US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces CTF-956 Mission Analysis Brief 26 Aug 2014 UNCLASSIFIED Overall Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO/REL TO USA,MNFA

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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces CTF-956 Mission Analysis Brief 26 Aug 2014 UNCLASSIFIED Overall Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO/REL TO USA,MNFA 1
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Agenda Area of Operations (AO) Initial Intelligence Estimate Enemy COAs Higher Headquarters Mission/Intent Task Organization Command Relationships Forces Available Specified/Implied/Essential Tasks Limitations Assumptions/ IRs Proposed Initial CCIRs Risk Assessment Proposed Mission Statement Conclusions - Shortfalls/Showstoppers/Recommendations Initial Staff Estimates Commanders Comments
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Area of Operations (AO) 1Aug EOM Mile Hammock Bay Bogue Field 21 Aug 25 Aug Morehead City (Sea buoy (RADCON buoy) to Gate exit) 25 Aug 1 Dec MSRs TBD (O/A 15 Oct) (N35 3325.7688 W077 0043.4046) Amberland School 26 Oct EOM Water Well (N35 3638.5092 W076 5140.8204)
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces 10 Miles Area of Operations
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Area of Influence Connecting Area to Area of Operations plus 3 miles out to sea within natural borders
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces 10 Miles Area of Operations
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Area of Interest (AOI) Amberland plus 40 miles north and south Amberland plus 12 nm out to sea
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Tropical / Nontropical Storm Tracks (Oct / Nov) OCTOBERNOVEMBER Seasonal Discussion Hurricane Season runs from June 01 st, through November 30 th. The peak for tropical storm activity is normally near September 10 th. CFMCC forces need to maintain situational awareness regarding the potential for tropical storm activity along the southeastern area of the Treasure Coast during this period.
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Climatology: October Amberland
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Amberland Climatology: November Amberland
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Terrain: Water table Physiographic Province Landtype (geomorphic setting)Average annual ground water depth Upper Coastal Plainlakes, rivers, and reservoirs0 feet wetlands,wet floodplains, and bays0-5 feet flats0-5 feet ridges, hills, slopes, and scarps5-15 feet Physiographic ProvinceRidge-to-Stream Dist anceSearch Radius Upper Coastal Plain6000 feet10 cells A coastal plain is an area of flat, low-lying land adjacent to a seacoast. Amberland
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Proper Home for Ambertines Revolutionary Militia (PHARM) (Asymmetric Threat) Jacksonville, XZ Jacksonville, XZ PHARM (aka Lovisa-PHARM) is a tribal Escambian Shahida fundamentalist militia. Primarily operates in Amberland, with possible cells located throughout the treasure coast. HQ Jacksonville Established to create an Ambertine- controlled and administered independent republic Objectives Drive Ambers government out of power in favor of a PHARM approved regime Promote radical Shahida ideology through terrorism as well as political means Primary Leaders Supreme Leader: Peter Polva President: Aplai Onbil-Hamblit PHARM PIA
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces PHARM: Situation Composition: Primarily Lovisa guerrillas Disposition: HQ in Jacksonville, XZ Strength: Unknown Training Status: Unknown Logistics: Unspecified Garnetian support, financial aid received from wealthy businessman Effectiveness: Historically able to force Amblerland government into negotiations Electronic Tech Data: Unknown Personalities: Peter Polva and Artis Plants Jacksonville, XZ Mile Hammock Bay, XZ 8 miles Bogue Field, XZ 13 miles
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces PIA: Situation Composition: Unknown Disposition: Headquarters in Myrtle Beach, Amberland. Cells throughout Treasure Coast Strength: ~ 100-200 active members Training Status: Unknown Logistics: Logistical network consist of warehouses Front companies and NGOs Assessed ~$120 million budget Effectiveness: Has successfully caused multimillion dollar damage to US assets Electronic Tech Data: Unknown; however, a communications company is with the groups support network Personalities: Jibril al-Tariq, Manfred al-Tariq, Kire al-Tariq, Dr. Neiland Wascowiczk Myrtle Beach, XZ Mile Hammock Bay, XZ 102 miles
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Limitations: Finite funding Limited manpower Trained members PIA: Capabilities & Limitations Capabilities: Day & Night attacks Land & Maritime attacks Attacking hard & soft targets Military & Commercial targets Bombings and SAF Deception False documents Disguises
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces PHARM Recruit through religious motivation Damage critical infrastructure to weaken national government Employs explosive devices PIA Attacks lightly defended targets Attacks targets representing ideals counter to their own ideals Blend in to their operating environment by altering their appearance Utilize fraudulent documentation for pre and post operation movements Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP)
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Enemy Center of Gravity PHARM COG * Lovisa Clan Support CC 1) Maintain Sizable force CR 1a) Legitimacy resulting in receptive population to their messaging 2) Maintaining logistical flows 1b) Porous border allowing for supply/personnel/training 2a) Positive control over border crossings CVLegitimacy required for messaging PIA COG * Financial Network CC 1) Funding Operations CR 1a) The ability to funnel money from front companies to illicit activities 2) Funding Training 1b) Have access to Jibril's ~120M USD 2a) Funds to purchase false documents CVFunds for activities come for legitimate sources vice illicit
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Enemy COAs PHARM: Most Likely Maintain intermittent asymmetrical attacks on Amberland government interest Most Dangerous Begin targeting US interest, including Bogue Field or the US Embassy, to force Amberland government into negotiations PIA: Most Likely Sporadic harassing attacks with explosives along LOCs and SLOCs to limit US and coalition freedom of movement Most Dangerous Attack employing disguises and falsified documents to gain entry to the US Embassy in order to conduct an attack employing small arms and explosives
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces CFMCC Mission Statement 19 NLT 1 AUG 2014, CFMCC CONDUCTS THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION (TSC) OPERATIONS IN AMBERLAND AND ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS TO ESTABLISH LOCAL SECURITY, RESTORE INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPPORT UNSCRS IN ORDER TO INCREASE HOST NATION CAPACITY, CAPABILITIES AND REGIONAL STABILITY. BE PREPARED TO (BPT) CONDUCT NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION (NEO) OF U.S. AND COALITION CITIZENS. BPT CONDUCT FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (FHA) OPERATIONS. BPT TO CONDUCT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION (RSOI) OF FOLLOW-ON U.S. AND COALITION FORCES.
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces CFMCC Commanders Intent 20 PURPOSE. CFMCC FORCES WILL CONDUCT TSC OPERATIONS IN AMBERLAND TO INCREASE HOST NATION CAPACITY, CAPABILITIES AND REGIONAL STABILITY AND TO DEMONSTRATE COALITION RESOLVE AGAINST PHARM AND GARNET AGGRESSION.
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces CFMCC Commanders Intent 21 METHOD. THE EASTCOM TSC PROGRAM PROVIDES A VISIBLE BUT NOT AGGRESSIVE U.S. INFLUENCE IN TREASURE COAST. THE TSC PROGRAM INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY TO INCLUDE LANDWARD AND SEAWARD PORT AND HARBOR SECURITY AND HIGH VALUE ASSET ESCORT; C- IED OPERATIONS; CARGO HANDLING FROM BOTH EXPEDITIONARY AND FUNCTIONING PORTS; MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS WITH COASTAL AND RIVERINE BOATS; AND INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION TO INCLUDE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL CONSTRUCTION. CONCEPTUALLY, THIS TSC PROGRAM WILL INCREASE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE AMBERLAND CIVIL AND MILITARY FORCES AND PROVIDE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS THAT BENEFIT THE CITIZENS OF AMBERLAND. MY INTENT IS TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. SUPPORT FOR HN AUTHORITY WHILE IMPROVING KEY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE NATION. WE NEED TO PROTECT OURSELVES FROM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES THAT WILL PRESSURE US TO LEAVE OR OTHERWISE DEGRADE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS.
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces CFMCC Commanders Intent 22 ENDSTATE. INCREASED SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY IN AMBERLAND AND IMPROVED CONFIDENCE AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH AMBERLAND CIVILIANS AND MILITARY.
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces 1 August Task Organization 23 UN / WFP/ IMO US EASTCOM AFEAST CTF 951 ATF CTF 952 LF AMBER/AMBERLAND COUNTRY TEAMS SOCEAST AREAST NAVEAST CTF 957 MPRG CTF 954 TASW CTF 956 NEF CTF 953 LOG MARFOREAST SPMAGTF - CR UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO/REL USA, MNFA
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces NEF Task Organization UNCLASSIFIED CTF 956 NEF EODGRU2 EODMU 6 CRS-4 EOD PLT CEXC PLT ALPHA Co Landward Security Seaward Security US Forces VIRTUAL COCOM OPCON Coordination TACON TACOM UUV/VSW NLD Forces PMU ~60 Pax (act) AS PLT BRAVO Co Landward Security Seaward Security DELTA Co Delta 1 (RCB, MK IV) Delta 2 (RPB/RAB) Landward Security Seaward Security PSU 307 ~640Pax (act) 10 pax (act) 54 (notional) ~73 Pax (act) Air Det (-) CBMU 202 UCT 1 NMCB 5 NMCB 1 29 pax (act) 249 (notional) Cargo Term Co Air Cargo Co (-) NCHB 11 Ex Support Co (-) 9 pax (act) Air Det COMCAM NLD EOD PLT
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Command Relationships COMUSEASTCOM is the supported Commander USNAVFOREAST has been designated CFMCC in the EASTCOM AOR CRS-4 is supported Commander for SPOD operations at Mile Hammock Bay and Morehead City operations NMCB 1 and NMCB 5 is supported Commander for construction projects EODMU 6 is supported Commander for C-IED operations 25
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces UNCLASSIFIED 26 CTF 956 Force Available UNITCAPTASKPAXGEARMODE/LOC CTF 956 (GRU2) C2Naval Command and Control of NEF Forces in Amberland 73 (act) J04ESU(-) J04MCP Line Haul/Bogue CTG 956.1 (FDPMU) Prev Med Conduct prev med operations to sustain all forces under CTF 956 and render humanitarian aid as required 9 (act) 14 (not) FDPMU Mobile Lab Line Haul/Bogue CTG 956.2 (EODMU6) EOD Counter IED and underwater clearance operations60 (act)J04MU6(-)Line Haul/Bogue CTG 956.3 (NMCB1) (CBMU202) (UCT 1) Vert & Horz Const Civil military operations support; water well, MSR maint, host nation public infrastructure, camp maintenance/support, underwater construction 29 (act) 122 (not) P25(-) Water Well P25FIE(-) Line Haul/Bogue CTG 956.4 (NMCB5) Vert & Horz Const Civil military operations support; water well, MSR maint, host nation public infrastructure 3 (act) 125 (not) P25(-) Water Well P25FIE(-) Com Air/Bogue CTG 956.5 (NCHB11) Port Ops Support APOD and SPOD operations ISO CTF 956. 10 (act) 54 (not) F01(-)Line Haul/Bogue CTG 956.6 (CRS-4) Port Sec Provide security, interdiction, point defense of critical assets. 640 (act)Port Sec Package Line Haul/MHB
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Specified Tasks Specified 1: Establish NEF MOC & FOB w/ Security at Bogue, Amberland & establish comms with CFMCC, USEASTCOM Implied 1.1: Deploy to NAVEAST AOR Implied 1.2: Coordinate with NAVEAST N6 Implied 1.3: Coordinate with Interagency and Amberland Implied 1.4: Coordinate with subordinate units for embark/movement Implied 1.5: Establish C2 of assigned forces Specified 2: Establish FOB w/ Security at MHB, Amberland for Expeditionary SPOD Ops Implied 2.1: Deploy to NAVEAST AOR Implied 2.2: Coordinate with NAVEAST N6 Implied 2.3: Coordinate with Interagency and Amberland Implied 2.4: Coordinate with subordinate units for embark/movement Implied 2.5: Establish C2 of assigned forces
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Specified Tasks Specified 3: Provide daily report/update to this HQ all military actions or movement of NEF forces inside Amberland Implied 3.1: Establish NEF Battle rhythm IAW with CFMCC Battle rhythm Implied 3.2: Establish and maintain Common Operating Picture Implied 3.3: Establish and maintain Force Structure equipment status Specified 4: NLT 10 Aug, coordinate w/ officials & conduct assessment to repair and maintain roadway along route Green. Construction should begin NLT 25 Aug with anticipated completion by 1 Dec Implied 4.1: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON Implied 4.2: Track status of operations and report to HHQ Implied 4.3: Coordinate with interagency and Amberland Implied 4.4: Establish and maintain appropriate Information Operations IAW CFMCC Implied 4.5: Provide financial service support for procurement of construction materials and contracting services as required
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Specified Tasks Specified 5: O/A 21 Aug, conduct expeditionary port ops at MHC, Amberland for offload of humanitarian supplies from MSC and international shipping and delivery to HN. Upon completion, approx 25 Aug, turnover port operations to Host Nation. Port Operations Include: Escort of U.S. Vessels; Pier Vetting; Cargo handling off U.S. Vessels; Landward and seaward security; other tasks as required to ensure the safe transit, arrival, offload and delivery to HN of Humanitarian supplies. Implied 5.1: Establish TOC IVO MHC Implied 5.2: Establish areas of operations from Sea buoy to MHC terminal gate Implied 5.3: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 5.4: Provide security for humanitarian supplies while under NEF control Implied 5.5: Perform hydrographic U/W survey to ensure safe passage of HVA IVO MHC
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Specified Tasks Specified 6: NLT 15 OCT make coordination with appropriate officials and conduct assessment to renovate school. Implied 6.1: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON Implied 6.2: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 6.3: Establish and maintain appropriate Information Operations IAW CFMCC Specified 7: NLT 26 Oct begin construction of a water well. Implied 7.1: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON Implied 7.2: Track status of operations and report to HHQ Implied 7.3: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 7.4: Establish and maintain appropriate Information Operations IAW CFMCC Implied 7.5: Perform water testing to certify water purification Specified 8: NLT 15 Aug conduct ISR operations along the intercoastal waterway from Mile Hammock Bay to Morehead City, Amberland. Implied 8.1: Coordinate with AFEAST/CFACC as functional component commander for air and space operations
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Specified Tasks Specified 9: O/A conduct other maritime security operations tasks. Implied 9.1: Coordinate with Composite Warfare Commander (when required) Specified 10: BPT conduct C-IED throughout Amberland. Implied 10.1: Maintain C-IED Operations Picture Implied 10.2: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 10.3: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON Implied 10.4: Perform C-IED Biometric and exploitation ISO HN C-IED efforts Specified 11: BPT conduct Non-combatant evacuation operations. Implied 11.2: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 11.3: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON Specified 12: BPT conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) operations. Implied 12.2: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 12.3: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Specified Tasks Specified 13: BPT to conduct reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) of follow-on U.S. and Coalition forces. Implied 13.1: Maintain APOD and SPOD Implied 13.2: Maintain and track TPFDD of U.S. and coalition forces Implied 13.3: Coordinate with CTF 953 Specified 14: Provide CONOPS to CFMCC NLT 25 July 14 Implied 10.1: Complete Mission Analysis and COA development Specified 15: Provide interim proposed public affairs guidance (PPAG) via separate message to OASD (PA) Implied 15.1: Coordinate with CFMCC PAO Specified 16: Implement, adjust and report accordingly force protection measures appropriate to anticipate terrorist threat Implied 16.1: Maintain intelligence picture
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Specified Tasks Specified 17: Determine pre-deployment and theater force protection training requirements. Implied 17.1: Coordinate with CFMCC AT/FP officer Specified 18: Collect on, assess, and refine priority intelligence requirements as the intelligence picture of the operation environment dictates. Implied 18.1: Maintain Intelligence picture. Specified 19: Identify and assess emergent threats to EASTCOM and host nation forces Implied 19.1: Maintain Intelligence picture. Specified 20: CFMCC conducts theater security cooperation (TSC) operations in Amberland and its territorial waters to establish local security, restore infrastructure and support UNSCRS in order to increase host nation capacity, capabilities and regional stability.
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  • Operational Limitations Restraint/ConstraintImplication Construction equipment in theater is limited to initial lift. Due to the expected duration of the operations, requests for additional assets will likely not be approved. (R) Any change of project scope will change completion time and limited capacity to support additional requirements Repair parts and construction equipment limited to U.S. Equipment only (R) Can not give repair parts or equipment to HN during Mil-to- Mil engagement CFMCC TSC operations will be executed within the recognized borders of Amberland to include sea accesses. Operations within Amberland only
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Facts 1.PHARM operates in major urban areas within Amberland with cells located throughout the treasure coast. 2.Garnet is supporting the PHARM in planning, logistics and recruiting/training new members to initiate an offensive campaign to destabilize the Amber and Amberland Governments. 3.The PHARM are known to conduct small scale attacks against Army, Police, Government officials and infrastructure to erode popular support of the government. 4.The PHARM also conducts piracy attacks and armed robbery within the territorial waters of Amberland and use the inland waters to transport and hide weapons further exacerbating the threat to international peace and security in the TCR. 5.CFMCC theater security cooperation operations will be executed within the recognized borders of Amberland to include sea accesses. 6.Amberland has contracted a local firm to provide outer security at Bogue Airfield and Mile Hammock Bay. The two bases dont have dedicated military security. Contract is good for deployment duration. RSO from US Embassy highly recommends active US security posture at and around US equipment and personnel. Current FP condition is Charlie (FPCON-C).
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Facts 7. Amberland has contracted to provide the materials for the road project and the school renovation. They have assigned government representatives to coordinate delivery and resupply of materials. 8. No mil to mil engagements have been approved by the US Embassy. All requests should be forwarded to CFMCC coordinated through the US Embassy RSO. US Forces will have civilian engagements along the intercoastal waterway and during port and airfield operations.
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  • Assumptions AssumptionSupporting Info Requirement 1. HN will continue to provide security to their bases and major infrastructures (MHB, MHC, Bogue Field) Will HN continue security to their bases and major infrastructures 2. HN will provide limited support Services i.e. fuel, water, food, berthing at (MHB, MHC, Bogue Field) What support services will HN provide to NEF 3. HN has construction materials available to support NEF Phase 0 projects What construction materials are available to support NEF projects 4. HN has limited equipment and trained personnel for mil-to-mil engagements for construction projects What HN units will support Mil-to- Mil engagement for construction projects and what are their capacity and capability 5. HN has limited port facility equipmentWhat port facility equipment does the HN provided at MHC and MHB
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  • Assumptions 6. HN has limited C-IED capabilities and equipment to support Mil-to-Mil engagements What HN units will support Mil-to- Mil engagement for C-IED and what are their capacity and capability 7. Intelligence assets will be made available to NEF in order to maintain intel picture and identify emerging threats What intelligence assets are available from CFMCC 8. HN will provide security for NEF personnel movements Which units will provide NEF security during Mil-to-Mil events 9. HN will provide dedicated security to NEFWill HN provide dedicated security to NEF for movement outside established FOB
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  • Assumptions AssumptionSupporting Info Requirement 10. Terrorist groups will adapt/change TTPs based on increased U.S. and Coalition footprint in Amberland Will terrorist groups adapt/change TTPs based on increased U.S. and Coalition footprint in Amberland 11. Friendly forces have operated in Amberland What Friendly forces have been operating in Amberland for the last 6 months 12. The HN and majority of civilian populace within our Area of Influence will support U.S and Coalition increased footprint in Amberland What is the U.S. Embassy assessment of increased U.S. and Coalition footprint in Amberland
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces 40Assumptions AssumptionSupporting Info Requirement 13. Terrorist groups will attack soft targets of opportunity along LOCs or SLOCs. Has there been any attacks against soft targets (NGOs) IVO Bogue, MHC, MHB
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  • Requests for Information (RFI) Info RequestedResponse 1. Will HN continue security to their bases and major infrastructures 2. What support services will HN provide to NEF 3. What construction materials are available to support NEF projects 4. What HN units will support Mil-to-Mil engagement for construction projects and what are their capacity and capability 5. What port facility equipment does the HN provided at MHC and MHB 6. What HN units will support Mil-to-Mil engagement for C-IED and what are their capacity and capability
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  • Requests for Information (RFI) Info RequestedResponse 7. What intelligence assets are available from CFMCC 8. Which units will provide NEF security during Mil-to- Mil events 9. Will HN provide dedicated security to NEF for movement outside established FOB 10. Will PHARM adapt/change TTPs based on increased U.S. and Coalition footprint in Amberland 11. What Friendly forces have been operating in Amberland for the last 6 months 12. What is the U.S. Embassy assessment of increased U.S. and Coalition footprint in Amberland 13. Has there been any attacks against soft targets (NGOs) IVO Bogue, MHC, MHB
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  • Proposed Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) 1. PIR-An Increase of local population support to terrorist groups 2. PIR-Emerging trends in implementing IEDs 3. PIR-Terrorist activity interfering with operations in the NEF AO 4. PIR-Terrorist activity targeting NEF personnel 5. PIR-Movement of terrorist personnel and equipment 6. FFIR-Change to LAD 7. FFIR-Change to ROE 8. FFIR-Change to Host Nation Support 9. FFIR- Inability of units to start/complete task as directed
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces HAZARD/THREAT ASSESSED RAC RISK CONTROLS & MITIGATION REVISED RAC SUPERVISION Withdraw of Host Nation Support D, I = 3D, II = 4 Asymmetric attackB, I = 1 ? B, II = 2 Inclement weatherB, III = 3B, IV = 4 Civil Unrest C, II = 3C, III = 4 Change in TTPs of enemy forces A, I = 1A, II = 1 Risk to Mission Probability Severity I II III IV 1 11 2 345 2 23 3 3 4 4 5 5 ABCD Probability Severity RAC 1 CRITICAL 2 SERIOUS 3 MODERATE 4 MINOR 5 - NEGLIGIBLE A: Likely to occur immediately or within a short period of time B: Probably will occur C: May occur in time D: Unlikely to occur I: May cause death, loss of facility/asset, mission failure II: May cause severe injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation III: May cause minor injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation IV: Minimal Threat, no impact to mission success
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces HAZARD/THREAT ASSESSED RAC RISK CONTROLS & MITIGATION REVISED RAC SUPERVISION Medicinal threatC, III = 4 D, IV = 5 Inclement weatherB, III = 3 Civil Unrest C, II = 3C, III = 4 Change in TTPs of enemy forces A, I = 1A, II = 1 Risk to Forces Probability Severity I II III IV 1 11 2 345 2 23 3 3 4 4 5 5 ABCD Probability Severity RAC 1 CRITICAL 2 SERIOUS 3 MODERATE 4 MINOR 5 - NEGLIGIBLE A: Likely to occur immediately or within a short period of time B: Probably will occur C: May occur in time D: Unlikely to occur I: May cause death, loss of facility/asset, mission failure II: May cause severe injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation III: May cause minor injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation IV: Minimal Threat, no impact to mission success
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces CTF 956 Proposed Mission Statement 46 O/A 1 Aug 2014, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group TWO (FWD) deploy as CTF 956 (NEF Commander) and establish a secure Maritime Operations Center (MOC) and Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Bogue and Mile Hammock Bay. CTF 956 will conduct theatre security cooperation operations in Amberland and its territorial waters to establish local security, restore infrastructure, and support UNSCRs in order to increase Host Nation capacity, capabilities and regional stability. CTF 956 will be prepared to conduct humanitarian assistance, non-combatant evacuation operations and reception, staging, onward-movement and integration (RSO&I) for follow on U.S. and Coalition forces
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces CTF 956 Proposed Commanders Intent Purpose : Strengthen existing relations with Amberland and reduce popular support for radical ideology. Reinforce the legitimacy of the Ambertine government in the eyes of the people in order to increase host nation capacity, capabilities and regional stability, and demonstrate coalition resolve against PHARM and Garnet aggression. 47
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces CTF 956 Proposed Commanders Intent Method : I intend to accomplish our mission by leveraging the full spectrum of CTF 956 theatre security cooperation and humanitarian assistance capability. The NEF TSC program provides a visible but not aggressive U.S. influence in treasure coast. The TSC program includes but is not limited to the following tasks: critical maritime infrastructure security to include landward and seaward port and harbor security and high value asset escort; C-IED operations; cargo handling from both expeditionary and functioning ports; maritime security operations with coastal and riverine boats; infrastructure construction to include horizontal and vertical construction. We will partner with our host nation counterparts at all levels during the planning process and give them the lead during the execution phase of all initiatives, projects, training, and operations of their governments relationship with the world community. Demonstrate coalition support for Amberland authority while improving key infrastructure in the nation. We need to protect ourselves from terrorist activities that will pressure us to leave or otherwise degrade our relationship with the legitimate governments. 48
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces CTF 956 Proposed Commanders Intent Endstate : Increased local Ambertine capacity and capability to provide security and infrastructure support to their nation. 49
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Initial Staff Estimates N-1- Manning Facts/Current Status: Lack of C2PC operators and air planners, lack of religious service Issues: Manning shortfalls, No religious service available during BA Conclusions/Recommendations: Submit augmentation message to USFF ISO BA14 augmentation. Offer ex-scenario event on Sunday to perform religious services at CL N-2- Intelligence Facts/Current Status: Garnet provides supplies, arms, ammunition to Lovisa Clan; Anti-Government demonstrations throughout Amberland; JiStern Militia supporting PHARM (rearm-refit); PHARM employing explosive devices. Issues/Requirements: ICOP not fully operational; Need NEF collection plan. Conclusions/Recommendations: None.
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Initial Staff Estimates N-3- Operations Facts/Current Status: Developing Phase 0 CONOPS, Movement plan Issues: NMCB task and location Conclusions/Recommendations: Work with CFMCC on determining actual location of task. MSR IVO Jacksonville, XZ N-4- Sustainment Facts/Current Status: Services support requires confirmation from MAW and MARHQ. Access to Class 8 will be minimal, requires reach back to HQ. Issues: Class 1 sourcing (MARHQ) Conclusions/Recommendations: Solidify support from Marine HQ to NEF for Class 1, 3, and support services.
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces Initial Staff Estimates N6- Communications Architecture and Status Facts/Current Status: operational status of communications circuits and command, control, communications, computers & intelligence (C4I) systems; bandwidth allocation; communications paths for various C2 functions; planned outages and degradations Issues: Shortfalls, show-stoppers, and major concerns Conclusions/Recommendations: Projected C4I systems and communications status during operations, impact of loss or degradation of C4I systems or communications PAO- Facts/Current Status: Manning reduction, cultural preparedness, morale. Issues: Loss of connectivity, greater embed demand than can be accommodated, equipment failures/shortages Conclusions/Recommendations: Ensure higher echelon support, redundancy in equipment/connectivity where possible
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  • US Fleet Forces US Marine Corps Forces UNCLASSIFIED 53 Commanders Comments