&^$#Unproblematic Multiculturalism

8/6/2019 &^$#Unproblematic Multiculturalism

1/22

(UN)PROBLEMATICMULTICULTURALISM AND

SOCIAL RESILIENCE

21 February 2008SINGAPORE


2/22

(UN)PROBLEMATICMULTICULTURALISM ANDSOCIAL RESILIENCE

REPORT OF A CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BYTHE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (CENS)AT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS)

21 February 2008SINGAPORE


3/22

In his opening remarks, Kumar Ramakrishna , Head,Centre of Excellence for National Security, S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, noted thatin recent times, fears of social fragmentation alongethno-religious lines have compelled governments ofmulticultural societies to devise policies and strategiesto ensure their nations ability to cope with attacks ontheir social fabric. Drawing from the examples ofSingapore, Australia and the U.K., as well as the worksof scholars alike, social resilience has been touted

as the key to keep these societies together in timesof stress. Hence, the aim of the workshop is to generatediscussions to operationalize the concept of socialresilience in such multicultural societies.

To this end, Ramakrishna identified the following keyquestions that the workshop sought to address:

(i) To what extent is cultural diversity a source ofdivision in society and are ethno-religiousdifferences necessarily the most divisive?

(ii) What are other challenges to social cohesion thatsocieties face?

(iii) All things considered, what makes for a sociallyresilient nation?

(iv) What aspects of the social fabric in particular needstrengthening in societies today?

(v) What level of integration should societies be willing

to live with and what best practices exist to helpattain this?

(vi) What are the indicators that the Holy Grail ofsocial resilience has been achieved?

Ramakrishna concluded that while it is unlikely thatall the answers to these important questions could begenerated, he hoped that the presentations and thediscussions would throw up enough ideas to assist

governments and communitiesespecially those inmulticultural nationsin crafting effective andmeaningful policy roadmaps towards greater levels ofsocial resilience.


4/22

I. The Challenge to the ModernJapanese State

Haruko Satoh presented on the Japanese case study.She argued that although Japan is often cited as anexample of a modern monocultural state shielded fromethno-religious upheavals, it does not necessarily meanthat Japanese society does not face any challengesto social cohesion. Instead, she contended that thereis a need to critically assess the current efforts atperfecting the idea of a Japanese nationhoodcharacterized by the compulsion to centralize controland treat Japanese society as homogenous, asperceived social stability based on sameness andequality has been found to be increasinglyunsustainable. She noted that the Japanese arebeginning to recognize the diversity within theirsocietygeographically, historically, culturally and, insome sense, religiouslyin a globalizing environment.This has influenced the relationship between state andsociety as the idea of the state and nationhood is beingreconceived in the public mind.

Satoh traced the roots of the myth of a centralizedhomogenous Japanese society to the Meiji era wherethe leaders sought to create a modern state out of afeudal system. She argued that while modern Japanhas soughtand achievedsuccess as a highly

centralized state, this very same acquired habit tocentralize is now turning out to be the bane of Japansroute to economic recovery and social and political

revitalization, which requires a federal structure ofgovernance. The fragile notion of a unified Japanesenation was attributed to an uneven nationalconsciousness of the Meiji state that had no socialunderpinning based on history. Nonetheless, effortsby the Meiji leaders to forge the myth of a unifiedJapanese national identity around the family-state withthe emperor as the divine father figure of the Yamato minzoku (Yamato ethnic tribe) did imbue in the nationalpsyche patriotism, community and belonging. However,this state-sanctioned national image was abused bymilitary leaders to steer the nation towards a war thatled to total defeat, undermining its legitimating poweras a consequence.

Satoh also noted that the myth of cultural homogeneitycould not replace economic stability in preventingsocietal breakdown. Moreover, state-society relationsare further complicated by the states adherence tothe conservative notion of a culturally homogenousJapanese society, resulting in its failure to recognizethe diversity of cultures embraced by the populacewith globalization. She also pointed out that there isa trend towards a revival of local cultural identities andtraditions that pre-date the Meiji era. For instance,various regions are increasingly taking pride indistinguishing themselves vis--vis their uniqueculinary traditions.

Satoh concluded that while the notion of a unified

Japanese identity has been somewhat undermined inrecent times, it has also allowed the Japanese torediscover and appreciate the diversity of their culturalheritage as strength in a globalizing world. Post-ColdWar Japan has realized that it is not immune to globalaffairs and there is increasing pressure to decentralizethe federal system. As the re-created social structuralis beginning to collapse, it is about time to reconstructthe community. Its increasingly affluent society hascreated a differentiated social community and the key

is to seek for a way to coexist, rather than harping onthe need for an overarching national identity that mayessentially be superficial.


5/22

II. Colonialism, Sinicization andEthnic Minorities in Hong Kong

Lee Kim-ming and Law Kam-yee examined the

impact of colonialism, nationalism and neo-colonialismon the ethnic minorities in Hong Kong. The ethnicminorities refer to new immigrants from Mainland Chinaand other non-Chinese inhabitants and immigrants.They argued that, contrary to the governments claimthat Hong Kong is a multicultural society, variousindicators seem to prove otherwise. State governanceis not sensitive to the needs of the minorities, whoseoptions are limited to assimilation or marginalization,exacerbated by the general indifference of the public

who perceive this as a problem exclusive to ethnicminorities. In this sense, the notion of multiculturalismin Hong Kong is limited as a descriptive term alludingto the mere existence of diverse ethnic groups,rather than the practice of tolerance and respectfor cultural diversity.

Lee and Law noted that Hong Kongs ethnic minoritypopulation is bifurcated along socio-economic status,with a small proportion from developed countries like

the U.S. and Japan who command high salaries, andthe majority who constitute lowly paid laborers fromdeveloping countries such as Mainland China, thePhilippines and Thailand. The income disparity alongethnic lines is clear as the median income of Asiansfrom developing countries is below the national averagewhile that of ethnic groups from developed countriesis significantly above it. The economic opportunitiesof non-white minorities are attributed to factors suchas the language barrier and discrimination against their

educational qualifications and pre-migration work

experience. Moreover, except for the domestichelp, they are spatially segregated in the mostimpoverished neighbourhoods.

Non-white minorities are also subject to culturalassimilation because of the lack of understanding

among the majority population of minority culture andsensitivities. For instance, Pakistani women encountergreat pressure to conform to the dressing norms ofthe majority, who perceive their traditional clothing asbackward and uncivilized. Those who are unableto converse in either Cantonese or English are alsodenied basic public services. The language barrieralso deprives most of these minorities fromgovernment-funded education, perpetuating their bleaklife chances in the job market in future. Despite being

ethnically Chinese, Mainland Chinese migrants are notaccepted by the Hong Kong Chinese. They areperceived by the Hong Kong people as ignorant, rude,dirty and greedy, and deserving of the hardship theyexperience. Such resentment is more pronounced intimes of economic downturns like recessions. As such,they are generally subjected to the same treatment asthe non-white population.

Lee and Law explained that the racial hierarchy reflected

in the psyche of the Hong Kong Chinese is a result ofcolonialism and Chinese neo-nationalism. As a formerBritish colony, the colonial mindset of white supremacystill persists, resulting in the regard of the Whites asthe superior race, even above that of the Hong KongChinese people. Despite contributing to the economicsuccess of Hong Kong, the non-white minorities aremarginalized as their contributions are notacknowledged in the national narrative that saw theHong Kong Chinese continuing the legacy of prosperity

left behind by the British. This has been worsened withthe policy of Sinicization after the handover wherebyHong Kong is subject to Chinese national laws thatdo not recognize ethnic minorities as nationals,depriving them of their rights.

Lee and Law concluded that with racial discriminationso entrenched in Hong Kong society, coupled with theweak bargaining power of the ethnic minorities, it isunlikely that a truly multicultural society based on

respect and understanding of cultural diversity can be


6/22

Discussion

Eugene Tan observed that it is obvious that bothJapan and Hong Kong tend to view themselves as

essentially monocultural societies and social resilienceis not on both governments agenda. In the case ofJapan, the government and society are moving alongdifferent paths in their search for an ideal identity. Heargued that the contested notions of the Japaneseidentity could be interpreted either as a manifestationof diversity or a reflection of division. He also highlighteda salient theme in the Japanese case study suggestingthat states tend to build resilience by imposing adominant homogenous identity that could ultimately

undermine the social fabric.

The concept of multiculturalism is practically descriptivein Hong Kong, where minorities are still constantlybeing discriminated against and marginalized. Perhapsthe best option ahead for Hong Kong is to startpractising policies of inclusion. One might even considermobilizing the bicultural elites to initiate change. Heconcluded with the observation that a strong nationalidentity is needed in order for multiculturalism to be forged.

During the question-and-answer session, the followingsalient points were raised. First, it was observed thatunfortunately in Hong Kong, resilience is defined in

terms of economic growth and not in terms of socialdynamics. Arguably, integration and assimilation willonly generate counter-productive effects within thesociety. Hong Kong is no doubt a transit platform forthe movement of global capitalism. However, mobilityis a class factor and, in this case, the majority ofthe Hong Kong people and most of its minority arenot mobile.

Second, considering the fact that economic growth isof such importance in Hong Kong, it was suggestedthat perhaps the relationship they are experiencingwith Mainland China is one of resentment with therecent Chinese economic success rather than merediscrimination based on ethnicity. However it is difficultto reconcile this argument with the fact that the wealth

of the Mainland Chinese is often owned by invisibleindividuals, yet those that are being discriminatedagainst and socially excluded are the lower-classmigrants. Essentially, the counter argument highlightsthe fact that the ethnic minority in Hong Kong is nothomogeneous. It is important to be able to identifyrace, ethnicity and, most importantly, class to teaseout the problem of social exclusion. Unfortunately,such identities are often being used instrumentally.

The third point pertains to the Japanese case study. As nationalism is a hugely contested idea, one is lessoptimistic that nationalismor national identity, forthat matterwould help Japan cope with the possiblebreakdown of its social structure. As its social fabricbegins to unravel, Japan is stuck with a system theycreated that see Western ideas being pitted againsttraditional heritage. As an affluent society breeds aliberal economy, it also cultivates a sense ofindividualism. Unfortunately, it often takes a crisis to

band a society together.


7/22

I. Multiculturalism in Malaysia:The Need for Local Knowledge toGrapple with Identity and Ethnicity

Shamsul A.B. presented his joint analysis with MansorMohd Noor of the Malaysian case study. Shamsulstarted with the observation that multi-ethnicity, ratherthan multiculturalism, is a more apt term to describeMalaysias condition. This is because multiculturalismconnotates a clear majority-minority situation whilemulti-ethnicity refers to competing small majorities,namely, the bumiputera (indigenous Malay population)versus the non- bumiputera , as is the case withMalaysia, which does not have a clear-cut numericalmajority. He then contended that most academicstudies and government policies on ethnic relationsin Malaysia uncritically accept the ethnic divide as realwithout consideration of the variable reaction of itspeople based on rational choice. Hence the paperseeks to reconcile the extent to which the dominantnotion of multiculturalism in Malaysia in both academiaand government discourses gels with those perceivedby the people.

Shamsul examined the nature of state-ascribed andself-ascribed notions of identity among Malaysians.

Based on their field study conducted within Malaysia,the cultural divide is real in that Malaysians do identifythemselves along ethnic, religious and language lines.Non-negotiable identity markers vary across ethnicgroups. For example, the Malays are open to negotiatingmost ethnic parameters except Islam but to theChinese, the Mandarin language is a more importantidentity marker than religion. However, contrary tostate assumptions, this is not necessarily problematicas it is comforting to know that the younger generationin particular do recognize the diversity within the nationand are aware of the sensitivity involved in their dailyinteraction with one another for the sake of socialcohesion. Moreover, all racial groups generally regardpolitical stability and bread-and-butter issues as moreimportant than racial issues. Hence, in reality, peopleare often capable of rationally identifying ones identityand defining otherness in their own ways best suitedfor their way of life.

Shamsul pointed out that it might be necessary for thegovernment to reassess the assumption that Malaysiansare divided along racial lines which underpins statepolicies. Instead of harping on the differences, it maybe useful to allow people to reach for an equilibriumat their own pace, and develop the common concernsand aspirations they currently share as Malaysians.This would require that the state stop actively promotingracial polarization and start letting the people thinkand choose for themselves, and to see diversity as an

asset, not a divisive force. It is time to move away fromthe flawed concept of multiculturalism and start lookinginto the study of multi-ethnicity based on the realityof ground sentiments.


8/22

II. (Un)Problematic Multiculturalism:Challenges and Opportunities forSocial Cohesion in New Zealand

Allen Bartley spoke on the challenges and

opportunities presented by the changes to NewZealands demographic composition. His analysisfocused on the social policies pertaining to two groupsof minoritiesthe i ndigenous Maori and non-white immigrants.

Contrary to sensational coverage in the media, Bartleycontends that Maori political separatism is not asignificant threat to social cohesion in New Zealand.Rather, the indigenous populations are well integrated

into the political and social policy frameworks acrossall levels of government. For instance, the political andconstitutional positions of Maori are protected by arange of state initiatives, including those concerninghealth, education, justice and the provision of socialservices. The Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs providespolicy advice regarding and representing the interestsof Pasifika communities in New Zealand to ministers,government officials and Pacific communities, and tomonitor social policy outcomes for Pacific peoples.

Nevertheless, despite such high-level corporatistengagement with the state, many Maori and PacificIslanders continue to be at the economic margins ofNew Zealand society, and feature prominently in aconstellation of social problems. As recipients of highlevels of social assistance, they were disproportionatelyaffected by cuts to social welfare spending as a resultof economic structural adjustments in the 1980s and1990s, accentuating the relative income disparitybetween the Maori and Pacific peoples on the one

hand and New Zealanders of European descent onthe other. The relative high rates of Maori and Pasifikayouths with low educational qualifications predisposethem to social exclusion as the potential for them togain access to the knowledge economy critical foreconomic mobility is limited. A serious consequence

of this social exclusion is a disproportionate numberof Maori represented in New Zealands crime andimprisonment statistics.

Bartley went on to examine the integration of anincreasing number of new immigrants of Asian descent.Historically, little attention was paid to this group ofmigrants mainly because New Zealands immigrationpolicies favoured migrants of European stock. Althoughthe policy towards Chinese immigrants was eased

somewhat after the Second World War, it was stilllimited to those who already had family in New Zealand.It was only in the 1970s, with emergent markets in

Asia, which prompted New Zealand to restructure itsimmigration policies. The end of the discriminatoryimmigration policy saw an immediate jump in NewZealands Asian population. However, this was metwith some resistance from some who saw them bothas an economic and cultural threat to New Zealand.Following this, many of these immigrants faced

institutional and attitudinal barriers to gainingemployment that commensurate with their educationalqualification, leading to the younger generation lookingto other countries for greener pastures. This in turnundermines the central imperative of the migrationpolicy, which seeks to attract committed andeconomically active citizens.

Bartley concluded by suggesting indicators forassessing the behaviours and social and institutional

conditions to secure greater cohesion across NewZealands diverse communities. These include structuraland institutional conditions and processes to enhanceeconomic and social inclusion (e.g. those pertainingto employment opportunities, quality of housing, accessto social assistance, experiences of racism anddiscrimination and political representation), andenhancing social capital at the community and individuallevels (e.g. participation in civic institutions, satisfactionwith educational opportunities, and participation in

social networks and cultural and leisure activities).


9/22

III. Negotiating Bangsa and Nasion :The Dilemma of Multiculturalismin Indonesia

Hikmat Budiman examined the social conflicts arisingfrom ethnic and religious difference in Indonesia. Bytracing the development of the states policies in

managing cultural diversity and the pursuit of a unifiedIndonesian identity from the New Order to the post- reformasi era, he assessed the consequences on theethnic minority communities.

First, Budiman examined the shift in the post-NewOrder era from a unified Indonesian identity towardsa myriad of local identities. He provided a historicaloverview of Indonesians nation-building process,beginning with Sukarnos vision of a unified Indonesia

akin to the legacy of the Sriwijaya and Majapahitempires of the pastfor the people to rally againstcolonial rule. In this way, the cultural diversity of thearchipelago was obscured and denied in order to attaina utopian future. Although Suhartos concept ofPancasila democracy formally acknowledged culturaldiversity as a national asset, in practice, only state-sanctioned forms of ethnic and religious diversity aretolerated. Suhartos policy of SARA (Ethnicity, Religion,Race and Inter-group relations), which identified theseissues as social taboos that should not be discussedin the name of maintaining national stability and unity,was a thinly veiled attempt at assimilation as it preventeddiscriminated groups, such as the Chinese, fromresisting moves to undermine the practice ofChinese culture.

However, in the post-Suharto era, with increaseddecentralization of power to local authorities and theend to the SARA policy, there has been a trend towardsthe assertion of regional identity. This has resulted in

complications as certain groups try to assert theircultural identities in the name of self-determination,often at the expense of other ethnic and religiousgroups in the same region. For instance, Acehsattainment of autonomy has been hailed by some asa victory for democracy. However, the imposition of

Islamic shariah has raised concerns over theimplications for relations between Muslim and non-Muslim Acehnese. According to Budiman, this ispartially attributed to the states entrenched bureaucraticnotions of regional cultural homogeneity. As a resultof the formalization of religious identity as such, therights of individuals with different values and identitieshave been undermined.

Budiman went on to identify the cultural strategies of

some local minority groups in negotiating their localidentity with the state-sanctioned one. Based on thecase study of the ToWana in Central Sulawesi, heillustrated the manner in which local communities resiststate efforts to assimilate them via means such asforced religious conversion and resettlement bychoosing to voluntarily relocate into the forest insteadof designated villages. However, the cost is poor accessto public services such as health care and education.Other forms of resistance include the creation of

contesting narratives and interpretations ofreligious teachings.

Budiman concluded by highlighting two issues thatrequire attention. First, there is a need to acknowledgethat uniformity is not a prerequisite for national unity.Secondly, national integration is only possible with theloyalty of the citizens to the nation and this can onlybe accomplished if the state is capable of improvingthe peoples well-being, prosperity, freedom, security,

and political and social rights.


10/22

IV. A Socio-Ecological System Approach to Multiculturalism andResilience: The Case of Singapore

Drawing on the socio-ecological systems approach in

sustainability science, Daniel Goh deviated fromtraditional analyses of multiculturalism as a politicalideology or state policy by assessing Singaporemulticulturalism as a complex and non-linear socio-cultural system providing for stable relations betweenevolving ethnic groups with regards to their political,cultural and economic lives. Correspondingly, thedimensions of the system are the level of minoritypolitical representation, the degree of interculturalinteraction and relative inequality in the costs of ascribed

identities. These three variables form a stabilitylandscape with basins of attraction, namely, anassimilative system, a liberal multicultural system anda post-colonial system. This basin concept allows themapping of a systems resilience when the stabilitylandscape changes due to global events like the post-2001 War on Terrorism and when the internal dynamicsdriving the system change the systems position in thebasin, for example, when the Singapore system shiftedfrom a melting pot to a mosaic communitarian

institutional emphasis in the 1980s. Hence resilienceis not defined as the ability of a system to return to itsoriginal function after external disturbances but thecapacity to reorganize while undergoing change relativeto the stability landscape.

The stability of all three systems is predicated on theassumption that low inequality is the key attractor ofsocio-cultural systems because the equitabledistribution of socio-economic resources andopportunities is fundamental to the stability of ethnicrelations. This variable is moderated by the level of

minority political representation and the degree ofintercultural interaction. The assimilative system ischaracterized by low minority political representationand high intercultural interaction, while the liberalmulticultural system is high on minority politicalrepresentation but low on intercultural interaction.

Singapore is perceived to be a post-colonialmulticultural society where social interaction is oftenmanaged and engineered. Such labelling is evident in

the level of intercultural interactions, minority politicalrepresentation and the inequality of cost that existwithin the political, social and economic realms. Policiesranging from political representation, to schoolssystems, to housing allocation, were implementedprima facie to address the issue of inequality.Unfortunately, such reactive policy-making did nottake into consideration the possible side effects thathave resulted in high ascriptive cost to the minority.

Goh suggested that the best prescription for Singaporeat this juncture might be to consider creating a newsystem that is based on higher minority representation,increased intercultural interaction and low inequalitycost. To achieve that, Singapore should recognize thecollective capacity of actors in the system to manageresilience. Rather than taking the securitizationapproach and trying to engineer its path, an adaptivegovernace approach should be adopted.


11/22

Discussion

It was pointed out that Singapore must recognize thatchange is inevitable and, in a complex system,individuals are deemed to be capable of self-organizing.However, such a process will only operate in optimum

capacity in a democratic state. On the same note, thestate should desecuritize social issues and manageits social system less.

Some observed that the democratization process mightlead to fragmentation of the society. Having said that,this perceived fragmentation (often through verbalviolent objection) might just be the organic and naturalway of dealing with a problem within a dynamic society.

Adaptability is the key to increasing the capacity of

the individual, which will lead to the strengthening ofthe nation state.

It was noted that some still subscribe to the idea thatsocial problems can and should be dealt with differentsolutions, depending on the targeted racial profiles.However, there is a need to understand that not allsocial problems are caused by racial differences andsolutions should always be issue-specific and notrace-specific.

Many were interested to know if there is in fact anideal model or best practices that every governmentshould adhere to in managing multiculturalism. Theresponse is that, like any other models and bestpractices prescribed to any field of studies, these are

at best guidelines consisting of pre-set dimensionsthat may not fit all conditions. Eventually, rationalapproaches based on recognition of the needs ofthe target community and society at large shouldbe adopted.

Considering the current social condition in Indonesia,doubt has been cast on the possibility of creating a newnational identity within the archipelagic state. Althoughthe vast majority only seek to be equal and not bedistinguished according to religion or ethnicity, muchof the problem lies with this silent majority that will notreact to disruptions and rifts caused by minorityhardliners purporting to represent their particularinterest groups.

Closing Remarks

Kumar Ramakrishna concluded with some reflectionson the key issues raised. One of the clearer themesthat came through the discussion of this workshop isthat, multicultural policies need to be customized.Each nation is unique in its own context and there isno one-size-fits-all solution even if it is a commonproblem. While it is good to think of best practices,they need to be applied with due care as the politicaldynamics within each social context is different. Witha strong advocate for space for individual preferencesof identity to be expressed, the question remains withregards to how that can enhance the practice ofsocial resilience.


12/22

Rapporteurs:Jane Chan

Edited by:

Yolanda Chin


13/22

(Un)Problematic Multiculturalism andSocial Resilience

Centre of Excellence for National SecurityS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Seminar Rooms 2 & 321 February 2008, Thursday

0830 - 0900 Registration

0900 - 0910 Welcome remarks by Kumar Ramakrishna , Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International

Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

0910 - 0950 Panel One: (Un)Problematic MonoculturalismChairperson: Yolanda Chin , Associate Research Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

The Challenge to the Modern Japanese State

Haruko Satoh , Doctoral Candidate, Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University, United Kingdom.

Sinicization, Social Marginalization and Minority Groups Resilience in Hong Kong

Law Kam-Yee , Associate Professor, Department of Asian and International

Studies, City University, Hong Kong, and Lee Kim-Ming , Lecturer, Division of Social Sciences, City University, Hong Kong.

0950 - 1000 Comments by discussant Eugene K.B. Tan , Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University, Singapore.

1000 - 1040 Q&A/ Discussion

1040 - 1050 Coffee Break

1050 - 1130 Panel Two: (Un)Problematic Multiculturalism (Part 1)Chairperson: Norman Vasu ,

Coordinator, Social Resilience Programme, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Multiculturalism in Malaysia: The need for local knowledge to grapple with identity and ethnicityShamsul AB , Director, Institute of Ethnic Studies,

Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Malaysia and Mansor Mohd Noor , Chairman of Public Administration, College of Law, International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Malaysia.

(Un)Problematic Multiculturalism: Challenges and Oppor tunities for Social Cohesion in New Zealand

Allen Bartley , Senior Lecturer, School of Social and Policy Studies, University of Auckland, New Zealand.

1130 - 1140 Coffee break

1140 - 1220 Panel Two: (Un)Problematic Multiculturalism (Part 2)Negotiating Bangsa and Nasion : The Dilemma of Multiculturalism in Indonesia

Hikmat Budiman , Executive Director, Interseksi Foundation, Indonesia.

A Socio-ecological System Approach to Multiculturalism and Resilience:

The Case of Singapore Daniel PS Goh , Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, Singapore.

1220 - 1320 Q&A / Discussion

Closing remarks by Kumar Ramakrishna , Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security,S. Rajaratnam School of

International Studies,Nanyang Technological University,Singapore.

1330 - 1430 Lunch


14/22

1. Associate Professor Kumar RamakrishnaHead Centre of Excellence for National SecurityS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Singapore

2. Ms Haruko SatohDoctoral CandidateCentre of International Studies Cambridge UniversityUnited Kingdom

3. Associate Professor Law Kam-Yee Department of Asian and International StudiesCity University Hong Kong

4. Mr. Lee Kim-MingLecturerDivision of Social SciencesCity UniversityHong Kong

5. Assistant Professor Eugene K.B. TanSchool of LawSingapore Management UniversitySingapore

6. Assistant Professor Norman VasuCoordinator Social Resilience ProgrammeCentre of Excellence for National SecurityS. Rajaratnam School of International StudiesSingapore

7. Dr. Allen BartleySenior LecturerSchool of Social and Policy Studies University of AucklandNew Zealand

8. Professor Shamsul A.B DirectorInstitute of Ethnic StudiesUniversiti Kebangsaan MalaysiaMalaysia

9. Associate Professor Mansor Mohd NoorChairman of Public AdministrationCollege of LawInternational StudiesUniversiti Utara MalaysiaMalaysia

10. Mr. Hikmat BudimanExecutive DirectorInterseksi Foundation

Indonesia

11. Assistant Professor Daniel GohDepartment of SociologyNational University of SingaporeSingapore

12. Ms Yolanda Chin Associate Research FellowCentre of Excellence for National SecurityS. Rajaratnam School of International StudiesSingapore

13. Shereen Mohd Idris Board Member Young AMP

Association of Muslim Professionals Singapore

14. Azeemah Mustafa Research Officer Research Centre On Islamic & Malay Affairs


15. Mohamed Irwan Taib Senior Research Assistant Research Centre On Islamic & Malay Affairs


16. Haji Maarof Bin Haji Salleh Director-GeneralCentre for Contemporary Islamic Studies Singapore

17. Matthieu Branders

Attache Royal Embassy of BelgiumSingapore

18. Mohammad AlzobiThird SecretaryKuwait EmbassySingapore


15/22

19. Jeanette Hennix Trainee Defence Department

Embassy of SwedenSingapore

20. Bob Strachan Lieutenant Colonel Deputy Defence Adviser Singapore Brunei

Australian High CommissionSingapore

21. Chng Kim See Head ISEAS LibraryInstitute of Southeast Asian StudiesSingapore

22. Ooi Kee Beng Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian StudiesSingapore

23. Daljit Singh Visiting Senior Research FellowInstitute of Southeast Asian StudiesSingapore

24. Tare Juay Hong Training Development Office Home Team AcademySingapore

25. Mark Jason Training Development Office Home Team AcademySingapore

26. Seah Hwee KhanTraining Development Office

Home Team AcademySingapore

27. Koh Seow Chuan Chairman

Art Gallery Project UnitMinistry of Information, Communications and the ArtsSingapore

28. Teresa Tan Research and Analysis Department NEXUS MINDEF

National Institute of Education Nanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

29. Ooi Giok Ling Humanities And Social Studies EducationNational Institute of Education Nanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

30. Patrick NathanDeputy DirectorNational Security Coordination CentreSingapore

31. Suman Sharma Part-time lecturer Division of EconomicsNanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

32. Yeoh Onn Chye Director General Studies Programme College of EngineeringNanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

33. Amit Jain Assistant Director International Relations OfficeNanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

34. Paul Wu Horng-Jyh Senior Fellow Wee Kim Wee

School of Communication and InformationNanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

35. Yang Quanbai, Visiting SscholarEconomic Growth CentreOnePeople.sgSingapore


16/22

36. Michael Heng Associate Professor Nanyang Technological University

Management Committee MemberOnePeople.sgSingapore

37. Ramesh Ganeson DirectorOnePeople.sgSingapore

38. Jacqueline Tan Deputy DirectorOnePeople.sgSingapore

39. Venkadasan Pragalathan Programme ManagerOnePeople.sgSingapore

40. Tan Cheng Cheng Programme Manager OnePeople.sgSingapore

41. Wong Shi Lei Programme ManagerOnePeople.sgSingapore

42. Ivan Kwek PhD Candidate School of Oriental & African Studies University of London

43. Lai Ah Eng Senior Research Fellow

Asia Research Institute

Singapore

44. Vinita Ramani MohanResearch Assistant S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

45. Kwa Chong GuanHead, External ProgrammesS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

46. Mohamed Nawab Contemporary Islam Programme S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Nanyang Technological University Singapore

47. Don Celakhan Pathan Contemporary Islam Programme S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

48. Ng Sue Chia Centre of Excellence for National SecurityS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

49. Hoo Tiang Boon Centre of Excellence for National SecurityS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

50. Gregory Dalziel Centre of Excellence for National SecurityS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

51. Nirupama KeshavResearch Analyst Centre of Excellence for National SecurityS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

52. Susan Sim Lee Koon Senior FellowInternational Centre for Political Violence and

Terrorism ResearchS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

53. R SubramaniyanResearch FellowInternational Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism ResearchS. Rajaratnam School of International StudiesNanyang Technological UniversitySingapore


17/22

54. Fatima Astuti Research AnalystInternational Centre for Political Violence and

Terrorism ResearchS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

55. Vidia Arianti Research AnalystInternational Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism ResearchS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

56. Ava Patricia AvilaResearch Analyst International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism ResearchS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

57. Jennifer Widjaya Yang Hui Research AnalystInternational Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism ResearchS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

58. Nur Azlin Mohamed YasinResearch AnalystInternational Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism ResearchS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

59. Nurfarahislinda Binte Mohamed IsmailResearch AnalystInternational Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism ResearchS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

60. Jane Chan Associate Research FellowS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies


61. Jean Michel Montsion Visiting Research AssociateS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

62. Adri Wanto Research Analyst S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

63. Ralf EmmersHead of Graduate StudiesS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

64. Yang Razali KassimSenior FellowS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

65. Amuzu Francis HeartmanMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

66. Ang Tiau LinnMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International StudiesNanyang Technological University

Singapore


18/22

67. Audrey ViadellaMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies


68. Daniel Raymond DomineyMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

69. Franck Emmanuel Marre MSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

70. Gonzalez Lozano Alma ArceliaMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

71. Hong YanMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

72. Hooi Weng Yew Edwin MarioMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

73. Hussain Mohammed M. AldajaniMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University

Singapore

74. Jaison JamesMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies


75. Kerk Kim PorMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

76. Nhina LeMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

77. Sean Sok Phay MSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

78. Wickramaratne Nimashi Thushantika MSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International StudiesNanyang Technological University Singapore

79. Ye JieyiMSc StudentS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore

80. Yeo Lay Hwee Singapore Research FellowSingapore Institute of International AffairsSingapore


19/22

The Centre of Excellence for National Security(CENS ) is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam

School of international Studies (RSIS) at NanyangTechnological University, Singapore. Establishedon 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorouspolicy-relevant analysis of a range of nationalsecurity issues. The CENS team is multinationalin composition, comprising both Singaporeanand foreign analysts who are specialists in variousaspects of national and homeland security affairs.

Why CENS?

In August 2004 the Strategic Framework forNational Security outlined the key structures,security measures and capability developmentprogrammes that would help Singapore deal withtransnational terrorism in the near and long term.

However, strategizing national security policiesrequires greater research and understanding ofthe evolving security landscape. This is whyCENS was established to increase the intellectualcapital invested in strategizing national security.To this end, CENS works closely with not justother RSIS research programmes, but alsonational security agencies such as the NationalSecurity Coordination Secretariat within the PrimeMinisters Office.

What Research Does CENS Do?

CENS currently conducts research in three keyareas of national security:

Risk Assessment/Horizon Scanning

- The art and science of detecting weaksignals emanating from the total security

environment so as to forewarn policymakers,the private sector and the public about

approaching shocks such as terrorism,pandemics, energy crises and other easy-to-miss trends and ostensibly distant events.

Social Resilience

- The capacity of globalized, multiculturalsocieties to hold together in the face ofsystemic shocks such as diseases andterrorist strikes.

Homeland Defence Programme- The security of land-based, aviation and

maritime transport networks and increasingly,the total supply chain vital to Singaporeseconomic vitality.

- Health, water and food security. - Crisis communications and management.

How Does CENS Help Influence NationalSecurity Policy?

Through policy-oriented analytical commentariesand other research output directed at the nationalsecurity policy community in Singapore andbeyond, CENS staff members promote greaterawareness of emerging threats as well as globalbest practices in responding to those threats. Inaddition, CENS organizes courses, seminars andworkshops for local and foreign national securityofficials to facilitate networking and exposure toleading-edge thinking on the prevention of, andresponse to, national and homeland security threats.


20/22

How Does CENS Help Raise Public Awarenessof National Security Issues?

To educate the wider public, CENS staff membersregularly author articles in a number of securityand intelligence related publications, as well aswrite op-ed analyses in leading newspapers.Radioand television interviews have allowed CENSstaff to participate in and shape the public debateon critical issues such as risk assessment andhorizon scanning, multiculturalism and socialresilience, intelligence reform and defendingcritical infrastructure against mass-casualtyterrorist attacks.

How Does CENS Keep Abreast of CuttingEdge National Security Research?

The lean organizational structure of CENS permitsa constant and regular influx of Visiting Fellowsof international calibre through the DistinguishedCENS Visitors Programme. This enables CENSto keep abreast of cutting edge global trends innational security research.

For More on CEN S

Log on to http://www.rsis.edu.sg and followthe links to Centre of Excellence for

National Security.


21/22

The S. Rajaratnam School of InternationalStudies (RSIS) was established in January 2007

as an autonomous School within the NanyangTechnological University. RSISs mission is to bea leading research and graduate teachinginstitution in strategic and international affairs inthe Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission,it will:

Provide a rigorous professional graduateeducation in international affairs with a strongpractical and area emphasis

Conduct policy-relevant research in nationalsecurity, defence and strategic studies,diplomacy and international relations

Collaborate with like-minded schools ofinternational affairs to form a global networkof excellence

Graduate Training in International Affairs

RSIS offers an exacting graduate education ininternational affairs, taught by an internationalfaculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. Theteaching programme consists of the Master ofScience (MSc) degrees in Strategic Studies,International Relations, International PoliticalEconomy, and Asian Studies as well as an MBAin International Studies taught jointly with theNanyang Business School. The graduate teachingis distinguished by their focus on the Asia Pacific,the professional practice of international affairs,and the cultivation of academic depth. Over 150students, the majority from abroad, are enrolledwith the School. A small and select Ph.D.programme caters to advanced students whoseinterests match those of specific faculty members.

Research

RSIS research is conducted by five constituent

Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defenceand Strategic Studies (IDSS, founded 1996), theInternational Centre for Political Violence andTerrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2002), the Centreof Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006),the Consortium of Non-Traditional SecurityStudies in ASIA (NTS-Asia, 2007); and theTemasek Foundation Centre for Negotiations(2008). The focus of research is on issues relating

to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacificregion and their implications for Singapore andother countries in the region. The School hasthree professorships that bring distinguishedscholars and practitioners to teach and todo research at the School. They are the S.Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies,the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship inInternational Relations, and the NTUC

Professorship in International Economic Relations.

International Collaboration

Collaboration with other professional Schools ofinternational affairs to form a global network ofexcellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS will initiatelinks with other like-minded schools so as toenrich its research and teaching activities as wellas adopt the best practices of successful schools.

S. Rajaratnam School Of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798

TEL 65-6790-6982 FAX 65-6793-2991 EMAIL [email protected] WEBSITE www.rsis.edu.sg


22/22

Documents

&^$#Unproblematic Multiculturalism