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Unpredictable Outcomes inForestry—Governance Institutions inPracticeJessica de Koning aa Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Group, WageningenUniversity , Wageningen , The NetherlandsPublished online: 05 Feb 2014.

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Unpredictable Outcomes in Forestry—GovernanceInstitutions in Practice

JESSICA DE KONING

Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Group, Wageningen University,Wageningen, The Netherlands

Community forest management in the Amazon has been subject to institutionalchanges because of a shift from government to governance. Although these changesaim to create opportunities for local communities, the effectiveness of new institutionsremains arbitrary. In particular, the unpredictability of legislative outcomes—as oneof the institutional changes—evokes discussion on how local people respond to newinstitutions. This article analyzes the effects of forest institutions at the local level.By using the concept of institutional bricolage, the article argues that institutionsin practice work differently than intended.

Keywords Bolivia, community forestry, Ecuador, institutional bricolage,institutions, Latin America, smallholders

Since the 1990s, global discussions on environmental change, biodiversity, andsustainability have resulted in changes in institutional frameworks for localcommunity forestry in many Amazon countries. These changes include—amongothers—new forest policies, an increased focus on local-level participation, anddecentralized national government control (Kaimowitz et al. 1998; Kaimowitz,Thiele, and Pacheco 1999; Leach et al. 1999; Sampford 2002; Larson and Ribot2004; Perz et al. 2005; Tacconi 2007). For local communities in the Amazon,institutional changes mean that newly introduced institutions alter the informallocal dynamics, everyday contexts, and daily practices in which community forestryis embedded (Mehta et al. 1999; de Koning and Benneker 2012).

Changes in institutional frameworks in the Amazon can be characterized asa shift from forest government to forest governance (Andersson and Gibson 2004;de Jong 2004; Andersson et al. 2006; Ebeling and Yasue 2009; Lockwood et al.2010). Forest governance is defined by Lemos and Agrawal (2006, 298) as‘‘interventions aiming at changes in [forest-] related incentives, knowledge, institu-tions, decision-making, and behavior.’’ These interventions not only imply new reg-ulations but also entail the participation of civil society organizations and marketactors in policymaking, policy planning, and management of forest resources (Lemosand Agrawal 2006; Gueneau and Tozzi 2008). In this article, the examples of forestgovernance interventions relate mostly to the introduction of new forest regulationsand the participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in this process.It is believed that governance institutions not only provide ‘‘better’’ regulations for

Received 18 May 2012; accepted 18 March 2013.Address correspondence to Jessica de Koning, Droevendaalsesteeg 3, Wageningen,

NL-6708 PB, the Netherlands. E-mail: jessica.dekoning@wur.nl

Society and Natural Resources, 27:358–371Copyright # 2014 Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 0894-1920 print=1521-0723 onlineDOI: 10.1080/08941920.2013.861557

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forest use but also could lead to improving local development, sustainable resourceuse, and social justice (Leach et al. 1999; Andersson and Gibson 2004; Paavola 2007).

Forest governance in the developing world is often linked to community forestry(Wiersum 1997). Community forestry refers to the involvement of social actors (indi-viduals or communities) in decision making affecting forest resources (Pokorny andJohnson 2008). Community forestry is often targeted by forest governance institutionsbecause communities possess the local knowledge about resources, environmental con-ditions, and technologies necessary for good implementation (de Koning and Cleaver2012). Community forestry enjoys a long history in the Amazon, resulting in a myriadof types of forest use in the already diverse social context of the Amazon. Each type offorestry builds on its own local institutional framework. New governance institutionsfor community forestry are thought to positively affect or even completely redesignthis local institutional framework (Wiersum 1997; Cleaver 2002; de Koning 2011).

The introduction of new institutions—such as forest legislation, norms, andstandards—faces many challenges, especially in terms of implementation (Lockwoodet al. 2010; Bartley et al. 2008; Arts and Babili 2012). Forest governance has resultedin an ambiguous institutional framework, with more stakeholders, such as NGOs,intervening in local community forestry (Andersson and Ostrom 2008; Bartleyet al. 2008). It has paved the way for multiple interpretations of forest institutions,unclear situations, and local forest users finding even more loopholes in forestregulations than they already had (de Koning 2011; Wiersum 2009; Bartley et al.2008). In other words, forest governance has led to a fuzzy situation with new institu-tions—varying from state legislation to NGO norms—and new players.

This has ignited discussions about the effect of new institutions on local forestryand how local people respond to new institutions (Perz et al. 2005; Andersson andOstrom 2008). In spite of much research, it remains unclear what actually happensat the local level when new institutions are introduced (Kaimowitz et al. 1998; Leachet al. 1999; Kaimowitz et al. 1999; Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Ribot et al. 2010). As itturns out, local forest users are not simply following the rules. It is uncertain whetherchanges in new policies result in changes in local use and management practices (Perzet al. 2005); people just continue their lives as they have always done, or simply rejectthese forest regulations (Andersson and Ostrom 2008). Discussions seem to focus onan institutional logic that talks about the effectiveness of institutions and how best todesign new institutions to enforce a more sustainable way of managing the forest(Mehta et al. 1999; Cleaver 2001, 2002).

This article aims to go beyond this institutional logic by looking at what happensin practice to explain how local people respond to newly introduced forestinstitutions as a result of governance reforms in the Amazon region of Bolivia andEcuador. It does so by using the concept of institutional bricolage. Coming froma relatively new, critical body of institutional thinking, this concept emphasizesthe influential role of local actors in enacting and reshaping new forest institutionsin practice. By exploring and fleshing out the characteristics and practices ofinstitutional bricolage, this article shows the creative processes at hand when newinstitutions are introduced in local communities.

Institutional Bricolage, a Critical Perspective on Institutions

The dominant perspective on institutions and their role in community forestryemphasizes that formally designed institutions, often introduced by the state, are

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the solution to forest degradation. This structural view is often related to Ostrom’sdesign principles in common pool resources management (Ostrom 1990; 1991). Thisis a popular design scheme among policymakers and seen as a blueprint for designingthe optimal institutions for the job to replace old, ineffective ones and change localpractices accordingly. However, it gives the impression of a direct and linear relation-ship between policy and local practices (Cleaver 2001; 2002; Leach et al. 1999; Mehtaet al. 1999).

This idea of ‘‘getting institutions right,’’ however, does not seem to correspondwith reality, as people’s choices about whether or not to comply with forest regula-tions are based on many factors that never seem to be related in a simple, linearfashion (Scott 2001; Poteete and Ostrom 2004; Becker 2003; Perz et al. 2005).Different perspectives on institutions in natural resource management have recentlybeen coming to the fore. These perspectives criticize the structural view of institu-tions and their working as being too static and not taking into account the localreality (Cleaver 2001; 2002; Leach et al. 1999; Arts et al. 2012). This body of criticalinstitutional thinking has embraced the concept of institutional bricolage (Cleaver2001).

Introduced by Frances Cleaver (2001), institutional bricolage is a process inwhich actors consciously and unconsciously reshape or piece together different insti-tutions at hand (Cleaver 2001; 2002; de Koning 2011). In processes of bricolage,components from different origins are continuously reused, reworked, or refash-ioned to perform new functions (Galvan 1997; Lanzara 1999; Cleaver 2001; 2002;Sehring 2009). Actors draw on institutions, knowledge, and relationships at handto create new institutional frameworks that are time and location specific. The resultis a messy interaction between different types of formal and informal institutions inwhich meaning flows and leaks through different contexts (Douglas 1987), andactors have room for maneuver to reshape (Arce and Long 2000; Cleaver 2002;Cleaver and Franks 2005).

Institutional bricolage differentiates between newly introduced institutions—often formal in character and introduced by government, NGO, or other externalentity—and locally embedded institutions—more informal, already existing institu-tions (Cleaver 2001, 2002). Although many governance institutions exist, this articlefocuses mainly on forest policy as newly introduced institutions and on traditionalbeliefs and community norms as locally embedded institutions. The creative roleof the agency of local actors in institutional bricolage is of specific importance.Although limited to certain institutional and social boundaries, there are manypossible outcomes of institutional bricolage.

Institutional bricolage is a relatively new concept in the field of natural resourcemanagement and is in need of further fine-tuning. Cleaver (2002) roughly identifiesdifferent institutional bricolage practices. De Koning (2011) groups these practicesinto three types and calls them aggregation, alteration, and articulation. Aggregationis the recombination of newly introduced institutions and locally embedded institu-tions. Alteration is the adaptation of institutions. This can happen to both newlyintroduced institutions and locally embedded institutions. Local actors often tweakor tinker with forest regulations to make them better fit their livelihoods or identity.Articulation involves the claiming of traditional identities and culture and therejection of newly introduced institutions. Articulation occurs when the introducedinstitutions are in direct conflict with local identities.

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Methodology

Doing research on institutional bricolage first implies an understanding of actors andagency. This understanding goes beyond the focus on productive identities (localactors as loggers, farmers, or forest managers) by also including the social–culturalroles and identities of actors (local actors as men, migrant or indigenous). By focusingon more than just one single aspect of their livelihoods, a better understanding can beobtained of the multiple practices of institutional bricolage. Second, research on insti-tutional bricolage needs to include the many aspects of livelihoods, life courses, andsocial networks in which actors are embedded (Cleaver 2002). Third, the institutionalframework, consisting of newly introduced institutions and locally embedded institu-tions, needs to be described in terms of these insttitutions’ function—in theory and inpractice—and their relationship with local actors. The difference between what insti-tutions should be in theory and what they are in practice is important to understandhow the reshaping of institutions takes place in institutional bricolage.

The research for this article aimed to investigate institutional influence on localforest practices in the Amazon region of Ecuador and Bolivia. In addition to neces-sary information on actors and institutions, it specifically addressed three themes:the local actors, their livelihoods, and their social network; institutions and organiza-tions present in the local communities and their importance for community forestry;and the relation between local forest users and forest-related institutions in practice.Six diverse communities of smallholders in Beni province, Bolivia, and MoronaSantiago province, Ecuador, were selected to explore the practices of institutionalbricolage. The cases were selected from a pool of 16 forest management cases in fourdifferent Amazon countries. This pool of 16 cases was derived from an extensivegroup of nearly 150 promising cases of community forestry in the Amazon, selectedby local experts1 (Pokorny and Johnson 2008).

As the nature of this research was exploratory, heterogeneity and richness wereimportant selection criteria for the cases. Consequently, all six selected communitiesemployed a different way of organizing community forestry—ranging from collectiveto individual, and extracting different products from the forests—some protected bylaw, others not. Various techniques were used to better understand how peoplerespond to institutions and the bricolage practice in which they engage. Thesetechniques were in-depth interviews, participant observations, group interviews,group exercises, and questionnaires.

Community Forestry and Governance Institutions in the Amazon Region ofBolivia and Ecuador

The Amazon regions of both Bolivia and Ecuador are increasingly being changed byinfrastructural developments and extensive cattle farming (Southgate et al. 1991;Rudel and Horowitz 1993; Stoian 2000; Pacheco 2006). Community forestry in bothcountries is an important addition to many household incomes (Sunderlin et al. 2005;Tacconi 2007; Stoian 2005). In addition to providing economic resources, the forestforms an important part of the identities of many smallholders, especially indigenouscommunities (Wiersum 1997). However, there are also some notable differencesbetween the two countries. In Bolivia, the strong historical links with the extractionof nontimber forest products such as rubber and Brazil nuts (Bertholletia excelsa)have affected the forest landscape as well as the economy (Stoian 2000; 2005). In

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Ecuador, the migration of highland farmers to the Amazon in the 1980s stronglyaffected the forests and the social–cultural composition of their inhabitants (Rudeland Horowitz 1993; Bilsborrow et al. 2004; Mena et al. 2006).

In Bolivia, the extraction of nontimber forest products resulted in the influx oflowland farmers into the Amazon from the late 19th century onward (Stoian andHenkemans 2000). This influx has resulted in a large group of peasant farmers:farmers who have lived for generations in the Amazon and, to a certain extent, mixedwith the indigenous communities. Although variety exists among peasants (for anoverview see Henkemans 2001), peasant smallholder communities have an extractivelivelihood mainly based on Brazil nut collection, more or less combined with agricul-ture and agroforestry. In addition to Brazil nut collection, timber extraction is oftenan additional source of income (Henkemans 2001; de Koning 2011).

The forest regime in Bolivia changed to a more governance-oriented approach in1996 (Martınez 2008). In 1996, Bolivia embraced a collective, community approachtoward forest management by designing a regulative framework focusing on com-munity forest management and increasing the responsibilities of municipal leveladministration (Martınez 2008; Andersson 2003). The reforms particularly changedthe situation for smallholders by linking land rights to access to forest resources.Smallholders were given user rights to their land and resources, and the right tobenefit from their forest resources. These are rights that they did not have beforethe change (Andersson 2003; Benneker 2008). Local communities can now applyfor a forest management plan. Such as plan allows a community to obtain annuallogging plans over a period of 20 years (Benneker 2008).

Ecuador experienced a different development trajectory in the Amazon thanBolivia. In Ecuador, a relatively recent colonization period affected the social–cultural and political setting. Large numbers of highland farmers were drawn tothe Amazon after a promotional campaign by the government. This migration igniteda chain of conflict between these migrant farmers and the indigenous inhabitants ofthe Amazon, a conflict that continues to the present day. Migrant farmers areoften small-scale cattle farmers who extract timber commercially to cover the costof cattle farming. Indigenous communities depend on the forest for their livelihoodand extract many different products from the forest, of which timber is the mostimportant.

Ecuador’s shift to governance started in 1999 with a new law on decentralization.For forest governance, this meant that most of the administrative tasks and respon-sibilities were delegated to the local administrative level. Furthermore, the controland monitoring of forestry were entrusted to a semiprivate organization (Ibarraet al. 2008). In 2004, the old forest law was adapted as well. The biggest changes werethe inclusion of sustainable forest management and the improvement of the forestaccess rights of minority groups such as indigenous communities. Another changewas the introduction of so-called simplified forest management programs: forestmanagement plans for individual smallholders (Ibarra et al. 2008; de Koning 2011).These are low-impact, small-scale forest management programs with a logging permitfor 1 year.

The changes in regulations for local smallholders were not the only noticeablechanges at the local level. In both Bolivia and Ecuador, forest governance openedup the field for many other stakeholders, in which local NGOs were of greatimportance. These NGOs played an active role in the promotion of the forest regula-tions as the government often lacked the resources to do so. In this process of

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promotion, NGOs also took the opportunity to plug their own ideas (Benneker 2008).This resulted in package deal-like situations in which it was difficult for local farmersto understand where the forest regulations ended and the NGO ideas began. The nextsections describe the local effects of the institutional changes brought about by forestgovernance institutions at the local level.2

Aggregation

Aggregation implies recombining different types of institutions. It involveslocally embedded institutions—such as traditional beliefs or community norms—expectancies, needs, and wants. These are pieced together with newly introducedinstitutions. In the selected cases from Bolivia and Ecuador, newly introducedinstitutions included new forest regulations, NGO standards, and market principles.Local farmers tend to pick out the most appealing institutions and ideas and recom-bine them with their own. An example of aggregation was found in a Boliviancommunity.

The livelihood of this peasant community in Bolivia is dependent on Brazil nutcollection and the logging of timber. Community members have a relatively large areaof forest that they use for the extraction of both. Their extractive livelihood is a tra-ditional livelihood often found in this region. Access to the forest is regarded as impor-tant and, in this case, historically determined. Informally, there was general consensusbetween them and their neighbors that this land was theirs, but there were no formaldocuments to prove it. The changes in forest governance have mainly resulted in thepossibility for this community to log timber with a community forest managementplan that members set up with the help of a local NGO (de Koning 2011).

Several different reasons played a role in the setting up of this forest managementplan. First, the presence of the NGO was instrumental in helping this community toset it up. The NGO explained the intentions of the plan and persuaded the communityto participate in the process. Second, the NGO promoted the forest management planas a secure source of income. Traditionally, this community extracted timber in aninformal manner. Thus, initially, the community forest management plan seemedto go according to plan and also according to its original intention: providing econ-omic incentives to stimulate sustainable forest management. However, a final reasonfor setting up this forest management plan appeared to be the most important. Thecommunity lacked formal land titles for its forest. The establishment of the forestmanagement plan, and consequently a local association, was thus also seen as theperfect opportunity to make an even firmer claim on the land.

Because the reforms now link the issue of land rights to forest management plans,the government allows forest management plans only for lands with formal landtitles. Even though the community did not have formal documents, it somehow man-aged to get a formally approved management plan without land titles. Consequently,the forest management plan became a replacement for land titles, something thatprobably would not hold up in court but worked well in practice. The forest manage-ment plan gave the forest the formal status it needed. In addition, the communityenjoyed a better status with their stronger land claims. A few years after the forestmanagement plan was set up and approved, the community did not apply for anymore logging permits. The revenues from logging were not as big as expected,and the community’s main objective—obtaining land titles—had already been achieved.This community seemed to go back to its traditional livelihood of Brazil nut collecting.

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The example shows that aggregation practices imply a certain level of adoptingor embedding newly introduced institutions. The forestry legislation was—to acertain extent—followed. However, the reasons for doing so and the outcome couldstill differ from the original intention. On paper it may look as if this community isfollowing the rules, but in practice we see a different situation. This example alsoshows that aggregation practices can have a rather strategic character, in this caseto acquire land titles. The institutional bricolage continued when community forestrybecame much more than just a way of sustainably managing the forest. It gave thecommunity the much-needed land security. In this way, the legislation on forestrygradually became a multipurpose institutional framework.

Alteration

Alteration practices imply adapting or reshaping institutions to certain circum-stances. Alteration can relate to both newly introduced and locally embedded institu-tions. Legislation can be reinterpreted, rules can be bent, or community norms can betweaked to better fit the current situation, livelihood, or identity. One example ofalteration was found in an Ecuadorian community of cattle farmers.

Cattle farmers were stimulated by the government to migrate from theEcuadorian Andes to the Amazon region of Ecuador. This migration, also knownas the colonization era, took place mostly in the 1980s. In these years, the governmentintroduced several facilitative rules to stimulate the migration, such as easy landtitling and access to financial resources. The migrant farmers in the selected com-munity used these pieces of legislation to create pastures for their cows, constructthe necessary infrastructure, and start farming in the Amazon. Today, they maintainthis cattle-farming livelihood. Within this livelihood choice, forestry is an importantway of covering cattle investment costs and maintaining a certain regular income.Every week, the farmers sell timber along the road and use this money to pay forcattle-related costs and food for themselves. They brought this traditional livelihoodwith them on moving from the Andes to the Amazon. In 2001, the Ecuadoriangovernment imposed new legislation. The facilitating regulations for migrant farmerswere abandoned, and smallholders now had to apply for an individual forest manage-ment plan if they wanted to sell their timber.

The new regulations were imposed and a local NGO helped to explain theirpurpose. Initially, farmers started to apply for a plan, influenced by this NGO.However, they remained reluctant. A few years later, most farmers had abandonedthe regulations and continued their normal practices of extracting timber without aforest management plan. There were several reasons for doing so. First, the risk ofbeing caught while selling illegal timber was small, as the government did not haveenough resources to effectively enforce this legislation. Second, and more impor-tantly, the migrant farmers felt that this law was not meant for them. This feelingwas created by the years of facilitation by the government. This facilitation not onlymade life easier, but also gave the migrant farmers an identity as ‘‘developers of theAmazon’’ or ‘‘pioneers.’’ They felt proud to help develop the Amazon. Conse-quently, migrant farmers started to differentiate themselves from the surroundingindigenous populations.

The migrant farmers saw the change in regulation as the government turningagainst them. In addition, they believed that their livelihoods were not in forestrybut in cattle. As the law specifically seemed to target people in forestry, they reasoned

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that it was not meant for them. As a result, they reinterpreted and reshaped the forestregulations. First, the migrant farmers stated that the forest regulations did not applyto them. According to them, the forest regulations were not meant for their type oflogging, but for the surrounding indigenous populations who relied much more onforestry than the migrant farmers did. Second, they argued that their logging activitieswere on too small a scale anyway to be regulated. Third, they called on the facilitatinginstitutions of the colonization era as the right institutions to comply with, eventhough these facilitating regulations were no longer in operation. As a result, theiridentity as cattle farmers, their need to distinguish themselves from their indigenousneighbors, and the continuing existence of former colonization institutions in practicewere used to completely alter the new forest regulations.

However, the alteration in the forest regulations did not only lead to resistance.It gradually led these migrant farmers to rethink the forest. Even though the farmersdid not comply with the regulations, they did evaluate their forest use. Slowly,farmers are no longer focusing solely on cattle; they are slowly adopting a newidentity in which forest is much more prominent than before. This is visible in theway they talk about the forest and the reforestation practices that are emerging.Forest is not just a tool to finance cattle farming; it is also something that isintertwined with their identity as Amazon farmers.

In this example, alteration practices resulted in the negation of new forestlegislation in Ecuador. Similar to the previous practice, different motivations, whichall played a role, were tied together in a complex, but also logical, way. Feelings ofidentity, old institutions, and livelihoods all combined were the motivations foralteration practices. Local forest users tried to seek the benefits and disadvantagesof forest regulations to come up with a solution that worked best for them. Thisexample shows that alteration practices occur in both newly introduced and locallyembedded institutions. The forest regulations were altered, but the locally embeddedinstitutions—in this case the local forest norms and identity—were also graduallychanged. In this sense, there was an institutional interplay between formal and infor-mal institutions, as one affects the other. This shows that this is not just an example ofresistance but a messy process in which some rules are bent and other norms aretweaked.

Articulation

Articulation practices reflect strong claims on identity. Articulation occurs whennewly introduced institutions conflict with local identities and locally embeddedinstitutions—such as traditions. As a result, the newly introduced institutions arerejected. Articulation can also lead to a hollowing out of the traditional. This processis also identified as leakage of meaning: when the same institution is used in differentcontexts, entailing flows and leaks from one context to the other (Douglas 1987).A good example of articulation practices comes from an indigenous community inEcuador.

From time immemorial, this indigenous community has belonged to a largesocial–cultural group called the Shuar. The Shuar regard themselves as independent,proud, traditional Amazon people who are forest dependent (Rudel 1983; Rudel andHorowitz 1993). The forest is of economic, social, and cultural importance. TheShuar generally oppose any interference from outside. They have their own governingsystem and ethnic federation and prefer to regulate their territory by themselves.

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Similar to action with the migrant farmers in Ecuador, the new forest legislation wasalso introduced into this indigenous community. In general, this selected indigenousShuar community was very hesitant to accept government interference of any kind.This resistance entered a new stage when the government introduced the forestregulations in 2004.

In this community, an NGO was active in explaining to members the concept ofsustainable forest use and the particularities of the new forest regulations. In spite ofthis, the regulations met with a lot of resistance as they were seen as a downrightthreat to the identity and independent culture of this community. Members’ identityand feelings of independence were strongly connected to the forest. Their forest-dependent culture meant that access to forest resources was important and shouldnot be controlled or limited by the government or anybody else. Consequently, theirresponse to this legislation led to the articulation of all kinds of forest traditions suchas access and use rights, identities, history, and many more. By articulating its ident-ity, the community distanced itself completely from the imposed forest regulationsand from the Ecuadorian government. In these practices, the community oftenstressed that the Ecuadorian government was never recognized as ‘‘the government’’anyway, as members preferred their own traditional governing system. However, thepresence of an NGO in this community to facilitate the promotion of the governancereforms led to some other changes as well. The rather closed community started toopen up to new ideas about forestry and sustainability. As a consequence, membersadapted some of the new forest practices.

However, the articulation practices also led to leakage of meaning. Strong articu-lation of traditions can result in these traditions losing their meaning. Identity claimsand claims on tradition initially related to the context of the forest but then moved todifferent contexts such as development, education, and health care. In these instances,the Shuar still claimed not to want any government interference. However, the realitywas that the Shuar were not that independent anymore and that governmentintervention, especially in the context of development and education, was actuallywelcomed. These traditional claims thus became hollow and started to lose theirmeaning, especially as many younger Shuar started to distance themselves from theirparents. Slowly, the community became stuck in a split between traditional identityand modern needs and wants, and the NGO’s influence added to this process.

This example shows that articulation practices can be strong and visible whena traditional identity is regarded as important. They also have an effect on locallyembedded institutions, as articulation can lead to a hollowing out of these institu-tions. When claims on what is regarded as a traditional identity are made over andover again, the meaning of that identity leaks from context to context. As it turnsout, that image of traditional identity does not always hold up in every situation.In addition, all kinds of outside factors continue to impact on that identity and thosetraditions; in this case the factor was an NGO. Consequently, locally embeddedinstitutions are also affected by practices of articulation.

Conclusion

This article set out to research how local smallholders in the Amazon region ofBolivia and Ecuador respond to new institutions introduced to them throughgovernance reforms. It first questions the effectiveness of new forest institutions. Itfocuses on forest governance institutions, as these have created a particular, fuzzy

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institutional framework with multilevel and multistake holder characteristics thatprovoke creative institutional reshaping (de Koning 2011). By looking at the wayin which local actors respond to new institutions, this article not only aims to shedmore light on institutional influences on community forestry, but also adds more sub-stance to the earlier mentioned practices of institutional bricolage. It ends by arguingfor a different way of looking at institutional workings and influence at the local level.

In the selected communities in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian Amazon, the insti-tutional reforms resulting from the shift to governance have led to the introductionof a new legal framework and opened up the arena for other players such as NGOsand market actors. As the examples show, forest governance does not always leadto a more transparent institutional framework. Neither does it replace the existinglocal forestry institutions. Rather, forest governance creates ample room for maneu-ver, leading to practices of institutional bricolage. New forest regulations, NGO ideasand norms, and market mechanisms have been simultaneously introduced to localcommunities, who consequently piece them together with existing institutions suchas traditions, community norms, or even former legislation.

These findings shed a different light on the popular view of forest governanceas the solution to environmental problems and social issues (Leach et al. 1999;Andersson and Gibson 2004; Paavola 2007). The article paints a picture of localfarmers’ dynamic responses to forest regulations as a result of governance. Forestgovernance institutions percolate down to the local level through different entitiesor organizations. In the examples, local actors reshaped institutions in a way thataffected forest management. This picture rejects the instrumental, managerialcharacter of forest governance and the robustness of formal institutions in general:two assumptions that often underlie forest regulations and that are quite popularin the literature on natural resource management (Mehta et al. 1999; Cleaver 2002;de Koning 2011; Arts and Babili 2012). This article illustrates that the outcomes offorest governance are unpredictable. This is not a new finding, but this articledoes describe how these unpredictable outcomes have occurred in the selectedcommunities and the practices of institutional bricolage that lie at the heart of this.

Institutional bricolage reveals that the introduction of a new institution forforest use—in these examples, new forest legislation—affects more aspects of locallivelihoods than just those related to forest. Legislation on forest management, forexample, is in theory aimed at forestry and targets forest users. Institutional bricolageshows that newly introduced institutions can touch upon social–cultural aspects ofidentity, set strategic processes in motion, and change the way local actors seethemselves. Through practices of bricolage, institutions become more fluid and moreprone to changes than is often assumed. This fluidity and change result in unpredict-able outcomes but also makes institutions ‘‘come alive.’’ Consequently, institutionalbricolage practices can be regarded as almost a necessary ‘‘rite of passage’’ for newlyintroduced institutions (de Koning 2011; de Koning and Benneker 2012)

The three practices of institutional bricolage give further detail and conceptuali-zation to institutional bricolage. Aggregation implies a certain compliance with newinstitutions but also shows that institutions can be multipurpose. Alteration showsthat institutional bricolage can lead to a complete reinterpretation of legislation.Articulation appears to be a strong rejection at first but also shows that traditionsand identity are not as strong and important as maybe thought. Furthermore, thethree practices also show the different characters of institutional bricolage. Localactors appear to be consciously trying to find loopholes in the law. The three practices

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of bricolage show that institutional bricolage is also a gradual, less conscious processand almost inevitable (Freeman 2007; de Koning 2011). Finally, the practices revealthe importance of locally embedded institutions and the many—often hidden—motivations that play a role in processes of institutional bricolage. In short, it isnot just that the pros and cons of forest regulation are balanced out and followedby a bricolage practice; rather, there is constant negotiation, or balancing, of newlyintroduced institutions vis-a-vis the informal ones in a time- and location-specificcontext.

The concept of institutional bricolage and its three practices call for a morecritical reflection on the institutional logic that often lies behind the introduc-tion of new regulations, norms, or standards on forestry. This institutionallogic takes an institutional design approach as its point of departure: craftingan optimal institution that will replace other institutions and lead to better useof forest resources (Cleaver 2002; de Koning 2011). However, institutions arenot only constraining, they also enable by providing the space for local actorsto engage in practices of institutional bricolage. Therefore, an understandingthat institutional frameworks for community forestry consist of patchworksof institutions, rooted in history and social relationships, and reshaped in dailypractice, can provide a satisfactory explanation of the actual effect of institu-tions on local forestry practice (Cleaver, 2001; de Koning 2011; de Koning andBenneker 2012).

Acknowledgments

The author thanks the people from the communities in Bolivia and Ecuador for theirvoluntary participation in this research. The author also thanks Prof. Dr. B. J. M.Arts and Dr. Ir. K. F. Wiersum of the Forest and Nature Conservation PolicyGroup, Wageningen University, the Netherlands, for their supervision, comments,and discussion, from which the research and the article benefitted tremendously.Finally, the author thanks Catherine O’Dea for language editing.

Funding

The author acknowledges the support for this research from the EuropeanCommission. The research described in this thesis was financially supported by theEC=INCO-funded research project ‘‘Forest management by small farmers in theAmazon—An opportunity to enhance forest ecosystem stability and rural livelihood(ForLive)’’ (INCO-CT-2004-510903).

Notes

1. The ForLive project (Forest management by small farmers in the Amazon—An opport-unity to enhance forest ecosystem stability and rural livelihoods) selected nearly 150 prom-ising cases of community forestry, of which 16 cases were selected to further investigate.

2. Although the research itself took place in six communities and multiple examples ofbricolage practices were found, only three examples of these practices have been chosenas best reflecting each bricolage practice and most strongly contributing to the argumentof the paper. This is not to claim that these three examples are the only suitable ones,as the scope of this research is much wider.

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