Upgrade Burnt Dam SpiUway Structure · The Burnt Spillway is a two gate structure that is required to discharge water in a controlled manner from the Burnt Pond Reservoir in the event

A REPORT TO

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

Electrical

Es

Mechanical

sI0N4

,.. 4Civil

SEYMOUR

ESI G NATURE Protection & Control

...Transmission & Distribution

or

Telecontrol

System Planning

Upgrade Burnt Dam SpiUway Structure

Burnt Dam

April 2012

newfoundland labrador

C) hydroa nalcor energy company

Upgrade Burnt Dam Spillway Structure

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro i

SUMMARY

In 2009 Hydro recognized that many of its hydraulic structures associated with the Bay

d’Espoir hydro generation system were over 40 years of age and had not undergone a

condition assessment or comprehensive upgrade to extend their service lives. Hatch, a

professional engineering consultant, was retained to study structures at five sites; Bay

d’Espoir, Burnt Dam, Victoria, Ebbegunbaeg, and Salmon River. A report was prepared with

recommendations to extend the service life of the structures at each site by 25 years along

with budget cost estimates to implement the recommendations.

This project provides for upgrades in the third year of a four year program to extend the

service life of the Burnt Dam structure. Hydro is proposing this project to ensure high

reliability of operation for the two gates at Burnt Dam Spillway. It will include refurbishment

and upgrading the heating, control, electrical and safety systems.

Also depending on findings from the detailed inspections of the gates scheduled in 2012, a

supplementary application may be submitted to replace and refurbish additional

mechanical components of the gates including the embedded parts, rollers, seals and

surfaces.


Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. i

1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1

2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................................ 4

3 JUSTIFICATION .................................................................................................................... 6

3.1 Existing System .......................................................................................................... 7

3.2 Operating Experience ................................................................................................ 8

3.2.1 Reliability Performance .................................................................................. 9

3.2.1.1 Outage Statistics ......................................................................................... 9

3.2.2 Legislative or Regulatory Requirements ...................................................... 10

3.2.3 Safety Performance ..................................................................................... 10

3.2.4 Environmental Performance ........................................................................ 10

3.2.5 Industry Experience ..................................................................................... 11

3.2.6 Vendor Recommendations .......................................................................... 11

3.2.7 Maintenance or Support Arrangements ...................................................... 11

3.2.8 Maintenance History ................................................................................... 11

3.2.9 Historical Information .................................................................................. 12

3.2.10 Anticipated Useful Life ................................................................................. 12

3.3 Forecast Customer Growth ...................................................................................... 12

3.4 Development of Alternatives ................................................................................... 13

3.5 Evaluation of Alternatives ........................................................................................ 13

3.5.1 Energy Efficiency Benefits ............................................................................ 13

3.5.2 Economic Analysis ........................................................................................ 13

4 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 14

4.1 Budget Estimate ....................................................................................................... 14

4.2 Project Schedule ...................................................................................................... 15

APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................. A1

APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................. B1


Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro 1

1 INTRODUCTION

The Bay d’Espoir Development includes three hydroelectric generating stations, six

reservoirs, and associated dykes, dams, canals and hydraulic structures. The headwaters of

the Bay d’Espoir Development begin at the Victoria Lake reservoir at an approximate

elevation of 320 meters. The water travels through the Granite Canal Hydroelectric

Generating Station (Granite Canal), Upper Salmon Hydroelectric Generating Station (Upper

Salmon) and finally through the Bay d’Espoir Hydroelectric Generating Station (Bay d’Espoir)

where it discharges at sea level. Additional water is collected, stored and diverted from

drainage areas between Victoria Lake and the Long Pond reservoir which is the forebay for

Bay d’Espoir.

The generating stations comprising the Bay d’Espoir Development were built over a number

of years with the Bay d’Espoir station being the oldest dating back to 1967 and Granite

Canal Development being the newest, coming online in 2003. Some of the oldest hydraulic

structures within the Bay d’Espoir Development were constructed in 1967. There are four

remote hydraulic structures associated with Bay d’Espoir. They are Ebbegunbaeg Control

Structure, Salmon River Spillway Structure, Victoria Control Structure and Burnt Dam

Spillway.

Burnt Dam Spillway, shown in Figure 1 and on the map in Figure 2, is a critical hydraulic

structure in the Bay d’Espoir Development. It allows water from the Burnt Pond Reservoir,

a small uncontrolled reservoir south of the Victoria Lake Reservoir, to be released in a

controlled, non-destructive manner when needed for flood control. Water discharged from

Burnt Dam Spillway is lost from the Bay d’Espoir Reservoir System, and not available for

production of electrical energy at Granite Canal, Upper Salmon and Bay d’Espoir generating

stations. The spillway consists of two seven-meter wide steel gates which can release a

combined 1,144 cubic meters per second of water at the maximum flood level. During the

44 year period up to 2011, one or both gates have been opened and then closed for flood

control 33 times.



Figure 1 - Burnt Dam Spillway Structure

Figure 2 - Victoria Lake and Burnt Pond Reservoirs



To provide further spilling in extreme floods (a 1 in 10,000 years occurrence), a fuse plug

has been constructed in the north end of the Burnt Canal. In the event that the Burnt Dam

Spillway is unable to handle flood flows, a fuse plug, which acts like a pressure relief valve,

will rupture and allow further flood waters to discharge from the reservoir. The fuse plug is

a section of the dam that is designed to fail once the water reaches a critical elevation. This

allows water to spill in a more controlled manner than what would occur if the dam

breached. The fuse plug is designed to fail at a water elevation of 315.2 meters, whereas

spilling at the Burnt Dam Spillway normally commences at 313.9 meters. The water level in

the Burnt Pond Reservoir can rise quickly in a flood situation. A delay in gate opening of 24

hours during a high run-off period could result in fuse plug failure.



2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

This project is the third year of a four-year program to upgrade the Burnt Dam Spillway

Structure (Burnt Spillway). Equipment at the spillway is at or near the end of its useful life

and/or is in a deteriorated condition. After this upgrade is completed, the Burnt Dam

Spillway will be in a condition to operate safely and reliably for another 25 years.

This project involves replacement, refurbishment and upgrade of various components at

the Burnt Spillway. The scope of work for the project includes the following:

• Replacing the upper and lower cut-out limit switches and overload switches and

controls on both gates;

• Replacing the gate positioning and measurement system on both gates;

• Replacing the electrical disconnect and starter on both gates;

• Installing stepped thermostatic control and monitoring on the gate, gain, and sill

heaters on gate 1;

• Modifying the sill heater for easier replacement on gate 1;

• Replacing the 120/240V distribution panel; and

• Replacing the 600V to 120/240V transformer.

• Improving the drainage around the diesel building to address flooding problems;

Also, depending on the findings from a detailed inspection of the gates scheduled in 2012 a

supplementary application may be submitted to complete the following:

• Refurbishing concrete and embedded parts (gate roller tracks and seal plates) on

both gates;

• Replacing gate seals, rollers, pins and bushings on both gates; and



• Refurbishing and recoating the metal surfaces of both gate.

The budget estimate for year three of this project is presently $885,800. Engineering is

scheduled to start in January, 2013 with construction being undertaken from July to October

2013.



3 JUSTIFICATION

This project is justified on the requirement to replace failing or deteriorated infrastructure

in order for Hydro to provide safe, reliable flood management for the Victoria Lake and

Burnt Pond Reservoirs as well as fisheries compensation flow into the White Bear River. A

condition assessment study performed by a professional engineering firm, HATCH, in 2008

(see Appendix A) identified Burnt Spillway as having the lowest overall Health Index when

compared to four other hydraulic structures of similar vintage within the Bay d’Espoir

Development. Hydro’s ability to continue to manage flood waters and meet its fisheries

compensation commitments is contingent upon the successful upgrade of Burnt Spillway.

When the four-year upgrade program for Burnt Spillway is complete, this hydraulic

structure will be in a condition to operate safely and reliably for at least another 25 years.

As discussed earlier there is a fuse plug installed in the north end of Burnt Canal as an

emergency relief to control extreme flooding. If the fuse plug ruptured Burnt Pond

Reservoir would drain down to the bottom elevation of the fuse plug resulting in loss of

storage from the Burnt Pond Reservoir. While awaiting fuse plug reconstruction, there

would be loss of the full potential use of the Victoria Lake Reservoir, which could be up to

550 Gigawatt-hours of stored energy. It is estimated that to replace that amount of energy

with thermal generation from Holyrood would be $105.2 million based on oil prices of

$114.5 per barrel. Water that would normally be released from the Victoria Lake Reservoir

into the Burnt Pond Reservoir, and which would subsequently flow through the Burnt Canal

to the remainder of the Bay d’Espoir Reservoir System, would instead be spilled through the

Burnt Spillway, and/or the failed fuse plug, and lost for hydro generation.

Critical component failure in a major piece of drive equipment would result in the inability

to open or close a gate. If the reservoir water elevations are rising and a gate is unable to be

opened it will diminished spill capacity and increase the potential of a fuse plug failure.

However if reservoir elevations are decreasing and a spillway gate is stuck in the open

position it results in a potential spill of up to 575 cubic meters of water per second. Spilled

water is lost and cannot be used for power generation anywhere on the system.



Operation of the fuse plug would have significant consequences including lost reservoir

water, fuse plug reconstruction cost, and disruption of effective water management for the

Bay d’Espoir Reservoir System while the fuse plug was being reconstructed. Reconstruction

of the fuse plug is estimated to cost $1,000,000 and would take between six and ten

months to complete, depending upon the time of year of the failure.

Heating of the gates and gains during winter operation is critical and if not available when

required could prevent the gates from opening due to ice accumulation in the gains and on

the gates. Seized gate rollers can overload the gate hoists resulting in damage to hoist

equipment or tripping of the gate overloads. Worn embedded parts and gate seals can

cause leakage, unnecessary spillage, and excessive icing of the gates and gains. Failure of

limit and load safety devices can result in major equipment damages as well as unsafe

working conditions. To ensure reliable operation of the gates at all times all electrical and

mechanical components and systems must be reliable and in good condition.

3.1 Existing System

The Burnt Spillway is a two gate structure that is required to discharge water in a controlled

manner from the Burnt Pond Reservoir in the event of flood conditions. It is also used in the

summer time to discharge water for fishery compensation. Each gate is raised and lowered

via a screw and drive nut system that makes use of a primary gearbox and two gear driven

hoists to transform the rotational motion of the main gearbox drive motor into vertical

motion for repositioning the gates. Other than a small building housing some of the

electrical panels the remainder of the structure is open to the elements.

The spillway structure was placed in service in 1967, is now approximately 45 years old, and

has never undergone a major overhaul. It is a manned remote diesel powered site that can

be accessed by truck over a dirt road for six to seven months of the year and by helicopter

other times of the year when the road is not kept open. However due to remoteness and

poor road conditions crew changes are normally done by a helicopter on a year round basis.



In year one (2011) of this upgrade program the plan was to replace the stop log hoist and its

storage enclosure but due to the late delivery of the hoist that work was not completed and

is now scheduled for 2012. Additional work approved in Board Order P.U. 2 (2012) as part of

the 2012 capital budget includes fabrication of a new stop log storage system, inspection,

and condition assessment of gate mechanical components. Planned major work for Burnt

Dam is shown in Table 1:

Table 1: Planned Major Work and/or Upgrades

Year Major Work and/or Upgrade Comments

2012 Replacement of stop log hoist, enclosure

and electrical equipment

Previously scheduled for 2011 but not

completed due to late delivery of hoist

2012 Refurbishment of gate hoists drives and

screws and refurbishment of stop logs

2012 Fabrication and installation of a stop log

storage system

Stop log storage system with a similar design

to the one a Salmon River spillway

2012

Detailed inspection of embedded parts

and mechanical and electrical components

of each gate

3.2 Operating Experience

In 2006 there was an incident whereby the gates at Burnt Spillway failed to operate when

required. A crew was dispatched from Bay d’Espoir to perform emergency work on both

gates but could not get either of the gates open to the position required in order to lower

the reservoir water level. This is a serious situation during times of high reservoir levels as

there is a potential to cause a fuse plug failure. The incident in 2006 did not cause a fuse

plug failure however it did cause the loss of a significant amount of reservoir water when

both gates for a period of time could not be closed when required. It was estimated at that

time that the cost to replace the value of the lost hydro generation with thermal generation

from the Holyrood station was $2.6 million (based on $50 per barrel).

During the incident, when neither gate would rise to the required open position, the

dispatched crew was successful in raising the gates sufficiently enough to prevent failure of



the fuse plug. However once the reservoir levels where reduced to an acceptable level the

crew had difficulty closing the gates. This resulted in three days of additional work but more

importantly the loss of a significant amount of stored energy in the form of lost water

through the spillway.

3.2.1 Reliability Performance

Due to the high potential for flash flooding of Burnt Pond the reliability of the Burnt Dam

Spillway must be kept extremely high. When it was first commissioned in the 1960s it was

an unmanned remotely controlled structure but due to problems being experienced, and

the need to guarantee operational reliability, it was converted to a manual operation. There

now is concern for the reliability of the gate operations due to hardware deterioration

which could cause a similar incident as happened in 2006. In addition there have been a

number of problems related to reliability of the diesel generators that supply power to the

hydraulic structure. Upgrades to the diesel generation system are planned in year four of

this upgrade program.

3.2.1.1 Outage Statistics

Outage statistics for the Burnt Spillway are not formally recorded. A review of work order

history indicates that there have been at least four occasions when a gate could not be

opened or closed due to cold temperatures, ice accumulation, or hardening of the grease for

the gate hoist screw stems. A malfunction of a gate at Burnt Spillway does not directly impact

production at any of the three downstream generating stations. Outages on Burnt Spillway

are normally planned and only taken for maintenance purposes, usually on an annual basis

during a time when the threat of spilling is very low. Only one gate is taken out of service at

any one time leaving the other gate available for spilling or fisheries compensation.



3.2.2 Legislative or Regulatory Requirements

In 1966, an agreement was made between the Newfoundland and Labrador Power

Commission (now Hydro) and the Department of Fisheries of Canada (now Fisheries and

Oceans Canada) titled Release of Water to Protect Fish Populations in Grey River and White

Bear River. The agreement took effect February 1966 and was varied by letters dated

September 8, 1977 and July 11, 1996 (see Appendix B). The agreement established

measures to be taken by the Power Commission for the conservation of stocks of

anadromous fishes to be affected by the Bay d’Espoir Development, under the provisions of

the Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1952, c.119; as amended by 1960-61, c.23. Hydro’s ability to meet

its fisheries compensation commitment is contingent upon the successful upgrade of the

Burnt Spillway to ensure reliable gate operation.

3.2.3 Safety Performance

Improper operation of limit and load switches on the gate hoists have the potential of

causing major damage to equipment and hazards to any employees working or operating in

the general area.

3.2.4 Environmental Performance

The gates at Burnt Spillway are required to provide fisheries compensation flow into the

White Bear River to protect fish populations. In accordance with an agreement between

Hydro and the Federal Department of Fisheries (see Appendix B), a flow of 7.08 cubic

meters per second must be maintained at the mouth of the White Bear River from June 1 to

September 30 each year. This is achieved by releasing up to 4.25 cubic meters per second,

through a gate opening of 8.5 cm in the Burnt Spillway during this period. Hydro relies on

Environment Canada flow data for White Bear River to schedule compensation flows

through Burnt Spillway. During the 44 year period up to 2011, the gates were operated for



fisheries compensation flow every year except for one. Also, if the gates were unable to

open during flood conditions breeching of the fuse plug and dam would potentially cause

environmental damage down steam of the structures.

3.2.5 Industry Experience

Churchill Falls Labrador Corporation is involved in a rehabilitation program on the control

and spillway structures in their system. These structures are approximately 40 years old.

Menihek Generating Station in Labrador was commissioned in 1954 and has gates similar to

the ones used at Burnt Dam. Menihek is also presently looking at a rehabilitation program

for their spillway structure.

3.2.6 Vendor Recommendations

There are no vendor recommendations pertaining to this particular type of work.

3.2.7 Maintenance or Support Arrangements

Routine preventive and corrective maintenance is performed by Hydro personnel. Repairs

to the embedded parts will be contracted out. Depending on the availability of internal

labor the remainder of the work planned for this project for 2013 will be completed by

internal labor or contracted out.

3.2.8 Maintenance History

The five-year maintenance history for the Burnt Dam Spillway is provided in Table 2. No

major maintenance activity was undertaken prior to 2007.



Table 2: Five-Year Maintenance History

Year

Preventive

Maintenance

($000)

Corrective

Maintenance

($000)

Total

Maintenance

($000)

2011 7.6 1.2 8.8

2010 2.0 0.2 2.2

2009 8.1 6.4 14.5

2008 4.1 11.1 15.2

2007 3.6 1.2 4.8

3.2.9 Historical Information

None of Hydro’s spillway structures have ever been overhauled. However due to improper

load design of the drives for the gate screws at Hind’s Lake Spillway Structure the drive

gears were upgraded and replaced on both gates. In addition one of the three gate screw

hoists (gate 2) at Ebbegunbaeg was replaced with a cable hoist due to concerns with the

availability of spare parts and frequent failures of the screws.

Upgrades to the Burnt Dam Spillway structure were approved in Board Order P. U. 2 (2012)

for $523,800 as part of the 2012 capital budget.

3.2.10 Anticipated Useful Life

It is anticipated that the service life of Burnt Spillway will be extended by at least 25 years

when the refurbishment program is complete.

3.3 Forecast Customer Growth

Forecast customer growth does not impact this project.



3.4 Development of Alternatives

There are no viable alternatives to upgrading the Burnt Spillway.

3.5 Evaluation of Alternatives

Where there are no alternatives, thus an evaluation is not required.

3.5.1 Energy Efficiency Benefits

There are no energy efficiency benefits that can be attributed to this project.

3.5.2 Economic Analysis

Where there were no alternatives an economic analysis is not applicable.



4 CONCLUSION

Burnt Dam Spillway is critical to Hydro’s Bay d’Espoir reservoir system for flood control and

fisheries compensation and must be maintained at an extremely high level of reliability. This

project provides for work to be completed in year three of a four year program that involves

upgrading of gate electrical systems and controls to help ensure a high degree of

operational reliability. Also depending on the findings from the detailed inspection in 2012

it possibly may include the refurbishment of the gates’ mechanical components.

4.1 Budget Estimate

A budget estimate for this project is provided in Table 3:

Table 3: Project Budget Estimate Project Cost:($ x1,000) 2013 2014 Beyond Total

Material Supply 160.0 0.0 0.0 160.0

Labour 411.3 0.0 0.0 411.3

Consultant 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Contract Work 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Other Direct Costs 122.0 0.0 0.0 122.0

Interest and Escalation 53.8 0.0 0.0 53.8

Contingency 138.7 0.0 0.0 138.7

TOTAL 885.8 0.0 0.0 885.8



4.2 Project Schedule

A milestone schedule for this project is provided in Table 4:

Table 4: Project Schedule

Activity Start Date End Date

Planning Open project. Develop detailed

schedule

January 2013 March 2013

Design Control systems , PLC Programming ,

Drawings

February 2013 June 2013

Procurement Procurement of materials March 2013 June 2013

Construction Upgrading of both gates July 2013 September 2013

Commissioning Commissioning of both gates and

control systems

August 2013 September 2013

Closeout Closeout, Lessons Learned and

documentation

October 2013 November 2013


Appendix A

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro A1

APPENDIX A

Hydraulic Structure Life Expectancy Study – Final Report (Hatch)

(excerpts applicable to the Burnt Dam Spillway Structure)


Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix A



Appendix B

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro B1

APPENDIX B

Release of Water to Protect Fish Populations

in Grey River and White Bear River


Appendix B


Category: Environmental Agreements with Government Agencies Agreement for Release of Water to Protect Fish Populations in Grey River and White

Bear River, 1996

TITLE: Agreement between Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Regarding Release of Water to Protect Fish Populations in Grey River and White Bear River dated February 1966, and Varied by Letter from Mr. R. J. Wiseman, Section Head, Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Mr. Gerald Marks, System Operation Engineer, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro dated September 8, 1977, and Further Varied for White Bear River by Letter from Ms. Michelle Gosse, Habitat Evaluation Engineer, Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Mr. L. LeDrew, Ecologist, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro dated July 11, 1996.

Related Documents:

AGREEMENT TITLE RELEASE OF WATER TO PROTECT FISH POPULATIONS IN GREY

RIVER AND WHITE BEAR RIVER

EFFECTIVE DATE FEBRUARY 1966, VARIED BY LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 8, 1977,

AND FURTHER VARIED FOR WHITE BEAR RIVER BY LETTER DATED

JULY 11, 1996

SIGNATORIES NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR HYDRO

AND

DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS

Schedule

An enumeration of requirements discussed between officials of the Department of Fisheries of

Canada and of the Newfoundland and Labrador Power commission at a meeting held in the

Commission’s offices on 21 January 1966 of measures to be undertaken by the Power

Commission for the conservation of stocks of anadromous fishes to be affected by the Bay

D’Espoir Power Development. These measures are required of the Power commission under

the provisions of the Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1952, c.119; as amended by 1960-61, c.23.

1. Salmon River, East Bay, Fish Populations: Fishways or other fish protective devices o

measures are not required at Power Commission works to be installed on this river (see

Ministerial approval dated August 6, 1965, and correspondence from Department’s Area

Office to Power commission dated August 26, 1965).


Appendix B


2. North West Brook Fish Populations: Fishways or other fish protective devices or measures

are not required to be installed to protect indigenous fish populations of this stream. This

does not preclude requirement for fish protective devices or measures which may arise

after the development has become operative as described in No. 5 below.

3. White Bear River Fish Populations: Fisheries problems that may arise when the watershed

of this river is incorporated into the Bay D’Espoir Power Development are not herein

considered. These will be evaluated separately when and if the decision to proceed with

this stage of the power development has been made.

4. Grey River Fish Populations:

i) The Power Commission will install at Pudop’s Dam, Grey River, a 4 foot, 6 inch

diameter release pipe and facilities adequate to ensure that flow in the lower river,

measured at an agreed gauging station below the confluence of Grey River and

Salmon Brook, does not fall below 600 cfs. Except as noted in 4(vii).

ii) The water release facilities referred to in 4 (I shall be maintained and operated by

the Power Commission.

iii) It is understood that release of water as described in 4 (I will normally be required

only during the period June 1 – October 31 of any year. This, however, does not

preclude requirement for water release if necessary for fish conservation purposes

at other times in any year.

iv) The supply and installation of gauging equipment (of a recording type) required at

the gauging station referred to in 4 (I shall be the responsibility of the Power

Commission. However, because of difficulties that may be encountered by the

Commission in fulfilling this responsibility, the Department will provide such

reasonable assistance in this regard as may be requested of it by the Power

Commission.

v) An officer of the Department shall be responsible for “reading” the aforementioned

gauge and shall, when flow falls to the 600 cfs. Level or below, immediately advise

the designated officer of the Power Commission. Upon receipt of such notice, the

Power Commission shall initiate measures to release amounts of water required to

maintain flow at, or bring it up to the 600 cfs. Level, and shall continue to release

such amounts as will maintain flow at or above such level until natural runoff

conditions below the dam are adequate to maintain flow at 600 cfs.

vi) On receipt of notice from the designated officer of the Department that water

release is required, the Power Commission shall take all necessary steps to initiate

same at the earliest moment; it being understood that, excepting conditions beyond

the control of the Power Commission, water release will be initiated within 24 hours

after receipt of notice from the Department officer>

vii) It is understood that flow as described in 4(v) will be provided except that when the

water level of Pudop’s reservoir is below that required to provide necessary volume

of flow through the release facilities, the Power Commission shall not be liable to

release water in excess of that which reservoir level will enable release facilities to

deliver below Pudop’s Dam.


Appendix B


viii) Until such time as more efficient means of communication may become utilizable,

notice of required water release to the Power Commission shall be by radio-

telephone. To this end, the Power Commission will supply adequate R/T sets at Grey

River and at Bay D’Espoir Control Room.

5. Conne River Fish Populations: Because it is impossible to predict the effect of the Bay

D’Espoir Power Development on anadromous fish runs to Conne River in advance of the

power development becoming operative and, particularly, since these runs may be

affected by greatly increased flow from the powerhouse at North West Brook, this

problem, if it arises, shall be the subject of separate discussion, the solution to which is in

no way prejudiced by the foregoing.

6. Other matters affecting the fishery interest that may arise, and which cannot reasonably

be foreseen at this time, shall be the subject of separate discussion when and if these

arise.

7. Meeting with Nfld. & Labrador Hydro on White Bear and Grey River Agreement: On

Friday, June 25, 1976, at 1000 hours, a meeting was held in B.R. Bauld’s office with two

officials of N&LH (G. Marks and J. Long). Also attending, addition to the undersigned, was

L.W. Rowe of C&P District Office, Grand Falls. Generally speaking, the following water

release agreements were arranged in principle.

White Bear River: As in the 1971 agreement, N&LH agreed to release 150 cfs from their

Great Burnt Dam during the months June, July, August and September in order to make

up the required 250 cfs at the mouth. In addition, it was agreed that a radio should be set

up at the guardian’s cable on White Bear so that he could water the flow and request

additional release if needed. Ultimately, the Corporation would like to get into a situation

whereby they would only release at Great Burnt during June-September when the flow at

the mouth fell below 250 cfs. Specifically, they do not want to release 150 cfs continually

unless it is needed.

Grey River: After several years of our review of flows and flow requirements on Grey

River, the Service indicated it would be satisfied with a guaranteed 400 cfs.

This Agreement has been varied by two letters attached:

1. Letter from R. J. Wiseman, Section Head, Department of Fisheries and Oceans to Mr. Gerald

Marks, System Operations Engineer, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro dated September

8, 1977 (see letter below) and,


Appendix B


2. Letter from Michelle Gosse, Habitat Evaluation Engineer, Department of Fisheries and

Oceans and Mr. L. LeDrew, Ecologist, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro dated July 11,

1996 (see letter below).


Appendix B



Appendix B



Appendix B
