking.

91

governments, carry out the acts of violence. (3) Independent terrorism, in

which the terrorist groups receive minimal or no assistance and virtually

no direction from national governments‖136

.

There was also a lot of attention focusing on Libya, Syria, Iraq, -

which were considered to be the ―traditional patrons‖ of terrorism- and

particularly on Iran as a supporter and a fund backer for islamist

activism, either in Lebanon – through Hezbollah – or outside it, for

example in Sudan. Although this latter country is mainly Sunnite, some

reports viewed it as possibly slipping toward the Iranian sphere of

influence since the beginning of the nineties137

. Nobody ever wondered,

as far as we know, for instance whether this has anything to do with Bin

Laden‘s choice of Sudan as a refuge for his close people, his funds and

himself, as a manner to counterbalance the increasing Iranian influence.

The West was then focusing on the Iranian connections and almost

forgetting that the greatest part of the radicalism islamist is Sunnite and

since centuries in rivalry with Shiism. The Economist for example wrote:

―From Iran, Mr. Turabi will admit only to getting oil and army vehicles,

though diplomats testify to three guerrilla training camps run by Iran in

the east of Sudan.‖138

Americo-American controversy

This situation has apparently raised an argument inside the USA.

In a memo published on the site of the PNAC, Gary Schmitt wrote :

―This past Sunday, pundit Fareed Zakaria alleged that the Project for the

New American Century (PNAC), which he characterized as "Bill

Kristol's advocacy group," paid no attention to Al Qaeda in the 1990s.

136

Katzman. Counter-terrrorism…Op.Cit. 137

The most common claim has been that Iran enabled Sudan to make massive

arms purchases, either directly from Tehran or through China, by giving Sudan

economic assistance. Interestingly, while Sudanese opposition groups and Southern

Sudanese looked at this support as funds to escalate the war in the South – a domestic

issue – international media have focused on Sudan as a fertile soil for terrorism and a

new ―beachhead for Islamic radicalism‖ – an international issue. A second serious claim

was that Iran sent Revolutionary Guards to Sudan. The Pro-Israeli Anti-Defamation

League (ADL) wrote in 1998 that ―hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards are sent

to terrorist training camps in Sudan to train in the subversion of moderate Arab

regimes.‖ Even more radical claims came from Sudanese opposition groups and

Egyptian disinformation, which asserted that 18,000 Iranian fighters have been based in

Sudan, fighting against the SPLA in the south. 138

The Economist, ―Sudan: An Evangelist at Home,‖ London. Apr. 18, 1992.

92

Similarly, Zakaria wrote last month in the New York Times, "One

searches vainly through the archives of the Project for the New American

Century, the main neoconservative advocacy group, for a single report on

Al Qaeda or a letter urging action against it before 9/11."

Then Schmitt started answering Zakaria : ―In fact, the directors

and fellows of the Project published several articles on the subject of the

war on terrorism and Al Qaeda prior to September 11. In September

1998, after the embassy bombings, William Kristol and Robert Kagan

wrote an editorial in the Weekly Standard in which they expressed

concern that the Clinton administration's cruise missile strikes in

Afghanistan and Sudan had not "made a dent in the terrorist networks"

and questioned whether the Clinton administration "really has the

stomach for such a war."

In an essay in the book Present Dangers, edited by Kristol and

Kagan and published in September 2000-a month before the bombing of

the U.S.S. Cole, Project Senior Fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht discussed the

necessity of taking action to "check the lethality, if not the growth, of

Taliban/bin Laden-style Islamic radicalism."139

Yet, even if there was some analysis of Al Qaeda activities in the

pre-September 11 period, it has not acquired the depth and the abundance

of details that characterized the papers following the event. Anyway, for

what concerned the financial part of the analysis , it would not be

inaccurate to say it was void, and on this level Zakaria was probably

right. We have thus to acknowledge that there was a ―diffused attention‖:

the Clinton administration for example was still hoping until its last days

to make a deal in the Middle East between Palestinians and Israelis. The

Iraqi situation – on the humanitarian level – was disastrous. And with

that, there were the ―traditional‖ – say – challenges (or Bêtes noires) of

the USA : the ―rogue states‖, and the loose network of terrorist groups

not necessarily thought to be a part of Al Qaeda, about which there was

much talk in the media (Abu Sayyaf for example, or the Algerian GIA).

The result of that ―diffused‖ attention is that Al Qaeda was not yet

occupying the first position in the terrorist ranking140

. The second result

is that its sources of funds were still let in the ―darkness‖.

139

Gary Schmitt, Memorandum To: Opinion Leaders, Addressing Terrorism

before 9/11, March 25, 2004, http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense-

20040325.htm 140

The U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations as of October 8, 1999: Abu

Nidal Organization (ANO), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Armed Islamic Group (GIA),

Aum Shinriykyo, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), HAMAS (Islamic Resistance

93

Occult international financial network

What we know today is that al Qaeda reportedly has been

exploiting for years the free market and the freedoms of the democratic

countries and the right to the banking secrecy and even the good will of

charitable people unaware of what would become of their donations, and

nobody seemed really to care about this occult self-financing system until

9/11.

To operate effectively though, transnational terrorists and

criminals need ready access to money and the ability to maneuver it

quickly and secretly across borders. On a large scale, such money

maneuvers can ripple across entire regions, embroiling global markets

and threatening vital American economic interests as well as

destabilizing other countries politically. The ability to move vast

quantities of wealth rapidly and anonymously across the globe—

sometimes combining modern-day wire transfers, faxes, and Internet

connections with centuries old practices, such as the hawala, of personal

connections and a handshake—gives terrorist and criminal networks a

strategic advantage over many states. Yet it also might be their

vulnerability.

In September 2001, President George W. Bush listed 27 terrorist

organizations and individuals whose assets were to be blocked in

American financial institutions. Since then, more than 202 entities and

individuals have been identified for punitive financial action worldwide.

The principals behind the Al Qaeda financing network reportedly are Al

Barakaat and Al Taqwa/Nada Management Group. Al Barakaat is a

Somali-based international financial conglomerate with operations in

over 40 countries, including the United States. The organization‘s

Movement), Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), Hezbollah (Party of God), Gama'a al-

Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG), Japanese Red Army (JRA), al-Jihad, Kach, Kahane

Chai, Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE),

Mujahedine Khalq Organization (MEK, MKO, NCR, and many others), National

Liberation Army (ELN), Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ), Palestine

Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction (PLF), Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command

(PFLP-GC), al-Qa'ida, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November), Revolutionary People's

Liberation Army/Front (DHKP/C), Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA), Shining

Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL), Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).

94

founder, Sheikh Ahmed Nur Jimale, reportedly is closely linked to

Usama bin Laden and has used Al Taqwa/Nada Group to facilitate the

financing and operations of Al Qaeda and other Islamist organizations.

Before its U.S. operations were closed down, Al Barakaat reportedly

wired at least $500 million in annual worldwide profits to the company‘s

central money-exchange office in the United Arab Emirates. Al Qaeda

allegedly received a flat 5 percent cut of that money, amounting to

approximately $25 million a year.

The events of September 11 pushed money laundering and the

financing of terrorism to the forefront of domestic and foreign policy

concerns in the USA. As a paper of the Strategic Forum reports 141

,

« since September 11, $34 million in terrorist assets, including $27

million belonging to Al Qaeda and bin Laden, have been frozen in the

United States. A total of 161 nations have blocked the assets of known

terrorist organizations, amounting to another $70 million. Action also is

being taken to disrupt severely the misuse of the hawala system and

other underground remittance systems used by bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and

other terrorist organizations » 142

.

Not surprisingly, Usama bin Laden excels at amassing and

distributing large sums of money to support his terrorist schemes. His

main sources for financial support include his personal wealth, estimated

between $280 million and $300 million, funds siphoned from overt

Muslim charities, and wealthy well-wishers, especially in the Gulf States.

Allegedly, a wide variety of international banks in the Gulf are used to

manipulate and move funds using business front organizations owned by

bin Laden. Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden‘s brother-in-law, was

reportedly responsible for managing parts of the financial network that

deal with major investments in Malaysia, Mauritius, the Philippines, and

Singapore. Bin Laden has- according to some reports- funded a number

of network cell operating expenses, including accommodations, safe

houses, cars, and payments to operatives for the recruitment of new

141

Kimberley L.Thachuk, Terrorism‘s Financial Lifeline : can it be severed?

Strategic Forum, n° 191, May 2002. 142

Idem. Once again, we must remind the reader of the important controversy

between the Arab and Muslim States and the USA and Europe about the definition of

terrorism, as many of the former states hold some organisations as ―national resistance‖

against occupying forces, which is not the position of the USA. Moreover, some Arab

regimes consider their own Islamist opposition as ―terrorist‖ even if it is a moderate

movement, whereas they may consider goups fighting in Iraq against the new system as

―resistance‖.

95

members. His contributions have further purchased explosives and key

components for explosive devices.

At least $5,000 is known to have been transferred from bin Laden

holdings to operatives in Yemen to fund the attack against the U.S.S.

Cole in 2000. The investment for bin Laden to mount the September 11

attacks is estimated to have been approximately $500,000, while the total

costs to the United States for cleanup, property losses, and Federal

Government bailouts will exceed $135 billion.143

The file against Saudi Arabia

In the summer of 2002, there were rumors in the American media

about a briefing given by an analyst from the Rand Corporation on June

10, 2002, to the Defense Policy Board, a high-level advisory group that

advises the U.S. Defense Department on defense policy. According to the

rumor, the briefer asserted among other things that ―Saudi Arabia

supports our enemies and attacks our allies‖ and that ―the Saudis are

active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers.‖

Commenting the rumor, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told

reporters on August 6 that the briefing represented the analyst‘s own

opinion and went on to say: ―It did not represent the views of the

government, it didn‘t represent the views of the Defense Policy Board.‖

State Department spokesman Phil Reeker told reporters that these

opinions ―do not reflect the views of the President of the United States or

of the U.S. Government.‖ He added that Secretary of State Powell made

that clear in a telephone call to Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faysal.

In November 2002, newsmedia reported that Princess Haifa, the

wife of Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar bin Sultan,

had provided funds— approximately $100,000 according to one article—

over a four-year period to a Jordanian woman (married to a Saudi citizen)

who was in need of medical treatment. The recipient, in September 11

hijackers. On November 23 and 24, a senior policy advisor to Saudi

Crown Prince Abdullah (the country‘s de facto ruler) said there is no

evidence that Saudi Arabia provided money to the hijackers and that his

government is determined to uncover all the facts; a Saudi Embassy

officials said the Saudi investigation will probably be widened to

scrutinize all gifts provided by the Embassy. Ambassador Bander told the

143

Idem.

96

New York Times on November 26 that Saudi Arabia is a partner with the

United States in its anti-terrorism campaign, while his wife expressed

outrage that donations to the needy were being linked to terrorism.

There is actually much to say about these reports alleging links

between the Saudi authorities and the terrorists, for they emanated from

several and varied people inside the USA and outside it. The Israelis

were not in the rear for that kind of work. On the contrary, they

contributed to the effort of ―unveiling‖ the so-called Saudi conspiracy at

a degree unequaled. It goes without saying that they have never been

satisfied with the ―special partnership‖ between the USA and the Saudi

Kingdom, out of jealousy. Moreover, if that is not because the words of

King Abdelaziz during the famous meeting with Roosevelt about the

Israelis are still ringing at their ears as the proof of the ―Arab hate‖, then

it is because they are convinced that behind ―Hamas‖ there is Saudi

Arabia and nobody else.144

Thus the long series of Saudi funding terrorism went on, with

however a noticeable ―shift‖ in the visions and the alliances : it was no

longer the American left-wing and liberal writers who attacked Saudi

Arabia for everything, from its intolerance toward other religions on its

soil to its puritanical conservatism and its victimization of the women, as

they used to do prior to 9/11. The new thing was that neo-conservative

Americans have been since that date leading the ―orchestra‖, which was

labeled in Saudi Arabia ―campaign against Islam‖.

As the official 9/11 Commission report acknowledges, though

"origins of the funds remains unknown". So there is a lot of speculation

about the matter. The report says that in fact , "Bin laden and his aides

did not need a very large sum to finance their planned attack on America.

The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and

$500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. Consistent with the

importance of the project, al Qaeda funded the plotters. Khaled al Sheikh

144

See about this topic : The testimony of Matthew A. Levitt, before the US

subcommittee on international trade and finance , committee on banking, housing and

urban affairs, August 1, 2002, which we can read on the Washington Institute site :

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/levitt/levitt080102.htm ; and the testimony of

Dore Gold before the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on July 31, 2003,

which also we can read on this URL :

http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/saudi/saudi_dgb.htm .

97

Mohammad provided his operatives with nearly all the money they

needed to travel to the United States, train, and live. The plotters‘

tradecraft was not especially sophisticated, but it was good enough. They

moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, easily defeating

the detection mechanisms in place at the time.145

"

According to the same report, it does not appear that any

government other than the Taliban financially supported al Qaeda before

9/11, although some governments may have contained al Qaeda

sympathizers who turned a blind eye to al Qaeda‘s fund-raising activities.

Moreover, the report adds that ―Saudi Arabia has long been considered

the primary source of al Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence

that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials

individually funded the organization.‖ This conclusion does not exclude

the likelihood that charities with significant Saudi government

sponsorship diverted funds to people linked to al Qaeda, without being

aware of those ties. Still, al Qaeda reportedly found fertile fund-raising

ground in Saudi Arabia, where extreme religious views are common and

charitable giving was both essential to the culture and subject to very

limited oversight, as it sought money from wealthy donors in other Gulf

states, which, in our eyes, does not imply that all those donors were

always aware that they were actually funding international terrorism.

Actually, the money of Zakat is not accounted for in any Arab or

Muslim state. If religious authorities are allowed to charge the sum

people have to give as Zakat at each Eid, they do not interfere with who

would acquire it ; neither do the government. Thus, people are free to

give money to whoever they deem deserving it. The Westerners who do

not know a lot about the system of Zakat are thus induced to think that

the fund-backers and all those who support charities and individuals

always know how the money would be dealt with. Nothing is more

inaccurate.

However, the report adds : "to date, the U.S. government has not

been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks.

Ultimately the question is of little practical significance. Al Qaeda had

many avenues of funding. If a particular funding source had dried up, al

Qaeda could have easily tapped a different source or diverted funds from

145

See 9/11 Commission Report.

http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf

98

another project to fund an operation that cost $400,000–$500,000 over

nearly two years."

Is bin Laden as wealthy as he is said to be?

The authors of 9/11 Commission report think that Bin Laden did

not fund al Qaeda from his personal fortune . It seems that the

organization relied primarily on a fund-raising network developed over

time. Thus, the CIA now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million

per year to sustain its activities before 9/11 and that this money was

raised almost entirely through donations. For many years, the United

States thought Bin Laden financed al Qaeda‘s expenses through a vast

personal inheritance. Bin Laden purportedly inherited approximately

$300 million when his father died, and was rumored to have had access

to these funds to wage jihad while in Sudan and Afghanistan and to

secure his leadership position in al Qaeda. In early 2000, the U.S.

government discovered a different reality: roughly from 1970 through

1994, Bin Laden received about $1 million per year—a significant sum,

to be sure, but not a $300 million fortune that could be used to fund

jihad. Then, as part of a Saudi government crackdown early in the 1990s,

the Bin Laden family was forced to find a buyer for Usama‘s share of the

family company in 1994.The Saudi government subsequently froze the

proceeds of the sale. This action had the effect of divesting Bin Laden of

what otherwise might indeed have been a large fortune. Nor were Bin

Ladin‘s assets in Sudan a source of money for al Qaeda. When Bin

Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, he owned a number of

businesses and other assets. These could not have provided significant

income, as most were small or not economically viable. When Bin Laden

left in 1996, it appears that the Sudanese government expropriated all his

assets: he left Sudan with practically nothing. When Bin Laden arrived in

Afghanistan, he relied on the Taliban until he was able to reinvigorate his

fund-raising efforts by drawing on ties to wealthy Saudi individuals that

he had established during the Afghan war in the 1980s. Al Qaeda appears

to have relied on a core group of financial facilitators who raised money

from a variety of donors and other fund-raisers, primarily in the Gulf

countries and particularly in Saudi Arabia. Some individual donors surely

knew, and others did not, the ultimate destination of their donations. Al

Qaeda and its friends took advantage of Islam‘s strong calls for charitable

giving, zakat. These financial facilitators also appeared to rely heavily on

certain imams who were willing to divert zakat donations to al Qaeda‘s

99

cause. Al Qaeda also collected money from employees of corrupt

charities. It took two approaches to using charities for fund-raising. One

was to rely on al Qaeda sympathizers in specific foreign branch offices of

large, international charities—particularly those with lax external

oversight and ineffective internal controls, such as the Saudi-based al

Haramain Islamic Foundation. Smaller charities in various parts of the

globe were funded by these large Gulf charities and had employees who

would siphon the money to al Qaeda. In addition, entire charities, such as

the al Wafa organization, may have reportedly participated in funneling

money to al Qaeda. In those cases, al Qaeda operatives controlled the

entire organization, including access to bank accounts. Charities were a

source of money and also provided significant cover, which enabled

operatives to travel undetected under the guise of working for a

humanitarian organization.146

While we emphasize that these official views about Muslim

charities have at last prevailed, forbidding some of them sometimes

without sound evidence, we should recall that if infiltrating some big

intelligence institutions was not that hard for many spies and double

agents, with all the « professionally granted » security they are endowed

with, then what about Charities and little associations ? It is obvious that

146

The 9-11 Commission Report : Final Report of the National Commission on

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Edition. We have to

remind the reader also of the controversy over that report. On July 29, 2003, Saudi

Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal called on the Bush Administration to release a

classified section of the joint congressional report covering intelligence community

actions before and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The classified

section reportedly described alleged Saudi links with persons involved in the attacks

and indicated that senior Saudi officials channeled charitable gifts to individuals that

may have helped fund the attacks. Prince Saud and other Saudi officials denied the

allegations and asked that the classified section be released to enable the Saudi

government to rebut the allegations. The Bush Administration refused on the grounds

that disclosure could reveal U.S. intelligence sources and methods and might

compromise the ongoing investigation of the 9/11 attacks. Members of Congress also

requested release of the classified section, some of them expressing concern that the

Bush Administration was trying to avoid publication of information that might

embarrass Saudi Arabia. One Member called for replacement of the Saudi Minister of

the Interior for failing to stop the flow of money to terrorist groups. At a hearing on July

31, two other Members asked the U.S. Treasury Department to provide a list of Saudi

organizations investigated by the Treasury Department but not publicly named as

terrorist entities.

100

the latter are an easy target for any party willing to divert them from their

initial course.

Arabs and Muslims charge Saudi Arabia

Reaching this point, let us honestly acknowledge that the Western

observers are not alone in charging Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States of

the responsibility of funding the islamist nebulae. We are certainly not

hinting to the Israelis,- it is a different matter, - but merely to Arab and

Muslim observers , whereas some of them enjoy a certain renown in the

Arab media. Let us take for example, the journalist Riad Najib El-Rayyes

(founder of Al Rayyes Books). He writes : ― The oil regimes in the Arab

peninsula, thought that in order to protect their wealth and stability, it

would be well advised to declare the allegiance of oil to Islam. Thus, they

began since the seventies to fund all the islamist, salafist-fundamentalist

movements, no matter their own commitments and loyalties in any

country where such groups require their assistance‖147

. Another writer –

a Saudi – did not hesitate after the murder of Saudi prince Talal Bin

Abdulaziz Al Rasheed, by islamists in Algeria, to say : ―Those who

killed him are those who want the word silenced (…)We have bred

monsters. We alone are responsible for it. I have written as much before

my personal tragedy and will continue to do so for as long as it takes. We

are the problem and not America or the penguins of the North Pole or

those who live in caves in Afghanistan. We are it, and those who cannot

see this are the ones to blame. Castrated as we are, we look to America.

Why? Because they went into Iraq and made a difference.‖148

However, while this study is not exactly about the Arab reactions

as to the issue linking terrorism and Saudi Arabia, we may still add other

significative examples, to show that not all of those who blamed the

policy of Saudi Arabia are Westerners or Israelis, but possibly people

angry with Saudi Arabia, if not Saudi citizens. The following is a citation

from a story published on the Egyptian magazine Ruz al Youssef , by

the deputy-editor. W. Al Abrashi says : ―I can state with certainty that

after a very careful reading of all the documents and texts of the official

147

Riad Najib El-Rayyes, Assailant and Victim , Islam and Arabism, (in Arabic)

published in July 2000, by Riad El-Rayyes Books, Beirut, Lebanon. P. 66. 148

Dr. Muhammad Talal Al-Rasheed, Senseless Violence, Senseless Death, The

Saudi Gazette, November 30, 2003.

101

investigations linked to all acts of terror that have taken place in Egypt,

from the assassination of the late president Anwar Sadate in October

1981, up to the Luxor massacre in 1997, Saudi Arabia was the main

station through which most of the Egyptian extremists passed, and

emerged bearing with them terrorist thought regarding Takfir – thought

that they drew from the sheikhs of Wahhabism. They also bore with them

funds they received from the Saudi charities. Apparently, we had to wait

all these years and the September 11 explosions had to happen, and many

other explosions that harmed Saudi Arabia's stability, for the Saudi

authorities to understand the two dangers: 'The danger of Wahhabi Takfir

Fatwas [and] the danger of charities, most of whose money ultimately

flows to the treasuries of extremists‖. 149

Now on the one hand, it is true that if all what has been said about

that issue cannot be entirely inaccurate, some of it goes beyond real

objectivity and turns out to be over-exploitation of a tragedy for political

interests.150

Speaking honestly, we did not see these documents upon

which M. Al Abrashi was building his argument, nor did he care to show

them to his readers. Secondly, we have to say that there is no such a

Takfir fatwa issued by the Wahhabi establisment, as far as we know,

although we must acknowledge that some fatwas have been issued by

Wahhabi opponents and dissidents or those called ―Sahwa Sheikhs‖.

On the other hand, as we have already hinted, this issue cannot

summarize the economic relationship between the two countries , despite

the extreme gravity of 9/11. It would be fair to recognize that both

parties share responsibility for failing to foresee and interpret accurately

the consequences of such common politics , like funding the jihadists and

many Islamism groups since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

We think that the responsibilty has to be shared, because as

several scholars and observers noticed, « The Islamic jihad was

supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia with a significant part

149

Wael Al-Abrashi, Roz Al-Yousef (Egypt), May 31, 2003. 150

Particularly aggressive on this side was Daniel Pipes with stories like ―Make

the Saudis pay for terror‖ (New York Post, April 15, 2002), wherein he holds ― the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia‘s massive implication in the death of 3000 Americans on

9/11‖ deserving judiciary suing : some kind of Lockerby affair, where King Fahd would

have ordered the massacre ! Which is not serious coming from a scholar. Anyway,

Pipes seems almost unable to control his anger against the Saudis. This is quite obvious

in other stories he published on the same subject. To read more about this case, see The

Middle East Forum. http://www.meforum.org

102

of the funding generated from the Golden Crescent drug trade »151

. Thus,

in March 1985, President Reagan signed « National Security Decision

Directive 166 », which authorized stepped-up covert military aid to the

Mujahideen, and it made clear that the secret Afghan war had a new goal:

« to defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan through covert action and

encourage a soviet withdrawal. The new covert US assistance began with

a dramatic increase in arms supplies – a steady rise to 65,000 tons

annually by 1987, as well as a ―ceaseless stream‖ of CIA and Pentagon

specialists who traveled to the secret headquarters of Pakistan‘s ISI on

the main road near Rawalpindi, Pakistan. There, the CIA specialists met

with Pakistani intelligence officers to help plan operations for the Afghan

rebels »152

. After a quite interesting analysis, Chossudovsky states :

« Jane Defense Weekly confirms (…) that half of Taliban manpower and

equipment originated in Pakistan under the ISI (…) In other words,

backed by Pakistan‘s military intelligence (ISI) which in turn was

controlled by the CIA, the Taliban Islamic State was largely serving

American geopolitical interests (…) No doubt, this explains why

Washington has closed its eyes on the reign of terror imposed by the

Taliban including the blatant derogation of women‘s rights, the closing

down of schools for girls, the dismissal of women employees from

government offices and the enforcement of the {Shari‘a laws of

punishment} »153

.

Is Saudi Arabia worse than other Arab States?

―The Saudi ruling elite is also paying for its repression and links

to Washington, especially when contrasted with its formalistic Muslim

piety‖, says Doug Bandow 154

. Explaining what was happening in these

151

See for example: Michel Chossudovsky, Who is Osama Bin Laden, Centre for

Research on Globalization (CRG), Montréal. 12 September, 2001.

152

Idem. 153

Idem. For more about this same topic, see the excellent book of Ahmed

Rashid, Taliban : Islam, oil and the new great game in Central Asia, I.B. Tauris &Co

LTD, London, 2000. According to this author, even the Israelis tried to have some

contacts with the Taliban. The Mossad started a dialogue with them through their

liaison offices in the USA. And even if Pakistan did not recognize Israel, ISI was

favorable to such contacts, says Rashid. But when the USA changed its position vis à

vis the Taliban, Israel followed up. 154

Befriending Saudi Princes, A high price for a dubious alliance, Policy

Analysis n° 428, March 20, 2002. CATO Institute.

103

last years, he says : ―with 70 percent of government revenues (and 40

percent of gross domestic product) derived from oil sales, the drop in

energy prices since the early 1980s has caused economic pain in Saudi

Arabia ; per capita GDP has dropped from $28,600 in 1981 to less than

$7,000 in 2002. Unemployment is estimated at 15 percent overall and

20 percent for those under 30‖. That has helped generate deep undertones

of unrest, but the discontented feel helpless to promote political change.

Criticism tends to be expressed through religious leaders. Before his

death, Saudi novelist Abdurrahman Munif warned that the ―situation

produces a desperate citizenry, without a sense of dignity or belonging.‖

Neil MacFarquhar of the New York Times notes : ―In another country

Mr. bin Laden might have become an opposition politician rather than a

holy warrior. But Saudi Arabia brooks no dissent.‖

Yet, while focusing on this negative side in Saudi Arabia, some

observers fail to see that it is just a detail in a worse picture. If held

together – with all its details – the picture of the Arab world does not

offer to the observer much hope about freedom and democracy. Maybe

this is going to change, but so far the Arab regimes were not front-

runners for democracy. To be sure, Bin Laden‘s recruits (the army of al

Qaeda, that is) come from all the Arab and Muslim countries, assuming :

1) that none of them could join the democratic opposition, because there

is simply no such a thing as what we call democratic opposition ; 2) that

even if such an opposition exists , the radical islamists being as they are -

prone to violent action – would not join it.

―Senior clerics live well on the government payroll and therefore

lack credibility‖, says Doug Bandow. Yet, he omits to say that such is

still the case in the rest of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia does not hold the

exclusivity of that demeanor155

. Better : Maybe those clerics are allowed

more freedom in Saudi Arabia than their colleagues in other Arab

countries, wherein the sermons of Friday and the Eid prayers are written

down by a bureaucrat in the Ministry of religious affairs and circulated

all over the country for the imams‘ usage. The reason for that is simple :

the ruler must be granted that people in the mosques hear but praises for

his own rule156

.

155

It goes without saying that our argument must not be taken for a justification,

but as it is intended to be : analysis, that is. 156

Oddly enough, in one of the most democratic country (France) the Imams of

the mosques are more and more controlled by the Ministry of Interior. M.Sarkozy

declared recently (July 2005) that the Republic cannot allow Imams to say anything.

104

The Americans do know anyway that the ability of some Muslim

governments to helping the United States win greater understanding for

its policies and objectives ―is limited by their own lack of credibility‖ as

a Blueprint for action asserts 157

. Decades of controlled press reporting,

government-owned broadcasting—which did little beyond televising

footage from government meetings—and extravagant lies have undercut

public trust, the report says.

A « related barrier to trust has been erected by Usama bin Laden

and his spokesmen, who have argued that impious Muslims and infidels

have constructed a vast edifice of lies intended to conceal the true nature

of reality from honest Muslims », says the Blueprint158

. The implicit

claim is that any assertion by the United States or its « Muslim puppets »

is necessarily false. The truth can be inferred as the opposite of whatever

the United States says. As an example, when the United States elected to

support the road map for Israeli-Palestinian peace, bin Laden denounced

it as a sly maneuver that was actually intended to enslave Palestinians.

Similarly, Western intervention on behalf of Muslims in the Balkans has

been dismissed as a ruse to further the denigration of Muslims. Another

impediment to a U.S. partnership with local governments in an effort to

foster dialogue and improve America‘s image lies within these

governments themselves. The Blueprint gives the example of the

Egyptian and Saudi governments, which « do not only permit but

deliberately echo and reinforce anti-American themes in a bid to buttress

their popular legitimacy. This policy, generally defended in a

disingenuous way as respect for free expression, is a key element of their

strategy for clinging to power while avoiding serious reforms »159

. The

conclusion the authors deduce is : ―We therefore need to bear in mind, as

we contemplate ways to enlist these governments in a campaign to

improve Muslim understanding of the United States, that we will in

effect be asking them to undercut their own perceived interests‖160

.

Some French media talked about « Zero Tolerance » as regards « Islamism », which

they hold for an efficient policy if compared with the British « laxity». 157

Defeating the Jihadists, a Blueprint for Action, Century Foundation Press,

11/16/2004, The report's authors are Richard A. Clarke, Glenn P. Aga, Roger W.

Cressey, Stephen E. Flynn, Blake W. Mobley, Eric Rosenbach, Steven Simon, William

F. Wechsler, and Lee S. Wolosky—all experts on various aspects of national security,

intelligence, counterterrorism, military operations. 158

Idem. 159

Idem. 160

Blueprint For Action , op.Cit. The report underlines that whereas state-

sanctioned anti-Americanism thrives in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the state-sponsored

105

Actually, such a behaviour has to be understood within its

context : American policy in the Middle East is not very popular, as

Washington is today aware. Yet, what the blueprint called « disingenious

way » may be the recourse of the weak not the powerful in what concerns

international relations. The Arab regimes – Saudi Arabia and Egypt are

by no means the only cases – represent the weak party, indeed, in front of

a Superpower having its own interests and goals. Understandably, their

governments do not wish to be taken for « puppets ». Anyway, this is

also the case of other nations. Even among Western allies, there is more

and more distancing following criticism and opposition to the American

schemes. Either in France or in Germany, such positions kept the

governments away from the war against Saddam Hussein. In Great

Britain, M.Tony Blair‘s position has been threatened by opponents in his

own party, because of his « unconditional » alliance with M. Bush.

More questions to answer

Rightly, Rachel Bronson observes that ―during the Cold War,

Saudi Arabia‘s religiosity was considered an asset in the struggle against

godless communism. Today, its religious activism poses a significant

threat. Saudi money has supported some of the most anti-American

mosques and schools across the globe‖161

.

There is, however, much more to say about this subject. Let us

mention for example the report of Freedom House in 2005, Saudi

Publications On Hate Ideology Fill American Mosques, with a foreword

by James Woolsey, former Director of CIA(1993-95), and thereafter

Chairman of Freedom House. In his introduction adapted from a

testimony before the House Committee on International Relations

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Woolsey says : ―Until

less than thirty years ago, our relations with the Saudis were generally

smooth. We were on the same side in the cold war, and the Saudis valued

our support (and we theirs) against Soviet influence in the Mideast. Of

course the oil embargo of 1973 created major stress, but the watershed

anti-Americanism of Iran is detached from a population that is effectively pro-

American. One common thread uniting anti-Americanism across the region is that it is

propagated by various powerful interest groups within the countries.

161

Rachel Bronson, Issue Brief, August 2004, Council on Foreign Relations.

106

year was 1979, when Khomeini came to power in Iran and extremists

took over the holiest of Islam‘s shrines, the Mosque in Mecca, which was

under the protection of the Saudi King; it was reclaimed by the Saudis

only after substantial loss of both life and face.‖ That is the year Woolsey

defined as that of the beginning shift in Saudi endeavor. He says : ―The

Saudis chose after the twin shocks of that year to strike a Faustian

bargain with the Wahhabi sect and not only to accommodate their views

about propriety, pious behavior, and Islamic law, but effectively to turn

over education in the Kingdom to them and later to fund the expansion

into Pakistan and elsewhere of their extreme, hostile, anti-modern, and

anti-infidel form of Islam. The other side of the bargain was that if the

Wahhabis would concentrate their attacks on, essentially, the U.S. and

Israel, the Saudi elite would get a more-or-less free ride from the

Wahhabis and the corruption within the Kingdom would be overlooked.‖

This is quite a strange talk coming from a man who was in charge of the

most important intelligence Agency in the USA (CIA), for the inevitable

questions are then : Where was America in that ―Faustian‖ Bargain? Was

Washington being marginalized by this queer shift in Saudi policy? If

such was the case, then how would we explain the tight cooperation that

went on and on years during between the Saudi authorities, the Pakistani

ISI and the CIA over topics of mobilization of the international islamist

network and assistance to the Mujahideens?

Following the consequences implied by Woolsey‘s argument, we

are undubitably confronted to a dilemma of logic : Either Washington

was aware of the shift in Saudi policy and despite this decided to carry on

its tight cooperation with Ryadh. Therefore, there is no excuse for the

American behaviour and no reproach at the Saudi. Or, Washington was

unaware of the Saudi shift , which has been discovered recently (!!!), and

this is even worse. May a Superpower afford to be so naïve? What would

we say if such were really the case with the ex-Soviet Union during the

Cold War, although there is definitely no possible comparison with Saudi

Arabia that has never been perceived as an enemy in the USA?

Yet, aware of the extreme importance of the relationship and the

difficulty of reducing it to the dark dimensions created by a disaster that

nobody could really control, R. Bronson put the focus on the greatest

challenges facing the two countries, such as the growing number of

young, poorly educated, unemployed Saudis. ―According to the United

Nations, 39 % of the population is under the age of 15. In 1980, Saudi

gross domestic product was 15,500 per capita, $ 2,500 more than the

107

comparable US figure. Now it‘s closer to $ 7,500, almost $ 25,000 less

than the US amount. Job creation has not kept pace with the growing

population, and Saudi Arabia‘s education system – which emphasizes

memorization and religious training – is producing graduates ill-equipped

to work in a modern, globalized economy. Debate had begun in Saudi

Arabia before September 11 about how to handle these challenges. Since

then these problems have appeared on Washington‘s radar screen –

because unemployed and disaffected youth seem to provide recruitment

pool for al Qaeda and other extremist groups.‖162

Thereupon, the author

of the paper163

suggested that the following issues were likely to be raised

during the presidential campaign:

« - Should the United States actively promote democracy in Saudi

Arabia and, if so, how?

- Is Saudi Arabia doing enough to clamp down on terrorist

financing?

- Is there anything the United States can do about the large

number of undereducated Saudi youth?

- Would a more rigorous energy conservation policy make

Americans more secure? »164

The questions upon which the 2004 presidential campaign

focused were however more concerned with the Iraqi problem than with

Saudi Arabia. Yet, Bronson‘s questions sound however still attracting the

attention of both American and Saudi leaders and thinkers, beyond the

simple event of the presidential elections in the USA. Their pertinence to

the US-Saudi current state of relations make them of a particular interest

to Republicans and Democrats.

In November 1999, for example, King Fahd himself stated that

"the world is heading for...globalization" and that "it is no longer possible

for [Saudi Arabia] to make slow progress." In the context of successfully

becoming integrated into the global economy, Fahd also emphasized the

importance of regional unity among Gulf states , economically,

politically, and militarily. Along these lines, a customs union among

GCC countries was agreed upon at the December 1999 GCC summit,

which would take effect only in March 2005. Currently, goods from

GCC countries are exempt from all Saudi import duties, as long as 40%

of their value has been added within the GCC and the producing

162

R. Bronson. Op. Cit. 163

Who happens to be a senior fellow and the director of Middle East and Gulf

studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 164

Idem.

108

company is owned at least 51% by GCC citizens. The GCC has also

agreed to impose a common set of Value Added Taxes (VATs) beginning

in 2005.

Yet , the security and economic matters being quite close , some

additional questions remain seeking an answer. According to the

Petroleum Economist, ―The consequences of a disruption to Saudi oil

supplies amid already tight supply and demand conditions would be

devastating for the global economy.‖165

Saudi Arabia takes the security

of its oil very seriously. Although details of the kingdom‘s security

budget are classified, analysts estimate the Saudis spent around $5.5

billion in 2003 and increased security expenditures by 50 percent in

2004. According to a recent assessment in Jane’s Intelligence Review, in

the past two years the Saudi government has allocated an extra $750

million to enhance security at all its facilities.

In the spring of 2004, however, the growing band of jihadists in

Saudi Arabia succeeded in sending shock waves through the global

energy industry without even firing a single shot at any physical oil

infrastructure. A twenty-five-hour rampage of attacks on foreign oil-

workers in Al-Khobar, the heart of Saudi refining operations, topped a

month of increasingly bloody attacks that seemed to mark an

intensification of the militants‘ campaign against Western interests in the

kingdom.

To summarize briefly the current challenges , it is believed that

socioeconomic and political malaise in Saudi Arabia raises concerns over

the internal stability of the regime in the medium term. Some American

observers think that it would be imprudent to place much weight on the

Saudi pillar as long as serious structural and political internal reform

remains off the agenda. Saudi Arabia is said to be the case of a

conservative regime blocking any avenue of domestic dissent except that

which it most fears—radical Islam—and therefore tries to manage. It is

also believed that to build a more stable regional system that will pose

less of a burden to external powers and reverse the growth of extremism,

reform of the region‘s political, economic, social, and—as just noted—

defense structures is essential. Reform also at last seems feasible, now

that some of the Gulf Arab regimes admit that they must permit pluralism

and provide better administration. But precipitate and externally forced

165

Security of Oil Supply; Saudi Oil Comes Under Threat, Petroleum Economist,

July 13, 2004.

109

democratization may lead to short-term destabilization without any

assurance of long-term gains.

―The key-question‖, writes The Middle East Report 166

―is not

whether democracy is compatible with Islam but whether democracy is

compatible with oil‖.

This view is however flawed with a clear prejudice. To the

contrary, we think that under the pressure of the events, the Gulf is

already changing, and that the change may even be more rapid and more

structured than in other Arab countries , particularly in North Africa 167

.

The oil rich countries of the Gulf have not invented Arab

authoritarianism. There are other Arab and Muslim states much more

rude to their own people, which are also deprived of the Gulf sources of

wealth. We do not think that to be deprived of such a wealth gives any

state the privilege of being more democratic or more able to operate the

shift toward democracy. On the contrary, this is a serious handicap : as

we know, none of the Western democratic countries is poor. Is

democracy then the luxury of the rich ? This is a question that deserves to

be further investigated.

The Gulf has an advantage, though : it owns the means to

achieving its own reform, to master its own destiny. Neither Saudi

Arabia nor the other GCC states rely on the foreign assistance for their

own subsistence and survival, as do other Arab countries. Thus, the

change will be embedded within the specific social and political regional

framework , and it may even go beyond any expectation, once started.168

Yet, it has to come from inside.

166

The Democracy Agenda in the Arab World, Middle East Report, n°174,

January-February 1992. 167

Each regime that has instituted elections and similar reforms among those

latter, has been compelled to do so by mass insurrections : Egypt in 1977 and 1986,

Tunisia and Morocco in 1984, Algeria in 1988 , and Jordan in 1989. 168

Just look at the little revolution Qatar achieved in the media vista of the whole

Arab world when it launched Al Jazeerah TV. It is indubitable that Al Jazeerah

changed completely and rapidly the way people in the Arab world look at their own

media.

110

111

Chapter III ________________

Strategic ramifications

Apparently, the US government has decided to bring the changes

it views as « necessary » in the whole Middle East, just after 9/11. The

first objection to this plan is related to its legitimacy: on which grounds

the Americans may claim a right to make changes in foreign countries?

Legitimacy claims are related to power. Two contrasting types of

power are of special interest to us here: power derived from a

constellation of interests that develops on a formally free market, and

power derived from established authority that allocates the right to

command and the duty to obey. The latter is obviously not the case of the

USA in the Arab world, then, what about the former?

That case is exactly what Max Weber proposed to call

―domination‖ (Herrschaft): he used the example of a large central bank

that dominates potential debtors by virtue of its monopolistic position in

the credit market. Though such a bank can impose conditions for the

granting of credit, it does not exercise authority and the debtors submit to

it in their own interest. If the bank controls credit institutions by virtue of

its central position, however, it may attempt currency management or the

control of the business cycle through regulations and special agencies

that approximate the formal authority of government. This example

illustrates that the constellation of interests between a central bank and its

debtors may shade off into an authority relationship between that bank

and the ―member banks‖ of a national banking system. This kind of

domination – to use Weber‘s term – is similar to the system whereby the

USA has been trying to hook its potential clients – among the Arab and

Muslim states – into its own strategy.

Ostensibly, the globalization played the largest part in catching

the candidates to such a game, especially in the aftermath of the Berlin

wall collapse.

112

If domination involves a reciprocal relationship between rulers

and ruled inside a determined country, the same may be said on a broader

scale. On the international scene, - between states, that is - there are no

rulers and ruled, though, but sovereign states. Theoretically, all the UN

members are associates in the same system. However, just a look at the

structure of the International Security Council is enough to persuade us

that there is no equality between the States. Hence, it is right to deduce

that what underlies the relations between the States is more related to the

power balance than to any formal equality. These are precisely

domination bonds.

―Domination‖, notes Reinhard Bendix ―requires an administrative

staff to execute commands, and, conversely, all administration requires

domination in that the power of command over the staff must be vested

in an individual or a group of individuals‖169

. Yet, we are still far from

answering the question about the legitimacy of change.

To make it happen, there must be some kind of identification in

purposes between the local elite to which the political change assumedly

incur, and the eventual international ―advisers‖,- in this case the US

government. The local elite would thus act as if it were carrying out a

project that is profitable for both parties: the foreign adviser and the

natives.

The local elite cannot perform such a task, though, without

legitimating its own domination. A government that has no credibility

inside its own country cannot achieve a profitable reform for its citizens,

and much less for the foreign supporter.

―In Weber‘s view beliefs in the legitimacy of a system of

domination are not merely philosophical matters. They can contribute to

the stability of an authority relationship‖170

. Weber saw only three

principles of legitimation – each related to a corresponding type of

―apparatus‖- that have been used to justify the power of command:

-1- ―Legal domination exists where a system of rules that is

applied judicially and administratively in accordance with ascertainable

principles is valid for all members of the corporate group (…)

-2- Traditional domination is based on the belief in the legitimacy

of an authority that ‗has always existed‘. The persons exercising the

169

Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber, an intellectuel portrait, a Doubleday Anchor

Book, 1962, p 292. 170

R.Bendix, op.Cit, p 294 .

113

power of command generally are masters who enjoy personal authority

by virtue of their inherited status (…)

-3- Charismatic domination (…) the power of command may be

exercised by a leader – whether he is a prophet, hero, or demagogue –

who can prove that he possesses charisma by virtue of magical powers,

revelations, heroism, or other extraordinary gifts‖171

.

At first glance, the message about the necessity of change has

reached its destination at least in two countries, where the local elite

identified its own interests with those of the American government:

Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, we have to remark that in both countries

change did not happen from inside, but was rather imposed after a war.

The Palestinian case is the third corner in the US triangular strategy that

adopted change in the Middle East as one of its goals, as it has been

advocated by some American analysts, in a document titled Wiser Peace,

- issued by the CSIS172

.

However, in the case of Saudi Arabia precisely, there is probably

a problem, and not a little one. First, despite the « discovery » that not

everybody is kindly disposed towards the Americans and the Westerners

in the Saudi kingdom – as everywhere -, since 9/11 and because of it, the

Saudi Royal family is still considered a precious ally and friend of the

USA. Indeed, some people may evoke the case of the Pahlavi and other

―friends and allies» of the USA who, when confronted to the ire of their

own people, were just unable to get any assistance from the USA. That is

why the Saudi Royal family has also an obvious interest in introducing

the necessary reform and allowing more public and individual freedom to

the citizens. Secondly, the Saudi opposition is not all honey and milk:

some of its components are radical Islamists even more puritanical, more

conservative, and more hardliner than any Wahhabi sheikh entrusted with

the official power of the State . This opposition is active inside the

kingdom (in the underground) and outside it. Indeed, it is asking also for

change, but what kind of change? To be sure, it is not the kind that would

get the admiration of the West. The case of Iran since the revolution is

clear enough. Therefore, if the West is well disposed toward social and

171

Idem. 172

See for an analysis of this document our book ―L‘après-Saddam en Irak‖,

l‘Harmattan, Paris, 2005. There are also other documents drawing on the same topics,

like Forging a Durable Post War Settlement in Iraq – Heritage Foundation -, and the

Washington Institute‘s Winning Peace in The Middle East, which we also analyze in the

first chapter of this book (in French).

114

political changes in the arabo-islamic world, it is unlikely that a slip

toward the far-right ultra-conservative Islamism is welcome. What to do

with that opposition? That is the question! Thirdly, When some assume

that the opposition elite may be considered as a key element in any

change intended in the arabo-islamic world, and could be trusted as such,

is this implying only the liberal opposition, or all the sensibilities from

the left-wing to the Islamists, the Panarabists and the rest? The question

is important, because of what we notice concerning some prejudgements,

pre-held positions and ―parti-pris‖ in the West toward such or such

political group or organization. Anyway, it is understood that this is not

an American or a Western problem; the internal struggle would select

those who will lead the change. Hezbollah or Hamas may be considered

terrorist organizations in the USA or Israel. However, in Lebanon, the

former is already represented in the parliament, and the latter will soon

find its way to it in the Palestinian territories173

. The foreign powers can

hardly impose their choice on these issues. If the Americans have had to

choose really who will rule Iraq, would they have chosen the Da‘wa

party or the SCIRI 174

? This is unlikely.

In fact, it seems that the USA policy in the Middle East is

confronted to paradoxical options: on the one hand, as a report of Rand

Corporation confirms 175

, after the devastating September 11, 2001,

attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, « the suppression of

terrorism rose to the fore of U.S. concerns in the Middle East. Al Qaeda

and other radical Islamist groups draw heavily on the Arab and Muslim

world for recruits and funding. In addition, much of their violence and

propaganda is directed at destabilizing Middle Eastern regimes that are

friendly to the United States. Thus, the United States must confront risks

on a governmental level, helping its regional partners secure themselves

against terrorist-generated instability, and at a popular level to ensure that

nationals in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, or other states in the

region do not join terrorist groups or provide them with financial or other

assistance »176

. In other terms, in order to fight international terrorism,

173

On Saturday March 12, 2005, Hamas announced that it will participate to the

next legislative elections expected for the summer, although it is still a controversial

issue among its militants. 174

Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq. 175

The Future Security Environment in the Middle East, Rand Corp. 2004. 176

Idem.

115

the US government has to continue the policy M. Bush himself and his

top-officials condemned, acknowledging that sacrificing democracy

while supporting and strengthening authoritative and dicatorial regimes

for the sake of stability, neither brought stability nor peace . On the other

hand, the US government knows that in supporting some Arab or Muslim

authoritarian regimes, the opposition – included the moderate and the

liberal movements – would be swept away, as none of its elements has

hitherto acquired enough strength to stand to the local government and

safely survive.

So, what is exactly the US strategy? How would it cope with the

local demands? Is there necessarily a common ground between US

interests and those of the populations in the countries concerned? These

questions are important insofar as we believe that a democratic country –

and the USA is one - cannot impose on another a non-democratic regime

without losing its own soul in this deal. Such a bargain is like that of

Mephistopheles in Faust. If the USA or any Western democracy has to

make a choice regarding a possible involvement in a local political

conflict in a foreign land, should that involvement be helpful to the side

of democracy or to that of perdurable autocracy? The history of the XXth

century shows that sovereignty is not a guarantee against undemocratic

processes ; nor has the USA always supported democratic rules.

Yet, one cannot deny that the insight of the foreign observer may

be profitable if it is fair and objective. There is a paragraph about the

sociologist Georg Simmel‘s description of the stranger, or outsider, to the

group, we cannot resist quoting: ―The stranger‘s position, said Simmel,

is defined by the fact that he has not belonged to the group from the start,

and that he brings a point of view to it that is foreign. He is both inside

and outside. Therein lies his particular value: his strangeness brings with

it a special objectivity about the group itself. The stranger as

characterized by Simmel (…) is not committed to the unique vision the

group shares (…) thus, while he may understand the gloss of reality that

the shared lens imparts, he is not bound by it. His objectivity is not

simple detachment, but a combination of indifference and involvement,

intimacy and distance. In his objectivity the stranger has a certain

freedom: he has no obligations to the group that might skew his

perception or prejudice his understanding (…) While he may have blind

spots, they are not likely to be those of the group, and so he can see what

the group vision misses‖177

.

177

Daniel Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple Truths, op.Cit.P239.

116

The Gulf or the Peninsula?

In her essay Arabia Incognita, Sheila Carapico178

points out to the

American research agendas so shaped by realpolitik that instead of

thinking in terms of the whole Peninsula, they are more inclined to using

the term Gulf. Carapico holds the view that it is time now to think about

the Arabian Peninsula as a sub-region similar to the Nile valley, the

Maghreb, etc. She describes the region as bounded by the Indian Ocean

and the Red Sea as well as the Gulf, a place that is part island and part

crossroads. Her purpose is to invite scholars to recognize the Peninsula as

a sub-region of the Arab world. But we must notice that this is a part of

her project to go "beyond the oil wells and shopping malls of the Gulf

and the mythic figures of the desert tribesmen to see the whole

Peninsula" and especially, to bridge the gap between "Gulf studies and

Yemeni studies", which may be as legitimate as useful. Yet, it is a

research domain quite different from ours here, as we are just focusing on

the study of a political case, more than that of a region or a sub-region.

Anyway, even if we consider Saudi Arabia as a key-element in the GCC,

we should not omit that the latter is more a politico-economical structure

than a geopolitical entity. Sheila Carapico has a different approach.

However, when she tries to describe the Gulf region in "classical terms",

- so to say, she is of a particular interest to this study. She says for

example "the Gulf is where American interests are", which is quite an

"original" definition of the region. Indeed there is a reason- and a good

one- for that. As she explains, "the Gulf" for the Persian-Arab Gulf can

refer to the larger region including Iran and Iraq, but also often is

shorthand for the Gulf Cooperation States (GCC), a pro-American

military alliance comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain,

Qatar and the United Arab Emirates "The Gulf also refers to what Gause

called the oil monarchies, any logical extension, to the citizen-subjects of

those kingdoms". Within the territory run by the GCC governments, the

Gulf refers specifically to al-Hasa in eastern Arabia, the strip of Persian

Gulf coast where most of the oil is pumped and shipped. Carapico

emphasizes the international characteristic of the new cities, as well as

178

Sheila Carapico, Arabia Incognita: an invitation to Arabia Peninsula Studies.

Robert Schuman Center For Advanced Studies. European University Institute, Working

papers, RSC/2002/12. Mediterranean Program Series.

117

the fact that the Gulf is the center of the CENTCOM, the US central

command: "the zone whose stability the Gulf war of 1991 was fought to

protect and will be preserved presumably at all costs". It is noteworthy

that "in addition to forming a military alliance, the monarchies on the

western edge of the Persian Gulf define themselves as a unique cultural

sub-region within the larger Arab and Islamic context‖179

.

In the Western analysis prevailing about this region, we have to

notice that instability is a recurrent topic. The point is that such views

have nothing to do with the situation that has evolved out of the 9/11

chaos. In fact, it may even appear that the notion of instability itself has

been a key-concept in different approaches trying to understand what are

the prospects of the region. However, we should observe that this is by

no means an exclusivity of this region. Many researchers in social

sciences and international policies do use this concept while analyzing

quite a different range of countries. For example, in South-Eastern Asia

or in Southern America, if not in Africa or the Balkans. Better: One of

the best specialists on these questions, M. Stanley Hoffmann, believes

that instability is actually a characteristic feature of the international

arena, which he sees as part order and part disorder180

. Instability in the

international politics of the Gulf has two aspects: domestic political

instability, which has international political implications, and

international political instability itself. Domestic political instability with

179

Idem. 180

Stanley Hoffmann: World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War

Era, November 1998, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. We live, Hoffmann notes,

"in a world of great originality, complexity, and uncertainty." It remains a world of

sovereign states, but these states are buffeted by forces often beyond their control. The

increasing globalization and privatization of economics both creates international

interdependence and further polarizes the "have" and "have not" nations. Ethnic and

religious conflicts tear at national cohesions, as does the rise of intense nationalist and

separatist aspirations. Older tools of understanding the world no longer suffice. The

"realist" approach that sees only competing, absolutely self-interested states captures

neither the current reality of cooperation, at times, among states nor the weakness of the

state in many instances. The "liberal" approach, which assumed a more peaceful world

would evolve through, among other things, the spread of markets, has ignored the harm

the world market has done. Hoffmann's own approach to international relations is itself

liberal yet - embracing Kant, Rawls, and others - focused on ethical and normative

considerations. Individuals have the right to autonomy and integrity, and states have the

duty to insure this right. While this might seem merely a simplistic adage, Hoffmann

deliberates carefully on what such an ethos means and how it might be applied to

understanding and judging myriad world situations and problems, from immigration to

armed intervention in the affairs of another state.

118

international political implications in turn has two meanings. The first

entails a change of regimes. What is meant is not only change of

government or change of controlling party or leadership. What is meant

is a change in basic form of government, a change in legitimating

principles, such as from democracy to dictatorship, monarchy to republic.

Such domestic political instability has international political implications

because regime changes often herald changes in the foreign policy and

reorientation of international alignments. If the regime change is a radical

one, it often carries a revolutionary fervor and interest in foreign

adventure. That was undoubtedly the case of the Iranian revolution,

which introduced an element of ideological competition in the

international politics of the Gulf that has given rise to the protracted Iraq-

Iran war and the creation of the GCC as a collective security pact. Both

of these activities are unexpected in a normal or "stable" dynamic

balance of power. In addition a number of territorial disputes between

Gulf States have been identified as well as cleavages within the political

communities of the Gulf States and potentially radical regime changes

that have destabilizing implications for the current system.

Lenore G. Martin notes that " a transformation of the Gulf

international system would occur in the event of radical changes to its

structure, which is composed of a number of major actors and a

distribution of their capabilities. These changes would be systemic in the

sense that a radical change in one element, such as a radical redistribution

of capabilities, would also incur a radical change in the other element, the

number of major actors. So, for example, the most likely transformations

from a dynamic balance of power would be to an imperial system, in

which a single major actor possessed predominant capabilities, or to a

bipolar system, in which two major actors possessed superior

capabilities."181

"Such transformations may result from the interactions of the

actors within the system", he emphasizes. "They may also result from

interactions with actors from outside of the system"182

. "One other

serious possibility that should be mentioned is the development or

introduction of nuclear weaponry into the Gulf"183

.

181

Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf: Threats from within, Lexington

Books, 1984. P.156. 182

Idem. 183

Idem.

119

Democracy and Interests

In the Rand report previously mentioned, it is stated that ―the

United States has a broad, worldwide interest in democracy and human

rights that has implications for U.S. actions in the Middle East. However,

this interest is honored more in the breach than in reality because Israel is

the only democratic state in the region‖. In other terms, the USA stays

more committed to promoting Israeli interests than those of the Arab

regimes. What is not taken in consideration here is the fact that Israel is

still considered as an aggressor, since its government does not abide by

the UN resolutions asking for Israeli withdrawal from the 1967

conquered territories. For the Arabs, the point is: does the Israeli refusal

to enforce the international law make it a Rogue State or not? If it does,

how could such a state be a pillar in the American strategy in the Middle

East? And if it does not, then what is the definition of a Rogue State? In

the political discourse prevailing in the Arab and Muslim countries, it is

repeatedly stated that the American unconditional commitment to Israel

would have negative implications for future and current US actions in

the region.

In fact, for a part of the Arab elite, the point is not about arguing

whether Israel is a democracy or not, but about whether democracy itself

is held by US policymakers as a condition for full access to the same

favors and privileges acquired by Israel: if such is the case, then the USA

deceived the Arab and Muslim governments, which it has supported sixty

years along , for Washington acknowledges none of them as democratic.

Therefore, what the USA is supporting them for, asks this elite?

The argument seems sound, particularly when it is compared

with the Rand report‘s findings : « Saudi Arabia, for example, says the

report , has no free press or free elections, and Saudi women face a

variety of restrictions on their travel, employment, and daily lives. Even

Egypt, which has had a parliament for decades, has bans on organized

political activity and on free speech, and has other basic impediments to

democracy »184

. If these restrictions elicit at most mild criticism from

Washington, the linkage between the most conservative of the Arab

countries (Saudi Arabia) and the most liberal (Egypt) is an interesting

feature., which implies that repression is not an exclusivity of the

184

Rand report. Op.Cit.

120

conservatives. As Jon Alterman notes, ―American officials have tended

to accede to official requests to downplay calls for democratization and

to shun extensive contacts with those working against the ruling

governments.‖185

As a result, even liberal Middle Easterners question

U.S. support for democracy. Murphy and Gause contend that ―there is a

pervasive sense in the Middle East that the United States does not

support democracy in the region, but rather supports what is in its

strategic interest and calls it democratic‖186

.

The latter sentence retains the attention, because if such is the

acknowledgement of an American report issued by an institution like

Rand, then what should be the attitude of the Arab elite? The ―settled

way of thinking‖ the Middle East issues may find it hard to admitting,

but policy making is not just creating illusions and playing with them, as

Charles de Gaule said once. That may be rewarding for a while, until the

growing dissent sweeps away the illusions and their makers, as the great

general himself experienced it in May 1968, and as the USA also learned

in 1979 when the Shah run away from Iran, giving up to the popular

pressure.

This is anyway more and more recognized by American analysts

and commentators. There is even an evolution less expected, because it

concerns ordinary folk in America and elsewhere. ― In the wake of

September 11, the U.S. public may be less tolerant of government

support for authoritarian states in the region‖, says the Rand report187

;

and it goes on adding that a survey conducted in November 2001 found

57 percent of the polled saying that it was ―very important‖ for the

United States to press for more democracy in Saudi Arabia, which is an

enormous increase over the 10 percent who responded similarly in a June

1999 poll.

The report recognizes by the way that concerns over

democratization and human rights often limit U.S. actions and could

affect the type of support it would provide in a crisis. For example, if

unrest in a Gulf state led to mass demonstrations and the government

responded by killing large numbers of unarmed protesters, the United

States would have to reconsider arms sales to that country and might

otherwise limit ties at least temporarily. Even if unrest arose threatening

the flow of oil or the stability of a friendly regime, the United States

185

Idem. 186

Future Security Environment, Op.Cit. 187

Idem.

121

would be not very likely to use its own forces, according to the report, to

directly assist a regime that used torture, arbitrary arrests, and other

forms of repression that would be widely condemned in the United States

and the West in general. Furthermore, the U.S. public may grow more

cautious about cooperating with autocratic Middle Eastern regimes in the

wake of September 11, particularly those that are not seen as cooperating

in the war on terrorism, further limiting the U.S. scope of action. And the

conclusion the Rand report draws from these statements is that ―although

human rights and democratization are not interests that the United States

actively seeks to advance or protect in the Middle East, they are broad

concerns that may inhibit U.S. attempts to defend its other interests‖188

.

However, the question that seems hitherto unavoidable for the

Arab elite, objecting to the special US-Israeli relationship over the

pretension that it is the only democracy in the region, is: if human rights

and democratization are not interests that the US actively seeks to

advance, then just what is the ground of its unconditional commitment to

Israel? In other words, if we do not consider all the assistance the Israeli

state receives from the USA as some sort of reward for its democracy –

―the only in the Middle East‖- then what is the object of the assistance?

If we insist on the Israeli-Arab conflict as an aspect of the

strategic ramifications in the aftermath of 9/11, it is well because it is

almost never absent of any American study even if it is concerned with

the Gulf – theoretically far away from Israel – or the sole Saudi Arabia.

Actually, Israel is also present in the background of the picture, each time

we have to analyze the local policies in the region. The discourse about

the Israeli-Arab conflict is an integrative part of the political discourse in

the Arab world without exception since long years. It has even a double

social and political function, for on the one hand, it is instrumented by

rulers and officials to demonstrate their commitment to the great cause of

the Palestinian struggle for justice and freedom, which gathers popular

consent and sympathy all over the Arab and Muslim world ; and on the

other hand, it plays a part in legitimating and illegitimating rulers and

policies by the media and the civil society. Let us put it more simply: an

Arab ruler who is losing credibility and legitimacy will doom himself if

going away from the collective consent of his society, he makes of an

Israeli government a friend at the expenses of the Palestinians, as far as

the struggle is not resolved. In blunt words, this is highly unpopular, as

everybody knows from President Sadate experience. People in the Arab

188

Idem.

122

world may forgive authoritarianism, but they do not forgive what they

believe to be treason coming from their own ruler. As Burhan Ghalioun

observed, some Arab rulers have not only inherited the colonization

legacy, but also its role. In their own countries, they are considered

foreign occupiers, and they behave as such, to the extent that they are

perceived as the enemies of the people. Whence the idea that the State in

such countries stands against the nation189

.

Threats and concerns

This leads us to question the American view about the interests

and the concerns in the region. We think there is some kind of confusion

– or a mismanaged ambiguity - in the report, when it comes to talking

about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

« In recent decades, says the Rand report 190

, several different

types of threats have emerged to the U.S. interests: One of the more

recurrent themes is the identification of Israel as a pro-western state,

whereas the Arabs, which enter in conflict with it, are ‗aggressors‘ ».

We do not see how such a situation may represent any direct

threat to the US interests. First : who identifies Israel as a pro-Western

country while the Arabs are perceived as ‗agressors‘, but the Israelis

themselves ? Second, we observe that the Arabs hold exactly the reverse

of that discourse : some of them -included Saudi Arabia and the rest of

the GCC- think that they are, indeed, pro-western states and that Israel is

an agressor maintaining by violence the Palestinians under occupation.

The Rand report failed to see the double side of the picture.

Moreover, when it talks of the challenges to the US interests, it

says that ―the greatest danger to regional security in the past was outright

aggression by a hostile state. Israel fought wars with its neighbors in

1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982. In addition, for much of this period it

regularly skirmished with Egyptian and Syrian troops as well as

Palestinian guerrillas‖191

.

189

See Burhan Ghalioun, Le Malaise Arabe, L‘État contre la Nation, La

Découverte, Paris, 1991. 190

Future Security Environment. Op.Cit. 191

Idem.

123

This is quite an explosive ―mixture‖, for at least in two of these

above-mentioned wars, Israel was certainly the aggressor, not the Arabs:

precisely in 1956(along with France and G.Britain) and in 1982, when it

invaded Lebanon and besieged its capital Beirut. Besides, in 1967, it was

well the Israeli air forces that undertook to destroy the Egyptian aviation

on the ground, even before any war plane could take off, and

subsequently, after invading the Sinai, and much of the West Bank and

the Golan, Israel refused to come back to the pre-war boundaries, as it

has been ordered by the U.N. resolutions. So, the question remains: What

is the meaning of ―hostile state‖ and « agressor » in the Rand report?

The case of Iran and Iraq is different. Here we are directly

confronted with the problems of the Gulf security. In the 1970s, Iran and

Iraq engaged in a proxy war over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and then

fought a brutal eight-year war with each other in the 1980s, which led to

disruptions in the flow of oil and destabilized the region. In 1971, Iran

occupied several islands claimed by the UAE. Iraq invaded Kuwait in

1990 and was only expelled by the U.S.-led coalition‘s massive military

effort.

There is also what the Rand report called ―internal instability‖:

« Internal instability also poses a threat to U.S. interests. Palestinian

groups have long used terrorism to weaken Israel. In 1987, Palestinians

in the West Bank and Gaza began a series of riots and demonstrations

against Israeli occupation, the first intifada. Violence continued

sporadically in the 1990s, surged after the collapse of peace talks in

2000, and remains intense »192

. The Arab reading of this sentence may be

as follows: unless the USA identifies its own interests to those of the

Israeli state, one cannot see how local uprising against the Israeli iron

hand in the West Bank and Gaza – which have never been acknowledged

as Israeli territories by the international community - can pose a threat to

US interests!

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that when talking of the unrest in

the Gulf States, the report identifies clearly the American interests to

those of these governments. Whence, the question : is it easier to unveil

the American anxiety about a region of vital importance for the world

economy than to recognize that in fact the US administration

sympathizes more with the Israelis than with the Palestinians? Anyway,

we are reminded that in 1979, Saudi and other Arab religious extremists

seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, holding off Saudi security forces for

192

Idem.

124

two weeks. Under the influence of the Iranian revolution, Shi‘a in

Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia rioted against their governments in

the early 1980s. In 1995, radical Islamists destroyed the Office of

Program Management/Saudi Arabian National Guard office in Riyadh

killing seven, including five Americans. It also appears that Saudi,

Egyptian, Yemen, and Algerian nationals are a major component of al

Qaeda, and many Gulf state citizens provided financial support to a range

of anti-U.S. Islamist causes. In general, many states in the Middle East

face economic problems and demographic pressures and have few

institutions for incorporating public sentiment into decision-making, a

combination that suggests that the potential for unrest remains acute.

We will add another element to this picture, of which everybody

should be aware since it triggered wars and revolts in the region. It is

what Fred Halliday calls the ―Gulf misperceptions‖193

. His analysis is

based on the hypothesis that the geopolitics of the contemporary Gulf are

dominated by a triangular conflict between the three most powerful states

of the region – Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. His thesis is that the causes of

instability in the Gulf, of past conflicts and probable future ones, ―lie

much less in a continuous history or in the geopolitics itself, in past

external intervention or relations between local states, and more in the

contemporary domestic politics of these three countries‖194

. More to the

point, if we ask what it is that has constituted the current divisions within

the Gulf, including misperceptions, the answer, according to Halliday, ―is

to be found in the forms of state produced in the region in the modern

period, and in the way which two groups of people, previously almost

completely separated from each other, came to be brought into contact by

modern political forces, in particular by two such forces, first external,

imperial intervention, and then internal, the rise of nationalism‖195

.

However, we think that Halliday writing under the latterly effects

of the 8 years long Iraqi- Iranian war, has a little exaggerated the hostility

between Iranians and Arabs. Is it true that the two groups of people have

been ―completely separated from each other‖ before the modern period?

Nothing is more doubtful, though. Halliday reminds us that ―Saddam was

quick to invoke Qadisiyya as a mobilisatory symbol in his war with the

Islamic Republic‖, which is true. Yet, neither Saddam nor his regime is

193

Fred Halliday , Arabs and Persians Beyond the Geopolitics of the Gulf, in :

Cahiers d‘études sur la Méditrranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, n°22, juillet-

décembre 1966. 194

Idem. 195

Idem.

125

supposed to be a reference in matter of historical thought or

historiography196

. Both have largely contributed to the miserable

falsification of Arabo-islamic history inasmuch as that history cannot be

reduced to the phenomenon of Shu‘ubiyya197

, without amputating it from

the most significant contribution to sciences, arts, philosophy etc, in the

classical and medieval times, provided by the Iranians.

If we cannot brush away the conflicting relations between Arabs

and Iranians, is it that not because all political and social relations are by

definition conflicting? What has been always uneasy to admitting in the

region is precisely the racialist view of the relations, especially when it

borrows the nationalistic discourse, either on the Arab side (the Iraqi

Baath conceptions for example) or on the Iranian (during the Shah

Muhammad Ridha rule). Here, we join Halliday on a point: When Great

Britain lost its influence 198

and the USA started increasing gradually its

naval presence and becoming the main arms supplier to pro-Western

regional states, the result was that Iran came increasingly to present itself

as the dominant power in the Gulf : ―it developed its navy, and,

especially after 1971, insisted that the Gulf be known by the name

‗Persian Gulf‘. During the 1970s this assertion of Iran‘s hegemony was

reinforced by the Shah‘s desire to make Iran a great economic power, a

‗second Japan‘: this imperial project was conceived of as a counterweight

to the Arab world as a whole‖199

. Yet, if Iran sought to develop its

military and economic ties with a bloc of non-Arab states – Turkey,

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India- ―as a counter-weight to the Arabs‖, let

us not forget that the common bond between these countries and Iran is

well Islam.200

196

In 1981, a year after the start of the Iran-Iraq war, Dar al Hurriya, the

government publishing house, issued Three Whom God Should Not Have Created:

Persians, Jews and Flies. The author, Khairallah Talfah, was the foster-father and

father-in-law of Saddam Hussein. It was the Iraqi Baathist too who, claiming to be the

defenders of Arabism on the ―eastern frontiers‖, brought to the fore the chauvinist myth

of Persian migrants and communities in the Gulf being comparable to the Zionist

settlers in Palestine. 197

It means a racial distinction between Arabs and Persians. 198

Withdrawal from Kuwait in 1961, from South Yemen in 1967, from Bahrain,

Qatar and the Emirates in 1971, from Oman in 1977. 199

Halliday. Op.Cit. 200

In India also there is a large Islamic community.

126

Defense and Security

Ever since the oil shocks of the 1970s, the United States has

steadily been accumulating military muscle in the Gulf by building bases,

selling weaponry, and forging military partnerships. James Aikin, who

served as a US envoy in Kuwait and Iraq, and ultimately as ambassador

to Saudi Arabia at the time, recalls that in 1975 an article headlined

‗Seizing Arab Oil‘ appeared in Harper‘s. The author, who used the

pseudonym Miles Ignotus, was identified as a ‗Washington-based

professor and defense consultant with intimate links to high-level US

policymakers‘. The article outlined, as Akins put it, ―how we could solve

all our economic and political problems by taking over the Arab oil fields

and bringing in Texans and Oklahomans to operate them‖201

.

Simultaneously, a rash of similar stories appeared in other magazines and

newspapers. ―I knew that it had to have been the result of a deep

background briefing‖, Akins says. ―Then I made a fatal mistake. I said on

television that anyone who would propose that is either a madman, a

criminal, or an agent of the Soviet Union‖. Soon afterward, he says, he

learned that the background briefing had been conducted by his boss,

then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Akins was fired later that year.

If the anecdote says a lot about Kissinger‘s manners, it says even

more about some American officials and policymakers‘ look at the Gulf,

maybe at the Arab world as a whole. In the 1970s, ―America‘s military

presence in the Gulf was virtually nil, so the idea of seizing control of its

oil was a pipe dream‖, notes Dreyfuss202

. How about the situation since

―Desert Storm‖? Indubitably, when he invaded Kuwait, Saddam Hussein

triggered a mechanism he will never be able to control. In very simple

words: he brought to reality Kissinger‘s old ―pipe dream‖.

Until 1991, the United States was unable to persuade the Arab

Gulf states to allow a permanent American presence on their soil.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, while maintaining its close relationship with

201

Reported by Robert Dreyfuss, The Thirty-Year Itch, March 1, 2003, Mother

Jones. 202

Idem.

127

the United States, began to diversify its commercial and military ties; by

the time US ambassador Chas Freeman arrived there in the late eighties,

the USA had fallen to the fourth place among arms suppliers to the

kingdom. ―The United States was being supplanted even in commercial

terms by the British, the French, even the Chinese,» Freeman notes203

.

All that changed with the Gulf war.

―After the second Gulf war‖, says Jerichow, ―in 1991 it was

difficult to pretend that the Saud family was not being protected by and

dependent on the USA‖204

. In all, ―6000 US soldiers, training facilities

and planes were stationed on a permanent basis in Saudi Arabia, the vast

majority of them in the eastern province which was already used to a lot

of foreigners in the oil industry. More than 30.000 US civilians were

working in the country in 1996‖.205

The United States and Saudi Arabia are not linked by a formal

defense treaty; however, a series of informal agreements, statements by

successive U.S. Administrations, and military deployments have

demonstrated a strong U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia206

.

Saudi forces acquired experience during the Gulf war and further

upgrading through a large-scale program of arms procurement. Together

Saudi Arabia and its five smaller Gulf neighbors remain vulnerable to

future external aggression, according to the American prevailing

analysis. On one hand, both the Iranian and Iraqi armed forces suffered

major personnel and equipment losses during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq

war and Operation Desert Storm, respectively, and neither is in a position

to offer an immediate threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). On

the other hand, the combined forces of Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies

have been outnumbered in important categories by those of Iraq and Iran,

even after the losses sustained by both countries in recent wars (with the

exclusion of operation Iraqi Freedom).207

In the decade after the second Gulf war, the USA sold more than

$43 billion worth of weapons, equipment, and military construction

203

Idem. 204

Anders Jerichow, Saudi Arabia, Outside Global Law and Order, Curzon Press,

1997, p. 97. 205

Idem. 206

For statements by previous administrations, see CRS Report 94-78, Saudi

Arabia: U.S. Defense and Security Commitments, February 3, 1994. 207

Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations, August 4, 2003, Alfred B.

Prados, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division /CRS Issue Brief for Congress.

128

projects to Saudi Arabia, and $16 billion more to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain,

and the United Arab Emirates. Before operation Desert Storm, the US

military enjoyed the right to stockpile, or ―pre-position‖, military

supplies only in the comparatively remote Gulf state of Oman on the

Indian Ocean. After the war, nearly every country in the region began

conducting joint military exercises, hosting US naval units and Air Force

squadrons, and granting the United States pre-positioning rights.

Obviously, Saddam‘s catastrophic invasion of Kuwait, created a new

situation, where the old precepts of arab and islamic solidarity sounded

without real meaning.

In an analysis that has preceded the war against Saddam, the

authors208

have assumed -rightly - that this regime will be defeated, and –

less accurately - « that Iraq will not implode into civil war, and that a

U.S.-led coalition will oversee the emergence of a new Iraqi government

that will have a modicum of internal legitimacy and external

acceptance ». Its pertinence to our subject is that if the war against

Saddam was indirectly a consequence of 9/11 and the Bush anti-terrorist

campaign, - since it has been waged upon the assumption that if

Saddam's WMD were not found and destroyed they might very well end

up in the hands of some terrorists – then post-Saddam Iraq is likely to be

a part of the regional system set up by the USA in the Gulf209

. That is

why the authors of the report think that a « fundamentally new Iraqi

regime is necessary but, » they argue, « insufficient for lasting Gulf

security ».

In effect, with a probability of the Iranian neighbor acquiring

nuclear capability, what would be the reactions of Saudi Arabia or even

of the UAE, which a controversy over three islands already oppose to

Iran?210

208

Andrew Rathmell, Theodore Karasik, and David Gompert, A New Persian

Gulf Security System, Issue Paper, Rand Corporation. 209

For an analysis in depth of this case, see: Hichem Karoui, l‘après-Saddam en

Irak, les plans, les hommes, et les problèmes. Op.Cit. 210

If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, then, from an American strategic

standpoint, a "best case" scenario for U.S. interests would be an Iran that retains a

defensive stance and does not seek to expand its influence in the region. That being

said, even defensive tactics can be affected in a world where states possess variable and

often wildly differing notions of national security interests. Because of this, Washington

is working to take preventive measures to slow Iran's quest for power. For instance, one

preventive measure taken by the United States to slow Iran's growth -- and a measure

that has been in place for years -- is U.S. economic sanctions. But it has been observed

that Washington's sanctions policy has not been entirely effective. Iran's economic

129

―It would be unlikely that Saudi Arabia would nuclearize in the

face of a nuclear armed Iran‖, says a recent report 211

; and in explanation

of this hypothesis, it assumes that « because Saudi Arabia would likely

not seek to build or establish nuclear technologies, alternate means could

be considered to secure a similar strategic end. More specifically, in

regards to weapons of mass destruction, the monarchy could seek to

increase clandestinely its chemical weapons as a parallel deterrent »212

.

Yet, we find the assumptions about the possible nuclearization of Saudi

Arabia as groundless as stupidly steeped in a heinous attitude toward

Islam. Whatever the criticism we may express vis-a-vis Saudi policy, we

have to acknowledge that it has never been characterized by such

ambitions of grandeur. Of course, there is Pakistan. But there is also

India, and the old rivalry between both countries. In the recent history of

the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, does not stand as a rival for any country.

Without expansionist ambition – such as the israeli or the iraqi during

Saddam‘s rule - , and without rivalry – such as the one prevailing

between all the nations that sought and got nuclear weapons - , why

should the Saudi state buy nuclearization ? The problem of Iran is

different , as this country has since the revolution – and much more so

since the American invasion of Iraq - felt threatened, either by Saddam,

or by Israel, or by the USA.

At present, the Saudi regime still has much to prove to its

citizenry about how it can reform without breaking the perceived

interpretations of Islamic law. A nuclear Iran ten or fifteen years ago

would have been a significant threat to Saudi Arabia; today, however, it

would likely cause only a moderate change to the power equation.

Nonetheless, such change would greatly benefit the Iranians with an

advantage in current bargaining issues, regardless of U.S. sanctions or

rhetoric.

sectors remain heavily reliant upon its energy resources. While its energy industry is

ineffectually managed due to haphazard state control, questionable oversight

procedures, as well as murky forms of regulation, these inadequacies and potential

liabilities make little difference to thirsty states such as China and India that have a

growing demand for energy resources. Because of this, some observers think that

Tehran is able to compensate for U.S. economic sanctions through its growing relations

with China and India. Yet, one is inclined to ask: Why Libya was not able then to stand

more to the sanctions imposed for its refusal to collaborate over Lockerby affair, despite

the Jamahiriya could also seek help in India and China and Russia and other nations? 211

Jonathan Feiser, Nuclear Iran: Repercussions for Turkey and Saudi Arabia,

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR), January 28, 2005. 212

Idem.

130

Elite change theories and American strategists

As we have previously pointed, to be efficient and legitimate any

change has to be performed by the local elite. There is no strategy that

can change this rule, and any strategy that does not take it in account

would be doomed. It is also important to note that besides approaches in

general theory of elite, the impact of the social theories of Michel

Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu proved to be decisive in shaping

conceptualizations of elite change. Foucault made clear that power does

not exclusively belong to a class or even to a group of people, rather it is

a general phenomenon in all aspects of social life. Bourdieu‘s theory on

different ―forms of capital‖ was also crucial because it opened the way

for thinking about the convertibility of different social assets.

Elite approach gained strength by the end 1980s, partly because

elite theory seemed to be more appropriate to capture the social changes

unleashed by the collapse of communism in East-Europe and the former

Soviet Union, than the classic Marxist approach. In the last two decades,

there were many studies in elite theory inspired by the classic

contributions of Weber, Pareto, Mosca and Mills. Burton and Higley

emphasized, for example, the importance of elite groups in political

change. They claimed that elite settlements represent one route to stable

democracy. Their definition is the following :

―Elite settlements are relatively rare events in which warring

national elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations

by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements. Elite

settlements have two major consequences: they create patterns of open

but peaceful competition, based on the norm of ‗restrained partisanship‘

among all major elite factions, and they transform unstable regimes (…)

into stable regimes in which irregular seizures no longer occur and are

not widely expected‖213

.

Elite settlements were presented as alternatives to social

revolutions. They are defined as the elite side of peaceful transitions to

democracy and acknowledged as the more important part of it. According

to the authors, elite settlements have five major characteristics: 1- speed

(it must be done quickly or not at all); 2- Negotiations (face-to-face,

213

Michael G. Burton and John Higley , Elite Settlements, American

Sociological Review, Vol 52, June 1987, 295-307.

131

partially secret); 3- written agreements; 4 – conciliatory behavior; 5 –

Experienced leaders.

The idea of such elite driven-change was formulated in the

intellectual atmosphere of the1980s which emphasized the importance of

the more formal, minimalist, « modest» meaning of democracy where

elite choices are not so much disturbed by the masses. Huntington‘s own

approach was also elite-centered when he said that ―democratic

institutions come into existence through negotiations and compromises

among political elites calculating their own interests and desires‖214

. The

elite settlement approach was then followed by some important

contributions in ―transitology‖, which described the process of regime

change largely as ―elite games‖.

With this view in the mind, we can now have a different approach

of the changes that have recently occurred (Iraq and Afghanistan, for

instance) and those still expected.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 2003 war

against Iraq, as we know, profoundly affected the Middle East in general

and U.S. policy in the region in particular. Although the ramifications of

these events are still being felt, several changes are already evident. The

way the American strategists look at the changes provides us with a

strategic insight regarding the options in the ―elite games‖. From the

American point of view, the ―elite settlements‖ would have to be

negotiated over topics of first priority for the Bush administration.

Nothing is said about the priorities of the other side (the countries

concerned), which are likely considered as identical to US priorities.

Thus, the Rand report about Future Security environment in the Middle

East, builds the American strategy upon the following points :

1- « A reprioritization of U.S. interests. Terrorism and WMD

proliferation have long been a concern of the U.S. government. However,

the scale of the September 11 tragedy has elevated terrorism‘s relative

importance, and the subsequent war with Iraq increased awareness of the

dangers posed by WMD proliferation. Other U.S. interests, such as the

Arab-Israeli conflict and relations with Saudi Arabia, may be reassessed

within this new context »215

. Let us notice by the way that the linkage

between terrorism and WMD proliferation was already in the background

214

Samuel P.Huntington, Will more countries be democratic? Political Science

Quarterly, Vol 99, 1984, 193-218. 215

The Future Security Environment in the Middle East, conflict, stability and

political change, Edited by Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman, Rand Project Air

Force.

132

of the picture, prior to the war against Saddam. To put it simply, it was

the main justification of the war, although it revealed afterwards to be a

fake excuse. It goes without saying that such a « priority » means to put

countries like Iran and Syria under close scrutiny.

2- « Reduced tolerance for state sponsorship of terrorism. In the

1980s and 1990s, Iran, Iraq, and « other sponsors of terrorism »

conducted limited strikes without suffering massive retaliation. Such

tolerance, however, has now eroded. The toppling of the Taliban in

Afghanistan vividly illustrated the U.S. willingness and capacity to

overthrow regimes that support anti-U.S. terrorist groups. That point was

further emphasized in the spring of 2003, when the Bush administration

used Saddam Hussein‘s pretended connections with al Qaeda as one of

the justifications for war »216

. This « priority » is understandable,

although it is also intended to be used as a deterrent. The case of Libya is

here enough expressive : the 180 degree about-face in the Libyan policy

was perceived by observers as much more related to the wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq than to the resolution of the Lockerby affair. The

message the wars delivered was sanctions against Libya over Lockerby

were not the last step but the first in the scale.

3- « A focus on internal stability. Although all regimes in the

Middle East were well aware of the threat that Islamic radicals posed

(several regimes had long been fighting Islamic insurgencies and many

others monitored and arrested radicals), the attention of the United States

was not focused on regional domestic politics. The attacks suggest,

however, that the domestic policies of regimes, particularly their

willingness to allow citizens to support or join radical causes abroad,

directly affect U.S. security »217

. Yet, we do not need to say that the US

focus on internal local affairs in the region is not welcome, whatever the

justification. It is actually felt as an hegemony will. So, as long as this

feeling is prevailing in the Arab and Muslim societies, Washington

would find great difficulties to have its « elites game » locally adopted

and tuning up.

4- « A decline in conventional military threats. With the toppling

of Saddam‘s regime, the danger of a conventional military conflict has

diminished considerably. Although Syria, Iran, and other ―potential

aggressors‖ maintain large forces, in general they do not field modern

equipment, are poorly trained, and otherwise pose only a limited threat.

216

Idem. 217

Idem.

133

In contrast, the region‘s two greatest military powers, Israel and Turkey,

are staunch U.S. allies »218

. However, the stated decline of conventional

military threat would be transformed from a statement into a priority at

the condition that it is maintained as a status quo, which is hardly the

case. The first party expected to breach the « status quo » is the US

government itself, as it is apparently carrying on the same policy as

concerns arms sails.

Saudi Elite positions

Some of the American research material related to Saudi Arabia

and the Gulf region, issued in the period preceding the operation Iraqi

Freedom, has stirred a lot of concern among the Saudi elite. For example,

the Saudi scholar Turki al Hamad wrote an op-ed reacting about the

release of what he deemed to be ― an indirect message to the Saudi

government pressuring it to be obedient to the demands of the American

administration, because the alternative might be the collapse of the whole

regime‖219

. In al Hamad‘s analysis, since 9/11, Saudi Arabia is no longer

the same country for the Americans, who discovered that ―America is

hated on a broad scale inside the Saudi society, as is the case of any other

Arab society, precisely because of the Palestinian problem. America used

to believe that the Saudis were not similar in their attitudes to other Arab

people, and suddenly they appear all the same. And the Saudis might

even have more extremist positions in so far as they stood on

fundamentalist principles‖220

. The result of a quick U.S. evolution,

according to al Hamad, is that Saudi Arabia appeared to the Americans

as « the cultural matrix, the social environment, and the financial source

of the terrorism that struck the twin towers in September‖221

. For al

Hamad, the danger was not in the review of the relations, but it was in

doing it into a state of ―vertigo‖ that made the American reactions much

similar to those of its enemies: ― if those who masterminded the 9/11

operation are known to divide the world into black and white, absolute

right and absolute wrong, belief and unbelief, axis of goodness and axis

of evil, and no middle point between these extremities‖, then what is the

218

Idem. 219

Turki al Hamad, America wal Saudiyya , kay la nafqid al dalil, Al Sharq al

Awsat, 18/8 /2002. 220

Idem. 221

Idem.

134

difference?222

Moreover, Saudi Arabia, in al Hamad‘s view, cannot

subscribe to the logic likely to emanate from ousting Saddam from

power, which would divide the region into indefectible allies and

absolute enemies. He thinks that some states like Qatar, Bahrain, and

Kuwait ―have nothing to lose in allowing the Americans to use their

territories for attacking Iraq. That may even be practically the best

political option for these states, in so far as they are relying on that kind

of cooperation for their survival. But a state like Saudi Arabia has quite a

different reasoning. For if it agreed on changing the Iraqi regime from the

outside, thus opening its own territories for the operation, that would

mean to issue its own death sentence‖223

. In Hamad‘s view, agreeing on

the American logic is ultimately agreeing that it might be used against

Saudi Arabia itself, if the Americans are dissatisfied with its policy. This

is far from being a stranded voice among the Saudi intelligentsia. Many

people are likely to share al Hamad opinions.

After the New York Times published on October 14, 2001, a story

about the necessity of reexamining Saudi Arabia, M. Khaled Abdallah,

wrote in response to this article, which symbolizes in his view the new

trend in American strategic thought: ―the story defined the essence of the

relationship in the era preceding the end of the cold war, as follows: it

was a realistic deal, whereof the USA got the oil its economy needed and

Saudi Arabia got the military protection when its security was threatened

by its violent neighbors, included Iran and Iraq.‖ 224

Yet, it was not all what the Americans obtained from Saudi

Arabia, says the story, but also other services such as large investments

and a lot of expensive weapons, along with Saudi help in other spheres of

fight against rebels and ex-Soviet Union weakening, like what happened

in Nicaragua, Iran, and Afghanistan. There was a partnership; but that did

not hinder the American administration, according to the Saudi writer,

from leaking to the media some reports charging Saudi Arabia of ―being

active at all the levels of the terrorist connection, from the planners to the

funds backers, and from the master minders to the executors, and from

the theorists to the supporters‖225

. And he adds: ―if we take the previous

sentence and just replace the word (terrorist) by (militant) in the context

of the eighties, it would be considered as a merit that Saudi Arabia

222

Idem. 223

Idem. 224

Khaled Abdallah, attariq al masdud fi al ‗alaqat assaudiya al amirikiyya,

12/8/2002, Al Quds al Arabi, London. 225

Idem.

135

deserved, not as a demerit‖226

. These considerations would lead the

writer to stating that what happened between the USA and Saudi Arabia

is not just a temporary problem, but it is ―a political event with a deep

and broad signification. The Saudi political structure in its essence is no

longer of any usefulness to the American strategy, and its negative

symptoms have grown embarrassing for the American decision-

maker‖227

. Then, Khaled Abdallah makes another step in explaining what

he deems to be the new American strategic thought. According to this

writer, there are two trends in the USA advocating change in Saudi

Arabia. The first tries to pressure the Saudi government to monitor the

reforms so that when the changes come the USA would not be ―ejected‖

or marginalized in the process, as it happened in other countries (Iran, for

example). But while some of the American elite is concerned by true

reforms, some others are pressuring for changes just for the sake of

empire hegemony. However, the ―doves‖ and the ―falcons‖ agree,

according to K. Abdallah, on the necessity of substantial change, which

means for instance, that the religious establishment becomes just a

Ministry for religious affairs (Awqaf) as in other Arab countries, instead

of being a partner in decision making as it has been so far.

K. Abdallah underlines in the context of pressures, the role of the

new conservatives. He thinks that in full agreement with the Zionist

lobby, the New Conservatives want to ―separate religion in Saudi Arabia

from finances, so that the former plays less an important part abroad.

Besides, they imagine the possibility of dividing the country in two or

three states, with the smaller controlling oil, the second controlling the

pilgrimage rent – what they call religious tourism- and the third – Nejed-

which is deemed to be the hub of fanaticism, would live from subsidies

provided by the two others‖228

.

The idea of dividing Saudi Arabia cannot be considered as

serious, even if it stems out of Einstein‘s mind, which is not the case.

Apparently, the situation in Iraq , the former Lebanese civil war and the

fragile geo-political configuration of the Middle East region, additionally

to the ethnico-religious tensions, and some precedents in the Balkans,

inspire the imagination of some observers. Yet, we have to recall that

there is no ethnical divisions in the Saudi Kingdom. The country is

unified. The Arabs are its main component since the pre-islamic period,

226

Idem. 227

Idem. 228

Idem.

136

and even on the religious level, Saudi Arabia is sunnite – its Shiite

population is but a minority, which is not representative of any threat

toward the system. This is neither the case in Iraq, nor in Lebanon or

Syria. Thus, the idea of partitioning Saudi Arabia may be but a pipe

dream.

There is no doubt that it is also exploited by the opposition and

used as an additional pressure against the government. As it happens

often in all opposition literature in the Arab world, some of these debates

are more likely to range into wishful thinking than into serious objective

analysis.

According to Muhammad Ali al Fayez, the first time the Saudi

government acknowledged that the Kingdom‘s union is threatened was

when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. It was rumored then that what

Saddam was aiming at concerned the division of Saudi Arabia into three

political entities: ―the eastern region (Alahsa and Qatif) to be annexed by

Iraq, and the Western region (Hijaz) to be annexed to the Hashemite

Jordan, and the southern region (Jazan, Asir, Najran) to be annexed to

Yemen.‖229

Such an idea is preposterous, in our eyes, because Saddam

had not the means of invading Saudi Arabia. The country is merely above

his resources, - and he could not ignore it – although he might have

thought of protecting his back while invading Kuwait.

Now, while acknowledging that in the past there has been a great

deal of animosity between the Saudi Royals and the Hashemite family-

which ruled Iraq, and is today ruling Jordan- we wonder how much

credibility should we accord to the thesis that suggests the following:

―the Hashemite threat has been an element of terrible pressure exerted on

the Saudis in matters related to Hijaz‖230

? The question concerns actually

the ability or inability of the Hashemites to gain back Hijaz from which

they have been expelled even before the proclamation of the Saudi

kingdom. If there are still ambitions on this side, Iraq is much more easy

to deal with than Saudi Arabia, in the wake of Saddam‘s ousting from

power. But, as far as we know, the Hashemite monarchical party revealed

to be unable to attract iraqi people or to obtain any real weight inside the

country. How would such a party dream of obtaining Hijaz ?

229

Muhammad Ali al Fayez, al ‗alaqat al saudiyya al amirikiyya tadkhulu

marhalat kasr al ‗azm, 5/8/2002, Gulf Issues. 230

Fayez. Op. Cit.

137

The ―Hashemite threat‖ is indubitably a myth231

. Moreover, M. al

Fayez himself must not be very convinced of his own thesis, for he

moved the threat, from the « Hashemite +Saddam » side to the American

and the Arab neighborhood. In his view, the Americans have taken over

the question of dividing Saudi Arabia into several states. Thus, against all

what international observers agree upon, he ―decided‖ that ―the USA is

not the protector of the regime anymore, but its main threat‖232

. How and

why? His answer is : ―Just after Desert Storm, the Saudis began to feel

the menace of the dangerous protector. In their private spheres, the

Saudis officials started hinting that there are serious conspiracies plotting

to tear up the kingdom, and that the Americans have up three or four

political entities‖.233

Furthermore, the Saudis have localized the real

threats in their regional neighborhood, according to this writer. He

suggests that even the other GCC states, ―are hoping that some day the

kingdom would split up, so that the states emerging from its

fragmentation would be as small as them‖234

. The conspiracy involves

along with the Americans, ―Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, and some of the

Gulf States‖.235

When one looks closely to these countries, it is inevitable to state

that with each of them Saudi Arabia entertains a normal – if not an

excellent – relationship. So, what is the point of trying to implicate them

in such a paranoiac thesis?

It seems as if the writer wants absolutely to find any ground

whereupon he would set up his argument.These are, perhaps, the limits of

an opinion that takes in consideration only one part of the problem, in

231

The struggle between Sherifiens and Saudis go back to the XVIIIth century.

Saint-John Philby writes about it: ―The first serious encounter between Wahhabis and

the Sharif of Mecca, who had deliberately provoked it, had served only to emphasize

the strength of the new fanatics. The puritan creed, for all its lack of appeal to the easy-

going materialism of the Badawin Arab, had aroused in the more settled communities

something of a national sense, which, without entirely eliminating the traditional

passion of the populace for internecine strife, could be brought into play under the stress

of a common danger to their independence. And the success which had so triumphantly

vindicated this feeling of a common interest in defense would before long engender

ambitions of a more aggressive character, whose pursuit would more readily evoke the

enthusiasm of the Badawin, though the tribes would ever prove an element of weakness

in the hour of trial‖. See: Arabia, H.St.J. Philby, London, Ernest Benn Limited,

1930.Pp. 53-54. 232

Idem. 233

Idem. 234

Idem. 235

Idem.

138

focusing on what may be called the ―imaginary country‖, in contrast with

the ―real country‖. As it happens, this is a feature we can easily localize

in the Arab political discourse, whether it emanates from the government

or from the opposition. In the absence of a real democracy, where

opinions could be contested on a rational basis, the debate would evolve

into an environment characterized by paranoia, wishful thinking, and

political phantasms. The matter does not concern the sole Saudi Arabia,

but it is -as any observer can state – an Arab phenomenon.

However, the analysis of al Fayez, becomes less fantasizing

when, backing away from conspiracy theories, and paranoid allusions, he

focalizes on the changes occurring in the ―real world‖. In this context, he

mentions new occurrences in the American policies, which may be

summarised as follows:

1- The prevalence of a vision considering Islam as a threat to the

West and its civilization. Thus, since the collapse of the Soviet Union,

the West has started the construction of a new enemy, which is Islam.

2 – The decrease of the Saudi role on the economic level, because

of the existence of alternatives to the Saudi oil, in Russia and the Caspian

Sea.

3 – The apparition of alternative military facilities, other than

Israel, in the heart of the Gulf and on the edge of the Arab peninsula, in

Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and very likely in Iraq and Afghanistan

and other central Asian states.

The first tip is clearly biased. For it is not accurate to pretend that

the West is making Islam his enemy : there are millions of Muslims

living in the West, and they do not have this feeling. The West is neither

a unified bloc with a standardised ideology (as was the communist bloc)

nor even a homogenous society with a unique identity and a unique

objective. The West is actually a World , with an incalculable number of

differences, potentialities and perspectives. Indeed , there is a trend,

which has made of Islam an enemy. But such is the case in the Arab

world, as 9/11 and other terrorist operations against Westerners proved it.

May we accurately say that the Arab world has made of the West his

enemy ? It is an unacceptable – because biased - logic.

The third tip in this argument is about strategic options depending

on American vision and interests. As such, it is pointless to discuss it.

As to the second tip, it raises the question of whether the Caspian

Sea oil represents a real alternative to the Middle East or a mere myth.

This must be clear: Oil currently accounts for 40 percent of global energy

consumption and is not anticipated to fall much below this share in the

139

next 20 years. Saudi Arabia alone sits on fully 25 percent of global

reserves, with Iraq following at 11 percent, and Kuwait, the United Arab

Emirates, and Iran at 9 percent each. Only Saudi Arabia has the ability to

weigh on oil pricing. Russia certainly cannot play this role. The euphoria

on the Caspian Sea as alternative suppliers to the Gulf is quite misplaced.

Russia‘s proven oil reserves constitute just five percent of the world total.

« The Russian do anticipate finding major new reserves on Sakhalin

Island off their eastern coast, in the ―northern seas‖ of the Arctic Circle,

and in certain fields in the Russian sector of the Caspian Sea. As for the

other post-Soviet states, substantial new reserves certainly lie in the

Caspian basin, already equivalent in size to those under the North Sea.

And more finds are expected in Kazakhstan, where the new Kashagan

offshore field is now estimated to contain around 22 billion barrels of

oil…more than twice the size of the Prudhoe Bay reserves in Alaska. But

even after adding a field of this size to the existing reserves and projected

Russian findings, Russia and the Caspian basin together will still never

have enough oil to displace Saudi Arabia‘s 264.2 billion barrels of

proven reserves »236

.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia has a trump card that Russia has not: It

is, in effect, acknowledged that the kingdom‘s extra reserves, to be used

only as a last resort during a crisis in the oil market, make ―policymakers

elsewhere beholden to Riyadh for energy security‖ and form ―the

centerpiece of the US-Saudi relationship‖. Russia actually produces and

exports at maximum capacity and is likely to continue to do so: ―to make

matters worse, a recent Russian energy report indicates that if current oil-

extraction levels continue and new technologies do not bring additional

reserves into production, Russia can expect to have depleted its current

reserves by 2040‖.237

Some other conclusions may be drawn out of that literature that

grows popular on the internet and on some Arab media, much more

because of the lack of democracy inside the Arab world and the need for

free expression and free thought, than because of the accuracy of its

thesis. The most important feature is perhaps the amalgam entertained

between fighting terrorism and fighting Islam. Thus, some writers do not

236

Shibley Telhami, Does Saudi Arabia still matter? Foreign Affairs, November-

December 2002. 237

Idem.

140

hesitate to say that what America is after since 9/11 is actually Islam:

that‘s the enemy.

Starting from the statements elaborated by some Western

theorists, as they are interpreted in the Arab world, some among the

Saudi elite – much like many among the Arab intelligentsia- think that

what is at stake does not concern terrorism but Islam itself.

―It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a

movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the

governments that pursue them‖, writes Bernard Lewis238

. ―This is no less

than a clash of civilizations…the perhaps irrational but surely historic

reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our

secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both‖. Such a statement

in professor Lewis‘s text was accompanied by a call: ―It is crucially

important that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally

historic but also equally irrational reaction against that rival‖.

Apparently, the call as wise as it may be has been dismissed and

forgotten. What struck the Arab mind was precisely the statement about

the clash of civilizations. It would be broadly circulated and commented.

And it would be Samuel P. Huntington the real champion of the theory

that gave the Muslims their ―enemy‖ inasmuch as it gave the West its

own. The paradox passed almost unnoticeable, for everybody observed

that Huntington was talking about ―the new fundamental source of

conflict‖ as if it were concerning the sole West, since he was speaking on

its behalf. But the point is: can such a hypothesis create an enemy for the

West, - and let‘s call it the Other - without creating in the same time the

Other‘s enemy, which would be the West? This is the mirror effect of the

Clash of civilizations’ theory. But here too, people read only what they

want to read, and not necessarily what is written black on white. What

the Arabs retained from Huntington for example, are little striking

sentences, such as: ―the principal conflicts of global politics will occur

between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of

civilizations will be the battle lines of the future‖239

. But other sentences

would not even be considered as part of the analysis. For example, who

cares when Huntington says: ―In the politics of civilizations, the people

and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the

objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as

238

Bernard Lewis, What went wrong? The Atlantic Monthly, January 2002. 239

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, summer

1993.

141

movers and shapers of history‖240

? And we can indeed multiply the

examples of that ―selective» reading of some important texts, so that it

becomes obvious that with 9/11 in the background or without it, 241

when

people do not want to understand each other, or when understanding each

other they do not want to reach an agreement, for any reason, there is

nothing to do about it.

Saudi Arabia a piece in the “machine”?

Now, how can we evaluate the American approach in this

connection?

To begin with, the Americans seem to consider Saudi Arabia as a

part of a whole, which may be called the Gulf, the GCC States, or the

Greater Middle East, according to the case. On the global scale of the

region, there is a notion that the United States should anticipate potential

changes and shape and hedge accordingly. The Rand Corporation report,

previously mentioned, recommends in this context, the following:

« - Anticipating changing assumptions: Planning for regime

change requires recognizing when assumptions about how a regime will

behave are vulnerable. Obviously, analysts should continue to follow the

changing fortunes of individual leaders to best determine who may take

power should a current leader die or become incapacitated.

« - Anticipating more fundamental shifts is far more difficult.

Predicting a coup, revolution, or other forms of rapid and radical regime

change is exceptionally difficult »242

.

This acknowledgement of the difficulty of anticipation draws the

attention to the importance accorded to certain indicators when they

suggest a country is likely to face regime instability. These indicators are

featured as :

« A) the presence of partial democracy. In general, mature

democracies and established autocracies are fairly stable. Regimes that

are in transition, however, often face unrest and instability and are more

likely to go to war. If Egypt, Syria, or other regional states liberalize,

they may be vulnerable to sudden changes. B) A crisis among the elite.

Many revolutions began after a split in the existing elite. As a result,

240

Idem. 241

Both texts cited here, of B. Lewis and S. Huntington have been published and

commented before 9/11. 242

The Future Security Environment in The Middle East. Op.Cit.

142

regimes may find it difficult to repress or co-opt dissent, providing

opportunities for revolutionaries. C) The spread of populism. Even if

democracy does not spread, elites may rely more on populism to

mobilize support for their rule. For many years, politics in the Middle

East was the purview of elites such as military leaders, security officials,

wealthy landowners, and businessmen. If leaders appeal more and more

to the people for support, popular views, which are often at odds with

those of current regimes, will matter more ». 243

Obviously, the above features are not concerned with a particular

country, but sound as guidelines for the policy of the USA in the entire

Middle East. Yet, we cannot understand them in their full scope without

the recommendations intended to be ―shaping and hedging‖, which we

summarize hereafter :

1- « The United States should consider actions to shape the

environment to make any regime change more favorable and, should that

not be practical, hedge against unfavorable changes »244

. However,

intervention is not synonymous of success and it has little influence over

succession in most countries, acknolwledges the report, which notices

that « pressure may backfire, leading to the rise of anti-U.S. leaders ».

2 – « Washington should also consider increasing contacts with

leaders who are out of favor and factions that are out of power but enjoy

considerable support . Focusing exclusively on the current power set

risks being blindsided should dramatic change occur, as it did in Iran.

Islamist groups deserve particular attention. Many of these groups are

hostile to the United States, but dialogue is possible with some members,

and indeed necessary if many of the stereotypes and conspiracy theories

are to be dispelled. Establishing contacts with non-regime figures, of

course, will anger the regime, a tricky balance to negotiate »245

.

3 – « The United States should also focus more on cultivating

public opinion. The current U.S. focus on elites will be less fruitful in the

coming years. The possibility that publics may play a greater role in

decision-making than in the past is currently a danger for the United

States because of the hostile perceptions many Arab publics hold toward

U.S. policy. Washington should attempt a media strategy that explains

U.S. positions, going beyond the standard Western outlets and focusing

on Arab satellite television stations and newspapers »246

.

243

The Future Security Environment in The Middle East, Op. Cit. 244

Idem. 245

Idem. 246

Idem.

143

4 – « The United States should also consider increased student

and military exchanges (..). The U.S. military should consider a diverse

and redundant basing structure and access arrangements as a hedge

against instability or change in one country. Given that many countries

are vulnerable to sudden change, and almost all may at some point

hesitate to provide access to placate domestic opinion, having many

options is necessary »247

.

We do not need to comment over all these topics, as some of them

are normal ties between states on the international scene. However, the

sole concern is about systematic intervention elevated to the level of

doctrine. We wonder how much of these concerns are real necessities for

the American foreign policy and how much stem out of imperialist

views. We think that building the American strategy upon such concepts

as « shaping and hedging », and « favorable and unfavorable changes »,

etc…plays only in favour of a military view of the future.

Ostensibly, States like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where domestic

and opposition opinion appears firmly against ties to the U.S. military,

are of particular concern. In the Gulf, leading producers also face strong

social and political challenges, and have relied on energy revenues to

subsidize internal stability, as well as high levels of defense spending.

There is no clear and definite linkage between oil revenues and internal

stability, just as the Middle East offers few absolutely predictable links

between economic reform and stability at least in the short term.

Nonetheless, analysts of regional affairs tend to agree that energy

revenues allow otherwise dysfunctional states to ―cover a multitude of

sins‖ in terms of governance and public policy. Lower revenues, against

a background of social unrest and political turmoil across the region,

could press some regimes past the breaking point. Regime change itself

might not affect oil exports over the longer term, but internal instability

might well interrupt production on a temporary basis, pushing up prices

and discouraging foreign investment. One consequence of the events of

September 2001 has been to increase Western scrutiny of the internal

situation in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies. The potential for

internal instability in Saudi Arabia, the key ―swing producer,‖ may well

be the leading source of energy security risk over the next few years.

Iran is also not immune to the challenges posed by volatility in oil

prices. As with Saudi Arabia, oil revenues may be a factor in its stability

247

Idem.

144

over the next decade, and it may affect Iranian procurement priorities and

its ability to pursue WMD-related programs.

New concerns, self-criticism

Some American analysts248

think that the fall of Saddam Hussein

and the Baath regime in Iraq removed a critical set of military threats

from the Gulf. At the same time, the end of Saddam‘s regime has

scarcely transformed the Middle East. No one knows how stable Iraq will

be in the future, what its governments will be like, what its strategic

goals will be, or how it will eventually rebuild its military forces and

rearm. Furthermore, there are other types of threats that affect the region

and Saudi Arabia‘s planning for defense and counterterrorism: Local

threats from conventional military forces and proliferation; Regional

threats from terrorism and Islamic extremism; Self-inflicted threats

created by poor military planning and inadequate attention to economic

reform of the part of the Southern Gulf states; and Threats imposed by

policy failures on the part of the USA.

Let us begin by the latest of these threats, as it concerns the

acknowledgement of American shortcomings. In some Saudi reports we

have already analyzed, there is a belief that the US role as regards Saudi

Arabia, has shifted from the status of friend and protector to that of

potential threat, which means eventually a ―potential enemy‖ of the Saudi

regime. However, few – if any – self-criticism has emanated from the

Americans about the crisis in the relations with Saudi Arabia. A lot of

pressure has been put on the latter as if it were the unique responsible for

what happened in 9/11. Nothing is further from the truth, though. This is

first a matter of logic: in each relationship there is at least two parties. If

it breaks up, would it be fair to charge only one party of the failure?

248

See for example : Saudi National Security, Military and Security Services,

Challenges and Developments, Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, Center For

Strategic and International Studies, September 30, 2004

145

In their report about Saudi National Security249

, Cordesman and

Obaid acknowledge some of the American shortcomings.

One key problem, says the report, has been the failure to find

viable ways to support reform, and US political efforts that have been

more counterproductive than useful : « If the US is to maintain the

political support it needs to sustain its current security role in the Gulf, it

must accept the fact that change must be evolutionary and must be driven

largely on the basis of local values and reform efforts. The US also needs

to show its Arab allies and friends the respect they deserve. The US

cannot afford to deal with Islam or the Arab world in terms of ideological

prejudice. The US does not need either neo-conservatism or neo-

liberalism. It needs pragmatism, neo-realism, and a return to the

―internationalism‖ that has shaped its most successful national security

policy efforts ever since World War II. The US cannot afford to engage

every terrorist movement by itself, and its intervention in Iraq has shown

that it risks alienating and radicalizing peoples and movements in nations

throughout the Islamic world if it does so. It needs to create local

partnerships with key nations like Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. It needs to

focus systematically on just how different the various Sufi, Salafi, neo-

Wahhabi, and Shiites movements are, and then deal with each separately

on the terms best tailored to defeating violence and extremism in each

separate case. A far more visible US effort is needed to make it clear that

the US understands these realities, and understands that it is fighting

against a relatively small minority of extremists, and not the Arab world

and Islam. In the process, the US must also make it clear that while

trying to persuade other countries of adopting ―universal values‖ this will

not mean imposing Western values »250

.

The last point is quite problematic, for as we know, the Western

values, which are those of the modernity and the post-modernity are

identified completely as universal values. Let us take an example : the

idea of separation between religion and politics. About this topic,

Bernard Lewis notes that « if the idea that religion and politics should be

separated is relatively new, dating back a mere three hundred years, the

idea that they are distinct dates back almost to the beginnings of

Christianity. Christians are enjoined in their Scriptures to ‗render…unto

Caesar the things which are Caesar‘s and unto God the things which are

249

Idem. 250

Saudi National Security, Anthony H.Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid. Op.Cit.

146

God‘s »251

. Thereupon, Lewis acknowledges that « this formulation of

the problems posed by the relations between religion and politics, and the

possible solutions to those problems, arise from Christian, not universal,

principles and experience. There are other religious traditions in which

religion and politics are differently perceived »252

.

The debate concerning this topic in Islam has been going on since

the XIXth century. To be sure, it is an internal debate, which means that

any attempt to hasten and pressure its issue in a way favorable to such or

such Western power, will be perceived as an intrusion if not a new-

imperialist manipulation.

251

Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, Why so many Muslims deeply

resent the West, and why their bitterness will not easily be mollified, September 1990,

The Atlantic Monthly. 252

Idem.

147

Chapter IV ______________

Impact on U.S. policy and the GCC bilateral

relations

―If something happens in Saudi Arabia, if the ruling family is

ousted, if they decide to shut off the oil supply, we have to go in‖, says

Robert E. Ebel, director of the energy program at the Center for Strategic

and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington think tank whose

advisers include Kissinger, former Defense Secretary and CIA director

James Schlesinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter‘s national security

adviser. The commitment to grant the stability and security of the Saudi

Royal family is clear enough for policymakers in Washington. That is

why when a man like Laurent Murawiec – former Rand strategist –

pretended to give lessons in wise foreign policy by describing Saudi

Arabia as the ―kernel of evil‖ and suggesting that the Royal family

should be replaced or overthrown 253

, he just get fired and lose the job,

not because he was ―too controversial‖, as R. Dreyfuss thought, but

rather because it is not advised when one has the job of adviser to lose

the sense of realities.

Some years ago, the same R.E.Ebel oversaw a CSIS task force

that included several members of Congress as well as representatives

from industry including Exxon Mobil, Arco, BP, Shell, Texaco, and the

American Petroleum Institute. Its report, ―The Geopolitics of Energy Into

253

See Robert Dreyfuss, The Thirty-Year Itch, March 1, 2003, Mother Jones.

Op.Cit.

148

the 21st Century‖, concluded that the world will find itself dependent for

many years on unstable oil-producing nations, around which conflicts

and wars are bound to swirl. "Oil is high-profile stuff," Ebel says. "Oil

fuels military power, national treasuries, and international politics. It is

no longer a commodity to be bought and sold within the confines of

traditional energy supply and demand balances. Rather, it has been

transformed into a determinant of well-being, of national security, and of

international power "254

.

As vital as the Persian Gulf is now, its strategic importance is

likely to grow exponentially in the next 20 years. By 2020, the Gulf will

expectedly supply between 54 and 67 percent of the world's crude,

making the region "vital to U.S. interests. This is no longer a matter of

controversy, anyway. The US policy in the region is not born in the

aftermath of 9/11 to be that much reactive even to an event of that size.

What we see today has been steadily built up step by step, and any

encroachment beyond the limits of the acceptable may be harmful to US

interests as well. If we look forward, we will have also to look backward

in order to understand how things are linked to each other.

Of vital interests

Back to 1980, we recall that in his State of the Union address of

January 23, while Soviet troops were attempting to pacify Afghanistan

and while Iranian revolutionaries were holding US diplomats hostage,

President Carter warned that "an attempt by any outside force to gain

control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the

vital interests of the United States…[and] will be repelled by use of any

means necessary, including armed force". The response crafted by US

policy makers to potential Soviet military threats to the Gulf region was

the development of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDF). Eight

months after the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine military forces were

invading Iran. They were not the Soviet forces contemplated by the

Carter Doctrine. They were Iraqi forces from within the Gulf.

President Reagan gave official recognition to such "threats from

within" in his corollary to the Carter doctrine. In October 1981 he stated,

"Saudi Arabia we will not permit to be an Iran", and was understood to

imply that the United States would be prepared to counter internal

threats. One year later it was announced that the RDF was to be

254

Idem.

149

reorganized, its forces almost doubled and its mission expanded. As of

January 1, 1983 the RDF was renamed the US Central Command

(CENTCOM). Its expanded mission was to respond to a broad range of

threats to oil supplies in the Gulf, from exterior (then Soviet) invasion to

internal revolt. 255

What is important here is the fact that the American military

presence in the Gulf, as a protecting system, has been started even before

the mobilization of mujahideens throughout the Muslim world to fight in

Afghanistan against the red army. At that time, Usama bin Laden did not

care a lot about CENTCOM‘s objectives, since he preferred to orient his

energy, his resources, and the men he led toward a fight outside his

country and region, foreknowing that he will be joining forces and

cooperating with the CIA and the Pentagon, and that did not seem to be

much repelling to him.

So, at this point, a nationalistic Islam does not sound to be a

notion that we can easily apply to this situation. If the fight against the

red army was nationalistic for the Afghans themselves, the case was quite

different for those who came from varied Arab countries to help, Bin

Laden included. How come that the latter did not talk then about

American troops ―humiliating‖ the Arabs by their invading presence ?

Why did he not choose from the outset to fight against them instead of

rushing toward the Soviet troops, thousands of miles away from his

country? 256

The point is that at the time Bin Laden engaged himself and so

many people with him in Afghanistan, the USA was not unhappy for that

involvement. It has even encouraged it not out of fantasy, but because it

was a strategic choice. « The Carter doctrine and the Reagan corollary

together outline US policy on the Gulf. It is a policy that seeks to protect

255

Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf: Threats from within, Lexington

Books, 1984, P.1. 256

On August 17, 2002, an editorial of the Saudi newspaper Al Watan,

headlined « is that the way America rewards its allies? » underlines the close connection

between Usama bin Laden and the CIA. According to Al Watan, the CIA has succeeded

in recruiting Muslim youth to fight in Afghanistan for purposes quite different from

what was declared. Moreover, ―many of those who are now hunted down by America as

terrorists have been trained in American camps‖, says the editorial. America has also

rejected a proposition from the Sudanese government in 1996, about delivering Bin

Laden, according to Al Watan. In the same time, Washington has pressured Ryadh for

receiving Bin Laden from Sudan, but the Saudi authorities refused on the grounds that

they had not yet a strong evidence for his crimes allowing the law-court to sentence

him. See: ahakaza tukafi‘u America hulafa‘aha?

150

Western supplies of Gulf oil by committing the United States to the

defense of the region from external and internal threats. These are threats

from outside of the region by the Soviet Union and threats to Saudi

Arabia and probably other Gulf sheikhdoms from within the region. The

principal instrument to support these commitments is CENTCOM »257

.

At the time, the strategy of dependence upon CENTCOM,

subjected US Gulf policy to criticism from two opposite sources. « On

the one hand, are the critics who view the Gulf as highly instable and

CENTCOM's present posture as likely to be ineffective. On the other

hand are the critics who view the Gulf as stable and CENTCOM as likely

to be unnecessary »258

.

Is it a turning point?

Today, American policy toward the Gulf Cooperation Council

states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates,

and Oman) may be in the midst of a change, according to some

analysis.259

That change might be affected at the margins by the outcome

of the war with Iraq, but its direction is set.

If this hypothesis is right, the change began before the attacks of

September 11, 2001, but its pace has accelerated since that fateful day.

For reasons of domestic politics in both Saudi Arabia and the United

States, it is assumed that Washington can no longer look to Riyadh as the

military centerpiece of its Gulf strategy. Because of the « growing

distance » in the Saudi-American relationship, the smaller Gulf states

would thus assume an even more central role in the maintenance of

American military power in the region, during the war against Iraq, and

most probably thereafter.

In G. Gause III‘s analysis there are three turning points in the US-

Gulf relations260

. The United States would be facing now the third crucial

turning point in its Gulf policy over the past thirty years, since Great

Britain gave up its role as a protecting power over the smaller states of

the lower Gulf. To summarize this point of view, we would say :

257

L.G. Martin. Op. Cit. P.1. 258

L.G. Martin. Op. Cit. P.2. 259

F. Gregory Gause III, The Approaching Turning Point: the future of US

relations with the Gulf States, Brookings Project on US policy towards the Islamic

World, Analysis paper n° 2, May 2003. 260

F.G.Gause ,op.Cit.

151

The first turning point in U.S.-G.C.C. relations was the British

withdrawal of 1971, and the response was the Nixon Doctrine policy of

the ―twin pillars.‖ Unwilling to assume direct military responsibilities in

the region in the midst of the Vietnam War, Washington built up the

Shah‘s Iran and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia with huge arms sales and

military training missions. The aim was that they would act as ―regional

policemen.‖ That policy fell apart with the Iranian Revolution of 1979,

but the military stalemate in the Iran-Iraq war permitted the United States

to remain relatively distant from the region for most of the 1980‘s.

The second turning point, according to the same thesis, began in

1987, with the massive American naval deployment in the Gulf at the end

of the Iran-Iraq war, and culminated in the Gulf war of 1990-91. This

was driven by the fear that a hostile local power, first revolutionary Iran,

then Saddam‘s Iraq, would dominate the region. The regional proxy

policy was replaced by one of direct and sustained American military

presence. The US military relationship with the Arab monarchies of the

GCC, close before that period, became more open, as all six states came

to host what looks to everyone in the region as a permanent American

military presence. For the first time since the closing of the American

military airbase in eastern Saudi Arabia in 1961, there was a continuous

American air force presence in Saudi Arabia from 1991 – not training

missions or American advisors to Saudi units, but an American air wing

stationed in the kingdom. American bases were also built in Kuwait and

Qatar. The American naval force in the Gulf, a paltry three ships in 1971,

was given fleet status and its headquarters in Bahrain was expanded.

American access to facilities in Oman and the UAE increased as well.

This current, third turning point would consolidate the American

military role in the smaller Gulf states, while bringing to an end more

open military cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Whether consciously or

not, the United States is falling into the historic position of Great Britain

in the Gulf, and seems set to replicate the general outlines of British Gulf

strategy: a strong presence on the coast, with a general aversion to

become too involved in inland Arabia. If combined with a new role in

Iraq, the American strategic position would mirror that of Britain

between 1920 and 1958. However, the regional circumstances are much

different from that of the first half of the twentieth century. The

populations of the smaller Gulf States are larger, more educated, and

more politically mobilized now. Their immediate prospects for regime

stability are very good. Yet, a close military association with the United

152

States might become more difficult to sustain domestically in the future –

as it already has in Saudi Arabia.

For the time being, as the American-Saudi relationship is deemed

to be contracting, particularly on the military level, American reliance on

the other Gulf States would be evolving. Since 1991, the United States

has developed an extensive network of Gulf military bases, covering

much of the G.C.C.:

- Kuwait has hosted American troops on a regular basis since

1991, at a permanent facility north of Kuwait City (Camp Doha). The

U.S. has also prepositioned equipment for an armored brigade. With the

build-up of U.S. and allied forces in Kuwait for an attack on Iraq, nearly

one-third of the territory of the country has been declared a closed

military zone.

- The headquarters of the vastly expanded American naval

presence in the Gulf, the Fifth Fleet, is in Manama, Bahrain‘s capital.

There is normally at least one carrier battle group in the Gulf area at all

times. Approximately 4,000 U.S. military personnel are attached

regularly to the headquarters in Bahrain.

- Qatar signed an agreement in December 2002 to upgrade

American facilities in the country, which include a major airfield at Al

Udaid, a command and control center (duplicating facilities in Saudi, in

case the U.S. is denied access to them), and prepositioning depots for the

equipment for two armored brigades.

- Oman provides access to American forces and prepositioned

material at airbases at Al Seeb and Thamarit and on Masirah Island in the

Arabian Sea.

- The port and airport facilities in the UAE provide vital logistical

support for American forces, and the country reportedly hosts more

recreational visits by American troops than any other foreign country.

U.S. military and the Gulf

« America's military strategy in the Persian Gulf has always been

as much about denying control of oil to enemies as assuring the flow of

oil to the West. And the significance of the relationship with Saudi

Arabia has always been more political than military »261

, says S.Telhami.

However, such an agressive policy has been tied up to the Cold War

261

Shibley Telhami, A Need for prudence in the Persian Gulf, The New York

Times, January 29, 2002.

153

time. As Telhami explains it, ―during the cold war, the policy of the

United States was intended to guard against the possibility of Soviet

control of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf region in addition to defending

against disruption of America's own oil supply. As declassified

government documents reveal, an oil-denial strategy was put in place by

the Truman administration in 1949, when it embarked on a policy—

without the knowledge of local governments—to blow up oil

installations and plug oil fields in the gulf states, with cooperation from

Britain and American and British oil companies, if a Soviet invasion

seemed imminent. The deployment of "radiological" weapons to make

the oil fields unusable was also considered. Despite concerns by State

Department officials that such a policy would be opposed by the host

countries if it ever leaked, this policy was implemented in the 1950's and

remained in place at least through the early 1960's, so great was the

worry that the Soviet Union would come to control a substantial share of

the world's oil‖262

.

But today, as the Cold War is over along with the Soviet threat, is

there any justification for an agressive policy ?

Despite there are problems between Americans and Saudis about

US military presence, as it seems, some reports do not exaggerate the

degree of the dissensions. There is even a tendency to inflate the reality

of threats to the security of the GCC States, in order to bind them with

complicated commitments to the US military strategy, and sell out tons

and tons of weapons and military material, which will never be used.

When we read some official reports, like the Congressional Budget

justification, for example, we see how much the American military

establishment is winning from controlling the oil region. In fact, nothing

is clearer than the ties binding the oil industry to the military complex, as

it has been insightfully analyzed by C.Wright Mills in his classic Power

Elite. We can hardly understand in this context, for example, why Saudi

Arabia – or any of the wealthy countries of the Gulf – should ever need

funds allowed by the US government, like IMET, in order to purchase

military training, and why is it a ―privilege‖ for Saudi Arabia to have

such a deal?

The very official Congressional Budget Justification reported263

« that Saudi Arabia remains a strong ally of the United States. The

262

Idem. 263

Congressional Budget Justification for Fiscal Year 04 Foreign Operations,

February 2003, Near East. It can be reached also on this URL:

http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm

154

kingdom has lived up to its pledge to provide the U.S. with whatever

cooperation or support is needed in the global war against terrorism; it

has also provided crucial logistical support for U.S. requests related to

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Saudi Arabia has long provided

political and logistical support for Operation Southern Watch and related

programs. Continued military to military contacts will encourage the

development of a professional military command and armed forces,

which will allow the Kingdom to assume a greater role in self-defense

and will assist the U.S. in achieving its policy goals in the region »264

.

The relatively modest amount of International Military Education

and Training (IMET) fund requested in Federal Year (FY) 2004

($25,000) « will permit the Saudi government to purchase military

training in the U.S. at considerably lower cost than is charged countries

that are not eligible for IMET »265

. While Saudi Arabia controls the

world‘s largest oil reserves, it faces increasing budget pressure. « The

Saudi military consequently enjoys diminished funding, and, as a result,

has sought less expensive -- and less effective -- training from other

countries. These steps have lead to diminished experience with U.S.

equipment and techniques, which in turn risks a decrease in the

interoperability of Saudi armed forces with those of the United

States »266

.

Providing IMET to Saudi Arabia, it is said, « ensures a continued

high level of Saudi attendance at U.S. military training institutions. Such

attendance provides the skills necessary for Saudi officers to maintain a

sophisticated level of military expertise geared towards interoperability

with U.S. forces; it also permits continuing maintenance of the extensive

inventory of sophisticated military systems that U.S. corporations sell to

the Kingdom. Greater exposure to training in the U.S. would apparently

help Saudi military personnel understand U.S. values, ideas, and

policies »267

. The program also « increases awareness of international

norms of human rights and fosters greater respect for the principle of

civilian control of the military, and the rule of law »268

.

Finally, as part of its efforts to prevent the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, related technologies

and other weapons, the United States planned to provide NADR Export

264

Idem. 265

Idem. 266

Idem. 267

Idem. 268

Idem.

155

Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) funds for a

cooperative program to help establish fully effective export controls in

Saudi Arabia. FY04 NADR funding focused on strengthening export

laws and regulations as well as establishing effective enforcement

procedures and capabilities.

Concerning the other Gulf States, the report stipulates the

following:

* Bahrain: In 2001, the US President designated Bahrain a

« Major Non-NATO Ally » (MNNA) in recognition of the close

cooperation and facilities support that Bahrain has provided the U.S.

Navy for the past 50 years. Bahrain currently hosts NAVCENT, the U.S.

Navy Fifth Fleet Headquarters, and important air assets. The United

States has « an enduring national security interest in retaining access to

these military facilities in order to maintain stability in the Gulf and to

facilitate the on-going war on terrorism »269

. The relatively open access

to facilities, land and airspace that Bahrain provides is « critical to: U.S.

Operations in Afghanistan, Multinational Interception Force (MIF)

activities that prevent illicit smuggling of Iraqi oil and other goods, and

any contingency operations and/or force projection in the Gulf and

Southwest Asian areas »270

. According to the report, the Government of

Bahrain has been a steadfast supporter of the US foreign policy

objectives. A member of the coalition against Iraq since 1990, « it has

remained a strong supporter of U.S. policies toward Iraq. During its

recent tenure on the UN Security Council (2000-02), Bahrain supported

U.S. objectives throughout the region »271

. Since the attacks on the

Pentagon and World Trade Center, Bahrain has also been a key supporter

of the US war on terrorism. Bahrain responded positively to all U.S.

requests connected to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and donated

its sole frigate to provide humanitarian support for Afghan relief. U.S.

political and military support and cooperation helps encourage the

political and economic reforms fostered by the King and Crown Prince.

In October 2002, Bahrainis elected the lower house of the National

Assembly by universal suffrage. Women candidates ran for national

269

See for Bahrain the same report on Congressional Budget Justification.

Op.Cit. 270

Idem. 271

Idem.

156

office in those elections -- a first for any Gulf Cooperation Council

member state.

U.S. security assistance programs – Foreign Military Financing

(FMF) and International Military and Education Training (IMET) –

support « the United States‘ national interest in maintaining stability in

the Gulf, promote interoperability and understanding with U.S. forces,

and buttress Bahrain‘s defensive capabilities »272

, says the report.

Bahrain received FMF for the first time in FY 2002 as part of the

supplemental appropriations request. While the FY 2002 allocation

funded the purchase of a critical air defense radar system, FY 2004 FMF

funding of $25 million would make important related weapons upgrades

and the further development of a truly integrated air defense network

possible. « Increased air defense coverage results in increased security

not only for Bahrain but also for U.S. and coalition forces »273

. The FY

2004 IMET increase from $450 to $600 thousand would allow more

Bahrainis to attend Professional Military Education (PME) courses in the

U.S.

Bahrainis regularly attend U.S. service war colleges, command

and staff colleges, and other key PME courses. Bahraini attendance at

key PME courses has fostered « important one-to-one relationships that

are paying invaluable rewards in the form of interoperability,

coordination and mutual understanding. Moreover, the IMET program is

said to increase awareness of international norms of human rights and to

foster greater respect for the principle of civilian control of the military,

the rule of law, and to help encourage the political reform already

underway in Bahrain »274

. Bahrain is also eligible to receive U.S. Excess

Defense Articles (EDA) under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

* Oman: the country occupies a strategic location on the

underbelly of the Arabian Peninsula and on the southern shore of the

Strait of Hormuz. As the Strait forms a key naval chokepoint for a very

large percentage of the world‘s oil and gas shipments, the Oman-U.S.

relationship is viewed as « critical to U.S. defense interests, not only in

the Persian Gulf region, but also globally »275

. Since concluding a

272

Idem. 273

Idem. 274

Idem. 275

Congressional Budget Justification. Op.Cit.Oman.

157

bilateral agreement with Oman in 1980, the United States has had access

to Omani military bases. This has proven « invaluable for U.S. combat

support and readiness » in the Gulf. Oman has been a « stalwart

supporter » of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),

providing critical support in a wide variety of areas. Oman has also been

an « active, long-time supporter of U.S. political and military initiatives

vis-à-vis Iraq ». The United States has « a critical interest in ensuring that

Oman continues to participate in efforts to promote regional stability, as

well as in retaining access to key Omani military facilities. Continued

access and assistance will be vital »276

to the success of any future

operations in Southwest Asia.

Continuing FMF support in the amount of $25 million was

requested in FY 2004. These funds would « help Oman address its

critical defense needs and focus on helping Oman increase its ability to

secure and monitor its considerable land and maritime borders »,

including the vital Strait of Hormuz. Oman‘s ability to monitor its

maritime borders, especially the Straits, « directly supports the war on

terrorism, complements expanding Coalition maritime interdiction

operations »277

, and helps ensure that the deployment route to the Gulf

remains unobstructed. FY 2004 FMF would help fund the acquisition of

a coastal surveillance system, mine countermeasure equipment and

coastal patrol boats. US improved defense sales relationship with Oman

would also be well served by this modest FMF program.

Increased IMET funding of $1 million requested in FY 2004

would also help « buttress the bilateral military relationship » with

Oman. Omani attendance at Professional Military Education (PME)

courses helps foster « one-to-one relationships that pay invaluable

rewards later in the form of interoperability, access, coordination and

mutual understanding. Maintenance, logistics and specialist training

would enhance the Omani military‘s value as a training and coalition

partner »278

. In addition, Oman was eligible in FY 2004 to receive Excess

Defense Articles (EDA) on a grant basis under Section 516 of the

Foreign Assistance Act. Omani access to EDA would complement U.S.

assistance under the FMF and IMET programs.

Finally, as part of its efforts to prevent the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, related technologies

276

Idem. 277

Idem. 278

Idem.

158

and other weapons, the United States planned to provide NADR Export

Control and Related Border Security assistance funds to a cooperative

program « to help establish fully effective export controls in Oman ». FY

2004 NADR funding is focused primarily on establishing effective

enforcement procedures and capabilities, including through the provision

of equipment.

* United Arab Emirates: Thanks to careful management of its

oil wealth and the free trade and open market policies promulgated by its

leadership, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an important regional

actor in the Gulf. U.S. relations with the UAE have developed

significantly since the 1991 Gulf War, and have become especially close

and mutually supportive since the beginning of Operation Enduring

Freedom (OEF). The UAE is the tourism, financial, transportation, trans-

shipment, and trade center of the Gulf region, and 20,000 American

citizens live and work there as a result. The UAE is said to be « open to

continued strong relations with the United States and considers its

fundamental interests and values as compatible with U.S. goals »279

.

Relatively modest U.S. technical assistance to the UAE would be critical

in helping its federal and emirate authorities to focus their « tracking of

possible shipments of components of weapons of mass destruction and

related materials through UAE ports and airports »280

.

As part of efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, their delivery systems, related technologies, and other

weapons, the United States planned to provide NADR Export Control

and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program funds for a

cooperative program in the United Arab Emirates. FY 2004 NADR

funding was provided to strengthen export control laws and regulations

as well as improve export control enforcement through training and

equipment.

In the Fiscal Year 2005 US Budget request, we can read the

following:

« For there to be security in the long run—both in the Greater

Middle East and here at home—we must marshal the energy and ideals

upon which our Nation was founded and work to promote democracy in

the region. The President‘s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)

279

Congressional Budget Justification. Op.Cit.UAE. 280

Idem.

159

promotes political, economic, and educational reform efforts in the

Middle East, especially focused on opportunities for women and youth.

MEPI funds grants, partnerships, training, and technical assistance. The

President proposes to increase funding for this important initiative in

2005 to $150 million. The President also proposes to double funding to

$80 million in 2005 for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)

for a Greater Middle East Leadership and Democracy initiative. The

Endowment is a grant-making foundation that distributes funds to private

organizations for the purpose of promoting democracy abroad. NED

focuses on democracy-building through civic education, developing

political parties, encouraging a free press, and promoting human

rights. »281

The same report contains a document entitled ―summary of

accomplishments and future challenges‖, which we reproduce as such

hereafter :

281

FY2005 Budget Request, which can be found at:

http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm

160

A Record of Accomplishment

(2004 vs. 2001 levels except as

noted)

A Commitment to the Future

(2005 proposals vs. 2004 levels

except as noted)

*Responded to the September 11th

terrorist attacks with the War on Terror—

led a coalition to defeat the terrorist-

supporting regimes in Afghanistan and

Iraq, liberated 50 million people, and

began rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq.

*Began transformation of DOD to face

threats of the 21st Century and increased

the defense budget 26 percent, the largest

increase since the Reagan

Administration.

*To defend against long range missile

threats, doubled investments in missile

defense systems and will deploy the first

ever land and sea-based system.

*Increased military pay by more than 21

percent over three years, expanded use of

targeted pay and bonuses, and improved

housing.

*Secured enactment of the largest

Government reorganization in a half-

century, merging 22 entities into the

Department of Homeland Security.

*Protected America by nearly tripling

homeland security discretionary funding.

*Provided $4.5 billion to State and local

governments and hospitals for

Bioterrorism preparedness, and secured

$5.6 billion for the BioShield Initiative.

*Provided a total of $8.8 billion for

terrorism-preparedness training and

equipment for State and local first

responders.

*Improved border and transportation

security by increased funding of nearly

$9 billion.

*Transformed the FBI into an agency

whose primary mission is to prevent

terrorist attacks and increased its budget

by over 40 percent.

*Blocked over $136.8 million in terrorist

assets.

*Advances ongoing efforts in the War on

Terror by providing $1.2 billion for

rebuilding Afghanistan and continues to

build a broad coalition to defeat terrorism

and spread freedom and democracy

worldwide.

*Targets over $5.7 billion in military and

economic assistance to front-line states

supporting the United States in the War

on Terror.

*Continues strengthening and

transformation of defense capabilities by

providing $402 billion for DOD, a seven-

percent increase.

*Provides a 3.5-percent pay raise for

military personnel and improves housing

by privatizing 90,000 units by the end of

2005.

*Improves America's security with a 10-

percent increase in homeland security

discretionary spending.

*Provides $5.3 billion for the

Transportation Security Administration (a

20-percent increase) and $6.2 billion for

the Coast Guard (a nine-percent

increase).

*Doubles the level of first responder

preparedness grants targeted to high-

threat areas that face greater risk and

vulnerability.

*Protects our food supply by providing

$553 million (a 180-percent increase) in

funds for a new agriculture and food

defense initiative and $274 million for a

new biosurveillance initiative.

*Provides $5.1 billion (an 11-percent

increase) for the FBI, including a $357

million increase for counterterrorism

activities.

161

Actually, these are a lot of services offered to the Gulf customers,

and the question is about whether these are ―privileged services‖ for

wealthy states, or programs for all the US allies. Is it a free option for

any State of the Gulf to join or reject, or a ―highly recommended‖ one?

What if neither Saudi Arabia nor its partners in the GCC want more

military training and weaponry? Besides, one cannot but point out to the

assumption that there is a link between maintaining the American

military build up in the region and keeping alive and propagating the idea

that any of the GCC States is about to ―implode‖ because of the internal

pressure or ―explode‖ because of the external, as if the sole presence of

the American military is the life-lifebuoy. We have to underline though,

that while the civilian cooperation may be appreciated, the American

militay presence is a subject of controversy, if not of dissension in the

region ; and that while it may be considered as a deterrent to potential

rivals (like Iran), it has also served as the main reason for accumulated

anger and protest, thus increasing the difficulties of the concerned

governments.

Democracy for sail

Should the Arabs democratise to alleviate American pains or

theirs? How can democracy fit in with the American military

surveillance? Should we consider the call for democratization emanating

from the Bush administration as a favorable response sympathyzing with

the social forces movement in the Arab countries or just an attempt to

control it?

It is today widely believed that the call for democratization and

reform for the Middle Eastern societies has emerged out of the mess of

September 11.

In his State of the Union address on 28 January 2004, US

President George W. Bush urged the rapid democratization of the Middle

East. Substantive details of Bush‘s plan were leaked to a London-based

Arab newspaper two weeks later, as a document branded ‗the Greater

Middle East Initiative‘ (GMEI). They amounted to a reform package

intentionally recalling the 1975 Helsinki Accords (which challenged the

Soviet bloc to respect individual freedoms and human rights) and

particularly focused on replacing autocracy with participatory

democracy. The initiative seemed to fit into Bush‘s larger vision, dubbed

the ‗forward strategy of freedom‘, which has been advanced as the core

162

of the administration‘s Middle East foreign policy. Superficially, the

initiative is targeting three ‗deficits‘ identified in the UN Arab Human

Development Report – freedom, knowledge and female empowerment –

as the bases for its own proposals, and couching outside involvement in

the no threatening language of development assistance. A more nuanced

reading of the document, however, illuminates a bottom-up approach that

would largely bypass states in favor of local stakeholders. For this

reason, regional powers, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were

indignant. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak complained that ‗we hear

about these initiatives as if the region and its states do not exist, as if they

had no sovereignty over their land‘.

The US stood a chance of diplomatically salvaging the GMEI by

recasting it as a prescription for support rather than an outside

imposition. In any case, there were some authoritarian regimes that the

US would not want to alienate in the near future. These included the

secular, anti-Islamist governments of Egypt and Jordan – both of which

have made peace with Israel – and the relatively cooperative Yemeni

regime. Another would be the government of Algerian President

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who is credited with taming an Islamic insurgency

unleashed in 1992 when an Islamist victory in democratic elections was

invalidated, has been a strong US counter-terrorism partner, and on 8

April was re-elected with 83% of the vote in an election deemed

generally fair by international observers.

The values embodied in the initiative, however, are not likely to

change. It enshrines the idea that US security concerns are best served

not by cultivating relationships with autocrats but by directly addressing

the root causes of terrorism. Moreover, the GMEI implicitly rejected the

idea that the resolution of the Palestinian issue is a prerequisite for

progress elsewhere. But the conventional wisdom, espoused by the

authoritarian leaders themselves, is that until the Palestinians have

attained a just settlement, illiberal states will continue to be justified as

necessary to maintaining order and insulating policy from the passions of

the ‗Arab street‘. Several prominent European leaders sympathize with

this view and oppose the GMEI. Until the death of Yasir Arafat,

Washington‘s decision to downplay conflict resolution between the

Israelis and Palestinians was consistent with the Bush administration‘s

general aversion to strategic micromanagement, but squared less easily

with the administration‘s express advocacy of a two-state solution.

However, it did seem to reflect realistically low expectations for

the ‗road map‘ for peace that was rolled out in May 2003 and has since

163

met with frustration due to persistent continuation of violence on both

sides and the inflexibility of both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships.

Marginalizing the conflict implied recognition that Palestinian fighting

and Israel‘s determination to diminish its citizens‘ vulnerability – by

building a security barrier and withdrawing from Gaza and parts of the

West Bank – had conclusively interred the Oslo process. Yet there was a

danger that the subordination of the Israeli–Palestinian problem could

lead to missed opportunities and increasing discomfort among allies.

As of April 2004, however, the US had its hands full in Iraq.

Against hopes of improving security to ease the scheduled handover of

sovereignty to the Iraqis on 30 June 2004, US retaliation for the ambush

and brutal killing of four American security contractors in the

conservative town of Falluja, west of Baghdad, on 30 March triggered a

Shiite, then a Sunnite uprising against the US-led occupation. Thus, if in

April 2003, a US military victory in Iraq was imminent, by April 2004, it

had come and gone, and an American political triumph in Iraq and major

peace dividends in the region seemed neither close nor assured.

A similarity between the cases of Iraq and Palestine, consisting in

the American emphasis on democratization, has not been enough

underlined by observers, although it is in the heart – as we assume- of the

GMEI deal. The link with the security and stability of the Gulf is likely

an issue still open for the debate.

As many American analysts point out, the future of Iraq also has

important regional implications. Since Saddam Hussein‘s rise to power in

the late 1970s, the country has been a source of regional instability. If the

domestic situation does not stabilize, violence and political unrest could

spread over Iraq‘s long and porous borders. But if US plans succeed,

Iraq, as a westward-leaning beacon of democracy and free markets, is

likely to inspire a measure of political and economic reform that could

both ameliorate the region‘s endemic problems and improve the chances

of a better accommodation between the Arab world and the West.

The Iraq war proved to be a mixed blessing for Tehran. The US-

led coalition‘s ouster of Saddam Hussein removed a deep and painful

thorn from Iran‘s side, and liberated Iranian Shiites‘ religious brethren –

the 65% Shiite majority that Saddam had brutally repressed. Tehran was

nonetheless uncomfortable with the United States installed as a powerful

occupying force in both Afghanistan and Iraq, on its eastern and western

flanks. Moreover, the liberation of the Iraqi Shiites stood to further

deepen the political and doctrinal cleavages in Iran‘s Islamic political

system, which hinges on the Velayat-al Faqih, or absolute clerical rule. In

164

that system, political influence and power are derived from the clerical

establishment in Iran. Any law or governing standard must be ‗Islamic‘,

and that determination falls to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

In Iraq, there is an assumption that a new and powerful source of Shiite

religious authority beyond Tehran‘s control could arise and test the

already vulnerable doctrinal basis of a regime founded on a fairly narrow

interpretation of Shia thought. In particular, Iraqi Shiites‘ traditional

opposition to the mixing of religion and politics was by February 2004

providing considerable intellectual support for those in Iranian politics

who questioned the prudence of paramount religiously based political

authority in Iran. More broadly, the rise of the Iraqi Shiites may

challenge Iran‘s international primacy, and give the non-Iranian Shiites –

from Lebanon and Yemen, to Azerbaijan and India – a greater say in

Shia affairs.

Societies under stress

In the charged diplomatic atmosphere following the failure of UN

debates on Iraq, both Iran and the EU had much to gain from

demonstrating that the EU‘s ‗constructive engagement‘ of Tehran could

produce tangible results. Tehran was motivated to deflect overly

aggressive American attention, while the EU could claim to be taking

direct and effective action to bring Iran into line without resort to the

threat or use of force. The focus of European diplomacy was Iran‘s

nuclear program, which both Washington and European capitals saw as

an Iranian bid to obtain a nuclear weapons breakout option. The EU

troika (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) was able in October

2003 to convince Iran to give a full account of its nuclear program before

the 31 October deadline set by the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) board to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing

activities, and to bring all of its nuclear activities under stronger IAEA

inspections. Both Brussels and Tehran portrayed this development as a

victory for dialogue over coercion.

But the onus was on Tehran and the EU to convince a skeptical

United States that the agreement reached in Tehran on 21 October

between the troika‘s foreign ministers and the Iranian government,

through the office of its National Security Council, was comprehensive

and robust enough not to require referral to the UN Security Council for

further actions, including potential economic and political sanctions. The

165

latter option had been the United States‘ preferred mode of dealing with

Iran since 2002, when revelations about Iran‘s clandestine nuclear

activities began to surface. Questions about the Iranian–European deal

rose immediately before the March 2004 IAEA Board of Governors‘

meeting, when the IAEA reported that Iran had failed to fully report its

past enrichment program and was continuing to build centrifuge

machines, despite its October 2003 commitments. Faced with the

prospect that the US and Europe might join forces to report Iranian non-

compliance to the Security Council, Tehran again made tactical

concessions, agreeing to expand the suspension to include construction of

additional centrifuge machines, while the IAEA Board responded to

Washington‘s unhappiness by giving Iran another ‗last chance‘. As of

March 2004, many observers believed that additional revelations of

Iran‘s nuclear activities could still emerge, making it undeniable that

Iran‘s nuclear program was intended to give Iran a nuclear weapons

option. A recent study282

states that in an era in which U.S. interests are

being examined more critically, the greater Middle East continues to

present high stakes for American policymakers. Taking a longer-term

(through 2025) perspective, U.S. key national interests include according

to this document:

* the survival of Israel and completion of the Middle East peace

process,

* access to oil,

* forestalling the emergence of a hostile regional hegemon,

* preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction,

* promoting political and economic reform and through it internal

stability, and

* holding terrorism in check.

Some of these interests are specific to the region, but most are

closely linked to broader, systemic interests in stability, non-

proliferation, energy security, and evolutionary versus revolutionary

change.

The notion of the « Greater Middle East » -GME- has been

adopted to capture one of the key macro trends in the current strategic

environment, and one that is assumed will be even more significant in the

future — that is, the steady erosion of traditional distinctions between

282

Sources of Conflict in the Greater Middle East, by Ian O. Lesser, Bruce R.

Nardulli, and Lory A. Arghavan, in: Rand Project Air Force/ The Muslim World after

9/11.

166

―Middle Eastern‖ security and ―European‖ and ―Eurasian‖ security. This

erosion is the result of the growing reach of military systems and the

growing economic and political interdependence of regions. Spillovers of

different sorts, from transregional terrorism and smuggling to refugee

flows and migration, are further contributing to the breakdown of old

regional definitions.

For the authors of the afore-mentioned study there are at least

four trends to be closely watched. They are peculiar to what they call

"societies under stress"283

. In their analysis, States across the region are

facing threats to stability as a result of internal trends. The most

consequential trends in this context include:

« - demographic change and relentless urbanization ;

- problems of economic growth and reform ;

- dysfunctional societies and the erosion of state control, and

crises of political legitimacy and the challenges of Islam and

nationalism »284

.

Taken together, these trends have encouraged and would

assumedly continue to support a pervasive sense of insecurity within

Middle Eastern societies. When officials and observers within the region

itself talk about future security, they would be concerned first and

foremost with internal security. The key ―drivers‖ identified here would

all « have consequences for the types of conflict and nonconflict

demands and constraints the U.S. military is likely to confront across the

region through 2025. The drivers represent deep systemic factors that

will be at the forefront of challenges to stability in the region for the next

several decades ».285

Handling the unrest

On May 5–6, 2003, Rand‘s Center for Middle East Public Policy

(CMEPP) and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) held a two-

day conference in Geneva on ―The Middle East in the Shadow of

Afghanistan and Iraq.‖ The conference was the fourth in a series of

283

Idem. 284

Idem. 285

Idem.

167

collaborative efforts by GCSP and RAND‘s CMEPP in the area of

security policy 286

.

The discussion of the impact of the Iraq war on the Arabian

Peninsula centered around two broad issues. The first was the impact on

the regional balance of power, particularly Saudi Arabia‘s role. While it

was difficult to say exactly what the impact of the Iraq war would be on

the Arabian peninsula, several participants suggested that it could lead to

« shifts in the regional balance of power ». In particular, the balance of

power in the GCC could « shift away from Saudi Arabia ». Qatar, they

noted, was emerging as « a major player » in the Gulf. It wanted « to get

out from under Saudi domination » and had clearly thrown in its lot with

the United States. Qatar‘s policy and regional ambitions were of concern

to Saudi Arabia, but its ambitions were « not congruent with Qatar‘s size

and real possibilities ». Qatar, some participants suggested, seemed to be

« punching above its weight »287

.

Iraq‘s evolution, several participants stressed, could have an

important impact on the Gulf States. If Iraq becomes a pro-U.S.

democracy, this could have a liberalizing impact on the Gulf monarchies.

The U.S. victory would end an era in which Gulf States lived under an

Iraqi threat. At the same time, there was a possibility that Iraq might be

integrated into a Gulf security system. In such a case, « a new Iraqi-led

bloc could emerge as a counterbalance to Iran, but also to Saudi Arabia‘s

detriment »288

.

Accordingly , Saudi Arabia was « likely to be affected » as well.

A reassessment of U.S.-Saudi relations was already visible before the

outbreak of the war with Iraq. But it was likely to gain greater

momentum as a result of the war. The Saudis, one participant pointed

out, had actually been more helpful in the Iraq war than many observers

had expected. Publicly, they had been rather critical of the war, but

« behind the scenes they had rendered considerable support to the United

States ». In any event, the war was likely to result in a lower U.S.

military profile in Saudi Arabia, which in turn could help reduce tensions

in U.S.-Saudi relations.

Saudi Arabia would remain sensitive to continued turmoil in Iraq,

it was noted. Iraq oil, participants agreed, could have an important

impact. Once Iraq‘s oil came back on line, this could reduce Western

286

The Middle East in the Shadow of Afghanistan and Iraq, National Security

Research Division, F.Stephen Larrabee, Rand. 2003. 287

Idem. 288

Idem.

168

dependence on Saudi oil. But it was stressed that it would take time for

Iraq to increase its oil production and that with the best will in the world,

Iraq could not replace Saudi Arabia‘s vital role as ―swing producer‖ in

the event of crises and shortfalls; for that, it would need the unused spare

capacity of two million barrels a day that was a uniquely Saudi asset.

Nonetheless, « either a strong pro-American and reformist Iraq or a

weak, unstable Iraq could lead to greater social unrest in Saudi Arabia »,

several participants warned. One important consideration will be the

nature of the regime that emerges in post-Saddam Iraq. If a Shia-

dominated republic should emerge in Iraq, « Saudi Arabia would feel

threatened »289

. In such a case, Riyadh could move to intensify relations

with Pakistan and might look to Islamabad for nuclear reassurance.

We have to notice, by the way, that this hypothesis needs

validation. First, Saudi Arabia is not a country with an important number

of Shiites. Historically, Shiisme has had very little impact on the

population, which is not the case of other arab countries. Iraq has been

certainly a hub for shiite activity, as well as Egypt and Tunisia in the

medieval times. The mainland of the contemporary Saudi Arabia has

never been under Shiite spell ; and there is no reason that it will be in the

future. Second, the only time wherein the Saudi kingdom felt threatened

by a shiite phenomenon was when the Islamic revolution of Iran burst

out. However, Saudi Arabia was not then the only country which felt the

threat. It was all the Arab countries – Iraq in the forefront – that felt the

destabilizing wave of the Iranian radical islamism…until the remote

Morocco , which explains why all sided with Saddam during the 8 years

long war with Iran.

Iranian nuclear ambitions are another important factor supposed

to affect the regional balance. If Iran develops nuclear weapons, the

United States, one participant suggested, « might be prompted to provide

a nuclear umbrella to the Gulf States ». However, this would only work,

another noted, as long as Iran did not have nuclear weapons that could

reach the United States. Once Iran achieved the capability to deliver

nuclear weapons that could hit the United States, the calculation would

change.

A second dominant theme during discussions was the prospects

for internal reform in the region, especially in Saudi Arabia. Several

participants noted that there was pressure for reform both from the top

and from the bottom. Both Bahrain and Qatar had recently taken steps

289

Idem.

169

toward greater political liberalization. An amorphous movement for

reform had also gained strength in Saudi Arabia since the 9/11 attacks on

the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

However, the parameters of reform are not clear. Most of the

leaders in the region were interested in some form of ―decompression‖—

that is, a relaxation of some restrictions—not genuine liberalization. This

was designed to buy time and postpone major reform. However, the

Iranian experience called into question whether slow, selective reform

could work.

Power paradox and Empire nostalgia

The reconstruction of Iraq intersects with two other, more subtle

developments which, when combined with Saddam‘s removal, amount to

a watershed that permits a new and better security system to be built. One

is the growing acceptance by elites in Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) states of the need for domestic reform. The

other development, obscured by rhetoric on both sides, is the growing

possibility that America and Iran can do business with each other. This

seems to be also the point of view of Kenneth M. Pollack, who served as

―Director for Persian Gulf Affairs‖ on the staff of the National Security

Council (from 1995 to 1990 and 1999 to 2001). He thinks that the three

main problems likely to bedevil the Gulf security over the next several

years « will be Iraq‘s security dilemma, Iran‘s nuclear weapons program,

and potential internal unrest in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation

Council »290

.

To summarize his thesis, let us say that ―the paradox of Iraqi

power can be put simply : any Iraq that is strong enough to balance and

contain Iran will inevitably be capable of overrunning Kuwait and Saudi

Arabia‖291

. This hypothesis is apparently suggested by a precedent :

Saddam‘s invasion of Kuwait. Yet, Besides the fact that Saddam‘s

intentions concerning Saudi Arabia are not known, and much less known

as yet was his capacity of achieving such a scheme, it is not necessary

that history repeats itself. To suggest such a hypothesis is to subsequently

imply that Iraq itself is condemned to be ruled by dictators and

expansionist leaders, whereas all the efforts are today focusing on

290

Kenneth M.Pollack, Securing the Gulf, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003. 291

Idem.

170

orienting the whole region – not only Iraq – toward democracy and

peace.

As for Iran, Pollack is convinced that ―its nuclear program has

gone into overdrive and unless stopped – from inside or outside – is

likely to produce one or more nuclear weapons within five years‖292

.

Concerning the unrest, he thinks that ―terrorism and internal instability in

the Persian Gulf are ultimately fueled by the political, economic, and

social stagnation of the local Arab states‖293

.

Now, where does all this become problematic for the United

States?

We should first remember that the US troops are already in Iraq,

and nobody knows until what time they will remain there, which means

also – to borrow an ironical expression widespread in the Arab media -

that the USA is, since April 2003, ―Iran‘s neighbor‖. Thus, the first two

questions – Iraq and Iran – are being tackled straightforward by the USA.

Yet, this is not the end of the troubles, but perhaps their beginning, for it

is – as everybody can state – an ambiguous tackling in an abnormal

situation.

Ambiguous, because of the unsaid, which lies in the intentions of

the concerned parties, or which is imagined as being a part of their varied

– and often- adverse projects. As to the abnormality of the situation, we

do not need to say more about what is believed to be as explosive as

harmful, not only to the region, but possibly to the world, included the

USA. Pollack emphasises in the same article that ―the United States is

not simply concerned with keeping oil flowing out of the Persian Gulf; it

also has an interest in preventing any potentially hostile state from

gaining control over the region and its resources and using such control

to amass vast power or blackmail the world‖294

, which sounds to be the

author‘s conclusion of the brief and violent Iraqi adventure with Kuwait.

But as we have already hinted, this is not the only reason for the

American presence. Just observe what happened since the Gulf War

(Desert Storm): a controversy over American military presence in the

Gulf (not only in Saudi Arabia); a controversy over the American

intervention in Iraq ; a controversy over American military presence in

Iraq ; and now a controversy over Iranian nuclear program.

292

Idem. 293

Idem. 294

Idem.

171

In this context and regarding the increasing critics, President Bush

for his first tour in Europe after his reelection, chose to allay the

Europeans : he depicted the allegations that the USA prepare an invasion

of Iran as ―ridiculous‖. Yet, he did not rule out any option in handling the

Iranian problem, which cast much more ambiguity even on the term

―ridiculous‖. Some people in Europe wondered: do we have the same

understanding of the language and the terms used in Europe and the

USA?

The unrest in the Gulf may even open the door to more ambiguity

and more controversial issues. In the American vision still marked by the

9/11 event, the unrest is linked directly to radical Islamism, governmental

despotism, and other social and economic failures, which breeds

terrorism. Moreover,― if the United States were denied access to the

Persian Gulf, its ability to influence events in many other key regions of

the world would be greatly diminished‖295

, notes Pollack, which is not

inaccurate. So, the issue is not only about local unrest, but also about

wider strategic concerns of the USA. This is precisely another source of

problems, inasmuch as the populations of the region feel that the US

military presence, instead of reassuring them, makes them uneasy. Such a

feeling may find its source even in the US theories about Empire and

hegemony that seem to have flourished after 9/11.

―In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New

York and Washington‖, notes Ivan Eland, ―several foreign policy

observers have concluded that America should look to the vanished

empires of the past for foreign policy guidance, not because the strategy

of empire should be scrupulously avoided, but because the strategy of

empire should be unabashedly embraced‖296

. Several examples may be

mentioned in this context. The first is provided by Max Boot of the

Council of Foreign Relations and former Wall Street Journal editorial

features editor. The September 11 attacks, says Boot, were ―the result of

insufficient American involvement and ambition ; the solution is to be

more expansive in our goals and more assertive in our implementation

(…) Afghanistan and other troubled lands today cry out for the sort of

295

Idem. 296

Ivan Eland, The Empire Strikes Out, the new imperialism and its fatal flaws,

Policy analysis n° 459, November 26, 2002, Cato Institute. See also: Hichem Karoui,

What has changed in the imperial views, 11/6/03:

http://www.hichemkaroui.com/archives.htm

172

enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident

Englishmen in Jodhpurs and pit helmets‖297

.

Sebastian Mallaby, Washington Post columnist, is also quoted as

an advocate of empire. He says that ―the logic of neo-imperialism is too

compelling … to resist. The chaos of the world is too threatening to

ignore, and existing methods for dealing with that chaos have been tried

and found wanting‖. He therefore calls for an ―imperialist revival‖

wherein orderly societies, led by the United States, can and should take a

page from the past and ―impose their own institutions on disorderly

ones‖298

.

Robert Kaplan, Atlantic Monthly correspondent, goes a little

further. The advise for American foreign policy should be sought in the

chronicles of the Greek, Roman, and British empires, in his view. ―Our

future leaders could do worse than be praised for their…ability to bring

prosperity to distant parts of the world under America‘s soft imperial

influence‖, says Kaplan, and ―Rome in particular, is a model for

hegemonic power, using various means to encourage a modicum of order

in a disorderly world‖299

.

In the result, this kind of speculations is not very reassuring,

either to the Arab populations or to their elites. The problem is that

beyond the obvious hegemonic views such theories convey, they leave no

place anymore to trust and confidence. How much of this talk about neo-

imperialism and empire nostalgia has reached the ears of the policy

makers in the Bush administration, and what is its impact ? Such is the

question the Arabs would raise, particularly when such views are linked

to neo-cons having an important part in the current foreign policy of the

USA.

―We always looked upon the media in the West, if I may use both

Britain and others, as a model of truth, as people who call a spade a

spade, and that would not try to cover up‖, says Khaled al Maeena, Arab

News editor-in-chief. ― But (…) we all became criminals (…) It‘s

297

Max Boot, The Case for American Empire, Weekly Standard, October 15,

2001.

27 Also see the same author: The Savage Wars of Peace: small wars and the

rise of American power (New York, Basic Books, 2002). Cited in: I. Eland. Op. Cit. 298

Sebastian Mallaby, The Reluctant Imperialist: terrorism, failed states, and the

case for American Empire, Foreign Policy 81, n° 2, March-April 2002. Cited in: I.

Eland. Op.Cit. 299

Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: why leadership demands a pagan ethos,

New York, Random House, 2002, p.153. Cited in: I. Eland.Op.Cit.

173

unfortunate because America has never been a colonizing power‖.300

However, with such imperial views in sight, and with a thorough reading

of American history – such as the one made for example by Howard

Zinn301

– would we still find that America « has never been a colonizing

power » ?

Withdrawing troops

Actually, what cannot be occulted is the existence of a debate

inside the USA. All those issues are discussed publicly, and because of

the transparency of a democratic society we can find their track, and

follow up with analysis and commentaries. Whereas in the Arab world

itself, such a task is much harder to performing.

Another aspect of the problem, as it seems to us, consists in that

the ambiguity of the US policy may also emanate from the nature of the

situation in the Gulf region, in addition to the nature of the political

debate in the American society.

―Many of those who called for an end to the American presence

in Saudi Arabia argue that the United States military must remain in the

region indefinitely for one reason : oil‖, says Christopher Preble, from

the Cato Institute 302

. ― To those who are focused on the Gulf‘s energy

resources and who argue that U.S. troops must remain in the region, the

euphemism most frequently used is ―engagement,‖ as if, the presence of

U.S. troops ensures that the United States is ―engaged.‖ By this logic,

engagement comes only at the barrel of a gun. But why can we not

assume that individual initiative, private enterprise, and cultural

exchange are also forms of engagement? Do people only travel to places

where U.S. troops are stationed? Can commerce only take place in the

presence of American troops? Of course not.‖ 303

These remarks might as well have been issued by an Arab writer.

Put under such a pen nobody would notice any difference. This means

also that people‘s minds are more connected to each other than the

differences of the races, the countries or the religions, may suggest. The

300

Media, Terrorism, and Reality, Remarks by Khaled al-Maeena, 13th Arab-

US Policymakers Conference, Washington DC, September 13, 2004. 301

Howard Zinn, A people‘s History Of The United States ; Harper Colophon

Books ; 1980. 302

Christopher Preble, After Victory, toward a new military posture in the

Persian Gulf, Policy analysis n° 477, June 10, 2003. Cato Institute. 303

Idem.

174

reason for that has been explained by a great genius of the XVth century:

Descartes, who said in his famous Discourse of the Method, that common

sense is the most shared thing in the world. We don‘t need to go further,

in order to find what makes us so different and so similar at once. Yet, if

common sense is the most shared thing in the world, stupidity is no less.

In this context, human history is as much the story of the success of

Reason than that of unreason and stupidity.

To continue with Preble‘s analysis, he thinks that ―The United

States needs not have troops stationed in the Persian Gulf in order to

remain engaged in the region. The Gulf‘s energy resources are important

to the global economy, but goods and services flow on the world market

where explicit ―protection‖ by military forces‖304

is absent. Furthermore,

if these troops have stabilized the Gulf, they remain also a source of

tension and instability, as the terrorist attacks against the Americans, in

Saudi Arabia demonstrated.

Preble rightly remarks that the American military presence in the

Middle East has engendered widespread animosity throughout the

Muslim world. He reminds us that in 1996, former U.S. Ambassador to

Saudi Arabia Richard Murphy called the ―great probability of terrorism

to be ‗an inescapable consequence‘ of our decision to keep troops in the

region.‖ But Murphy‘s statement presumed that the United States had no

choice but to leave American forces in the region.

―In fact‖, says Preble, ― given the threat from terrorism and the

limited utility of the forces in the region, a change in our military

deployment policy was warranted long before September 11, 2001.‖305

So, what‘s happened? Why instead of withdrawing forces, the

USA increased them?

For Preble, ―despite the known risks (…) three successive

presidential administrations, both Republican and Democratic, chose to

keep American troops in the region.‖ Furthermore, he says ―The

president of the United States should never submit American foreign

policy goals to the vagaries of international public opinion. But when the

troops serve no useful purpose, their presence is known to contribute to

anti-American sentiment, and those who wish us ill capitalize on anti-

Americanism to encourage disgruntled psychopaths to fly airplanes into

304

Idem. 305

Idem.

175

buildings, it is clear that our forces in the Persian Gulf make America

less, not more, secure.‖306

Like many observers, Arabs and Westerners, Preble advises that

the United States should follow up its military victory and the

establishment of a new Iraqi government with swift troop withdrawal

from Iraq. Besides, the Bush administration‘s decision to shift U.S.

forces out of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia should be only the first of

several steps to substantially reduce the U.S. presence throughout the

region. The Bush administration should clearly articulate its plans for

removing troops from the region. As he put it, ― Americans rightly

marvel at the proficiency of our armed forces, and American taxpayers

have funded the military‘s transformation. The Pentagon should reorient

policy in a way that takes advantage of our technological superiority and

capitalizes on our ability to project power from a distance, by eliminating

our expensive and unnecessary policy of forward deployment throughout

the region. The troops are unnecessary. They are costly. And they do

little to make the United States safer and more secure.‖307

Similarly to the above-mentioned features, an Issue paper of Rand

Corporation308

emphasizes the same needs. The USA, it says, entered the

21 century preserving stability in the Gulf via an extensive forward

military presence. Long before September 11, Washington‘s strategic

dilemma was clear. Starting in the seventies, with Britain‘s withdrawal,

the United States took over the role of security manager of the Gulf.

From the outset, the United States sought to avoid a costly and

unwelcome forward presence in the region, instead relying on regional

allies to police the security system and on its own ability to project force

to the region if they could not. In the 1970s, the United States used the

twin pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia to ensure stability and to contain

threats to the status quo. Iran was effective in the 1970s in helping to

crush Dhofari rebels in Oman and in marginalizing Soviet-backed

Baathist Iraq.

The United States « supported Iranian and Saudi authoritarian

regimes out of strategic expedience and fear of radical alternatives.

Political reform was not on the American agenda neither in the Gulf nor

in the rest of the Arab world ; American diplomats and intelligence

306

Idem. 307

Idem. 308

Andrew Rathmell, Theodore Karasik, and David Gompert, A New Persian

Gulf Security System, Issue Paper, Rand 2003.

176

operatives had virtually no contact with reformist and other opposition

elements »309

.

Until 1990, the United States stuck to the British approach of

maintaining a low-cost security system by relying on regional allies and a

naval presence. After the Gulf War, this approach was replaced by one

involving extensive forward basing and regular military engagements,

sometimes escalating into large-scale deployments (e.g., in 1990, 1992,

1994, 1998, 2002, and 2003).

The Issue paper acknowledges that « in addition to the direct

costs, U.S. presence has become a lightning rod for political discontent.

The United States has contributed to that discontent through its support

for Israel (the pros and cons of that support aside) and for autocratic Arab

regimes. In most countries, the deeper cause of political discontent is the

socioeconomic malaise that grips the region. At a more philosophical

level, discontent reflects the Arab and Islamic world‘s struggle to adapt

to modernity and a divisive debate within Islam about its response to the

modern world. Al Qaeda is the most extreme expression of this

discontent, encompassing a minority of Muslims. This generalized

discontent, which is focused on existing regimes and the United States,

threatens remaining U.S. allies, especially Saudi Arabia, in ways that the

U.S. strategy of military presence plus reinforcement cannot address—a

reminder that balance of power alone cannot suffice »310

.

Yet, even with all these disadvantages and others we did not

mention, the paradoxal conclusion the Issue paper reaches is that ―the

United States does not have the option of withdrawing from the Gulf as

the British did 30 years ago (knowing the United States would take over).

Therefore, it is an important U.S. interest to support a more favorable,

affordable, and durable Gulf security system—one that takes advantage

of and promotes political change rather than resists it‖ 311

.

Thus, political reform in the region has grown to be a necessity both local

and international. The Issue paper emphasizes also that the democratizing

vision goes further than Iraq to remake the Middle East.

Democratization, it is argued, « will enable countries across the region to

defuse domestic dissent and become productive members of the

international community rather than remain in a developmental and

political ghetto ». In this argument, democratic transformation cannot and

309

Idem. 310

Idem. 311

Idem.

177

need not stop at Iraq. Its advocates call for exploiting the « domino

effect », using Iraq as a lever to bring about change in other Arab states.

Yet, we have to observe that on the one hand, the condition to

such transformation is the success of democracy in Iraq, which is still far

from being achieved. On the other hand, if democracy is the goal and the

reward, we do not need to frame it – even if it were only on a theoretical

or a hypothetical level – into Cold War concepts, such as « domino »

theory.

We are often reminded in this context that the need to create a

regional security environment conducive to the consolidation of

democracy was a central consideration in U.S. and Western strategy

toward Europe after World War II. NATO was created not only to deter a

Soviet threat, but also to establish the security umbrella under which

fragile post-war West European democracies could establish themselves.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE created a

framework that both encouraged democratic change and helped ensure a

soft and largely non-violent landing when communism eventually

collapsed. At the end of the Cold War, the need to consolidate fragile

democracies was also a key factor leading NATO and the European

Union to extend a security umbrella to Central and Eastern Europe.

The situation in the Gulf – and broadly in the arab world – today

can hardly be compared with Europe, at least because the Arabs have

never been considered as an integrative part of the NATO, nor did they

ask for it. Consequently, if the West wants to help promote democratic

change in the region, it must step up its efforts, together with other

countries, to resolve the core geopolitical conflict afflicting the region,

between the Arabs and Israël.

The cause of democracy and human development in the region

will be enhanced immeasurably by a final resolution of the Israeli-

Palestinian issue and the broader Israeli-Arab conflict based on United

Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the vision of two

states — Israel and Palestine — living side-by-side in peace and security.

Many in the Arab world today see a Western — and especially American

— commitment to a renewal of the role of honest broker in Israeli-

Palestinian peace negotiations as a litmus test of Western intentions in

the Arab world more broadly, including democracy.

The way forward in the Middle East must be to work in parallel

on resolving the Israel-Arab conflict and on promoting democracy across

the region. The West cannot credibly make the case for democracy across

the region if it is, or appears to be, unwilling to support the Palestinians‘

178

right to political self-determination and a resolution of this conflict in all

of its aspects. On the other hand, autocratic Arab governments could no

longer hide behind or use this conflict to deflect domestic pressures for

domestic change. Terrorists across the region could no longer exploit this

conflict to recruit men and women into their ranks.

179

Chapter V ____________

Futuristic assessment

How can we live together if we do not try to understand each

other as to be able to accept, more easily, our differences? Such a

question seems today inevitable, as the future will depend on the answer

we will provide.

The dramatic global resurgence of religious, often fundamentalist,

movements over the last decades has caught many people by surprise,

notes Martin Riesebrodt : ―To most of us, such a resurgence of religion

came as a surprise since according to our modernization myth, religion

was supposed to be headed towards a continuous path of secularization

and privatization. Indeed, this myth presented us with several options for

the fate of religion in the modern world, but neither a return of religion as

a public force nor its ability to shape people according to its own ethos

and instill into them a new habitus was among them‖312

. However, the

point that seemed to him more enticing is that the social scientists in their

attempts to cope with their own cognitive dissonance have been as

―interesting as this surprising return of religion‖. Digressing about this

point, he notes that the most typical reactions were ―denial and instant

conversion‖. In his view, ―some authors have simply insisted that their

expectations of modernization and secularization are basically sound.

Focusing on the resurgence of religion outside the modern West allowed

them to pretend that these revivals of religion are still part of a

modernizing process. And, not surprisingly, many have taken pains to

312

Martin Riesebrodt, Secularization and the Global resurgence of Religion,

University of Chicago, paper presented at the comparative social analysis workshop,

university of California , Los Angeles, March 9, 2000.

180

detect a ―Puritan spirit‖ or an ―inner-worldly asceticism‖ in such

movements, revealing their problematic reading of Max Weber‘s

―Protestant Ethic‖ as a general theory of modernization‖.313

Nonetheless, we do not see why social scientists should refrain

from trying such comparative analysis, as the temptation is actually great

and the rewards promising on the theoretical level. If there is nothing to

find out from such an endeavour, only the result would reveal it. Yet, if

comparative analysis may add something – as modest as it could be – to

our knowledge of the studied Phenomena, then why not to give it a shot ?

Other authors have chosen the opposite route of instant

conversion , says Riesebrodt, by ―denying the existence of any general

trend towards secularization in the West and elsewhere. In particular,

rational choice theorists have explained secularization as an effect of

religious monopolies‖314

. He pointed particularly to the sociologist

Steven Warner who emphasized ―American exceptionalism in contrast

to the European trend towards secularization‖. Warner maintains that

there is a ―new paradigm‖ in the making for the study of religion in

America which rejects an older paradigm based on the European

experience of secularization.

Apparently, this is not the only difference in European and

American notions about religion and secularization. The ―American

exceptionalism‖ in this context reminds us of Charles Taylor‘s ―moral

exceptionalism‖, which may also serve as a paradigmatic shift in the

history of the West. In the introduction to this study, we have already

hinted to the possibility that since 9/11 the world is no longer what it was

before, and that at least concerning the American view, there is certainly

a new paradigm in the making, as regards world policy. The Europeans

are not obliged to have the same analysis, and there is a reason for that:

either in the Middle East or elsewhere, the USA is the leading power

not Europe. If success there is in tackling hard and complicated issues of

world policy, everybody would profit from it ; and if not, the USA would

be alone to bear whatever results, because it is her policy, not the

Western alliance‘s.

Our analysis, all along the four previous chapters, aimed

altogether at demonstrating the need for handling regional and

international issues differently. A new pattern of thought is already acting

313

Idem. 314

Idem.

181

behind the scene and pulling the strings. To deny it would change

nothing to the facts.

A point has however to be cleared. It concerns the reaction

against such an overwhelming American influence. Many people used to

say that this is an Arab-American problem ; but in our view, it is not …at

least, not to the degree imagined.

Anti-Americanism

« Among the components in the mood of anti-Westernism, and

more especially of anti-Americanism, were certain intellectual influences

coming from Europe ». The remark was made by Bernard Lewis 315

, who

goes on pointing out to Germany as one source of these influences. ―A

negative view of America formed part of school of thought by no means

limited to the Nazis but including writers as diverse as Rainer Maria

Rilke, Ernest Junger, and Martin Heidegger‖, he says 316

. If we mention

this question, it is well because a non negligible part of Arab modern

culture has been influenced by European intellectuals, to the point that it

is just impossible to make – say – a critic of a modern literary work in

Arabic, without any reference to the Western works in the same domain.

Indeed this is not only the case of comparative literary studies‘ focus but

also that of social sciences. Bernard Lewis acknowledges it when he says

―German philosophy, and particularly the philosophy of education,

enjoyed a considerable vogue among Arab and some other Muslim

intellectuals in the thirties and early forties, and this philosophic anti-

Americanism was part of the message‖317

. Social scientists and Arabists

who study for example the Baath ideology or the Panarabism cannot omit

to look for the European influences on these trends of thought. We do not

even need to underline the extensive influence that the Marxist literature

enjoyed in the Arab world: to some degree, the Arab anti-Americanism

came from this source, but it was not the sole. As European powers were

much more present in the Arab world, before the Second World War, it

315

Bernard Lewis, The roots of Muslim Rage, op. Cit. 316

―In this perception, America was the ultimate example of civilization without

culture: rich and comfortable, materially advanced but soulless and artificial; assembled

or at best constructed, not grown; mechanical, not organic; technologically complex but

lacking the spirituality and vitality of the rooted, human, national cultures of the

Germans and other ‗authentic‘ peoples‖. Idem. 317

Idem.

182

was merely unimaginable that the European culture does not mould the

Arab elite. When Europe began losing influence and the USA gaining it

in the same region, the trend of anti-Americanism was first unleashed by

angry Europeans. The Arab elite was at the time hoping that the USA –

which had no colonial experience with Arabs-, relieved them from their

pains while representing a counterweight to the colonialist powers.

Nothing was perhaps more alien to the Arab mind than the idea that the

USA could threaten the Arab people: in 1956, when Israel along with

Great Britain and France attacked Egypt as a reaction against the

nationalization of the Suez Canal, the USA stood against such an

aggression. It has never been forgotten, and indeed the US position

against France‘s colonialist plans in North Africa in the same period,

helped those who were fighting for independence. Therefore, one should

look for the seeds of anti-Americanism in the European cultural

production of that time more than in the Arab‘s. For one thing: apart

from the communist propaganda, nothing in the Arab culture of the time

was anti-American. Better : some of the best literature about the new

Arab awakening came from the United States, on the hands of people like

George Antonius, Nagib al Raihani, or Gibran Khalil Gibran. Yet, things

began to change and to worsen with the Arab Israeli conflict getting on,

unresolved, and with the USA siding irremediably with Israel, until the

picture completely metamorphosed. Today, Arab anti-Americanism has

reached peaks even the overzealous European anti-Americans have not

attained.

Why? That is the question.

New time , new thought

There was an opportunity that neither Americans nor Arabs

seized to stop the escalation in the love-hate relationship. This is when

the Berlin wall collapsed on November 9, 1989, and that the world

shaped by the post-second world war politics began to fall apart. It was a

good opportunity because the fall of the Berlin wall (1989), followed by

the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and finally the

fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991, generated an optimistic mood

regarding the future of international relations, especially in the West.

This optimistic perspective was best captured in Francis

Fukuyama‘s article ―The End of History.‖ According to this view, the

Soviet Union‘s collapse had validated the superiority of the Western

liberal model of economics and politics and confirmed its universal

183

application. It was, therefore, expected that those countries that had not

yet embraced this model would embark on market-oriented economic

reform and democratization. It was also believed that, with the end of the

Cold War, military expenditures could be reduced and more funds both at

national and international levels would be spent on economic and social

development—the so-called peace dividend. This optimism was further

strengthened by the victory of the international coalition created in 1990

under U.S. leadership to reverse Iraq‘s aggression against Kuwait and

later buttressed by the Oslo process resulting in the 1993 Palestinian-

Israeli peace agreement. Indeed, it was hoped that the end of the Gulf

War (March 1991) would usher in a new period of peace and prosperity

in the Middle East. But, unfortunately, not only that did not happen, but

the situation even worsened with the failure of the Oslo process, the rise

of the second intifada, and the return of the Israeli falcon, General Ariel

Sharon, to power in Israel.

Was the new paradigm that would explain the international scene

in the aftermath of Berlin wall‘s fall, Huntington‘s ‗Clash of

Civilizations‘ as suggest some people?

It is true that the attacks by terrorists belonging to the extremist

Muslim organization Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon on September 11, 2001, appeared to validate the clash of

civilizations thesis. But if such is all what we can account for, to

summarize 1500 years of Western-Muslim relationship, it is rather a very

sad conclusion for the whole mankind.

Bernard Lewis rightly notes that ―the Muslim world is far from

unanimous in its rejection of the West, nor have the Muslim regions of

the Third World been the most passionate and the most extreme in their

hostility‖318

. It is also true that many Muslims share with the West

―certain basic cultural and moral, social and political, beliefs and

aspirations‖319

. Considering the fact that the greater part of the world is

still outside Islam, it would be a madness to make of all those people an

enemy, just because they happen to be in ―the house of war‖, according

to the Islamic medieval interpretation of the mankind division320

. Yet,

this is exactly what some fanatics pretend to do.

A Wilton Park Conference on rebuilding trust between the

Muslim world and the West after 9/11 identified the symptoms of the

318

B. Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, op. Cit. 319

Idem. 320

Mankind is thus divided into: house of Islam and house of war (unbelief).

184

current crisis between the Muslim world and the West as involving : « a -

the attack of September 11, 2001 on the USA and the symbols of

Western financial, political and military power; b - the ongoing

Palestinian-Israeli crisis; c - the wars of ‗regime change‘ in Afghanistan

and Iraq ». 321

In this context, it was stated that « 9/11 has been a watershed in

US Arab relations. For the Saudi political elite, the radical questioning of

their favored status with the USA has been a severe blow. Whilst both

sides have made serious efforts to disavow the stereotypes of ―Crusade‖

or ―Islamic terrorism‖, some of the characterization has stuck. The Saudi

political elite has paid a heavy price for the climate of xenophobia and

religious extremism, which was tolerated or even encouraged in that

country. The US reaction to 9/11 was unprecedented. This attack on the

US mainland has yielded a ―zero-tolerance response‖. In spite of the

widespread hatred of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the US has by

no means been universally successful in projecting the war as one of

liberation and reconstruction ».322

The conference was particularly concerned about violence and

terrorism : The prevalence of use of armed force, whether by state or

non-state actors, whether through war, occupation, resistance or

terrorism, is indicative of a volatile and dangerous set of relationships

between the Muslim world and the West. From TV news, place names

such as Afghanistan, Baghdad, Ramallah, Bali, New York, Washington,

Rabat, Riyadh, Istanbul and Madrid are familiar. The globalization and

unpredictability of violence is a feature of our times. The political use of

armed force has again become an acute area of debate since 9/11. The

Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States brought almost universal

condemnation. The US-led coalition‘s wars of ‗regime change‘ deposed

dictatorial regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Particularly the action

against Iraq, however, led to deep divisions in the world community.

Even within western societies, the justification for, and legitimacy of the

war has been vigorously contested. Under the heading ‗war against

terrorism‘ many states have introduced legislation, which is also used

against political opposition, as well as against possible terrorists.

Particularly, but not only, in the Arab world, Israel‘s definition of

Palestinian resistance to occupation as terrorism (in contravention of the

321

Report on Wilton Park Conference 745: Monday 3 – Friday 7 May 2004 on

―Rebuilding trust between the Muslim world and the West‖, organized in co-operation

with the Swedish Institute in Alexandria. 322

Idem.

185

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 181, 242 and 337) is widely

contested. It is almost universally rejected in the Arab world. Unless

international legitimacy and respect for international law is secured, it is

difficult to see how « the just war principle of use of armed force », if

only as a last resort , can be consistently upheld. Important principles

such as the protection of human rights, the state‘s monopoly of armed

force, and diplomacy rather than war as the key to international relations

have all been weakened in recent years. Representations of ―the West‖

for Arab youth, the material standards of living of the West, and the

media reach of globalized communication presents Arab youth with an

ambivalent picture. On the one hand, the West is seen as the dominant

society holding back development (the hostile Other), on the other hand,

it is seen as highly attractive and an Eldorado. In a number of western

countries, however, right wing, anti-immigrant political parties have

arisen. For the West, this presents the dilemma of whether to deny such

parties the ―oxygen of publicity‖ or whether censorship and restrictive

legislation would add the glamour of martyrdom to such political views.

Second- and third-generation youth from Muslim countries face difficult

tasks of ―social navigation‖ in seeking to find their own identity or juggle

their multiple identities. They also face the difficult and possibly

excessive expectations of being able to act as a ―bridge‖ to the societies

from which they, their parents or grandparents emigrated. At the same

time, they face difficulties of full acceptance within the community

where they live. The existence of such transnational communities

presents a wide range of challenges.

Politics of identity

Often, the politics of identity operates through a community

defining itself in relation to ‗the Other‘. In European history, such sharp,

binary definitions have usually been at the expense of Jewish and

Muslim minorities. It is more healthy for European identity to be

established in terms of ideals such as: the rule of law, adherence to

standards of human rights, the legitimacy of democratic politics and the

separation of powers. If, however, the identity of the European Union is

defined negatively as different from the Muslim world, the impact could

have negative consequences both for the sizable minorities of Christians

in the Middle East and Muslims within the European Union. « Within

European history, there have been strong tendencies for nation states to

regard uniformity as a threat. Such anxiety about diversity can easily feed

186

the roots of intolerance and even culminate in ethnic cleansing »323

.

Tolerance of ‗the Other‘ as an individual is not enough. What is required

is the safeguarding of communal rights of those of different ethnic and

religious backgrounds. Minorities must have rights both in the private

and the public sphere. Fundamentalism, whether of a religious or

antireligious sort, cannot adequately respond to other communities. The

destruction of Bosnia serves as a warning of what can occur when

nationalist ideologies cannot accept ‗the Other‘. « In the war, which

destroyed Bosnia, huge numbers of Muslims were killed or expelled.

Over 1000 mosques were destroyed. Europe failed to protect a

longstanding Muslim community within its midst and failed to protect

the diversity of a European country »324

.

When Mohammed Arkoun talks of enemy construction in the

West, focalizing on Islam325

, we should recall that at the same time, the

Muslim culture – and some call it modern – uses the same tools for the

same purpose: in the Arab countries, little children go to the koranic

schools since they are 2 or 3 years old. The koranic schools (called al

kuttab in the Maghreb) are the second environment of the child directly

after the family. In these schools or ―madrasas‖ (kuttab), Koranic verses

are learned by heart. Even before he could understand the historical

conditions that caused their apparition , the child grows up learning by

heart some verses of the Koran pointing out to Christians and Jews

sometimes as « people of the Book » - ahl al kitab -, with whom Muslims

have to debate, and sometimes as the enemies against whom they have to

fight. When we know that there are hundreds and hundreds of books

written only for the purpose of interpreting these verses, one may wonder

about the wisdom of teaching the Koran to little children, without

bothering to explain it to them. Yet, how about teaching the Bible to the

children in the Christian countries? Has anybody doubted of the

importance of religious teaching in the West? In fact, it is almost the

same problem anywhere, and we can add the same observation for the

Judaism and other religions. It is always at an early age – when the brain

of the child is like a sponge, taking everything in and incapable of

reflexion – that religious precepts are taught. Thus, religion is inherited,

along with the family legacy, the race, and the country of birth ; it is

seldom a matter of free choice.

323

Wilton Park…Op.Cit. 324

Idem. 325

See our introduction.

187

If the majority of the terrorists of 9/11 happened to be Saudis, the

ideology that shaped their minds in not homogenous, and it is not

necessarily Wahhabite. Let us not omit that al Qaeda, as an international

network is compounded of elements ideologically diversified, although

they share a common ground. Actually, those people were not the first to

perform such terrorist operations in the world, and it is unlikely that they

will be the last. Radical Islamism leads logically to terrorism. Radical

Islamism is not necessarily Wahhabite ; it is not even necessarily

Sunnite. It may proceed out of an peculiar interpretation of the Koran and

the Hadith (tradition of the Prophet). Those who prepare psychologically

and physically young men (and girls) to blow up themselves along with

people they never saw before, would use any thought, any idea, any text

convenient for their purposes. They act as gurus do with mesmerised

followers of their sects. Their secret weapon is brainwashing. Their

precedent was the programmer of the Manchurian candidate, if not

Ravachol.

If they use the Koran as the manual of the little terrorist, it is not

the fault of the Koran, though, but their own reading of the verses.

Reading the Koran is not complicated. Anybody with some notions in

Arabic can do it. But interpreting the meaning of the text , that is the

problem. A problem from which have emerged in the 9th century the

schools of Islamic thought, which asked the Greeks for help to

understand the divine word revealed to the Muslims. In order to

understand the Koran, scholars started translating Aristotle and the other

philosophers, and comparing what the latter said with what they

understood of their own revelation. That is how philosophy was born in

those remote centuries in the Arabo-islamic world.

―In the first century of the Abbasid Caliphate most of the great

works of Greek philosophy and science – Plato, Aristotle, Euclid and

Hippocrates – were translated into Arabic. There were few original

thinkers; one notable exception was Al Kindi, the first outstanding

Islamic philosopher, who was called the philosopher of the Arabs. He

was highly appreciated by the Caliph Mamun and died about 870. Al

Kindi was of noble Arab descent in the male line; but most of the famous

later Islamic philosophers such as Avicenna (980-1037) were Persian.‖326

326

Peter Mansfield, The Arabs, op. cit. p50.

188

From al Kindi, to Avicenna and Averroes, very learned Muslim

scholars tried to understand what was the link between Reason and

Revelation. The debate was intense. It represents actually the whole

history of the classic islamic mind. Yet, despite this rich history, in the

XX and XXI centuries, some people assumed that the Koran is to be

understood only one single way and it must be theirs, and for that

purpose they started their ―jihad‖ to kill anybody who does not agree

with them, either in order to make Islam pure or to reach an idealistic

purity by the blood.

The pressure the Americans put on Saudi Arabia after 9/11 for

reforming its educative system was actually ―one-eyed‖: the other eye

remained blind and thus unable to see the facts: it is not just the system in

Saudi Arabia that produced radical Islamism, it is also different systems

in the whole world, for one thing is true: the first wave of radical

Islamism was meant to be an opposition to the states some of which were

supported by the West. The second was born and grown up in the West.

It is thus, as much an arabo-islamic problem as a Western.

When the opponents failed to change anything to the local

regimes, they thought of striking at the heart of those who support those

regimes. They found help and support in Europe and America, among

marginalised angry Muslims. The Jihad against the « enemis of Islam »

was the rallying slogan. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya ,

Somalia, Sudan, etc, gave them the possibility for perfoming training and

fighting.

So, the kind of terrorism, which struck the USA, was of the same

brand that struck the Westerners in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, etc… It is

also of the same brand that put the bombs in the Parisian metro, in the

Madrid trains station and in the London subway.

The game was not initially about ―American arrogance»: how

would the Islamists have accepted to be trained in Pakistan and

Afghanistan under American supervision, if America was initially

considered as their enemy? Would anyone explain this puzzle?

Indeed, there is in the Islamist literature – from Sayyid Qutb and

Abu al A‘la al Mawdudi to Sheikh Ali Khudhayr and Ayman al Zawahiri

– a construction of the West as the historic enemy of Islam, that is. But

for any observer who endeavours to read thoroughly some of these texts,

it is clear that this discourse aims at opposing the secular and modernist

one from an ideologically preconceived basis more than arguing against

the Western social scientists and thinkers on a scientific ground. None of

the fundamentalist thinkers considers important for example to discuss

189

the theories of Michel Foucault about knowledge and oppression, or

those of Derrida about language and deconstruction, or those of Alain

Touraine or Taylor about the subject and modernity, or those of the

Frankfurt school, etc…although this should have been the logical way to

make the demonstration of the soundness of their own arguments as

regards the relations between Islam and the West. And one would hardly

find any real reference to Bernard Lewis or Francis Fukuyama or Samuel

Huntington in their works, at least as a counter-argument or to give

substance to their own views. How can any thinker find his own way, if

he does not read other thinkers or criticize them? Genuine thought does

not stem out of nothing : Nietszche was Plato‘s reader, before reversing

him. Marx was Hegel‘s disciple. Sartre was Kierkegard‘s reader.

Habermas owes a lot to Weber. Avicenna invented a formula, which was

repeated by Averroes and Albertus Magnus: ―Thought brings about the

generality in forms‖. Better: ―Averroes is more important in Christian

than in Mohammedan philosophy‖, says Bertrand Russel.327

And the

history of thought is nothing but such an addition. Where do the

contemporary Islamist thinkers belong?

Islam and the West

The ―neofundamentalists‖ reject the West out of a

misunderstanding, since they never tried seriously to know about the

West more than the ―clichés‖ over-used in their dissertations. For them

the West is summed up in a few stereotypes : it is the land of the

crusaders and the colonialists. They would build up the West they

imagine upon this basis ; and they would not lack arguments on this

level, since it is true that the largest part of the historical relationships

between the West and Islam is concerned by wars and political struggle

more than by dialogue : first, the crusades ; then the colonisation ; and in

the second decade of the twentieth century, the dislocation of the

Ottoman empire, the Sykes and Picot conspirative agreement about the

partition of the Middle East between France and Great Britain , then the

aggression of Suez in 1956, the war of Algeria, and so on.

These are, indubitably, real events of real history. Few people

even in the West could reject the idea that imperialism is lurking behind

such or such war. Yet, we know that imperialism is not the whole West;

327

Bertrand Russel, A history of Western Philosophy, A Clarion Book, Simon

and Schuster, 1967, p 427.

190

we know that the West that colonized countries and triggered wars was

also the West that bred the Human Rights Declaration and invented all

the modern welfare we are today enjoying. But how history is re-

appropriated and instrumented to serve the purposes of such or such

party, is another problem.

One may contend that this re-appropriation of history is also

performed by governments, which is indeed a cogent argument ; that is

why educative programs are important. The question is not only about

how Christians and Jews and Westerners are represented in school

textbooks in the Arab and Muslim countries ; it is also about how

Muslims and Arabs are represented in Western textbooks and in the

media. How many manuals of history or books of philosophy in the West

talk objectively about Muslim contributions to civilization ? How come

that a whole historic period -when Muslims were leading universal

sciences and thought - is completely omitted, so that young pupils grow

convinced that the Western civilization owes everything to the Greeks

and the Romans and nothing to the Arabs and Muslims ?

The Saudis are criticized because they have made of proselytizing

and propagating Islam a state doctrine, though carried out with respect to

the law in non-Muslim countries, it can represent no public harm, as

conversions are always an individual choice. Yet, what have been

Christian missionaries doing in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, since many

years ?

Although the recently voiced opinions about the clash of

civilizations posit that Islam falls outside the Judeo-Christian and

Hellenic cultural continuum, the reverse is actually true : Classical

Islamic civilization, as we have already hinted, was constructed out of

Arab, Biblicist, and Hellenic cultures, additionally to the fact that it cast a

wider net by integrating Persian, Central Asian, and Indian components

within its cultural synthesis. Historically, Islam is the true bridge between

East and West. We should not omit that Islam‘s Hellenism was mediated

primarily through Eastern Christian intellectual circles, and important

streams of Muslim philosophical and scientific thought still remain an

understudied field linking late Antiquity with the Renaissance. Thus,

there are strong grounds of asserting that Islam as a civilization force and

religious tradition should be perceived as an integral part of the Western

tradition in as much as this tradition tends toward universal ecumenism.

As we know, the first peoples to be conquered by Islam were

those of the east Mediterranean or Hellenic world, whose minds have

been formed by Greek thought. The first Islamic theologians did not

191

reject Greek philosophy out of hand. On the contrary, with the

encouragement of the early Caliphs (such as Mamun: 813-833), they

studied deeply all the sciences of the classical world ; and it can be said

that the Christian West ultimately recovered much of the knowledge of

Greek philosophy that it had lost in the dark ages through the Arabs and

especially the great universities of Moorish Spain. The Arabs introduced

Aristotle to the West centuries before the revival of Greek scholarship,

which directly preceded the Renaissance and was one of the causes of the

Reformation.328

The Arabic Aristotle of Spain was one of the principle

sources for medieval Christian scholars in the thirteenth century.

―During the twelfth century‖ writes Bertrand Russel, ―translators

gradually increased the number of Greek books available to Western

students. There were three main sources of such translations:

Constantinople, Palermo, and Toledo. Of these Toledo was the most

important, but the translations coming from there were often from

Arabic, not direct from the Greek.‖329

It has been noticed that what is often viewed, as a clash of

civilizations is actually a clash of symbols. The symbols on the one side

are headscarves, turbans, and other signs of Islamic religious expression

that Westerners find sometimes repellant, just as fundamentalist Muslims

view much of Western culture as anti-Islamic. Moreover, cultural contact

between Islam and the West has been marred by historically unequal

power relations, ―leaving the West arrogant and insensitive and the

Muslim world defensive and insecure‖330

.

The failure of romantic nationalism

Muqtedar Khan observes that « the American support for

authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world breeds radical opposition in

these countries and stimulates anti-American sentiment ».331

And he is

surely right, for just observe how the opposition in the Arab world – all

trends confounded- reacted to the American intervention to oust Saddam.

328

T.Arnold and A. Guillaume (eds), The Legacy of Islam, London, 1931,p.29. 329

About arabo-islamic contribution to the Western thought, see: Bertrand

Russel, A History of Western Philosophy, a Clarion Book, Simon & Schuster, USA,

1967, Chapter X, Mohammedan Culture and philosophy. 330

See the contribution of Abdul Aziz Said, Director of the Center for Global

Peace, to the workshop organized by the United States Institute of Peace on November

2001. 331

See the contribution of Muqtedar Khan to the same workshop. Op.cit.

192

Our first remark is that instead of siding with the Iraqi opposition –

which should have been the logical course – they sided with Saddam!

Even if they did not say so, but rather covered it with anti-imperialist or

antiwar slogans, they have de facto supported the dictator at least for

labeling the Iraqi opposition as ―agents of the CIA‖, not as people who

are fed up with oppression.

In the same paper, M. Khan remarks also that the lack of peaceful

channels for protest and dissent in the Arab world has slowly radicalized

most moderate Islamic opposition groups. The West legitimized the

military coup that prevented Islamists from coming to power after

winning an election in Algeria in 1992. The United States gave tacit

support to Turkey when it forced Islamists out of power in the 1990s,

even after they had won popular mandates. ―It is not the hatred of

democracy and freedom but the desire for democracy that has made

many Muslims hate the United States, which they blame for the

perpetuation of undemocratic polities in their world‖332

. Other sources of

hostility include American troops stationed in the Gulf, and uncritical

American support for Israel.

There are three dangers, noted Khan, against which all peace-

loving people must be on guard : « (1) the conflict emerging from 9/11

must not be allowed to become a clash of civilizations between Islam and

the West; (2) hawks and extremists must not be allowed to hijack and

dominate the discourses in the West and in the Muslim world; and (3) the

search for security and revenge should not be allowed to undermine the

moral fabric of our societies ».333

All societies, including those of Europe and North America, carry

within them the seeds of intolerance and authoritarianism. What makes

the Arab world stand out then is simply its recent record of extreme

illiberalism. Nazih Ayubi334

observes in this context that there is a

difference between a ―hard state‖ and a ―strong state‖: one punishes and

coerces, whereas the other achieves its goals. By these definitions all

Arab states are hard states, and a few, such as Syria or Iraq (under

Saddam), are ultra-hard or ―fierce‖ states that employ vast bureaucracies,

large armies, harsh prisons, and sometimes firing squads to preserve

themselves by force. Yet, these hard states are also weak states that lack

the capacity to enforce laws, break traditional patterns, and adapt to

332

Idem. 333

Idem. 334

Nazih Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle

East, London, I.B. Tauris, 1995.

193

changing conditions.335

Ayubi argues that, regardless of the status of

Arab civil society, « three interconnected factors drastically limit the

Arab state‘s capacity for social control. The first pertains to vested

interests against political or economic liberalization. The second consists

of cultural dispositions favorable to authoritarianism. And the third

involves inhibitions against reforms liable to fuel uncontrollable and self-

augmenting demands for redistribution »336

.

The analysis identifies systematic repression as an obstacle to

change. But it is misleading to ascribe the observed repression only to the

abuses of state officials. Responsibility lies also, if not mainly, with

ordinary citizens who keep quiet or even actively support the political

status quo in the face of tyranny and inefficiency. To one degree or

another, every Arab country exhibits an expressive equilibrium in which

individuals refrain from speaking honestly for fear that the vast majority

of their fellow citizens will stay loyal to the status quo, leaving dissidents

isolated. And every potential dissident who exhibits such reticence

discourages other malcontents from publicizing their complaints.

Ayubi argues that pan-Arabism, « far from being an innovative

force for growth and liberation, has been a source of illiberal

conservatism ».337

Born as a defensive response to Turkish nationalism,

European colonialism and Zionism, « pan-Arabism emphasizes

communal solidarity and considers individualism an alien trait to be

suppressed ». Thus, it uses modern nationalism as a vehicle for

preserving the « anti-individualist strands of the Arab cultural heritage ».

But it has been manifestly unsuccessful in achieving its political goals.

Capable of galvanizing crowds and instilling communal pride, it has

taught successive generations that the individual Arab can prosper only

as a servant of the global Arab community. Yet, not only it has not

unified Arabs, but also by granting legitimacy to the most illiberal

regimes of the Arab world (like the Baathist regimes of Syria and Iraq), it

has delayed both economic and political liberalization and hindered

335

A long line of distinguished thinkers, most notably Karl Wittfogel, author of

Oriental Despotism (1957), have held that in the Middle East the state has always been

strong and civil society always weak. Wittfogel‘s argument, which draws on both Marx

and Weber, hinges on the state‘s control of most land and irrigation systems. Although

the specifics of Wittfogel‘s thesis are generally treated with skepticism, its essential

message enjoys wide acceptance. 336

Ayubi. Idem. 337

Ayubi. Op.Cit.Pp. 136-51.

194

viable unification while indulging in romantic self-praise and

sentimentalist nostalgia.

The failure of romantic pan-Arabism may only be understood in

the light of the failure of local state-nationalism. Concerning Pan-

Islamism, Ayubi thinks that it has been also a romantic and highly

ritualistic doctrine, ignoring many practical issues of modern life, which

is true. However, it is not only romantic pan-Arabism that banned

individualism from expression, but also romantic local state-nationalism,

which in identifying the state to the party in power or to the autocratic

leader made of any opposition a ―high treason‖ to the people, and ended

up wrapping up the individual and any private life, any private freedoms

into the mythological flag, as a way to cover the absence of freedom by a

miserable nationalism. In this context, people become the anonymous

mass forced to follow the steps of the head of the state. No private life is

allowed to the individual in such a situation. In some countries, romantic

local state-nationalism has been historically marked by the fascist

discourses of the thirties (Xxth century), for an understandable reason : it

was hostile to the occupying powers (France and Great Britain, that is).

It is exactly in that period that many nationalist leaders and parties

struggling for independence have emerged.

Reason and individuality

We hardly need to stress the importance of individualism in the

modernization process in the West. From literary studies to rational

choice theory, issues broadly construed as ‗cultural‘ have inspired

academic debates, fostered interdisciplinary exchanges, and prompted

battles over the methods, evidence, and objectives of scholarly research.

Derived from Max Weber, classic analysis of the ‗effective affinity‘

between the Protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism in the West, these

studies attempted to demonstrate how cultural attitudes and beliefs either

constrained or promoted progress.

In a book published in Arabic under the title ―Assassination of the

Reason‖, Burhan Ghalioun starts from the remark that the main

dimension of the current crisis in the Arab society is related to culture.

But the Arab writers were much more concerned, in his view, by its role

in the Nahdha- Renaissance- than by its social function: ―the cultural

question has become particularly attractive for the research only after the

irruption of the question of identity. The link of the culture to the nahdha

has thus become the specificity of those who were preaching change and

195

revolution, whereas the same link to the identity has been claimed by

those who preached conservatism, authenticity and independence‖338

.

Such a division has been enacted and reflected by the controversy

over modernity (hadatha) and traditionalism (taqlid). The Arab

contemporary thought in its entirety fell under the effect of such a

dispute. ―The history of the modern Arab culture has become that of the

development of this conflict, of its metamorphosis, and of its different

resurrections‖339

. The conflict has not only divided the Arab

intelligentsia, but also the Arab society, Ghalioun observes. Thus, two

opposite camps appeared, each one with its own vision of the past, of the

present, of history, of the Reason, of the Rationality, and with its own

purposes, its own political and social mottos‖340

. More specifically,

Ghalioun notes that ―while the call to the authenticity is to be defined by

embracing religion, the call to the modernity would rather identify itself

with science‖341

. We may also paraphrase Ghalioun and say that this

debate has crossed several stages and taken varied forms, but since the

XIXth century, it has nearly concentrated into the conflicting and –

sometimes violent – controversy between Islamic salafism and social

evolutionist secularism.

The decline of Islamic civilization prompted a number of Arab

intellectuals, including some already exposed to European culture and

impressed by the accomplishments of Europe, to call for radical reform.

As a consequence of the intellectual debate aroused within the Arab

world by European advancement, an opposition was drawn between din

(religion) and ‘aql (reason), asalah (nobility) and mu’asarah

(modernity), din and dawlah (state) and din and ‘ilm (science or

knowledge).

Pioneers of Arab secularism

The early secularizing elite was dominated by a group of

Christian Arabs who had received their education at the Syrian Protestant

College and then settled in Egypt. Important figures included Shibli

Shumayyil (1850-1917), Farah Antun (1874-1922), Georgie Zaidan

(1861-1914), Ya‘qub Suruf (1852-1917), Salama Musa (1887-1958) and

338

Burhan Ghalioun, Ightiyal al ‗aql, ed. Madbouli, Cairo, 1990, 3d print, p 22. 339

Idem. 340

Ghalioun, op. Cit, p 23. 341

Idem.

196

Nicola Haddad (1878-1954). Al-Muqtataf and Al-Hilal publications,

founded respectively in 1876 and 1892, were used by writers and

thinkers belonging to this group. They strove to propagate the

transcendence of ideas like love of country and fellow countrymen over

all other social ties, even those of religion.

Through their copious writings, these thinkers succeeded in

consolidating the foundations of secularism in the Arab world. Praising

the liberal thought of France and England during the eighteenth and

nineteenth century and condemning the hegemony of tradition over the

human mind, they stressed that reason should set the standard for human

conduct. For modernization to take place, they demanded that only

traditions, which were compatible with this objective, should remain.

The main aim of these intellectuals was to lay the basis of a secular state

in which Muslims and Christians could participate on a footing of

complete equality.

Shibli Shumayyil, who after graduation from the Syrian

Protestant College went to Paris to study medicine, is reputed to have

first introduced the theories of Darwin to the Arab world through his

writings in Al-Muqtataf. He belonged to the late nineteenth century

movement, which saw science as the key to unlock the secret of the

universe, even as a form of worship. He believed that the religion of

science necessitated a declaration of war on older religions. To him

social unity, which was essential for a general will to exist, involved the

separation of religion from political life since religion was a cause of

division. He insisted that nations grew stronger as religion grew weaker,

and pointed out that this was true of Europe, which had only become

powerful and truly civilized once the Reformation and the French

Revolution had broken the hold of religious leaders on society. He

condemned both shuyukh (Islamic scholars) and priests of resisting

progress and development.

Farah Antun (1874-1922) who migrated from Tripoli to Cairo in

1897 chose to propagate his views through a study of the life and

philosophy of Ibn Rushd (Averroes). He was influenced by the works of

Ernest Renan to such an extent that Hourani calls him Antun‘s master.

Antun believed that the conflict between science and religion would be

solved, but only by assigning each to its proper sphere. He dedicated his

book to what he called ―the new shoots of the East those men of sense in

every community and every religion of the East who have seen the

danger of mingling the world with religion in an age like ours, and have

come to demand that their religion should be placed on one side in a

197

sacred and honored place, so that they will be able really to unite, and to

flow with the tide of the new European civilization, in order to be able to

compete with those who belong to it, for otherwise it will sweep them all

away and make them the subjects of others.‖

Like Shumayyil and other Lebanese writers of the time, Antun‘s

aim was to lay the intellectual foundations of a secular state in which

Muslims and Christians could participate on a footing of complete

equality. His emphasis was on proving the invalidity of what he termed

‗the inessential part of religion‘: the body of laws. His second condition

for secularism was the separation of temporal and spiritual authorities,

suggesting that the separation of the two powers in Christianity made it

easier for Christians to be tolerant than for Muslims. He added that if

European countries were now more tolerant, that was not because they

were Christian but because science and philosophy had driven out

religious fanaticism, and the separation of powers had taken place.

Salama Musa (1887-1958) called for separating the sphere of

science and the sphere of religion insisting that religion, due to the

influence of religious institutions and clergymen had lost its progressive

nature and become a heavy burden. He tried to emphasize that Islam and

Christianity have identical stands with regard to the freedom of thought

and emancipation of the mind. He strongly believed that ‗society cannot

advance or progress unless the role of religion in the human conscience is

restricted ; progress is the new religion of humanity.‘

Muslim secularizers

The next generation of Arab secularist thinkers was mostly

followers of Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). While pressing for

reforms, Abduh believed that a modern legal system should develop out

of shari’ah and not in independence and favored an equal partnership,

rather than separation, between those who governed and the guardians of

the law. He stressed above all that no conflict existed between Islam on

the one hand and logic or science on the other. Shocked by the magnitude

of backwardness in the Arab world, he scorned those who blindly

imitated the old and resisted the new. He believed that Islam‘s

relationship with the modern age was the most crucial issue confronting

Islamic communities. In an attempt to reconcile Islamic ideas with

Western ones, he suggested that maslaha (interest) in Islamic thought

corresponded to manfa’ah (utility) in Western thought. Similarly, he

equated shura with democracy and ijma’ with consensus. Addressing the

198

question of authority, Abduh denied the existence of a theocracy in Islam

and insisted that the authority of the hakim (governor), qadi (judge) or

mufti, was civil. He strongly believed that ijtihad should be revived

because ‗emerging priorities and problems, which are new to Islamic

thought, need to be addressed.‘ He was a proponent of the parliamentary

system; he defended pluralism and refuted the claims that it would

undermine the unity of the ummah, arguing that the European nations

were not divided by it. ‗The reason,‘ he concluded, ‗is that their objective

is the same. What varies is only the method they pursue toward

accomplishing it.‘

However, some of Abduh‘s disciples, such as Qasim Amin and

Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid, were not entirely and exclusively influenced by

his thought. They had been influenced by the Christian pioneers of the

secularist school of thought and began to work out the principles of a

secular society in which Islam was honored but was no longer the

arbitrator of law and policy. Seeking to reconcile secularist ideas with

Islam, they went so far as to develop Abduh‘s emphasis on the

legitimacy of social change into a de facto division between the two

realms of religion and society, each with its own norms.

Qasim Amin (1865-1908), known as the emancipator of women,

suggested that the problem with the Muslims was a lack of science. He

stressed that it was useless to hope to adopt the sciences of Europe

without coming within the radius of its moral principles. The two, he

believed, were indissolubly connected, and ‗we must therefore be

prepared for change in every aspect of our life.‘ He believed that

perfection is not to be found in the past, even the Islamic past, but can

only be found, if at all, in the distant future. To him, the path to

perfection was science. Since Europe was the most advanced in the

sciences, was ahead of the Muslims in every way, he insisted that it was

not true that the Europeans were only materially better but not morally.

Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid (1872-1963) was a leading member of

this group. Although he was a close associate of Abduh, Islam played an

insignificant part in his thought. He was not concerned, like Al-Afghani,

to defend it, nor like Abduh, to restore to Islamic law its position as the

moral basis of society. Religion, whether it be Islamic or not, was

relevant to his thought only as one of the constituent factors of society.

The official abolishment of the Khilafah (Caliphate) in 1924

aroused a debate among thinkers of the time over the importance of the

Khilafah and the response of Muslims to its abolishment. Ali Abdel

Raziq (1888-1966), a graduate of Al-Azhar and Oxford, contributed to

199

the debate with a book published in 1925 that turned to be one of the

most controversial works in modern Islamic history: Al-Islam wa Usul

al-Hukm: Bahth fil-Khilafah wal-Hukumah fil-Islam (Islam and the

Fundamentals of Governance: A Thesis on Caliphate and Government in

Islam). Abdel Raziq claimed there was no such thing as Islamic political

principles, a theory believed to have been drawn mainly from the

opinions of non-Muslim writers on Islam. He denied the existence of a

political order in Islam and claimed that the Prophet had never

established one and that it had not been part of his mission to found a

state. His work has been a main source of ammunition in the vigorous

campaign launched by ‗secularists‘ in later times against the validity of

Islamic law or shari’ah. The book pioneered the idea of rejecting

conventional interpretations and replacing them with innovations based

mostly on orientalists‘ opinions and writings on Islam.

In this connection, what has been remarked about the failure of

modernization in the Arab world342

should be explained also in the light

of the oppression undergone by individuals and individualistic thought in

the Arab world. I would go further and say: the self is in the arabo-

islamic world what has been wiped off as a neglected thing, and without

the rediscovery and the reconstruction of that self, it is useless to hope for

any real progress.

According to Esposito, contemporary Islamic reformers or

neomodernists stress the need to renew Islam both at the individual and

the community levels. They advocate a process of Islamization or re-

Islamization that begins with the sacred sources of Islam, the Koran and

Sunna of the Prophet, but that also embraces the best in other cultures.

They see themselves as engaging in a dynamic process that is as old as

Islam itself. Much as early Muslims interpreted and applied Islamic

principles and values to their times and adopted and adapted political,

legal, and economic practices from the cultures they had conquered, the

neomodernist reformers wish to bring about a new Islamic renaissance

(nahda) pursuing a similar selective, self-critical path. They distinguish

between God's revelation and human interpretations, between that part of

Islamic law which is eternal and that which is contingent and relative,

between immutable principles and regulations that were human

constructs conditioned by time and place. In contrast to neorevivalists,

neomodernists are more creative and wide-ranging in their

reinterpretation of Islam and less tied to traditional interpretations of the

342

See for example the works of Burhan Ghalioun on this topic.

200

ulama. For this reason, they are often accused of "deviationism" by the

ulama, who charge that neomodernists lack the necessary training and

credentials to interpret Islam.343

Or, to paraphrase Charles Taylor, the question ―who am I‖ is

often spontaneously phrased by people to describe the problem of

identity. But ―this can‘t necessarily be answered by giving name and

genealogy. What does answer this question for us is an understanding of

what is of crucial importance to us. To know who I am is a species of

knowing where I stand.‖344

What is important to underline here is the link

between identity and a kind of orientation, which Taylor calls

―framework‖, and he stresses that ―a person without a framework

altogether would be outside our space of interlocution ; he wouldn‘t have

a stand in the space where the rest of us are‖.345

In other words, ―what I

am as a self, my identity, is essentially defined by the way things have

significance for me. And (…) these things have significance for me, and

the issue of my identity is worked out, only through a language of

interpretation which I have come to accept as a valid articulation of these

issues.‖346

Outside this framework, it is useless to try to answer the

question ―who this individual is‖, for the self is partly made by its self-

interpretations. That is exactly where the construction of the ―Other‖ – as

enemy or as ally – fits in.

― What we call identity crisis‖ observes B.Ghalioun in ―State and

Religion‖, ―represents only one aspect of the renewal of the national

personality in a time of deep civilizational crisis such as what is

undergone by altogether underdeveloped societies‖347

. In his view, within

the world struggle for the construction of the national self and the

achievement of independence and distinction 348

, the Islamic revival –

notwithstanding the existence or inexistence of faith – is a fundamental

element in the construction of the communal belonging, ― as a source of

common values determining the behaviors and the great historical and

human orientations‖.349

343

See : John L.Esposito, Contemporary Islam ; reformation or revolution? From

Oxford History of Islam, 2000 Oxford University Press. 344

C. Taylor. Op. Cit. P 27. 345

Taylor, p 31. 346

Taylor, op.cit, P 34. 347

Burhan Ghalioun, naqd assyasa addawlatu waddine, Ed. al mu'assasa al

arabiyya liddirasat wannachr Beirut, 1993. P. 255. 348

With the signification given to this term by Bourdieu. 349

B. Ghalioun, naqd assyasa. Op. Cit. P256.

201

Let us note, by the way, that the debate about identity,

authenticity, modernity, etc, is accompanied in the Arab world by a

feeling of distrust and even hostility towards the West. And although we

can hardly put 9/11 on the account of the reconstruction or the reconquest

of the identity, we state only that such a violent expression of the hard

feelings toward the West – and particularly the USA – may be a response

to that ―construction of the enemy‖, which M. Arkoun has identified as a

part of the Western culture, omitting to say that it is also a part of the

Arabo-islamic culture. However, despite the relative success of Islamists

in providing adversarial idioms and resonant political critiques, the

struggle among nominally Muslim citizens and Islamist activists is as

pronounced as the solidarities an Islamist adversarial politics has

fostered. Being ―Muslim» might signify a set of religious beliefs, an

ascriptive attachment, a ―cultural‖ identification, a state classification, a

set of recognizable activities, or none of the above. There are those who

see a separation of mosque and state as fundamental, and those who

advocate their conjuncture. There are those who think the shari‘a should

be the source of legislation, those who view it as a source, and those who

wish it were irrelevant to contemporary law. There are countries where

the ‗Ulamas,- or religious elite - are independent of the state, places

where mosque sermons are controlled by the state, and places where the

‗Ulamas are coterminous with the state. There are in short vigorous

communities of argument and plural varieties of social and political

practice. This plurality makes any invocation of a single political doctrine

of Islam empirically untenable and theoretically meaningless.

Towards Liberty

There is a tradition of thought in the West, distinguishing three

types of liberty: the political, the civil and the economic. As defined by

Hayek 350

, liberty or freedom is ―that condition of men in which coercion

of some by others is reduced as much as is possible in society‖. This

conception of individual liberty is closely related to the notion of

individualism, ―a distinctly Western concept to which most other

civilizations have not subscribed‖, according to Deepak Lal351

. If this is

350

Hayek F.A. The constitution of Liberty, London, Routledge, 1960. Cited in:

Deepak Lal, Does modernization require westernization? The Independent Review, v.

V, n° 1, Summer 2000. 351

D. Lal. Op. Cit.

202

really the case, assuming that modernization has not resulted in self-

sufficient democratic regimes in the Arab world, then something was

wrong since the start. In other words, if individualistic values were not

allowed to evolve as integrative part of what Joseph Needam called ―a

packet of change‖ – responsible in his view of the ―European miracle‖ of

modern economic growth- then it becomes clear that this is a good reason

explaining the current failure of the Arab societies on the level of

freedom and democracy.

Two remarks are worth noticing here : first, economic

performance requires economic and civil liberty, because they underwrite

the sanctity of private property. The second is that hereditary monarchy,

not democracy, indeed delivered the industrial Revolution.

As nobody needs to reinvent the warm water, the Arabs do not

need to start the change process out of the zero level. However, this does

not mean that they are dispensed from democracy, since the first

condition – i.e. civil and economic freedom- is still necessary for them to

perform an economic genuine progress.

For Deepak Lal, ―although individualism was an essential aspect

of the West‘s subsequent trajectory, it is not essential – or inevitable, as

Hayek‘s cultural evolutionary view would suggest – for the ―rest‖ to

adopt this particular Western value in order to reproduce the West‘s

economic success‖352

.

However, we need first to establish as a fact that individualistic

values do not exist in any form whatsoever in the Arab and arabo-islamic

thought, if not since the Nahdha, then mainly in the classic ages. This is

actually far from being proven. If communalism has prevailed over

individualism in the modern Arab and arabo-islamic culture, this is not in

itself the evidence that the values of individualism have never been of

any importance in the Arabo-islamic civilization, not to speak of the pre-

Islamic culture. We need certainly to make a new reading of that heritage

with the purpose of seeking these values. Some researches have already

tried to question the classic heritage, but with the exception of the

psychoanalyst approach achieved by Ali Zay‘ur who studies the

individual Arab more than the individualistic values, there are little

works that even when escaping the dogmatic ―rape‖ focus on localizing

and analyzing these values.

D. Lal raised a question also very discussed by the Arab thinkers

since the XIX th century: to promote in the rest of the world the material

352

Idem.

203

prosperity that the ―European miracle» has brought to the West, does the

unique Western value system need to be transferred, and if so, how? The

answer he gave opposed Hayek‘s view. The latter has answered

positively to the question ―does modernization require westernization?‖

He maintained that the market economy requires cultural underpinnings

in the form of a set of ‗modern‘ values based on individualism. He even

argued that a form of cultural evolution had, in an unplanned way, led

from a Stone Age culture with its sense of communal bonds to a modern

culture with respect for abstract rules, such as the rule of law, and a

―detachment from communal, co-operative ends‖. In his view, it would

seem that, even though the culture of liberty arose in the West, because

of its success it should naturally spread across the world. A similar

implicit belief underlies the current Western moral crusade around the

world, wherein a combination of the market and good governance

(euphemism for democracy) is increasingly offered as a panacea for

poverty and war.353

Maxime Rodinson,354

the well-known French orientalist and

social scientist, maintains that there is nothing in Islam – either in the

Koran and Sunna or the sacred Law that was developed from them- that

is especially hostile to capitalist enterprise. However, as P. Mansfield

notes, ―it cannot be proved that Muslim societies would have developed a

capitalist formation of the European-American type. It is equally

impossible to prove that they were incapable of doing so‖355

. If the

private accumulation of capital never attained the European level, despite

a self-confident and enterprising Islamic bourgeoisie existed in the

Middle Ages, the result of its failure to reach political power – as this

was in the hands of the Mamluks and other Turkish and Caucasian

military- in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as happened in

Europe, was that when the European powers invaded and occupied many

of the Arab lands in the nineteenth century these were all at a pre-

industrial stage. Did colonialism prevent the Arabs from industrializing?

That‘s the question! Anyway, we ought to notice that the heart of the

Arab Peninsula – the current Saudi Arabia – has never been occupied by

the Europeans. Industry failed to progress out there, though.

―It is a paradox of Islam that as social system it is at once the

most democratic and the most authoritarian of religions‖, notes

353

Idem. 354

In : Islam et Capitalisme. 355

The Arabs, op. Cit. P. 85.

204

Mansfield356

, who adds: ―it is democratic because it has no established

church hierarchy to intercede between God and the faithful (…) But

because in religious matters the humblest Muslim stands on a level with

the caliph or his chief qadi a third root of faith had to be added (to the

Koran and the Tradition)- the voice of the people or ‗consensus‘ of the

faithful (ijma in Arabic)‖.

Even if Ijma does not mean the democratic counting of votes of

the Muslim community to reach decisions on points of law or ethics at

any given time but the slowly accumulating pressure of opinion over a

long period, nevertheless, it is a democratic principle in Mansfield‘s

view, ―in the sense that it means the acceptance of the will of the

majority‖357

.

He notes also that Heretics in Islam have been condemned by the

orthodox, but they have rarely been persecuted and still more rarely have

they been burned at the stake. It is worth noticing in this context, that

those who suffered martyrdom like Al Hallaj and Averroes, were not

atheists: the first was a great sufi (mystic) and the second was the latest

great philosopher of the classical age, the one who tried his life during to

find the connection between philosophy and prophecy (Reason and

Revelation). That is why the remarkable tolerance of classical and

medieval Islam towards variations in belief and practice did not diminish

the tendency towards political absolutism. Thus, whereas there was a

natural tolerance enjoined by Islam of the Christians and Jews – the

dhimmis – who were organized in their own millets or religious

communities with internal autonomy and considerable individual and

communal freedom, the attitudes toward the Shia Muslim subjects of the

Ottoman empire, who existed in large numbers in what are now Iraq,

Lebanon and Yemen, was more severe. ―There was no requirement for

Sunni Muslims to treat the Shias kindly and there was a long history of

hatred and warfare between them which especially affected the Shias of

Iraq, who were close to the rival and Shia Empire of Persia‖358

.

It is clear that much of that ambivalence that marked the classical

and medieval Islam remained and is still affecting today‘s attitudes.

On the other side – that of the West – there is ―the moral

exceptionalism‖ to paraphrase Charles Taylor, who says: ―there is no

doubt lots of pride and illusion in our self-image. But it is still true that

356

Op.Cit.P.69. 357

Idem. 358

The Arabs.Op.Cit.p88.

205

the civilization which grew out of western Europe in modern times

(certain aspects of which now extend well beyond Europe) has given an

exceptional value to equality, rights, freedom, and the relief of

suffering.‖359

As he explains in an end note, moral exceptionalism is just one

facet in the complex idea of civilization, which has been an essential

notion in the collective self-narration of the Western culture over the last

two centuries. ―As it develops in the Enlightenment ‗civilization‘

designates the condition we have evolved to, mainly through the

development of the arts and sciences‖. But, the concept was not confined

to the scientific- technological-economic domain. « The notion was

current that progress in the arts, sciences, and commerce, brought with it

a softening of morals : ‗le doux commerce‘ civilizes us ». By the

nineteenth century, ‗civilization‘ comes to englobe the new moral

sensitivity to suffering and concern for general well-being. In addition,

there is a third facet: ―civilization is thought to involve a sense of

ourselves as individuals in the triple sense I described earlier‖, says

Taylor. Thus, ―civilized people are capable of taking an objectifying

distance from their society, culture, and history‖.

Why is this possible for the West and much more problematic for

the arabo-islamic world? It is true that this did not happen in a few years,

but through an accumulation of experiences and knowledge that shaped

the Western societies as well as the individual, but this must not be an

excuse to condone laxity, apathy, and tolerance of despotism in the

Arabo-islamic world. As M. Khan put it, ―Many Muslims have become

hypocritical in our advocacy of human rights in our struggles for justice.

We protest against the discriminatory practices of Israel, India, and other

Non-Muslim nations, but are mostly silent against the discriminatory

practices in Muslim states. We rightly condemn Israeli treatment of

Palestinians at all international forums. But our silence at the way many

Muslim nations have treated the same Palestinians really questions our

commitment and concern for them. While we loudly and consistently

condemn Israel‘s ill treatment of Palestinians, Russian excesses in

Chechnya, or Serbian atrocities in Bosnia, we remain silent when Muslim

regimes abuse the rights of Muslims and slaughter thousands of them.‖360

359

Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: the making of modern identity,

Cambridge University Press, 1989, P397. 360

M. Khan. Islamic perspectives on Peace and Violence. Special Report.

United States Institute of Peace. Op.Cit.

206

Since the objectification of the self is part of what Taylor called

―moral exceptionalism‖, it is true that the focus on threats to the Western

freedom led the Westerners, as noted Robert W. Hefner, ―to overlook the

fact that the violence (of 9/11) was directed, not merely against the

United States, but against moderate and democratic-minded Muslims

around the world. The attack was but the latest chapter in a long struggle

between moderate Muslims and Islamists hardliners for the hearts and

minds of Muslim believers‖361

. Thus, for this writer, ―there is no clash of

civilizations between Islam and the West. The really decisive battle is

taking place within Muslim civilization, where ultraconservatives

compete against moderates and democrats for the soul of the Muslim

public.‖ 362

Moreover, Hefner thinks that the globalization so widespread

in our age will never bring about a world-wide homogenization of culture

and identity: ―What the process has done is make the interests we share

with the great majority of Muslims all the clearer. One hopes that we

Americans will not forget this fact as we move beyond the events of

September 11. The lesson to keep in mind is that our suffering and

outrage were shared by millions of Muslims. They look to us now to

remember just how deeply we share political challenges and a common

humanity‖363

.

This line of reasoning is consistent with the ―moral

exceptionalism‖, which if well understood, should be universal inasmuch

as the modernity itself is a common ground for all of us. This emphasis

on feelings‘ sharing between people of different religions and

communities should be understood as a direct coping with the future.

Here too, much of the endeavor with respect to future relations between

the West and the arabo-islamic world should stress the individualistic

dimension of any change. In fact, we know, nothing can be done outside

the ―framework‖ of the individual mind, on both sides. That‘s why any

reform should first focus on the education: it is in the years of learning

that a mind is being shaped for the rest of the time life. Let‘s put it

otherwise. In the terms of Alvin Toffler, ―we can begin our battle to

prevent future shock at the most personal level. It is clear, whether we

know it or not, that much of our daily behavior is, in fact, an attempt to

ward off future shock.‖364

361

Robert W. Hefner, September 11 and the struggle for Islam, Department of

sociology, Boston University. Social Science Research Council. 362

Idem. 363

Idem. 364

Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, Pan Books, London, 1980, p 338.

207

For Toffler, since we use varied tactics unconsciously ―to lower

the level of stimulation when they threaten to drive us above our adaptive

range‖, why not ―increase their effectiveness by raising them to

consciousness‖?365

Whether we are concerned by tactics of control of cognitive

simulation or by tactics of control of the body, as those that have been

described by Michel Foucault366

, we are dealing with a level of

consciousness, which means a degree of moral thinking. To generate the

result we hope for, we have to adopt the right method with an order of

priorities. As Descartes put it: ―the true function of reason, then, in the

conduct of life is to examine and consider without passion the value of all

perfections of body and soul that can be acquired by our conduct, so that

since we are commonly obliged to deprive ourselves of some goods in

order to acquire others, we shall always choose the better‖367

. This

definition of the mastery of reason brings about an internalization of

moral sources. ―The Cartesian proof is no longer a search for an

encounter with God within‖, says Taylor, ―it is no longer the way to an

experience of everything in God. Rather what I now meet is myself: I

achieve a clarity and a fullness of self-presence that was lacking

before‖368

.

How much close to this feeling are we today? The question does

not concern some people in particular, excluding the others. Americans,

Arabs, Europeans, Muslims, Christians, Jews… Everybody should try to

answer it, honestly, because it is urgent to know how wide is the gap

between us. The Americans think, not without reason, that they are the

epicenter of the Western world. They pretend to lead the West and

possibly all those who identify to their values and purposes. This is much

better formulated by Wallerstein: ―I think that Americans tend to believe

that others have less of many things than we have, and the fact that we

have more is a sign of grace (…) Americans consider that life in the U.S.

is more comfortable, that our production competes more successfully in

the world market, and that therefore we are certain to win the wars into

which others may drag us. Americans also consider their society to be

more efficient. Things run more smoothly – at the work place, in the

public arena, in social relations, in our dealings with bureaucracies (…)

But of course most Americans would deny that the less-ness of others is

365

Idem. 366

In : les mots et les choses, surveiller et punir ,etc.… 367

Letter to Elizabeth, Descartes‘ letters. Cit. In Taylor, p151. 368

Taylor. Op. Cit. P157.

208

merely material. It is spiritual as well. Or if the term spiritual seems to

exclude the secular humanists, it is cultural as well (…) to all those

"huddled masses yearning to breathe free." Our density of freedom is

visualized in so many ways. Which other country has the Bill of Rights?

Where else is freedom of the press, of religion, of speech so honored?

Where else are immigrants so integrated into the political system? Can

one name another country in which someone arriving here as a teenager,

and still speaking English to this day with a thick German accent, could

become the Secretary of State, the chief representative of Americans to

the rest of the world? Is there any other country where social mobility,

for those with merit, is so rapid?‖369

On the other side, there is a similar feeling that Saudi Arabia has a

responsibility vis à vis the Muslims of the world. ―We are the epicenter

of the Muslim world‖, says Haifa R. Jamal al-Lail. ―The historic

relationship between our government and Islam is crucial. Our role as

Custodian of Mecca and Medina is central to all that transpires in the

Kingdom. We focus tremendous resources on the annual pilgrimage, or

hajj (…) Over two million Muslims perform the hajj pilgrimage each

year‖.370

It is true that this only event makes of Saudi Arabia the center of

the Islamic world, and it cannot be of any good to underestimate the fact.

On the contrary, taking it in consideration may avoid a lot of trouble to

those who are pressuring the Saudis for reforms as well as to those who

among the Saudi elite claim these changes. The whole affair is to know

what kind of change is reasonably acceptable in such a country and what

is not?

We are not talking about democracy, as we consider that Islam, as

a religion, cannot be opposed to democratic regimes. We are rather

talking about moral prospects of change. And on this level, the West

should accept the fact that it is not going to change the individual Saudi

to the extent that nothing would distinguish him (or her) from a

Westerner.

We have to make these two spheres of human and social endeavor

quite distinct, because any ambiguity would lead to more

misunderstanding and more conflicting behavior, on both sides. On the

one hand, Political reform is a matter of collective options. It involves the

369

Immanuel Wallerstein, America and the World, the Twin Towers as

Metaphor, Social Science Research Council, Essays, New York. 370

Haifa R. Jamal al-Lail, Saudi Society, Reform and Terrorism, paper

presented to the Norfolk World Affairs Council on May 31,2004.

209

elite, the state, and the civil society. Like any other country of the world,

Saudi Arabia is influenced by the regional and international atmosphere.

Thus, reform preaches its own cause from inside the society, as we can

state. On the other hand, we should understand that the cultural

conceptions are different from a country to another. Those latter include

the moral values, which in the case of a ―traditional legitimacy‖ – Max

Weber – are much closer to religious faith, and as such, claim a kind of

immunity against change forced from the outside.

Let‘s take an example: is the notion of freedom the same in the

Saudi society and the American? Indeed, we are not talking about

political freedom, but moral and religious freedom. On this level, there is

much to say, and not much to agree on, I am afraid.

In a landmark speech on May 9, 2003, at the University of South

Carolina, President Bush announced America‘s firm commitment to

democracy and freedom in the Middle East as the key goal for America‘s

war on terror:

―We support the advance of freedom in the Middle East, because

it is our founding principle, and because it is in our national interest. The

hateful ideology of terrorism is shaped and nurtured and protected

by oppressive regimes. (I am stressing) Free nations, in contrast,

encourage creativity and tolerance and enterprise. And in those free

nations, the appeal of extremism withers away. Free governments do not

build weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of mass terror. Over

time, the expression of liberty throughout the world is the best guarantee

of security throughout the world. Freedom is the way to peace.‖

Some widely propagated ideas about change in the arabo-islamic

world need to be reviewed, at least because what is thought to be

―obvious‖ in the West is not so elsewhere. Such a work has already

begun in the USA, although it needs likely more systematization. We

take as an example on this way the article ―Middle East Democracy‖

published on Foreign Policy371

. Among the myths that need to be thought

over ―promoting women‘s rights is crucial for democratic change‖. ―This

myth, a favorite of women‘s organizations and Western governments,

reflects the combination of correct observation and false logic. No

country can be considered fully democratic if a part of its population (in

some cases, the majority) is discriminated against and denied equal

371

Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, Middle East Democracy, Foreign

Policy, November-December 2004

210

rights‖, say the authors. But ―the main problem at present is that Arab

presidents and kings have too much power, which they refuse to share

with citizens and outside institutions. This stranglehold on power must be

broken to make progress toward democracy. Greater equality for women

does nothing to diminish the power of overly strong, authoritarian

governments‖. Worse: ―Arab leaders know this truth too well. Many

autocrats implement policies to improve women‘s rights precisely to give

themselves reformist credentials and score points with Western

governments, media outlets, and nongovernmental organizations. These

efforts, however, often amount to a trick of smoke and mirrors designed

to disguise the governments‘ refusal to cede any real power‖372

.

Another myth, ―Arab Democrats are the key to reform»: No, say

Ottaway and Carothers, because if all Arab countries ―boast a small

number of Westernized liberals who advocate respect for human rights,

freedom of thought and speech, and democratic change‖, we know that

―democratic transformation requires more than the ideological

commitment of a few individuals‖. Moreover, Arab democrats in some

countries ―are not a persecuted group. Rather they tend to be

professionals comfortably ensconced in the upper-middle class.

Therefore, they are hesitant to demand genuine reforms that might lead to

a hard-line takeover and content to advocate democratization from the

top‖. According to the authors of the article, it would be ―a serious

mistake‖ under such conditions, ―for US and European democracy

advocates to focus on Arab democrats as the key to political change‖.373

A third myth assumes that ―Islamists are the main obstacle to

Arab democracy‖, hence they must be forbidden from accessing it. The

article is more nuanced; the authors point out to the fact that the chance

of an overwhelming electoral victory that would allow Islamists to

abrogate all freedoms at once is remote in the Arab world. ―During the

last decade‖, they say, ―Islamist parties and candidates have participated

in elections in eight Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan,

Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen), always with modest results‖

(…) and ―Turkey, a country where an Islamist party took power with a

large majority, is becoming an encouraging example of democratic

success‖. However, what is noteworthy is the fact that ―Islamist parties

are also integral to democratization because they are the only

372

Idem. 373

Idem.

211

nongovernmental parties with large constituencies. Without their

participation, democracy is impossible in the Middle East‖374

.

Hence the question: building upon such myths without regard to

the real situation, is it helpful or justified?

In another paper, Marina Ottaway, notes that despite the fact that

calls for democracy in the Arab world are increasing, there are also clear

signs that this newfound interest in democracy has not translated so far

into an attempt to build popular constituencies for democratic change.

―Political parties embracing democracy remain weak, their leaders

isolated in downtown offices while Islamist organizations set up

headquarters in lower-class sections of town. Prodemocracy intellectuals

in general shun political parties and prefer to set up nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs), often with foreign funding. These organizations

can generate quickly visible activities such as conferences that receive

attention abroad. But these groups are not necessarily able to speak to the

general public in their own countries. As a result, the acceptance of

democratic ideas by Arab publics revealed by opinion polls has not

become the foundation for the rise of a new political force. Ideologically,

the Arab street belongs much more to Islamist preachers than to

democracy activists‖375

.

Taken together, all these features mean that Arab democracy is

not underway, and if ever some kind of pluralistic rule is achieved in any

of these countries, it might fall under one of the categories created by

political and social scientists to designate such an evolvement, which is

not necessarily westernized: semi-democracy, formal democracy,

electoral democracy, façade democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak

democracy, partial democracy, illiberal democracy, and virtual

democracy… characterize the ―gray zone‖ that is situated between

outright dictatorship and liberal democracy. Some of these terms, such as

façade democracy, and pseudo-democracy, apply only to a fairly specific

subset of gray-zone cases. Other terms, such as weak democracy and

partial democracy, are intended to have much broader applicability.

Actually, to talk about democratic change in the Arab world when

the Western governments themselves have been supporting such or such

dictatorship, is an euphemism. The Western democracies are precisely

those that so far sustained with money and weapons the most dictatorial

374

Idem. 375

Marina Ottaway, Democracy and Constituencies in the Arab World, Carnegie

Papers, n°48, July 2004.

212

regimes of the Middle East. For that reason, people in the concerned

region are much skeptic about so many plans of so-called

democratization emanating from the Western governments and supported

by them.

Therefore:

- A sustained effort has to be consented aiming at boosting

democratization and modernization together with a serious movement

towards resolving the Middle-East conflict in its multiple sides and

aspects. Yet, who would lead such efforts, when suspicion is floating

about everything and distrust is master?

- Modernization should not be pursued at the expense of

democracy, because without freedom, the welfare state is just a golden

cage. Yet, even modernization revealed to be a false one, as it has been

reduced to importing high-tech products and other gadgets, whereas

genuine modernization should be creative as well.

- Demilitarizing the oil rich region of the Gulf may sound, in the

present time, almost a pipe dream, albeit the military build up is not

absolutely necessary for the stability of these countries. It may even be a

cause of tension.

- To call for democratization and to support military expansion or

autocratic regimes at once is equal to sending a schizophrenic message to

someone who is already in a state of advanced paranoia.

- The backbone of any democratic change is the civil society and

the social movements. If there is a way to strengthen both of them

without triggering a war, generating a revolution, or causing a

coup…maybe there is a hope. If not, the society will reproduce itself and

―History‖ will go on, indifferent to all those who have neither the means

nor the will to master ―her‖.

Paris, August 1, 2005.

Hichem Karoui.

213

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221

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http://world.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/1749

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Miscellaneous documents :

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following link : http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-

fatwa.htm

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Ibrahim al Sakran, the religious curricula in boy‘s schools in the

Saudi state school system: :

http://www.alwihdah.com/print.asp?cat=1&id=711

222

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Commitments, February 3, 1994.

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Operations, February 2003, Near East. It can be reached on this

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http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm

- Guidance For Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist

Financing, 24 April 2002, Financial Action Task Force on Money

Laundering (FATF).

- Dore Gold before the US Senate Committee on Governmental

Affairs on July 31, 2003, which also we can read on this URL :

http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/saudi/saudi_dgb.htm

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on international trade and finance , committee on banking,

housing and urban affairs, August 1, 2002:

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/levitt/levitt080102.htm