U.S. Disaster Assistance to DevelopingCountries: Lessons Applicable to U.S.

Domestic Disaster Programs

January 1980

NTIS order #PB80-153760

Preface

Congressman Thomas L. Ashley, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Housingand Community Development and Senator William Proxmire, Chairman of the SenateCommittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and member of the Senate Commit-tee on Appropriations, requested that the Mice of Technology Assessment (OTA) under-take a study in the area of natural hazards. In response OTA initiated a preliminary anal-ysis to define what issues are or should be of concern to Congress and where further studycouId be useful to Congress.

This Background Paper, “U.S. Disaster Assistance To Developing Countries: LessonsApplicable to U.S. Domestic Disaster Preparedness,” probes the relationship between dis-asters in the developing countries and natural hazards in the United States. It does notlook into the hazard and disaster situation in the industrialized nations.

For this study, a working paper was prepared as the basis for a workshop, which in-cluded a broad sweep of stakeholders in the public and private sectors, scholars concernedwith the field, and members of various congressional committee staffs. On the basis of thatworkshop’s recommendations, a revised working paper was prepared and sent to all par-ticipants, and to dozens of other experts, for extensive review and comment. ThisBackground Paper is the responsibility of OTA, not of those who so ably advised us on itspreparation.

JOHN H. GIBBONSDirector

. . .111

OTA Project Staff

Joseph F. Coates, Heud, Exploratory Program.Goldie Hallas, secretarial Support

Terry Saunders Parsons, Administrative Support

Consultant

James W. Morentz

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

Kathie S. Boss Joanne Heming

Contents

ChapterL

II.

111.

Iv .

v .

VI.

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Disasters and Their Consequences in Less Developed Countries . . . . .Disaster Events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Impact on Life and Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Economic Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Capacity to Prepare and Respond: Differences BetweenDevelopingand Industrialized Countries ● .***** ● ******* ● ******* ● ******* ● *.Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Population . ........................0.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Unplanned Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Transportation and Telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Knowledge of Hazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Disaster Assistance Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Disaster Assistance in a Complex Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Policies on Disaster Assitance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Structure of U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Disaster Programs in Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lessons From Disasters in Less Developed CountriesforU.S.Domestic Disaster Programs. .Dealing With the HazardLifecycleSpecific Progam Areas . . . . . . . . .Conclusion . . . . . . . . . ... .O...

LIST OF TABLES

Table No.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.

—● ✎ ✎ ☛ ☛ ☛ ☛ ● ✎ ☛ ☛

. . . . . . . . . . .

.*.*.. . . . . .

. . . . . . . .**.

U.S. Disaster AssistanceTypes ofEvents . . . . . .U.S. ResponsetoNaturalandManmadeHazardsForeism Disaster Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● ☛ ☛ ☛ ☛ ☛ ☛ ● ☛ ☛ ☛ ☛ ☛ ☛ ☛ ● ☛ ☛ ☛ ☛ ☛ ☛

. . . . . . ● ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎● O.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● 0.... ● ...***. . . . . . . . ●

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .*....*. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● ✎☛✎✎✎☛ ✎✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ...0.0. . . . . . . . .

Foreign Disaster Statistics and Emergency ReliefCosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Leading Recipients of U.S.Assistance Since 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .International Assistanceto the Guatemala Earthquake of 1976. . . . . . . . . . . .Questions for Developing U.S. International Disaster Programs. . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF FIGURES

Page1

3

5567

99

1010111111

1515181921

23232529

Page

5677

161719

Figure No. Page

l. Lifecycle of a Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242.’’The Disaster Cycle’’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

v

Acknowledgments

The OTA staff wishes to express appreciation for the assistance and cooperation of thefollowing as reviewers, readers, commentators, and as sources of information with regard to thisand previous draft materials. They are, of course, not responsible for the contents of this report.

● Gilbert White, University of Colorado● Charles Fritz, National Academy of SciencesŽ E. L. Quarantelli, Ohio State University● Anne C. Martindell, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance● Christian Holmes, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance• William Dalton, Office of Foreign Disaster AssistanceŽ Weston Emery, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance● ,Russell Dynes, American Sociological Association● Clark Norton, Congressional Research Service● Alcira Kreimer, National Academy of Sciences. Wilfred Owen, The Brookings Institution● Roy Popkin, American National Red Cross

vi

1. Summary

Although there are obviously major and mani-fold differences between the United States and thedeveloping countries, people tend to respond todisasters in similar, constructive ways in all socie-ties. And although the flow of technology as wellas disaster assistance has been from the UnitedStates and other industrialized nations to the de-veloping countries, there are some lessons thatmay be transferable to the United States, as a formof reverse technology transfer, from the disasterexperience of developing nations.

The purpose of this report is to distill from theapplication of U.S. disaster assistance to develop-ing countries those lessons that may be applicableto U.S. domestic disaster preparedness and re-sponse.

The very lack of resources among the developingcountries seems, ironically, to generate lessons forthe United States. For, having less, the developingnations must do more with what they have whendisasters occur. Hence, the force of straitened cir-cumstances requires that the less developed coun-tries employ different techniques or procedures toachieve the same objectives as the more resource-intensive U.S. institutions.

This applies even to situations where a U.S. in-strumentality, the U.S. Office of Foreign DisasterAssistance, is extending aid on the basic of domes-tic disaster principles and procedures. How thoseprinciples and procedures have been adapted tothe institutions and disaster environments of thedeveloping nations may also be the source oftransferable lessons to U.S. domestic programs.

Since the key difference between disasters in de-veloping countries and those in industrializedcountries stems from wide variation in the abilityto respond, institutions are, therefore, the mainfocus of any search for lessons transferable to theUnited States.

There are two major areas of lessons, the first ofwhich stems from the fact that the term “disaster”actually is a generalization for a whole series of in-terconnected events, beginning with the existenceof a hazard and proceeding through many steps

which might be called the hazard and disaster life-cycles. Concentrating on the final phase of theselifecycles, the particular disaster event, tends todivert attention from the fact that it may be farmore productive, efficient, and humane to con-sider possible deficiencies in mitigation, prepared-ness, education, training and warning capacity.The ability of the United States with its manifoldresources, to respond has sometimes obscuredthese deficiencies. But the less developed countriesdo not share our ability to respond to disasters andhave in many cases turned, therefore, to im-pressive preparedness, education, and training ef-forts. The United States has already begun to in-corporate into its own aid programs this growingrecognition that most emergency conditions sharecommon components and a lifecycle that offersvarious points at which intervention may usefullyoccur. Hence, increasing attention is being givento the stages prior to the emergence of a disaster,through prevention, mitigation, warning andpreparedness planning. Such programs can reducethe huge direct disaster relief costs as well as the in-direct costs of local economic dislocation.

The second source of applicable lessons concernsspecific program areas where experiences in devel-oping country disasters may prove beneficial toU.S. domestic disaster efforts. For example, disas-ter aid in the developing countries emphasizes self-help assistance far more than does the U.S. Stud-ies show that people actually prefer rebuilding ad-vice and supplies to extensive mass shelter or tem-porary housing. This lesson might well be appliedin dealing with domestic disasters.

In addition to self-help for disaster victims, thespecific areas offering promise for helping improveU.S. domestic disaster programs are:

-Planning-Infrequent disasters-Information-Evacuation-Voluntary agencies-Transportation-Public contributions

-Building standards-Emergency organizations-Surveillance-Practice and training-Contingency funding-Stockpiling-Reserve cadre-Adaptation during system failure

vantage of the lessons available from participatingin developing country disasters. The first impedi-ment is the fact that information has not been or-ganized for the specific purpose of facilitatingtransferable lessons. The second impediment is thelack of a formal mechanism to disseminate princi-ples, practices, and suggestions considered applica-ble to U.S. disaster programs.

Unfortunately there are two organizational im-pediments hindering the U.S. from taking full ad-

2

H. Introduction

Natural and manmade hazards know no politi-cal boundaries. Disaster strikes poor and rich na-tions alike and is a universal threat to all people, atall times, in all places.

This study distinguishes hazards, which are thedangerous circumstances found everywhere, fromdisasters, which are events in which hazards haveundesirable effects on people or their works. Haz-ards may exist side-by-side with man or be con-tained by man for long periods.

When hazards impact on human systems, theunintended effects constitute disaster. The mostcommon definitions of disaster, therefore, focuson the impact of unplanned events on the socialstructure of communities. One of the most quoteddefinitions reads:

An event, concentrated in time and space, inwhich a society, or a relatively self-sufficient sub-division of a society, undergoes severe danger andincurs such losses to its members and physical ap-purtenances that the social structure is disruptedand the fulfillment of all or some of the essentialfunctions of the society is prevented.l

This definition is substantially the same as the oneused by the U.S. Agency for International Devel-opment (AID), Office of Foreign Disaster Assist-ance (OFDA) in its International Disaster Pre-paredness Seminar, held in 1977.2

The capacity to prepare for and respond to dis-asters varies with the internal social, political, andeconomic capabilities of nations. Disasters in thedeveloping countries, therefore, reflect not onlysocietal differences between them and industrial-ized countries but also wide differences among de-veloping countries. The term developing coun-tries, itself, includes a spectrum extending from

ICharles E. Fritz, “Disaster,” Contemporary Social Problems(cd.) Robert K. Ykrton and Robert A. Nisbet (New. York:Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1%1), p. 655.

%ternational Disaster Preparedness Seminar, Office ofForeign Disaster Assistance, L’.S. Agency for InternationalDet’elopment, June-Julv IQ77.

the very poor and the largely rural to the more ur-ban, more industrialized, and more developed.

The varied levels of development influence thecapacity of the nations to prepare for and respondto disasters. As the internal capabilities of a socie-ty develop, there is less need to resort to outsideappeals for aid following disaster. As a result, mostof the recipients of U.S. disaster assistance havebeen—except for a very few major disasters, for in-stance, earthquakes in Italy and Romania—na-tions that are among the world’s least developed.In the past decade, the United States has given dis-aster assistance to 26 of the 41 countries that theUnited Nations has identified as least developedor most severely affected by recent economic con-ditions.

Indeed, this emphasis has been reaffirmed as re-cently as an August 1977 joint cable from the Act-ing Secretary of State and the AID Administratorto all U.S. field missions. The Chiefs of Missionwere instructed to “do their utmost to ensure thatthe needs of disaster victims be met— particularlyin those instances where the Government of thedisaster-affected country does not respond suffi-ciently to the needs of the disaster victims. ”

The purpose of this report is to identify lessonsof U.S. disaster assistance to less developed coun-tries that may be applicable to U.S. domestic dis-aster programs. Lessons of advanced countries,such as snow and cold programs of northernEurope and Canada and earthquake programs inJapan, are not examined. Further, the lessonsfocus on the least developed countries, rather thanthe more industrialized of the developing coun-tries, because U.S. aid is largely directed- to thepoorest nations.

The next three chapters lead into a discussion ofseveral program areas where developing countrydisasters may suggest alternative approaches or in-cremental improvements for U.S. domestic pro-grams. This background covers:

jLT s FoTelgn Di~a~rer .~~~lsruncc (Washington. D. C.: ~’.s.. .Agency for International De\’elopment, Office of ForeignDisaster Assistance, Januarv 1978), p. 3.

3

● the occurrence and impact of disasters in thedeveloping countries;

● the similarities and differences between lessdeveloped countries and urban, industrialized

countries in disaster preparation and re-sponse; and

Ž the United States program of disaster assist-ance to the less developed countries.

4

. .

III. Disasters and Their Consequencesin Less Developed Countries

Conditions vary widely with regard to hazardsand the risks to populations in the many countriesaround the world. This section focuses on thosecountries and disasters with which the UnitedStates, through programs of the Office of ForeignDisaster Assistance (OFDA), has interacted in thepast decade. Three characteristics of internationalhazards—types, human victims, and economicconsequences —are reviewed.

DISASTER EVENTS

A wide range of hazard agents are responsiblefor the disastrous impacts on people and propertythat have motivated U.S. disaster assistance. Astable 1 illustrates, not only the natural disasters offlood, earthquake, and drought strike the less de-veloped countries that receive the bulk of U.S.

aid, but also the manmade hazards prevalent in in-dustrialized nations have been extended to allcountries. Thus, transportation disasters on land,on the sea, and in the air, and industrial disastershave joined the traditional natural threats.

The natural hazards identified in table I con-stitute 82 percent of all disasters to which theUnited States responded. The 13-year average ofmanmade disasters consists of more than sevenevents per year or 18 percent of all events. A trendtoward increasing numbers of manmade disastersmight logically be expected to accompany what-ever development occurred over the 13-yearperiod; however, no such trend exists. In 1965, 34percent of all disasters were manmade, and in1977, 13 percent were manmade. In the middleyears, the percentage ranged from a low of 10 per-cent (1974+-75) to a high of 30 percent (1976), asseen in table 2.

Table I.-U.S. Disaster Assistance Types of Events

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9 10 7 6 6 6 8 10 3 5 9 4

SOURCE: Tabulations of OFDA computer printout. “’Disaster History USG Response... Feb. 13, 1978.

. .

—

Table 2.-U.S. Response to Natural and Manmade Hazards

1965 19661967 1966 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977Natural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (#) 33 37 61 39 39 47 45 25 26 26 46 21 19

(%OI 68 80 66 85 87 89 86 76 72 90 90 70 83Man-Made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (#; 17 9 10 7 6 6 6 8 10 3 5 9 4

(%) 34 20 14 15 13 11 12 24 28 10 10 30 13Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (#) 50 46 71 46 45 53 51 33 36 29 51 30 23

SOURCE: Tabulations of OFOA computer printout. “Disaster History USG Response,’” Feb. 13.1978.

Merely tallying the number of disasters, thoughuseful as a rough index, can be misleading. Disas-ters vary enormously in magnitude and in disrup-tive capacity. For example, while OFDA reports112,000 people killed in all disasters during 1973,this is fewer than half of the final tally of dead inone country alone, Ethiopia, during that sameyear, according to figures released by the govern-ment that took power after the devastatingdrought and famine.1 Similarly, OFDA calculateda total of $16 billion in worldwide damage from1965 to 1975. This stands in contrast to an esti-mate of the Development Assistance Committeeof the Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD) that typhoon damagein Southeast Asia alone was $9.96 billion between1960 and 1970.2

The sources of information and mechanisms forcollecting, handling, and analyzing disasterstatistics are a response to bureaucratic needs forquantification and have only limited meaning.Recordkeeping in less developed countries and thechaotic atmosphere of disasters contribute to theinitial use, and later institutionalization, of guessesand estimates. In the 1972-74 Sahelian Drought,one response to the news media’s persistent searchfor fatality statistics was: How can you expect acount of the dead in counties where they can’t make acount of the living? The U.S. Public Health Seryicefinally estimated that 100,000 people had died.That number has appeared countless times as anauthoritative statistic.

Even as an indicator of magnitude, however, thesimilarity between U.S. and developing countrydisaster frequency is marked. In the past 5 years,

[Stephen Gr=n, [ntemat[om~ DIsuster Relief (N’e\v York:

McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977), p. 16.zDavid Holdsll.otih, Present Rok of the Red Cross in ASiSf-

unce, Background Paper 3, Joint Committee for the Re-appraisal of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1975, p. 77.

according to a recent survey of the Governors ofthe 50 States, 23 percent of all disasters to whichthe States responded were manmade.J In the past5 years, 18 percent of the disasters to whichOFDA responded were manmade.

One important difference between disaster oc-currence in the United States and developingcountries is civil strife. In developing countrydisasters since 1965, 51 percent of all manmadedisasters (9 percent of the total) were civil war andcivil strife. In the United States, according to the

‘survey of Governors, only seven civil disturb-ance/terrorism incidents representing less than 0.5percent were recorded in the last 5 years.

THE IMPACT ON LIFE AND SAFETY

The death toll in developing country disasters isso great as to rival major wars. As a result ofdisasters to which the United States responded,3.6 million people died and an estimated 474million others were seriously affected in somefashion from 1965 through 1977. Table 3 showsthe year-by-year statistics. These should be takenas indicators rather than as absolute for they are,at best, approximations.

Statistics fail to illustrate the true sense ofhuman suffering and social disruption from disas-ters. They can be imagined a little better perhapsby recalling just a few destructive events and theirimpact:

● The earth in Guatemala shook for severalminutes in 1976: 23,000 people are estimatedto have died and 1 million others were af-fected.

3Emergency preparedness Project, Emer,gen~? PrePUrcdncssauf Response in 57 Stutes und Territories (Washington, D. C.:National Governors Association, 1978).

‘Ibid.

6

Table 3.-Foreign Disaster Statistics(Fiscal Years 1965=77)

of 1.2 million people and the dislocation ofover 30 million people.5

New Number NumberYear disasters killed affected

1977 . . . . . . . . . 23 6,602 3,500,1431976 . . . . . . . . . 29 96,589 32,537,6751975 . . . . . . . . . 24 48,000 44,315,0001974 . . . . . . . . . 20 101,000 14,887,0001973 . . . . . . . . . 25 112,000 215,240,0001972 . . . . . . . . . 30 115,000 37,023,0001971 . . . . . . . . . 51 522,000 68,070,0001970 . . . . . . . . . 51 73,000 11,743,0001969 . . . . . . . . . 36 1,019,000 32,482,0001968 . . . . . . . . . 55 4,000 5,456,0001967. . . . . . . . . 52 1,518,000 14,223,0001966 . . . . . . . . . 48 7,000 4,140,0001965 . . . . . . . . . 50 47,000 5,504,000

Total . . . . . . . 452 3,568.000 453,083,000

●

●

●

The Sahelian region of West Africa drought,which lasted 5 years, is estimated to havekilled 100,000 people and affected another 23million.

The civil wars of East-West Pakistan andNigeria-Biafra together resulted in the death

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

Table + suggests the scope of the economic im-pact of disasters; but keep in mind this impact ison less developed countries. U.S. assistance wentto 26 of the poorest countries in the world, whereper capita annual income hovers around $200.Thus, direct foreign disaster assistance can pro-duce economic impacts far in excess of some signif-icant international financial indicators. For exam-ple:

● Three states affected by the Sahelian drought,Mali, Mauritania, and Chad, had recent(1976.77) international monetary reserves of$6.9 million, $76.8 million, and $11.87 mil-lion respectively. The total amount of aidgiven to these three nations in the 1973-75period was: Mali—$90.67 million; Mauri-

5A Ret’ieu’ of the U.S. Gotwnment Foreign Disuster AssistancePrograms (Washington, D. C.: Committee on InternationalDisaster Assistance, National Academv of Sciences-NationalResearch Council, Commission on Sociotechnical Systems,1978), p. 1.

Table 4.–Foreign Disaster Statistics and Emergency Relief Costs (Fiscal Years 1965-75)

Value of assistance in millions of dollarsEstimated Other donor nations

property damage Voluntary and international In-countryYear (millions of dollars) U.S. Government agencies organizations self-help

1975 . . . . . . . . . $2,769.775 $ 2 0 0 . 4 $14.9 $270.4 $74.51974 . . . . . . . . . 1,040.470 140.3 17.3 152.3 58.81973 . . . . . . . . . 2,717.400 301.4 15.5 158.9 658.11972 . . . . . . . . . 492.721 314.9 12.0 582.2 81.01971 . . . . . . . . . 2,558.860 189.0 16.7 266.6 744.81970 . . . . . . . . . 1,417.667 48.7 12.2 59.5 96.61969 . . . . . . . . . 1,978.168 102.6 12.2 16.5 131.01968 . . . . . . . . . 439.478 32.6 7.9 16.5 607.11967 . . . . . . . . . 2,720.296 81.4 12,2 173.2 2.964.71966 . . . . . . . . . 249.869 25.4 1.6 9.6 *1965 . . . . . . . . . 411.389 46.3 3.8 3.6 ●

Totals. . . . . . $16.796.073 $1,483.0 $126.3 $1,788.3 $5.416.6

.Data not available.SOURCE: Estimated property damage compiled from OFDA computer printout. “Disaster History USG Response..” Feb. 13. 1978. Other data from

OFDA compiled by National Academy of Sciences. Committee on International Disaster Assistance. The u.S. Government Foreign DsasterAssistance Program, p. 3.

●

tania—$61.5 million; and Chad—$24.57 mil-lion. b

The 1974 budget revenues of the nation ofCyprus totaled $135.8 million. The worlddonor response to the 2-month civil strife in1974 was over $26.9 miIlion.7

Table 4 shows a decade of U.S. Government as-sistance totaling nearly $1.5 billion and otherdonors contributing nearly $2 billion. Simply add-ing these sums to development assistance duringthose years would have made a positive impact.More important for the long-term economic devel-opment of these disaster-prone countries is the lastcolumn, in-country self-help. These are funds di-rectly diverted from productive sectors of nations’economies to provide relief assistance for their dis-aster-stricken citizens. That self-help category isnearly $5.4 billion.

When the $16.8 billion of estimated propertydamage is added to the $5.4 billion in self-help, anet “outflow” of capital from productive sectors of$22.2 billion is computed. International donorassistance constitutes $3.3 billion in lost “develop-ment income.” The resulting $25.5 billion is thetotal direct development “loss” due to disasters inthe past decade: that is, a cash loss of funds thatcould have gone into productive enterprises.

As awesome as these statistics are, the economicdislocation resulting from disasters may have an

b~l.$. Agencv for International Development, wc~~~ndN’oces for Mali, ‘Mauritania, Chad, and Cyprus (published ir-regularly) and OffIce of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

‘Ibid.

even longer term effect, substantially offsettingreal economic growth. For example, the Office ofthe United Nations Economic Commission forLatin America has estimated that the countries ofthe Central American Common Market have sus-tained disaster damage averaging 2.3 percent ofthe gross domestic product from 1960 through1974. a William Dalton, head of the Preparednesssection of the AID Office of Foreign DisasterAssistance, said recently that disaster-relatedlosses in less developed countries had averaged $2billion a year for the past 12 years. “Now, thatmay not be much in terms of the global economy,”Dalton continued, “but that $24 billion added tothe development efforts of those [less developed]countries could be significant” for progress.9

In summary, both similarities and differences ex-ist between developed and developing countries inthe nature and effect of disasters. Even in thelarge-scale losses of life and property, however,lessons may be available. The destructive impactof a disaster on a small national economy maybe amodel of the local inflation and subsequent de-pression found at the site of U.S. domestic disas-ters. These lessons are likely to be conditioned byseveral factors discussed in the next chapterrelating to the preparation for and response todisasters.

Kommittee on International Disaster Assistance, op. cit.,p. 3.

~William Dalton, remarks at the Conference on 1ncerna-tional Dis~scers and Discontinuities, Congressional ResearchService, Washington, D. C., Feb. 16, 1978.

\

IV. Capacity to Prepare and Respond:Differences Between Developing

and Industrialized Countries

The differences between disasters in the develop-ing countries and those found in the United Statesresult in part from different national and socialcapabilities. However, it is easy to overestimate thefragility of the social systems of less developedcountries. Because people are poor does not meanthat social relations are poor or inadequate. Sociallife in less developed countries maybe more easilyrestored than in industrialized countries. A housecan be rebuilt with local labor and materials in 2days in a developing country, while in the UnitedStates a building permit probably could not be ob-tained in that time. As analysis moves from indi-viduals to institutions to national socioeconomicperspectives, the distinctions between developingcountries and urban, industrialized countriesbecome greater.

At the individual level, human beings respondas human beings whether in societies with margin-al or affluent economies. Responses by people tostress induced by disasters tend to show strongcross-cultural similarities in perception and behav-ior. For example, panic flight is rare in any society.Severe mental breakdowns as a result of catas-trophes seldom occur on any scale anywhere.Signs of impending danger tend to be perceived asnormal occurrences. People tend to personalize thedisaster, thinking that it has happened only tothem and their surroundings, and they generallyshare keen anxiety over separation from familymembers and tend to begin an immediate, inde-pendent search for missing people. Finally, con-vergence of people, information, and material onthe scene of the disaster immediately after it hap-pens is seen across all cultures. *

The reference above to building permits makesthe point that differences appear more sharply and

Icharles E. Fritz, “DiSaSter,” Conremporap %Cidl pro~lem~(d.) Robert K. Merron and Robert A. Nisbet (New York:Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), p. 655.

clearly at the organizational and institutional levelthan at the human and individual level. However,with institutional differences also come institu-tional similarities. For example, developed coun-tries may have greater resources, but they have nomonopoly on wisdom or the ideal model of disas-ter-related decisionmaking. Cities are built inflood plains and on earthquake faults in both in-dustrialized and less developed countries.

Institutions, moreover, are a reflection of thesocioeconomic capacity of the nation as a whole.At the macro level of analysis, developing coun-tries are most readily distinguished from the in-dustrialized nations by comparatively fewer re-sources available to prepare for and respond todisasters.

The continuum of similarities and differences—individual to institution to national systems—suggests the loci of possible lessons transferable toU.S. domestic disaster programs.

Institutions become the bridge between the dif-ferent resource capabilities of nations and similarhuman needs. Transferable lessons, therefore, arelikely to be those in which less developed countrydisaster institutions suggest organizational, mana-gerial, informational, or educational alternativesto the resource-intensive disaster preparedness andresponse methods of the developed countries.

To get a clearer focus on the adaptations likelyto be necessary in transferring alternative prepar-edness and response approaches, it is useful toidentify several pressures placed on institutions inless developed countries which affect their capaci-ty to prepare for and respond to disasters.

RESOURCES

Growing numbers of the world’s population livein a permanent state of marginal existence “where-

9

in the slightest natural phenomena can cause ter-rific loss of life and economic, social, and politicaldisruption on a large scale,”2 according to a studyconducted by the United Nations Association,Panel on International Disaster Relief. The reportcontinues:

There is now a patchwork of disaster crisis areas inthe developing world—regions that are so vulner-able that they are in a virtually permanent state ofemergency. Haiti, Ethiopia, Nepal, Indonesia,Bangladesh, El Salvador, Afghanistan, major sec-tions of Nigeria, and the Sahelian countries—thereare large sections of the Earth where the life-support systems are so thin that the occurrence ofrelatively minor natural phenomena can cause ma-jor disasters with severe adverse human effects.3

The economic conditions of less developedcountries severely limit the resources available toprepare for and recover from disaster. Additional-ly, the human resource base is weakened by lack ofeconomic opportunity, thus leading to increasedsusceptibility to disaster consequences.

POPULATION

Urbanization and internal migration are world-wide phenomena caused by real and perceived in-equities between rural and urban areas. Lack of re-sources and problems of unemployment have re-sulted in increasingly higher density living and theuse of marginal lands in Iess developed countries.This has put larger numbers of people at risk fromnatural hazards. As flood plains, earthquakezones, marginal agricultural lands, and verdanthurricane coasts draw more and more people, therisks of greater human suffering from catastrophesincrease. In 1970, 74 percent of the 2.6 billionpeople in developing countries lived in rural areas.By 1980, this percentage is expected to decline to57 percent of the population, thus thrusting nearly1.5 billion more people into urban areas in lessdeveloped countries.s

High population growth rates of the developingcountries exaggerate the impact of disaster. For theentire world, the growth in population between1975 and 1990 is expected to be 33 percent. In thedeveloping countries, this increase will be 41 per-

cent, and in the least developed countries—whichare the more disaster-prone—the growth will beeven greater: upwards of 50 percent. As a conse-quence, the scope of disaster impact on human set-tlements must increase in the coming years.

UNPLANNED GROWTH

Through inability or unwillingness, failure toplan development in the poor and disaster-pronecountries will result in greater exposure to naturaland manmade hazards for larger numbers of peo-ple. The failure of macro- and micro-planningleads to uncontrolled development. Macro long-range planning of the siting of human settlementsand capital development projects often neglects totake hazards into account. For example, followingthe huge Guatemala City earthquake of 1976,which killed over 23,000 people, building begananew in exactly the same location as the oldruined city.’ Similarly, Managua, Nicaragua wasrebuilt on the same faultline in 1855, 1937, and1968.8

The second factor in unplanned growth ismicro-planning and engineering. Habitable struc-tures in the less developed countries are often in-appropriately designed for hazardous conditions.The houses of Managua and Guatemala City arelargely adobe with heavy tile roofs. Furthermore,the custom in both cities is to construct the front,and often only, door to open inward for greatersecurity against unwanted intrusion. The com-bination of heavy walls, the heavy roofs, and thedoorway results in an inability to open the door toescape after the first earth tremors. When thequake itself strikes, the heavy tile collapses. Thelarge majority of the dead found in both citieswere jammed inside doorways.

One of the opportunities provided by disastersin developing countries is for governments to planredevelopment. Following a disaster, internationalassistance is often available to plan the reconstruc-tion of public buildings and therefore to influencethe private sector growth of cities. However, in

‘i4cts of Suture, Acts of ?vJun: The Global Response to NaturalDisasters, (New York: U.N. Association, Policy Studies Panelon International Disaster Assistance, 1977), p. 19.

‘Ibid,~~[artln M. McLaughlin, et al., The United Srares and World

Detdopmenr Agenda 1979. (New York: Praeger Publishers,1Q79).

oU.N. Association, opcit., p. 15.‘Computer printout, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance,

L“.S. Agency for International Dm’elopment.qJJJ. -iation, op. cit., p. 15. Following the most re-

cent earthquake (1972) most reconstruction has been movedseveral kilometers fkom the historic center of the city and theearthquake epicenter.

10

many cases where outside reconstruction planningassistance has been provided, this did not guaran-tee an improved planning or redevelopment proc-ess. The cases of Guatemala, Lice,10 and AndhraPradeshll have been well-documented and showinadequate reconstruction, often on the ruins ofthe last disaster. Parallel experiences have oc-curred in many reconstruction efforts in theUnited States, most notably in the flood-proneareas of eastern Kentucky and Johnstown, Pa.

POLITICS

The political ramifications of a disaster and itsrelief are usually seen to be especially influential indeveloping countries. This, however, may be anerror of perspective. The role of politics in devel-oping countries may appear more important thanit is because of our distance from the events andlack of familiarity with the political systems. In un-derdeveloped countries, the domestic political sys-tems seem less stable than in the industrializedcountries, thus raising attention to political con-siderations in disaster. Also, ethnic, religious, andracial attitudes and rivalries are often seen to influ-ence the functioning of disaster relief. The well-documented, apparent indifference of ruling eth-nic groups to the nomadic cattle herders and othertransient minorities in the drought-affected Afri-can countries south of the Sahara is illustrative.

In the United States, by contrast, the option ofpurposeful neglect is rarely raised. Victims mayfeel slighted by a bureaucracy, or an organizationmay move in such a muddled fashion that relief ispoorly distributed; but there seems to be little con-scious neglect. In the United States, there are somany organized interests advocating equity thatvictims eventually are served—well or badly, butserved. In less developed countries, some groups.are systematically ignored and become double vic-tims, of disaster and of official neglect. ,

The preceding problems in developing countriesare not to suggest that urban and industrializednations offer models of political efficiency. A

9Comptrol]er General of the United States, OkrtUtIOns onthe Gwmmudmt Eurrltqwk Relie/Ej/ort, ID-76-71, 1976. p. 52.

l~wil]lam A. &fl[chel\, Tltc Lice Earrhqtuk in southeasternTtuke?. (Colorado: The United States Air Force Academv,1976).

I I Fred Cunv, “Recent Work in the Aftermath of the An-dhra Pradesh Cvclone,” Memorandum to INTERTECHmember, Januarv 197S.

major weakness of the bulk of disaster research inthe social and behaviorial sciences has been a fail-ure to recognize and study the political factors thatcut across all aspects of domestic disaster planningand response. Whether warnings are issued,whether a disaster declaration is sought, whatkind of short-term and long-term aid is provided,the equity or lack of equity in disaster relief andrehabilitation, are all often strongly affected bypolitical factors. They are all political decisions incertainly one sense of the term. This stands outrather sharply in the work done on earthquakepredictions. Because of the time factor involved,anyone who has to consider the social consequen-ces of predictions with respect to planning andresponse is forced to recognize the pervasivepolitical overtones of all that is involved.

TRANSPORTATION ANDTELECOMMUNICATIONS

A further pressure on disaster-related institu-tions in less developed countries is the relative lackof a physical infrastructure. Because over half ofthe population is located in rural areas, communi-cations and transportation systems are importantto the efficient assessment and response to disas-ters. Yet, less developed countries have inadequateroads, airports, railroads, telephones, and othercapital development items that are essential topreparedness and response, by the standards of in-dustrialized nations.

For example, in the area of public communica-tion, the broadcast media plays an important rolein issuing warnings of impending disaster and con-ducting educational campaigns. In the less devel-oped countries, there is an average of 17 radio sta-tions per country and 2 television stations. Four-teen of those countries, however, have three orfewer radio stations and eight have no television atall. Among the developed countries, Italy has 795radio stations, the United Kingdom has Z 17, andthe United States has 8,100. Additionally, theUnited States has 985 television stations, theUnited Kingdom has 300, and France has 1,500.

KNOWLEDGE OF HAZARDS

Among persons who professionally deal withhazards in the United States, there are four com-

11

mon complaints. These concern information onlong-term trends, vulnerabilitv of population,short-term impact needs, and capability co re-spond. For the less developed countries, the in-formation base is far worse, if it exists at all.

This inadequacy of information constitutes anadditional pressure placed on planning capabilitiesin less developed country disaster institutions,which is shared with institutions in the UnitedStates.

The Committee on International Disaster As-sistance of the National Academy of Sciences hasidentified several information problems, of whichfour correspond to the four complaints above andare reviewed here: hazard analysis, vulnerabilityanalysis, short-term needs assessment, and disas-ter-relevant resource analysis.

Hazard Analysis

A hazard is defined as “a potentially harmfulcondition whose existence and magnitude of oc-currence can be expressed in probabilistic terms. ”13

The goal of hazard analysis is the understanding ofoccurrence patterns and the impact of past eventsin order to predict both occurrence and impact forthe future. This is achieved by the collection andassessment of information about the nature,causes, frequency, distribution, and effects of past,and therefore potential, disasters. Given the com-plexity of natural hazards—the variety of agents(earthquake, wind, hod, drought, etc.) and theinteraction of agents (earthquakes may cause di-rect damage due to the ground shaking and sec-ondary effects through power failures and gas ex-plosions, tsunamis, and Landslides)—largeamounts of analytical data are necessary to makeaccurate forecasts. Both historical data (the longerthe period, the more accurate the analyses andforecasts) and current, real-time monitoring ofevents are necessary to achieve useful forecasts.

Currently, many forms of environmental dataacquisition exist: direct observations of local in-formants, networks of observing stations, instru-ment observation, satellite observation utilizingthe most advanced remote-sensing technology,

[2,4 &l,le~~, of che U.S. COtwmwru Fweign Disaster AssistancePrograms (Washington, D. C.: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Commission on %ciotechnicalSystems, Committee on International Disaster Assistance,1978, p. 38.

1‘Ibid., p. W.

12

telecommunctions networks, and data processingat national, regional, and world centers. For ex-ample, the world weather watch program of theWorld Meteorological Organization of the UnitedNations incorporates observation, communica-tion, and data processing in providing member na-tions with meteorological data. Similarly, theFood and Agriculture Organization of the UnitedNations uses local ground observers, air reconnais-sance, and weather information to report monthlyon the crop situation in many less developed coun-tries and warn of impending food shortages andcrop failure. It was the view of the committee,however, that “The data collection methods areavailable, but the collection and utilization oftechnical data to mitigate disasters is lacking.”14

The problem, in hazard analysis, is in promotingthe use of information and its dissemination inusable form.

Vulnerability Analysis

Vulnerability to hazards is a population’s sus-ceptibility to loss when a hazard event of a givenmagnitude occurs.

The committee asserts that vulnerability anal-ysis is concerned with the “human responsesystems to natural hazards which enlightenedhumans may control. All human actions thateither aggravate or mitigate the effects of naturalhazards must be taken into account in assessingvulnerability. ”15

Vulnerability analysis requires considerableamounts of information. At a minimum, the com-mittee writes, the following kinds of informationare necessary for “known hazard-prone areas:”

number and geographic distribution of popula-tion, buildings, and lifeline systems (e.g., publicworks, medical facilities);measurements reflecting catastrophic losspotential (e.g., structures of high occupancysuch as schools and places of public assembly);andmeasurements reflecting vulnerability to sec-ondary losses (e.g., industrial and commerciallocations, dangerous materials storage). 16

The problems inherent in collecting these vitalpieces of information are huge. In the developingworld, in particular, engineering research on struc-

l+Ibid., p. +1.[%id.$ p. +3-+4.IsIbid., p. +5.

tures is often of little value. The great bulk ofbuilding-related fatalities have occurred in simplenonengineered structures, typically of adobe orother local construction. Furthermore, the large-scale migration of rural populations to urbancenters makes vulnerability analysis more difficult.Finally, the records of natural events have notbeen kept for more than a few years; thus, the ac-curacy of predictions is suspect.

Short-Term Needs Assessment

No single factor hampers the ability of both do-mestic and international disaster agencies to re-spond to an emergency more than the lack ofdamage assessment and assessment of victims’needs. Damage and needs assessment are the vitalcomponents necessary for agencies to make sounddecisions promptly. The U.S. missions in the im-pacted country frequently have not had the re-sources to make dependable assessments ofdamages and needs. In-country mission disasterrelief officers who have had assessment trainingare hampered by communication and transporta-tion difficulties. OFDA was reluctant for a longtime to use U.S. military personnel to assessdamage because it was believed that they mightnot be accepted in a disaster-stricken country. AMilitary Disaster Assessment and Survey Teamwas used in the El Salvador earthquake of 1965 forthe first time. It was successful but demonstratedthe need for better training and closer ties betweenthe military and OFDA. William Dalton ofOFDA has confirmed that improvements havetaken place in recent years but that disaster assess-ments continue to be a prime concern of the Of-fice. 18

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) com-mittee report highlighted four aspects of impactand needs assessment that make the accurate in-terpretation of damage difficult. These aspects sug-gest the complexity of the problem and the para-mount importance of such assessments in disasterrelief. The NAS committee devoted its entire sec-ond year of activity to the study of damage andneeds assessment. 19

First, preimpact conditions of buildings, health,institutions, etc., need to be known to determine

*lIbid., p. 13.IsWi]liam Dalton, interview., Feb. 11, 197S.1$’C ommittee on [international Disaster Assistance, .~ssess-

ing hwrncuiomd Disustcr .Needs (Washington. D. C.: N’ationalAcademy ~~f Sciences-Natic>nal Research Council 1979).

change resulting from the disaster. One of theproblems with preimpact data is that, when it ex-ists, it is often diffused throughout different ad-ministrative units. Disaster officials face difficultiesin obtaining, collating, and promptly assessingsuch disparate information.

Second, the difficulties in collecting postimpactdata revolve around inability to gain access to dis-aster areas, disruptions in the often inadequatecommunications, destruction of existing records,and the exodus of victims with potentially usefulinformation. The NAS committee also empha-sized the lack of expertise in conducting local sur-veys, the deficiency in methodologies for rapidground survey assessment, the political problemsinvolved in the use of external assessment teams,and the local and international politics involvedin the assessment of needs.

Third, organizational and cultural biases enterinto the assessment process. On the one hand, or-ganizations typically commit their resources to themost visible task within their capabilities ratherthan assessing needs and satisfying them.20 On theother hand, cultural standards of value place dif-fering importance on different disaster-inducedlosses. For example, relief officials from developedcountries may well be more impressed by industri-al losses, while the people and officials of thestricken developing country might place a greatervalue on food, energy, and agricultural recovery.The problem of imposing the values of the reliefdonor on the recovery efforts of the disaster- im-pacted country increases with the unfamiliarity ofdonors with recipient cultures.

Fourth, “A major problem in damage assess-ment results from the fact that lack of damage isseldom reported.”2l Because disaster impactdamage is virtually never complete, resources forrelief and recovery may exist in proximity to thedisaster zone but never be utilized. The NAS com-mittee cites mass media reports, in particular, astending to overlook this fact because they concen-trate on the drama of destruction rather thanwhat has been untouched. In industrial societies,certainly, large amounts of resources are un-damaged and can be redirected to the emergency.“Even though the level of stored resources withindeveloping countries may not allow the same com-

‘°Committee on International Disaster Assistance, op cir.,p. ?s.

‘i Ibid., p. 29.

13

fortable margin, the same situation would prob-ably pertain in many disasters occurring indeveloping countries.” 22 In the Managua,Nicaragua earthquake of 1972, for example, sixdifferent medical units were dispatched to thescene by almost as many countries. The earth-quake, however, had done little damage to the 16hospitals in the area and did not merit outsideresources. Nearby in-country medical facilitieswere more readily available. Thus, a tremendouswaste of resources—which could have beenavoided by an accurate needs assessment— oc-curred during the emergency.

Disaster= Relevant Resource Analysis

The last of the four information problems associ-ated with U.S. and developing country disasterprograms lies in the fact that response to both nat-ural and manmade disasters requires resources,both human and material. As the committeestated: “If the primary objective of internationaldisaster assistance is to respond to victims’ needsthat have not been met at the local level, it is im-portant that agencies like AID/OFDA have docu-mented information on the capability of devel-oping countries to respond to various disaster-generated demands.”23

Wbid., p. 29.ZjIbid., p. 48.

Two types of information are necessary: first,the level of disaster preparedness in the disaster-impacted society, and, second, a general resourceprofile of the society.

The need for these two profiles of in-country dis-aster preparedness and available resources is an in-formation problemveloped countries.

In summary, thebility—of disaster

shared by developing and de-

commonality—and transferra-experiences from developing

countries to U.S. programs lie in institutional ad-aptations of disaster procedures. Despite differ-ences in resources, population, growth patterns,and political systems, which appear at the nationallevel, all people have similar responses in disaster.Institutions link individual needs to national capa-bilities.

Two sources of institutional innovation are thefocus of attention. On the one hand, developingcountries have created alternatives to theresource-intensive U.S. disaster procedures. Onthe other hand, OFDA has adapted domestic dis-aster procedures to its international operations.Lessons applicable to U.S. disaster programs are tobe found in these tw”o sources of procedural, man-agerial, or informational alternatives.

14

V. International

The ccountryences ofaster misuch or:ices anddisasterAssistaral DeveDisasterwith suland maternatio

DIt

Interrfluencecwhich cneeds:

● S o v ,

● mul● poli

Severe

In thecountrieexistencmonthsEven givecase, m:demonsare impordisasterstimulatother cacreased

Disaster Assistance Programs

portunities for learning from developinglisasters are based largely on the experi-ndustrialized countries and donors in dis-gation, preparedness, and response. Twolnizations dominate disaster-related serv-resources in the predisaster and post-hases: the U.S. O&Ice of Foreign Disastere (OFDA) of the Agency for Internation-loPment (AID) and the United NationsRelief Organization (UNDRO). Togetheridiary agencies, a few other governments,~ voluntary organizations, this is the in- ,al disaster donor community.

SASTER ASSISTANCE IN AOMPLEX ENVIRONMENT

tional disaster assistance is frequently in-by one or more of the following factors act to the detriment of disaster victims’

eignty,plicity of donors, andcal nature of disaster events.

jnty

1972-74 Sahelian drought, the affected governments refused to recognize the

of a severe emergency for severalduring the height of the tourist season.1n that the drought might be an extreme:ers of sovereignty, pride of country, andations of self-reliance and responsibilitytant factors that enter into international .ssistance. In some cases, these factorspositive efforts at in-country self-help. In:s, however, they result in delays and in-ifficulties due to sensitivity to foreign

J1 ames ‘CornmunicPennsylva

. Morentz, The Making oj an huemationd Event:ion and the Drought in West Africu (University ofa: doctoral dissertation, 1976), p. 153.

assistance and suspicion of the motives of donorcountries.

Issues of sovereignty also arise during relief ef-forts. Some nations are hesitant to permit the useof foreign military disaster assessment teams orpermit the uncontrolled overflight of relief aircraftwhich, again, are often military. Whether politicalconstraints or legitimate fears, the issue of satelliteremote sensing of foreign countries also remains tobe solved.

Finally, sovereignty can directly limit the hu-manitarian goals of U.S. assistance. What recoursewould the United States have if the government ofa disaster-stricken nation simply refused aid?

International Politics

The complex politics of disaster were carried tothe extreme in Bangladesh. In 1970, a devastatingcyclone struck East Pakistan causing over $25 mil-lion in damages and affecting 10 million people. Inaddition to short-term effects, the general neglectof reconstruction by the central government inWest Pakistan was a major reason for the ensuingprotracted civil war. Refugees of the civil strifesubsequently burdened the Government of Indiato such a degree that it declared war on Pakistanin 1971. The conflict resulted in the independenceof East Pakistan, then renamed Bangladesh.Bangladesh, since 1970 has accounted for nearly25 percent of all U.S. assistance, beginning withrelief following the cyclone and continuingthrough the civil war and refugee resettlement.Relief for war refugees, through September 1972,totaled $296 million and the cyclone relief addedanother $16 million.

Civil strife in Bangladesh is not an isolated case.Historically, the largest number of U.S. relief ef-forts have taken place in response to natural disas-ters. Hazards that have a rapid onset, such asearthquakes, tropical cyclones, hurricanes, andriver floods, have especially attracted U.S.

15

.. .—

emergency response. These rapid onset disasters,how’ever, have received only a minority of U.S.financial aid: approximately 30 percent since 1965.The creeping disasters of drought and epidemicsaccount for only another 10 percent of all funds.The largest proportion of the $1.6 billion providedby the U.S. Government has gone to a category ofmanmade disasters: civil strife and civil war. Ap-proximately 60 percent of all U.S. funds have goneto victims of civil strife, internal political prob-lems, and wars. Recent examples include Cyprus,1974-75; the Dominican Republic, 1965; Nigeria,1969; Jordan, 1970; and the Middle East duringthe 1967 Seven-Day War.

The leading recipients of U.S. disaster assistancesince 1975, shown in table 5, suggest the complexpolitical nature of disaster assistance, representedespecially by the four cases of civil strife. In an ef-fort to avoid politicizing U.S. assistance in civilstrife, OFDA usually makes funds available toU.N. agencies or voluntary organizations. For ex-ample, in the 1974 Cyprus civil war, all U.S. fundswere channeled through the U.N. High Commis-sioner for Rekgees (UNHCR) and the Interna-tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In the1973 Mid-East War and Sudan civil strife,UNHRC and ICRC were again active with U.S.voluntary agencies in seeking an equitable distri-bution of U.S. Government aid to victims on allsides of the conflicts.

Table S.-Leading Recipients ofU.S. Assistance Since 1965

i3.4.

: :

: :9.

10.11.12.13.14.15.

Bangladesh Civil Strife end Aftermath: 1971-73India Drought and Famine: 1965.67Peru Earthquake: 1970Nigeria Civil Strife: 1967-69Bangladesh Cyclone: 1970Nicaragua Earthquake: 1972Philippines Floods: 1972Sahel Drought: 1973-75Ethiopia Drought: 1974-75Pakistan Floods: 1974Somalia Drought: 1974-75Cyprus Civil Strife: 1974-75Honduras Hurricane: 1974Lebanon Civil Strife: 1975-76Guatemala and Italy Earthquakes: 1976

Ranked by amount of U.S. relief expenditures.SOURCE: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. AID.

Multiplicity of i)ot’to~s

An international disaster assistance effort mayconsist of several dozen donors, greatly increasingthe problems of coordination. Table 6 shows the

16

broad su’eep of got~ernment and institutional in-volvement in a major disaster. Through February16, 1976, response to the great Guatemala earth-quake came from 26 countries bilaterally, 8 inter-national organizations, 1 foundation, 25 volun-tary organizations, and 70 countries through theLeague of Red Cross Societies. Compared to do-mestic disaster assistance, this presents a problemof different magnitude (numbers, distances, lan-guages, and politics) rather than kind. Yet, the dif-ference is significant.

The diverse number of pubIic and private orga-nizations that participate in international disaster-assistance activities creates its own problem. Inany major disaster, this multiplicity ofinvolvement—for different reasons, at differentlevels of contribution, with different capabilities,and with different degrees of independentperformance—virtually guarantees problems of co-ordination among the many private and govern-mental international donors and between thedonors and the disaster-stricken nation. As theNational Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committeeon International Disaster Assistance \\’rote: “Totalk of an international disaster-response system isinappropriate because that concept implies rela-tively high levels of mutual awareness, interde-pendence, and coordinated activity that presentlydo not exist.”z

For example, during the international donorresponse to the Sahelian drought, logistics expertsfrom the United States and other donor countriesestablished a plan for scheduling the arrival andoffloading of ships carrying relief grains andcereals into the ports of Dakar, Senegal, andAbdijan, Ivory Coast. This sci,edule was of criticalimportance because of the grosslv inadequate railand road transportation to the inland-affectedpopulations. The cooperation of nations in stag-gering the arrival of ships was crucial, and thesystem worked. One day, ships of the People’sRepublic of China arrived, demanded to be off-loaded, and by doing so wrecked the carefullyscheduIed system for weeks.

In summary, the environment in which industri-alized nations assist in less developed country dis-

2 A Ret’iett of the L’.S. Gotwmmenr F o r e i g n Dis~srerAssistance Programs (Washington, D.C,: National Academ}”of Sciences, National Research Council, Commission on%ciotechnical Svstems, C o m m i t t e e on [ncernationalDisaster Assistance, IWO, p. 5.

—

Table 6.-International Assistance to the Guatemala Earthquake of 1976

National Donor Assistance

Argentina Ecuador Mexico SpainBelgium France New Zealand SwedenBrazil Germany, FRG Nicargua SwitzerlandCanada Haiti Norway United KingdomColombia Honduras Panama United StatesCosta Rica Israel Peru VenezuelaDominican Republic Italy

International Organization Assistance

Organizations of American States (OAS)League of Red Cross Societies (liCROSS)European Economic Community (EEC)Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)United Nations System

World Health Organization (WHO)World Food Program (WFP)United Nations International Childrens Fund (UNICEF)United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (U NDRO)

through United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Assemblies of GodBaptist World AllianceCARECatholic Relief Services—

United States CatholicConference

Christian Reformed WorldRelief Committee

Church World ServiceDavid Livingston FoundationFood for the Hungry

Voluntary Agency Assistance

Interchurch Medical AssistanceLutheran World ServiceMennonite Central CommitteeMedical Assistance ProgramSalvation ArmySeventh Day Adventists

World ServiceSouthern Baptist Convention

Foreign Mission BoardWorld Neighbors, Inc.

World Relief CommissionWorld University ServiceWorld Vision InternationalAmerican Friends Service

CommitteeAmerican National Red CrossChristian AidHelp the AgedBritish Red CrossMormon Mission

AfghanistanAustraliaAustriaBahamasBarbadosBelgiumBoliviaBrazilBulgariaCanadaChileChinaColumbiaCosta RicaCubaCyprusCzechoslovakiaDenmark

League of Red Cross Societies

Dominjcan RepublicEquadorEgyptEl SalvadorEthiopiaFinlandFed. Rep. of GermanyFranceGerman Dem. Rep.Great BritainGreeceHondurasHungaryIceland[ranIrelandItalyJamaica

JapanKorea Rep.KuwaitLebanonLiechtensteinLuxembourgMalaysiaMauritiusMexicoMonacoMoroccoNetherlandsNew ZealandNicaraguaNorwayPanamaParaguay

PeruPhilippinesPolandRomaniaSingaporeSouth AfricaSpainSurinamSwedenSwitzerlandThailandTrinidad and TobagoTurkeyUruguayUnited StatesU.S.S.R.Yugoslavia

Other Assistance

Pan American Development Foundation

17

asters provides many opportunities for U.S. disas-ter programs to observe and learn about complexdisaster behavior and organization.

U.S. POLICIES ON DISASTERASSISTANCE

Faced with the complexities of assistance to de-veloping countries, the United States continues toobserve the primary and traditional motivation ofdisaster assistance, humanitarianism. Only a fewof the countries to which assistance is given eachyear are of strategic importance. The humanitari-an concern was reemphasized by the Carter ad-ministration. A cable in August of 1977 instructedall U.S. Ambassadors to ensure that the needs ofdisaster victims were met. Particularly stressedwere those instances where the government of thedisaster-affected nation was not responding suffi-ciently to the needs of the victims. According toan OFDA document, “This policy linked disasterassistance with the protection of the most funda-mental human right— the right to survive.

Among the other key elements of the U.S. for-eign disaster assistance policy are eight activitiesdesigned to:

Render emergency relief, in coordination withother governments, international agencies,and voluntary organizations, to victims ofnatural and manmade foreign disasters. Suchassistance can be provided to the people ofany nation affected by disasters and must, tothe greatest extent possible, reach those areasmost in need of relief and rehabilitation.Monitor all potential and actual disaster situa-tions.Assist in rehabilitation when such rehabilita-tion is beyond the capacity of local resources.Encourage and participate in foreign disasterpreparedness through the provision of techni-cal assistance and international training pro-grams.Consider on a case-by-case basis longer termreconstruction assistance, where there hasbeen severe social and economic disruption,and implement the program as a developmenttool.

)~~.s. Foreiw llw.xer Assisca~ce (Washington, D.c.: U.S.~gmcv for international Development, Office of ForeignDisaster Assistance, January 1978), p. 3.

18

Support the efforts of international organiza-tions and voluntary agencies involved in for-eign disaster assistance.Increase U.S. technical capacity to definedisaster-prone conditions and to recommenddisaster avoidance measures.Initiate, within international fora, efforts toincrease other donor participation in disasterrelief, preparedness, and prevention.

Implicit and explicit donor country values affectthe crucial decision of what, where, when, andhow foreign disaster assistance will be provided.Because these values motivate decisions and helpto establish the general framework within whichorganizations operate, the necessity of having aclear rationale for involvement in internationaldisaster assistance should be evident.

The Committee on International Disaster As-sistance recently suggested that the AID Office ofForeign Disaster Assistance focus on several ques-tions (table 7) in developing an explicit rationalefor the U.S. Government programs. These ques-tions illustrate the complexity involved in mergingindividual donor country values into a consistentinternational donor community value. Further-more, they point out the need for the potentialrecipients to make clear their views on the ex-pected role of the donor nations and their own in-country programs during disaster.

In its analysis of U.S. disaster assistance to thedeveloping countries, the NAS Committee at-tempted to state its “basic value premises. ” Thesein general summarize many of the congressionalattitudes of recent years. Furthermore, they ex-press a rationale for U.S. participation in develop-ing country disasters which is “essentially the ra-tionale of the Office of U.S. Foreign DisasterAssistance which was accepted by the Academy,”according to former OFDA Director AnneMartindell.

The Committee believes that the policy frame-work, strategies, and ethics of international disas-ter assistance should be guided by the basic princi-ples of humanitarianism, evidenced by a concernfor the response to the human needs of disaster vic-tims. The Committee also believes that the funda-mental purpose of international disaster assistanceshould be to respond to the locally unmet needs ofdisaster victims. Thus the nature and quantity of

4Letter from Anne Martinclell, Director, U.S. Office OfForeign Disaster Assistance, January 1479.

Table 7.-Ouestions for Developing U.S. International Disaster Programs

41.

2.

3.

What types of disasters should be included in a U.S. 4.program of international disaster assistance? Shouldkey criterion be the magnitude of the damage? If so,what measure or combination of measures should beused-death, injury,property damage?To what extent should foreign disaster relief be used asa vehicle to enhance foreign policy goals? The pursuit offoreign policy goals implies criteria that have onlymarginal relationships to the magnitudes of disaster im-pacts or to the capability of a country to meet its owndisaster-induced needs. The potential conflict betweenthese two sets of objectives needs to be carefully con-sidered.At what point in the disaster process should assistancebe provided? Should assistance be restricted to theemergency period? Or would it be more productive toprovide assistance in the development of disaster 5.mitigation techniques or for the organization ofpreparedness measures? Should the type and timing ofemergency assistance take into account its potentialutility in longer term rehabilitation and recovery? Whattypes of recovery aid will be cost-effective in enablingthe society to be better prepared to cope with futuredisasters?

What type of aid is needed most? A concern withdisaster victims is certainly appropriate but victimpopulations can be defined in various ways—as individ-uals, families, tribes. and as local, regional, and nationalgovernments. In fact, to think of the “victim” as societyis often important. If this is done, societal needs wouldbecome a much more important focus. Society-focusedneeds would shift types of assistance toward the re-placement of “damaged” societal resources (e.g.. there-placement of roadbuilding equipment or communica-tions facilities). In light of the fact that internationaldisaster assistance is usually provided to nations thatare struggling to achieve greater self-sufficiency, shouldthe avoidance of future dependency relationships, (par-ticularly technological ones) be one of the criteria usedin determining the type of assistance rendered?How should disaster needs be determined? Shouldneeds be specified by the affected country or should theneeds be determined by what the donor wishes to give?Should needs be determined by an international bodywhich then solicits contributions from the internationalcommunity? Do affected countries have the right torefuse assistance, particularly if donor countries stiliperceive unmet needs?

;OURCE: The National Academy of Science, Committee on International Disaster Assistance, pp. 3S-37.

international disaster assistance should be condi-tioned not only by the intensity of impacts and thevulnerability of human settlements, but aIso by thecapability of the affected community to meet itsown disaster-generated needs. Outside disasterassistance should complement, not duplicate, theexisting resources and response activities of therecipient country. Donors should help but notoverwhelm, assist but not create a dependencyrelationship, provide for genuinely needed goodsand services but not disrupt the natural adjust-ment mechanisms in the disaster-stricken popula-tion. Finally, we believe that the external contribu-tions to the stricken nation should be the result ofcoordinated rather than disjointed effort.5

THE STRUCTURE OFU.S. ASSISTANCE

The Government’s international disaster assist-ance over the last two decades has greatlyexpanded in resources allocated, in skill, in its pro-fessional response, in its expanding knowledgebase, and in sophistication as reflected in anawareness of broader needs for policy and programimprovement.

~Committee on Internarlonal Disaster Assistance, .~ss~ssing

International Disaster N’eeds (Washington, D. C.: NationalAcaclemv of Sciences-National Research Council 1979), P.6.

The National Research Council recently notedthat:

In the past decade a rapid evolution has occurredin the need for and the organization of interna-tional disaster assistance. During the last 12 years,the U.S. Government has responded to disastersin other countries in which over 3.6 million peoplelost their lives and 474 million people were serious-ly affected. It has contributed $1.6 billion out of atotal of $3.6 billion donated for foreign disasterassistance. Seventy-five percent of all U.S. Govern-ment disaster assistance has been expended in the1ast 5 years, and since 1957 the public sector shareof U.S. disaster assistance has expanded from 15percent to more than 80 percents

A review of the structure of the U.S. disaster as-sistance program must consider three items: theorganization of OFDA and its capabilities, the“triggering” mechanism by which assistance is ini-tiated, and OFDA’S coordination with both inter-national organizations and private voluntaryorganizations.

Organization of the Office of ForeignDisaster Assistance

The first major effort to coordinate the U.S.Government’s response to international disasters

bA~~lU~ Re@rt, (Washington, D. C.: N’ationd A~a~~rn~’of Sciences, hTational Research Council, 1977), p. 177.

19

was made in 1964. Previously, not only did the dis-aster response capability suffer but no accumula-tion of experience nor continuity of expertise wasmaintained. Following the designation of aForeign Disaster Relief Coordinator in AID in1964, interagency relief coordinators were ap-pointed in the Departments of State; Defense; andHealth, Education, and Welfare, and the initialGovernment-wide response capability was begun.

Several reorganizations of this capability havetaken place, most recently in 1977. Today, two di-visions exist: Operations, which conducts actualrelief efforts, monitors all potential disasters, andevaluates and plans disaster relief efforts; and Pre-paredness, which develops early warning systems,strengthens disaster preparedness, and plans inthe long term.

The capabilities and resources of this organiza-tion include:

a staff of about 20 people,a budget that averages about $25 million,stockpiles of emergency supplies in four loca-tions around the world,Mission Disaster Relief Officers in embassies,a discretionary disaster relief authority of$25,000 for each Ambassador,access to Food for Peace (Public Law 480) foodcommodities,an Emergency Operations Center with round-the-clock monitoring and communicationscapabilities,a reserve cadre in AID regional and bureaupersonnel,an information system of historical data, andan integrated evaluation system that permits“lessons learned” in past disaster performanceto be systematically incorporated into futuredecisons.

The Triggering Mechanism

The process by which U.S. assistance is given toa disaster-stricken country begins with the U.S.Ambassador. It is the Ambassador, or Chief of theDiplomatic Mission, who determines if a particu-lar event “is of a magnitude to warrant U.S. helpand whether such aid would be acceptable to thestricken country.’” Upon such determination, twoimmediate resources become available. First, theAmbassador’s discretionary relief authority of

‘Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, op. cit., p. 8,

20

$25,000 can be used as a cash donation to the gov-ernment, to voluntarv agencies, or to make localpurchases of goods, transport, or labor. Second,with the approval of AID, the Ambassador canshift Public Law 480 food commodities that arealready in the country to the emergency opera-tions, usually as a gift.

[f the scope of the disaster exceeds the two im-mediately available resources, the Ambassadorcommunicates the needs to OFDA. Supplies mustbe approved by OFDA, usually only after an on-site assessment of needs and available resources.Coordination of supply, transportation, in-country distribution, and personnel is the respon-sibility of OFDA. When the requirements of thedisaster greatly exceed the capabilities of OFDA,special allocations from Congress are often forth-coming.

Coordination With Other DisasterOrganizations

In recent years, the requirements for effective co-ordination have increased as the volume of inter-national disaster assistance and the number of par-ticipants have greatly expanded. As the Commit-tee on International Disaster Assistance reported:

. . . there has been an increase in the number ofparticipants looking for meaningful roles to play. Itis obvious that disasters create genuine humanneeds. Responses to these needs create furtherdemands for personnel, equipment, transporta-tion, and communications facilities, and fororganizational and coordinative mechanisms tomobilize disaster-relevant resources. What is notobvious is the degree to which present interna-tional disaster assistance programs comprise an ef-fective response to disaster-generated needs.8

Within the United States, OFDA has takensteps to meet the demands for coordinative mecha-nisms. In 1974, a new plan was developed forbringing structure to the massive and sometimesindiscriminate humanitarian response of theAmerican public that often follows extensive newsmedia reporting of serious foreign disasters. Thisnew plan provided a means for coordinating thecollection, screening, and shipment of relief sup-plies from communities throughout the country.State Governors have appointed foreign disasterrelief representatives, and the Defense CivilPreparedness Agency, the Red Cross, and volun-

~Committee on [nternationa] D i s a s t e r ~ssistance, ~p.cit., p. +.

tary agencies have offered the use of their commu-nications systems and disaster-experienced person-nel. This plan was activated during the relief effortfor the Guatemala earthquake in 1976.

Within the U.S. Government as well, OFDAhas coordination responsibilities which have beenexercised for several years. Among the agenciesthat often are involved in relief efforts are:

●

●

●

●

●

✎

Department of Defense (DOD), whichtransports supplies and provides such special-ized services as the construction of bridges,erection of temporary shelter, and the provi-sion of medical care;Department of Health, Education, andWelfare (HEW), through its Center forDisease Control (CDC), which provides as-sessment of the immediate medical needs andoverall health situation;U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS), which pro-vides teams of geologists and volcanologists toassess the extent of earthquake or volcanicdamage and the probability of recurrence;National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-tration (NOAA), which provides early warn-ing of storms and has released personnel todevelop drought projections;Smaller agencies such as the Peace Corps,whose volunteers provide an assessment ofneeds and, in some cases, assistance.

internationally, OFDA supports the relief oper-ations of the United Nations, International Com-mittee of the Red Cross, and the League of RedCross Societies, through cash grants, logisticalbackup, emergency food, relief supplies, equip-ment, and personnel. In particular, the UnitedStates has been a supporter of the U.N. DisasterRelief Organization (UNDRO) since its inceptionin 1972. Funded primarily by voluntary contribu-tions from U.N. members, UNDRO offers the op-portunity to enhance global coordination of disas-ter relief not only in the role of an internationalorganization but also as a functioning, operationalunit. Since late- 1976, a permanent disaster coordi-

nation center in Geneva has served as a central iformation exchange during emergencies.9 TheUnited States, through AID and the State Deparment, has publicly supported the improvementthis capability and provided funds specifically located to improve UNDRO. 10

U.S. DISASTER PROGRAMSIN REVIEW

A review of disaster programs sponsored by theUnited States is largely a review of OFDA. As thechief agent of the Government’s responsedisaster-related needs around the world, OFDAhas sought to coordinate the many governmentand private voluntary resources of the UnitedStates. During its 15 years of existence, OFDA hcoordinated this response to over 500 disasters andhas formalized the response procedures used U.S. missions in foreign countries. OFDA has tablished stockpiles at four locations worldwideand has created procedures to speed the deliverythese and other disaster-related goods and serices. Moreover, OFDA has undertaken effortsapply science and technology to foreign disasterpreparedness and relief and has launched signicant efforts in disaster preparedness planningthrough both direct technical assistance and Int~national Disaster Preparedness seminars. Itthrough the actions of OFDA that the UnitedStates has participated in developing countdisasters, thus offering the potential benefitssuch experience to U.S. domestic disaster prgrams.

gunited Nations Disascer Relief Organization, Uh’DhxletL.s/etter, Number 3 (May 1977), PP. 1-2.

loDepa~menc of State and A g e n c y f o r Internati(llDe\’elopment comments in Reports to the Congress bv tComptroller General of che LI.S., A’eed for an IntematiotDisaster Re/ie/ Agenq (Washington, D. C.: L~.S, Coverment Printing OfT~ce, Mav 1976) and Obsert”acions on :Guatemtdu Earchquuke Relief Effort (Washington, D. C.: L’.Government Princing Office, Augusc 1976).

1

VI. Lessons From Disasters inLess Developed Countries for

U. S. Domestic Disaster Programs

The United States, for more than the past threedecades, has tried to lead the less developed na-tions into modernization. For better or worse, theflow of knowledge, technology, and innovationhas been from America. In the disaster field, expe-rience gained by U.S. participation with the devel-oping countries may present a useful countertrend. In small but significant ways, developingcountry adaptations of informational, organiza-tional, managerial, and educational practicescould benefit U.S. domestic programs.

The first chapters of this report described thecontext of disasters in less developed countries andpointed out that individuals respond similarlyunder the stress of disaster across cultures andplace similar demands on institutions. The key dif-ference between disasters in developing countriesand those in urban and industrialized countrieslies in the internal capability to prepare and re-spond. Thus, institutions are the focus of a searchfor transferable lessons.

The existence of possibly useful lessons need notimply a deficiency in U.S. domestic efforts. In-deed, many of the models for disaster programs inless developed countries were derived from indus-trialized countries. These lessons, however, repre-sent alternative forms of organizational and mana-gerial performance that may be useful in assessingand improving domestic disaster actions.

The most import element in transferring lessonsto domestic programs, a transfer mechanism, ismissing. Neither lessons derived from institutionaladaptations in developing countries nor from theinternational operations of OFDA will be readilyincorporated into domestic programs without anexplicit transfer mechanism. Even the aggregationand evaluation of possible lessons is made difficultby the lack of a systematic overview of all practicesin less developed countries which may be appli-cable to domestic programs.

The first area of possible transferability of les-sons involves dealing with the entire hazard life-cycle. The second area is a cluster of 16 topicsdirected to particular program adaptations and im-provements.

THE HAZARD ANDDISASTER LIFECYCLES

In the United States, a major emphasis over theyears has been response to and recovery from dis-asters. As a result, deficiencies in mitigation, pre-paredness, education, training, and warning were,in many ways, “obscured” by our capacity to re-spond and reconstruct. Poor preparedness was sel-dom an issue because the U.S. infrastructure isvast and recovery capability abundant. In time ofemergency, local capacity is supplemented by thatof the State, which can be supplemented by Fed-eral resources. Thus, a strong political system canguarantee the dispersal of an individual commu-nity’s loss across an entire nation.

Less developed countries often lack both abun-dant resources and a political system that canassure special consideration for every victim. As aresult, less developed countries have turned, inmany cases, to impressive education and trainingin preparedness. The United States is only nowrecognizing that mitigation and preparedness maybe less expensive in the long-run than continuedreliance on recovery. A good base of experience inthis programmatic approach to predisaster activ-ities lies in the Office of Foreign DisasterAssistance (OFDA) which has, for several years,been directed toward the full lifecycle of hazards.

In dealing with disasters and their impact onpopulations and property, emergency response tothe event itself is increasingly seen as insufficientand a misuse of scarce and valuable resources. Tosimply deliver goods to disaster-stricken people

23

fails to recognize that the hazard exists long beforethe disaster strikes and that it will recur unlessthings change. An exclusive focus on the emergen-cy phase ignores contributions that can be madeto the mitigation or avoidance of the hazard.Figure 1 suggests one approach to illustrating theevents in the lifecycle of a hazard. Emergency reliefand short-term recovery are only small, but import-ant, parts of the hazard lifecycle. Recognition ofthe other events in the lifecycle (such as steps 9through 15) can result in positive benefits for pop-ulations living in risk areas. Figure 2 presents theOFDA image of the disaster cycle.

According to a document prepared by OFDA:

From the beginning, responsibilities of the AIDDisaster Relief Coordinator were recognized as be-ing twofold: 1) coordination and direction of theU.S. Government response to foreign disasteremergency requirements; and 2) development, inadvance, of plans and policies for improved pre-paredness for foreign disaster emergencies, both in

Figure l.-Lifecycle of a ● Hazard

1. Man enters area2. Man diecovers or learns about hazard3. Man Ignores, forgets, discounts, or4 . B u i l d i n g t a k e s < —5. Major/minor disaster occcurs

Institutional cycle starts Abandonment rare

9.10.11.12.13.14.15.

PreventionMitigation (control)ProtectionPredictionMonitoringEmergency organizations and planningEmergency organizations exercized(unusual)

16. Disaster occurs

— 17. Damage needs assessment18. Rehabilitation /recovery planning (rare)—

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

24

the United States and in foreign disaster-pronecountries. 1

Even with those original intentions, the earlyemphasis of the Agency for International Develop-ment (AID) /OFDA disaster program was directedtoward emergency response. As the OFDA offi-cials freely admit, in the early years the limitedstaff size and the large number of disasters (averag-ing nearly 50 a year) prevented even a brief look atpreparedness and planning.

The Disaster Office began to train disaster reliefofficials from foreign countries in 1967 when asingle disaster relief official from Jamaica came tothe United States. Six weeks of training withOFDA and the American National Red Cross ledto the development of the first InternationalDisaster Preparedness Seminar for foreign officials.Held every year since 1969, the 6-week seminarshave involved 132 foreign disaster officials from -Hnations. z Beginning in 1979, a series of regionalpreparedness seminars have also been held to bet-

IU.S. Foreign l)isusrer Assistance (Washington, D. C.: ~l.S.Agency for International De\’elopment, Office of ForeignDisaster Assistance, Januarv 1978), p. 6.

%id., p. 14.

Figure 2.-“The Disaster Cycie”

Now

ReconstructionI I

Piannlng andpreparedness ,Z’

//

//// II// Disaster// organization

/’

Disasterill

EmerUency operations

SOURCE: Instruction Guidelines, international Oisaater preparednessSeminar. OFDA Disaster Technical Assistance Branch, Agency for In.temational Development (Washington. D. C., 1977), p, iv.

ter address specific common problems of a smallgroup of neighboring nations. The foci o theseseminars are to encourage countries to p pare,improve, and test national disaster plans; to makehazard and disaster resource analyses; to reatepermanent disaster organizations; to en; na-tional disaster emergency laws; and to mantainsystematic working relationships with Voluntaryagencies.

The Instruction Guidelines for the 1977 explicitly described “The Disaster Cycle”eluding five stages. Beginning with “NOVforeign disaster relief oficials were told thesteps in the cycle precede disaster “PlanniPreparedness” and “Disaster Organizationdisaster impact signals the beginning of s“Eme