UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I LIBRARY

ISLAM, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION: THE CASE OF MUHAMMADIY AH AND NAHDLATUL ULAMA

IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAW Al'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ART

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

AUGUST 2008

By

Pramono Ubaid Tanthowi

Thesis Committee:

Ehito Kimura, Chairperson Manfred Henningsen Benedict J. Kerkv liet

We certifY that we have read this thesis and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in

scope and quality as a thesis for the degree of Master of Art in Political Science.

Thesis Committee:

Chairperson: Ehito Kimura

Member: Manfred Henningsen

Member: Benedict J. Kerkvliet

ABSTRACT

Mnhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are two largest Islamic organizations in

Indonesia. Long active as both religious and political organizations during 1950s and 1960s,

they withdrew from formal political arena and declared their disengagement from any political

parties in the 1970s and 1980s that enabled them to survive under the repressive Suharto regime

and consequently develop nascent civil society movements.

This thesis examines the relation between those Muslim civil society organizations

and democratization in the post-Suharto Indonesia: how they defend their positions as

autonomous entities beyond state and simultaneously intensely involve in political arena. It

also studies their roles in the process of democratization.

The study reveals a great deal ahout their participation in the political system, where

they are now an important part of the political leadership and their interests are now well

represented. However, the problem is that, in reality, there is a significant degree of overlap

between civil society and political society as well as between civil society and the state.

This study also shows the role of those Muslim civil society organizations in the

democratization process. These mass-based religious organizations seemed to be

consequential in all stages of democratization: they sought to broaden the free public sphere

and combined their efforts, along with other pro-democracy movements, in de-legitimating

and bringing the authoritarian Suharto regime down. They also join forces in encouraging

political participation, monitoring the elections, forcing the government to be more

accountable and transparent, and spreading the ideas of religious tolerance.

1

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This thesis is the product of two years of study and research on the dynamic

relationship between Islam, civil society, and democratization in post-Suharto Indonesia. It also

flows from over a decade of my personal involvement both in discourse and activism with

Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia.

There are so many people who have helped me along the completion in one way or

another; they encouraged me, provided guidance, and never lost faith that I would complete this

effort. The warmth and generosity of all of those who helped me during my two years of

research and writing continually amazed me, and I apologize to anyone I fail to mention here.

While I cannot list all those that I am grateful to, several deserve special recognition.

I would like to thank first of all the member of my wonderfully supportive committee:

Ehito Kimura, Manfred Henningsen, and Ben Kerkvliet. They always gave me valuable

comments, challenged me with provoking insights, provided unique perspectives on my

research, and went above and beyond the call of duty to accommodate me in their bnsy

schedules. Their meticulons readings of my thesis also saved me from many errors (any

remaining ones are my own responsibility). I have greatly enjoyed my interactions with my

committee, and am honored to have had the opportunity to work with them.

My study in the Department of Political Science at the University of Hawaii at

Manoa, including my Graduate Certificate in International Cultural Studies, was made possible

by the East-West Center Graduate Degree Fellowship. I was fortunate to receive financial

support during my years of graduate study from the East-West Center, which was also greatly

instrumental to my fieldworks in Indonesia. In the East-West Center, lowe thanks to Charles

i

Morison, Terry Bigalke, Mendl Djunaidy, and Stella Kolinski for their supports. My graduate

study was also supported by some other institutions and individuals. In the Asia Foundation

which provided me with additional funding during my first year lowe thanks to Douglas

Ramage and Robin Bush. During the second year I received additional financial support from

the American Indonesian Cultural and Educational Foundation (AICEF). I was also fortunate to

receive valuable financial supports from the Central Board ofMuhammadiyah, Pusat Studi

Agama dan Peradahan (pSAP), Kak Din Syamsuddin, Mas Jerne Geovannie, and Mas Rizal

Sukma.

Special thanks also to all who gave me their time and shared their insights in

interviews and other conversations throughout my fieldworks in Indonesia. They not only

infonned me about the political and social activities of the NU and Muhammadiyah in recent

years but also provided me with many of the crucial perspectives and interpretatious ofIslam

and civil society relations in Indonesia on which this study is based. Among those to whom I

owe particular tbanks are Buya Syafii Maarif, Kak Din Syamsuddin, Kyai Hasyim Muzadi, Mas

Haedar Nashlr, Kyai Masdar Mas'udi, A.S. Hikam, Mas Rizal Sukma, Eunsook Jung, Sukidi,

Izzul Muslimin, Gunawan Hidayat, Ahmad Rofiq, Raja Jull Anthoni, Syaiful Bahri Anshori,

Ahmad Suaedy, Syafiq Hasyim, Adung Abdurrahman, Zuhairi Misrawi, Muhamad Ali,

Achmad Ubaedillah, Saiful Umam, and Lance Nolde.

Above all, I want to thank my parents who always supported me with their advices

and prayers. Finally, and the most importantly, an enonnous thank you to my wife Herawaty

and my son Risyad Mahdavi Tanthowi who made immense gifts oflove throughout the years I

had been leaving them and simultaneously brought me happiness on even the hardest days. It is

to my wife and my son that I dedicate this work.

ii

Anshor

Bughat

DPR

Fatwa

Golkar

HMI

Jjtihad

IMM

IRM

Istoghotsah

JPPR

GLOSSARY

The youth wing ofNU.

A tenn in Islamic law referring to rebellion against a

legitimate ruler who thus deserves the death sentence.

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives).

Religious edict.

Golongan Karya (Functional Groups), the political

vehicle of the New Order Regime which was established

in 1973 and survives the reform era.

Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (The Islamic Student

Association), the Masyumi-inspired stodent organization.

Vigorous inquiry. The term is then adopted in Islamic law

referring to legal reasoning in response to the newly­

emerged problems.

Ikatan Mahasiswa Mubammadiyah (The Muhanunadiyah

Stodent Association).

Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah (The Muhammadiyah

Adolescence Association).

A public prayer gathering which is mostly held by the NU

organization.

Jaringan Pendidikan Pernilih untuk Rakyat (the People's

Voter Education Networks).

i

KAMMI

Khittah

Kyai

Masyumi

MPR

Mill

Muktamar

PAN

Parmusi

PBB

PBR

Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (The United

Action of the Indonesian Muslim Student), the newly

PKS student wing.

Original guideline.

Traditional Islamic scholar which is mostly found in the

NU community.

Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (The Consultative

Council of Indonesian Muslims), the largest Islamic party

in 1950s which was established in 1945 and forced to

dismiss in 1960 by Sukamo.

Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (people Consultative

Assembly)

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (The Indonesian Council of

Ulemas).

National Congress which is held in the NU and

Mubammadiyah organizations once in every five years.

Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party), the

party of Amien Rais which draws many of its members

from the modernist Muslim camp.

Partai Muslimin Indonesia (The Indonesian Muslim

Party).

Partai Bulan Bintang (The Crescent and Star Party).

Partai Bintang Reformasi (The Reform Star Party)

ii

PD

PDI-P

Pesantren

PKB

PKl

PKS

PMII

PPP

Tanwir

Wali

Partai Demokrat (The Democrat Party)

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (The Indonesian

Democratic Party of Struggle).

Islamic boarding school which is mostly run and owned

by kyai ofNU.

Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (The National Awakening

Party), the party of Abdurrahman Wahid which draws

many of its members from the traditionalist Islam camp.

Partai Komunis Indonesia (The Indonesian Communist

Party).

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (The Prosperous Justice Party).

Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (The Indonesian

Islamic Student Union), The NU-affiliated student

organization.

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (The Unity and

Development Party).

Annual meeting in the Muhammadiyah organization.

Protege of God, saint.

iii

i

Politics says:

A is a friend

Bisafoe

Dakwah rectifies:

A is a friend

B is a companion

Politics tends to break up and divide

Dakwah tends to invite and unite

(Ahmad Syafii Maarif, 2006, p. 335)

Muslim Civil Society and Democratization:

The Case of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul mama in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Chapter I Introduction

Civil Society, Islam, and Democratization

Literature Review

Methodology

Structure of the Thesis

Chapter II NU, Mnhammadiyah, and the Origin of Civility

Introduction

The Origins ofMuhammadiyah and NU

The Involvement ofMuhammadiyah and NU in Politics

Muhammadiyah, NU and Political Disengagement

Muslim Civil Society: Competing Discourses

Conclusion

1

8

18

20

22

24

25

29

39

44

47

Chapter ill Muslim Civil Society and Political Change: Political Development 1998-2007

Introduction 49

Muslim Civil Society, Political Parties, and the 1999 election

The Rise and Fall of President Abdurrahman Wahid

Muslim Civil Society and the 2004 Presidential Election

National Congress and Leadership Change

Muslims' Approaching the 2009 Election

Conclusion

i

50

60

78

99

114

127

Chapter IV Muslim Civil Society and Democratization

Introduction 129

The Construction of Free Public Sphere 130

The Election Monitoring 155

The Corruption Eradication 162

The Last Bastion of Civic Pluralism 169

Foreign Donor and State Capacity 189

Conclusion 196

Chapter V Concluding Remarks 198

Bibliography 207

Biographical Sketch

ii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Introduction

For a long time numerous observers and experts of Indonesian affairs seemed to

believe that Islam was peripheral importance in modern Indonesian life. They were convinced

that state and society of Indonesia were thoroughly dominated by nominal Muslims (or

abangan) of Javanese ethnicity. The impression was reinforced by the relative scarcity of

academic studies of Islam in Indonesia.! Compared with other Muslim countries, Islam in

Indonesia has been little studied. However, since the last decade of the 20th century, it is no

longer tenable to hold such a view. Most observers now agree that a significant change in the

Indonesian Muslim society has been undergoing.2 They now believe that since that decade

Indonesia has been experiencing a historically unprecendented Islamic political revival.3 Not

only do many Indonesia's most influential Islamic leaders, such as Abdurrahman Wahid and

Amien Rais, once occupied the highest positions in Indonesia's political system, but Islamic

parties also playa significant role in the political affairs.

Equally important is the significant roles played by Indonesian Muslims in the process

of democratization. The political development in Indonesia since the 1990s has been witnessing

that the Islamic revival and democratization have marched hand in hand under, among others,

the leadership of Muslim democrats. Recent development in Indonesia offers an even more

striking indication of Muslim interest in democracy and civic pluralism. In the final years of the

! Hefner, "Introduction", 1997, p. 8. 2 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, 1994, Ch. 7, "Islam: Coming from the Cold?"; Yatikiotis, lndonesilln

Politics Under Suharto, 1994, Ch. Y, ''Toward an Islamic Identity?" 3 Tanthowi, Kebangldtan Politik Kawn Santri, 2005.

1

Suharto dictatorship (1996-98), a powerful movement for a democratic Muslim politics took

shape. In alliance with secular Muslims and non-Muslims, the movement succeeded in May

1998 in toppling the long ruling Suharto. No less remarkable, Muslims participants in the

democracy campaign dedicated themselves to devising religious argnments in support of

pluralism, democracy, women's right, and civil society.4

Unfortunately, the general debate now concerning Muslim communities in Indonesia

has been predominantly shaped by studies on development of Islamic radicalization and

political violence.s This is largely because the glaring process of democratization was soon

blurred by a rash of sectarian violence. For instance, from 1999 to 2002, battles between

Christians and Muslims in Maluku took some eight thousand lives.6 During roughly the same

period, the central highlands on the nearby island of Sulawesi saw bloody skirmishes between

Muslim and Christian gangs, causing a thousand deaths.7 Equally alarming, in the months

following Suharto's fall, radical Islamic groups sprang up in cities across Indonesia.

While political scientists and anthropologists have been much concerned with the

developing some radical Islamic movements, they have paid little attention fur the mainstream

moderate ones, as if they have lost their standing in the Indonesian Muslim community. Although

these extremist groups have been very vocal and active, however, this concern is not relevant,

because they are small and have very little influence. Admittedly, set against the succession of

weak governments that Indonesia has had since the fall ofSuharto, these groups look very

menacing. The fact remains, however, they are insignificant in number and, without support from

4 See Refuer, Civil Islam, 2000; Barton, ''The Origin ofIs1amic Liberalism," 1997; Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, 1995.

S Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, 2007; Hasan, Laskar Jihad, 2006; Eliraz, Islam In Indonesia, 2004; Barton, Indonesia's Struggle, 2004; Side!, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, 2006; Yunanto at aI., Militant Islamic Movements, 2003; Marika and Wright-Neville, Terrorism and Islam in Indonesia, 2005.

6 van Klinken, ''The Maluku War," 2001, p. 1-26. 7 Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso," 2001, p. 44-79.

2

certain element in the army, they will not be able to go very far with their threats. Therefore, rather

than studying certain groups of Indonesian Muslim which are considered as anti-democratic forces

- threatening progress and clashing with the liberal democratic ideals, this thesis nonetheless

examines other groups which are adopts a positive outlook about the role of Islam in Indonesian

society instead.

By analyzing the broader phenomenon within Indonesian Muslim community, this

study indicates that the growing religiosity among Indonesia's Muslim will not lead to

significant change in their political attitudes: vast majority of them are personally tolerant and

moderate in their outlook and very few Indonesian Muslim are attracted to Islamism in the

democratic election of 1999 and 2004.

In studying Indonesian politics, the Muhammadiyah and NU organizations are

important for some reasons. They are two largest Indonesia's Islamic organizations, with

approximately 25 and 35 million members respectively. Both organizations represent very

different segments of the Indonesian Muslim population - from a sociological, theological,

socio-economic, and political perspective. In fact, the cleavage between them represents the

primary cleavage in Indonesian Islam, although not mutually exclusive. With a little

simplification, it is said that the NU represents traditional Islamic stream, which is mainly

active in the rura1 areas. Meanwhile, the Mubammadiyah represents modernist Islamic stream,

which plays their roles in urban areas. Given their strong and overarching organizational

structures, the NU and Mubammadiyah have been playing their important roles in society, but

they do focus primarily on their own constituencies.

The significant of the NU and Muhammadiyah also lies in their political role since

their early developments. Both organizations playa significant role in developing a sense of

3

nationalism among native peoples; they also played their role as political forces during the

liberal democratic era in the 1950s: the NU once became a political party when it divorced

from the Islamic Masyumi party in 1952 (until 1984), within which the Muhammadiyah

remained one of (and subsequently became the dominant one among) its special organizational

members from 1945-1959; they also played a crucial role during the political crisis in 1965-

1967; and finally both played a significant role in the political change that ended the

authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998. In sum, the Muhammadiyah and NU organization have

been, and remain, important participants in Indonesia's political affairs.

Equally surprising, in studies of civil society in Indonesia during the 1990s and early

20oos, little attention has been shown to these associations. In the growing volume of studies on

Islam and civil society, they may be mentioned in passing but seldom appear to be thought of as

part of civil society themselves, unlike say students' associations, ICMl and issue-oriented

NGOs. Although there are quite a few recent studies ofMubammadiyah and especially ofNU,

most of these focus on their religious discourse, system of religious education, their national

leaders, or their role in national politics. There has hardly been any comprehensive inquiry on the

specific role these associations play in the intermediary entity, standing between state and society

as a whole, or their roles in the process of democratization.

This thesis presents a study of the Muhammadiyah and NU movements during the

political reform in Indonesia. To begin with, I am going to present a more thorough account on

their roles in "practical politics": how they keep their relationships with political parties,

particularly the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB), two

parties which not only were established by the Muhammadiyah and NU leaders respectively,

but also whose mass bases largely come from both organizations. It seems to me that both

4

organizations sought to steadfastly assert their independence from both parties, at least

formally. Although both parties incorporated non-Muhammadiyah and non-NU as well as non­

Muslim figures into their leaderships, many people, however, see both political parties are

invariably inseparable from both organizations.

It is also important to study how they played their roles in the 1999 and 2004 elections

as well as the subsequent tensions and co-operation between both organizations. For example,

prior to and during the 2004 presidential election, NU and Mnharnmadiyah played similarly

significant roles. Out of five pairs running for presidential election, two president candidates,

Amien Rais and Harn71lh Haz, came from Muhammadiyah and NU backgrounds respectively, and

two vice-president candidates, Hasyim Muzadi and Shalahuddin Wahid, came from NU

organizations. Ahead of the election, not only did both organizations provide a remarkably large

number of votes whose loyalty is relatively guaranteed, they also formed a tacit alliance with

political parties during the election campaign. This further reflected their ambiguity between retreat

from ''practical politics" and keep equal distance to all political parties.

Beside their roles during the political reform, the second aspect I would like to study

is the contribution of these organizations in the process of democratization, a highly overlooked

subject in scholarly works of Indonesian politics. In a society where religion plays an important

role in public life, as in Indonesia, the role of religion, of religious institutions, and of social

movements that either had a religious identity or were influenced by religion was prominent

since the early democratization process.

Despite the coercive and strict control of the Suharto regime, for example, since early

in the 1990s Mnhammadiyah and NU are not predicated on the privatization of Islam and the

secularization of society, but rather on the self-organization of an autonomous Muslim public

5

civil society, able to counteract and countervail state power and willing to promote and defend

a public culture of pluralism, political participation, and social justice.8 Both also played a

predominant role in the pro-democracy movement that forced President Suharto to step down

in May 1998. While they provided a large number of students and members in mass protests,

their leaders, along with secular and non-Muslim leaders, were especially crucial in mobilizing

them for peaceful protests and demands for democratization.

After the fall of Suharto, both organizations also function to support the development

of political parties by stimulating political participation and increasing the political efficacy and

skill of democratic citizenship. Moreover, their young generations worked in concert, along

with other NGOs, in the People's Voter Education Network (JPPR) not only in monitoring the

1999 and 2004 general and presidential elections in order to ensure their fairness, but also in

promoting an appreciation of the obligations as well as rights of democratic citizenship by

carrying out a massive civic education program.

In a new democracy, both organizations widen their functions to promote the more

substantive dimensions of democracy: increasing the transparency and accountability of

government. From 2003 to 2006 both worked hand in hand to carry out anti-corruption

programs. As social-religious organizations, however, they do not focus on investigation and

advocacy. They systematically addressed corruption issues by emphasizing their moral

persuasion; developing theological interpretations ofQur'an and Smmah concerning anti­

corruption verses; media campaigning; drafting integrity pacts for candidates running in

regional elections; increasing the awareness of regional members of parliament in pro-poor

budgeting; as well as establishing corruption watch dogs in regional level.

8 See Hefuer, "A Muslim Civil Society," 1998.

6

The most important one, both organizations have been working in maintaining the

pluralistic and tolerant nature of Indonesian society. Many studies affirmed that Indonesia's

largest Muslim social organizations are significant obstacles to the further growth of Islamism.9

Not only are their leaders' tolerant and pluralistic views, but their broader memberships also

seemed immune to Islamism's allure. These organizations have grown from the same soil as

Indonesian Islamism, but their roots run considerably deeper, and they have in turn been

enormously successful in entrenching political moderation in Indonesia. Their strength is one

of the great causes for hope in Indonesian democracy.

There are two questions I would like to answer from this thesis. Firstly, how the

Mllhammadiyah and Nahdlatul mama organizations maintain their positions as autonomous

entities beyond state and simultaneously intensely involve in politics. Secondly, what role have

these two organizations been playing in the democratization process.

By ''politics'', I refer in the course of this thesis both to political society and state, that

are political parties, election campaign, and government. By democratization, I refer to the

process of political change took place in Indonesia which comprises of three major phases:

liberalization, transition, and consolidation.

This thesis is an in-depth case study ofMuhammadiyah and NU, and their relations with

political society and state in Indonesia. This is not a study about the theological discourse within the

Mllhammadiyah and NU communities. Instead, it is all about the behavior, choices, policies, and

strategies adopted by the Mllhammadiyah and NU organizations in their interactions with political

society and state over a period of post-Suharto era. Therefore, this thesis offers a political-historical-

9 See Mujani and Liddle, "Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion," 2004.

7

anthropologiCal perspective on the Muhammadiyah and NU movements: their relations with

politiCal parties and state during the reform era.

Nor is this thesis a comparative study between them; I am not going to compare the

differences and similarities between Muharnmadiyah and NU in their dealing with politics.

Instead, I am going to put them together in this study: how both have been cooperating and

competing each other, how they have been going through their tensions and fraternities, and

how they have been both dealing and instigating their rivalries and cordialities.

B. Civil Society, Islam, and Democratization

Central to this thesis are some conceptual frameworks regarding the concept of civil

society, democratization, the relation between civil society and democratization, of Islam and

civil society, as well as of religious organization and democratization. In doing so, I may not

propose new definitions and understandings; I am rather going to borrow them from able

theorists and political scientists whose works are prevalent in the field of political science.

There are several ways in which political scientists use and define "civil society" since

the concept is rather ambiguous and means different things to different people. As Lehmbruch

puts it, "Quite often, when 'civil society' is used in the politiCal literature or the media, it is no

longer clear what exactly the respective author has in mind. The denotations of "civil society"

have undergone significant changes over time and in different contexts. As a consequence, the

meaning in the contemporary discourse is franght with considerable ambiguity". 10

Despite its long intellectual and political history, in this thesis I am largely following

Larry Diamond and his colleagues in defining and distinguishing the concept of civil society. In

his seminal article published more than a decade ago, Diamond defines the concept as ''the

10 Lehmbruch, "Gennany", 2001, p. 230.

8

realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, and

autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. "II In a similar

vein, according to Linz and Stepan, civil society is "arena of the polity where self-organizing

and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to

create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests."12

According to Diamond, civil society is distinct from "society" in general in that it

involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions,

preferences, and ideas, to exchange infonnation, to achieve collective goals, to make demand on the

state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable.!3

Similarly, it is also important to distinct civil society from political society. According to Linz and

Stepan, "political society" is an "arena in which political actors compete for the legitimate right to

exercise control over public power and the state apparatus."14

Therefore, according to Diamond, civil society is distinct from political society, which

encompasses all those organized actors whose primarily goal is to win control of the state or at

least some positions for themselves within it.15 Organizations in civil society, according to

Diamond, may indeed form alliances with parties, but if they become captured by parties, or

hegemonic within them, they move their primary locns of activity to political society and lose

much of their ability to perform certain unique mediating and democracy-building functions. 16

After defining the concept of civil society, it is important to understand the concept of

democratization. In this study several terms are used in similar ways: democratization, political

II Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society," 1994, p. 3-17. 12 Linz and Stepan, ''Toward Consolidated Democracies," 1996, p. 14-33. 13 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 1999, p. 221. 14 Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," 1996, p. 14-33. 15 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 1999, p. 221. 16 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 1999, p. 221.

9

change, and political reform. While many will take issue with the impreciseness of using these

terms interchangeably, what I am interested in here is the process of political change toward a

more open, accountable, fair political system, and to me this is the essence of democratization.

There are many scholarly works on democratization. The literature that has the most

relevance to this thesis are works that came out in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as scholars

offered explanations of the wave of countries undergoing democratization.17 While terminology

often differs, there are some common elements in much of this work. In a simplest way, the

democratization process involves three processes: liberalization, transition, and consolidation.

By liberalization, I refer to measures which entail a significant opening of the previous

anthoritarian regime. This process could result from either split in the authoritarian regime or

popular mobilization, or could be a result of an interaction between them. Meanwhile, by

transition, O'Donnell and Schmitter define it as "the interval between one political regime and

another. "18 They go on to explain that transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching

of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of

some forms of democracy, the return to some forms of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a

revolutionary alternative. Finally, consolidation, according to Diamond, is ''the process by which

democracy becomes so broadly aud profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very

unlikely to break down."19 In a similar vein, Linz and Stepan note that consolidated democracy is

a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned

incentives and disincentives has become, ''the only game in town."20 It involves behavioral and

17 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule, 1986; Huntington, The Third Wave, 1991; and Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 1991.

18 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 1986, p. 6. 19 Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society," 1994, p. 3-17. 20 Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," 1996, p. 14-33.

10

institutional changes that nonnalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty. This

nonnalization requires the expansion of citizen access, development of democratic citizenship

and culture, broadening ofleadership recruitment and training, and the like.

It is important to note that there does not seem to be any logical sequence to these

processes. Democracy activists do admit that it is not inevitable that transitional countries will

move steadily on this assumed path from opening and breakthrough to consolidation.

Transitional countries, they say, can and do go backward or stagnate as well as move forward

along the path. Of the nearly 100 countries considered as "transitional" in recent years, even

only a relatively small number-probably fewer than 20-are clearly en route to becoming

successful, well-functioning democracies or at least have made some democratic progress and

still enjoy a positive dynamic of democratization.21 Most of the ''transitional countries,"

however, are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy. They have entered what

Carothers calls "a political gray zone."22

Keeping these definitions of civil society and democratization in mind, the next

theoretical task is to understand the relation between both concepts. Needless to say, theories of

democratization seek to understand the factors influencing the emergence and success of the

formal properties of modem democracy in particular society. Many scholars come to a

conclnsion that the dynamics of the democratization are not just a matter of political elite. Such

theories are increasingly inclined to attribute a role in democratization to civil society,23 and

this trend is discernible in many part of the world.24 However, this does not mean that civil

21 See Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" 1996, p. 20-37. 22 Carothers, "The End of the Transition PIII8digm, " 2002. 23 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 48-56; and Diamond, Developing

Democracy, p. 218-260. 24 Alagappa, Civil Society, 2004; and Feinberg alai. (eds), Civil Society, 2006.

11

society alone can produce democracy. Thus, what seems to be important is a balance between

civil society, political society, economic society, and the state, especially on the development

of cultures of social trust and respect for the rule oflaw. Civil society, then, is just one factor in

the process of democratization.

Schmitter and Diamond theorize the role of associations in society as contributing to

or articulating the demands and interest of various sectors of the population.2s In such a

position, civil society is poised to advance democracy in two generic ways: by helping to

generate a transition from authoritarian rule to electoral democracy and by deepening and

consolidating democracy once it is established.

In fact, Diamond outlines the ten democratic functions of civil society: (1), providing

the basis for the limitation of state power; (2), supplementing the role of political parties in

stimulating political participation; (3), serving as a crucial arena for the development of other

democratic attributes, such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a

respect for opposing viewpoints; (4), creating channels for the articulation, aggregation, and

representation of interests; (5), generating a wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and so

mitigate, the principal polarities of political conflict; (6), recruiting and training new political

leaders; (7), monitoring elections: deterring fraud, enhancing voter confidence, affirming the

legitimacy of the result, or demonstrating an opposition victory despite gove=ent fraud; (8),

disseminating information and aiding citizens in the colIective pursuit and defense of their

interests and values; (9), supporting economic reform; and (10), strengthening the democratic

state by giving citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it. 26

2S Schmitter, "Civil Society East and West," 1997; and Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society," 1994. 26 Diamond, ''Rethinking Civil Society," 1994, p. 7-11.

12

Given these theories of civil society, democratization, and the relation between them,

thus, what kind of cultural variation can be accommodated within the scope of civil society and

democratization? Is Islam uniquely different in its resistance to the conditions of civil society

and democratization? Islam is perhaps the prime example of a religious tradition that is widely

considered in the West to be in tension if not outright conflict with the normative tradition of

civil society,27 and contemporary perceptions are now further shaped by the events of

September 11, 2001. In his influential book, Ernest Gellner concludes that Islam is

incompatible with civil society, both normatively and empirically, since Islam is fundamentally

unsecularized.28 Gellner understands secularization as the declining social significance of

religion. He says that in industrial or industrializing societies religion loses much of its

erstwhile hold over men and society. Where religion remains socially important, argues

Gellner, the development of individual autonomy is constrained. This in turn constrains the

development of civil society because, as Ozda1ga explains, ''individuals, who are not able to act

independently of the community of believers, cannot become the building-stones of the kind of

intermediary organizations on which civil society is built."29

In the same token, the eminent Turkish Scholar, Serif Mardin, begins by answering ''the

question of whether the ideals of democracy and civil society are genera1isable to the Muslim

world," with the response that "civil society is a Western Dream, a historical aspiration," and as

such, "does not translate into Islamic terms."30 Therefore, in spite of the appearing of aspects of

pluricentric social organization that undexpinned the historic development of civil society in the

West elsewhere in the world, including in Muslim societies, as part of the modernization process,

27 Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, 1996. 28 Gellner, The Condition of Liberty, 1994, p. 15. 29 Ozdalga, "Civil Society and its Enemies," 1997, p. 74. 30 Mardin, ''Civil Society and Islam," 1995, p. 278-279.

13

Mardin warns that Westem and Muslim "dreams" have not converged, because Muslim societies

have inherited a "collective memory of a total culture which once provided a 'civilized' life of a

tone different from that of the West.''3!

There are empirical as well as conceptual reasons to believe that those arguments are

grounded in dubious assumptions. It is interesting to put here the three most relevant of four

challenges to Gellner's arguments proposed by David Herbert in his comprehensive study,32

Firstly, Herbert argues that Muslim have generated a wide range of responses to the discourses

of democracy and civil society. Indeed, normatively, Muslims have taken up a full range of

positions on the compatibility or incompatibility of the relationship between Islam and both

democracy and civil society. Each position seeks to justify itself in relation to the primary

sources of Islamic law: the Qur'an and Sunnah. This reality contradicts the simplistic integraJist

position-the view that Islam insists that all aspects of life should directly governed by its

unchanging precepts-that Gellner attributes to Islam.

Secondly, Herbert argues that the historical model on which Gellner bases his

argument applies only to a minority of historic Muslim societies and that the historically

predominant model of Muslim society has been characterized by institutional differentiation. It

is important to note that what is generally conceived of as the Islamic or Muslim countries in

the Arabian Peninsula is in fact home to a small minority of the ummah. Out of the more 1.3

billion Muslim population in the world today, the majority inhabit South and Southeast Asian

regions. There are also a significant number of Muslim populations in Central Asia, West and

North Africa, and, surprisingly, Europe.

3! Mardin, "Civil Society and Islam,» 1995, p. 290. 32 Herbert, Religion and Civil Society, 2003, p. 76-79.

14

Political scientists and journalists sometimes misleadingly equate Islam with Arab

culture. They then assert correctly that there are no democracies in the Islamic countries of the

Arab world, leaving the false impression there are no Muslims living under democratic

regimes. In fact, as Stepan points out, a case can be made that about half of all the world's

Muslims, over 600 million, live in democracies, near-democracies, or intermittent

democracies.33 It seems that Gellner bases his generalization on his studies of Muslim countries

in North Africa. AI; a matter of fact, what he claims about that region cannot necessarily be

generaIized to all Muslim countries.

FilUllly, Herbert argues that in practice in many parts of the Muslim world today Islam

has proven itself capable of mobiIization as a public discourse without stifling but rather

contributing to democratic pluralism. Religion, as Esposito points out, has been a significant

factor in the reassertion of civil society in many Muslim societies.34 He argues that Islamic

history provides examples of many non-state actors, institutions, and organizations that served as

intermediaries between the ruler/gove=ent and the people. Meanwhile, in the contemporary

Muslim world, NGOs, professional associations, social welfare agencies, as well as educational

and financial institutions have proliferated not only in the most populous Muslim region of

Southeast Asia, 35 but also across the Muslim world.36

The last theoretical task necessary to this thesis is to understand the relationship

between religious organization and democratization. The literature of democratization mostly

focuses on the role of the middle class, labor unions, election monitoring groups, and other

33 stepan, ''Religion, Democracy," 2000. 34 Esposito, "Islam and Civil Society," 2003, p. 70. 35 Nakamura, at al. (eds.), Islam and Civil Society In Southeast Asia, 2001. 36 Sajoo (ed.), Civil Society in the Muslim World, 2002; Kubba, "Arab and Democracy, 2000.

15

NGO institutions in the regime change. However, little attention has been paid to how religious

organizations are affecting democratization.

In his provocative book, Huntington gives primacy of place to Christianity as the

distinctive positive influence in the making of Western civilization: ''Westem Christianity, first

Catholicism and then Catholicism and Protestantism, is historically the single most important

characteristic of West em civilization."37 For Huntington, Westem culture's key contribution has

been the separation of church and state, something that he sees as foreign to the world's other major

religious systems (Confucianism and Islam).

In this regard, Stepan and Casanova warn us not to be trapped in major

misinterpretations.38 Such a point of view is based on the assumption ofunivocality. We, as

Stepan notes, should beware of assuming that any religion's doctrine is univocally pro-

democratic or antidemocratic. Westem Christianity has certainly been multivocal concerning

democracy and the twin tolerations. At certain times in its history, Catholic doctrine has been

marshalled to oppose liberalism, the nation-state, tolerance, and democracy.

Secondly, such a perception falls into the fallacy of ' 'unique founding conditions."

This fallacy involves the assumption that the unique constellation of specific conditions that

were present at the birth of such phenomena as electoral democracy, a relatively independent

civil society, or the spirit of capitalism must be present in all cases if they are to thrive. To put

it differently, one can hardly make the argument that Catholicism is intrinsically, that is,

"essentially", democratic or has elective affinities with democracy or with civil society.

Finally, Catholicism was not the only religion that played a positive role in civil

society formation and democratization throughout the third wave. Other religious groups

37 Huntington, The Clash o/Civilizations, 1996, p. 70. 38 Stepan, "Religion, Democracy," p. 44; Casanova, ''Civil Society and Religion," 2001, p. 1042-1043.

16

played equally positive roles in various places: Lutherans in East Gennany, Protestants as well

as Catholics in South Korea, Episcopalians and various other churches in South Africa, and in

Romania, a Hungarian Unitarian minister, who triggered that country's revolution.

Casanova argues that religions have potential roles in civil society fonnation. He

proposes a three-step reconstruction of the transfonnation of religions that make possible their

roles in democratization.39 Firstly, religion in general can serve as autonomous public spaces

and as a countervailing power to state power. Secondly, religions have to give up their

monopolistic claims and recognize religious freedom and freedom of conscience as universal

and inviolable human rights. Thirdly, not only should religions voluntarily disestablish

themselves from the state, but they also should disengage from political society proper. This

does not necessarily mean the privatization of religions. Contrarily, this relocation is the very

condition for the possibility of a modem public religion.

As shown by Cheng and Brown, some religious organizations have played a decisive

role in democratic transition in Asia, while others have been donnant, and still others have

acted in alliances with conservative politicians and business interests to block democratic

development.40 They contend that religious doctrines do not predetermine the involvement of a

religious organization in the politics of democratization. Doctrines may constrain or inspire, but

they do not preclude or determine. They go on to say that most religions are multivioced; their

doctrines could be and have been interpreted in ways that permit, if not encourage, political

action for the cause of democracy.

39 Casanova, "Civil Society and Religion," 2001, p.1045-1047. 40 Cheng and Brown, "Introductioo," 2006. p. 3.

17

As far as religious organizatious' involvement in the process of democratization is

concerned, according to Cheng and Brown, it is shaped and influenced by three key factors.41

Firstly are their ties to preexisting regimes. Secondly are their ties to political opposition. And

finally is how they define (or redefine) their role in civil society. In this seuse, religious

doctrines do not explain the variations on the calculations of religious organizations about

whether to directly engage themselves in the democratization process.

c. Literature Review

Although many authors have studied political Islam and the state in Indonesia, not much

attention has been given to specific Muslim civil society organizations, namely Mllbammadiyah

and Nahdlatul Ulama and their interplay with politics and their role in the process of

democratization. Douglas Ramage gives an emphasis on the centrality of the Pancasila ideology

and the contrasting views of it in four political groupings: Abdurrabman Wahid and NU, the

Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), the armed forces, and secular nationaIists.42

Other authors have emphasized the centrality of the transformation of political ideas and practices

within Muslim communities during New Order,43 the Subarto regime's specific strategies to

structure state-Islamic relations,44 the emergence of civil pro-democratic Muslim in the process of

democratization in Indonesia, 45 and the compatibility of Islam and democratic values in Indonesian

Muslim community in the reform era. 46

A large number of scholars have studied in detail particular major Islamic organizations,

including their relationship with larger political structure of the state. While studies by van

41 Cheng and Brown, "Introduction," 2006, p. 14-17. 42 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, 1995. 43 Effendy, Islam and the State, 2002. 44 Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, 2002. 45 Hefiter, Civil Islam, 2000. 46 Mujani, Rellglaus Democrats, 2003.

18

Bruinessen, Fei1lard, FeaI1y, Kadir, and Bush emphasize the centrality of the NU on their studies,47

some other authors, such as AIfian, Nakamura, Peacock, and Syamsuddin emphasize the centrality

of the Muhammadiyah in their inquiries.48

Among these scholarly wOIks, Kadir and Bush's dissertations as well as Bruinessen and

Fei1lard's books have some similarities with my own thesis, particularly in term of their approaches

to studying NU. So does Syamsuddin's dissertation on Mnharnmadiyah. Their studies, by and

large, provide extensive discussions of particular NU or Mnbammadiyah' s political activities

dIning the New Order and aftermath (Bush's Dissertation), despite their formal disengagements

with political parties and their foci on non-political (cultural and social) activities since the 1970s

and 1980s. They, to large extent, give their works an emphasis on elite discourse, with a special

attention to their relationships with the New Order regime (Bruinessen, Kadir, and Syarnsuddin),

the army (Feillard), and the Habibie and Wabid's presidencies (Bush).

The first distinction between my thesis and these scholarly works is that none of them

studying both the Mnharnmadiyah and NU. fuamining both organizations altogether, I will present

a more comprehensive picture of Indonesian Mnslims and underscore that, despite several different,

even rival, varieties of political expression within Muslim co=unity, they have been working in

concert to support the democratic change in Indonesia. While one organization seems to be more

willing to submit to the state control than the other, broader picture will show us that neither is less

democratic than the other.

Secondly, some of these scholarly works already deal with the roles played by the Islamic

community and the NU particularly in the incipient process of political IIbera1ization (Kadir) and in

47 van Bruinessen, NU. 1994; Feillard, NU Vis-a-vis Negara, 1999; Featy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia, 1998; Kadir, Traditional Islamic Society, 1999; Bush, Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia, 2002.

48 Alfian, Muhammadiyah, 1989; Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree, 1983; Peacock, Purifying the Faith, 1978; Syamsuddin, Religion and Politics in Islam, 1991.

19

the long process of political transition in Indonesia (Refuer and Bush). However, their studies by

and large give their emphasis on the relationship between Muslim civil society and the state. While

I am also studying the relationship between the Muslim civil society organization and the state,

however, I expand my inquiry into their further contribution, as civil society movements and as

religious organizations, in the process of democratization.

Finally, as most of their time-period coverage is the New Order era, except Bush's

dissertation which extends to 2002, there was no a comprehensive account of the involvements of

both NU and Mllbammadiyah during the democratization era until the SBY's presidency. The

extension of the time-period coverage will in turn lead to the further interpretation of the

significance ofMllbammadiyah and NU's political activities for the full-fledge democratization, not

simply in the state-civil society relations during the liberalization and transition era.

D. Methodology

To address this topic, I will conduct a qualitative study. I am going to employ

ethnographic methods to explore conceptions and practices of two Muslim civil society

associations in Indonesia: Muharnmadiyah and NU. Therefore, the first sources of data

collection are semi-structured interviews, discussions, and participant observation. I have a

close relation with both institutions. I was born into a NU family. My father is still an important

figure ofNU in my sub-district. When I studied my Islamic senior high school in Jogjakarta, I

was also involved in the NU Students Association (IPNU).When I moved to Jakarta to continue

my undergraduate study in the State Institute of Islamic Studies (lAIN, currently urN) in

Jakarta, I was involved in the Muharnmadiyah Students Association (IMM). I was a vice

president of that organization in 1999-2001 and 2001-2003. I have also been the Executive

Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Civi1ization, a research center under the

20

Central Board ofMuhammadiyah in 2001-2006. This center is incorporated in the People's

Voter Education Network (JPPR), a consortium of numerous youth wings ofMuhammadiyah

and NU and other NGOs working in civic education and election monitoring. Finally, when

Muhammadiyah and NU launched anti-corruption programs in 2003, I was also appointed to

lead the Muhammadiyah Institute for Good Governance Program, the Muhammadiyah's task

force of the program. All these activities enabled me to have a close relationship with almost all

leaders ofNU and Muhammadiyah. Such a personal background has SP3!ked my interest in

studying both Mllbammadiyah and NU, and has enabled me to have a closer look into the

"soul" and inner feeling of these organizations.

My fieldwork of study was effectively carried out during summer 2007. I was

primarily based in Jakarta, where the NU and (one of) Muharnmadiyah headquarter is located.

However, I was also able to attend numerous discussions held by both Mllbammadiyah and NU

organizations. Beside this fieldwork, I had another fieldwork in Indonesia during December

2007-January 2008 to carry out a more detailed and extensive interviews with leaders of

Muhammadiyah and NU. These interviews ask resource persons not only the facts they knew,

but also their interpretations of those facts.

In addition, sources of data include documents, reports, resolutions, speeches,

magazines, internal publications, and other Mllbammadiyah and NU materials not available

outside Indonesia or, in many instances, not available outside both organizations. I also make

extensive use oflocal Indonesian newspapers and magazines.

Finally, I use secondary sources. In addition to the more genera1literature concerning

state-civil society relations and on religion and politics, this thesis draws on writings focusing

on the dynamic interplay between state and Muslim civil society organizations in Indonesia.

21

The analyses of the Indonesian state are quite extensive. So do the analyses of political Islam in

Indonesia. The existing writings on the relations between Muslim civil organizations and the

state provide a general but important background of both organizations. Finally, existing

studies of the Muhammadiyah and NU are heavily referred to throughout the thesis as a means

to provide additional historical data othexwise unavailable in the primary documentations.

E. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is organized into five chapters but is not rigidly set out in a chronological

order. My first task is to establish the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the study.

Therefore, this chapter not only reviews the discourse of Islam, civil society, and

democratizations, but it explains the significance of this study as well. Chapter II is an

overview of the relationship between political Islam and the state during roughly fifty years of

Indonesian independence in which Mnbammadiyah and Nahdlatul illarua (NU) had been

transforming from political to civil.

Chapter ill deals with the political roles played by these two organizations during the

transition period. First of all, it presents a comprehensive account on how they keep their

relationships with political parties. This chapter also deals with the roles played by the

Muhammadiyah and NU in the 1999 and 2004 legislative and presidential elections as well as

the subsequent tensions and co-operation between both organiz.ations. It also analyzes the

leadership changes within both organizations in 2004 and 2005 respectively and their

implication for both organizations in the near future political and societal affairs. Finally, it

examines the possible roles played by Indonesian Muslim civil society organizations and their

leaders in the 2009 election.

22

Chapter IV examines the contribution of both organizations to the democratization

process. It looks first at their roles to sustain their position as independent civil organizations

during the last decade of the New Order regime and subsequently transform themselves into

movements clamoring demands for democratization. It also studies how their young members

worked in concert, not only in the election monitoring but also in a massive civic education

program. Equally important, it deals with how both organizations widen their functions to

promote the more substantive dimensions of democracy: increasing the transparency and

accountability of govermnent. It also studies how both organizations have been working to

maintain the plura1istic and tolerant nature of Indonesian society. Finally, this chapter studies

not only the interconnection between intemational funding received by most Islamic NGOs and

the internal democratization, but the state-society relation in post-Suharto period as well.

The final part of the study, at one level deals with the questions of Muslim civil

society organizations and democratization as well as Muslim civil society and the state in

Indonesia. More genera11y, the chapter will reflect upon larger question about the relationship

between Islam and civil society in the Muslim world.

23

CHAPTER II

MUHAMMADIYAH, NU, AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVILITY

A. Introduction

Indonesia is a home to the world's largest Muslim population of approximately 200

million people. However Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Nor Indonesia is a secular state. It is

not an Islamic state in a sense that the 1945 Constitution rejects the superiority of any religion

over the other. It is also not a secular state in the conventional sense of relegating religion to the

private sphere, and enforcing a strict separation between religion and state. The philosophical

basis of the state, Pancasila (five principles) begius with a declaration of the beliefin one God,

and the state recognizes six major religions. AIl a matter of fact, religion in Indonesia occupies

an important, and also ambiguous, position in the public affairs.

This ambiguity has in part been the result of the position of Islam in Indonesian

history and society. Having aware of their overwhelming majority, organized Muslims have

been unwilling to limit their activities to the nonpolitical realm. This refusal sterns not only

from adherence to doctrinal principle-there is no separation between religion and politics in

Islam-but also from fear of being marginalized from political arena. Unfortunately, within a

numerical majority, political Islam in Indonesia is an active minority. Therefore, political

organizations committed to explicitly Islamic goals have never been able to garner sufficient

mass support to control the goverument and establish a state based on Islamic principles.

This chapter will first present a historical overview of the origin of the ideological

pluralism within Indonesian Islam, of which political Islam has become a minority within a

numerical majority. Secondly, this chapter will present an overview of several critical moments

24

in the political development of Indonesian Islam during the roughly fifty years of the

independence period in which Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) had been playing a

significant role. This is purported to explore the organizational precedents for non-state social

associations for civil society in the majority Mnslim nation of Indonesia.

B. The Origins of Muhammadiyah and NU

Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country. Nearly 88 percent of its

approximately 220 million people identify themselves as Muslims. This country, along with

other Southeast Asian countries, has long been at the center of Asian maritime trade networks.

Hence, the global connection of religious and cultural systems to Indonesia existed long before

the present stage of globalization. Since the coming of Islam to Southeast Asia, Islamic

worldwide models for religious life have combined with distinctive local Indonesian patterns,

supporting the development of vibrant regional Muslim CUltures.! Today, these cultures

continually shape and are shaped by the changing conditions of life in contemporary Indonesia.

Moreover, Indonesia is also the largest archipelagic nation, spanning all or parts of five large

and thousands of smaller inhahited islands, each one ecologically and ethno-linguistically

distinct.2 Within these diverse "indigenous" ethnic groups, there is a small (around 3 percent of

the population) Chinese population widely seen as non-indigenous (non-pribumi), and resented

by many because of its disproportionate ownership of middle and large-scale private enterprise,

thank to the Dutch colonial policy. In addition to its Muslim majority, there is a substantial

number of Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and tribal animists.

Complicating matters even further, as Hefuer says, despite its Sunni majority in

theological orientation, these Muslims have been deeply divided along ethnic, regional, and

I See Hefuer, "Religion: Evolving Pluralism," 1999, pp. 205-236. 2 See Cn'bb, ''Nation,'' 1999, pp. 3-38; Emmerson, "What Is Indonesia?" 2005, pp. 7-73.

25

ideologicallines.3 The fissures are of two main inextricably linked kinds, so far as their political

effect is concerned: one is based on the extent to which the religion itself is regarded as a valid

motive force, and the other on the division between the "modernist" and "traditionalist"

interpretation of it. The spread of Islam in the archipelago, particularly in Java was uneven. The

religion went from the coast to the interior. Its spread reflected trading networks, the rivalry

between coastal and interior states, and the competition of different cultural groups. In some other

islands, the religion penetrated smoothly. Examples include Sumatera and South Sulawesi. In

there places, the spread of Islam did not contend with the cultural legacies of animism, Hinduism,

and Buddhism. Historically, therefore, many Muslims from the nation's largest ethnic group, the

Javanese, have been of syncretic or nominal Islamic persuasion (abangan), as opposed to strict

Muslim (santri), and thus resistant to the demands of Islamic orthodoxy.4

In the social structure of Indonesian Islam there is also an historical fault line between

two relatively distinct (though also in some ways blurry and now fading) religious-social-

economic-political orientatious, namely the "modernist" and "traditionalist". The modernist (or

reformist) movements,S which had their inspirations from the Islamic reform in the Middle East

during the second half of the nineteenth century, were both backward and forward-looking in

that it aimed to cleanse Islam of allegedly non-Islamic accretions acquired during the centuries

since the age of the Prophet Muhammad and, at the same time, sought to demonstrate that the

Muslim faith was based on rationality and thus not in conflict with the scientific spirit of the

modern world. The influence of reformist ideas spread in Indonesia as more and more

3 Hefiler, "A Muslim Civil Society?" 1998, p. 290. 4 The variants of Javanese Islam and their social significance are descnoed in Geertz, The Religion of

Java, 1960; and Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java, 1963. S The standard accowrt on the modernist movemeots in the late colonial Indonesia, see Noer, The

Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942, 1973.

26

Indonesians visited the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) as pilgrims or students and

returned as bearers of the new approach.6

By the beginning of the twentieth century, several modernist organizations were

established, the most influential of which was the Muhammadiyah (the followers of

Muhammad).? Founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta, Java, the Muhammadiyah

soon established itself at the forefront of the movement to reorient Islam and society. Its main

principles are derived from the Koranic dictum, "arnar rna 'ru! nahy rnunkar" (calling to do

good and refrain from evil deeds). The main impetus for its establishment was to challenge

what they perceived as the two main weaknesses in Javanese society: on the one hand they

regarded traditional Islamic education as backward and incapable of coping with the challenge

of the modem world, and on the other, they rejected the non-Islamic accretions to Islamic

practice and urged a return to the basic purity of Islam as found in the Koran and Hadith.8

Similarly, they observed with bitterness and resentment how the Dutch had ruled over the

country and had built a colonial educational system dedicated almost entirely to the preparation of

people to work as colonial administrators and clerks.9 Facing these real challenges, The

Muhammadiyah thus concentrated its energies mainly on education, health services, and care for

the poor, and eschewed fonnal politics. For example, in contrast to traditional Islamic education,

Mnhammadiyah schools combined the model of European school and Islamic education, and thus

taught science, math, history and geography along with traditional Islamic subjects.

6 On the origin of Islamic refornrism in the Middle East and its impact on Sontheast Asian Islam, see Azra, The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia, 1992. On the comparative study between the Mubammadiyah and Abduh's ideas, see Lubis, Pemikiran Muhamnuuliyah don Muhammad Abduh, 1993.

1 See Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree, 1983; Pescock, PurifYing the Faith, 1984; A1fian, Muhammadiyah, 1989.

8 On the Mubammadiyah's theology and ideology, see Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse, 2001; Federspiel, "The Mubammadiyah," 1970, pp. 57-79; Nakamnra, "The Reformist Ideology of Mubammadiyah," 1980, pp. 273-286.

9 On the encounter between Mubammadiyah and Christian mission, see Shihab, The Muhammadiyah Movements, 1995.

27

In response of the proliferation of the modernist, reformist organizations, more

traditionally uIama organized themselves into the Nahdlatul Ulama (the Awakening of Islamic

scholars-NU) in East Java in 1926.10 Challenging the modernist's emphasis on self-study and

individual responsibility, the traditionalists defended the privileged role of religious scholars by

pointing out that religious scholars (ulama) were heirs of the Prophets (al-ulama waratsatul

anbiya) in that they were part of the chain ofIslamic knowledge leading back to the Prophet

Muhammad. Given their anthority on Islamic law and its classical commentaries they served,

through their pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), as centers for the dissemination of Islamic

knowledge in the interior, rura1 area of Javanese society. While the Muhammadiyah tended to

be more successful in attracting better-educated followers from urban areas, the NU generally

retained the loyalty of the network of these religious scholars (ulama) who, through their

pesantren, had great influence among the students and ordinary people of the peasantry.!! As

far as the organizational style is concerned, the NU also emphasized on these relatively

autonomous and dispersed charismatic religious scholars, in contrast to the Muhammadiyah

which developed organizations with rule-governed bureaucracies and open election.

Although the NU and Muhammadiyah have grown closer together, the tension

between these two orientations has remained a key feature of Indonesian politics and society to

this day. Despite their rivalry, however, both organizations have experienced the similar

tendencies, being a large organization. While the NU established strong roots in East and

Central Java and South Kalimantan, the Mubammadiyah gradually became more of a

10 On the standard account for the NU, see Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama1985; van Bruinessen, NU, 1994; Feillard, NU Vis-a-vis Negara, 1999.

II Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition, 1999.

28

nationwide organization, spread out in cities throughout the country derived its support largely

from Sumatera, South Sulawesi, West Java and the north coast of Java

Ai; illustrated above, there was a ubiquitous precedence of autonomous and

independent institutions during the late colonial period. Furthermore, there was also a deep

tradition of pluralism and diversity within Indonesian society, not only between Muslims and

non-Muslim, but also between devout and nominal Muslim as well as between the modernist

and traditional Islam. The next part will examine tension and cooperation among and between

these diverse groups in the course of 50 years of Indonesian independence.

c. The Involvement of the Muhammadiyah and NU in Politics

The proclamation of Indonesian Independence in 1945 was soon followed by the

establishment of a provisional parliament and the commencement of political activities by a

large number of competing parties. Among these parties-religious, secular, and even

communist-Masyumi was one of the most significant.12 The Masyumi (Majelis Syuro

Muslimin Indonesia-Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) was created in the Japanese

period and transformed into a political party on November 7, 1945 in a Mubammadiyah's

boarding scbool in Yogyakarta 13 This party was comprised not only of individual members but

of corporate ones as well, namely, Muslim political, religious, social, and educational

organizations, as what so-called "special members", that are NU, Muhammadiyah, and some

other smaller and regional organizations.

Therefore, Muslim politicians have had powerful positions since the early days of the

Independence period. The Masyumi was a leading member of most coalition governments

12 See Noer, Partai Islam dalam Pentas Nasional, 1987. 13 A comprehensive account on the political relation between the Masyumi and Muhammadiyah, see

SyaifuIIah, Gerak Politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi, 1997.

29

during the Parliamentary Democracy period (1949-1956) and on several occasions had led the

governing coalitions.14 Early in the revolution, in exchange for giving up their claim to an

Islamically defined state, which would have alienated Christian and other religions minorities,

Islamic groups were granted their demand for a ministry of religion. From this base, largely

controlled by the NU but shared by a contingent ofMuhammadiyah educators, the Islamic

bureaucracy was expanded outwards throughout the archipelago.

But these gains coopted and divided political Islam. The Ministry became not a salient

but an enclave, while political competitions among Muslims, particularly between the

modernists and traditionalists, reinforced theological differences. The Masyumi, as has been

mentioned, was a federation of many organizations, each one with its own policies. Soon the

strain began to show. First, in 1948, the Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesian (pSI!) withdrew, to

campaign in its own right and under its own emblem. Then, in 1952, the NU broke away also to

campaign under its own emblem. IS This left the Masyumi to become the political vehicle of the

reformist movement, which took over the name virtually by default.

Throughout the 1950s, when political struggle was profoundly colored by ideological

battie,16 the Islamic parties and organizations, including the NU and Mubammadiyah, favored the

creation of a state based upon Islamic law. They believed in the holistic nature ofIslam as Islam

constitutes more than theological or ritual systems. Moreover, they argued, Islam does not

recognize the separation between the spiritual and temporal; rather it governs all aspects oflife.

14 On the rise and fall of the governments during this period, see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 1962.

" There were two reasons for the NU to withdraw. Firstly, as the reformists continued their efforts to dominate the federation, the NU sought to get a greater role by establishing its own party. Secondly, there was a dispute between Mnbammadiyah and NU as to which organization would control the Ministry of Religion in the next Masyumi-Ied coalition. For a comprehensive account for the political activities of the NU during this period, see Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia, 1998.

16 Feith concluded that there were five major political streams involved in the political battle during this period: Islamic traditionalism, Islamic modernism, socialism, oonmumism, and mdical nationalism. See Feith, "Introduction", in Feith and Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking, 1970, p. 1-24.

30

They also argued that Islam was the first basis on which Indonesia established a modern political

organization which attracted mass support. In this regard, they contended that Islam was the one

which first paved the way for political actions aiming at independence and which first planted the

seed of Indonesian unity. As a matter of fact, many of the Muslim leaders believed that

Indonesia's nationalism should be Islamic in nature. 17 Meanwhile, nationalist and non-Islamic

parties supported the retention ofPancasila and found the concept of an Islamic state distasteful.

Only Pancasila, they affirmed, could appeal to the varied, ethnic, regional, and religious groups

that comprised Indonesia. They contended that Islam, insofar as it entered politics qua Islam, was

a divisive element.1S Ideologically and intellectua11y, this tension was paralyzing for Islam so

long as it was directly engaged politically.

In the first general election of 1955, six parties campaigned under the barmer of Islam.

They expected to win an outright electoral majority and subsequently go on to establish an

Islamic state. To the surprise of almost everyone, however, six Islamic parties took at best

43.9% of the vote for parliament, indicating clearly enough that a large number ofMus1ims had

opted for non-Islamic parties. From an electoral field of more than thirty parties, the Sukarno-

led Indonesian National Party (PNI) won 22.3 percent of the vote; Masyumi, 20.9 percent; NU,

18, 4 percent; and the Indonesian Communist Party (PIG), 16.4 percent. 19

After the 1955 elections, when Sukarno started to promote his idea of Guided

Democracy, power moved to the presidency, the army, and the PKI.20 Other political parties

steadily lost strength, and therefore the ideological rivalries were increasing. Sukarno sought to

17 On the competing discourses between the Islamic group and nationalist group concerning the nature of Indonesian nationalism and the place of Islam during this period, see Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, 2005, Cha,pter 2.

1 On the dynamics of political Islam during this period, see Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modem Indonesia, 1982.

19 Feith, The Indonesian Electians of 1955, 1957, pp. 58-59. 20 See Feith, "President Sukamo, the Army and the Communists," 1964, pp. 969-980.

31

submerge these ideological differences in a single national belief. He called it Nasakom

(NasionaIisme, Agama [religion], Komunisme). Unfortunately, this new country could not be

simultaneously Marxist, Islamic, and developmentaIist, except perhaps in the mind of Sukamo.

As the Guided Democracy period came in 1959, the distinct political attitudes of

Islamic parties were discernible, to some extent reflecting differences in regional-cultural

backgrounds.21 The NU, culturally closer to the Javanese value system of the ruling elite and

following a long tradition of Sunni political conservatism, was always accommodative towards

the government of the day. To the NU, any government that allowed (and preferably facilitated)

its citizens the exercise of their religious obligations was acceptable. Its chief concrete

objective seemed to be to secure as much patronage from the government as possible.22

Meanwhile, the Masyumi, culturally closer to the Outer islands' value system of egalitarianism

did not shy away from open confrontation with Sukamo. The Masyumi never formulated ideas

about a specifically Islamic political system; it basically demanded western-style parliamentary

democracy with a greater say for committed Muslims in matters of government policy.

In political terms, this meant on the part of the NU a readiness to legitimize Sukamo's

presidency, to tolerate Sukamo's increasingly radical nationalism and left-wing sympathies,

and to participate in successive coalition governments that shared his views.23 By doing so, of

course, they ensured that they were in position of strength vis-a.-vis the reformists. The

Masyumi, on the other hand, would not compromise. It refused, on principle, to have any

association with a government that included Communist fellow travelers, and it resented

Sukamo's broad religious sympathies, his policies, and his personal lifestyles.

21 van Bruinessen, "Islamic State or State Islam?," 1996, p. 22. 22 For religio-political interpretation of the NO's political behavior during this period, see Haedar,

Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indanesia, 1994; Fea1y, "Rowing in a Typhoon," 1994. 23 See Federspiel, ''Sukarno and His Muslim Apologists," 1976.

32

The Masyumi's political power started to wane since the outbreak of the PRRI

rebellion in 1958. Masyumi did not officially support the rebellion but three of its top leaders

joined them. Given its ambivalent attitude toward the rebellions, it was labeled the party of

separatism and revolt.24 The Masyumi was forced to dissolve in 1960 for its supposed

complicity in the rebellion and its continuing opposition with Sukamo. Its leaders were placed

under political arrest; their supporters either joined NU or other small Islamic parties, i=ersed

themselves in religious or cultural activities, or remained silent. Prior to the dissolution,

Muha=adiyah dismantled its special membership to Masyumi in 1959 and devoted itseifto

educational, social, and religious activities.25 Islamic political activity during the Guided

Democracy period was therefore essentially dominated by the NU, whose freedom of action

was also circumscribed.26 Like all other parties, the NU was forced to give uncritical support to

Sukamo while hoping his goodwill would protect its interests.

The failed Communist coup of 1965 was a watershed in modern Indonesian history. It

brought about the fall ofSukamo and his Guided Democracy idea, and in its wake caused

terrible bloodshed.27 The PKI, the largest Communist party outside the Communist countries,

and its sympathizers were eliminated and the Suharto-Ied New Order regime came to power.

Both Muha=adiyah and particularly NU followers took active parts in the suppression of the

24 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 1966, p. 185. 25 It was during that time that Mubammadiyah formulated "Kepnoadian Muhammadiyah (The Character

ofMuharomadiyah)", which declared its identity as "an Islantic movement whose activities revolves around Islantic propagation (dakwah) both within Muslim community and society as a whole." This concept began to be deliberated in the 1956 Muhammadiyah Congress in PaIembang, South Swnatera, and was formaIly ratified in the 35th Muhammadiyah Congress in 1962 in Jakarta. The objective of this concept was that the Mubammadiyah sought to clear itself from any complicity in the Masyumi's political rivalry with the Sukarno, and therefore avoided any ensuing consequent of the Masyumi's dissolntion.

26 On political Islam during the Guided Democracy period, see Maarif; Islam dan Politil< di Indonesia Pada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin, 1988.

27 There is no reliable figures exist for the number of people who were killed. A scholarly consensus has settled on a figure of 400-500,000, but the correct figure could be half or twice as much. See, Cnob (ed.), The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966, 1990; Cnbb, "Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966," 2001.

33

PKI (Le. in killing thousands of alleged members and activists), particularly in strongly Muslim

areas such as East Java and Aceh.

As reward for their assistance in forcing Sukarno from power and liquidating the PKI,

Muslim leaders at first expected to be welcomed into the new regime or, at very least, allowed

to play an active political role. Gradually Islamic political leaders began to feel that Islam was

the most important civil force in society, as its major antagonist, the PKI and Sukarno, had

been eliminated. Members of the Masyumi had high expectations that their party would be

rehabilitated, on the assumption that they were the very people who had adamantly resisted

Sukamo's regime.28 As early as December 1965, a "Coordinating Body of Muslim Activities"

(Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin) was formed, uniting 16 Islamic organizations which

worked toward a rehabilitation of the Masyumi. From June 1966 onwards, many of them, and

in the first place the Muhammadiyah, openly began to advocate the return of the Masyumi.

The political rewards they expected never materialized. The impression in the Suharto

and military regime was that, with the Communists destroyed and the nationalists discredited,

the Muslim's political opportunity would be simultaneously obstructed. Early in 1967 Suharto

made it clear that the army would not countenance the revival of the Masyumi party. The

Suharto regime did allow a formation of a Masyumi successor by the name ofParmusi (partai

Muslimin Indonesia) while refusing to allow Masyumi senior leaders to playa leadership role

in this party.29 The party at first rejected this condition but eventually gave in and obtained

legal recognition in February 1968. Led by Djarnawi Hadikusumo (Chairman) and Lukman

Harun (General Secretary), moderate Muhammadiyah leaders, the party executive contained

many Muhammadiyah figures as well as some other representatives of various Islamic groups.

28 Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," 1968, p. 1004. 2'J See Ward, The Fowulation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, 1970.

34

The Parmusi ran into next trouble with the army when it held its first party congress

early in November 1968 in Malang, East Java.30 At this congress Parmusi elected Muhammad

Roem, a very senior Masyumi leader who in the 1950s had served as Foreign Minister and

Deputy Prime Minister but had not participated in the PRRI revolt, as the new party chainnan.

However, the government could not agree to the newly-selected leadership of the Pannusi.

Relations became increasingly tense in the two years after the congress. Despite a series of

meetings held between fonner Masyumi leaders and the anny leaders, in order for the later to

give consent, however, Suharto maintained his refusal. Moreover, the government sought to

prevent former Masyumi leaders to participate in the election planned for July 1971.

It was in response to this growing tension that in October 1970 Djaelani Naro and

Imron Kadir, members of the executive party who was considered close to Suharto's right-hand

man, Ali Murtopo, announced that they had unilaterally taken over the leadership of the party.31

This coup allowed Suharto to intervene, as he announced that he was changing the Parmusi

leadership and appointing Mintaredja and Sulastomo as party chairman and general secretary, a

decision which met with approval from Naro group and caused extreme chagrin among

Masyumi loyalties. Mintaredja was a member of the cabinet and was identified with

Muhanunadiyah although he was unpopular with the rank and file ofMuhammadiyah

membership because of his lack of commitment to the Masyumi ideal. By launching these

policies, the government sought to make the Pannusi always lacked credibility as a Muslim

party and was never able to mobilize popular support in elections.

30 On the tension between the army and the supporters of the Masyumi, see Samson, "Army and Islam in Indonesia,» 1971-1972, pp. 545-565.

3J CrOIWb, "Indonesia,» 1981, p. 202.

35

A series of political turbulences during 1965-1971 created a confusion and internal

conflict within the NU leaders.32 Although the NU had given the anny vigorous support in the

extermination of the PKI, its senior leaders initially hesitated to join the anny leaders in their

moves against Sukarno, while its young generation rallied in streets demanding Sukamo's fall.

Many of the NU leaders were personally close to Sukamo and had benefited at the expense of

their Masyumi rivals during the Guided Democracy period. It was only in early 1967 when it

was clear that Sukarno was about to be deposed that the NU leaders reversed their position and

began to call not only for Sukarno's dismissal but also his arrest and trial. Clearly, the initiative

was in the hands of junior NU leaders while senior leaders were at first wary of making the

wrong steps in a confused political situation. Swinging its support behind the Suharto, the NU

leader, Idham Chalid., retained his post in the cabinet and the party continued to control the

Department of Religion, its main source of patronage to its supporters throughout the nation.

These undemocratic tendencies since the inception of the Suharto regime exacerbated

the very conflict between senior and junior leaders of the NU.33 While the former sought to

ingratiate themselves with the military leaders rather than confront them in the style of the

modernist, there was much frustration within the younger leaders, and the later began to be the

most outspoken opponents of the new regime.

The open conflict between the anny and the radical wing of the NU took place during

the 1971 election, when finally violence erupted between them. In the coercive and fraudulent

election, the government political vehicle, Golkar (Golongan Karya-Functional Groups),

succeeded in attracting a few ulama to its camp, while the NU proved to be the most formidable

rival. The young and controversial leader Subchan Z.E. set the tone for a campaign in which

32 See FeiIIard, ''Tmditiona1ist Islam and the Army in Indonesia's New Order," 1996, pp. 42-67. 33 vanBruinessen, "Indonesia's UIama and Politics," 1990, p. 55.

36

the party was uncharacteristically confrontative. The dirty methods wielded by the regime

during this election had forced the NU to playa role it had previously always avoided: the role

of an opposition. But there was another, rival tone. The senior leaders, seeking to sustain their

cordial relationship with the new regime, appealed to NU sympathizers to increase participation

and cooperation with government agencies and to make the election "a success".

The 1971 election were contested by eleven political parties. The vast majority of votes

(62.8 percent) went to Golkar. The Pannusi, after a series of government interferences, polled only

5.3 percent of the vote. The NU maintainoo its previous strength and won 18.7 percent - slightly

more than its gain in 1955. The total Muslim vote amounted to only 27 percent. 34 The result was

acceptOO distressfully by the NU particularly. The next blow came when the only major source of

patronage, the Ministry of Religion, was taken away from the NU, and the government appointed

Mukti Ali, a modernist Muslim scholar. These consecutive disappointments were deernoo by many

senior NU leaders as results of the fierce opposition of the NU young leaders. Early in January

1972 Subchan was dismissed from the party's executive board, paving the way for the senior NU

leaders to reestablish cordial relationship with the new regime.

The govermnent's next step toward the further political demise of ideology consisted

in the "simplification" of the party system; all the parties (except Golkar) succumbed to

government pressure to merge into two new parties, one (pOI-the Indonesian Democratic

Party) for nationalists and Christian parties, and another, the Unity and Development Party

(PPP) for four existing Muslim parties. The PPP, whose name neither denoted nor connoted

Islam, was deliberately designed by the regime to weaken it by exploiting internal conflicts and

rivalries, and it was quite successful in this respect.

34 See Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia, 1974.

37

During the 1970s, the NU was numerically the largest component within the PPP, but

it was not given a corresponding proportion of the party's parliament seats, thanks to the

continuing government interference in favor of the handpicked party leader, Naro. Prior to the

1982 election, Naro unilaterally drew up his own list of candidates without consulting the NU

leaders, aimed at blocking the NU's most vocal spokesmen from reelection. Depite NU's

protest, the government approved Naro's list ofPPP candidates.

The last, but not least, strategy used by the regime to tame potential opposition was

the compulsion for all political and mass-based organizations to adopt the state ideology

Pancasila into their constitutions as the "sole basic principle". This was no problem at all for

the PPP while initial difficulties were quickly resolved by the NU, but the Mubammadiyab and

other modemist-refonnist organizations offered strong resistance and ouly succumbed when it

became clear that they would lose their legal existence if they failed to conform.3s

The series of restriction ofIslam under the New Order reflected, on the one hand, the

proclivities of state leaders influenced by both technocratic and pre-Islamic ideas and fearful of

any institutions they do not control. They also, however, continued the experience of

Indonesian Islam over a far longer time: politically, the religion has characteristically been on

the defensive, and since the independence it has fought for an ever-narrowing range of claims

on the state. Therefore, Ruth McVey has rightly noted that the history ofIslamic struggle in

Indonesian politics seemed to be a "faith as the outsider". 36

3S The Masyumi ideologically-related student union, HMl (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) split into two organizations, as one group strongly resisted the bill and the other one complied. Meanwhile the Masyumi affiliated high-school students' union PIT (pelajar Islam Indonesia) lost its existence for its fierce resistance. See Karim, HMI MFO dalam Kemelut Modernisasi Politik di Indonesia, 1997; Sitompu!, Nahdlatul Ulama dan Pancasila, 1989; Harun, Muhammdiyah dan Asas Pancasila, 1986.

36 McVey, "Faith as the Outsider," 1983, pp. 199-225.

38

Despite these restrictions, however, there was not only one-way traffic. As seen in the

next part, politically restrained, Islam broke out saliently in remarkable ways, surprising any

whose views of it were formed in the parliamentary and Guided Democracy periods, and the

most important one was that the Muhammadiyah and NU retreated from "practical politics".

D. Muhammadiyah, NU and Political Disengagement

It became clear that in the course of its first twenty years period, the New Order

gradually capable of limiting the influences of both political and mass-based Islamic

organizations in Indonesian politics. On the other side, however, it is difficult to ascertain the

convergence response from the Muslim society.37 Different responses and divergent interests

revolved around disagreement within Muslim society over the appropriate way they should go

in defending their interests and fearing a political backlash.

Different approaches have been taken by the Islamic groups to respond to such a

challenge. They varied widely, ranging from open opposition to accommodationist moves

toward the regime. Five major trends can be seen in this respect. The first trend was

accommodative to the regime. Certain wings within the Parmusi, PPP, and NU were out-and-

out collaborators and they were successfully maneuvered into key positions within those

parties, thank to their close relationship with the military and the regime. The second trend was

intra-parliamentary opposition. In this regard, some other Muslim leaders within those political

parties inclined to be confi:ontative, and they responded the state policies both by nuanced

criticism and by attempts to exert pressure through their membership in the parliament. 38

37 On the awkward relationslrip between Islam and the New Order regime, see Raillon, "The New Order and Islam," 1994, pp. 197-217; Liong, ''Indonesian Muslim and the State," 1988, pp. 869-896.

38 On these first two groups, see Samson, ''Conceptions of Politics, Power, and Ideology in Contemponii)' Indonesian Islam," 1978, pp. 196-226; Samson, "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism," 1973, pp. 116-142.

39

The third one was extra-parliamentary radical confrontation. A small number of

radical Islamist groups kept on voicing their criticism toward Suharto's policies on Muslim

community. In many cases, however, open oppositions from Islamic groups were relentlessly

repressed by the state apparatus, whose prominent example was the killing of hundreds of

Muslim demonstrators in Jakarta's port ofTanjung Priok, in 1984.39

Not all responses to the state policies, however, were negative. There was evidence of

vigorous discussions among young Muslim intellectua1s on religious matters as well as

attempts to rethink the position of Islam in a pluralistic state, abandoning the triumpha1ist

ambitions of the past. This is thefourth trend, which is sometimes called intellectual and social

transformative approach. 40 Some of the most prominent young intellectua1s were individuals

such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, and Dawam Rahardjo.

Tantamount to the mushrooming of young Muslim intellectuals, there was another,

and for the purpose of this thesis the most, significant trend within the Indonesian Muslim

communities, which sought to reevaluate their strategy within the new, authoritarian political

system. This last trend was adopted by the Muhannnadiyah in 1971 and the NU in 1984, when

both organizations retreated from "practical politics".

As indicated in the previous part, by the late 1960s it was obvious that Islamic hopes

in the New Order were misplaced, and that political Islam had little opportunity. It became

clear as well that the regime would intervene at will in the affairs of Islam if seen necessary for

the sake of stability, development, and purposes of state, all to be defined by the regime itself.

3. See Kolstad, "Enemy Others and Violence in Jakarta," 1996, pp. 357-380. 40 See Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, 2003; Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia,

1995; Ali and Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam, 1986; Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia, 1980.

40

The modernist Muslims came first to realize such challenges. They saw that all parties

have been SUbjugated to restrictions, manipulations, and pressures, but the modernist Muslims

have been the most greatly affected. They came to a conclusion that political parties were

highly susceptible of state control, and therefore, no longer deemed as effective means to

pursue their political interests. In other words, one way of confronting the vulnerability of

political parties is, of course, eschewing them. Therefore, one result of the restriction of

political Islam has been to turn Muslim leaders away from formal political activities.

There were many roads taken, however. A small group of refurmists/modernists

around Muhammad Natsir founded the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah (DDI-Islamic Missions

Council) in 1967. Natsir was one of the most prominent Indonesian modernist Muslim

intellectual and politician in the twentieth century.41 Their turn from politics to dakwah was

probably not simply due to the only available alternative, but was also inspired by political

experiences. They seemed to come to realize that many, ifnot most Indonesian Muslims were

not interested in Islamic political parties and their agendas. It must have seemed an obvious

conclusion that the way to change lay not in parliament but in a change in attitude and

awareness of the Muslim community, which could be brought about by interISive dakwah.

Meanwhile, the larger part of the modernists, of course, continued to be active within

the Muhammadiyah which in the 38th Congress in Makassar, North Sulawesi in 1971 officially

stated that the organization is, "an Islamic dakwah movement devoting itselfto working in the

entire aspects of human and societailives, and has not any organizational affiliation with

41 See Uddle, "Media Dakwah ScripturaJism," 1996, pp. 323-356. In the colonial period Natsir engaged in a tiunous debate about the relationship between religion (Islam) and the state with the secu1ar nationa1ist leader Sukamo. He bad been prime minister in 1950-1951 and remained chairman of the Masyumi in the succeeding years. Under his leadership the Masyumi increasingly enunciated a policy of opposition to wbat it felt was the attempt of President Sukamo to bypass constitutional democracy. In the late 1950s be supported the PRRI rebellion, for which he was arrested and imprisoned unti11966.

41

particular political parties or organizations." Since 1971 on, the Mubammadiyah have been

focusing their energies on the ideas of social welfare and education programs. In response to its

members' demands that the Mubammadiyah be more politically active, it advises them to join

or not join any of the existing political parties on an individual basis.

The Muhammadiyah's decision to halt its political engagement preceded by thirteen

years the same decision made by the NU in 1983. In its national deliberation ofulama in

Situbondo, East Java in 1983, the NU decided to return to its "original guideline" (khittah)

stated by its founders in 1926. This decision was then ratified in the following year in its 27th

congress in the same place.42 Of the many resolutions passed during the congress, as the

consequence of the Khittah 1926, was that ''the NU as an organization (jam 'iyah) is

independent from any political and societal organizations.'043 The other decision passed was,

among other things, the acceptance ofPancasiia as the sole foundation of the NU.

The decisions, made by the Muhammadiyah and NU to move in this similar direction,

have been largely prompted by the political impasse for the supporters of the Muhammadiyah

and NU. For the supporters ofMuhammadiyah, the regime's objection to revive the Masyumi

was not too disappointing them. Nor was the regime's objection to the return of the senior

Masyumi leaders to the Parmusi's leadership. It was the unilateral action taken by Naro and

Kadir, thanks to the regime's backing, to the Parmusi's leadership, whose both the chairman

and the general secretary were the Muhammadiyah's prominent figures, that rendered the

Muhammadiyah to realize that there was no longer opportunity in the political realm. The

Mubammadiyah's leaders once considered to transform itseifto a political party. But they

realize as well that it would have met the similar restrictions and manipulations.

42 See Nakamura, "NU's Leadership Crisis and Search for Identity in the Early 198080" 1996, pp. 94-109. 43 See PBNU, Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama Ire 27 Situhondo, 1986, p. 107.

42

Similarly, the series of the state's political manipulations directed toward the NU had

been gradually increasing their resentment. The NU lost its post in the ministry of religion; it

suffered from state's coercion during the elections; and its intra-parliamentary opposition to the

state's issuance of several bills supposedly offending the Islamic sensitivity was paid offby its

under-representativeness in the PPP's parliamentary seats. As a result, the NU's major sources

of patronage gradually dried up and they came to realize that there was no longer benefit in

further participation in parliamentary politics. Although there were a small number of the NU

leaders who fought to keep the NU inside the PPP, however, its vast majority leaders took the

line not only of withdrawing from the PPP but from politics altogether and returning to its

original guideline of 1926, becoming once again a socio-religions organization with no longer

interest in active political affairs.44 To those leaders who decided to remain in the PPP in order

to keep their seats in national and local parliaments, the NU forced them to resign from the NU.

The messages behind their disengagements from political parties were clear. On the one

hand, the Ml1hammadiyah, the largest component within the Parmusi, no longer supported it

Compounded with the rejection of such Masjumi elder statesmen as Natsir and Roem, who still

commanded widespread respect and affection, to the Parmusi' s claim to be the heir to their old

(Masyumi) party, the Muhammadiyah's decision was fatal for the Parmusi's perfonnance in the

1971 election. The Parmusi, no longer representing any readily identifiable constituency, polled

only 5.3 percent of the vote--a quarter of the Masyumi's strength in 1955. On the other hand, the

NU, comprising the largest component within the PPP, departed from it. While in previous

elections the NU leaders had issued fatwas obliging their followers to vote for the PPP, in the 1987

44 See, Irsyam, Ulama dan Partai Politik, 1984; Karim, Metanwrfosis NU dan Politisasi Islam Indonesia, 1995; Jones. "The Contraction and Expansion of the ·Umat· ... 1984. pp. 1-20; Ida, Anatomi Konjlik NU. Elit Islam dan Negara. 1996.

43

the NU explicitly told its members that any political party would do. As a result, the PPP's electoral

showing drastically declined. While in the 1977 and 1982 elections it had received 29 percent and

28 percent of the vote, respectively, it was reduced to 16 percent in the 1987 election.

The lost votes of the Parmusi in the 1971 election and of the PPP in the 1987 election

surprisingly went to the regime's political machine, Golkar. This decline was in part because of

military's intimidation, coercion, and cooptation prior to and during the election, and in the

other part because many voters had been lured away by various forms of persuasions: subsidies

for mosques and schools, free tickets to Mecca for locally influential Muslims, promises of

local development funds and other forms of patronage. While the ministry of religion, as major

source of patronage for Muslim society, was totally under the state's control, its projects and

funds would be easily available to Muslim leaders who had gone over to Golkar. For them,

pragmatically, there were no longer incentives to be out of the mainstream.

The retreat of political Islam during this period has not really meant depolitization,

rather removal of Muslim political activity from the vulnerable and by now pointless arena of

party politics to the more salient one of broad social action. An able Indonesian expert, Donald

Emmerson, once noted that although the Indonesian Muslims had been experiencing a

"political impasse", however, they finally found a "cultural opportunity',.45 The further

implication of the political disengagement decided by the Muhammadiyab and NU for the

rejuvenation of cultural Islam will be detailed below.

E. Muslim Civil Society: Competing Discourses

Another important motivation behind the withdrawal of the Muhammadiyah and NU

from party politics was that they began to realize that their long-decade involvements in

45 See E=erson, "Islam in Modem Indonesia,» 1981, pp. 159-168.

44

practical politics had prevented them from devoting sufficient attention to their religious and

social functions. Many Muslim leaders felt that the political struggle had diverted too much

attention from what they saw as the real tasks of both organizations: the spiritual guidance and

education of the Muslim community. It was felt also that the Muhammadiyab and NU had got

off the right track a long time ago and that they should attempt to regain their original purity by

reemphasizing their identity as religious organizations.

This political retreat was a hallmark epitomizing their effort to abandon their

propensity to enforce piety from the ''top-down'' and a milestone of their endeavors to make a

cultural virtue of the necessity of political retreat by strengthening, from the "bottom up", the

piety of the base on which their long-run political strength must rest. By doing so, the

Muhammadiyah and NU incrementally changed their foci from the political arena to the civil

one. Their retreat from the political arena led them to pay more attention to cultural

movements, such as education, societal empowerment, community services, intellectual

discourse, and religious inquiries.

While there was a consensus between the Muhammadiyah and NU that their nature,

instead in the political realm, was in the society, they disagreed on the mode of relationships

between state and society in Indonesia. The role of religion and religious groupings in relation

to the state was then highly debated.46 In discussing and analyzing the contested nature of the

concept of civil society and the plurality of its empirical manifestations, we should keep in

mind that their different motivations and approaches led in turn to different models.47

The retreat ofMuhammadiyah from party politics, compounded with the upsurge of

the new Muslim intellectuals since 1970s, was eventually not only capable of reducing political

46 Schulte Nordholt, "Introduction," 2002. 47 Tanthowi, ''Mnbammadiyah dan NO dalam Kompetisi Makna Civil Society," 2001.

45

hostility between Islam and the regime, but it also made the regime accommodate some

(modernist) Muslim's political and economic interests. The modernists' motivation, to be

accommodated in the development process during the New Order period, unwittingly prompted

them to adopt a Hegelian approach of civil society, in which they give an emphasis on: first,

their supplementary and complementary function to the state. Therefore, the Muhammadiyab

has been concentrating primarily on educational program, health services, social cares, services

the state supposedly deliver. Second is the necessary of the middle class, of course, which were

more or less dependent to the state.

Under this Hegelian approach, the civil society model constructed by the

Muhammadiyab resulted in: first, independency in various aspects, particularly in the fields of

education, social and health services.48 For example, up until 2000, the Muhammadiyab run

more than 9.000 schools, 190 universities and colleges, 241 hospitals and clinics, and 322

social service institutions. Second is middle class who flourished largely because of educational

ladder, instead of their roles in economics and business. They have been mostly working in the

fields of education and bureancracy. Therefore, most of the Muhammadiyab supporters are

school teachers, university professors, state employees and state bureaucrats.

Slightly different from the Muhammadiyab which adopted the Hegelian approach, the

NU seemed to prefer the Tocquevillian model of civil society. According to the NU, civil

society should function as countervailing forces to the political monopoly of the state, by

nurturing independent institutions in society and cultivating civic culture in order to develop

democratic civility.49 The motivation behind this approach is that the NU had been supposedly

marginalized in the development process during the last decade of the New Order regime. This

48 See Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia,» 2002, pp. 133-163. 49 See van Bruinessen, "KonjlDlgtur Sosial Politik di Jagat NU Paska Khittah 1926," 1994, pp. 61-86.

46

marginalization was because the state only accommodated Islamic community who appeared to

support the modernization process, and the one of course come from the modernist camp. The

traditional Islam was even further perceived by the state as obstacles to the Indonesia's

development and modernization.

Prompted by such motivation, from the late 1980s the NU's activities were directed to

broaden free public sphere by empowering grassroots institutious, advocacy for lower class

society, and strengthening various types ofNGO. They contended that civil society can be

developed inasmuch as the society has self-reliance in its ultimate meaning and free from state

intervention and cooptation. The fina1 result of civil society constructed by the NU was the

mushrooming of new activists within NU since the mid 1990's, whose professions are mostly

NGO activists, independent intellectuals (non-university), and journa1ists. For the NU, they are

believed in capable of performing their ultimate function: agents of change.

F. Conclusion

As the above discussions illustrate, there was a powerful organizational precedent for

extra-state, society reinforcing, and power dispersive associations in the course of the Indonesian

history. The emergence of the Mllhammadiyah and NU epitomized this precedent, which were

characterized by a self-regulating associationallife and a countervailing balance of power. Hefner

once said that although "a vigorous tradition of non-state social associations is not sufficient to

generate encompassingly civil values,',so there were indeed invaluable seeds of self-regulating

and autonomous organizations within Indonesian Islamic society. Similarly, there has been also a

long tradition of diversity and pluralism, between Muslims and non-Muslims, between devout

and nominal Muslims, and between modernist and traditionalist groups. This fragmented setting

so Hefner, "A Muslim Civil Society?" p. 298-9.

47

has thwarted the hopes for ideological unifonnity across space and for consistency of belief and

behavior overtime, and finally proved that Indonesian Muslim politics is not monolithic.

We have a conclusion, however, that in the course of the roughly fifty years of

Indonesian independence, Islam and Muslims had been playing significant roles in politics and

society alike. Founded in the period of awakening of Indonesian nationalism as nonpolitical

organizations, the Muhammadiyah and NU had been intensely involved in varying degree in

party politics during the late 1940s until the early 1 980s. Under the ultimate authoritarian

period of the Suharto regime, both organizations swiftly return from political realm to their

original mandate as social religious organizations. This political impasse, surprisingly enough,

was a blessing in disguise, as they have been able to preserve their independency and provide

social capital for Indonesian Muslim at the end of the last century.

No end is in sight. Yet it is probably true that any real hope for fundamental political

change in Indonesia depends in part on the mobilization of Islamic support. The question now

is how to mobilize such support, around which claims, and with what moral direction. There is

no obvious answer to this question, largely because Indonesian Islam, to repeat, is hardly

united, but asking it opens up a number of issues worth pondering. Under what conditions will

Indonesian Islam mobilize and for what purposes? What are the strategies that these competing

religious organizations resort to in dealing with one another? Are there distinctions among the

major groups with respect to their propensities for political action? These are among some

questions that I would like to discuss in the next chapter.

48

CHAPTER III

MUSLIM CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CHANGE:

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1998-2008

A. Introdnction

With the fall of the New Order regime, there were changes in Indonesian politics and

society alike. Considerable change occurred also in the Muslim associations. The

Muhammadiyah, the NU, and other associations akin to them, have become more energized in

political affairs with their cadre and members actively recruited for the newly formed political

parties-nearly all having some sort of Islamic identity. In this respect we find a re­

politicization-returning these associations to the role that they enjoyed prior to their political

disengagement, when they were politically active.

Long suppressed under authoritarian rule, Indonesian Islamic groups are now

enjoying space granted them by democratic freedom. Since the early days after Suharto's

overthrow, a diverse range of parties and organizations, particularly the Muhammadiyah and

NU. are debating what role Islam should play in governance: is Islam always a means to

achieve political ends? Or can the relationship function the other way around? And how should

they combine their political activism and their commitment to stay away from practical

politics? They are also debating whether the diverging approaches to the state adopted by the

Muhammadiyah and NU during the New Order era (between the Hegelian and Tocquevillian

frameworks) remain suitable after the fall of Suharto. Those puzzles of where Islam fits into

politics and vice versa are among some necessary questions I would like to answer in the

following discussions.

49

B. Muslim Civil Society, Political Parties, and the 1999 Election

One of the phenomena punctuated the Indonesian transition-or so-called the

Reformasi era-was the mushrooming ofIslamic or Muslim-based parties. Their emergence was

largely helped by the political freedom proclaimed by President Habibie in August 1998, which

gave impetus to the birth of new political parties in general. The lifting of the ban on Islam as

the foundation for political party meant the green light for Islamic or Muslim-based parties.

Their emergence is thus without doubt a distinctive feature of political reform.

Among 141 new political parties in the early Reformasi era, 42 were Islamic, defined

here as parties that either explicitly claim Islam as their ideology or draw support mostly from

Islamic organizations. This total later declined, since only 20 Islamic parties (out of 48 parties)

qualified to compete in the 1999 election.! As far as Islamic political parties are concerned,

many observers believed that the mushrooming of so many Islamic parties has been motivated

more by the lust for power of the Muslim leaders than by genuinely religious motives.2 If the

Muslim leaders were more concerned about religious interests, of course, they would have

established fewer Islamic parties-preferably only one for each the traditionalist and the

modernist camp. Unfortunately, the contest for power among Muslim leaders led in tum to a

wider fragmentation ofIslamic-oriented political grouping. This is discernible in the division

among the supporters of both traditionalist and modernist Islam.

The NU and Muharnmadiyah did not transform themselves into political parties, but

in spite of calls from various sides not to weaken the Islamic community by the establishment

of too many parties, Islamic leaders could not resist the temptation to found numerous of

I Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia," 2004, p. 672. 2 Azra, ''The Islamic Factor in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 1999, p. 311. See also Haris, "Politicization of

Religion," 2004, p. 61-76.

50

parties. Among the NU circles, the most important initiative was the establishment of Partai

Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB-The National Awakening Party), which was proclaimed in

Abdurrahrnan Wahid's house on July 23.1998.

During the process of the PKB's establishment, the role of the NU organization was

decisive. As many NU politicians within PPP and senior kyai across regions began to clamor

for NU to form a party, on June 6, 1998, around seventy NU senior leaders and politicians met

at a pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Rembang, Central Java, to deliberate these growing

demands. During the meeting. the NU leaders undoubtedly lamented the marginal position of

the NU in Indonesian politics during the New Order regime. One NU leader expressed his

frustration that "it is now the time for NU to 'break the fast' after been fasting for more than 32

years." Another leader noted that for more than 30 years the NU members had been dispersed

everywhere. "Regretfully, they had always been marginalized in their respective places." The

meeting decided to form an eleven-member team comprising senior NU leaders, which was

charged to formulate the next-party's vision, mission, platform, and charter, whose results

would be submitted to the central board ofNU (pBNU).3

Responding to the mounting demands, two weeks later PBNU formed its own team

comprising five members assisted by a nine-member team, whose task was preparing necessary

steps to form a new party. They were drawn mainly from members ofthe PBNU.4 When the

new party was declared, the PKB was chaired by former PPP General Secretary, Matori Abdul

Djalil. The party had also Muhaimin Iskandar. Abdurrahrnan's nephew as its general secretary,

and Imam Churrnain, a former GoIkar leader, as its treasurer. Meanwhile, Ma'ruf Arnin was

3 The subjects of the discussion during the meeting and the members of the team of eleven, see Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, 2002, p. 173-182.

4 On the detailed tasks of both teams, see Asmawi, PKB Jendela Politik Gus Dur, 1999, p. 24-25.

51

appointed as the chair of the advisory council (Dewan Syuro). Abdurrahman held no executive

position, since he sustained his chainnanship of the PBNU. However, this did not impede him

to command the central authority within the PKB, as almost all decisions within the party

should be based upon his initiative or consent. For instance, not only did Abdurrahman succeed

in installing Matori as the PKB's chainnan despite disagreement from numerous NU leaders,

but he was also the one who created the entire line-up of PKB leadership prior to its

declaration.s In order to draw the line between the NU and PKB, Abdurrahman in his remarks

during the PKB declaration pointed out that the NU officials who had dual leadership in the

PKB should step down from the NU leadership.

While the PKB expected to garner its votes from the strong NU community and its

leadership was drawn largely from NU activists, the PKB was presented as a party sensitive to

the interests of all Indonesians. Hence the party used the word 'nation' and not, for instance,

'ummat' (Islamic community). The party aimed, in fashionable political jargon, at being an

inclusive party, not an exclusive one. It was presented as a nationalist, 'red and white' party,

not a 'green' Islamic one. Although it had no official counection with the NU, the PKB was

without doubt the brainchild ofa few keyNU leaders from the organization's central board.6

The introduction of the PKB party platfonn plausibly emphasizes its NU identity referring to

two most basic NU treaties, and its constitution stated explicitly that the party originated from

the "womb of the NU" and that it represented the aspirations of the NU community.

PKB was the party officially endorsed by the PBNU, but this by no means that NU's

leadership was unifonn in its political outlook. Several NU leaders openly opposed

Abdurra1unan and established their own parties. The most important ones were Partai

5 Bush, Islam and Civil Society, 2002, p. 219. 6 Kadir, "Contested Visions of State and Society in Indonesian Islam," 2000, p. 320.

52

Kebangkitan Umat (PKU) which was led by Abdurrahman's uncle, YusufHasyim; Partai

Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU) which was led by Syukron Makmun and Idham Chalid; and Partai

Solidaritas Nasional Indonesia (partai SUNI) with Abu Hasan as its chainnan. The birth of

these rival parties was triggered by two main factors. First was the political orientation of the

new party.7 Many senior NU leaders opposed the adoption ofPancasila, instead ofIslam, as the

basis for the PKB. Secondly, some ofthe leaders of the rival parties had long been

Abdurrahman's bitter rivals for control over NU leadership during the past period. While

Idham Chalid had been the chainnan ofNU until 1984 when Abdurrahman took the NU

leadership, Abu Hasan was his rival in the bitter battle of the 1994 NU congress.

While the role ofNU in the establishment ofPKB was decisive, the role of

Muhammadiyah in the establishment ofPartai Amanat National (pAN-the National Mandate

Party) was less instrumental. Various groups contributed to the establishment of the PAN. They

worked separately to prepare any necessary steps to establish a new political party. First was

MARA (Majelis Amanat Rakyat - Council of People's Mandate), a broad based cabinet

watchdog organization founded on May 14, 1998 by Amien Rais and other intellectuals and

prominent figures. Second was Tebet Group which was comprised of some Muslim

intellectuals and NGO activists. Third was PPSK (Pusat Pengkajian Strategi dan Kebijakan -

Center for Strategic and Policy Studies), a research center under the University of Gadjah Mada

at Yogyakarta, of which Amien Rais had been the director. At last, on August 5,1998 those

groups held a meeting in Wisma Tempo, Simagalih, West Java, to formulate the party's

platform and form a nine-member team whose chainnan was Amien Rais.8

7 Mietzner, ''Nationalism and Islamic Politics," 1999, p. 177. • Najib, Melawan Arus, 1999, p. 147.

53

Despite the efforts of these diverse groups, the role of Muhammadiyah was not

insignificant. A month before, on July 5-7, 1998 the Muhammadiyah held an annual national

meeting (Tanwir) in Semarang, Central Java whose participants were members of the central

board (PP) ofMuhammadiyah and four delegates from each its provincial board. Despite the

fact that the vast majority of the participants demanded to form a new political party, the final,

official resolution stated that neither the Muhammadiyah transform itself into a political party

nor it facilitate (membidani) the establishment of a new party. The Tanwir, however, delegated

an authority to the PP Muhammadiyah to carry out a political ijtihad (vigorous inquiry) to form

a new political party. Since Tanwir is the second most authoritative decision-making forum

within the Muhammadiyah organization next to congress, any form of the new party resulted

from the political ijtihad would be considered legitimate by the Muhammadiyah members.

During this period, Amien Rais had been taking ambiguous stances.9 In the closing

ceremony of the Tanwir, Amien mentioned the possibility of the establishment of a new party

which would be chaired by his close companion and the vice chairman of the Muhammadiyah

Syafii Maarif. In the subsequent days, various political groups were trying to woo Amien to

lead their parties. Amien once gave a signal to accept the bid offered by some PPP leaders to be

the next chairman of the PPP. He was also said to agree to lead a new party which was prepared

by various groups representing the spirit of the Masyumi. Meanwhile, he also went on to let the

MARA, Tebet Group, and PPSK respectively prepare the establishment of a new party. It was

also reported that in a PP Muhammadiyah meeting he would like to devote himself to the

Muhammadiyah, instead of continuing his political career. However, almost all other members

of the PP Muhammadiyah did not agree; they rather endorsed his endeavor to form a new

• Rais, Putra Nusantara. Son oflhe Indonesian Archipelago, 2003, p. 105.

54

political party. After much speculation, Amien admitted that he was keen to be part of a new

political movement that could bring together the various elements of reform movements.

Eventually, the new party PAN was proclaimed during a mass meeting at the Senayan Stadium

on August 23, 1998.

A day before the PAN declaration, during the meeting in the Muhammadiyah

headquarter which was attended by thirteen members of PP Muhammadiyah and the chairman

of all provincial board ofMuhammadiyah all over Indonesia, Amien decided to step down from

the Muhammadiyah leadership, concentrated on his duties in the next-day new party and he

was replaced by Syafii Maarif. In order to further keep the Muhammadiyah away from politics,

at the end of September 1998 the central board ofMuhammadiyah issued a resolution no.

480/1998 which prohibited dual leadership between the Muhammadiyah and political party and

the use ofMuhammadiyah facilities for political activities.

Amien took great pains to stress that PAN was a nationalistic organization, and did

not cater exclusively to Muhammadiyah or Masyumi circles or to the wider Islamic

community. He described PAN as a ''miniature Indonesia", aiming at as many segments of

Indonesian society as possible. An able scholar whose interest is mostly on Indonesian Islam

and particularly NU testifies that, the PAN's platform "showed greater sophistication and

understanding than found in any other party. The party's directions were unambiguously

reformist and democratic. It opposed sectarianism and championed the development of a

modem secular state that was home to all people, groups, and faiths."l0

As a consequence of its secular, nationalistic platform, the PAN could not maintain

the modernist community as a united front. Some other parties also emerged from the

10 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 253.

55

modernist camp, and, by and large, they exerted the Islamic identity of their party. On July 17,

1998 various group, which claimed representing the spirit of Masyumi founded the Partai

Bulan Bintang (pBB--Crescent and Star Party) with Yusril Ihza Mahendra as its chairman. In

this regard, one should also add the Partai Ummat Islam (pUI-Islamic Community Party)

which was led by a notable political scientist Deliar Noer; and the Partai Keadilan (pK-Justice

Party) which was led by Nur Mahmudi Ismail.

Based on the aforementioned explanation, the central board ofNU showed its more

immediate reactions, compared to Amien's long ambiguous reaction, to the demands both from

regions and from its senior leaders which called the establishment of a new NU-based political

party. With the formation of a party connected to the official structure ofNU, the NU figures

opposing it were left behind. Three rival NU-based parties were established, but they lacked the

momentum that central board had seized. On the other hand, Amien failed to react in a similar

way. Amien had obtained a more nationalist profile for his roles during the economic and

political crisis leading to Suharto's downfall. Riding on the wave of public sympathy, Amien

had provided the very intellectual leadership that the highly diversified student movement and

middle-class pro-democracy movement so desperately needed. Thus during the ensuing

liberalization era, Amien faced a dilemma: ifhe chose the establishment of an explicitly

modernist Islamic party, he would have almost certainly emerged as the sole leader of the

camp, but at the same time he would have lost the support of the secular reform groups with

which he had worked in concert during the anti-Suharto movement. On the other hand, the

formation of a nationalist party would have allowed him to develop the moderate image

appropriate for his emergence in national politics, but would also have alienated him from his

56

modernist constituency. In contrast to the traditionalist camp, Amien seemed highly unlikely to

succeed in maintaining a certain extent of homogeneity within the modernist groups. I I

It seemed that in the traditionalist camp both senior leaders and the PBNU were

directly involved in the formation of the PKB. It was apparent in the formation of several

teams, whose members were mostly senior leaders and activists of the NU, which were charged

to take necessary steps to prepare the establishment of the new party. On the other hand, the PP

Muhammadiyah other than Amien himself was almost absent in the PAN formation. The

Muhammadiyah's attachment to the PAN was simply because the 1998 Semarang Tanwir

recommended the PP Muhammadiyah to carry out a political ijtihad, which was finally left to

Amien himself, and the fact that Amien once headed the Muhammadiyah during the reform

movement, of which the Muhammadiyah members and leaders alike so proud.12 These different

involvements would in tum lead to different connections between both sides in the near future.

Although during the 1998-1999 more than 150 political parties were founded, much

attention focused on President Habibie's Golkar party and the parties of the three most

respected opposition figures of that day: Abdurrahman, Amien, and Megawati ostensibly

receiving more public acclaim than Habibie. The three represented respectively the

traditionalist Muslims with their bulwarks in Central and East Java; the modernist Muslims,

many living in non-Javanese regions and in urban centers; and the secular nationalist camp in

and outside Java. Bali was also Megawati territory.

During the election campaign, politicians, in order to attract voters to their parties, are

waging an ideological battle for the soul of the nation, much of it over the fault line of religion-

II On the comparison between the traditionalist and modernist camps in forming new parties, see Mietzner, "NationaIism and Islamic Politics," 1999, p.173-199.

12 Maarif, "Hubungan Mllbammadiyah dengan Amien Rais dan PAN," 2000, p. 14.

57

to be precise, the extent to which Islam will guide the affairs of the country, how it would do

so, and which Muslims will do the guidance. I3 During the campaign period, the NU and

Muhammadiyah respectively played a different role in their relations to the PKB and PAN.

Abdurrahman, while sustaining his leadership in the PBNU, had come to fully embrace the

PKB "as his own". 14 He, along with other senior NU leaders, campaigned for votes in the

traditional NU strongholds of Java and Madura. This was a clear message that the PKB was the

political arm of the NU, while three other NU-affiliated parties had a tough time competing

against the organizational advantages enjoyed by the PKB. In contrast, the PP Muhammadiyah

hardly worked in the election campaign for the PAN. Instead, it insisted to apply its resolution

no. 480/1998 while stressing that the Muhammadiyah members, according to the resolution of

the 1971 Makassar congress, were free to votes any political parties they wished.

Table 1 The 1999 Legislature Election Result

PartL Percentage No. of Seats PDI-P 33.7 153 Golkar Party 22.5 120 PKB 12.7 51 PPP 10.7 58 PAN 7.1 34 PBB 1.9 13 PK 1.3 7

During the last days of the election campaign, both Abdurrahman and Amien.like

other political party leaders, had optimistic poll expectations since their massive rallies in the

campaign. IS While Abdurrahman told journalists that he expected the PKB would get more

than 30 % of the national votes, Amien spoke confidently of getting 90 % of all modernist

13 Zenzie,'1ndonesia's New Political Spectrum," 1999, p. 246. 14 Kadir, "Contested Visions of State and Society in Indonesian Islam," 2000, p. 328. 15 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 272.

58

votes and maybe as much as 30 to 40 % of the total. Unfortunately, this extravagant optimism

has not been translated into votes. In June 1999, when Indonesia held its democratic election,

seven parties out of 48 participants won significant percentages of the vote. The most

successful parties were Megawati's secular Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P),

with 33.7 % of the vote and Golkar, the former president Suharto's political vehicle, with 22.5

%. Five others are Islamic or Muslim-based: the PPP, with 10.7 %; the PKB, with 12.7 %; the

PAN, with 7.1 %; the PBB, with 1.8 %; and the Justice Party (PK), withjust 1.3 %.16

Beside the good performance of the PDI-P, to which many Islamic leaders during the

election campaign had been pointing out as the party that did not clearly commit to Islam, the

poor result of Islamic parties in the 1999 election "worried many Muslims, who believed that it

marked the end of political Islam" in Indonesia.17 Worse still, the high hope of the PKB and

PAN did not come true as they gained only nearly one third of their expectation.

The small share gained by these two parties was a result of manifold factors. First is

the fragmentation of Muslim voters into twenty Islamic parties compared to ten parties in the

1955 election. Even worse is the fragmentation within the traditionalist and modernist

communities into several parties, something that did not happen in the past. However small

shares were gained by those tiny splinter parties, the total was more than fifteen percent of the

votes. Second is the relative strong showing of the old PPP party, which was previously

predicted by many to be uprooted in the Islamic community after the establishment of the PKB

and PAN. Due to its experience of serving for twenty five years as the only party representing

Muslims' interests, the PPP was able to maintain its loyalists both within traditionalist and

16 On the detail result of and discussion on the 1999 election, see Suryadinata, Election and Politics in Indonesia, 2002; and Blackburn, Pemilu: The 1999 Indonesian Election, 1999.

17 Azra, "Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia," 2004, p. 142. On the sorrows bemoaned by Islamic community, see Basyaib and Abidin (eds.), Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah?, 1999.

59

modernist communities. Similarly, the Golkar survival in the second place also contributed to

the defeat of the Islamic parties, particularly the PAN and PKB. Since its extraordinary

congress in July 1998, the Golkar party was demonstrating some movement toward Islam by

appointing many Islamic figures, mostly from modernist camp, to its central leadership.I8

Third, closely related to the first one, were the new experimentations of Abdurrahman

and Amien respectively to design the PKB and particularly PANas inclnsive parties. The PAN

did worse than many had expected, given that its leader was often portrayed as the

"locomotive" of the reform movement. The time limit since their establishments to the election

-less than one year- was insufficient for Abdurrahman and Amien to convince the public to

rely on their parties. An Indonesian expert notes that Amien's message "was in many ways a

new one, both for Indonesia and indeed for Amien Rais" himself. I9 Finally, different policies

adopted by the PBNU and PP Muhammadiyah in dealing with the PKB and PAN have led to

the different results for both parties. Despite the aforementioned three factors above, the full

supports of the PBNU and its senior leaders have defended the PKB from its worse showing. In

contrast, the PAN lacked similar support from the PP Muhammadiyah during the election.

The poor result of Islamic parties, particularly the PKB and PAN, prompted many

Islamic leaders to look for another opportunity in order to sustain their existence in the political

arena. The next part will examine the rise and fall of President Abdurrahman and its ensuing

volatile relationship between the NU and Muhammadiyah.

C. The Rise and Fall of President Abdurrahman Wahid

18 See Nakamura, "Prospect for Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 1999, p. 90; Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia," 2004, p. 674-678.

19 Bourchier, "Habibie's Interregnwn," 2000, p. 22.

60

Ahead of the presidential election, with so many parties and none having decisive

majority, it was highly likely that a coalition needed to be formed to create a majority in the

MPR in order to elect a new president and vice-president.2o The election results apparently

showed that the most likely frontrunners were either the PDI-P candidate Megawati or the

Goikar candidate Habibie. For Megawati, the PAN and particularly PKB seemed to be her

natural partners, as she, Abdurrabman, and Amien have agreed three weeks before the election

to form a common front among their three parties, which was known as the "Paso

communique", to work together to overcome Goikar. Habibie, on the other hand, seemed

highly likely to draw enormous supports from his party Golkar, the military, and the functional

representatives whose appointment were in his authority.

Megawati was understandably thrilled with the PDI-P showing in the polls and began

to feel as if she was destined to win the presidency. Despite the clear message sent by the

election result, however, Megawati stubbornly refused to build a broad-based alliance to win a

clear majority in the presidential election. It was partly because of her political inability, and

partly because of her overconfidence, she refused to respond to Abdurrabman and Amien's

offers to initiate the coalition. Abdurrabman was stunned when, after requesting four cabinet

positions for PKB and NU, Megawati offered him only one, no more than that.21 Amien was

similarly disappointed when he urged Megawati to take necessary steps to form a stable

20 The MPR consisted of the entire 500 members of the People's Representative Council (DPR) and 200 other representatives. The 500 DPR members consisted of 462 elected members and 38 appointed members for the military and police forces. The other 200 members consisted of 135 regional representatives who were elected by the provincial-level parliament and 65 functional group representatives who were elected by the president.

21 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 275. Despite this disappointment, Abdurrahman continuously stated that he and his PKB would support Megawati for the post.

61

coalition among the signatories of the Paso communique, she saw no urgency to make

arrangement with the parties that could help her to gain an absolute majority in the MPR.22

There were so many pro-reform Indonesians who ardently hoped for a united anti-

GoIkar front comprising Megawati, Abdurrahman, and Amien. These hopes were fading,

however. The presidential election was not simply about division between pro-reform and anti-

reform groupings. It was also about religion. Since the election campaign, many Islamic leaders

had been campaigning to disqualifY Megawati because of her gender. They stated that Islam did

not allow a woman to be a head of state, despite the fact that this subject is still debated in Islamic

discourse.23 The tension between both sides was getting worse. Megawati's supporters were

deadly serious in their resolve to ensure her election by every possible means. They began to put

a thumbprint in blood on large cloths. The practice, which had started in East Java, spread and

was immediately copied elsewhere. They also put their signatures on huge banners carrying texts

such as 'Megawati or revolution'. They flocked to do so in the thousands.24

Amien began to look for an alternative presidential candidate to avoid an outright

choice between Megawati and Habibie. Without a third candidate who was acceptable to both

sides, he contended. a dangerous situation began to cast a long shadow over future stability.

The chance was great that whatever the outcome of the presidential election, violent protests

would be the result. Amien announced on July 20, 1999 that he and the leaders ofthe PPP,

PBB, and PK parties agreed to form a central axis (paras tengah).25 This agreement originated

to the "Kartika Chandra communique" signed by Amien, the PPP leader Hamzah Haz, and the

22 Mietzner, "The 1999 General Election," 2000, p. 42. 23 See Platzdasch, "Islamic Reaction to a Female President," 2000; Van Dorn-Harder, "The Indonesian

Islamic Debate on a Woman President," 2002. 24 Van Dijk, A Country in Despair, 2001, p. 446. 25 See Suharsono, Cemerlangnya Poros Tengah, Jakarta: Perenial Press, 1999.

62

PK leader Nurmahmudi several days after the Paso communique signing. Amidst the growing

tension between the Megawati and Habibie supporters, the central axis appeared to offer the

potential of drawing those Islamic parties away from an otherwise inevitable coalition with

Golkar.26 The logic was that with a combined total of nearly 200 seats in the MPR, they could

match Golkar or PDI-P and therefore be in position either to put their own candidate in the

palace or at least to avoid an outcome in which Muslims became minor political players.27

However, the central axis was unable to find a single viable presidential candidate to

unite them. Amien rated his own chance too little because ofP AN's poor showing in the

legislature election. Other Islamic party leaders, such as Harnzah or Yusril, had even narrower

bases of support. Faced with a dearth of candidates, Amien surprised many people and the

central axis alike by blurting out the possibility of supporting a candidacy by, of all people, his

arch-rival: Abdurrahman Wahid.28 But few took Amien seriously. As Mietzner points out, there

were three major problems.29 First, many politicians in the PPP and PBB either openly or

tacitly backed Habibie for another term in office. Second, Abdurrahman had maneuvered the

PKB into Megawati's camp. Now that he was about to change the strategy, the party was

reluctant to follow this policy shift. Third, even if the first two problems were overcome, the

alliance would still have been far away from an absolute majority in the MPR.

Many people still wondered about the future of this alliance. Other Islamic party

leaders immediately dismissed Amien's suggestion as a "personal opinion" which they did not-

and would not--support. On the other hand, Amien's suggestion to nominate Abdurrahman

brought the latter into serious conflict with his own party, which had earlier decided early in

2. Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 275. 27 Bourchier, "Habibie's Interregnum," 2000, p. 23. 28 O'Rourke, Reformasi, 2002, p. 251. 29 Mie1Zner, "The 1999 General Election," 2000, p. 43.

63

August 1999 to support Megawati. Mietzner goes on to note that Amien was well aware that

the only way to convince Abdurrahman and the PKB to join the central axis was offering the

nomination to the NU chainnan. He correctly assumed that the nomination would be an

irresistible temptation for Abdurrahman. Amien also realized that PKB delegates in the MPR

would have tum their back on Megawati if their patron ran against her.3o

To cement the new-found bond between Amien and Abdurrahman, a rally joining

Muhammadiyah and NU leaders and supporters alike was held in the front yard of the

Muhammadiyah headquarter on September 26, 1999 in Jakarta. It was the first of its kind ever

held. The central axis and the cooperation between both organizations were greeted as a new-

found unity within the Islamic community. Some even hailed it as an indication that Indonesian

Muslims had re-found its strength. This new cordiality between NU and Muharnmadiyah was

also bolstered mostly by a growing friendship between their youth organizational wings: Ansor

ofNU and Muhammadiyah Youth Movement. During this critical period, Ansor leader

SyaifuIIah Yusuf (Abdurrahman's nephew) and Muhammadiyah youth leader Imam

Addaruqudni arranged many public gatherings, public seminars, and meetings. Their

cooperation revealed a sense that the modernist and traditionalist camps could work together.

Mostly because of their vigorous endeavor, personal relations between Amien and

Abdurrahman were steadily becoming more intimate and warm.31

When the new MPR convened on October 2,1999, however, no convincing prediction

on how the rival groups would mobilize supports in the presidential vote. It was clear that three

broad groupings would compete in the assembly: PDI-P whose support was assured, Golkar

30 Mietzner, "The 1999 General Election," 2000, p. 43. 31 Barton, Abdurrahman Wah/d, 2002, p. 268.

64

which suffered a deep internal division, and the central axis whose solidity was widely

questionable. The central axis, compared to two other groupings, was the most unlikely winner.

The political balance of those three groupings was soon swinging, when the MPR

members, before deciding on who would become president and vice-president, elected two

important positions in the Indonesian political structure: chairpersons ofMPR and DPR. Amien

was elected chairperson of the MPR on October 3, 1999. He defeated the PKB chairman Matori

by a small margin of26 votes. It was surprising that Amien's nomination was also backed by

the Islamic modernist wing of Golkar, while Matori's nomination was backed by PDI-P. In the

second round, the Golkar chairman Akbar Tanjung, once headed the Masyumi-affiliated

Islamic student organization (HMI), was elected as the DPR chairperson. He received an

overwhelming 411 of the 491 votes.32 PDI-P supported his nomination, but afterwards it

became clear that PDI-P got nothing in return for its support.

In the presidential vote, the political strength and fortune of the central axis were more

apparent. Habibie's accountability speech was rejected by the MPR members by 355 to 322 in

a vote on October 19,1999 amidst massive demonstrations outside the MPR. With this blow,

Habibie withdrew his candidacy in the early morning of October 20, 1999. The real drama, the

presidential election was due to commence only nine hours later. While reportedly Megawati,

following the rejection of Habibie's speech, went home to sleep, all other party leaders

commenced a frantic, marathon session oflobbying and politicking. Kingsbury describes it

eloquently that, "there was a flurry of political activity as promises were made and broken,

deals were done, and political dreams were shattered and, in one case, realized.,,33

32 Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, 2002, p. 144. 33 Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 2005, p. 287.

65

After he withdrew his candidacy, Habibie recommended nominating the PBB

chairman Yusril, the PPP chairman Hamzah, the military commander Wiranto, and the Golkar

chairman Akbar. One by one, these possible candidates declined to run against Megawati.

Eventually, the President and several central axis leaders decided to support Amien into the

race. Habibie thought that, whatever commitment Amien had made to Abdurrahman, in the

final analysis most of the central axis would give their support to him rather than the physical

infirm Abdurrahman.34 Amien firmly rejected, however. He explained that he would lose his

credibility and ruin the newly established NU-Muhammadiyah relationship should he accept

the bid. Syafii Maarif, current Muhammadiyah chairman, was on hand to help Amien. He

argued that the NU-Muhammadiyah relationship had improved since Amien supported

Abdurrahman, but to withdraw that support might trigger unrest. Go1kar had eventually no

other alternative than supporting Abdurrahman.

Abdurrahman defeated Megawati in the vote for the presidency on October 20, 1999.

He received 373 votes, Megawati 313. Megawati was humiliated by her defeat. Even worse

were her supporters. Almost immediately riots broke out in Jakarta and several other cities.

Largely because of these uncontrollable unrests, Abdurrahman and many party leaders agreed

to offer Megawati the vice-presidency. In the vice-presidential election on October 21, 1999,

Megawati defeated Harnzah by 396 votes to 284.35 Her election restored peace, but mutual

distrust remained among political leaders. It seemed as if the sophisticated and complicated

election was a climax, but in fact the more deadly game was just only beginning.

34 Crouch, "Indonesia," 2000, p. 119. 35 Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, 2002, p. 148-150.

66

Relief,jubilation, and renewed optimism accompanied Abdurrahman's election to the

presidency. For years Indonesians had been clamoring for reform, and now nothing seemed to

stand in this way. Cronies notwithstanding, public generally regarded the Abdurrahman-

Megawati pair as the ideal outcome to the prolonged transition. Ideologically speaking, the

executive branch included the immensely popular nationalist, secular leader Megawati, but the

presidency itself went to a figure regarded as a respected Muslim scholar, Abdurrahman. The

high optimism was further fueled by the formation of the National Unity Cabinet comprising 35

ministers. As expected, as an inclusive government, it incorporated not only representatives from

the parties which had made his own election possible (PKB, PAN, PPP, PBB, PK, Golkar), but

the PDI-P and military obtained several influential seats as well. Having long espoused pluralism,

Abdurrahman included representatives from each official religion and most major regional and

ethnic groups. Looking at the other posts, the cabinet also included one minister from the NU

(Minister of Religion) and Muharnmadiyab (Minister of National Education) respectively.36

Given its number and diversity, unfortunately, this rainbow cabinet "was also disunited, often

with little ability or experience, reflecting its origius as a political compromise.,,37

The Abdurrahman govermnent enjoyed a broad popular mandate. The question was

whether it can use that window of opportunity to take measures to overcome the crisis, restore

public trust in the political system and get Indonesia back to a new pattern of political stability

and economic growth. Despite its popular mandate, however, the new govermnent was

unfortunately overwhelmed by numerous challenges. They were, among other things, economic

36 From this cabinet on, a new pattern of relation between the government and these Islamic civil society organizations was set up, as at least one ministry position has been each allocated for the NU and Mnba1l111ladiyah, apart from seats allocated for the PKB and PAN.

37 Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 2005, p. 290.

67

recovery, national integration, law supremacy, and military refonn.38 But very early in his

presidential career, both supporters and opponents began to view Abdurrahman's progress with

dismay. Within his twenty-one months of holding power, Abdurrahman had to face a

fonnidable host of antagonists and hostile actions. On July 23, 2001, the MPR in tum

impeached and sacked him, and elected Megawati to be the new leader.

It was widely contended that his impeachment resulted from long-deadly political

conflict among elite politicians in Jakarta. The political conflict was not apparently provoked by

his failure to address the problems. Rather, his failure to address the problem was largely caused

by the very intra-elite political conflict. As far as Abdurrahman progresses are concerned, the

analysis of political developments during his administration suggested that while he had enjoyed

modest success in certain areas, such as military reform, freedom of the press, and separatist

movernents,39 there was little progress made in the institutional modernization of the political and

legal frameworks, the basis of which was laid by the reforms of the Habibie administration.

According to Mietzner, "the high level of political conflict among the elite has prevented

significant progress in the major sectors of institutional, legal and military refonn.'.40 His

commitment to address fundamental issues of constitutional changes seemed to be subordinated

to the main focus of the intra-elite power struggle-the political survival of his own presidency.

If the political conflict was not triggered by elite disappointment of his progress, what

went wrong? Why did Abdurrahman lose support from elite politicians so soon? There are three

interrelated explanations. First the Indonesian constitution (DUD 1945), before being amended

during the Megawati presidency, provided insufficient explanation for inter-institutional relations

38 Mietzner, "Abdurrabman's Indonesia," 200 I, p. 29-44. See also Gorjao, "Abdurrainnan Wahid's Presidenc~," 2003, p. 13-43.

3 See Barton, "A Fair Measure," 2001, p. 33-46. 40 Mietzner, "Abdurrabman's Indonesia," 2001, p. 43.

68

between the president, DPR, and MPR, leaving it unclear whether Indonesia adhered to a

presidential or parliamentary system, or a chaotic mixture of them. Based on the constitution, the

Indonesian system gave both the DPR and MPR unspecified powers to demand the president's

accountability and removed him ifhe was deemed guilty of violations of the constitution, the law,

or the state policy guidelines. Second is related to his dearth of political support within the DPR

and MPR. While his election was supported by numerons parties, however, his real political

backing was only PKB. Its minority seats in the DPR (12 %) and MPR (8 %) rendered

Abdurrahman position in a susceptible to any political opposition.

While these two factors were instrumental to Abdurrahman's impeachment, however,

emphasizing simply on both factors is misreading. Had both factors become the most crucial

factors to intra-elite conflict, Megawati would have faced similar political opposition.

Megawati sustained her presidency until the end of her term in 2004 without major political

opposition from both the DPR and MPR. Megawati surely inherited a similar constitution

granted the parliament sufficient power to sack her. However, the constitution was successfully

amended during her presidency, thanks mostly to the vigorous efforts of the MPR under

Amien's leadership. Similarly, while PDI-P controlled slightly more seats in the DPR and DPR

than PKB did, PDI-P was still a minority. However, Megawati succeeded to maintain support

from political parties needed to sustain her presidency. If the constitution and political balance

were insufficient to explain the Abdurrahman impeachment, what did matter?

An able scholar on Middle East politics Daniel Brumberg offers an interesting but

misleading explanation. In his comparative study on Iranian and Indonesian politics, he points

out that the intra-elite Indonesian conflict exemplified "multipolar competition between and

within competing Islamic and secular groups." He goes on to note that the competition was

69

between the moderate, secular vision ofIslam embodied in Abdurrabman and his PKB and the

Islamist groups within the central axiS.41 Indeed, there were competing visions on Indonesian

Islam among moderate and Islamist groups. But taking this division into account as the sole

explanation for the elite conflict was too bold. Did not those Islamic PPP, PBB, and PK parties,

putting aside their theological differences with the traditionalist PKB/NU, voluntarily support

Abdurrahman in a time when the PKB had formed a political alliance with the PDI-P to support

Megawati? Did not also both groups eventually work in concert to help Abdurrahman's win in

the presidential election against the nationalist candidate Megawati?

Many interpretations also deduced that the fall of Abdurrabman represented a return

to political authoritarianism. However, according to Edward Aspinall, this drew heavily on the

views of Abdurrahman and his supporters. Therefore, Aspinall goes on to argue, it is important

not to exaggerate this argument. 42 A third reason, and the most important one, as to why

Abdurrahman faced unbearable political opposition was related to his behavior and leadership

style. ''He had been always unpredictable and erratic," says one observer.43 Not only did his

eccentric style frequently damage his credibility,44 but democratic transformation, on which so

many had pinned their hopes, was also stymied by his own eccentric, unpredictable, and

autocratic behavior.''''5 This ran in tandem with other negative reports on his capacity as

president, including reneging on political deals, sacking cabinet ministers for unspecified

reasons, promising and then refusing to devolve authority to the vice-president, having

41 Bromberg, "Dissonant Politics in Iran and Indonesia," 2001, p. 381-411. 42 Aspinall, "The Downfall of President Abdurrahman Wahid," 2002, p. 30-31. 43 GOljao, "Abdurrahman Wahid's Presidency," 2003, p. 14. 44 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 300. 45 Conceicao, Indonesia's Six Years of Living Dangerously, 2005, p. 44.

70

considerable shifts of outlook from day-to-day, and his heavy reliance on a small and shrinking

coterie of confidants whose political or administrative ability was questionable.46

He frequently spoke or joked before fully considering the implications of what he was

about to say. His constant jokes about his political opponents also did not help to mend fences,

and sometimes offended people, which for instance happened during his speech in the

parliament meeting on the closure of Information Ministry and Social Affairs Ministry. At the

meeting, members of parliament criticized his policy which they thought was taken without a

proper consideration and review. Abdurrahman defended his policy and made a strong

comment, "I guess my explanation was not really understood by you all since there was no

difference between talking to you and talking to kindergarten kids.'.47 Such unnecessary

statements, combined with accusations of corruption and scandals, had become quite common

during Abdurrahman administration.48

His methods of doing business, deciding issues, and bestowing favors all reflected more

Abdurrahman's penchant fortraditional-NU style ofpatrimonialism than the formal decision

making and management processes of state policies.49 For his fanatic followers, as Fealy says,

Abdurrahman was not just a kyai (traditional Islamic scholar) but a venerated wali (protege of

God, saint). The actions of wali often fall outside normal social conventions, but because wali are

seen as a divinely gifted, they are above human criticism. The fact that he was nearly blind and

that his party only controlled 8 % of the MPR seats, but he finally could become president, has

strengthened the belief among his followers that he possessed a somewhat super-human power.

46 Kingsbury, The Politics ojlndonesia, 2005, p. 302-303. 41 Dwidjowijoto, Can He Manage? 2000, p. 102. 4S On the detailed accusations of corruption and scandals agaInst Abdurrahrnan, see Budiman,

"Indonesia," 2001, p. 146. 4' On the comprehensive account of his traditional leadership style, see Fealy, "Abdurrahman Wahid and

the al-Khidr Question," 2001, p. 5-14; Budiman, "Will Gus Dur Survive?" 2001, p. 47-51.

71

Although his followers were also often surprised and confused by his actions, they sought to

understand what he stood for. Even if they did not know what he sought to achieve, because he

never gave any explanation, they simply believed that it was because they did not yet understand

his goal, and therefore it was still admirable and deserving support. Abdurrabrnan as president,

sadly, has behaved much as he did before he was elected. Just like any kyai, he simply makes

decisions without firstly asking approval from others, particularly his followers, who will

automatically obey his decisions. In addition, he is accustomed to a culture where it is not

necessary for him to explain what he did. Unfortunately, he also led the nation this way. His

ineffectiveness is the fact that he did not transform himself into a real president.

Complicated even matters, having understood his minority support from the DPR and

MPR, Abdurrabrnan "has been unwilling to act like a politician in a democracy, that is, to build a

broad base of support and adopt a set of policies responsive to the interests of this constituency,"

says a veteran Indonesian observer William Liddle.5o He fired numerous ministers from PPP,

Golkar and PDI-P without consultation with their original parties. It should not be surprising that

his cabinet, whose members were not sure whether they will retain their positions next month,

had not worked as it should. 51 In August 2000, he crated a new cabinet that seemed to be "all the

president's men" rather than representing political parties in the DPR.52

Moreover, despite the growing criticism, he seemed to be insensitive to the Muslim

concerns. He proposed an idea of opening trade relation with Israel, which in his mind would

be a shortcut to revive the national economy. This idea was strongly opposed by many of

Muslim leaders, because it contradicted the constitution, which was clearly against any form of

'0 Liddle, "Indonesia in 2000," 2001, p. 208. " Shiraishi, "Indonesia," 2000, p. 138. 52 "All the Wahid's Men," Tempo, August 28-September 3,2000.

72

foreign invasion and because of their solidarity with their fellow Muslims in Palestine which is

invaded by Israel. He also proposed an idea to lift the ban on communism, based on his long

idea of pluralism and democracy. This idea was even more controversial and provoked stronger

opposition from his political enemies from Islamic community, nationalist parties and the

military. As Abdurrahman became more erratic and unpredictable, his popularity plummeted

and whatever sense oflegitimacy he had gained through the election process quickly diruiuish.

Those parties that had supported him, let alone his rival, in the 1999 presidential election now

turned against him, and eventually he was unseated after twenty-one months at the office.

The intra-elite political conflict, particularly between the parliament and the President

bore awkward relationship between the NU and the President. S3 Although there was a small

number of young NU-affiliated NGO activists debating an appropriate way to balance between

loyalty and criticism of Abdurrahman's presidency, the moves to unseat Abdurrahman created

a profound shock within the NU leaders. They deemed such efforts as a political conspiracy by

a majority of the MPs whose interests were only in power and in serving their own interest.S4

On the eve of Abdurrahman's dismissal, the feeling in the NU community was that he had been

maltreated (didzaliml), an Arabic tenn with a profound religious connotation.

In a more spontaneous response, pro-Abdurrahman demonstrations flourished in

November 2000, but intensified in February 2001 when the first memorandum would be issued

against the President. All the eleven parliamentary factions but the PKB voted against him. In

response, Abdurrahman' s supporters staged their own protests, cutting down all the trees in

streets, including the sacking of regional Golkar offices in some cities of East Java, the

53 See Van Bruinessen, ''Back To Situbondo?" 2002, p. 15-46; FeiUard, ''Indonesian Traditiona1ist Islam's Troubled Experience with Democracy," 2002, p. 117-144.

54 Anam, Seandainya Aku Jadi Malon, 2002, p. 63.

73

heartland ofNU. They also staged attacks on schools and buildings linked to Muhammadiyah.

It seemed that they could not distinguish between the political conflict between the parliament

and the President with the conflict between the DPR chairperson who became the Golkar

chainnan and the MPR chairperson who once headed the Muhammadiyah. While there was a

concern about such a violent response, the real threat seemed to come from an extreme (but

loosely affiliated) wing of the NU known as Pasukan Berani Mati (pBM-the Ready-to-Die

Forces), new militias set up in East Java with men who vowed to die for Abdurrahman.

Members of this group undertook special training in several cities of East Java.55

Three months later, when the DPR issued the second memorandum against the

President, the situation continued to worsen. Unfortunately, the NU followers felt that Amien

was the man behind the drive to shake up Abdurrahnlan in the parliament. The Abdurrahman

supporters not only resumed to attack Golkar and Muhammadiyah buildings but also to spread

terror to the Muhammadiyah activists by painting their houses with X-red signs. This has

reminded people of events surrounding the 1965 communist coup. At the time, the red lines on

the door signaled death for its inhabitants. The sign had made it easier for the NU-paramilitary

force Banser to kidnap allegedly members of the PKI and massacre them. 56 The political

violence between the first and second memorandum in East Java, according to Muhammadiyah,

damaged 5 universities, 12 schools, 5 clinics, 4 mosques, 9 local offices linked to

Muhammadiyah, and the houses of at least 18 Muhammadiyah localleaders. All this political

violence was detailed in a white book compiled by the Muhammadiyah provincial board which

simultaneously refused any financial compensation offered by the NU.57

55 "Into the Valley of Death," Tempo, April 16,2001, p. 14-16. 56 "Terror Politics," Tempo, April 16, 2001, p. 20-21. "Sopbiaan, Tase\an, Hamid, Muhammadiyah Korban Kekerasan Politik, 2002.

74

Tantamount to this spontaneous, violent response, there was a debate within the NU

leaders on what should be done. All appeared to feel that the efforts to unseat Abdurrahman

also concerned themselves. A veteran NU observer describes the growing resentment:

"It was not only President Gus Dut who was being humiliated; it was the NU and its subculture, it was the kyais, it was the entire, relatively backward segment of the population represented by the NU who were being humiliated. With Abdurrahman's election to the presidency, the NU had for the first time known itself to be a fully accepted element of the nation, as worthy of leading it as any other. His imminent ousting was a blow to self-respect.""

Several NU kyai held a religious meeting (Bahtsul Masail) in Sukabumi, West Java on

April 2, 2001 discussing whether moves to oust a democratically elected president should be

fought with forces as being" bughaf', a term in Islamic law referring to insurgents against a

legitimate ruler who thus deserves the death sentence. 59 The meeting unanimously decided that

opponents of the President were definitely guilty of bughat if two conditions were met: they are

Muslims and they have the mass mobilization capacity to oppose the government. This resolution

however was not backed by the PBNU which decided to avoid using any violent means to defend

the president. Rather, the PBNU, in a meeting held in Cilegon, Banten, stated that the PBNU will

not tolerate any physical violent action by anyone, because violence is forbidden by religion and

also brings damage to the nation. This decision was a relief since many began to feel that there

seemed to be an imminent clash between the pro-Abdurrahman militia (including the PBM) and

the anti-Abdurrahman militias coming from various hard-liner Islamic groups. Worse still,

religious arguments were used by both groups in almost different ways.

In the eve of the second memorandum, the PBNU organized a massive istighotsah, a

public prayer gathering, on April 29, 2001 in Jakarta which was attended by more than twenty

5. Van Bruinessen, "Back To Situbondo?" 2002, p. 38. 59 "Flexibility", Tempo, April 16, 2001, p. 19.

75

thousand NU members. This event was purported as another political tool of the President and

the NU in the ongoing power struggle against their adversaries. While many people feared the

outbreak clash between the pro and anti-President, however, the event proceeded peacefully,

and eventually the attendants also dispersed peacefully.

The elite political conflict also exacerbated conflict among student organizations.

While they were relatively united during the long protest against Suharto, those student

organizations were divided by the dismissal of the President Abdurrahman. The Masyumi­

inspired student organization HMI (Hirnpunan Mahasiswa Islam), the newly Partai Keadilan

student wing, KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia), the Muhammadiyah

student organization (!MM), and most students from universities marched in streets demanding

the Abdurrahman dismissal. Meanwhile, the NU-affiliated student organization PMII

(Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia), along with some smaller leftist organizations, did not

directly defend Abdurrahman's presidency, they rather demanded the dismantling of the heir of

the New Order regime, the Golkar party.

In addition to the defense strategy based on religious and streets fronts, the NU

chairman Hasyim Muzadi also made another effort to defend the Abdurrahman presidency. He

toured many political figures to call for a political compromise instead of conflict. His

objective was to gamer political support from political leaders.6O He first of all visited President

Abdurrahman to convey the message from several NU kyais from East and Central Java

pleading him to calm down. Hasyim then visited Vice-President Megawati and the

Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Maarif separately. Hasyim told them his concern about the

imminent conflict in grassroots level and the urgency to take necessary actions to subside the

60 "Tak Cukup Bersafari," Gatra, 25 November 2000, p. 74-75.

76

tension. Hasyim also visited some political party leaders such as Harnzah Haz ofPPP and

Ahmad Sumargono ofPBB.

While the NU have made many efforts to defend Abdurrahman's presidency, the

Muharnmadiyah's response was not insignificant. During the outbreak of terror and threat

against Muhammadiyah figureheads in some towns of East Java, the Muharnmadiyah leaders

and members have not made any move. Since early March 2001, however, the Muhammadiyah

leaders had sent clear messages that they supported the impeachment of President

Abdurrahman. In the inaugural speech of his professorship, the deputy chairman of

Muharnmadiyah, Din Syamsuddin, also pointed out that in Islamic political thought there is a

possibility to impeach a president during his tenn, had he deviated from justice, lost one of his

five-senses or vital organs, or engaged in a sexual affair; the cases that had allegedly happened

in Abdurrahman's presidency and personality.61

Two days later the Muhammadiyah leaders made a clearer statement when they met

with Vice President Megawati. The PP Muharnmadiyah stated that the national leadership had

lost all moral and social legitimacy, and this indicated that the president should resign. They

went on to state that wisdom, sincerity and statesmanship were necessary to save the national

leadership in a constitutional manner. They also appealed to Megawati to prevent national

disintegration and to conduct measures to save the nationalleadership.62 The Muhammadiyah's

support to the dismissal of Abdurrahman had inevitably exacerbated the worse relationship

between the NU and Muharnmadiyah organizations and their supporters.

The NU had made vigorous extra-parliamentary efforts to defend Abdurrahman's

presidency. However, they could not prevent his dismissal when the MPR held an extraordinary

61 Syamsuddin, "Antara yang Berkuasa dan yang Dikuasai," 2005, p. 85-112. 62 "Opportunity Knocks," Tempo, March 12, 2001.

77

session on July 23, 2001 impeaching him and electing Megawati as the new president. But the

NU did not lose everything. The MPR also elected Hamzah Haz, the PPP Chairman, as the new

vice-president (hirnselfthe NU background, but has not shared Abdurrahman's political views).

The ministry of religion was also granted to an NU academician, Said Agil Munawwar

(meanwhile, Muhammadiyah kept the ministry of education). After the NU lost the

Abdurrahman's presidency, at least the lesser gains remained. The next part wiII examine the

roles played by the Muhammadiyah and NU in the 2004 presidential election.

D. Muslim Civil Society and the 2004 Presidential Election

The ascension of Megawati to the presidency was welcomed with relief because the

drama and chaos of21-months under President Abdurrahman had eventually come to an end.

Many people hoped at least that Megawati would preside over period of stability that would

enable her ministers to tackle the massive challenges that had largely been neglected during

Abdurrahman presidency.63 Inheriting a state tom by a long constitutional crisis, indeed, this

hope was met during her presidency as the political turbulence had subsided and the

government had been stable. Unlike her predecessor, she aptly avoided provoking the anger of

her political rivalries and maintained cordial relationship with all major political parties.

While many considered Megawati a failed president in term of providing an effective

leadership,64 however, a major break from the past representing an attempt to foster a more

mature democracy occurred during her term. For example, under Amien's leadership, the MPR in

November 2001 amended the constitution requiring for the first time direct election of all

members of the DPR and the Regional Representative Councils (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah-

DPD), as well as the president and vice-president. According to the MPR consensus, the new

63 Crouch, "Political Update 2002," 2003, p. 15. 64 See Lanti, "Indonesia: The Year of Continuing Turbulence," 2002, p. 111-129.

78

system would encompass a number of new features. First, all 550 seats of the DPR would be

filled by election. Neither military nor police would have any longer appointed representation as

in the previous DPR. Second, all 128 DPD members would also be directly elected. Each of the

country's 32 provinces has four seats in the DPD, which replace the appointed representatives of

regional and functional groups. Third, the DPR together with the DPD formed a bicameral MPR.

Fourth, as the presidential election would be held after the legislature election, a political party or

a coalition of political parties which won a threshold either 3% of the DPR seats or 5% of the

nationwide vote could nominate the pairing candidate. Furthennore, unless a pairing candidate

won a simple majority and garnered the majority of votes (50 + 1 %), a second round will be held

between the two leading pairs to decide the winner.65

While this period was punctuated by political stability as no major conflict occurred

among elite political leaders, however, some Islamic political parties were inflicted with deep

internal division. The PKB was divided into two parties. This was an ensuing conflict of the

previous political chaos, where the PKB chairman Matori and his supporters eventually voted

for Abdurra1unan's impeachment in order to secure his own seat in Megawati's cabinet as the

Minister of Defense. In 2002 attempts to reconcile Matori's rebel faction with Abdurra1unan

failed, and since both factions operated as two entities with the same emblem. However, the

PKB-led by Matori was fading out when Matori suffered an acute stroke in 2003 and his party

was then disqualified by the election commission to contest for the 2004 election. The PPP

experienced a similar internal conflict. Some young PPP politicians, mostly from the modernist

camp, led by a renowned Islamic preacher Zainuddin M.Z., had demanded to speed up the PPP

congress before the 2004 election in order to accelerate the political regeneration within the

" See Enunerson, "A Year of Voting Dangerously," 2004, p. 104; Smith, "Indonesia in 2002: Megawati's Way," 2003, p. 101.

79

party. Meanwhile, some others PPP politicians under vice-president Hamzah adamantly

defended the congress to be held after the 2004 election. This was deemed by the former as a

trick for the later to secure their tickets in the 2004 legislature and presidential elections. AB no

consensus was reached, the young group split and formed the new PPP Reformasi, and later on

participated in the 2004 election as the Partai Bintang Reformasi (pBR, Reform Star Party).

In the meantime, during the period between the two year-long political turbulence and

ahead of the 2004 election, the relationship between the Muslim civil society organizations and

political parties was ambiguous. This was partly because of the remnants from difficult political

relationship during the Abdurrahman's presidency, where the NU leaders strived to defend him

in his palace. On the other hand, this was also because of political competition for the

presidential election among leaders of political parties and Muslim civil society organizations.

More than 200 political parties registered to take part in the 2004 elections but only 24

parties were qualified to contest, including 5 leading parties which had taken part in the 1999

election: the PDI-P of President Megawati; the Golkar Party, the former party of the Suharto

regime; the PKB of Abdurrahman; the PPP of Vice-President Hamzah Haz; and the PAN of

Amien. Out ofthe 24 parties running for legislative seats, 7 Islamic parties participated in this

second democratic election during the reform era.66 In this election, only seven parties emerged

as meaningful vote getters. Leading the field was GoIkar with 2 1.6 % of the vote, followed

closely by the PDI-P with 18.5 %. The PKB ran a distant third with 10.6 %, while the PPP

tallied 8.5 %, the new Democrat Party took 7.5 %, a freshly renamed Islarnist formation called

the PKS took 7.3 %, and the PAN took seventh place with a 6.4 % showing.67

66 On the prevalence of political aliran during this election, see Lanti, "Outlook on the Indonesian Parliamentary Election 2004," 2004 .

• 7 Qodari, "Indonesia's Quest," 2005, p. 78.

80

Table 2 Results of the Parliamentary Elections (1999 and 2004)

Election PDI-P Golkar PKB PPP PAN PBB PKJPKS PD 1999 33.7% 22.5% 12.7% 10.7% 7.1% 1.9% 1.4% -2004 18.5% 21.6% 10.6% 8.2% 6.4% 2.6% 7.3% 7.5%

In fact, support declined for all five major vote-getter of 1999, a decline no doubt

attributable to the fact that both Abdurrahman's and Megawati's post-1999 governments had

been based on grand coalitions of all the major parties. The people have apparently shown their

displeasure with these ruling parties which had not done much for the people.68 Indonesia's

economic malaise had entered its seventh year, but economic growth remained too low to

absorb the growing labor force.69 Such political disillusionment is common in countries

experiencing a protracted democratic transition, where politics was punctuated by instability

and economic reform has not yet delivered its promise of welfare. It seemed that the 2004

parliamentary election functioned well for people to punish the failed ruling parties.

The main beneficiaries of the popular disillusionment were the Partai Keadilan

Sejabtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party) and Partai Demokrat (PD, Democrat Party) which

during the electoral campaign both aptly sought to dissociate themselves with the government

of the preceding five years while they were indeed parts of them. Moreover, the PD's strong

performance can be attributed solely to the popularity of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)

whose profile soared in the wake of his marginalization within Megawati's cabinet and

subsequent resignation from his ministerial portfolio, which elicited widespread media

attention and considerable public sympathy. Meanwhile, the PKS in particular shifted its

strategy from direct advocacy of the syariah to the fight against corruption, collusion and

68 Wanandi, "The Indonesian General Elections 2004," 2004, p. 117. 69 Aspinall, "Elections and the Normalization of Politics in Indonesia," 2005, p. 123.

81

nepotism, issues the big parties had to struggle with as they attempted to overcome public

perception of their complicities in such activities. 70

As far as the performance of Islamic political parties is concerned, if the total votes

received by all the Muslim parties are tallied excluding the PAN and the PKB, in the 2004

parliamentary election they received 23 percent of the vote, or 127 of the 550 seats in the DPR.

If the PAN and the PKB are included, then they gained 42 percent or 231 seats this year. In

1999 they got 34 percent of the vote or 171 seats (out of500).

From the results of this parliamentary election, it was clear that the multi-party system

of 1999 remained in place. In fact, the parliament became more fragmented than in 1999 as

major parties gained lower percentages in 2004. This led to the conclusion that the government

would once again be formed by a coalition and power-sharing arrangements as part of

concessions might be given by presidential candidates to secure office. The likely implication

was that the desire for strong government might be elusive, reflecting the failure of the election

to produce a decisive result thereby making the outcome for the presidential polls uncertain.

When the results of the parliamentary election were announced, it became clear that

only seven parties were qualified to propose their candidates. Other parties could only do so

when they combined their votes. In addition, during the presidential election, candidates for

both president and vice-president should be proposed as a pair. Therefore, the pairing mostly

depended on the results of the parliamentary election, as it enabled the potential candidates to

find their running mates or conversely other candidates prefer to serve as vice-presidential

candidates in order to share power and attract more votes. However, political parties are also

70 Sebastian, "The Paradox ofIndonesian Democracy," 2004, p. 264-265.

82

allowed to nominate a person who is not originally a party member. This will offer a chance to

some respected non-politician figures to be presidential or vice-presidential candidates.

Both religion and ethnicity played a significant role in the pairing process. All of the

presidents of Indonesia, except Habibie who assumed office by default, were Javanese. This

divide between Javanese and non-Javanese constituted a crucial factor in the pairing process.

Thus, if the proposed president was a Javanese, then it might be prudent to have a running mate

who was non-Javanese (or vice versa) in order to gamer the necessary votes from outer islands.

In this regard, the new leaders would be able to project themselves as a truly "Indonesian team"

rather than fueled what was increasingly perceived as a perpetuation of Javanese domination.7l

Similarly significant was the divide between Islam and nationalist political outlooks.

While all of the Indonesian presidents were Muslims, however, except Abdurrahman they came

from the nationalist camp. Therefore, if the proposed presidents were nationalist, they tended to

look for their running mates from Islamic political parties or organizations and vice versa. In a

largely Islamic populace, the winner would be one that was able to appeal to the majority of the

Muslim voters. It was in this context that the NU and Muharnmadiyah organizations and their

leaders plausibly played a significant role.

Since long before the parliamentary election, there were a number of presidential

hopefuls. The PDI-P had nominated Megawati, the incumbent. Similarly, the PAN had also

nominated Amien Rais, while the PKB had nominated Abdurrahman. Apart from these three

candidates, there was also Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBy), coordinating minister

of security under the Megawati government who was proposed by the PD; Akbar Tanjung (the

Golkar Party Chairman and speaker of the DPR); Gen. (ret.) Wiranto (former coordinating

71 Singh, "The 2004 Presidential Elections in Iodone8ia," 2003, p. 439.

83

minister of security fired by Abdurrahman in 1999); Let. Gen. (ret.) Prabowo Subianto (fonner

Suharto's son in law and fonner chief of the anny special force); Nurcholish Madjid (leading

Islamic scholar), Sultan Hamengku Buwono X (Sultan and governor of Jogjakarta); JusufKalla

(coordinating minister for people's welfare under Megawati); Aburizal Bakrie (businessman);

and Surya Paloh (Head of Metro-TV and daily newspaper Media Indonesia).

While the PDI-P, PAN, PKB, and PD had openly declared their respective candidates,

the Golkar party as the winner of the parliamentary election held a convention in order to select

their presidential nominees. In the convention, aimed at increasing internal democratization and

attracting extra-voters, the last eight aforementioned candidates vied for the Golkar ticket.72 By

the time of the Golkar convention on April 20, Wiranto extraordinarily won in the convention

designed by Akbar Tanjung in the hope that he would be the main beneficiary. While Wiranto

had supposedly the most effective electoral machine in Golkar, it was questionable whether he

could manage full support from the Golkar voters since it was rumored that Akbar did not

support Wiranto's nomination wholeheartedly,73 and the fact that JusufKaIla's nomination as

SBY's vice-presidential candidate might split the Golkar voters.

Similarly problematic was Arnien's nomination. After securing the PAN's support for

his nomination in its Jogjakarta congress on February 2000, he began to push the

Muhanunadiyah leaders to declare its fonnal support since 2002. It was also reported that there

had been repeated pressure put on Muhanunadiyah leaders from PAN supporters within the

organization to endorse Arnien through a fonnal declaration. However, Muhanunadiyah leaders

such as the Chainnan Syafii Maarif and the Secretary General Haedar Nashir repeatedly

72 Three candidates dropped their candidacies for different reasons. Nurcholish could not afford a large sum of money needed to run up to the convention; JusufKalla accepted SBY's bid to become his running mate; and Sultan argued that it would be morally incorrect to compete with Akbar, after the later was freed by the Supreme Court from the Bulog scandai.

73 Ananta at.ai., Emerging Democracy in Indonesia, 2005, p. 79.

84

refused the pressure and said that the formal support would be an inappropriate political move

since Mubammadiyah was not a political party and that it would jeopardize the impartial

character of the organization.74

The first collision between both factions took place in the Mubammadiyah annual

meeting (Tanwir) in Bali on January 2002. During the meeting, the pro-Amien faction insisted

Mubammadiyah to explicitly mention Amien's name as the presidential nominee. On the other

hand, the pro-impartiality faction defended that such declaration would violate the natural non-

political character of the organization. Amien and his supporters were further shocked by the

Mubammadiyah's invitation to President Megawati to open the Tanwir. This was deemed by

Amien as Mubammadiyah leaning to support Megawati rather than himself. Worse still, in her

remarks, Megawati stressed that Mubammadiyah was not a strange entity to her, since she was

brought up in a Mubammadiyah family. She recalled that her father the late Sukarno, was a

member of the Mubammadiyah, and once even served in the movement's executive body.

Megawati's mother was also the daughter ofMubammadiyah's top executive in Bengkulu,

Sumatra. "And I believe that it is for the first time in history that a woman from a

Mubammadiyah family is leading this country as its president," she said, to huge applause from

the participants.75 The compromise was eventually reached, however, and the final

recommendation stated that "the Mubammadiyah will support its best cadres to become the

national leader," without naming who "the best cadres" are.

The next political battle between both factions took place in the Mubammadiyah

Tanwir on June 2003 in Makassar. As the presidential election was getting closer, the demand

for Mubammadiyah to declare its support for Amien had also mounted. Ahead to the Tanwir,

74 See Tanthowi, "Mnhammadiyah dan Pencalonan Amien Rais," 2003. 7S "Megawati Opens Mnhammadiyah Annual Meeting in Denpasar," The Jakarta Post, January 25, 2002.

85

the national media was embellished by a dispute between Amien and Syafii concerning

Muhammadiyah's appropriate standpoint on Amien's candidacy. While the Tanwir participants

were discussing Muhammadiyah's stance, a meeting between members of the PP

Muhammadiyah with Amien and his supporters was held in order to reach consensus. It was

reported that in the meeting Amien did not conceal his anger with Syafii's open rejection to

endorse his nomination. It was also reported that some Muhammadiyah leaders went out of the

meeting infuriated by Amien's belligerence. The consensus was eventually reached stating:

''The Tanwir 'comprehended the participants' aspiration concerning the nomination of the Muhamrnadiyah's best cadre in the 2004 presidential election, in the framework of the refonn continuation and country's salvation ... The Tanwir entrusted to the central board of the Muhamrnadiyah to follow lIP this aspiration and in a proper time issue an instruction for all Muhamrnadiyah members.,,'6

The awkward relationship between Amien and the Muhammadiyah was exacerbated

by the issue heard by Amien that Syafii was on the top ofMegawati's list of vice-presidential

nominees. Depite Syafii' s persistence that between two buses would not overtake each other,

meaning that he would not vie for the Muhammadiyah's support,77 Amien increased his

pressure on Muhammadiyah to endorse his candidacy before the parliamentary election, hoping

that the endorsement will simultaneously increase the support of the Muhammadiyah members

for his party. As the pressure was unstoppable, the Muhammadiyah eventually "fully endorsed

Amien as the best cadre and former Muhammadiyah chairman to strive for the reform

continuation and the country's salvation in the 2004 presidential election.,,78 In a political

statement to conclude its plenary session on February 9-10, 2004 in Yogyakarta,

76 See Tanfidz Tanwir Muhammadiyah Tahun 1424 W2003 M, Berita Resmi Muhammadiyah, No. 04/2003'j? 21-22.

Interview with A. Syafii Maarif on December 24, 2007 in J ogjakarta. In his words, he said "sesarna bus kOla tidak boleh saling rnendahului."

78 See Keputusan Sidang Pleno Pimpinan Pusat Muharnrnadiyah Bersarna Ketua-Ketua Pimpinan Wilayah Muhammadiyah tentang Kebijakan Mubarnrnadiyah Menghadapi Pernilu 2004. The open debate on the Muhammadiyah's support for Amien was detailed in Siandes, Muhammadiyah, 2004.

86

Muharnmadiyah emphasized that Amien was the country's best hope and the refonnist figure

who still committed to fuIIy implementing the ideals of reformasi. To the dislike of some of

Amien's supporters who sought a side effect of the declaration for their party's benefit, Syafii

reiterated that the endorsement had nothing to do with the PANas Muharnmadiyah members

were free to choose any political party. It was widely circulated that, for Muharnmadiyah

members, ''whatever their political parties, their president would invariably be Amien."

Partly because of such unbinding dictum, the PAN saw its vote share dropped from

7.1 to 6.4%. During the first week after the parliamentary election, it was reported that Amien

was shocked by the PAN's poor perfonnance and began rating his own chance was threatened.

There had been a number of rumors circulating in Jakarta that Amien would quit the

presidential race or would simply be the ruuning mate. Many Muharnmadiyah members were

also nervous and demoralized. They began to realize that ''whatever their political parties, their

president would invariably be Amien" fonnula at last decreased Amien's chance in the ensuing

presidential election. Finally, a week after the parliamentary election, Amien announced in the

Muhammadiyah office that he remained runuing for president. This particular place was not

insiguificant for such announcement. According to Amien's political advisor Rizal Sukma, it

would send a strong message that Amien was still the indispensable Islamic leader without

having to say so. It would give also the impression that his decision was not without a clear

power base. Finally, it would also send a clear reminder to those Muharnmadiyah members

who did not vote for the PAN that in the presidential election they should vote for him.79

A similar awkward relationship developed between the NU and Abdurrahman during

the Megawati presidency. Along with the PKB chainnan Matori who decided to join the

79 Confidentiallet!er from Rizal Sukma for Amien Rais, April 8, 2004.

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extraordinary MPR session unseating Abdurrahman, the NU Chairman Hasyim Muzadi disagreed

with the planned violence to defend Abdurrahman's presidency. Seeing the powerful movement

toppling Abdurrabman, the NU priority, according to Hasyim, was to save what could be saved

for the NU's interests. The PPP chairman Harnzah was thus elected vice-president and the

ministry of religion was granted to the NU leader, Said Agil Munawwar. Hasyim's maneuver was

criticized by Abdurrahman, accusing Hasyim of doing little to prevent the special session of the

MPR. The rift between the NU and Abdurrahman increased after the fall of Abdurrahman,

involved the attitude to be taken toward the new Megawati government.80 While Abdurralunan

refused any contact with Megawati in the months following his impeachment, Hasyim and other

NU leaders have kept regular contact. The rivalry between Abdurrahman and Hasyim surprised

many people, since Abdurrahman backed Hasyim's election in the 1999 NU congress.

The ensuing tension intensified concerning the presidential issue. The PKB had

declared its support for Abdurrahman to run in the presidential election. Many PKB leaders

also stated that the party would nominate Hasyim as PKB's presidential candidate if

Abdurrahman resigned from the race either for health or other reasons. Seeing this chance,

early in February 2004 Hasyim called on the NU members to vote for the PKB with former

president Abdurrahman as its presidential hopeful. Tantamount to the Muharnmadiyah

endorsement to Amien's candidacy, Hasyim said that PKB was NU's political vehicle and NU

members and supporters should fully support the party. Despite strong criticism from some NU

supporters from the PPP saying that such a call could cause conflict among the grass roots,

Hasyim said ''the political support will come not from the NU institution but from NU

80 Feillard, "Indonesian Traditiona1ist Islam's Troubled Experience with Democracy," 2002, p. 139.

88

members. NU members will be obliged to cast their votes for PKB and the latter should

recognize the NU membership of those who give their support to other parties. ,,81

However, Abdurrahman did not allow Hasyim diminishing his chance with pleasure.

He insisted that he was the only possible PKB candidate. In mid February 2004 Abdurrahman

began his campaign to unseat Hasyim from the NU's leadership through an extraordinary NU

congress. Hasyim himself admitted that there had been an undeclared war between him and

Gus Dur for the impeachment reason.82 Hasyim also admitted that Abdurrahman was

disappointed after he refused to support Alwi's PKB over Matori's in the PKB conflict. Hasyim

argued that he did it to preserve the NU's impartiality.

After it became clear for Hasyim that his prospect in the PKB was slim and

Abdurrahman's assault on his NU post intensified, Hasyim began his campaign that the NU

refused to support the PKB in the parliamentary election. When a number of the PKB leaders

met him at the NU office to ask for the NU's support due to the fact that "the party was born

from the NU's womb", Hasyim asserted that he would prevent the NU becoming involved in

politics. "Both the PKB and NU must keep their own institutions healthy. Although the PKB

was born from us (the NU), we are different institutions. The NU is a religious organization

while the PKB is a political organization, so just don't mix them up," Hasyim said.83

At the same time, Megawati had been seeking a prominent national figure who could

revive her beleaguered image and boost her chances of winning. In an earlier meeting, PDI-P

had considered a Muslim leader to complement the party's broad support from grassroots

members with its nationalist/secular orientation. As mentioned above, there was a tendency for

81 "Mnbammadiyah Backs Amien," The Jakana Post, February II, 2004. 82 ''Hasyim Challenges Move to Unseat Him from Post," The Jakana Post, February 28, 2004. 83 ''NU Refuses to Support PKB in 2004 Polls," The Jakana Post, March 6, 2006.

89

nationalist leaders to team up with the Muslim leaders and vice versa. For Megawati, in

particular, this was aimed at complementing her lacking Islamic credentials, as some Islamic

leaders using religious arguments had been campaigning to disqualify her bid because of her

gender. With this criterion, after the reluctance of the Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Maarif,

the chance remained wide open for the PDI-P to pick one of the NU figures, either Hasyim

Muzadi or vice-president Hamzah Haz of the PPP.

Complicating the matter, Wiranto, after winning the Golkar ticket, was also eyeing his

running mate from the Muslim camp. With Muhammadiyah declaring its support for Amien, a

struggle ensued to secure the NU figures. However, the NU ticket was not easy to secure. On

the one hand, Hasyim, fearing Wiranto's record of human rights abuses, opted instead to

partner with Megawati. Wiranto keen on securing a presidential running mate from the NU and

considering Abdurrahman's opposition to Hasyim's candidacy, turned his attention to

Abdurrahman's younger brother Solahuddin Wahld. The latter was Hasyim's deputy chairman

of the NU and was endorsed by the PKB, the main party representing the NU. Meanwhile,

Harnzah, after Megawati had chosen Hasyim as her running mate, decided to run for the

presidency. Actual1y, the PPP was divided about his decision to run, but in the end they

relented, even though they knew his chance was slim. Worse still, Abdurrahman initially also

continued his candidacy and chose Marwah Daud Ibrahim, a Golkar female leader coming from

Sulawesi, as his partner. However, this pair was barred by the election commission (KPU) from

taking part in the presidential election as Abdurrahman failed the medical check-up test.

As far as Amien's partner was concerned, Amien was keen to take a nationalist figure

as his running mate. Amien had earlier mul1ed on running with SBY, but it turned out that the

latter's party got more votes in the parliamentary election than PAN. Amien then turned his

90

attention to the military commander Endriartono Sutarto, but the latter refused his offer. After

weeks of uncertainty, Amien announced on early May former minister Siswono Yudo Husodo

as his running mate for the July 5 presidential race. Siswono said he hoped his candidacy would

create a solid and harmonious duo between Amien, "a nationalist, religious" figure and himself,

a man who always "tries to be religious, and a nationalist".84

Finally, when the campaign for the presidential election began, only five pairs took

part in the race: Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid (proposed by Golkar), SBY-JusufKalla (proposed

by the PD), Amien Rais-Siswono (proposed by PAN), Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi (proposed by

the PDI-P), and Harnzah Haz-Agum Gumelar (proposed by the PPP).

Looking at their ethnic backgrounds, among the presidential candidates, all but one

(Hamzah) were Javanese. Among the vice-presidential candidates, three of them were Javanese

(Hasyim, Solahuddin, and Agum) while the other two were non-Javanese (Siswono and Jusuf

Kalla). Looking at the religious backgrounds of the candidates, it is obvious that all were

Muslim. In terms of their political outlooks, however, out of all presidential candidates, three

were nationalists (Megawati, Wiranto and SBy), while the rest were Islamic (Amien and

Harnzah). Among the vice-presidential candidates, three were Islamic (Hasyim, Solahuddin,

and JusufKa\la) while the rest were nationalists (Siswono and Agum).

It was clear that in the presidential election, the Muhammadiyah support was

relatively unified behind Amien's bid since there was only one candidate from the modernist

camp. While the Muhammadiyah itself did not officially set up a campaign team, a number of

its leaders have listed themselves in the official campaign team for Amien-Siswono. The

Muhammadiyah deputy chairman Din Syamsuddin, who is not officially included in the

84 "Amien Names Siswono as Running Mate in July 5 Race," The Jakarta Post, May 10, 2004.

91

Anllen-Siswono team, has also set up the Refonn-Minded People's (MPR) movement, which

works to garner support for the pair. At the same token, the regional leadership of

Muhammadiyah throughout the country as well as its youth and woman wings has initiated

respectively to set up similar campaign teams.

Relatively significant for Anllen's bid was the support from several small parties. At

the end of May 2004, six minor political parties-the Marhaenisme Indonesian National Party

(PNI Marhaenisme), Social Democratic Labor Party (PBSD), Freedom BuB National Party

(pNBK), Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (pPDI), Indonesian Unity Party (pSI) and the

Refonn Star Party (pBR)-announced their supports for the Amien-Siswono pairing. With PAN

and Muhammadiyah as the main sponsors, additional votes from these parties were expected to

increase the estimate votes for Anllen-Siswono to 17 millions.

Somewhat problematic was the support from the PKS. Despite its good showing in

the parliamentary election, the PKS did not propose any presidential candidates, nor did any

presidential candidates seek their partner among the PKS leaders. Although the PKS has been

weB-known for its cohesive network, meaning that the existing presidential candidates from the

nationalist camp could secure this Muslim voting bloc, they were highly unlikely willing to be

identified too Islamic, as the PKS had been considered to be the most conservative Muslim

party, along with the PBB and PPP. Rather, they preferred Muslim leaders from a pluralist

Islamic party and organizations, such as PKB, NU, or Muhammadiyah.

During the campaign period, a strenuous tug-of-war between two camps within the

party had prevented it to take a swift decision over whom it should endorse: Wiranto or

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Amien.85 The official reason was their confusion about the candidate who had a greater chance

of beating Megawati. Most party officials appeared to prefer Wiranto, but they had a problem

with the Golkar Party which was seen as a legacy of the New Order, a regime which suppressed

Muslims' political expression. However, Wiranto's strength was that he had a greater chance of

beating Megawati because he was backed by the Golkar which won most votes in the April

poll. As for Amien, the latter's chances of even surviving the first round was considered small.

Therefore their aim of replacing Megawati would likely fail. His strength, however, was that

Amien had a long record ofIslamic leadership and once regarded as a "locomotive of reform".

Despite this formal reason, people had rumored that this division was based on a reason as

trivial as the grooming of a head scarf ofa candidate's wife.86

Five days before the voting, the PKS decided late in the game to throw its support

behind Amien-Siswono. This late decision was seen by many as "playing it safe" and the most

likely consensus reached by both camps. Despite Wiranto' better chance, supporting him might

risk the PKS's pro-reform image. This decision was also aimed at debunking an allegation that

they were controlled by Wiranto and his money. Therefore, rather than merely speculating on

victory, it was far better to remain close to Amien, since the members of the PKS and Amien's

PAN basically came from the same circles: the urban Muslim middle class, campuses and

politically enlightened communities. The decision would enhance its identity as a Muslim-

based party that opted to back candidate who will strive for its members' interests. However,

both camps delayed endorsing Amien until the last days in order to absolve themselves from

endorsing the secular candidates without having to work hard to campaign for Amien.

8S "PKS is Tom between Wiranto, Amien," The Jakarta Post, June 5, 2004. The party bas pledged not to support the incumbent president because of her failure to achieve significant progress during her administration.

86 Sukanto, ''What's Taking the PKS So Long to Make up Its Mind?" 2004. Many PKS concerned Amien's wife which bas not really covered her hair. Neither does one ofhis daughters. Meanwhile, Wiranto's wife and two daughters wear the Islamic head scarf, and another family member is a supporter of the PKS.

93

Therefore, the PKSs support for Amien did not necessarily mean that the candidate would

expect the votes of all of the party's members, meaning that Amien's chances have not

automatically been enhanced to a significant degree. This late support left an indelible effect in

the following years in the strained relationship between the Muhammadiyah and the PKS.

Unlike the relatively united Muhammadiyah support for Amien, the emergence of

several NU candidates divided and confused its members as they would have to choose one of

the figures. The conflict among NU grassroots supporters was unavoidable as the elite tried to

influence the NU members to win their votes. Some believed that the emergence of some NU

candidates was wittingly orchestrated to put a foot in all pairs.87 According to the acting NU

chairman Masdar Mas 'udi, however, that was not the case.88 The 2004 presidential election saw

the open fight among NU leaders to woo the NU members' support. On the one hand, the PKB

executive board unanimously decided to fully support Wiranto-Solahuddin. The decision,

however, was made without a clear endorsement from Abdurrabman, as he had earlier pledged

to abstain in the July 5 polls in protest over the KPU's decision to disqualify him from the race.

Abdurrabman had given his blessing to Solahuddin to run as Wiranto's running mate, although

it did not mean that he altogether supported the pair.89 Intemal division was unavoidable when

NU decided to let Hasyim became Megawati's running mate. Although Hasyim was less

influential within the NU community than Abdurrahman, however, he was the formal NU

leader who commanded the NU structures.

This internal conflict was punctuated by the split among NU leaders. As a traditional

Islamic community, NU members depend upon kyai not only in their religious life, but also in

87 Staff, "Some Lessons from the Democratization Process," 2004, p. 132. 88 Interview with Masdar F. Mas 'udi on December 27, 2007 in Jakarta. 89 "PKB Divided over Candidate Choice," The Jakarta Post, May 14, 2004.

94

social and political fields. Each time, prior to the general election, NU leaders delivered a

statement that told them who to vote for. Such statement had been usually strategic and

powetful, but not this time. Most kyai and bigpesantrens such as Pesantren Lirboyo Kediri,

Genggong Probolinggo and Sukorejo Situbondo, were supporters ofHasyim, and the kyai

delivered a statement to NU members and santri (pesantren pupils) to vote for the Mega­

Hasyim pairing. Similarly, the Wiranto-Solahuddin pairing was supported by Abdurrahman and

Abdullah Faqih, the most influential kyai of the PKB, and the leader ofPesantren Langitan

Tuban. This internal conflict was not only in Jakarta. It was also the case on local levels. Each

local kyai pursued their own interests and took side with one of the candidates and sought to

influence their santri to vote for their candidates. Many kyai were now busy supporting one of

the candidates while neglecting the educational process in pesantren. 90

In order to minimize the impact of conflict on the NU organization, the supreme

(Syuriah) NU council during its meeting on May 17 in Rembang, Central Java, finally, decided

that all NU candidates and their official campaign team members could not be active in the

organization. The meeting was attended by numerous Syuriah members such as Fachrudin

Masturo, Mustofa Bisri, Fuad Hasyim, Said Agil Siradj, Tholchah Hasan, Masdar, Manarul

Hidayat, Fahri Toha and Chotibul Umam Wiranu. The syuriah also decided to appoint Masdar

the acting NU chairman, replacing Hasyim, who was declared non-active by NU's Syuriah

Council. Aside from Hasyim, Solahuddin had earlier resigned voluntarily from his post in NU.

In addition to these decisions, Masdar also prohibited all NU leaders, including those

of affiliated bodies, from making statements on behalf of the organization supporting any

presidential or vice presidential candidates in the upcoming election. The decision to suspend

.. uNU, Mubammadiyah Involvement in Politics May Weaken Them," The Jakarta Post, May 12,2004.

95

Hasyim and other NU leaders who were involved in the presidential campaign was made to

maintain the neutrality ofNU.91 Masdar said the ban applied to leaders ofNU and autonomous

organizations, including Ansor, Muslimat, IPNU, IPPNU, and Lakpesdam NU, from their

central boards down to the grassroots level. He stressed that NU would not issue a political

edict as suggested by a number ofNU leaders, saying that NU had decided not to support or

reject any presidential and vice presidential candidates in the upcoming election.

While some presidential candidates vying for political support from Islamic political

parties and organizations alike, the support was not the only significant factor dominating the

people's decision-making. It was theoretically true that the backing of a considerable party

mechanism which would be able to convert the advantages of popularity into votes at the ballot

booth. Here, networks and organization would be essential to concretize popular support, thus

the critical role of the political party.92 Similarly insignificant was the solid platform for a

presidential bid. Many people had yet to take the candidates' platform and programs into

account when they went into the polls. It is important to note that the presidential election was

the election of individuals rather than parties. Therefore, the 2004 presidential election proved

that personal image and popularity were more important than party affiliation.93 In the first

round presidential election held in July 5, The SBY-Kalla pairing obtained 33.57% of the vote.

The pair was followed by Megawati-Hasyim (26.61 %), Wiranto-Solehuddin (22.15%), Amien-

Siswono (14.66%), and Harnzah-Agum (3.01 %). Although during the first round candidates

with major party support tended to gain some advantage, it was not that crucial. The result

91 ''NU Leaders Banned from Taking Side," The Jakarta Post, May 18, 2004. 92 Sebastian, "The Paradox of Indonesian Democracy," 2004, p. 274. 93 Suryadinata, "Indonesia: The Year ofa Democratic Election," 2005, p. 138.

96

showed that popularity and personal image mattered; otherwise, Yudhoyono would have

obtained only 11.33% (the PD, PBB and PKPI votes).94

The period between the first and second rounds of the presidential election was a busy

time in Indonesian politics. As there were only two candidates, new alliances were formed and

new strategies were set Up. Major and medium-sized political parties began to eye the likely

winning pair in order to reap post-election benefits. During this period, Megawati appeared to

be more active to invite partners into new alliance. The Golkar chairman Akbar drove his party

to support Megawati, despite strong opposition from a number of Golkar leaders. The PPP also

joined the Megawati camp. These three major political parties, supplemented by four small

other political parties (the PBR, PDS, PKPB, and PNI Marhaenisme) formed the Koalisi

Kebangsaan (National Coalition) on August 19, 2004 which was chaired by Akbar. Based on

their gain in the parliamentary election, they expected to gain at least 55.8% total votes.

On the other hand, SBY -Kalla had also expanded their coalition. During the first

round they were backed only by three political parties (pO, PBB, and PKPI). Ahead to the

runoff they had received additional support from the PKS. These four parties formed the

Koalisi Kerakyatan (People's Coalition) on August 26, 2004. In total, the People's Coalition

would have secured only 21.4% total votes. Meanwhile, both the PKB and PAN decided to

remain neutral and advised their constituencies to decide themselves on who to be voted.95

On a party coalition basis, Megawati had the upper hand, but the direct presidential

election was based on personality, and party support was not as crucial as personal image and

perceived capability by the voters. When the second round presidential election was held on

94 On the losing and winning pairs in the first round presidential election, see Ananta alai., Emerging Democrafl, in Indonesia, 2005, p. 74-89.

, Staff, "Challenges to the New Government," 2004, p. 329.

97

September 20, SBY -Kalla received 60.62% votes, while Megawati-Hasyim received 39.38%

votes. The second round presidential election confinned that the party machinery, upon which

Megawati-Hasyim had relied, flunked the elections. The election results proved that the use of

party machinery in generating party loyalties was ineffective.96 This, however, needs further

evidences from local elections and the coming 2009 presidential election.

On October 20, 2004, SBY assumed office as Indonesia's sixth president. On that day,

the cabinet was announced and a new administration established. There were last minute

negotiations and bargaining. The cabinet was not entirely the professional cabinet that SBY

promised. Rather, it was a compromise cabinet, made up of political appointees and

professionals.97 Out of36 posts, 16 ministers represented political parties. Apart from political

parties backing him in the runoff (PD 2 posts, PKS 3 posts, PBB 2 posts, and PKPI 1 post),

SBY also incorporated some ministers representing splinter groups from political parties which

did not support him. They were included Alwi Shihab and SyaifuIIah Yusuf of the PKB,

Bachtiar Chamsah of the PPP, and Aburizal Bakrie and Fahmi Idris ofthe Golkar party. He was

aware of the potential opposition coming from the National Coalition had he neglected them in

the cabinet line-up. By doing so, SBY sought to make the best use of the division for his own

gain. While he could exploit those internal divisions, he could also enhance the inclusive image

of his new administration to garner more public legitimacy.

Looking at the other posts, there were some ministers representing the NU and

Muharnmadiyah. The ministry of religion was granted to the Indonesian ambassador to Egypt

Maftuh Basyuni, himself from NU. The PBNU had never recommended anyone for a

96 On the discussion about personality and political machinery as the key to political success in the 2004 Indonesian presidential election, see Aspinall, "Politics," 2005, 20-23.

97 On the complete cabinet line-up, see Shiraishi, ''Politics in Indonesia," 2005, p. 25-39.

98

ministerial post, since its chainnan in tandem with Megawati were the rival ofSBY-Kalla in

the run-off. The Maftuh's appointment was thus the SBY's own initiative. When SBY assigned

his entourage to open contact with Hasyim in order to ensure that the path was paved for

Maftuh to assume the ministry, Hasyim was more than happy that the NU was still awarded the

desired ministerial post although the man had not any record in the NU leadership.98

Unlike the appointment of the ministry of religion from the NU, the Muharnmadiyah,

that appeared to be neutral before the second round, began to prepare three ministerial

candidates after it became clear that SBY-Kalla won the run-off. They were the ministry of

defense, ministry of national education, and ministry of health. During the cabinet fonnation,

the national media began to name the Muharnmadiyah candidates Rizal Sukma to assume the

ministry of defense. In the final process, however, SBY -Kalla asked the Muhammadiyah to

nominate a female figure for the ministry of health, while Muhammadiyah had prepared the

male one. During the last hours, the Muharnmadiyah eventually offered Siti Fadilah Supari, the

daughter offormer chairman of the Central Java Muharnmadiyah provincial board and a senior

doctor in the Jakarta Muhammadiyah hospital, as the minister of health.

While SBY government succeeded to minimize a growing opposition threatening his

presidency, as all major political and social organizations have been represented in the cabinet,

the major political battles after a year-long 2004 elections were among rival groups in major

political and social organizations. The next part will study the leadership changes in Islamic

organizations and their further relationship with political parties.

E. National Congress and Leadership Change

.. "Why Mega Stayed Away," Tempo, November 1, 2004, p. 27.

99

The following months after the presidential elections saw the intensified conflict

between the NU and Abdurrahrnan Wahid and to some degree between the Muharnrnadiyah

and Arnien Rais, when both organizations held their congress. Surprisingly, the outcome of

these conflicts was similar in term of the declining influence of both Abdurrahrnan and Arnien

in those Islamic organizations where they once headed.

Ahead to the NU congress scheduled to take place in Surakarta, Central Java on

November 28-December 3, 2004, Abdurrahrnan sought to prevent Hasyirn's re-nomination for

the NU chairman, despite Hasyirn's intention to re-nominate himself. Abdurrahrnan saw

Hasyirn dragging the NU into practical politics as he politicized the NU during the presidential

election when he stood as Megawati's running mate. On the other hand, Hasyirn replied that

those people who accused him dragging the NU into politics were (the PKB) politicians. In

fact, this conflict was the continuation of the previous rift within the NU during the presidential

election. The Abdurrahrnan's camp consisted of many NU leaders and kyai who supported the

Wiranto-Solahuddin pair, while Hasyim's camp consisted of those kyai who supported him and

Megawati. Abdurrahrnan and his PKB supporters feared that the NU would be a political

vehicle again, should Hasyim be re-elected to lead the NU, just like when he teamed up with

Megawati in the 2004 presidential election. For Hasyirn and his supporters, Abdurrahrnan's

efforts were simply aimed to control the NU leadership and prevent its use to support any

candidate contradicting the PKB's candidate in the 2009 presidential election.

The kick offhad been given during the first week after the presidential election, when

Hasyirn resumed his position in the NU leadership. A number ofNU leaders supporting him

during the campaign had also their suspension lifted. While officially this enabled Hasyim to

100

prepare for the NU congress, it also enabled Hasyim to wield his influence as the NU chairman

to re-nominate himself.

Meanwhile, Abdurrahman used many ways to block Hasyim's road to the NU

chairman. He nominated himself for the supreme (Syuriah) NU council,99 while persuading the

current Syuriah chairman Sahal Mahfudz, himself Abdurrahman's uncle, not to accept his re-

nomination for the post. In order to extend the support, he ordered the PKB politicians and MPs

as well as mobilized a large number of senior kyai to persuade the delegates from provincial

and local branches. He also tried to lobby Sahal to council Hasyim not to nominate himself

again. However, Sahal did not comply. Rather, he left the decisions entirely to the congress

participants. "IfI were to obstruct him from nominating again, it would mean I was declaring

something haram (illegal) that is actually halal (legal) under law," he said. lOO For the candidate

for the Tanjidziyah ( executive) chairman, Abdurrahman cited many names. Initially he named

Cecep Syarifuddin, one of the deputy NU chairman. Not long after, he changed his candidate to

Tolchah Hassan, former minister of religion during his presidency. Later on, he mentioned

Mustofa Bisri, a well respected kyai-cum-poet. Unfortunately, they eventually refused to

contest. Finally, the Abdurrahman's camp threw its support for Masdar Mas'udi, the acting NU

chairman during the presidential elections.

Hasyim and his supporters did know, of course, that those entitled to vote at the

congress were the executives of provincial and local branches. Since the beginning he seemed

to have confidence that most provincial and local branches supported him. Hasyim was known

99 In the NU constitution, the Syuriah council holds the highest authority over the Tanfidziyah. However, since the Abdurrahrnan's Tanfidziyah leadership (1984-1999) the Syuriah had been overshadowed by the Tanfidziyah, because he is the grandson of the NU founder and his intellectual capacity exceeded anyone in the organization. In the congress, the nomination for the Tanfidziyah chainnan is possible as long as they were approved by the elected Synriah. In this regard, should Abdurrahrnan won the Synriah chairman, he could block Hasyim's re­nomination, or restore the Synriah position over the Tanfidziyah regardless of the elected Tanfidziyah chairman.

"""A Threat fromKrarnat Raya," Tempo, December 13, 2004, p. 14.

101

for his generosity to "look after" (Javanese, ngopeni) those branches and pesantren. He

frequently visited those branches and pesantren during his term and donated funds for their

activities. Moreover, during the campaign for presidential election more and more branches and

pesantren received funds from Hasyirn. In terms of funds, which have been the main problem

for the NU executives to run the organization, Hasyim has been well known for his craft to

accumulate them. "I have no idea the source. But he obviously could mobilize it easily as long

as for the NU interest," one NU branch executive from East Java said.1ol

Having aware that Hasyim enjoyed strong support from provincial and local branches,

his supporters planned to increase the criteria for support for the candidates. While the existing

draft for procedural rules at the congress required the candidates for chairman of both the

Syuriah and Tanfidziyah must have at least 60 local branches support, Hasyim's supporters

attempted to increase the required number to 125. The compromise was then achieved in the

number of99. This move indicated that the congress began to be a zero sum game. 102

On the election day, the organizing committee recorded 455 votes from 465 delegates

(30 province and 435 local branches) with voting rights. In the nomination for the Syuriah

chairmanship, Sahal emerged as the single candidate, as no other contenders could garner

minimum support (99 votes). Abdurrahman failed to enter the race, since he secured only 75

votes, while others garnered less support. In conformity with the meeting procedures, as there

was no other candidate with significant vote, the congress participants unanimously ordained

Sahal as the Syuriah chairman for the 2004-2009 period. Sahal's triumph meant that

Abdurrahman failed to block the reelection bid of Hasyirn. In the nomination, Hasyim received

293 votes, Masdar 103, Mustofa Bisri 35, while other contenders got less support. Under the

101 "Hasyim Dibendung, Hasyim Didukung," Forum Keadilan, No. 30,28 November 2004, p. 89. 102 "Let Battle Connnence," Tempo, December 6, 2004, p. 29.

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meeting procedures, Hasyim and Masdar had won the right to take part in the second round. In

the second round, however, Hasyim defeated Masdar with 346 to 99 votes.

There was no doubt that Hasyim took control of the NU structurally and

organizationally, thus allowing him to win the chairmanship election during the congress.

Abdurrahman, meanwhile, had lost a lot of his influence in the organization he chaired for 15

years until he became the fifth president in 1999. This defeat signaled the beginning of the end

of his political authority in the NU community. His ouster as president in 2001 was the turning

point for his popularity. During the congress, Abdurrahman only received the backing of young

intellectuals and many senior kyai, all of whom are outside the NU's structure, meaning that

they did not have voting rights. Therefore, their support was not enough to defeat Hasyim.

The depth of the division reflected not the cleavage between the kyai and politicians

as in the 1984 NU congress. Nor did it reflect the rivalry between the opposition figure and the

state-supported one as in the 1994 NU congress. It instead merely reflected the rivalry between

two politicians which vied for the NU support for their political gain during the next five

years.103 This battle revealed how profound their exposure to political affairs was during the

earlier five years. Both camps seemed to playa political game skillfully. Therefore, the

congress was unsurprisingly surrounded by allegations of both slander and vote buying.

Hasyim's triumph has shocked not only Abdurrahman but numerons senior kyai

supporting him as well. They began to feel that their words, which until then "commanded

obedience," seemed to be no longer heeded.104 When it became clear that their candidates were

about to fail to gamer sufficient support in the congress, some respected kyai ordered

Abdurrahman to set up a rival NU organization. "We, the kyai, leave it fully to Gus Our

103 "Pertarungan Dua Kiai Politik," Forum Keadilan, No. 31, December 5, 2004, p. 13-14. 104 "When Senior Kiai Are No Longer Heeded," Tempo, December 13, 2004, p. 20.

103

(Abdurrahman) to set up a correct PBNU," one kyai red a decision signed by 29 senior kyai. It

was not clear what ''to set up a correct PBNU" really meant.

For Abdurrahman, this was clear enough. After his failure to assume the Syuriah post

and prevent Hasyim's re-election, he had resolved to keep control of the PBNU offices. The

PBNU office was built during Abdurrahman's presidency when PBNU was under Hasyim

leadership. Abdurrahman did not simply seek to occupy the building, but he also warned

Hasyim that he would form a contending PBNU management. Apparently, Abdurrahman was

very serious about his plan to form the alternative PBNU. He said that there would be two

PBNUs at the same address. Both would use the same building, facilities, and name. But the

identifying numbers on their correspondence would be different. IOS

Hasyim's response seemed to be caIrn. He said that contending organizations never

last long. He gave the example of his experience with kyai Sahal and kyai TIyas Ruchiyat in

defending Abdurrahman against the Abu Hasan camp, which had formed a rival NU

organization after the 1994 NU congress at Cipasung, Sukabumi. Because they had sided with

Abdurrahman, who did not have President Suharto's support, they were repeatedly summoned

by police. I06 Despite his deep disappointment, however, finally Abdurrahman did not continue

his plan. He came to realize that he would have lost much wider respect not only from the NU

supporters but also from other Indonesians people should he continue his plan. While the

emergence of the rival NU organization appeared to subside, the bitter rivalry between

Abdurrahman and Hasyim seemed to continue, however.

After Abdurrahman's defeat in the NU congress, his charisma would be put to the test

again during the PKB's congress on April 16-18, 2005 in Semarang, Central Java The PKB

lOS "Benang Kusnt Konflik NU," Gatra, December 18, 2004, p. 34-37. 106 ''Kok Sekarang Gus Dur Man Bikin Tandingan," Farum Keadilan, No. 31, December 5, 2004, p. 19.

104

congress saw a showdown between Abdurrahman's two rival nephews: Abdurrahman protestor

Syaifullah Yusuf and his supporter Muhaimin Iskandar. On the one hand, Syaifullah, the

chainnan of the NU youth wing Ansor and the State Minister for the Development of

Disadvantaged Regions, received support from senior NU kyai, including those who backed

Abdurrahman in the NU congress. On the other hand, Muhaimin, the deputy DPR speaker,

along with two other candidates, Mahfud and AIi Masykur Musa, was backed by Abdurrahman.

Abdurrahman had also rejected Syaifullah's bid. When pressure from numerous kyai had

mounted for Abdurrahman to let Syaifullah vie for the PKB leadership, he then allowed

Syaifullah to join the race under one condition: he had to qnit the Cabinet and relinquish his top

job in the Ansor Youth Organization should he be elected PKB leader.

Syaifullah, along with AIwi Shihab, was dismissed as the party's secretary-general

(and chainnan respectively) after he took up a ministerial post under President SBY's Cabinet.

The official reason behind this ban was that the party would ban its executives from serving as

government officials to prevent conflict of interests and abuse of power. Many people believe,

however, they were suspended because President SBY appointed them without Abdurrahman's

approval, meaning that President SBY was deemed trespassing his authority within the PKB.

Therefore, Alwi and Syaifullah were suing the party's central board over the suspensions,

which they said have violated the party's statutes. They argued that the party's statutes do not

say anything about executives holding dual positions. They recalled that during Abdurrahman's

presidency, many senior PKB executives simultaneously served as ministers, such as Alwi,

Mahfud, AS Hikam, and Khofifah.

While the lawsuit was still undergoing, Syaifullah ran for the PKB chainnanship.

S yai fullah' s influence within the party should not be underestimated. In an extraordinary PKB

105

congress in January 2002, he looked certain to win the leadership, with a majority backing from

regional branches and senior kyai. However, Abdurrahman's risky end-game strategy of

threatening to quit ifhis rebellious nephew was elected paid off, and the meeting chose

Abdurrahman's close aide Alwi Shihab, after senior kyai backed down from confrontation with

their chief patron. However, friends are not friends forever, and on October 2004, Alwi was

suspended from his post after joining SBY's Cabinet along with Syaifullah.

Similar to the meeting procedures in the NU congress, the PKB standing orders also

required all candidates for the party's leadership to receive approval of the elected chairman of

the party's powerful board of advisor (Dewan Syuro). Therefore, Syaifullah teamed up with a

little-known kyai and co-founder of the PKB Ma'ruf Amin as the candidate for Dewan Syuro

chainnanship. The pair received strong support from a number of senior kyai and many

delegates from the PKB strongholds ofCentrai and East Java.107

Fearing that Abdurrahman would lose face as happened in the earlier NU congress,

his supporters made many efforts to guarantee his success. Abdurrahman was then elected

Dewan Syuro chainnan when the congress was still in the initial phase and without the process

of nomination. When the congress was still undergoing, the meeting chair and Abdurrahman

supporter, Misbach Hidayat, unilaterally pounded the gavel deciding Abdurrahman as the

elected Dewan Syuro chainnan.

This decision triggered protests not only from the Syaifullah and Ma'ruf pair as well

as their supporters, but also from numerous senior kyai and senior party executives such as AS.

Hikam, Khofifah, and the East Java PKB Chairman, Choirul Anam. After Syaifullah withdrew

his candidacy, the East and Central Java regional executive boards also took leave. They

107 "Wahid's Way," Tempo, April 25, 2005, p. 24-25.

106

claimed that they were accompanied by several other regions and 256 out of 465 branches.

Hikam even appealed to the congress participants to boycott the continuing congress, because

"This congress has been flawed." He said, "Many congress regulations have been tinkered with

to achieve personal goals."I08

While the continuing congress elected Abdurrahman loyalist nephew Muhaimin as the

executive chairman without any substantial contender, AIwi and Syaifullah considered the

result ofthe congress was not legitimate. They even still considered themselves the legitimate

chairman and general secretary of the PKB. The following day after the Muhairnin election,

numerous senior kyai asked them to convene another congress. Four months after the Semarang

congress, another PKB congress was held early in October 2005 in Surabaya, East Java. On this

congress, the East Java PKB chairman, Choirul Anam won the executive PKB party and senior

kyai Abdurrahman Chudori won the powerful Dewan Syuro chairman. Meanwhile, Alwi and

Syaifullah seemed to have abandoned their bitter conflict, realizing that their prolonged

complicity in the PKB conflict would not only jeopardize their own political career, but also

backfire for the government as if they were ordered to interfere in the party conflict.

The emergence of two PKBs in 2005 illustrated further decline of Abdurrahman's

charisma within the NU community after his defeat in the NU congress. When he lost in the

NU congress, he was still backed by numerous influential kyai. When the PKB split into two

factions, however, he also lost most support from those kyai who supported him during the NU

congress. Compounded with his bitter conflict with the current PBNU, it would be no wonder if

the PKB will lose significant votes in the 2009 elections.

108 "Chaos Awakened," Tempo, May 2,2005, p. 29.

107

While the NU and PKB congresses left indelible marks in the split within the NU

community, the leadership change within the Muharnrnadiyah community was marked by less

conflict. Arnien's defeat in the first round presidential election led him and his supporters in the

PAN to blame the Muharnrnadiyah for its ambiguous support. He noted that it was the

Muharnrnadiyah halfhearted endorsement that he could not secure the support of the whole 30

millions of its members and supporters. The Muharnrnadiyah leaders replied that it was the

PAN's responsibility to have Arnien win in the race, since it was his main political vehicle, not

the Muharnrnadiyah. They said that the Muharnrnadiyah was only endorsing him when the

PAN perfonnance in the parliamentary election was poor.

There was also a growing resentment within the Muharnrnadiyah community over the

PAN. Many Muharnrnadiyah leaders, particularly the youth generation, felt that the PAN had

failed to accommodate the aspiration ofMuharnrnadiyah members, despite the fact that PAN

was led by fonner Muharnrnadiyah chairman Arnien. They gave some examples that prior to

the 2004 parliamentary election, many Muharnrnadiyah youth cadres were put in the unlikely­

winning-numbers of the PAN candidate list. They also said that the decision-making process

within the PAN was dominated by a non-Muharnrnadiyah faction, meaning that they would not

do any favor for the Muharnrnadiyah aspiration.

The Muharnrnadiyah youth leaders began to discuss how to solve such a problem.

Through a marathon discussion, they came up with three alternative steps. The Muharnrnadiyah

leaders should take over the PAN leadership in its congress scheduled to take place on April

2005 in Semarang, a week before the PKB congress. The Muharnrnadiyah leaders could also

endorse the likely-win faction in the congress and then share the new PAN leadership. Ifboth

108

choices had failed, the Muhammadiyah leaders could initiate the establishment of new party

representing the Muharnmadiyah aspiration.

When the Muharnmadiyah held its national meeting (Tanwir) in Mataram, West Nusa

Tenggara, on December 2004, a number of youth Muhammadiyah activists began to sound the

plan to set up a new party. The final decision concerning this issue was that

"The Tanwir could apprehend the emerging aspiration from the Muhammadiyah members, particularly the youth Muhammadiyah generation, to establish a new political party. Tanwir perceived that this idea should be reviewed carefully, since the establishment of a new political party should be based on a deep consideration, not disappointment nor merely lust for power. Therefore, Tanwir authorized the youth Muhammadiyah generation to follow up and review this idea further, while taking the Muhanunadiyah principles into account and without plunging the Muhannnadiyah into practical politicS."I09

While they began discussing the possibility to establish a new political party, in the

months leading to the PAN congress, the Muhammadiyah circle concluded that the most likely

possible candidate to take over the PAN leadership was the Muharnmadiyah deputy chainnan

Din Syamsuddin. He matched Amien's criteria needed to lead the PAN. While Amien holds his

Ph.D. from Chicago University, Din from UCLA. Both were also well known for their Islamic

knowledge. Din was not only supported by the Muhammadiyah circle, but initially some

provincial boards of PAN supported him as well. When the East Java PAN provincial board

held a meeting to gamer support for Din, 19 out of 33 provincial boards were reported to

support him. It was reported that Din agreed to run for the PAN chainnanship under two

conditions: he had to be elected unanimously and Amien should invite him to run. Despite the

remarkable support from 19 provincial boards, however, no one could assure him that all

participants would elect him in the upcoming PAN congress, since some other contenders had

109 Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah No. 116/2004 tentang Tanfidz Keputusan Tanwir Muharnmadiyah Tahun 1425 Hl2004 M, Lampiran No.5 tentang Rekomendasi Tanwir III Muhammadiyah 2004.

109

also nominated themselves such as Fuad Bawazier, an MP from the PAN; Hatta Rajasa, the

minister of transportation under the SBY cabinet; and Sutrisno Bachir, a businessman.

Even more complicated was the second condition: Amien's invitation. Din's relation

with Amien had been up and down. Since early in the 1990s, their relation had been strained

when Amien was in the forefront of opposition against the Suharto regime while Din was a

high rank official of Suharto' s political vehicle Golkar. During the campaign for the 2004

presidential election, however, Din established a campaign body working to garner support for

Amien from the Muhammadiyah community. Ahead to the PAN congress, Amien simply

mentioned that Din would be a good candidate without explicitly inviting him to advance.

Before the PAN congress started, Din retreated from the race. He seemed to

unwillingly risk his chance in the PAN congress, while he was the most possible winning

candidate in the Muhammadiyah congress scheduled to take place three months later. Without

Din in the race, the remaining strong candidates were Fuad, Hatta, and Sutrisno. Should these

three candidates continue to run, Fuad would be likely the wiuner since he was reported to

secure most support from the delegates by vote-buying. Fuad is the former Director General of

Taxation and minister of finance during the Suharto era.

In order to increase the support for Sutrisno, Amien was reported to ask Hatta to

withdraw his candidacy warning that he "could very well call President SBY asking him to pull

Hatta from the cabinet" should Hatta forge ahead.110 Amien seemed to fear that Fuad would

succeed him as the PAN Chairman. It was reported that the more adroit Fuad's maneuvers, the

clearer Amien's support for Sutrisno.1t was as if Amien would not let go of PAN to be led by

Fuad; it would be very disappointing should the PAN, which was established to strive for

110 "Amien's Choice," Tempo, April 18, 2005, p. 22.

110

reform and rectifY the remnants of the New Order authoritarianism, be led by a former minister

during the New Order era. The PAN congress eventually elected Sutrisno the PAN Chairman,

while Amien was elected chairman of the symbolic advisory board.

Sutrisno's election into the PAN leadership did not abate the resentment within

Muhammadiyah circles. Although Sutrisno sought to incorporate some youth Muhammadiyah

activists in the PAN leadership, however, it was perceived too little. Despite Sutrisno's claims

that he was born in the Muhammadiyah family, however, he was also deemed to have no record

of involvement in the Muhammadiyah leadership. Therefore, some youth Muhammadiyah

activists continued their efforts to establish a new political party.

Ahead to the Muhammadiyah congress scheduled to take place in Malang, East Java

on July 3-8, 2005, the rift between Amien and Muhammadiyah intensified. Amien was reported

trying to prevent Din's election for the Muhammadiyah chairmanship. Amien's biggest concern

was that Din would use the Muhammadiyah as a political vehicle in the upcoming 2009

presidential election, and that would contradict the PAN's interest. Many believed that Amien

toured several regional and local Muhammadiyah branches campaigning that those

Muhammadiyah elites who were involved in the Bank Persyarikatan affairs were improper to

re-nominate themselves in the congress. I I I During the congress, Amien held a number of

meetings to garner support from provincial and local branches. However, the impact of his

campaign was very limited, due largely to the election procedures deciding that the delegates

t t t In 2002, the Muharnmadiyah took over the Bank Swansarindo through acquisition aod then renamed it to the Bank Persyarikatao. While it has no direct link with the Bank, however, seven figures of the organization became its shareholders. Because ofits decline in the bank's solvency (its capital adequacy rstion [CAR] dropped to less thao 8 % required by the centrsl Bank Indonesia), the Bank was included by the BI in the special monitoring unit. Should it failed to solve the problem, the BI could freeze the Bank's operstion. While Muhammadiyah leaders sought to solve the problem, including through seversl political lobbies, Amien made use the affair as his weapon to prevent the re-nomination of those seven figures who was involved in the Bank affairs, including Din. See "When Muharnmadiyah Bears the Brunt," Tempo, Jaouary 3, 2005, p. 70-71.

111

would elect 13 members of the executive appointment committee, instead of one figure as the

chairman. The election procedures within Muhammadiyah seem to automatically delimit the

possibility of blocking a certain name from the candidacy. 112

Amien's campaign had larger impact only in the Tanwir session held-one day before

the congress-to select 39 names. The Tanwir was attended by 159 delegates consisting of

members of the central board, 4 delegates from each provincial board, and two from each

autonomous organization. At the Tanwir, Din's name came in third, just after Haedar Nashir

(general secretary) and Rosyad Sholeh (one of deputy chairman). When Amien came to realize

that Din's popularity was unstoppable on the local level, he turned his campaign from blocking

Din's candidacy to promoting some candidates which were supposedly under his control,

including the minister of education under the SBY's cabinet, Bambang Sudibyo, former

minister of education under Abdurrahman's cabinet, Yahya Muhaimin, and the chairman of

Central Java Muhammadiyah provincial board, Dahlan Rais, himself Amien's younger brother.

In the congress, however, Din's popularity was apparently unstoppable. In the

election session, which was attended by all nearly 2000 delegates (all Tanwir delegates

combined with two delegates from each district leadership board and one delegates from each

sub-district leadership board), Din won the most votes with 1718, Haedar won 1374 votes,

Muhammad Muqoddas 1285, Malik Fajar 1277, Yunahar Ilyas 1264, and Rosyad Sholeh 1209.

112 Unlike in the NU, the election process in the Mubamrnadiyah is under the authority of the election committee which is appointed by the central board severnl months before the congress. Its main task were (I) distnouting nomination forms to the provincial boards and all autonomous organizations. They are asked to nominate 13 candidate names. (2) The committee then review all requirements, including administmtive and substantive ones (among others are ID number, 5-year long membership). (3) The committee also presides the election session, both in the Tanwir to elect 39 names out of all candidates and in the congress to elect the 13-member executive appointment committee out of39 names. Those 13 names then select the new chairman and other positions in the central board ofMubammadiyah.

112

Dahlan came in seventh with 1135 votes, whereas Bambang came in eleventh with 881 votes.

Meanwhile, Yahya failed to secure sufficient votes to advance in the big thirteen.

The fact that Din came in third in the first round but won in the second round

indicated two different things. On the one hand, the Bank Persyarikatan affairs had larger

impact in a more elite circle (the Tanwir delegates were mostly from the provincial boards)

whose exposures to such an affair were more profound. On the other hand, Din's popularity in

grass-root level was indeed irresistible. Din is a figure with plenty of public exposure outside of

Muhanunadiyah. His popularity is also a result of his frequent visits to the provincial and local

boards since he had served as the chairman of the Muharnmadiyah youth movement (1989-

1993). It was not surprising that at the 2000 Muhanunadiyah congress he already came in

second in the election after the elected-chairman Syafii Maari£

This was not the end ofthe game, however. The chairman would be elected through

the meeting of those 13 names, and there is no rule requiring the one with the most votes must

become the chairman. Din's supporters were perplexed by the composition of those 13 people:

Din secured only two votes while others were controlled by the Jogjakarta camp which was at

odds with him. His supporters from Jakarta camp began fearing Din's slim chance. Therefore,

they held a press conference urging the 13-member committee to choose the candidate with the

most votes as the chairman. This action disappointed the members of the committee, accusing

them which interfered with the committee's prerogative rights. Many Muhanunadiyah activists

began to fear that the old-rivalry between the Jakarta and Jogjakarta camps, which had abated

during previously five years since the 2000 congress in Jakarta, would resurface. I 13

III Since the 1980s, the Jakarta camps bad been comprised many politicians, while the Jogjakarta camp had been comprised many ideologists and administrators figures.

113

This concern did not materialize, however. Rosyad Sholeh, the election committee

head for the 45th Muhammadiyah congress announced after three hours meeting that the 13-

member committee unanimously elected Din the new chairman of the PP Muhammadiyah for

the 2005-2010 period. Rosyad divulged that Din was elected without voting. Rosyad also

described the meeting as one full of smiles, good cheer, and benevolent feelings. 1 14 Aware of

Din's remarkable popularity in grass-root level, they appeared to avoid confronting the

majority's choices. It seemed that those 13 people were self-consciously unwilling to push their

interests to the point of risking imminent conflict on a scale so deep as to endanger the future of

their beloved organization. The fear of further rift between Amien and the Muhammadiyah was

also minimized by Din himself when in his speech during the closing ceremony he unilaterally

asked Amien and Syafii to sit on the newly-formed advisory council. 1 15

While major Islamic organizations were by far deeply involved in the political

struggle, it is also important to study current political development within the Muhammadiyah

and NU and how they approach the upcoming 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections.

F. Muslims' Approaching the 2009 Election

One year from the 2009 elections, some important features regarding Muslim political

development are worth examining. First is the further relationship between the NU and

Muhammadiyah on the one hand with political parties on the other. The 2009 election will

likely see the emergence of two new political parties linked to the NU and Muhammadiyah:

The Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (pKNU-Ulama National Awakening Party) and the

114 "Mufakat di Lantai Dna," Gmra, July 16, 2005, p. 42. II' The composition of the advisory council for the time being has yet to be discussed by the 13-memher

executive appointment committee. Din was also aware that he ought to have their approval before aonouncing his invitation. Considering the necessity of Din's move in the public eyes to minimize. the ensuing conflict, however, no objection raised from one of the 13 people.

114

Partai Matahari Bangsa (pMB-National Sun Party). While they are now stiIl undergoing

verification, they are likely to be eligible for the polls.

PKNU is the transfonnation of the PKB resulting from the Surabaya congress whose

establishment was supported by a faction opposing the results of the PKB Semarang congress

which elected Abdurrahman Wahid and his nephew Muhaimin Iskandar. After inflicted in a

long, bitter fight with the PKB-Ied by Muhaimin, the conflict ended when early in the 2006 the

Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Muhaimin-Abdurrahman camp. The loss of the Surabaya

PKB-congress faction means it could not contest the 2009 elections unless it changed its name

and party attributes. The newly found PKNU is now led by Choirul Anam.

The PKNU establishment did not receive any specific response from the NU chairman

Hasyim Muzadi. However, its estahlishment unwittingly benefited Hasyim in his rivalry with

Abdurrahman, as it will likely decrease the PKB's showing in the 2009 elections and thus

reduce Abdurrahman's charisma within the NU community. Responding to the existence of

several political parties claiming themselves to be born by the NU, Hasyim in his speech during

the commemoration of the NU 82nd anniversary in Jakarta, on February 3, 2008, said that they

will not necessarily be supported by the NU members unless they pay sufficient attention to

fight for the NU aspirations. During the commemoration, the PPP, PKB and PKNU seemed to

vie for the NU sympathy. Hasyim pointed out that the party which wiIl likely be supported by

NU members in the 2009 election is one that apparently fights for their aspirations. Hasyim

also firmly rejected to drive the NU members to support certain political party. I 16

Meanwhile, the PMB was resulted from the long discussion of a number of

Muhanunadiyah youth activists. The party is now headed by Imam Addaraqutni, former

116 Interview with Hasyim Muzadi on January 10, 2008 in Jakarta.

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chairman of Muhammadiyah youth movement and former MP from the PAN (1999-2004).

Meanwhile, Ahmad Rofiq, a former chairman ofMuhammadiyah Students Association (lMM),

now serves as the general secretary. The PMB, declared in Jogjakarta on December 11,2007,

was aimed to accommodate the aspirations ofMubammadiyah, which they claimed were left

unheeded by the PAN under the leadership of Sutrisno Bachir. Seeing the PAN's pluralist

brand was somewhat problematic for certain Muhammadiyah followers, the PMB therefore

uses Islam as its ideological base. Fearing the conservative image for their new party, however,

the Islam that the PMB will promote is a progressive, substantive one.

While many PMB's supporters have been insisting the close relationship between this

new political party with the Muhammadiyah, the Muharnmadiyah chairman Din Syarnsuddin

has said that his organization has no connection with the PMB, even though it was established

by its young activists. When several PMB leaders met him, Din pointed out that the

Muharnmadiyah's stance as social-religious organization that eschews practical politics should

be maintained. "The cadres ofMuharnmadiyah and political parties based on Muhammadiyah

mass do not need to plunge the organization into politics," he warned. 1 17

Din's reluctance to acknowledge the PMB's claim to be the proper party for the

Muhammadiyah members is understandable. The PMB's prospect in the 2009 election is

palpably slim and less rewarding. The 2009 elections will see for the first time a head-to-head

fight between two parties vying for a similar electorate in the modernist camp, meaning that

both have to share support from the Muharnmadiyah followers. Another disincentive for the

PMB is that it is supported in local level by mostly the young Muharnmadiyah activists whose

political experiences and influences are limited, while the PAN has secured support from more

117 "Sikap Mubammadiyah dalam PoUtik Praktis," Kompas, February 21, 2008.

116

senior ones. Therefore, according to an able observer on Indonesian Islam Mitsuo Nakamura,

such a party will be smaller than the present PAN in terms of the number of cadres and the

scale of popular support. Moreover,

"If the idea behind such a move is only to produce a political arm of the Muhammadiyah in the sense of expressing the political aspirations of the Muhammadiyah, the attempt is likely to face an extreme difficulty. That is the impossibility of formulating an integrated program expressing political aspirations of the Muhammadiyah members. This derives from the simple fact that the Muhammadiyah is not a political organization, and there has been, is and will be a variety of political orientations within the organization. In this regard, the Muhammadiyah has been, is and is likely to be larger and more heterogeneous than the PAN or any its substitution.,,118

In this regard, Din's reluctance to welcome warmly the PMB's establishment thus is

also plausible. The poor performance of the PMB will jeopardize Din's chance ifhe eyes the

presidential or vice-presidential bid in the 2009 presidential election, since it will likely

diminish the Muhamrnadiyab grandeur claiming to represent nearly 25 or 30 millions people.

In addition to the relationship between the NU and Muhammadiyah with new political

parties, it is also important to examine the role of the NU and Muhammadiyah in the regional

head elections. Tantamount to the direct presidential election in 2004, local head (that is,

governors and mayors) direct elections have also been implemented since June 1,2005.

Whereas the candidates for local head should be nominated by a political party or coalition of

several political parties, however, they could nominate candidates either from within their

political parties or from outside. In this regard, the local leaders of the NU and Muhammadiyab

in the provincial and local boards are significant, since they are frequently recruited by political

parties in the direct local head election in order to gamer extra votes.

In the Muhamrnadiyah camp, a number of its cadres were reported to contest in the

local head elections. However, these were not big deals for the Muhammadiyah, since they

were for the time being no longer holding any executive position in the organization. During

1\8 Nakamura, "Mubammadiyah Faces the Challenge of Democracy," 2005, p. 221.

117

the local head election, they already served in the political party leaderships. In the Riau

province, for instance, the current vice-governor Wan Abu Bakar is fonner chainnan of

Muhammadiyah youth movement provincial board ofRiau. However, he is now serving as the

chainnan ofPPP provincial board. In the upcoming local head election expected to take place

at the end of this year, he is reported to contest for the governor position, despite the fact that

he has not yet secured both the PPP support and his running mate. Another example is current

mayor in Bojonegoro district of East Java, Suyoto. He is fonner deputy chainnan of the central

board ofMuhammadiyah youth movement. During the election in November 2007, however,

he had been the chainnan of the PAN provincial board of East Java.

Unlike the Muhammadiyah's insignificant participation, the NU's involvement in the

local head election is even worth worrying. 1 19 A number of the NU leaders, mostly in the NU

heartland of East and Central Java provinces, were nominated in the local head elections, either

for vice-governor or mayor and deputy mayor. Interestingly, their bids have been different from

the candidates nominated by the PKB, meaning that the old conflict between Hasyim and

Abdurrahrnan as well as the NU and the PKB remained within the traditionalist community.

The current local head election for govemors of East and Central Java provinces

provide the strong indication for the intensifying rift between them.120 In Central Java local head

election scheduled to take place on June 22,2008, the current chainnan ofNU provincial board

Mohammad Adnan accepted to be the mnning mate of the Central Java Golkar chainnan

Bambang Sadono. Meanwhile, the PKB has nominated fonner Central Java military commander

Agus Suyitno and current Wonosobo mayor Kholiq Arlef for the governor and vice-governor

candidates. Another example is the East Java local head election scheduled to take place on July

119 Interview with AS. Hikamon January 10, 2008 in Jakarta. 120 ''Makin Banyak Pengurus NU TeJjun ke Politik Praktis," Kompas, February 20, 2008.

118

23, 2008. The current NU regional chainnan Ali Maschan Musa accepted to be the running mate

for Golkar governor candidate, Soenmjo. Meanwhile, the PKB has also nominated the current

Mojokerto mayor Achmady as the candidate for East Java governor. Complicated even matter,

Abdurralunan's rebellious nephew Syaifullah was nominated by the PAN to be the running mate

of the PD governor candidate Soekarwo, while the chairwoman of the central board of the

Muslimat (women wing of) NU, Khofifah, was nominated by PPP to be governor candidate.

Similarly alarming conflict has been in the West Java local head election scheduled to take place

on April 13, 2008. 121 The West Java NU board has declared its support for the Danny Setiawan-

Iwan Sulanjana pair, which was nominated by the Golkar and PD, while forbidding its members

from choosing other pairs. Meanwhile, the PKB has also declared its support for the Agum

Gumelar-Nu'man Abdul Hakim pair, which was nominated by the PDI-P and PPP. These

examples of political competition between the PKB and the NU might not only generate

confusion within their mernbers in the same traditionalist community but consequentially also

diminish their own chances in the local head elections.

In addition to the relationship between the Muslim organizations and political parties

and the ensuing conflict between them, it is also important to foresee the key potential

candidates for the 2009 presidential election and the chances of the Muharmnadiyah and NU

leaders to play significant roles. While much of the presidential election will be determined by

the preceding parliamentary election, there are a number of presidential hopefuls: President

SBY, former President Megawati, former President Abdurrahman, Vice-President JusufKalla

(the chainnan of Golkar), Gen. (ret.) Wiranto (the chainnan of new Hanura Party), Let. Gen.

(ret.) Sutiyoso (former governor of Jakarta), and Sultan Hamengku Buwono X.

121 "PBNU Cerna. Terhadap Nasib NU," Kompas Online, February 18, 2008, see http://www.kompas.comlread.php?cnt=.xm1.2008.02.18.23431299&Channe!=1&rnn=l&idx=!

119

President SBY, while reported to announce his re-nomination six month before the

2009 presidential election, is believed to be re-nominated by the PD. According to most

opinion polls SBY by far remains the most popular candidate, despite the drastic decline

compared to the early months of his presidency. The decline is largely due to the poor

performance of his administration. Now that the absent of new powerful candidates in the race,

SBY's chance of at least reaching the runoff highly likely remains high.

Megawati was officially re-nominated by the PDI-P. While SBY's popularity is

declining, according to most opinion polls, Megawati's popularity is ominously increasing,

although did not yet surpass that ofSBY. Aware of her failure during the 2004 election, she has

now increasingly become pro-active to garner more support for her candidacy. She was

frequently reported to visit her constituents in the remote provinces and districts. She has also

concurrently begun criticizing the failure of current govermnent, something which has been

absent in her long political career. If Megawati keep going on this right track, it seems that we

will highly likely see a rematch between her and the incumbent President SBY.

Along with Megawati, Sultan is considered to be the most likely comparable

contender for SBY in the 2009 presidential election. While he is now serving for the governor

of Jogjakarta, his popularity is believed to reach larger segments in Indonesian society,

particularly in predominant Javanese ethnicity. Unlike SBY and Megawati, his weakness is that

he is not yet supported by major political party, although a number of political parties, such as

the PAN and other smaller parties were reported to nominate him as the presidential candidate.

Wiranto is another candidate considered to have a fair chance to contest in the 2009

presidential election. While in the 2004 presidential election he was nominated by the Go1kar

party, to contest in the next presidential election he has established his own political vehicle the

120

Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura, the Party of People's Conscience) on December 2006.

However, according to most opinion polls, his party will gain only a small share in the 2009

parliamentary election. Without support of such strong political machinery as Golkar in the

2004 election, the chance of this man of action is predictably slim.

Sutiyoso, after finishing his second term as the Jakarta governor in 2007, has been

preparing to contest in the 2009 presidential election. To vie for public support, he began

presenting himself as a decisive, resolute leader which contrasts SBY's hesitant and indecisive

image in the public eyes. Even though he was reported to back the establishment of numerous

new political parties, however, his chance in the 2009 presidential election may even be

slimmer than that ofWiranto, since the chances of his newly-established political parties to

qualify the 2009 parliamentary election is also predictably small.

Abdurrahman also tried hard to join the presidential race. His PKB party had also

declared its strong support for his candidacy. His presidential ambition, however, is placed in

doubt since the election commission will likely re-issue health requirement for presidential and

vice-presidential candidates requiring good eyesight. Moreover, his PKB party is now

increasingly inflicted by acute internal conflict. Recently, Abdurrahman dismissed the PKB

chairman Muhaimin, whose loyalty has long been unquestionable, after Muhaimin was accused

of disloyalty and arranging the PKB extraordinary congress, which were strongly denied.122

\22 Muhaimin is the third PKB chainnan fired from the post, after Matori and Alwi Shihab. Malori was dismissed because he attended an MPR plenary session impeaching Gus Dur as the fourth president In 2001. After beIng ousted from the party, Malori and his loyal supporters then established a splinter PKB faction, but did not qualify to contest In the 2004 election. Alwi, along with Syaifullah, was fired In 2004 as PKB chairman after accepting ministerial post In the SBY cabInet. After their contending PKB faction lost the case at the court, many more PKB senior figures were dismissed, such as AS. Hikam and Khofifah. In 2007, three other senior PKB executives were also dismissed. The PKB general secretary Lukman Edy was dismissed from his post In May 2007 after he was appoInted the ministerial post In the SBY cabInet replacIng Syaifu\lah Yusuf. On July 2007, two PKB deputy general secretaries Eman Hermawan and HanifDhakiri were dismissed for disloyalty reason.

121

Another ambiguous presidential candidate is the Golkar chainnan and vice-president

JusufKalla. Although having the seemingly best political machinery in his hand, KaIla's

chance wiIl also be predictably slim. According to most opinion polls, his popularity is not

comparable to Megawati, let alone SBY. Another disincentive for his chance is the fact that he

comes from the outer Buginese ethnicity of South Sulawesi, not from the predominant Javanese

one. He is also contained in a difficult position to nominate himself while he is currently still

serving as the vice-president. Worse still, within his Golkar party, there are also many other

figures eyeing the presidential bid such as current DPR speaker Agung Laksono, former Golkar

chairman Akbar Tanjung, the current coordinating minister of social welfare Aburizal Bakrie,

and media tycoon Surya Paloh. Although many figures have emerged to contest, the Golkar

party decided to abolish the convention system to select the presidential candidate. Rather, the

Golkar candidate will be selected in a national coordination meeting and based on a national

survey. Therefore, the outcome is even more unlikely predictable.

The perennial black horse candidate, Amien Rais has also yet to signal his intension to

run for presidency. He was reported to contest for presidency provided his main political

vehicle the PAN could garner sufficient support for his candidacy, at least 15% in the 2009

parliamentary election and no younger candidates run for the post. In addition, his bid will also

reportedly depend on "the divine guidance" (petunjuk yang di atas). This ambiguous decision is

seemingly a result of his awareness that the 2009 presidential election will be an uphill battle

because in terms of organization, budget, and popularity, he has never really gotten off the

ground. He has an obvious political ambition. However, he is also perplexed by his doubt on

the PAN performance in the 2009 parliamentary election.

122

There are not too many potential vice-presidential candidates capable of attracting

extra supports. The majority of those who supposedly feel themselves attracting a broad base of

support usually opt to run for the presidency. Therefore, it is possible that some of the above­

mentioned presidential hopefuls, such as Sutiyoso and Sultan, in the last minutes, might be

willing to serve as vice-presidential candidates in order to gain a ticket in the race. The pairing

may depend on the results of the 2009 parliamentary election, as the larger parties will tend to

nominate its leader for the presidency and figures from smaller parties will tend to be the

running mates. However, the result of the 2004 presidential election, whose winner was

supported by a medium-sized party beating the pair supported by a coalition of major political

parties, mirrored the fact that there has been a certain degree of depreciation of the importance

of political parties in the presidential election. Although political parties remain important to

nominate the pairs of president and vice-president, however, personal image and popUlarity are

more important than party affiliation. It is thus plausible that some senior Golkar officials have

preemptively announced that the party will re-nominate the winning pair of SBY -Kalla in the

2009 presidential election, despite the fact that the Golkar will predictably gain more votes than

the SBY's PD in the upcoming parliamentary election.

As aforementioned above as well, there is a simple logic to presidential pairings; they

are mostly combinations formed from the following: Javanese-outer province; nationalist-Islam

or Islam-military. Therefore, it is highly likely that Hidayat Nur Wahid (the MPR speaker and

former PKS chairman), Suryadharma Ali (the PPP Chairman), Yusril Ihza Mahendra (former

PBB chairman), Hasyim Muzadi (the NU chairman), Din Syamsuddin (the Muhammadiyah

chairman), and Jimly Asshiddiqie (head of the Constitution Committee) will be the favored

running mates. Surprisingly, those names are considered to be the Muslim representatives. Out

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of those names considered suitable for vice-presidency, four names are worth further

mentioning: Hidayat, Suryadharma, Hasyim, and Din. As the leaders of the large mass-based

Islamic organizations and political parties, they are considered the most suitable partners for

candidates who are backed by strong party machinery, or candidates from nationalist camp.

Since the 2004 presidential election, Hidayat was fervently supported by the PKS as

its presidential candidate. However, the party had earlier pledged not to nominate its candidate

unless it gained more than 20% of votes. Nor did Hidayat run for vice-presidency, since no

presidential candidate signaled any willingness to team up with him. Similar conditions

appeared to be re-applied by the PKS in nominating its presidential candidate in the 2009

presidential election, while waiting for bids from larger political parties to forge an alliance on

a nationalist-religious line. However, his weakness is his etlmicity, as most presidential

hopefuls are also ethnically Javanese.

Suryadharma Ali, the current Minister of Cooperatives and Small Medium Enterprises

in the SBY cabinet, has also yet to decide whether he will contest in the 2009 presidential

election. He signaled his political ambition when he, along with a number of senior PPP

executives, visited Megawati's residence on September 2007, a week after the PPP held a

national coordination meeting. To a large extent, Suryadharma resembled his predecessor

Harnzah Haz in terms of his lack of confidence and thus his leaning to place himself as a junior

partner in the political bargaining to form a pair in the 2009 presidential election. In response to

a question on his visit to Megawati's residence, he replied that his PPP and Megawati's PDI-P

has been maintaining close ties during the New Order era and the Reform era. He went on to

say that it was not by accident that Megawati took Harnzah to be vice president between 2001

and 2004. However, he immediately dismissed the image that the PPP is merely attracted to

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forge an alliance with the PDI-P. "What we are doing now is enhancing friendship and strategic

cooperation with all parties and building a common understanding on serious problems the

. . f:' "h 'd 123 nation IS acmg, e once Sal •

Many wonder whether Hasyim will run in the 2009 election either as presidential or

vice-presidential candidate, since his pairing with Megawati was defeated in the 2004 runoff.

Moreover, a day before the election of the NU chairman in the 2004 NU congress, he, along

with his rival Masdar, has signed a contract requiring that he will not drag the NU in political

activities. The contract also mentioned that he will not accept nominations for political

positions, whether legislative or executive.124 Will he comply with the contract? Anything

could happen. Many instances indicated the opposite. Although the chairman of East Java NU

provincial board Ali Maschan has signed a similar contract before his election, he eventIially

could not help accepting to be the running mate of the Golkar governor candidate Soernujo in

the 2008 local head election. So did the chairman of Central Java NU provincial board

Mohanunad Adnan in the 2008 Central Java local head election. Both were simply suspended

temporarily from their position during the election process. Hasyim could similarly do so, if

there is an interesting bid for him. The fact that he defeated Abdurrahman's camp in the 2004

NU congress indicated that Hasyim took control of the NU structIirally and organizationally.

A comparably new comer in national politics to Hidayat and Hasyim, Din

Syamsuddin is considered to have a fair chance in the 2009 presidential election. His ascension

in the Muhanunadiyah chairmaI1Ship in its 2005 congress despite Amien's opposition indicated

his considerable popularity within the organization. The growing demands in Indonesia for

regeneration of the leadership from old figures to new and younger ones seemed also to benefit

123 "PPP Maintaining Decades of Close Ties with PDI-P," The Jakarta Post, September 24, 2007. 124 ''Paper Promises," Tempo, December 13,2004, p. 16-17.

125

him. Elected as chairman in the 2005 Muhammadiyah congress, Din has taken a different

approach in his observation of the Muhammadiyah-political party relationship. Unlike former

Mnhammadiyah chairmans Amien and Syafii Maarifwhich conformed the Mnhammadiyah's

stance to keep equal distance from all political parties, Din is positioning Mnhammadiyah at an

equal propinquity with them. Therefore, he has not been reluctant to develop a cordial

relationship with major political parties. Early in 2006 he was intensely involved in the

establishment of Baitul Mus1imin Indonesia, an Islamic-organizational wing of the secular,

nationalist POI-Po He was also frequently invited to deliver his remarks in the PAN national

assembly. Similarly, he invited President SBY to deliver his speech in the 2007

Mnhammadiyah annual national meeting (Tanwir) in Jogjakarta. In so doing, Din seemed to

maintain all possibility for his political benefit in the 2009 presidential election.

These moves surely raised big question marks within the Mnhammadiyah community,

as it has been uncommon to see such a blunt political ambition within the Mnhammadiyah

tradition. However, Din has officially dismissed speculation that his ties with those political

parties have led him to being nominated as a running mate in the 2009 presidential election. "I

have never been requested by PDI-P or Megawati to be the party's vice presidential candidate

... It's only a misunderstanding which has been widely reported in the media," he once said.125

Sure, he has to rhetorically say so, because he has also signed a political contract before his

election as the chairman in the 2005 Mnhammadiyah congress.126

By far, Din seemed officially to honor the contract. When a survey even said he had

the opportunity to run for the vice presidential post, Din replied he would not be affected by

125 "Muhammadiyah Sees Party Equally: Din," The Jakana Post, June 4, 2007. The PDI-P will announce Megawati's partner in the 2009 presidential election in its national coordination meeting expected to take place on November 2008 in Surakarta, Central Java.

12' "MuhammadiyahMencoba Lari darlPolitik," Forum Keadilan, No. 12, July 17, 2005, p. 88-89.

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such public opinion. In response to questions on his readiness to participate in the 2009

presidential election, he instead reaffirmed that it was time to enjoy his chairmanship in

Muhammadiyah. "It is important to know that I have not yet thought of being active in joining

government affairs," he said.127 While he did not seemingly diminish his own chance in the

upcoming presidential election, Din pointed out that he himself had yet to make a decision on

whether he would participate in the 2009 general election. According to him now was not the

right time for him to respond to issues on his nomination for presidential pOSt.128

It is still too early to predict who will win in the 2009 presidential election, since even

the pairing has yet to be forged to contest in the race. However, it is almost certain that Muslim

leaders will be once again significant factors in the overall 2009 presidential election.

G. Conclusion

This chapter by and large indicates that Muslim civil society organizations in

Indonesia have been highly diverse in composition, resource endowment, and goals; they are

arenas of power, struggle, cooperation, and contestation. The composition and dynamics of

these civil society organizations have altered dramatically over time in Indonesia, and more

change is in sight. While in the previous era the diverging feature of Muslim civil society

organizations had embodied the difference between the Hegelian and Tocquevillian

frameworks, the post-New Order regime reveals the resembling feature of both the modernist

and traditionalist camps in term of their relationship with the state and political society alike.

The interaction between the state and Muslim civil society organizations in post-

Suharto Indonesia has not been necessarily confrontational. Rather, there is much overlap

between Muslim civil society organizations on the one hand and political society and the state

127 ''Din Syamsuddin yet to Decide Whether to Run for Presidency," Antara News, October 29, 2007. 12. Interview with M. Din Syamsuddin on January 9, 2008 in Jakarta.

127

on the other; in different degrees, the boundary separating them has been porous. Moreover, the

development ofMusIim civil society organizations has not been necessarily detrimental to the

development of political society. There was much synergy between them. For instances, the

NU and Muhammadiyah, in a different degree, were instrumentals to the establishment of the

PKB and the PAN. The representatives of the NU and Muhammadiyah have also been

incorporated in every cabinet of post-New Order administrations. Several leaders of those

Islamic organizations also took part in the 2004 presidential elections as candidates of both

presidency and vice-presidency. Several local leaders of both organizations took part in local

head elections (pilkada).

The politics of post-Suharto Indonesia has also been marked by no single dominant

party, volatile coalitions and political alliances, and power-sharing arrangements constituting

the post-New Order administrations. These power-sharing arrangements surely incorpomted

major political powers whose legitimacy was necessary for the resilience of those governments

vis-a.-vis political opposition in the parliament and civil society alike. In this regard, the post­

Suharto cabinets incorpomted not only the representatives of major political parties, but also

such Muslim civil society organizations as the NU and Muhammadiyah. Suffice to say that,

based on the above-mentioned explanation, the Muhammadiyah and NU organizations will

continue to play significant roles not only in the Indonesia's political development, but also in

many other areas to foster the democratization process.

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CHAPTER IV

MUSLIM CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

A. Introduction

In the course of the last ten years or more, the political landscape of Indonesia, the

world's most populous Muslim country, has been transformed almost beyond recognition. In

May 1998, Indonesia still had a highly centralized authoritarian regime. From 1999 on,

however, Indonesia has staged a series of free, fair and extremely peaceful elections for the

country's legislature and - for the frrst time in 2004 - president and had several rotations of

government. Indonesians now enjoy extensive political freedoms as numerous political parties,

among them Islamic, compete freely for popular support. In brief, Indonesia has made in a

short time a remarkable transition from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. This

transition, surely, has not been risk-free. Many people initially seemed to be pessimistic that the

Suharto's downfall, who ruled Indonesia with an iron hand for more than 32 years, will lead to

anarchy, chaos, and even the breakup of this nation of more than 17,000 islands.! Moreover, to

the extent that the political crisis was compounded by a protracted economic crisis, many

people had begun to believe that the democratization would fail and Indonesia would fall apart

in an accelerating spiral of inter-ethnic or inter-religious violence.

Such pessimistic impression, however, is not the case in Indonesia now. Many people

now see that the demise of the New Order regime has led to the birth of a new and more

democratic Indonesia, with a far more developed civil society. Indonesia's new democracy, in

I See, Emmerson, ''Will Indonesia Survive?" 2000; Cribb, ''Not the Next Yugoslavia," 1999; Armstrong, "The Next Yugoslavia," 2004; Aspinall and Berger, ''The Break-up of Indonesia," 2001; Rohde, "Indonesia Unraveling?" 2001.

129

many respects, has become considerably more stable in the last four years. While Indonesian

Muslims appeared to benefit much from the political freedom brought about by the democratic

transition, whither Islam in a democratized Indonesia? Do Indonesian Muslims have something

positive to contribute to deepen social support for substantive democracy, or will they largely

be the impediment and threat to the emergence of an open and plural society? These are some

daunting questions which I would like to answer.

B. The Construction of Free Public Sphere

Indonesia's national priorities under the New Order regime were defined in terms of

economic development. Suharto's economic tasks seemed clear enough, as he suggested in a

speech to a Bogor economic seminar shortly after his appointment as acting president in 1966:

stabilizing the economy, curbing inflation, and ironing out pricing problems.2 The requisites for

this, from Suharto's point of view, were political stability and social order. To achieve them,

the New Order regime generally relied on three pillars of control.3 First, New Order extended,

formalized, and consolidated military control over political life. The dWifungsi (dual function)

doctrine legitimated a socio-political function for military, as well as a defense and security

role. Army officers were appointed to posts in the legislature and bureaucracy; a formidable

intelligence apparatus was developed, as was the military's "territorial structure" which

shadowed civilian government structures all the way down to the village level.

Second, the government restructured the chief institutions of political and civil

society. The inherited infrastructure of parties, legislature, and elections survived, but it was

transformed by a combination of intervention, manipulation, and blunt coercion. The regime

refashioned Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups) as its electoral vehicle. Enforcement

2 Elson, R.E. Suharto, p. 160. 3 Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, 2005, pp. 22-23.

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of "mono-loyalty", by which civil servants were obliged to vote for Golkar, massive

mobilization of state resources, and widespread intimidation, delivered Golkar more than 60

percent of the vote in 6 elections (once every five years since 1971 until 1997). The strategy of

creating a government-sponsored political party was accompanied by the establishment of

corporatist interest groups incorporated in the Golkar networks, whose objective was "to suppress

class and group conflicts and instill hannony, solidarity, and cooperation between state and

society. ,,4 Complementing its strategy, the first target of corporatization was the association

representing government employees (KORPRI). The subsequent target was then labor, business

sector, press, Muslim scholar, national youth, peasants, women, and national sports.

Finally, the government sought to constmct a comprehensive ideological justification

for authoritarian rule. Government agencies fashioned a revived "Pancasila ideology", which

stressed social harmony and the organic unity between state and society.s According to the

"family principle" (asas kekeluargaan), individuals and groups were expected to subordinate

their own interests to those of the society as a whole. According to the official view, there was

no place in Indonesia for conflicting interests either within society or between society and

state;6 political opposition is officially declared illegal. Instead, both state and society were

deemed as an integrated unity, where deliberation and consensus (musyawarah dan mUfakat)

replaced the divisive and conflictual politics of the past.' To establish the political stability and

ensure that there was no dissent challenging the New Order,

"Heavy surveillance and severe censorship operated in the administration of formal education at all levels, in the mass media, religious rituals, and artistic productions. Most curricula needed to be approved by local authorities. No electronic media were allowed, at least in theory and, until recently (in 1988), in practice, to produce and

4 Mas'oed, "The State Reorganization of Society under the New Order," 1989, p. 18. S Momt, "The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government," 1981. , Aspinall, "The Broadening Base of Political Opposition in Indonesia," 1996, p. 217. 7 Sanit, "Pembuatan Keputusan Politik Musyawarah dan Mnfakat di DPR RI," 1992.

131

broadcast their own news. Reporters and editors from print media received regular threats. To make the threats effective, actual closure of selected media without due legal process occurred from time to time. In certain areas or periods religious leaders had been banned from giving sermons. Theatrical productions, academic seminars, and poetry readings were all vulnerable to attempt by the police and local military authorities to control the content oftexts before they can be delivered in public.',s

Based on the explanation above, the New Order hegemonic state power was

obviously achieved through a combination of both the apparent and celebrated consent on the

one hand, and the perceived but undiscussed coercion on the other. In that hegemonic position,

the New Order regime was able to hold authoritarian control over major political, economic,

and cultural institutions. It has also managed to reproduce the conditions for its hegemonic

power by the use of occasional political violence, witch-hunts, and propaganda.

Despite this hegemonic power, resistance movements and oppositional forces

regularly emerge from time to time. They have come and gone in the course of Suharto

administration, some with more consequences than others, but-until the middle of the 1990s--

none has succeeded even just nearly toppling the regime, let alone radically transforming the

existing political system. While its sustainable economic growth impressed many people, the

Suharto regime remained one of the most durable in the world.

The experiences of years ofliving under the authoritarian regime, surely, provided an

impetus for pro-democracy dissent. Having aware of the growing demand of democratization,

the regime began raising hopes by calling for a new era of keterbukaan (opeunesS).9 This era

saw a loosening of the censorship of the press, the release and subsequent reinstatement of

certain dissidents, as well as the toleration of political protests, demonstrations, and criticism of

the government. The government also created a National Commission for Human Rights

• Heryanto, "Indonesian Middle-Class Opposition io the 1990s," 1996, pp. 243-244. 9 Heio, "Indonesia io 1989: A Question of Openness," 1990; Lane, "Openness, Political Discontent and

Succession in Indonesia," 1991.

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(Komnas HAM), allowing for the existence of institution that could potentially limit the

government's abuse of power. 10 The immediate effect was to open previously restricted areas

of debate and stimulate a freer press. Seminars on political issues proliferated. Government

ministers and officials commented more liberally on topical issues. Parliamentary hearings

were occasions to grill ministers and demand change.!! In addition, under this Indonesian

glasnost with relaxed political and social controls, poets, unionists, and religious leaders voiced

thoughts and grievances long bottled up. With almost unprecedented bluntness, the press

tackled taboo subjects ranging from the business interests of the president's family to the

rustlings in some Muslim groups eager for more political power. Satirical plays poked fun at

the dynastic ambitions of the First Family.!2

The debate about openness was since 1990 inextricably linked to the issue of

succession, the inescapable but unpredictable replacement of President Suharto by someone

else-name, manner, timing, and consequences unknown. Discussed in the media, debated in

meetings, performed onstage, succession in the early 1990s elaborately foreshadowed the real

things as officials, journalists, politicians, artists, students, and others in the elite or middle

class tried to open or preempt the term on which the transfer of p,ower would occur.!3

Despite the mushrooming discussions about succession, however, this issue was all

about Suharto himself. So long as the president did not explicitly declare his intention to step

down, the succession would not happen, as everyone was discouraged to run against him. By

that time, unfortunately, he had not made his intention clear, claiming pretentiously that his re-

nomination and re-election were not his own choice but that of the MPR. For Suharto, power

10 Bertrand, "False Start, Succession Crisis, and Regime Change," 1996, p. 325. II Vatikiotis, "Indonesia: A Guide to Succession," 1997, p. 193. 12 Schwarz, "Indonesia after Suharto," 1997, p. 121. 13 Emmerson, "Indonesia in 1990: A Foreshadow Play," 1991, p. 182.

133

was a matter of personalities, not institutions-an approach to managing power derived from the

Javanese culture. In this regard, "Whoever heard of a Javanese Sultan retiring?,,14

It was in this period of openness that the growing demands of reform took place.

Various pro-democracy movements continued voicing their disenchantment with the regime,

although the era of openness ended almost immediately after Suharto's re-election in 1993

when the government maneuvered political opponents out of power, closed important

publications, imprisoned labor leaders, outspoken politicians, and other activists. Broadly

speaking, the pro-democracy actors during the late 1980s and early 1990s, according to Anders

Uhlin, consisted of four categories: elite dissident and intellectuals, the old generation of

NGOs, student activists, and the new generations ofpro-<lemocracy and human rights NGOS.15

Among these diverse actors, there were many Indonesian pro-democracy activists who were

more than nominally Muslims and they frequently use Islamic discourses instead of West em

ideas to motivate their struggle for democracy. Among those Muslim intellectuals who

demanded democratization during this period were leaders of the NU and Muhanunadiyah. 16

The growing resentment within Muslim camps was somewhat surprising, because

since the late 1980s, after two decades of denying Islamic interests, Suharto had begun to

integrate Islamic organizations into the New Order's institutions. Regardless ofSuharto's

precise intention, he decided to approve the formation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim

Intellectuals (ICM!) in December 1990.17 He gradually side-lined the secular Javanese Muslim,

abangan and Christians who had long formed the core of the regime's power base, thereby

allowing a renewed sense of confidence among Muslims. Despite few skepticism and

14 Crouch, "An Ageing President, An Ageing Regime," 1992, p. 44. IS Uhlin, Indonesia and Ihe "Third Wave of Democratization, 1997, p. 87. 16 Tanthowi, "Islam dan Reformasi," 2002, p. 58-74. 11 Anwar, "Islam, Negara, dan Formasi Sosial dalam Orde Barn," 1992; Hefner, "Islam, State, and

Society," 1993.

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oppositions, IeMI offered Muslim intellectuals and activists alike the first opportunity to

organize a political platform in more than 20 years-an opportunity they were quick to grasp.

Muslim leaders, mostly from the modernist camp, thereafter enjoyed a strong position during

the last five years of the New Order regime.

Many Western observers saw Suharto's action was only a momentary effort to woo

Muslim support in advance of the 1992 election in the time when he faced a growing challenge

from segment of the military. IS For most pro-democracy Muslim intellectuals such as Amien

Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo, and Adi Sasono, however, Suharto's intension was

much less important than the benefit IeMI might provide for themselves, the Muslim

community, and the whole nation. Rather, they saw it was the time for them to make use of the

organization to playa vital role in the demilitarization of the Indonesian political system. Many

Muslim intellectuals were aware ofSuharto's motives and they feared that he might succeed in

co-opting their independency. They were also aware that the opportunity for the Muslim

community was highly limited and circumscribed, particularly when the IeMI chairmanship

was awarded not to one of the independent Muslim intellectuals, but to the Minister of

Research and technology B.J. Habibie, one ofSuharto's proteges. Despite the limited

opportunity, the opening nonetheless provided Muslim intellectuals with a platform for political

discussion. Independent Muslim reformers began working hard to sponsor seminars on human

rights, economic reforms, and constitutional law: initiatives by that time were unimaginable.

These opportunities reassured many pro-democracy Muslim intellectuals that IeMI could

18 See Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, 1994; Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia," 1996; Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Soeharto, 1998.

135

continue to play in the cause of democratization and justice, despite the fact that the

organization was flooded with influence-seeking-bureaucrats and Habibie's close aides.19

Not all Muslim intellectuals were comfortable with the accommodation between

Muslims and the state through the ICMI establishment. Among those few intellectuals who

refused to join the ICMI was Abdurrahman Wahid. He accused ICMI as sectarianism;20

Abdurrahman believed that ICMI legitimized Islamic exclusivism and eroded social tolerance

for non-Muslim Indonesiaus.21 He also saw those who joined ICM! as "legal-formalist"

activists, meaning that for them political organization of Islamic nature was necessary. For him,

such approach was not valid in a highly pluralistic society such as Indonesia, in which another

approach, namely "the moral, educational and persuasive approach to Islamic teachings" would

be more beneficial to the majority and minority alike.22 His critique was based on his

perception of the "Trojan Horse" theory: he saw many Muslim intellectuals involved in the

ICMI simply as a way to enter the govemment and Islamize politics from within.

Abdurrahman's rejection ofICMI was greatly influenced by his perception of his own

position and the NU within the emerging power struggle early in the 1990s. He considered that

the NU was locked in competition with ICMI-which was largely supported by the modernist

camp-for political predominance. He was also acutely aware ofNU's marginal position in the

political structure relative to Muslims from the modernist camp. He expressed his

disappointment at being excluded from the political mainstream: "Look at how [the regime]

tries to block NU people from entering the key positions in ICMI. Influential mass

\9 On the serious tension between these two groups, see Hefner, "Is1arnization and Democratization in Indonesia," 1997.

2() Feillard, "Traditionalist Islam and the State in Indonesia," 1997, p. 151. 21 Ramage, "Democratisation, Religious Tolerance and Pancasila," 1996, p. 236. 22 Wahid, "Islam, Politics and Democracy in the 1950s and 1990s," 1994, p. 153.

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organizations [NU] are neglected and given peripheral positions in ICMI.,,23 Abdurrahman's

rejection to join the ICMI was thus plausible since the NU was less represented in the newly­

established association.24

Since that time, Abdurrahman's relation with Amien Rais, who supported the ICMI,

started to strain. Abdurrahman explains "I quarrel with Amien Rais who would like to establish

an Islamic society. For me an Islamic society in Indonesia is treason against the Constitution

because it will make non-Muslims second class citizens. But an 'Indonesian society' where the

Muslims are strong-and strong means functioning well-then I think that is good. ,,25 On the

other hand, many modernist Muslims accused him as a heretic, an intellectual prima donna and

a friend to Christian, ethnic Chinese, and the military. "Wahid is not only exaggerating

differences among Muslims but he is distorting our positions and sowing disinformation ... I

believe in Islam and democracy too, a democracy that guarantees freedom of religion, press and

speech," says Arnien RaiS.26

Abdurrahman made his agenda clear after he, along with some other secular and

Christian intellectuals, established a nondenominational coalition and discussion group known

as the Democracy Forum in March 1991. Although the coalition was not banned, however,

Suharto made clear his displeasure with Abdurrahman's move. Abdurrahman explains, the

Democracy Forum "is not an action-oriented group. It is just a group of people from different

constituencies ... we made it clear that we seek a common platform. We would like to discuss

and reflect on the parameters of democracy, the limits of power, and how we could promote the

23 Cited from Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, 2002, p. 111. 24 Van Bruinessen, "Konjunctur Sosia! Polilik eli Jagat NU paska Khittah 26," 1994, p. 82. 25 Cited from Ramage, "Democmtisation, Religions Tolemnce and Pancasila," 1996, p. 241. 26 Cited from Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, 1994, p. 190.

137

democratization process in a satisfying way.'.z7 Abdurrahman's opposition was widely featured

in the media, catapulting him to open opposition with the regime.

Abdurrahman's move was also received with ambivalent responses within the NU.

Some NU leaders, such as the acting chairman of the powerful Syuriah council llyas Ruchiyat,

former vice-chairman of Syuriah council Ali Yafie, and Abdurrahman's uncle YusufHasyim

joined the rCMI. They worried that Abdurrahman's activities on behalf of democratization

would damage NU by too closely associating it with democratic critics of the regime.28

Therefore, despite his harsh criticism both ofICMI and the regime, Abdurrahman did not

forbid NU leaders and members to join rCMr, and many did join.

Abdurrahman's opposition intensified when he refused to support Suharto's re-

nomination for another term in office. From late 1991 and early 1992 there were considerahle

indirect pressures for all major organizations to endorse his re-nomination. Many organizations,

groups, and individuals had already done so, including the Muhanunadiyah and some senior

NU leaders who joined the rCMI. However, Abdurrahman refused to do so, arguing that the

NU was no longer a political organization, therefore such endorsement would be

inappropriate.29 This move thus provoked Suharto's wrath since his opposition was construed

as an attempt to undermine Suharto's patronage of the Muslim mainstream.

Soon after being re-elected president in the MPR session in March 1993, Suharto was

subsequently determined to unseat Abdurrahman from the NU chairmanship and replace him

with a more pliable figure. The campaign was underway at the NU congress in Cipasung, West

Java, in December 1994. In a determined campaign to unseat him, state officials and military

21 Wahle!, ''The 1992 Election," 1992, p. 127-128. 28 Ramage, "Democratisation, Religious Tolerance and Pancasila," 1996, p. 237. 29 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, 1995, p. 57.

138

combined their efforts both to induce and to intimidate the congress delegates in order to garner

sufficient support against the incumbent.30 Surprisingly, Abdurrahman survived the tumultuous

event by winning re-election to the NU chairmanship by a slim margin (174 to 142) against

Abu Hasan. Robert Hefuer believes that the effort ultimately failed because a segment of the

military which had been hostile to Suharto indicated that they had no interest in seeing

Abdurrahman overthrown.3! They regarded Abdurrahman as a valuable ally in the struggle

against Suharto's accommodative strategy to the Muslim camp and the concomitant growth in

power ofICMI and its chairman, Habibie. Few months later, the regime also failed to block the

candidacy of another potential political opposition, Megawati, in the 1993 PDI congress in

Surabaya. Megawati was also said to have similar support from a segment of the military.

It would be a mistake to conclude that the commitment to democracy and political

reform was limited to those intellectuals who opposed the "honeymoon" between Islam and the

state. Despite the accommodative relation, however, some Muslim leaders sustained their

independence by keeping their distance away from the regime's cooptation. They continued to

make use of the limited space provided by the ICMI to clamor for justice, democratization, and

political reform. One such example was Amien Rais. Since the 1990 Muharnmadiyah congress

in Jogjakarta, he was appointed the deputy chairman of the Muharnmadiyah. He also supported

the ICM! establishment and served in itS high rank position.

Despite his proximity with Habibie, he distinguished himself in the media as a vocal

opponent ofSuharto. He regularly criticized Suharto's long period presidency and called for the

establishment of a reliable mechanism for presidential succession. In December 1993, nearly

nine months after Suharto was sworn in as president for his sixth term, Amien raised an issue of

30 See Feaiy, "The 1994 NU Congress and Aftermath," 1996. 31 Heiher, "Islam and Nation in the Post-Suharto Era," 1999, p. 54.

139

succession in the annual national meeting (Tanwir) in Surabaya, East Java. He said that the

succession must take place in 1998 and that it was necessary for the country to begin discussing

the various criteria that would be needed to select the next president.32

While the ensuing intense debate on the succession issue broke out, however, senior

government officials and President Suharto himself responded negatively. During February and

March 1994, President Suharto frequently issued statements meant to deflect criticisms and to

end the succession debate launched by Amien. Suharto said that there was no need to discuss

the matter any further as the country already had a mechanism in the MPR to deal with the

succession. While he said that he would step down in time and that he was not president for

life, he also pointed out that ''we have to abide by the established procedure that we have been

using. Don't make your own rules because this might spawn friction and disputes.'033

Despite the president's indirect but firm response, Amien even increased his criticism

and began taking pains to relate the political and social injustice that was happening around the

country. While admitting that Indonesia under Suharto's administration had achieved

remarkable economic growth and political stability, however, says Amien,

"Poverty and unemployment remain cyclical. The number of people living below the poverty mark could be perhaps twice or thrice the official figure of 27 millions ... There has not been a regeneration ofleadership in our democratic process. Unlike monarchies where the leadership renewal only occurs with the death of the monarch, a democratic system ensures a rotation of the elites via a constitutional process ... With no limitation to the period in office, the incumbent tends to veer away from the democratic institutions and defend the unreasonable and irrational vested interests of political supporters ... Leaders who have held the reins of government for too long tend to see themselves as the personification of stable governance and hence crucial to the survival of the nation. This complacency is a threat to democracy. The situation worsens when the leader takes on the attitude of Louis XIV of France. His concept of"L'eta c'est

32 See Rais, Moralitas Politik Muhamrnadiyah, Yogyakarta: Dinamika, 1995, p. 47-60. 33 Singh, Succession Politics in Indonesia, 2000, p. 16-17.

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moi" treats any personal criticism of his leadership as a personal assault to the nation and the core ideological values of the state ... ,,34

President Suharto was reported to be uncomfortable with Amien's criticism. Hence,

the regime sought to prevent Amien's election at the Muhammadiyah congress taking place in

Aceh in July 1995. Amien could not disguise his fear that there was no way he would be

elected as he was most critical of Suharto and had made strong statements about political

succession. Suharto also attended the opening ceremony of the congress and during his speech

he mentioned that he was educated in Muhanunadiyah schools and attributed his success as the

President to the ability to "breathe the air of Muhanunadiyah". Suharto claimed that his

indebtedness to Muhanunadiyah was invaluable. By delivering such tacit hint, Suharto,

according to Amien, wanted Amien to stop criticizing him as they shared the same

background.35 Similar to the earlier unsuccessful efforts to block Abdurrahman and Megawati,

however, the government also failed to prevent Amien's popularity within the organization.

The consecutive failures of government efforts to prevent the elections of

Abdurrahman, Megawati and Amien displayed in varying degree the regime's continued failure

to keep control of domestic discontent. The three outlined developments indicated a decline of

what had thus far looked as a very strong authoritarian regime. On the other hand, they also

showed success for public confrontation against the otherwise apparently very powerful state

apparatus. They were made possible by the strengthening of civil society movements and the

blossoming of urban middle-class politics.

Two years ahead to the 1997 election had been marked by numerons events indicating

the escalation of the regime coercion toward its political opponents. In the meantime,

34 Rais, Suksesi & Keajaiban Kekuasaan, 1997, p. 3-38; Gaffar, ''Indonesia 1995," 1996, p. 51-55. 3S Rais, Putra Nusantara, Son of the Indonesian Archipelago, 2003, p. 61.

141

Abdurrahman began working hand in hand with Megawati. Now that Megawati's abangan

religious outlook, Abdurrahman and many traditionalist Muslims felt comfortable, of which

many modernists such as Amien found it difficult to establish a point of contact.

The regime subsequently attempted to undennine the popularity of its political

opponents. During October 1996 and January 1997 Muslim rioting occurred sporadically in

East, Central and West Java. Targets of the violence included not only government offices,

police stations and churches, but also factories and shops belonging to non-Muslims and

Chinese people. The cities affected included Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, Pekalongan and

Surabaya. 36 Abdurrahman suspected that the incidents had been "engineered" (direkayasa),

since many local people reported seeing 'muscular young men with short haircuts' speaking

with 'out-of-town' accents asking for directions. While precisely who had been organized these

campaign remained unclear, most people assumed that provocateurs from outside of the towns

had played a decisive role in iustigating violence.37 Abdurrahman had also been warned by

contacts in the military in August and September 1996 that the regime was planning a new

round of attacks against him. Abdurrahman and many NU leaders suspected that the unrest was

intended to show that Abdurrahman could not control his membership and that Abdurrahman's

claim that the NU was a force for tolerance and democratization was a fraud.38 Their suspicion

was based on the fact that those cities affected by violence such as Situbondo, Surabaya,

Pekalongan are well known as NU strongholds. Meanwhile, Tasikmalaya, although not an NU

stronghold, is regarded as a santri (pious Muslim) city.

3. Forrester, "Towards March 1998, With Determination," 1998, p. 56. 37 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 219. 3S Hellier, Civil Islam, 2000, p. 191-192.

142

Several months earlier, a similar campaign was launched against the chairwoman of

the POI Megawati. Unlike Abdurrahman and Amien, Megawati was not an intellectual and had

no thought-out political platform or clearly political vision, but she inherited many aspects of

her father's charisma. Nor was Megawati remarkably confrontational towards the government

and her political statements were always within the boundaries of what was tolerable in the

political construction of the New Order.39 Her increasing popularity, however, was seen as a

potential threat for Suharto's sole candidacy in the next 1998 MPR session. It was widely

believed that Suharto always wanted to be elected unanimously and without any contender.

On July 27,1996, the expulsion ofMegawati supporters from the POI headquarter led

to the worst rioting in Jakarta for many years. The violence affected not just the POI office, but

many shops and offices along several main roads in Central Jakarta were looted and burned.

The government responded savagely to the unrest. Several hundred of Megawati's supporters

were arrested, and hundreds "disappeared". Many people believed that this riot was also

"engineered" by certain element of the military. Many people witnessed that the perpetrators

were unloaded from trucks; many of the men were well-built and with short crew-cut hair,

leading many to suspect that they were in fact soldiers out ofuniform.40

Meanwhile, Amien also intensified his criticism against Suharto and his

administration. Since his ascension to the chairman of the ICMI Council of Experts (Dewan

Pakar) in 1995, he tried to bring the succession issue into ICMI's discourse as he believed that

Suharto would re-nominate himself for his seventh term in 1998. However, in line with the

regime's stance that rCMI should not make political statements of any kind, Habibie ensured

that the succession issue remained outside onCMI's formal pronouncement. In addition, early

39 Eklof, Indonesian Politics in Crisis, 1999, p. 25. '" Eklof, Indonesian Politics in Crisis, 1999, p. 42. This tragedy is well-known as the "Gray Saturday".

143

in January 1997 Amien gained growing fame for his courage to identify publicly what was

wrong with the New Order regime. His blunt comments and speeches earned him a reputation

as a courageous person, and also pejoratively as somebody (he was born in Surakarta) who was

not 'Javanese' enough.41 Amien spoke openly about the 'nepotism' which was invariably

involved in the selection of electoral candidates, the 'collution' of high officials and civil

servants with members of the business community, and the control of foreign investors over the

country's natural resources, of which the position of Freeport Indonesia and Busang were

glaring examples.42 All a consequence of his frankness, Amien lost his position in rCMr as

chairman of the Council of Experts in February 1997.43 Suharto had ordered Habibie to take

this action, but publicly the pretence was upheld that all was peace and amity. Amien himself

spoke about his feeling of being guilty because he was 'too vocal' and did not want rCMr to

suffer from his moves. Such words clearly indicated that, as had indeed been the case, Amien

was forced to withdraw.

In contrast to Amien, who had escalated his opposition even since the tragedy Gray

Saturday occurred, Abdurralunan made a sudden political reversal and began reconciliation

with Suharto. Early in November 1996, when the President opened a national NO meeting in

East Java, both publicly shook hands and their pictures received wide coverage. Abdurralunan

inunediately expressed his support for the re-election of Suharto in 1998. In the months leading

to the 1997election, Abdurralunan went even further. He began opening his constituency for

Golkar's campaign, escorting the president's daughter Tutut around NO pesantrens. In return to

41 Van Dijk, A Country in Despair, 2001, p. 57. 42 See Basyaib and Abidin, Ada Udang di Balik Busang, 1997. The extent to which he succeeded in

attracting public attention was such that, at the end of 1997, the Islamic-oriented magazine Ummat elected him the "Man of the Year". This had been done, it was said, partly because it had been Amien who had made the most 'news' in 1997.

43 In July 1998, after the fall of Suharto, he was reinstated as chairman of the Council of Experts.

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the inclusion of many NU leaders in the Golkar candidate list, Abdurrahman also effectively

backed Tutut's vice-presidential candidacy, repeatedly suggesting that she was a 'future leader'

with whom it was important for the NU to develop links.44

Abdurrahman offered several explanations for his political reversal toward the New

Order regime. It seemed most likely, however, that the shift was driven mostly by his

conclusion of Megawati's removal, of violence in his NU base, and ofthe fact that his previous

allies in a segment of the military were getting weaker. Aware of the intensifying campaigns

against himself and the NU membership, he came to realize that he had no choice but to

negotiate a truce with Suharto.45 The events had forced him to put aside his democratic

engagement so as to protect his NU base. By doing so, he also hoped to prevent his

modernistfICMI rivals from monopolizing access to Suharto.

Meanwhile, Amien continued along the path he had chosen. Startling and delighting

his audience, in late September 1997, soon after the inauguration of the new DPRIMPR

members, he caused some commotion when, prompted by a question-during a discussion about

national leadership-in his readiness to be nominated as presidential candidate, he professed his

willingness to stand. This move was, by the standards of prevailing Indonesian politics, overtly

courageous. Some Muharnmadiyah leaders were afraid it might reflect negatively on the

organization, as Amien had stepped into a very sensitive field by entering Suharto's own

preserve. According to Amien himself, well aware that he stood no chance at all of being

elected in the presidential election scheduled to take place in March 1998 during the MPR

session, his willingness to be nominated was an act of political education directed to the

Indonesian people. By his nomination Amien wanted to de-"sacralize" the presidential post and

44 Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, 2005, p. 197-198. 4S Hefner, Islam and Nation, 1999, p. 59; Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 221.

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to make people aware that it was incorrect to assume automatically that only Suharto was

entitled to become the sole presidential candidate.46

The final months of 1997 also saw the consolidation among major oppositional

leaders: Amien, Megawati, and Abdurrahman. When Indonesia's economic crisis had escalated

since the mid-I 997 , Abdurrahman began calling for reform, in a time when Amien had been on

the move. Abdurrahman seemed to be determined to clear his name and correct the image that

he had quit from the pro-democracy movement. Abdurrahman also frequently met with

Megawati to demand further economic and political reforms. While there was a growing

relation between Abdurrahman and Megawati, Abdurrahman's campaign also indirectly

aligned him with Amien. In public, however, Abdurrahman refused to consecrate the alliance

with a formal declaration, maintaining the chill that has long marked his relationship with

Amien.47 In January 1998, unfortunately, Abdurrahman was debilitated by a stroke sidelining

him thereafter from political events during the peak of the reform movement. Despite his

survival in the following several months, however, in the eyes of the general public, he was off

the scene.

Since February 1998, student activists on campuses allover the country had begun

refusing Suharto's reelection in the MPR session scheduled to be held in early March 1998. As

most MPR members were already under Suharto's control, however, no wonder that Suharto

was re-elected president for his seventh term and Habibie was also appointed vice president.

Many Muslim leaders, particularly from the modernist!ICMl camp, had ambivalent feeling of

Habibie's election. While being thrilled as they at last won what they had long been admiring,

however, they were also disappointed by the new cabinet formation. The cabinet did contain a

46 Rais, Demi Pendidikan Palilik, 1997. 47 Hefiter, Civil Islam, 2000, p. 199

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number ofIeMI members, but no leading IeM! reformists were included. The feeling was that

Habibie had been powerless to champion reMI interests. No doubt, Suharto instead opted for

cronies and uninspired loyalists, such as his daughter Tutut and timber tycoon Bob Hasan.

While this move seemingly indicated Suharto's capability to ignore the Muslims'

interests, however, its effect was so clear that Suharto lost his last support remaining in his hand

from the Muslim camp. Disappointed by the new cabinet, Amien and some ICMI leaders such as

Adi Sasono, Dawam Rahardjo, and Nurcholish Madjid took their organization on a track that

would clearly lead the confrontation with Suharto. With Abdurrahman sidelined by a stroke and

Megawati adopting a more retiring public role (a curious strategy, disappointing many of her

followers), leadership of the anti-Suharto movements now passed into the hands of Amien.48

Pointing out that many of the ministers were not the right person in the right place, he ridiculed

them that such persons would not be able to differentiate between the interests of the state and

their own private ones, or those of their family and companies. Amien appealed to the wider

audience to give the new govermnent six months to prove its worth. If the crisis had not been

resolved, an extraordinary session of the MPR should be convened to call Suharto to account.

Otherwise, Suharto should be unseated with a peaceful 'people power'. Amien also toured

campuses where he addressed rallies and urged students to continue their struggle. By mid-April,

he began talking openly of 'people power', telling student audiences "if democratic means to

bring about change have reached a dead-end, there is no other way except a mass movement.''''9

At the same time, Abdurralunan lost his control of the NU. so While he was recovering

from his stroke, the central board of the NU effectively overruled him and underlined NU's

48 Hefher, Islam and Nation in the Post-Suharto Era, 1999, p. 60. " Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, 2005, p. 230. "Mietzner, "From Soeharto to Habibie," 1999, p. 75.

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support for the students' demands. With Muhammadiyah, NU, and rCM! standing in the forefront

in the confrontation against the govenunent, Suharto, in addition to his last remaining resource in

the military, began to seek support from the conservative Muslim camp.

Suharto, through his loyalists within the military, seemingly succeeded to court the

conservative Muslim camp. At the same time, however, the larger segment of the military started

to build contacts with pro-democracy leaders. The mounting opposition from students and people

caused a split within the military. A segment of the military under Prabowo, himself Suharto's

son in law and commander of the army special forces (Kopassus), sought to defend Suharto's

presidency at any cost and they built an alliance with conservative Muslim camp. Another camp

under the military commander Wiranto eventually seemed to be more responsive in its approach

to the pro-reform demands. Anticipating possible political configuration after the fall of Suharto,

both camps played high-risk games.

Suharto made another blunder when he, conforming to IMP prescription, announced

rises in electricity and fuel prices on May 4, 1998. This triggered larger and more violent protests

allover the country. The most alarming riot broke in Medan, South Sumatera, when destructive

rioting engulfed the city and surrounding areas for several days. In the days following the Medan

riots, the major Muslim organizations intensified their opposition. Amien called for the president

to step down immediately, and he sensed that the military was obviously wavering in its support

for Suharto. rCMr leaders also echoed similar demand, saying that an extraordinary MPR session

was needed to solve the leadership problem. The NU leaders also announced that the organization

was preparing its own reform proposal.

The climax of the crisis began with the shooting of four students during the

demonstration at Jakarta's Trisakti University on May 12,1998, which was speculated to be

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"engineered" by anny units loyal to Prabowo. On the next two days, on May 13-14, 1998, one

of the most serious rioting in modern Indonesian history took place. Speculation about the

mastermind also pointed out to Prabowo's special forces anny unit. Many of the commercial

centers such as shopping malls, banks, markets, shop houses were looted, destroyed and

burned. Many citizens, mostly of Chinese descent, were robbed, beaten, or raped. More than

1000 people lost their lives, most of whom were looters trapped in burning shopping malls.

Similar rioting occurred in Surakarta, Central Java and Palembang, South Sumatera.

The Trisakti killings and the ensuing riots had a profound political impact. On the one

hand, it fueled the mounting grievance and resentment among people, middle and lower class

alike. On the other hand, they undermined Suharto's long-established credibility in maintaining

security and order. Pressure on Suharto to step down increased greatly. Some hundred thousand

students began occupying the DPRIMPR buildings, pushing the DPRIMPR members to

convene the extraordinary MPR session as soon as possible. Similar huge student

demonstrations also took place in many cities allover the country.

Shocked by the violence, pro-reform leaders then echoed the reformasi damai

(peaceful reform) as their slogan. Prominent critics of the government, along with their

supporters, wore head bands, bearing the text. The violence also prompted elite opposition to

get more organized. On May 14, 1998 Amien announced the formation of a kind of cabinet

watchdog organization named Majelis Amanat Rakyat (the People's Mandate Council, or

MARA). In founding it, great care had been taken to avoid any suspicion of sectarianism and

therefore it included representatives from the various religious communities. It combined a

range of ICMI and other Muslim figures, former ministers, intellectuals and senior journalists,

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dissidents, and leaders ofNGOS.51 On the next day on May 15, another organization initiated

by Abdurrahman, Forum Ketja Indonesia (Indonesian Working Forum) was set up. It included

many NU and PDI-P leaders.

It was Amien who then called for an alliance with Abdurrahman and Megawati

against Suharto. Since Abdurrahman's distrust of Amien was well known, Amien's appeal was

indicative of his determination to put aside personal disagreements in the interest of the pro-

democracy struggle. Amien noted that he realized that the movement could not win without a

broader base. In this instance, however, it was Abdurrahman who refused. Abdurrahman

declined to join formally with Amien because he thought Amien had not sufficiently distanced

himself from those who wanted a more formal institutionalization of Islam in state and

society.52 Although a form of collective leadership to replace Suharto was necessary by that

time, elite opposition continued to be deeply divided and was far from being in a position to

form an emergency government.

Pressure for Suharto to step down was added by the unremitting student

demonstrations, particularly those who occupied the parliamentary buildings, and the constant

stream of delegations by much respected people and groups visiting parliament pushing the

DPRIMPR members to convene an extraordinary session to call for Suharto's resignation. The

parliament compound thus became the focus of political attention. It was the place where

students, academic staff, public figures, former cabinet ministers, artists, and retired officials

flocked to voice their demands and suggestions. Critics finally made the DPRIMPR

spokesperson Harmoko and his deputies suddenly realize that the institutions they headed

" Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, 2005, p. 233. '2 Hefner, Islam and Nation in the Post-Suharto Era, 1999, p. 60-61.

150

represented the people; now they had to do something. In the afternoon of May 18, Harmoko

and his deputies made up their minds, calling on Suharto to step down.

In response, Suharto attempted to reach a compromise and retain power, while he also

sought to deepen the division within Islamic opposition. During his meeting with a mild-

mannered Muslim scholar Nurcholish Madjid on May 19, Suharto mentioned that he first

wanted to consult with a number ofIslamic leaders. He named Nurcholish and Abdurrahman.

State Secretary Saadillah Mursyid cited the names of several others who would be suitable for

the occasion. But when Saadillah was finished, Nurcholish asked, "What about myoid

classmate?" Suharto asked whom he meant. "Ami en Rais," was the reply. "Well," said Suharto,

"Let's hold off on that." On the surface, Suharto got he wanted. Playing the NU off against

Amien, four of nine participants were the NU leaders (Abdurrahman, Ali Yafie, Ahmad

Bagdja, and Ma'ruf Amin). Only two represented the Muhanunadiyah (Malik Fadjar and Yusril

Ihza Mahendra). The other three were Nurcholish, Cholil Baidowi, and Emha Ainun Najib.

However, Suharto's effort to split Amien from the Muslim community failed. Amien had

previously given instructions to some of the participants in Malik's house.53 Amien had insisted

on elections within six months and Suharto's resignation or Suharto should hand over his

mandate.

Suharto's effort to co-opt those Muslim leaders also failed. As Emmerson describes it,

the Muslim leaders attending the meeting were numerous and diverse enough to be of use to

Suharto. They had a moral status that Harmoko, in Suharto's eyes and the eyes of the public,

lacked. If Suharto could generate the impression that these Muslim notables supported his plan

for political survival through limited reform, he might be able to rescue his chance of staying

53 Mietzner, "From Soebarto to Habibie," 1999, p. 82. Nurcholish, Amien, and the Mnbammadiyah deputy chairman Syafii Maarif got their Ph.D. from the Chicago University early in the 19808.

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on. However, the Muslim leaders refused to support him. But, by agreeing to meet with the

president precisely when he was being vilified by students around the country, they did foster

an impression that the Muslim leaders greatly preferred peaceful change from inside the New

Order to its violent overthrow from without. 54

The following day provided further evidence that democrat Muslims were unwilling

to press their opposition to the point of risking violence on a scale so large as to endanger

democratization. On May 20, 1998, which is National Awakening Day, a number of cities

around the country were braced for a massive show of force by students, Islamic groups, and

other pro-reform demonstrations. The epicenter, of course, was Jakarta, where Amien had been

working assiduously since March to mobilize a 'people power' on the National Monument

square, which is located right in front of the presidential palace. Military commanders had been

preparing feverishly. Main arteries began to be sealed off and by early morning on that day all

roads leading to the square were heavily barricaded with multiple rows of coiled barbed-wire.

Thousands of troops guarded this perimeter with assault rifles. Around 160 tanks and armored

vehicles were stationed at major intersections and strategic buildings, while some 40.000 troops

were deployed throughout the city. 55 After viewing by midnight the overwhelming presence of

troops, Amien by now had called off the rally at three in the morning that day in a speech

broadcasted on TV and radio. Amien was also warned by senior military commander that the

military was prepared to tum the sprawling grounds of the National Monument into a sea of

blood, comparable to Beijing's Tiananmen square crackdown. Amien was loathing to risk

major loss oflife. He was unwilling to risk what could have turned into a bloody confrontation

with security forces. Jakarta residents heeded Amien's call and stayed off the streets, so the city

54 Emmerson, "Exit and Aftermath," 1999, p. 304. 55 O'Rourke, Reformasi, 2002, p. 131.

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was like a ghost town. Amien then moved to the MPRIDPR buildings, to lead student

demonstration urging the parliament to set up the procedure ofSuharto's impeachment.

May 20 turned out to be the last full day ofSuharto's presidency. His final efforts to

postpone his resignation by composing both a new cabinet and a Reform Committee failed

when some 14 ministers were asking not to be included again for any new cabinet and when

some major opposition leaders, which were contacted, refused to join the Reform Committee.

By eleven o'clock, Suharto finally caved in. "That's it," he said, "I'll just resign." On the

morning of May 21, Suharto resigned and Habibie was sworn in as Suharto's successor.

The fall of Suharto, unfortunately, did not lead to total reform as demanded by pro-

democracy movement. This was partly due to the fragmented and weakly organized nature of

opposition.56 Instead of taking profit from Habibie's weakness and challenging him with a

credible civilian reform alliance, civil society seemed to be more divided than even before.

Every oppositional leader, including Megawati, Amien and Abdurrabman, was busy

repositioning themselves, consolidating their support, and forming new parties. Although

pluralism is the essence of civil society, in many countries where communist or authoritarian

regimes fell civil alliances were quickly formed and usually took over at the first general

election following the regime change. But Indonesia was heading in the opposite direction. 57

Their failure to form a broad-based alliance underlined the fact that civil society movements in

Indonesia have been deeply divided along religious fault lines. Their volatile relationship

during years-long of opposition has thus also been colored by distrust among them.

Soon after Habibie's ascension. it seemed that pro-democracy movements were

divided between those who supported, or at least accepted, Habibie because they viewed him as

56 Hadiz, "Contesting Political Change after Suharto," 1999, p. 109. "Mietzner, "ABRI and Civil Society in the Post-Suharto Era," 1999, 149.

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an Islamic president, and those who rejected him because they viewed him as a Suharto look-

alike. Their diverging opinions were based on the nature of the transfer of power from Suharto

to Habibie. The first group viewed that the transfer of power was legitimate since it was in

accordance with the constitution. In contrast, the second group viewed the transfer of power

was illegitimate since both Suharto and Habibie were elected in pair, so that both had to step

down altogether. While the pro-Habibie alliance comprised many groups coming mostly from

Muslim conservatives, the anti-Habibie front comprised many secular groups.

In this regard, the three main opposition reformers, namely Megawati, Amien, and

Abdurrahman, seemed to take a moderate stance. This was evidenced when those three leaders,

along with Sultan Hamengku Buwono X ofYogyakarta, held a meeting at the home of

Abdurrahman in Ciganjur, Jakarta on November 10. The meeting was made possible by

students who demanded Habibie's replacement by a presidium consisting of those four leaders.

This total reform was firmly refused. In a joint statement known as the Ciganjur Declaration, it

was clear that these popular leaders preferred an evolutionary transition to democracy. 58 They

made it clear that they were not interested to replace the legislature or Habibie. They instead

accepted Habibie as a transitional president and urged him to speed up the electoral process. On

the abolition of the military's dual functions, they only agreed that it had to be done gradually

over a six year period. Only in term of investigating Suharto's wealth did these leaders agree

with the students. They also spoke of the need of decentralization of governance and the need

for a fair share of funding between the central government and the regions. 59

The importance of the Ciganjur declaration was not simply because it punctuated the

willingness of major oppositional leaders to work in concert during the precarious events. It

,. Budirnan, "The 1998 Crisis," 1999, p. 47. ,. Young, "Post-Suharto," 1999, p. 96-97.

154

was significant, as Bourchier puts it, because it instead marked a parting of the ways between

those demanding total reform and those oppositional leaders who favored only incremental

change. In retrospect it also appears to have been important step in a process of accommodation

between pro-democracy leaders and the status quo forces.5O

Civil society in Indonesia, as elsewhere, is an arena of power, ineqUality, struggle, and

cooperation that is populated by a wide array of voluntary and non-voluntary groups whose

political orientations, interests, resources, capacities, and methods span a wide spectrum. These

non-state groups, operating in urban and rural areas and at times in foreign countries, function

independently or in small networks to advance specific causes and interests that may diverge

and conflict with one another. However, in the following sections, I will show other evidences

where the Muhammadiyah and NU forge an alliance to foster a democratization process.

C. The Election Monitoring

Indonesian democracy has been restored since 1998 after four decades of

authoritarian rule under President Sukamo (1959-1965) and President Suharto (1966-1998).

Within a week of taking over from Suharto, President Habibie allowed the formation of more

political parties. Tantamount to the formation of hundreds of new political parties, new

enthusiasm had also been explosively growing among Indonesian people to participate in the

electoral process. Sirnilar eagemess also emerged within the Islamic community, the modernist

as well as the traditionalist camp. While many within the organizations supported the

establishment of new political parties (as described in Chapter III), in the meantime, some other

groups within the NU and Muhammadiyah instead opted to organized a remarkable, extensive

non-partisan domestic voter education and election monitoring network. Since the 1999

00 Bourchier, ''Habibie's Interregnum," 2000, p. 19.

155

election, youth wings of and numerous NGOs affiliated to the NU and Muhammadiyah,

combined with mass-based Christian, interfaith, and Islamic university groups, have been

working in concert through Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih untuk Rakyat (the People's Voter

Education Networks, JPPR).61 The JPPR, financially supported by the Asia Foundation, was

established in 1998.

In 1999 Indonesia held its second free and fair elections after the 1955 election. As

reform era began after the fall of Suharto, the early years of transition had been colored by

sectarian conflict and regional disintegration. Many feared that the 1999 election would

intensify the conflict leading to massive violence. Such concern was plausible since the election

took place only two years after the last election during the Suharto era. The 1997 election was

marked by the massive eruption of campaign violence, more than any campaign violence

during the New Order time. More than 250 people were killed in campaign-related incidents

and rioting throughout the country.62 Such violence, however, was not the case during the 1999

election. With the notable exception to the several outbreaks of violence between the supporters

of the PKB and PPP in towns along the north coast of Java, there was a high turnout and

minimal violence. The success of the election, according to David Bourchier, was attributable

61 Groups representing Mllbammadiyah are the Muhammadiyah Youth Movement (PM), the Mllbammadiyah Students Association (!MM), the Mllbammadiyah Adolescent Association (IRM), the Mllhammadiyah Young Women Movement (NA), the Society Empowerment Council (MPM), the Mllhammadiyah Women Movement (Aisyiyah), the Center for the Study of Religions and Civilizations (pSAP), the Mllhammadiyah University ofYogyakarta (LP3 UMY), and the Mllhammadiyah Higher Education Council (Dikti Mllbammadiyah). Groups representing the NU are the NU Youth Women Movement (Fatayat NU), the NU Family Welfare Institute (LKK NU), (The NU Institute for Research and Development of Human Resources (Lakpesdarn NU), the Center for Development ofPesantren and Society (P3M), the Institute for Social Institutions Studies (ISIS). Other institutions are Ahimsa, Elsham Papua, Fabmina, ICCE UIN, JIL, LABDA Yogyakarta, LAPAR Makassar, LK3 Banjarmasin, LKlS Yogyakarta, LKPMP Makassar, MADIA, Percik Salatiga, PPSDM UIN, PSW UIN, Radio 68 H, and Rahima. Accessed from the official JPPR website http://www.jppr.or.idlcontentiview/14/29/onApriI15.2008.This section is mostly based on interviews with two national coordinator of the JPPR: Gunawan Hidayat (2003-2005) and Adung Abdurrahman (2005-2007) separately on January 2 and 12, 2008 in Jakarta.

62 Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, 2002, p. 32-34.

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to the management of the election commission and the neutral stance of the military. But, he

goes on to say, it had just as much to do with the commitment of ordinary Indonesians to the

process.63 Moreover, the contrast between the non-violent campaign and the previous two

years' rioting reinforced beliefs that previous elections were manipulated with restrictions on

free campaign and coercion on electoral process. The 1999 election demonstrated that when

Indonesians marched and assembled of their own accord they tended to do so peacefully.

The JPPR has been significant because it helped to ensure free and fair elections in

Indonesia. Needless to say, during the New Order regime, six elections were organized whose

results were not really interesting or important since the outcomes were more or less

determined in advance. As various kinds of pressures, intimidation and threat had been applied

to the voters,64 therefore elections during the Suharto period had very little to do with

democracy; they were aimed simply at serving as a legitimizing factor for the regime and

providing a degree of international recognition. Learning from previous elections, it was

necessary to ensure that the 1999 election would not be tainted with similar manipulations.

Therefore, a new election law was issued. Many regnlations were in contrast to the

ones that were applied during the New Order era. The election was organized by an election

commission comprising political party representatives, instead of the government body. Civil

servants were not allowed to join political parties but they were free to choose any political

party. This literally signified the end of mono-loyalitas of civil servants and their compulsory

support for Golkar. The regulation also applied to the military. There were 119 accredited

national organizations and twenty international election monitoring institutions in the 1999

63 Bourchier, "Habibie's Interregnum," 2000, p. 20. 64 See Haris, "General Election under the New Order," 2004, 18-37. See also Callahan, Pollwatching,

Elections and Civil Society in Southeast Asia, 2000, p. 145-150.

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election.65 Tens of thousands of independent election observers monitored the election in

almost every single polling station. Despite few minor flaws in the system and cheating in the

process, no doubt, all international and domestic election monitoring groups praised the overall

process, caIling them 'the first free and fair elections in over 44 years'.

Robin Bush, deputy representative of the Asia Foundation in Jakarta, points out that it

is not necessarily surprising for a Muslim majority nation to have successful elections. What is

surprising, and what is to her knowledge unprecedented in the Muslim world, is that Muslim

organizations and activists were directly responsible for ensuring the success and validity of

these elections.66 In both the 1999 and 2004 elections, the JPPR implemented one of the largest

and most comprehensive civil society voter education campaigns ever conceived. In 1999 they

trained and deployed 117 community-based voter education volunteers, and distributed over 23

million pieces of voter education materials (leaflets, stickers, and posters). In 2004 they

deployed over 140,000 voter education and election monitoring volunteers, and produced as

weIl as distributed over a million pieces of voter education materials in 350 districts. As

regional head elections (Pilkada) have been implemented since 2005, the JPPR kept

performing the voter education and electoral monitoring; it has already deployed more than

60.000 election monitors in nearly all regions.

The JPPR activities are divided into two different functions.67 First is voter education:

the JPPR provides information about the candidates and their policies as well as the procedures

of the election. Information about the candidates and their policies is often difficult or

impossible to obtain, as there has been no tradition of candidates having to articulate policy

os See Bjomlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 2004, Chapter 12 "Foreign Support for Domestic Election Monitorin; in Indonesia," p. 256-278.

See Bush, "Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia," 2005. 67 The Asia Foundation, Democracy and Elections in Indonesia, Newsletter, September 2006.

158

platfonns to an electorate. To encourage candidates to develop clear policy statements and

increase the amount of infonnation available to voters, JPPR undertake activities that address

both these critical issues. For example, in certain districts JPPR develops candidate

questionnaires which require candidates to make specific, quantifiable policies. The results are

printed in voter education brochures that are mass produced and widely distributed to the local

popUlation. JPPR has also been active in organizing and hosting candidate debates, providing

an opportunity for candidates to respond directly to voters and answer questions about

important local issues. Usually, these candidate debates are also broadcasted live on local radio,

so allowing many voters to benefit from the debates. In addition, the JPPR has also been

working to provide clear guidance on the procedure of the election, not only through brochures

and leaflets but also through public meetings and workshops. As the election processes are

complicated, particularly for less-educated people, the failure to provide such guidance will

lead to the high number of invalid ballots.

The second function of the JPPR is the election monitoring. In this regard, the JPPR

deployed monitors which have two functions. First, their presence at the polling station

provides a visible deterrence to those who may try to intimidate voters or subvert the election

process. A second role of the monitors is to complete a checklist about their observations from

their polling station. This checklist, once complete, is submitted to the district coordinator who

can then comment publicly to election officials and the media about JPPR's perception of the

quality of the election. Volunteers of JPPR ensured that the electoral process at national and

regional levels run peacefully and freely.

The other important aspect of the JPPR is concerning the most basic criteria for all

monitors: political neutrality. The JPPR has been trying its best to maintain its neutral position,

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even though the network is composed primarily ofNU and Muhammadiyah members. The

JPPR requires all its monitors not being registered as party officials or members of official

campaign teams, let alone being candidates for legislative or executive bodies. The interesting

example was when the Muhammadiyah declared its support for Amien Rais in the 2004

presidential election. During the process leading to the declaration, many Muhammadiyah

youth organizations affiliated with the JPPR, opposed the Muhammadiyah plan to endorse

Amien's presidential bid. Their opposition, unfortunately, could not stop the plan. When it

became clear that the Muhammadiyah fully endorsed Amien's presidential bid, all

Muhanunadiyah youth wing organizations formally abandoned their membership in the JPPR,

fearing that their continuing involvement would jeopardize the JPPR neutrality. In order to

maintain the proportional membership balance between the NU and the Muhammadiyah within

the JPPR, all networks and their volunteers which had earlier been developed by those

Muhammadiyah youth wing organizations were thus taken over by other institutions which are

closely associated - but without formal affiliation - with the Muhammadiyah.

Compared to other monitoring election groups, the JPPR has obviously many

advantages. First, as its institutional members are composed mostly by organizations affiliated

with the NU and Muhammadiyah, their broad constituencies provide the JPPR with enormous

advocacy power and unparalleled access to ordinary grassroots voters. Second, as the JPPR

recruit its volunteers from local people, the JPPR not only cost efficiently but it also able to

easily understand the dynamics oflocal politics and culture. In regard to election monitoring,

their volunteers supposedly have better understanding about the candidates and their track

records. Meanwhile, in regard to voter education, their volunteers would not have any cultural

barriers to provide information for the electorate. For example, they could provide information

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in local languages. Third, as the JPPR is supported mostly by many youth wing organizations

of the NU and Muhammadiyah, their volunteers supposedly have more political weight to

prevent any fraud in the electoral process, either from political parties, candidates, members of

campaign teams, or the election committees.

After serving in the election monitoring and voter education for ten years, I find some

remarkable findings about the JPPR phenomenon. First, the fact that this voter education and

monitoring group is made up primarily of Muslim organizations; it indicates the commitment

of the Muslim majority to the most basic and fundamental of democratic processes that is free

and fair elections. Second, and really the indicator of the depth of the Muslim civil society in

Indonesia, is the fact that the JPPR represents an unprecedented instance ofNU and

Muhammadiyah members collaborating and working in concert in Indonesia. Within the JPPR

these two organizations not only coexist, but work hand-in-hand, sharing responsibility, credit,

and political leverage. This is significant for two reasons. First is historical. In many instances,

the NU and Muhammadiyah playa very important role, but they do focus primarily on their

own constituencies. In the case of the JPPR, they were able to effectively transcend those

affiliations, and work to ensure the democratic process for all Indonesian citizens.68 Second is

that because they could mitigate the potential conflict between both organizations since at the

same time there had been political conflict between Amien Rais and Abdurrahrnan Wahid as

well as between the President and the parliament whose impact pervaded into the grassroots

level. Third is that the JPPR can contribute both to the better elections and to the strengthening

of civil society, thereby contributing to long-term democratic development. Election

monitoring provides civil society organizations the opportunity to build networks and

68 Bush, "Islam and Civil Society in Iodonesia," 2005.

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relationships that will enable them to continue to press for democracy after elections. It gives

them a chance to learn how to build coalitions and advocate public policy reforms in a more

democratic political system. The next section will provide another instance how Indonesian

Muslim civil society institutions contribute to the process of democratization.

D. The Corruption Eradicatiou

Indonesia has been in a historic period of transition from the authoritarian regime of

Suharto to laying the foundation for constitutional liberalism and a democratic political

structure. Ten years after the Reformasi started, governance and corruption continue to be

Indonesia's biggest challenges. Many people commented that the tremendous political,

economic and institutional changes that have marked Indonesia's transition to a more open,

competitive society provide new opportunities for improving governance and fighting

corruption. But, to date, Indonesia's achievements in promoting transparency and openness

have not been matched by genuine government accountability for dernonstrable results in

restoring integrity to the public sector and reducing corruption.

Corruption in Indonesia has been endemic. No doubt, Indonesia has the unwanted

reputation of being one of the most corrupt countries in the world, although fighting corruption

has been high on the policy agenda since the fall of Suharto. Despite Indonesia scores 2.3 in the

2006 and 2007 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 0.2 higher than that of2005, but together

with countries which score below three, it is still categorized as corrupt countries.69 Indeed

corruption, or what Indonesians generically call KKN (the Indonesian-language acronym for

corruption, collusion, and nepotism), remains a debilitating disease that infects institutions in

69 See, The 2006 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, http://www.infoplease.comiipalA0781359.html; Compare with The 2007 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, htlp:llwww.infoplease.comiworldlstatistics/2oo7-transparency-international-corruption­perceptions.html.

162

aU branches of the Indonesian state apparatus. Worse still, there has been a significant change

in its essential patterns and dynamics. During the Suharto era, a highly centralized,

authoritarian government meant that there was a certain degree of predictability about the

corruption that fed into a greatly personalized, patrimonial system of rule centered on the

presidency. With the unraveling of Suharto's New Order, power has become much more

diffused and decentralized, and the patterns and dynamics of corruption have done likewise.70

The alarming scale of corruption has apparently made Indonesia difficult to achieve a

consolidated democracy, where the civil and political society must be embedded in, and

supported by the rule oflaw. Democratic consolidation, according to Linz and Stepan,

requires-among other things-all significant actors-especially the government and the state

apparatus--be held accountable to, and become habituated to, the rule ofIaw.71 For civil and

political society alike, a rule of law animated by a spirit of constitutionalism is an indispensable

condition. Moreover, although many concluded that Indonesia's democratization has been

consolidated since the 2004 election, however, according to Merkel and Croissant, Indonesia's

democracy-since its deficient implementation of the rule oflaw and horizontal accountability-

was labeled a defective democracy. Such kind of democracy is usuaUy accompanied by large-

scale abuses of political authority, by corruption and misuse of constitutional enactments, or by

using other legal loopholes for the personal benefit of political stakeholders.72 In addition to

Indonesia, they go on to say, this kind of defective democracy can be found in aU regions:

Venezuela, Argentina, Russia, Ukraine, and Philippines.

70 Hadiz, "The State of Corruption," 2004, p. 210. 71 Linz and Stepan, ''Toward Consolidated Democracy," 1996, p. 18-19. 72 Merkel and Croissant, "Conclusion: Good and Defective Democracy," 2004, p. 205.

163

The lack of progress in fighting corruption has been widely discussed with fear among

Indonesian people, including the NU and Muhammadiyah leaders. Their concerns departed

from fundamental questions such as why corruption keeps on happening while anti-corruption

regulations and policies are being constantly exercised, at least rhetorically. Religiously

speaking, why is Indonesia as the world's largest Muslim country also among the most corrupt

countries in the world? Now that Muslims constitute the majority of the Indonesian population,

is the high level of corruption also caused by certain Islamic teachings that have been

understood, taught and applied by Indonesian MuslimS?73

Frustrated with the government's lackluster anticorruption measures, the NU and

Muhammadiyah-leaving their ideological differences behind- have signed a Memorandum of

Understanding (MOV) on October 15, 2003 to initiate a national anticorruption movement. The

MOU, facilitated by the non-governmental organization the Partnership for Governance

Reform, was signed by NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi, Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Maarif

and Partnership executive director H.S. Dillon. Its significance did not go uunoticed as the two

organizations have rarely collaborated in matters of policy, except in certain adverse conditions

when both felt compelled to put things right. For the two organizations to unite and to take the

initiative in the fight against corruption means that in the eyes ofNU and Muhammadiyah

corruption in this country has already grown to such alarming proportions that it threatens the

future of the nation as a whole.74

Under the MoU, the NU and Muhammadiyah have done a number of interrelated

endeavors. Among other things,first, in order to raise awareness of the anti-corruption

73 Interview with Saiful Bahri Anshori, the manager program orthe NO anti-corruption taskforce aod deputy general secretary of the PBNO, on Jaouary 9,2008 in Jakarta.

74 Interview with Rizal Sukma, the deputy coordinator of the Muhannnadiyah aoti-corruption taskforce aod head of tile international affairs council of the PP Mnbammadiyah, on Jaouary 12, 2008, in Jakarta.

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movement among their members and Indonesian people alike, the NU and Muhammadiyah

have developed an Islamic interpretation of corruption drawn primarily from Islamic law and

historical precedents.75 They not only provide extensive examinations of corruption from the

Islamic perspective, in terms of its numerous definitions in Islamic law, they also explain the

devastating impacts of corruption for economic development, public welfare, security,

environmental sustainability, law enforcement and public morality.

These religious interpretations were not simply published in books and thus

distributed widely through organizational networks of the NU and Muhammadiyah. They were

also disseminated through training of Islamic preachers and published in piecemeal Friday

sermon supplements. The potential impact of these efforts should not be underestimated since

the pronouncements of religious leaders are culturally heeded by most Muslims in Indonesia In

a country where the great majority of people are Muslim and the clergy enjoys considerable

respect, certainly the banding together of these two respected organizations can lend

considerable power to the anticorruption drive.

Second, in order to develop a strong civil society able to check the behavior of the

corrupt power-holders and their collaborators, the NU and Muhammadiyah have set up

corruption watchdogs in their branches across the country to monitor possible corruption at the

local level. They were trained to have sufficient capacity to advocate pro-poor budgeting and

monitor corruption in local government. Furthermore, in order to increase the transparency and

accountability in local governments, the Muhammadiyah and NU have also initiated a

breakthrough by facilitating concerned local Parliament members to form an anti-corruption

caucus on local levels. They were not only furnished with sufficient technical assistance to

" See Maje\is Trujih dan Tajdid PP Mnhammadiyah, Fikih Anti Karupsi, 2006 and Naim, Rofiah, and Rahmat, NU Melawan Karupsi, 2006.

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improve their capacity in local budgeting, but they are also trained to engage in experts'

meeting in order to find solutions and gather recommendations on the most effective strategies

to improve public participation in the monitoring process of the implementation and efficiency

in the govemment's expenditure. Members of this caucns were recruited not limitedly from

those who become members of the NU and Muhanunadiyah. Instead, they were recruited

nearly from all political parties committed to fight against corruption.

Third, in order to awaken a nationwide anger against corruptors and the practice of

corruption, the NU and Muhanunadiyah have been carrying out many campaign activities

through media, such as advertising the anti-corruption message in newspapers, distributing

stickers, leaflets and banners, hosting talk shows in radio and making movies. The

Muhanunadiyah and NU have also held regular press conferences conveying commentaries on

the state of corruption in Indonesia.

Forth, in order to avoid cynicism accusing them as talking only on corruption, the NU

and Muhammadiyah have also been campaigning the internal good govemance. Both

organizations are determined to implement a modern management system at their organizations

based on the principles of accountahility, transparency, integrity, participation and justice. In so

doing, they sought to improve audit management, estahlish good governance guidelines and

ensure transparency in their reports; all are aimed at minimizing irregularities. Both organizations

have a number of economic activities and strive to attain a prosperous society. The success in

these efforts would promote role models on how to develop good governance internally.

Fifth, in the months leading to the 2004 legislature election, the Muhanunadiyah and

NU also used the momentum to promote their anti-corruption agenda. Amid the growing

campaign of anti-crooked politicians, both published leadership guidelines for candidates of

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MP and regional representatives. The anti-crooked politicians' desks were also run by student

wings of both organizations. Political contracts with candidates running for the local

parliaments were also signed at the NU and Muharnmadiyah regional chapters shortly before

the 2004 legislature election took place. Both also launched a public campaign, mostly through

religious events, urging people to vote for candidates with clean track record.

While most pilot projects of the NU anti-corruption activities were carried out in

several cities where the NU has strong organizational support, that are Kendal and Magelang of

Central Java and Blitar and Probolinggo of East Java, Muharnmadiyah activities were

concentrated in the provinces of Lampung, Central Java, Yogyakarta and West Sumatera.

Since the signing of the memorandum, many Indonesians have hailed the resolve of

the two organizations to combat corruption. Since neither the executive nor the legislature and

the judiciary have so far shown their political will to end corruption, many people thought, who

better could the public trust to do the job than the two Muslim organizations which together

claim a following of no less than 60 million? In contrast, the campaign has also met with

considerable skepticism almost the moment it became public knowledge.

Such high expectation and skepticism are justifiable concerning the fact that for the

average Indonesian, whose life depends on the services of a corruption-riddled bureaucracy,

there can be no doubt that corruption at present pervades almost every stratum of the

administration, from the top echelons of govermnent down to the district and sub-district levels

and to the neighborhood officials. For as long as can be remembered, govermnent

anticorruption drives have always stalled, mostly due to the reluctance of the authorities to act.

In the light of such a background, the moderate answer may be to encourage all concerned

citizens and groups to partake in these efforts, in their own ways, which could then be sifted to

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fmd those that are workable?6 It would certainly help for the public to see that something is at

last being done to curb corruption. In this regard, the NU-Mubammadiyah coalition is only a

part of the chain for finally getting the anticorruption drive rolling. As social-religious

organizations, without the authority to execute, they focus their efforts on campaign, advocacy,

and monitoring. If we eventually fail to curb the corruption, therefore, it would be misleading

to scapegoat the NU and Muharnmadiyah.

As the role played by both organizations during the last ten years of the Suharto

regime was remarkable in broadening a free public sphere and opposing the authoritarian New

Order regime, it seemed that after the fall of Suharto both organizations have been continuing

their role to provide "the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the

state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of

exercising that control.,,77 In this regard, both civil society organizations are vital for containing

the power of democratic governments, checking their potential abuses and violations of the

law, and subjecting them to public scrutiny. Indeed, says Diamond, a vibrant civil society is

probably more essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy than for initiating it. 78

The potential impact of these anti corruption efforts carried out by the

Muharmnadiyah and NU is enormous. They have relatively loyal and vast constituencies all

across the country that can be mobilized. Unfortunately, within the two organizations, and

particularly within the NU, there are disagreements over the extent to which the organizations

should address corruption.79 The disagreement seems to be based on the differences between

conservatives and progressives in the NU. Traditionally, NU kyai and their pesantren have

76 Johnston, Civil Society and Corruption, 2005, p. xi. 77 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" 1984, p. 204. See also Lipset, Political Man,

1981, p. 52. 78 Diamond, ''Toward Democratic Consolidation," 1994, p. 17. 70 Davidaen, Juwono and Timberman, Curbing Corruption In Indonesia 2004-2006, 2006, p. 68-69.

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been beneficiaries of government funds and the largesse of government officials. These

payments, which often take the fonn of gifts or donations, are not easily differentiated from

corruption. Hence, conservatives are concerned about how NU comes to define corrupt

practices, whereas progressives think that such payments do in fact co-opt NU's kyai and

therefore should not be permitted. As for Muhammadiyah, the new chainnan, Din Syamsuddin,

appears less interested in placing corruption high on his agenda. At best, he seems to be more

interested in using the anti-corruption campaign to furnish his image before the public, as he is

known for his political ambition. As a result, it seems unlikely that NU and Muhammadiyah

will undertake major anti-corruption initiatives in the foreseeable future.

While this section is devoted to examine the anti-corruption campaign carried out by

the NU and Muhammadiyah, the following section will study their role in promoting civic

pluralism against the increasing sentiment of radicalism within Indonesian Muslims.

E. The Last Bastion of Civic Pluralism

Indonesia has been gaining much media coverage through the images of radicalized

Muslims and sectarian conflicts. The foreign affairs' ministries ofa number of western

governments have taken a conservative approach and advised citizens to stay away from

Indonesia or take precautions. Such alarming images are not without evidence. In fact, radical

and dogmatic interpretations of Islam have gained ground in recent years in many Muslim

societies. In Indonesian context, there are many reasons for this, and there are also a large and

growing body of literature continues to be engaged in exploring them. It is clear that the events

of political openness brought about by the democratization, the September 11 attacks and the

ensuing war on terrorism have provided momentum for such radicalization.

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In the course of the last ten years, there has also been a rise in the number of Islamic

associations that adhere to fundamentalist principles and that are often militant in their

approach to societal problems. They are strongly anti-American and they call for the

conversion of Indonesia to an Islamic state. Laskar Jihad, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI),

the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Hizbut Iahrir Indonesia (HII) and Jemaah

Islamiyah (JI) are the most prominent of these new groups.so Another instance is the

mushrooming ofIslamic parties since the fall ofSuharto which is indicating that Indonesian

Islam was not as apolitical and domesticated as had seemed in the late New Order.

There is widespread concern that the growth ofIslamism may lead to the type of

"identity politics" that contributed to the collapse of Indonesia's first experiment with

parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. Will they support the democratization, or will they lead

to a revival of sectarianism? Although a definitive answer is impossible, we need to raise the

question of whether there is a real danger that radical Islamism may come to disturb the

religious and political freedoms of a moderate majority? By analyzing the broader

phenomenon, however, I will argue that the resurgence of Muslim politics in Indonesia will not

lead to significant change in their political attitudes: a vast majority of Indonesian Muslims are

personally tolerant and moderate in their outlook.sl There are several reasons supporting this

conviction. And the role of the NU and Muhammadiyah is potentially remarkable.

Despite the blossoming of numerous Islamic parties since the fall of Suharto, they do

not speak with a single voice. Rather they are intrinsically diverse. Current Muslim parties in

Indonesia constitute a remarkable phenomenon in the Muslim world, where most Muslim

80 Van Bruinessen, "Genealogies ofIslamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia," 2002; leG, "Al­Qaeda in Southeast Asia," 2002; Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia," 2004; Hefner, "Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 2005; Hasan, Laskar Jihad, 2006.

81 EliIaz, Islam in Indonesia, 2004, p. 67.

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political parties are strongly ideological and are not committed to open political dialogue with

others. Significantly, there is no unity on what Islam's role in politics should be. This is marked

by the existence of numerous parties rather than one that is representing all Muslims or one for

each traditionalist and modernist. Equally important, they disagree among themselves about

important matters such as the mentioning of sharia in the constitution.

In fact, during the MPR session in 2000, only the PPP and PBB proposed inserting a

clause demanding the application of sharia law for Muslims, a demand taken as the revival of

the so-called Jakarta Charter, which was once a part of the draft Constitution at the beginning

of the Republic. When it came to an actual debate in the MPR, however, their proposal did not

survive and was soon overwhelmed by opposition coming from inside and outside the MPR.82

The NU and Muhammadiyab, which favored an Islamic state in 1955, opposed the

agenda of formally adopting the sharia into the Constitution.B3 Hasyim Muzadi ofNU saw that

the struggle for sharia to be enforced in Indonesia was not realistic. He has urged the

promotion of universal values for the people's prosperity, instead of pushing the idea of sharia.

According to Syafii Maarif of Muhammadiyah, members ofLaskar Jihad (Jihad warriors) in

Solo felt disappointed with Muhammadiyah for not supporting the restoration of the Jakarta

Charter in Article 29. Due to these developments, some Muslim hard-liners have alleged that

Muhammadiyah and NU are no longer Islamic, or are no longer articulating Muslim

aspirations. Syafii was reported to have said: 'I believe that many people within our (NU and

Muhammadiyah) community will condemn our stance, but I have warned them that we must be

committed to promoting unity, which our founding fathers declared when establishing this

82 Azra, "The Megawati Presidency," 2003, p. 65. 83 See Hosen, ''Religion and the Indonesian Constitution," 2005. On the contrasting views between those

who sopported and opposed the sharia, see Zein and Sarifuddin, Syari'at Islam Yes Syari'at Islam No, 2001.

171

nation'. To put it differently, it seemed that the focus is no longer on how to bring Islam into

the foundation of the state, but how to bring Islamic coloration into policies produced by the

state. This reflects a sharia approach from these two Islamic organizations.

Tantamount to the NU and Muhammadiyah opposition, the agenda of adopting the

sharia into the Constitution was also firmly opposed not only by the secular Golkar and PDI-P,

but also the PKB and PAN-that draw their supports mostly from the NU and Muhanunadiyah

members. They took the stand that the national consensus of Pancasila, the five principles of

Faith in One Supreme God, Humanism, Nationalism, Democracy, and Social Justice, should be

continued as the state foundation. As a result, its preamble containing Pancasila and Article 29

guaranteeing the freedom of religious belief and practice were both left intact throughout the

debates on the constitutional amendment.

The opposition ofP AN and PKB as well as the Muhammadiyah and NU is a new

development within Islamic community. This is arguably among the result of the rejuvenation

of cultural Islam during the New Order era: as it thus has been stimulating the emergence of a

new paradigm of Islam adopted by some Islamic parties, which stresses the substantive aspects

ofIslam rather than its legal and formal ones.84 Unlike the characteristic ofIslamic parties in

the 1950s and 1960s where they attempted to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, the new

paradigm draws much more attention to the substantive aspects of Islam and the new Islamic

generation is much more interested in establishing inclusive and pluralist political parties.

In light of these developments, any analysis of Indonesian politics should not

overlook these dynamics. nor should one assume that political Islam has been static and united

in focusing on the state ideology. Instead, in the post-Suharto era, an interesting spectrum of

S4 Jamhari, "Islamic Political Parties," 1999, p. 184.

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political Islam has appeared in Indonesia. Today, the five Islam-friendly parties represent the

transfonnation of political Islam in Indonesia since the 1970s. These parties are not only varied

in their commitment to an Islamic agenda but also strongly divided on this agenda. 85 Among

them, three (the PBB, PPP, and PKS) clearly adhere to Islam as their ideology. They pursue

platfonns somewhat similar to those ofIslamic parties in the 1950s. These three parties are

Islamist and fit what most scholars commonly understand as Islamic parties. In contrast, the

PKB and PAN derive support from Islamic organizations while appearing pluralistic. One can

see that the PAN and PKB are Islam-inclusive parties, as their platforms do not explicitly focus

on pursuing an Islamic agenda. What is unique is that they welcome Muslims' political

aspirations, but they all oppose the fonnal adoption of sharia in the Constitution.

Furthermore, in the 1999 election out of twenty Islamic parties which participated in

the election only ten parties gained one seat or more in the DPR. Put together, they could only

win 37 per cent of the votes (172 seats), including PKB and PAN. Without these last two

parties, however, they gained only 17.8 percent of the votes (87 seats).86 In the 2004 election,

their performance seemed to be better. If the total votes received by all the Muslim parties in

the 2004 election are tallied including the PAN and PKB, they gained 42 percent or 231 of the

500 seats in the DPR. However, if the PAN and the PKB are excluded, then they received 23

percent of the vote, or 127 seats.87 Moreover, in the 2004 presidential election, the two

presidential candidates running in the second round have secular political outlooks, although

they are Muslims in term ofreligion.88

" Woodward, "Indonesia, Islam, and the Prospect for Democracy," 2001; Riddell, "The Diverse Voices," 2002; Fealy, "Divided Majority," 2003. Salim, Partai Islam dan Relasi Agama Negara, 1999.

86 Effendy, Islam and the State, 2003, p. 214. 87 Wanandi, "The Indonesian General Election 2004," 2004, p. 118. 88 Emmerson, "One Nation under God?" 2006, p. 77.

173

The results of the 1999 and 2004 elections were a significant decline compared with

the first democratic election of 1955, when Islamic parties altogether won 43.9 % of the total

votes. They were also united in supporting an Islamic agenda. The results once again reflected

the minority appeal ofIslamism, regardless of both the fact that the majority of the Indonesians

are Muslims and the fact that there has been increasing Islamic revivalism within society.

Analyzing the figures on the basis of the division. it is clear that the greater portion of the votes

was awarded to the secular and pluralistic Islamic parties rather than to the formalistic Islamic

parties. Given the results of these elections, some observers argue that they are an important

indicator of the political moderation of Indonesian Muslims today.89 Other observers note that

the presence of these two political parties seem to be an effective block within the Muslim

community against the growth of any tendency leading to religious communalism.90

Another instance that the NU and Muhanunadiyah playa significant role in maintaining

the moderate nature of Indonesian Muslims is proven by their stance concerning Islamic

radicalism and terrorism. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the ever-growing

post-Suharto radical Islamic discourse in Indonesia was increasing and was in itself shaped by

thernes evident in the global sphere, where the rhetoric of a clash between Islam and the West

became a major theme in international relations.91 The government's response in the aftermath of

the terrorist attacks elicited strong reaction in the country. President Megawati was shocked by

attacks from the Islamist groups and political parties for expressing Indonesia's cooperation in

the U.S-led war on terror, during her visit to the United States only one week after the events.

They even accused her of being a lackey of the United States. However, when President Bush

89 Mujani and Liddle, "Politics, Islam," 2004, p. 112. Hefuer, "Globalization, Governance, and the Crisis of Indonesian Islam," 2002, p. 13; Barton, "Islamism and Indonesia," 2002; Effendy, "Enforcement ofShar'iab in Indonesia," 2004, p. 95.

90 Nakamura, Islam and Democracy, 2005, p. 27. 91 Sebastian, "Indonesian State Response to September II," 2003, p. 432.

174

ordered American troops to invade Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, President Megawati, seeking

to calm domestic criticism, criticized the u.s. campaign in Afghanistan. She described it as ''the

spilling of blood to avenge the spilling blood." On October 8, 2001, the Department of Foreign

Affairs also released a statement expressing deep reservations about the military actions

undertaken by Washington in Afghanistan.92

Domestic reactions to the Government's responses were remarkable. Their anti-

Megawati campaign then turned into anti-Americanism. Demonstrations by Indonesian

Muslims, particularly from hard-liner groups, occurred in Jakarta and other big cities in the

country protesting the u.s. bombing of Afghanistan, demanding President Megawati to

condemn it, and even calling for a holy war (jihad) in defence of Afghanistan. The Indonesian

Council ofUlernas (MUl) also backed the call for jihad by issuing fatwa (religious edict}-

causing great alarm. In addition, hard-liner groups demanded that the government suspend

diplomatic relations with the United States, opened venues for the registration of holy warriors

prepared to go to Afghanistan and threatened to use their pararnilitaries to 'sweep' hotels in the

city of Surakarta in search of American and British tourists.93

Outside these radical responses and threats, however, the mainstream of Indonesian

Muslims reacted differently. The leaders of the country's two largest Islamic organizations, the

NU and the Muharnmadiyab, repUdiated calls for radical action. The NU Chairman Hasyim

Muzadi said that the NU would not recruit its members as volunteers for such a jihad. He

maintained that jihad does not always mean holy war; efforts to develop Islam and the Muslim

ummah are also called jihad. He also believed that the terrorist attacks of September 11 were a

92 Sirozi, "Indonesian Responses to September 11,2001," 2006, p. 390. 93 Hasan, "September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia," 2005, p. 303. While there

was finally no real 'sweepings' occurred, such threat was widely captured by media--<lornestic and international alike--which had worsened the image of Indonesian Muslims.

175

tragedy of humanity. As such, the terrorist attacks should not be transformed into religious

conflicts. In a similar vein, the Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Maarif also indicated that his

organization would not get involved in a radical move. He criticized the MUI's call for jihad,

which he believed had been misunderstood by many Muslims, given the diverging

interpretations of the word. He concluded that it was not wise to use the word jihad as it would

only raise Muslim's anger and provoke radicalism.94

The MUI's call for jihad was also clarified by the MUI secretary general and vice

chairman of the Mnhammadiyah Din Syamsuddin saying that it was not referring to a violent

jihad; jihad in this call was not an armed war but a serious, peaceful attempt to assist their fellow

Afghan Muslims who would suffer from the U.S. attacks.95 In order to appease the radical

appeals, the NU and Muhammadiyah in a join statement condenmed the attacks and labeled them

an aggression against non-combatant Afghans. However, they also condenmed the terrorist

attacks stating that violent action was not recommended in Islam against civilian and outside the

battlefield. Such evidence indicated that sentiment among mainstream Muslims were in

accordance with the conciliatory and sympathetic remarks made by President Megawati.

The Bali bombing of October 12, 2002, may have proved a blessing in disguise for

Indonesia in dealing with Islamic radicalism.96 Prior to the bombing, the government refused to

arrest the allegedly-spiritual leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network Abu Bakar Ba'asyir

on the ground that there was no evidence to put the cleric behind bars. Indonesia's removal of

the Anti-Subversion Law (the equivalent of the Internal Security Act of both Singapore and

94 Azra, "The Megawati Presidency," 2003, p. 50. " Hasan, "September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia," 2005, p. 304. The

government has also issued a ban on Indonesians joining the jihad in Afghanistan-invoking a law which forbids Indonesians joining foreign armies.

,. Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy, 2006, p. 173.

176

Malaysia, used to arrest "subversive" elements without trial) was put forward as the reason why

newly democratic Indonesia could not employ authoritarian methods from the past.97 After the

Bali bombing, however, with the government under intense pressure to prove Indonesia's

commitment to combating terrorism, President Megawati demonstrated decisive leadership by

introducing anti-terrorism regulations, which provided a legal umbrella for counter-terrorist

activities. International cooperation was welcomed to investigate the bombings and two

presidential decrees were hastily drawn up to improve intelligence coordination. The state's

rapid actions put hard-line groups, in the wake of the bombings, now under closer scrutiny of

the security apparatus. As a result, the Indonesian government soon issued an arrest warrant for

Ba'asyir, while the other radical group Laskar Jihad was disbanded after government pressure

and its leadership was put in jail.

At the same token, the NU and Muharnmadiyah had by the end of 2002 gained

enough momentum to jointly criticize the radical fringe groups. The Bali bombing, by and

large, has contributed to a more resolute and stronger attitude among Indonesian Muslims in

general to confront radicalism; more and more Muslims abandon the defensive and apologetic

attitude toward the ruthlessness of the bombing perpetrators. The previous believe among some

people of the so-called 'conspiracy theory' seemed also to decreasing. Virtually, all Muslim

leaders issued statements in strongest terms ever condemning the bombing.98 According to

Hasyim Muzadi, for whatever reasons, terrorism is the most vulgar and barbaric crime against

humanity. He goes on to say that there is no religion that condones violence, because religion is

a system of belief aimed at creating civilization and, at the same time, a human soul that is full

of divine values including affection for another. Hence, says Hasyim, "in principle, terrorism

97 Smith, "Indonesia in 2002," 2003, p. 103. 98 Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy, 2006, p. 217.

177

and religion contradict each other.,,99 At the same token, Syafii Maarif states that Indonesia in

recent times has become the victim of terror conducted by misled Muslims due to their

destructive and political interpretation of the Islamic teachings. Syafii goes on to say that they

have wrongly interpreted their religion to achieve their political objectives by misusing it.

Syafii call the terror action as "the brutality demonstrated by these abnormal people."IOO

The September 11 and the ensuing 'war on terror' indicated that international factors

significantly contributed to the escalation ofIslamic radicalism in Indonesia. In an Indonesia no

longer immunized from global Islamic discourse by the once all-pervasive Suharto-era state

security apparatus, transnational Islamic issues resonate in the country through the media

coverage; feel a sense of solidarity with the Palestine cause, or collectively with other Muslims

experience a sense of outrage at the sight of civilian war casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is

true that a majority of Indonesian Muslims neither approved of Tali ban interpretations ofIslam

nor had any liking for Saddam's regime. lOt Most Indonesians also condemned the September

11 attacks and the perversion ofIslam that gave rise to them. In the absence of reliable polling,

it is reasonable to conclude that this is probably a fair reflection of mainstream Indonesians.

They do not support Osama bin Laden, but equally they do not wish to see the United States

intervene in the Muslim world. to2

In dealing with the growing Islamic radicalism in Indonesia, it is necessary for the

Indonesian government to understand that this issue was partly due to the socioeconomic crisis

and the instability that it brings combined with the absence of state authority in dealing with

militants, particularly those with the tendency to break the law, and partly fueled by

., Muzadi, "Same Faith, Different Names," 2003, p. 91. 100 Maarif, Menggugah Nurani Bangsa, 2005, p. 111. 101 Sebastian, "Indonesian State Response," 2003, p. 433. 102 Smith, "What the Recent Terror Attacks Means for Indonesia," 2001, p. 9-10.

178

international factors. Therefore, the future ability of Indonesia to continue on the path of

economic recovery as well as political reform will determine the future ofIslamic radicalism.

Likewise, the govermnent's decisiveness and consistency, on the one hand, to pay attention to

international Islamic issues in placating Islamic concerns, and to move against domestic

militants on the other, will determine Indonesia's success in dealing with radical movements,

which to some extent have stained the moderate image of Indonesian Muslims.

Another effort carried out by the Muhammadiyah and NU to maintain the moderate

nature of Indonesian Islam is seen in the flourishing networks of smaller NGOs loosely

connected to both organizations. As many people perceived the Muhammadiyah and NU as

large-scale NGOs, the establishment of a number of smaller NGOs within the organizations

indicates the existence ofNGOs within NGOs.

The mushrooming ofNGOs within the NU and Muhammadiyah has its origin in the

establishment of numerous NGOs since early in theSuharto period. to3 Many former students and

activists who initially supported Suharto' s rise to power and hoped that it would end the

authoritarianism ofSukamo's Guided Democracy became disappointed with the New Order's

leaning to authoritarianism. As the political parties were severely manipulated and opposition

movements were suppressed by the regime, many NGOs were established.104 Since many

underprivileged groups in society had been marginalized by the accelerated economic

development promoted by the New Order regime, the NGOs began focusing their activities on

specific development-related issues such as ruraI and urban development as well as

environmental and legal issues.

10' On the broader discussions concerning NGOs in Indonesia, see Eldridge, Non-Government Organizations, 1995; Sinaga, NGOs in Indonesia, 1994, Hadiwinata, The Politics ofNGOs in Indonesia, 2003.

104 UhIin, Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Demacratization ", 1997, p. 97.

179

Ali. old-generation ofNGOs were often driven by dedicated middle class activists,

they tended to adopt a less confrontational strategy against the regime. It was not until late in

the 1980s and early 1990s that a number of new radical NGOs increasingly became issue-

oriented. They targeted the most disadvantaged, promoting self-help projects and empowering

people, politically, economically, and socially.I05 The establishment of this new generation of

NGOs stenuned from their dissatisfaction with the developmental approach giving too much

emphasis to macro-economic growth and its top-down approach. I06

Among those young activists who supported the old-type ofNGOs were those with an

Islamic modernist and traditionalist backgrounds. Since early in the 1970s, through the

legendary LP3ES (the Institute for Econornic and Social Research, Education and Information)

they had initiated programs that were intended to raise the potential of the pesantren as a

medium and motor of rural and human resource development. By the mid-1980s pesantren-

based development efforts shifted to a new NGO named P3M (the Centre for Development of

Pesantren and Society). The most significant contribution of the P3M was, however, in

challenging and developing traditionalist Muslim discourse. The P3M has long been initiated

important debates on religion and societal affairs including land conflicts, gender relations,

democracy, and corruption.

Since the mid-1990s, while Abdurrahman gradually became an outspoken opposition

leader to the Suharto regime, a number ofNGOs were established by young NU generations. As

the NU's 1984 congress decided that the organization should back to their original guideline

(khittah) and stay away from practical politics, the decision also required the NU to give priority

10' Nyman, Democratising Indonesia, 2006, p. 50. 106 Hikam, "Non-Governmental Organizations and the Empowerment of Civil Society," 1999, p. 219.

180

again to religious and social concerns (syu 'un ijtima 'iyyah). 107 In the meantime, the NU activists

also began controlling the management of the P3M, which had previously been managed by the

modernist camp. Supported mainly by the Ford Foundation and the Asia Foundation (and less

visibly USAID and a range of other foreign agencies), most of the Muslim NGOs in the 1990s

working at the grassroots have some personal or ideological affiliation with NU.

In addition to the P3M, there are many other NGOs closely affiliated to the NU

community which are properly categorized into the old generation ofNGO. The foremost is the

Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia (Research and Development

Institute for Human Resources, LAKPESDAM). Dedicated to community-based development,

it is also NU's official documentation center as well as publishing house. Its original mission

was to work for improvement ofthe poorest masses of the NU supporters. 108

Since the fall ofSuharto, the number ofNGOs loosely affiliated to the NU has been

increasing. By and large, they fit into the new type ofNGOs working on specific issues, such as

human rights, minority rights, pluralism and tolerance, gender, and policy advocacy. The

Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (Institute for Islamic and Social Studies, LKiS), while

known as a book publisher of critical Islamic thinking, has become more systematic since its

establishment in 1997 in conducting short course on human rights, gender equality and similar

pesantren-based course and trainings. I 09

The trainings organized by the LKiS lead in tum to the establishment of the Lembaga

Kajian Hak Asasi Manusia (Institute for Human Rights Studies, LKHAM) in Tasikmalaya,

West Java in 1999. Given the 1996 sectarian rioting and the rise ofIslamist movements in this

107 Van Bruinessen and Wajidi, "Syu'un Ijtima'iyyah and the Kyai Rakyat," 2006, p. 205-248. lOS Ramage, "Social Organizations," 1999, p. 209. 109 The Asia Foundation, Islamic Organizations and Development in Indonesia, 2007, p. 2.

181

region, the LKHAM took pains to promote the ideas of tolerant and transformative Islam. It

organizes a number of activities such as public education, relation with non-Muslim groups,

kin d I· ad 110 pesantren networ g, an po ICY vocacy.

Another NGO loosely affiliated to the NU, the Lembaga Advokasi dan Pendidikan

Rakyat (Institute for Public Advocacy and Education, LAP AR), was established Makassar in

1999. Taking a more radical stance toward human rights issues, the Lapar coordinates

initiatives designed to promote reconciliation between victims of the 1965-1966 allegedly

communist massacre killing and Muslim leaders who participated in the violence. In addition to

reconciliation, the Lapar also seeks to change legislations that continue to bar ex-communists

and their children from government services and other state agencies.

Another NGO, the W AHID Institute, was established not only to disseminate

Abdurrahman Wahid's ideas of democracy and tolerance, but also to further his commitment to

minority rights. I I I Established in 2004, The W AHID Institute is committed to the exchange and

dissemination of progressive Muslims thought to promote tolerance and democracy. In

particular, the institute is committed to developing a dialogue between the highest spiritual and

political leaders in the West and the Muslim world. I 12 While Abdurrahman established an NGO

focusing on tolerance and democracy, his wife Sinta Nuriyah has initiated the establishment of

the PUAN AMAL HA YATI, which runs 5 women crisis centers, located in Tasikmalaya and

Indramayu in West Java and Jember, Madura and Malang in East Java. The centers are aimed

to assist traumatized women by providing counseling, legal and medical support and to protect

them from the abuser. In these centers, the NGO uses a religious approach to support the

110 Ali, ''Moderate Islam Movemeot in Contemporary Indonesia," 2007, p. 226. III Interview with the Executive Director of the Wahid Institute Ahmad Suaedy, on January 9, 2008 in

Jakarta. 112 See in the front page of its website in http://www.wahidinstitute.orglengIishlcontentJview/12140/

182

victims and carries out activities to sensitize the stakeholders, including government officials,

law enforcers, community and religious leaders on gender equality and equity.

Another stunning effort within the NU community on women issues has been carried

out by FAHMINA, apesantren-based NGO in Cirebon, West Java. Led by a traditional and

senior Kyai Hussein, Falunina has been conducting a series of thematic discussions on

democracy, gender equity, and human rights from a deeply Islamic perspective, using classical

texts and teachings within thefiqh (Islamic law) as well as the Hadis (Prophet's utterances) and

Quran, to show that these values come from Islam and are not being imported from the West.

On the issue of women's rights, Fahmina approached the topic by raising local problems, such

as the high numbers of domestic violence victims currently handled by the Fahmina-affiliated

Women's Crisis Center Balqis; rape cases; women trafficking; and girl education inpesantren.

By relating women's rights to these local issues, Fahmina effectively rejected the common

claim that "women's rights" is a Western concept. ll3

Whereas the involvement of the NU activists and members in the NGOs' activities

has been enormous since the mid-1990s, the involvement ofMuhammadiyah young generation

in such activities has been increasing only after the fall ofSuharto. Activists ofMuhammadiyah

and similar reformist backgrounds previously tended to get involved in a different type of

endeavors than the typical NGO: discussion groups and other forms of adult education, some

charitable work, and co-operatives. They also tended to be less dependent on sponsoring by

foreign agencies. Since the reform era, however, there was a growing anxiety within

Muhammadiyah young activists that deduced the organization has increasingly been trapped in

a routine of activities, tended to become government-like bureaucracy, and lagged in

1\3 Bush, "Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia," 2005.

183

responding religious discourse and other critical issues such as democracy, tolerance, human

rights, and gender equality. These young generations were mostly former activists of two youth

wings ofMuhammadiyah, the Muhammadiyah Adolescence Association (IRM) and the

Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM); they also espoused religious studies mostly in the

State Islamic University (IAINIUIN) in Jakarta and Jogjakarta during the 1990s.

Some leaders of the IRM, since 1998, started to introduce some programs focusing on

democracy and anti-violence. As a response to growing Islamic radicalism that rejected

democracy as a Western product and being incompatible with Islam, they conducted seminars

and discussions on such issues as the state-religion relation, religion and pluralism, and the like.

In addition, concerned with the outbreak of sectarian violence in some regions, they conducted

massive training in some provinces to raise awareness about harmonious co-existence among

divergent religious adherents. They also brought youths from interfaith backgrounds together to

discuss anti-violence and how Islam and other religions support conflict mitigation. I 14

Another endeavor within the Muhammadiyah to promote democratic civility and

religious pluralism took place early in 2001 when some young Muhammadiyah activists

established the Pusat Studi Agama dan Peradaban (The Center for the Study of Religion and

Civilization, PSAP). The Center has been devoting its activities to build a civil society based on

religious and human values. I IS It conducted extensive research and public discussion on such

issues as religion, democracy, pluralism, and civil society. In order to spread its vision, the

Center also published books and a journal on these issues. The further involvement of young

Muhammadiyah activists in NGO-like-institutions has been organized within the MAARIF

114 Latic£, ''Post-Puritanisme Muhammadiyah," 2003, p. 78-80. I IS See its profile at http://psap.or.idljatidiri.php.

184

INSTITUTE for Culture and Humanity. Established in late 2002, the Institute was aimed at

extending and furthering the ideas and vision of former Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii

Maarif to promote social justice and universal values of humanism. Its activities are focused on

inter-religious dialogue, religious tolerance, and advocacy of public policy. I 16

Another effort within the Muhammadiyah community is promoting civic education

which is organized by the Institute of Research and Educational Development of

Muhammadiyah University ofYogyakarta (LP3 UMY). Its program is focused on the

development of a civic education program based on principles of democracy and human rights.

It produced a book entitled Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Society in 1999 which is

aimed to be the hand book for the course. Over 500 teachers from more than 80 universities

were trained in teaching civic education and nearly 100,000 students enroll in these courses

each year. The program is intended to replace the authoritarian indoctrination required under

the Suharto regime with courses on democracy, pluralism, and citizenship. I 17

Some other young Muhammadiyah activists also sought to partake in this endeavor by

estahlishing the loosely-bound Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals Network (JIMM) in

2003.118 Intended to revita1ize the intellectual tradition within the Muhammadiyah, maintain the

Muhammadiyah's reformist nature, respond to the rise of conservatism within the

Muhammadiyah, and fill the gap of intellectual disparities between the older and younger

generation within the Muhammadiyah, the JIMM takes pains to produce theological discourses

based on three pillars: hermeneutic, critical social sciences, and new social movements. I 19

I" http://www.maarifinstitute.org/ 117 USAID, "summary Assessment of the Islam and Civil Society Program in Indonesia," 2006, p. 2. lIS Burham, "Jaringan Intelektual Muda Mllhamroadiyah (JIMM)," 2006. '" Boy Z.T.F, In Defence o/Pure Islam, 2007, p. 81.

185

Some influential Muslim NGOs take pains not to appear too closely associated with

either NU or Muhammadiyah, such as RAHIMA the Centre for Education and Information on

Islam and Women's Rights Issues, which was estahlished in 2001. As an NGO focusing on the

empowerment of women with an Islamic perspective,120 Rahima organizes massive and

structured training for Muslim girls and young women, and attempts to develop an Islamic

feminist discourse, critically engaging with estahlished views and current teachings that place

women in a subservient position.

The most unabashedly liberal Muslim organization in Indonesia, but not an NGO

proper, is the Liberal Islam Network (JIL), estahlished in 2001 by young liberal Muslim

intellectuals to counter the growing influence and activism of militant and radical Islam in

Indonesia.121 It is trying to win back the initiative in setting the terms of debates on Islam and

society from the Islamists. The network started out as with a mailing list and website, soon

adding a radio program, relayed by local stations in many Indonesian cities, and a syndicated

newspaper colunm. Its core members have deliberately sought a high profile in the media

because they feel that Muslim intellectuals have too long been involved in arcane discussions

and left the production of simple and accessible texts on Islam for large audiences to the

Islamists. More than any other group, the Liberal Islam Network sees the struggle against

narrow and intolerant interpretations ofIslam as its chief mission.

As van Brninessen points out, most of the Muslim NGOs flourishing since the 1990s

have shown themselves very open-minded towards non-Muslim minorities and eager to engage

in inter-religious dialogue and joint activities. Most Muslim NGO activists feel as at ease with

120 See its profile in its website http://www.rabima.or.idlEnglishirabima..PI.Ofile.htm. 121 See Ali, ''The Rise of the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia," 2005.

186

their counterparts of Christian background as with fellow Muslims active in Islamist

associations. The relaxed relations with non-Muslims distinguish their activities sharply from

the Islamist groups. Fostering or avoiding inter-religious relations have become matters of

principle for both camps. 122

Despite these enonnous efforts and their invaluable impacts on Indonesian Muslims

and society as a whole, it would be wrong to assume that the NU and Muhammadiyah natures

are discretely moderate or liberal. As both the NU and Muhammadiyah have increasingly

become giant organizations with millions of followers, it would be incorrect to view them as

monolithic, single entities. Rather, their supporters are highly diverse: some of them are

receptive to the ideas ofIslamic liberalism and even secularism; however, some others are

''highly sympathetic to key aspects of the radical outlook and agenda and at times their rhetoric

can be remarkably similar to that of radical groupS.,,123 Indeed, there is not a single

interpretation ofIslam; there are many factions with varying commitments to democracy and to

pluralism. Although both camps share similar religious resources in Quran and Hadis,

however, there are numerous interpretations and conflicting readings. In this regard, it is

necessary to keep in mind that, as described in preceding Chapters, Indonesia particularly since

the 1970s and 1980s saw a pluralization of society and religious authority alike, characterized

by the emergence of new movements and rival visions of what Muslim politics should be.124

Therefore, profiles the NU and Muhammadiyah "cannot be painted with broad brushes".12s

122 Van Bruinessen, "Post-Suharto Muslim Engagement with Civil Society and Democratization," 2003, p.7-8.

123 Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia," 2004, p. 105. Compare to Liddle, "Year One of the Yudhoyono-Kalla Duumvirate," 2005, p. 2005; Boy Z.T.F, In Defence o/Pure Islam, 2007.

124 Hefiler, "Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization," 2001, p. 509. 125 Khan, "Radical Islam, Liberal Islarn," 2003, p. 421.

187

In Indonesian context, however, many believe that the Islamist faction within the NU

and Muhammadiyah are peripheral to the mainstream, which remains overwhelmingly committed

to tolerance within the Indonesian nation. The Islamist factions are said to have limited influence

in the organizations. In addition, based on aforementioned explanation, civil-democratic Muslims

emerged as the dominant force among these new movements. The ranks of democratic Muslims

were swelled by an influx of young activists disillusioned with the rise ofIslamism and

determined to demonstrate that Islamic values are consistent with democracy, pluralism, and

tolerance. Unlike the unbridgeable division within the Islamist groups in Indonesia, 126 the join

efforts in combating corruption, supporting voter education and election monitoring indicate a

gradual consolidation of Muslim organizations into a cohesive movement; they are determined to

transcend sectarian differences to promote democratic values.

In this regard, the mushrooming ofNGOs within Muslim communities which focus

their activities on issues such as pluralism, tolerance, women rights, and minority rights, can be

a crucial arena for the development of important democratic attributes, such as moderation,

willingness to compromise, and respect for opposing viewpoints. 127 Moreover, their endeavors

to enhance the awareness of gender equality and minority rights are also worth mentioning

since the respect for equality before the law is one of the basic democratic values.

In contrast to the moderate stream, those radical groups share a common character in

a sense that they all adhere to a literal understanding ofIslamic doctrines, which they feel

should be adopted into private and public life. They also bluntly reject democratic political

system as western inventions and incompatible with Islam. Worse still, they also do not

126 leG, "Indonesia Beckgrounder," 2004. 127 Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," 1994.

188

reluctant to carry out violence activities to exert their agendas. For instance, it was frequently

reported that many of the radical Islamic groups assaulted what they perceiVed as un-Islamic

activities, such as attacking nightclubs, threatening alcohol vendors, as weIl as raiding heretical

sects and closing down churches. Clearly, as Greg Barton says, Islam, like other major world

religions, can both inspire democratic reform and be used to justify the authoritarian repression

of basic freedoms. But there can be no doubt that the endeavors of moderate Islamic

movements will help determine the enduring character of Islam's overall contribution to

democratization and religious reform.128

As a matter offact, Indonesian Muslims have an extraordinarily large and weIl-

developed structure of Islamic NGO institutions that can be a resource of critical importance in

the ongoing war of ideas within the Indonesian Muslim, as weIl as in the effort to build

moderate Muslim networks.129 These institutions wiIl help to keep the Muslim communities in

the NU and Muharmnadiyah rooted in their moderate and tolerant values despite the onslaught

of extremist ideology from the Middle East.

F. Foreign Donor and State Capacity

Despite the burgeoning Muslim civil society organizations in Indonesia, particularly

since the fall of Suharto, however, few people, including those Muslims from the radical camp,

react with skepticism or suspicion. Because most activities of those NGOs have been funded by

international funding donors, they are deemed as tools for foreign powers to intervene domestic

political affairs, or worse to ruin the Muslim community from within. In such suspicion, it is

128 Barton, "Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia," 2006, p. 239-240. 129 Rabasa at. a1., Building Moderate Muslim Networks, 2007, p. 109.

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argued that their programs and activities have been detennined by international agencies and

the main priority areas were established before the programs are negotiated. 130

Indeed, the discussion on the democracy promotion or civil society aid has been

prevalent in the domain of democratization since the 1990s.131 What is surprising is their

''number, size, and professionalism, and the speed, deusity, and complexity of intemational

linkage among them.,,132 Despite thousands of programs carried out and a large amount of

money spent in over a hundreds countries in recent years, however, the most basic questions

about democracy promotion or civil society aid-what it accomplishes, where and why it fails,

and how it can be improved-have been remained unresolved, at least until now.

In discussing such critique, again, I begin with a statement that for many Muslim

NGO activists, foreign donors' objectives are far less significant than the benefit of this

available financial assistance for their institutions, the Muslim community, and the whole

nation. Many Muslim NGO activists are aware that there might be some hidden agendas behind

such financial assistance. However, they believe that this aid is nonetheless beneficial, so long

as it provides the Muslim activists with opportunity to work for wider the Muslim community

and the nation as a whole.

Furthermore, I, along with many others, contend that international funding may

succeed in contributing to the process of domestic democratization under four conditions. First,

the primary motive for democratization is and must be internal to Indonesian people.133 In this

seuse, outsiders lend support to a process that is locally driven. Without such intemal motive,

130 Crawford and Hennawan, "Wbose Agenda?" 2002; Crawford, "Partnership or Power?" 2003; Mallaranll,eng and van Tuijl, "Breaking New Ground or Dressing-up in the Emperor's New Clothes?" 2004.

1 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 1999, Ottaway and Carothers, Funding Virrue, 2000, Burnell, Democrag Assistance, 2000.

12 Keck and Sikkink,Activist Beyond Borders, 1998, p. 10. 133 Burnell, Democracy Assistance, 2000, p. 9.

190

the democratization process will fail, or is not fully authentic, or will take root only with great

difficulty. Second, the issues that they promote are both embraced universally around the world

and accepted locally. This means that the issues must be both universal in nature and cultura1ly

specific in this country.134 Without such compatibility, the programs will similarly fail or take a

longer time to be embraced. Third, international donors are likely to contribute to civil society

development when there are sufficient nascent civil society institutions or fledgling non-state

associations. In this respect, foreign donors will occupy the positive terrain by providing

support, incentive, inducement, reward, as well as advice and instruction, training programs,

equipment and other forms of material support to institutional capacity building. Fourth, the

political system of the country where international donor works is determinant to the success of

the democracy promotion. As Sundstrom indicates, it is crucial whether there is support from

the local political structure and elites. 135 Where local elites are supportive of the concept of

autonomous civil society, or at least they do not actively harass it, attitudinal and behavioral

changes brought about by transnational assistance are substantial and thus likely to be long

term. In contrast, in regions where the local political environment is decidedly discouraging

civil society institutions, a typical outcome is superficial.

Tantamount to such suspicion, probably there are some people underestimating the

impact of the aforementioned civil society assistance on overall democratization in Indonesia For

instance, in spite of the anti-corruption campaign carried out by the Muhanunadiyah and NU,

doesn't corruption remain ubiquitous in business institutions, bureaucracy, courts, police, and

other political institutions? In this regard, I argue that democracy assistance or civil society aid is

in fact an insufficient condition for a democratic opening or for building democracy, although it

134 Sundstrom, Funding Civil Society, 2006, p. xv. '" Sundstrom, Funding Civil Society, 2006, p. xv.

191

could come close to being essential in some countries. As Ottaway and Carothers point out, the

status of civil society is only one of many factors that contribute to the success or failure of

democratization. Even in the most effective case, civil society assistance alone could not be

expected to bring about a highly undemocratic system's transformation into a democracy.136

In addition to the available support from international donor funding, it is also

important for us to look at another factor that enables the mushrooming civil society

movements and NGOs in post-Suharto Indonesia, including those within the Muslim

community: the weak state capacity. The weak states, as Migdal defines, are those with low

capabilities "to penetrate society, regulate social relationship, extract resources, and

appropriate or use resources in determined ways" (emphases are original),137 while the strong

states, in contrast, are those with high capability to complete these tasks. The weak states,

Migdal goes on to illustrate, are punctuated by govermnents which "have been unable to

achieve that which had been so widely assumed inevitable.,,138

As described earlier in this chapter, the New Order regime had exhibited during its

first two decades many of the characteristic of a strong state.139 Suharto's military-based regime

had been in power and faced no major organized challenge from society. The regime had

occasionally dealt with many outbreaks of rioting while separatist movements persisted in some

remote provinces. However, the political dominance of the regime was never in question. As a

result, the strong state brought about, among other things, a transformation of the Indonesian

economy. The success of capitalist development under the New Order was unwittingly central

to the beginning of the political liberalization since the second half of the 1980s. Capitalism in

136 Ottaway and Carothers, Funding Virtue, 2000, p. 303. 137 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 1988, p. 5. 138 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 1988, p. 7. 139 See Crouch, "Indonesia's 'Strong' State," 1998.

192

Indonesia, as elsewhere, has given rise to both a new middle class and a new working class

which in tum had played a decisive role in challenging the authoritarian Suharto regime. Since

the late 1980s, therefore, student and labor protests have been more frequent. l40 At the same

time, there was a considerable division within the ruling elites, particularly between Suharto

and certain element within the military, when many of senior military officers loyal to (retired)

General Murdani began criticizing Suharto's rule and his families' business. The response from

the regime was clear: since the late 1980s the New Order regime had introduced a new era of

openness and Suharto began wooing Muslims' support.

In this regard, I argue that the politicallibera1ization since the late 1980s and early in

the I 990s had been a combination of the expansion of the notable middle and working classes,

although they remained small compared to more developed countries; and the increasing

disunity and divisiveness in the authoritarian elite. This is starkly in contrast to Bertrand's view

that political liberalization in Indonesia, similar to one in Brazil, was mainly a result of

divisions internal to the political elite and during the absence of real threats from society.141

Bertrand, in order to support his argument, refers to O'Donnel and Schmitter who point out

that, "[T]here is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence--direct or indirect-of

important divisions within the authoritarian regime.,,142

Many of the instances I describe in the first section in this chapter indicate that there

were two processes that took place in concert: the decline of the authoritarian regime and the

rise of the oppositional forces. As Heryanto points out, the two processes are not simply two

\40 Berger, "Old State and New Empire in Indonesia," 1997, p. 346. \4\ Bertrand, ''False Start, Succession Crisis, and Regime Change," 1996, p. 322. \42 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 1986, p. 20, and pp. 17-18.

193

sides of the same coin, one necessarily resulting from the other. 143 The regime's waning power

was initially more related to internal divisions, and, to a lesser extent, to international pressures.

However, the decline thus provided more room for the consolidation of the existing opposition.

On the other hand, the rise of the oppositional forces was initially a result of the economic and

social transformation during the New Order era. The oppositional forces in turn could exploit

the regime's decline, since people could openly criticize one faction of the ruling elite and be

protected by the opposite faction. l44

Against this background, it was no doubt that since the mid-1990s on the civil society

movements and NGOs have been mushrooming in Indonesia, including those which were

supported by young Mnslim activists from the NU and Muhanunadiyah communities. This

phenomenon has been increasing since the fall ofSuharto in 1998 which was preceded by

severe political and economic crises. To be sure, the complicated crises in Indonesia during

1997-1998 had debilitated the state capacity so that the governments, particularly those before

the SBY administration, had demonstrated neither the political will nor the capacity to

overcome its fundamental challenge that is the survival of the nation in its present

configuration. The nationwide breakdown of law and order, according to Donald Weatherbee,

was the major indicator of the state decay symptoms.145 To be fair, he goes on to say, the

successive post-Suharto governments did not inherit institutional capabilities that could replace

the military as guarantors of political and social stability. Glaringly absent from Indonesia was

a societal commitment to the rule oflaw. With the lifting of both normative and real

constraints, groups and individuals had felt free, and even entitled, to challenge the authority of

143 Heryanto, "Indonesian Middle-Class Opposition in the 1990s," 1996, p. 244-245. 144 Budiman, "Indonesian Politics in the 1990s," 1992, p. 132. 145 Weatherbee, "Indonesia," 2002, p. 25.

194

government-acting outside of the prescribed constitutional and statutory order. AB a result,

secessionist movements as well as sectarian and ethnic conflict had flourished during roughly

eight years after the fall of Suharto. Moreover, the unilateral action by ordinary people to

punish the criminal and the transgression of rules every day by so many people in all types of

situations had compounded the feeling. l46

Since the proliferation of a large number of civil society movements and NGOs has

been made possible by the weak state, there is a question whether there is any possibility that

once the state succeed to revitalize its capacity and become a strong state-as increasingly

shown by the SBY administration, it will return to an authoritarian state, resuming to exercise

its strict control over the society. In this respect, I will argue that a scrupulous analysis on

recent developments in Indonesian politics will lead to an optimistic prospect for the process of

democratization. The military, once deeply entrenched in Indonesian politics and economy

during the New Order, is no longer able to exercise any political influence, as many measures

have been taken to bring it 'back to barrack' .147 The strong civil society movements which

since the mid-1990s have an increasing sense of confidence will also likely oppose any

authoritarian leaning.148 The international conununity, whose economic and political support is

heavily needed by the govermnent, will also discourage any consolidation of a coercive regime.

The proliferation of power centers resulted from political pluralism will also block any

possibility of re-authoritarianization. And finally, elite politicians now seem to prefer seeking

power through elections to in-constitutional and unilateral actions. This is an obviously stark

146 See Wanandi, "Indonesia: A Failed State?" 2002. 147 Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia, 2006; Kingsbury, Power Politics

and the Indonesian Military, 2003. 148 Nyman, Democratising Indonesia, 2006.

195

contrast to the fact that there were three extraordinary leadership changes in Indonesian politics

in four years during 1998-2001.

These disincentive factors to the authoritarian leaning at the same time constitute the

haIlmarks of the process of political normalization, and can be viewed as marking the end of

Indonesia's tumultuous political transition, despite the fact that there are some hurdles need

fixing. 149 During roughly the last five years, there has been an increasing belief that democratic

procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern coIlective life. It seems that

democracy has become "the only game in town" and it is unIikely to break down. And

surprisingly, as discussions of this chapter indicate, the contribution of Muslim civil society

organizations in the process ofliberaIization, transition, and consolidation has been remarkable.

G. Conclusion

This chapter by and large indicates that the contribution of the Muslim civil society

organizations to the process democratization is remarkable. Although their role was only

complementary, since the democratization requires many other conditions, it seems that their

contribution is by no means insignificant. The NU and Muhammadiyah seemed to be

contributive in all stages of democratization. In the liberalization phase, they worked in concert

with other secular and non-Muslim groups to broaden the free public sphere and stay away

from the state's corporatist strategy. In the transition phase, they combined their efforts, along

with other pro-democracy movements, in de-legitimating and unseating Suharto from his post,

supporting the development of political parties, stimulating political participation, and

monitoring the elections. In the consolidation phase, the Muhammadiyah and NU expand their

149 Aspinall, "Elections and the Normalization of Politics in htdonesia," 2005; Aspinall, ''Politics,'' 2005; Freedman, Political Change and Consolidalwn, 2006, Chapter 3 "htdonesia: Democratization but Hurdles Still Remain," p. 83-106.

196

role by campaigning anti-corruption movements, forcing the govermnent to be more

accountable and transparent, disseminating the hazardous effects of corruption, and spreading

the ideas of religious tolerance and gender equality. As the process of democratization in

Indonesia now is dubbed as being consolidated, therefore, it is important to keep in mind the

undeniable role played by those Muslim civil society organizations, namely the NU,

Muhammadiyab, and a large number NGOs loosely affiliated to them.

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This thesis has taken a relatively detailed look at how the new relationship between

the civil society organizations, namely the Mubammadiyah and NU, and the state has been

developing in Indonesia since the fall of the New Order regime in May 1998. It has also

examined in detail the contribution of those civil society organizations in fostering the process

of political change since the imminent liberalization process until the fully-fledged

consolidated democracy. This final chapter is aimed at reviewing the findings in the course of

the study and asses their implications for the scholarly field of comparative politics as well as

the further questions on the state-civil society relation, on the relation between Islam and civil

society, and on the relation between civil society and democratization.

In modem Indonesia, as elsewhere, Islam had been politically engaged in several

different ways: as the base for political parties, as an empty slogan in an ideological rivalry, and

as a source of ethical and moral standards and criticism. With the fall of the New Order regime

in May 1999, however, there were considerable changes both in the political system and in the

relationship between the state and Muslim civil society institutious. Islam in Indonesia is now

finding a new place in society and politics following the demise of the New Order. Overall, the

position of Islam and the range ofits activities are ubiquitous. It provides values of

considerable worth to its followers and to the Indonesian republic as well.

By examining the ways in which Muslim civil society organizations exert their

interests and play their role during roughly the last ten years, the study has revealed a great deal

about their participation in the political system, where they are now an important part of the

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leadership and their interests are now weII represented. However, the problem is that, in reality,

there is a significant degree of overlap between civil society and political society as weII as

between civil society and the state. Indonesia after Suharto provides several examples of this,

one of them being the relationship between political parties and civil society. The establishment

of two political parties, namely the National Awakening Party (PKB) and National Mandate

Party (PAN) soon after the downfall of the New Order regime indicates such overlap since their

mass bases are primarily drawn from the long established Nahdlatu1 Ulama (NU) and

Mubammadiyah constituencies. Indeed, this relationship has always been problematic,

particularly in an empirical sense. Those civil society organizations have often been plunged

into practical political affairs: many Muslim leaders have made use the NU organization and

supporters to defend AbdurraIunan's presidency; the Muhammadiyah had played a decisive

role in Amien's presidential bid; and the direct local head elections have provided more space

for both organizations both in nominating and in supporting candidates.

To a lesser extent, there has also been a blurred relation between those civil society

organizations and the state. While the state decay has been profound since the fall of the

Suharto regime, the consecutive post-Suharto governments have always been incorporating the

representatives of the Muhammadiyah and NU into the cabinet. In so doing, the state seemed

unIikely to co-opt those Muslim civil society organizations, as the authoritarian New Order

regime did. The state instead has sought to extend its political legitimacy among the wider

constituency amidst the political instability during the reform era whose hallmark, among other

things, has been the volatile political coalition within the cabinet and the parliamentary.

The point I wish to make in this study is that boundaries between political parties and

the state on the one hand, and Muslim civil society organizations on the other in post-Suharto

199

Indonesia can be blurred even if we accept the theoretical distinction between civil society and

state, as is connnonly done in most the contemporary democratization literature. Indonesian

politics is not an exception in this respect. The blurred boundaries between political parties,

civil society, and the state appear to be a more prevalent, at least, in the volatile and uncertain

period of transition, where political parties often had to be built from scratch and in atmosphere

of newly-emerging enthusiasm toward the very idea of the political party.

In addition, as what has happened in Indonesia in recent years the study also indicates

that one cannot overlook the contribution of the Muslim public masses to the democratization

process. In Indonesia without the participation of the civil society organizations, including the

NU and Mnhammadiyah, democratization would not have been achieved. Although their role

was ouly supportive, they lent popular weight to the democratic transition and helped deepen

democratization. This is by no means to obscure the siguificance of other domestic and

international actors as well as fissures within the government and the military alike that may

provide an opening for the resurrection of civil society.

Beyond the roles of the NU and Mnharnmadiyah in the political development during

the reform era, this study also shows less visible, yet more fundamental, functions of those

Muslim civil society organizations both before and after the fall of the New Order regime.

These mass-based religious organizations seemed to be consequential in all stages of

democratization. In the liberalization phase, they sought to broaden the free public sphere and

keep away from the state's corporatist strategy. In the transition phase, they combined their

efforts, along with other pro-democracy movements, in de-legitimating and bringing the

authoritarian Suharto regime down, supporting the development of political parties, stimulating

political participation, monitoring the implementation of the democratic elections, and

200

providing alternative political leaders. In the consolidation phase, the Muhammadiyah and NU

expand their foci by forcing the government to be more accountable and transparent,

disseminating the hazardous effects of corruption, and spreading the ideas of religious tolerance

and gender equality.

The empirical results of this thesis by and large show that the strength of these

Muslim civil society organizations before the transition and post-transition not only deepened

freedom and civil liberties, as discovered by Karatnycky and Ackerman, 1 but also, as Tusalem

points out, help enhancing the state's capacity to uphold the rule of law, control the prevalence

of corruption, and promote governmental effectiveness, regulatory quality, voice and

accountability, and political stability.2

Unfortunately, as the involvement of Muslim civil society organizations in practical

politics has been very much in vogue during the last ten years, bitter conflict both between and

within the NU and Muhammadiyah also emerge severely. It should be noted that the tension

between both organizations has long been enduring, but mostly due to minor theological

differences. In this regard, we can conclude that because the newly-forged cordiality between

the traditionalists and modernists in the months leading up to the election of President Wahid

was not genuine, the ensuing conflict between their leaders is more acute. Moreover, it should

also be noted that internal division is not new in those organizations, since their leaderships

have never been entirely united in their political outlooks. Those organizations are always

comprised many leaders and activists with greatly differing backgrounds and widely divergent

interests. What is new in this period is that the scale and intensity of those internal conflicts

seem to be no longer bridgeable.

I Karatnycky and Ackerman, ''How Freedom is Won?" 2005. 2 Tusa1em, "A Boon or Bane?" 2007.

201

In this sense, I cannot help to reiterate what former Mubammadiyah chairman, Ahmad

Syafii Maarif, once said-which I put in the forefront of this thesis-that politics tends to break

up and divide while dakwah tends to invite and unite. They should be aware that their

involvements in practical politics should come in second after devoting sufficient attention to

their religious and social functions. Unless they realize that the power struggle has diverted too

much attention from their real tasks of spiritual guidance and education of the Muslim

community, those organizations and their leaders will be highly likely dragged into severe

divisions which in turn undermine their moral authority within larger society.

In addition, this study also reveals the other fact that, despite bitter conflict among

their political leaders, it is far easier for both organizations to forge a genuine alliance in

carrying out long term and society-oriented agendas. These concerted efforts to support the

democratization process are not only capable of reducing political conflict which took place

several years earlier during the Wahid presidency, but also help overcoming the traditional

rivalry between both organizations.

It is widely believed that the scholarly debate about the compatibility between Islam

and democracy has been perhaps the most passionate at the theoretical level-and probably the

least important. .AI; discussion continued, two broadly opposed positions emerged, one

pessimistic, the other cautiously optimistic. In the former camp, some scholars examine the

Koran, Islamic law and tradition to textually demonstrate that Islam is not only incompatible

with democracy but much more an obstacle to democratization than a facilitator of democratic

reform. Ironically, their views are bolstered by radical Islamists who similarly argue the

incompatibility of these two concepts. They, noting that very few Muslim-majority countries

have democratic governments and the rise of Islamic radicalism is a product of despair and

202

anger caused largely by domestic political oppression, have held that Islam may be

incompatible with open government.3

Others, however, argue that Islam is not necessarily antithetical to democratization.4

Recent development in Indonesia (along with Turkey and, to some extent, Iran) offers an even

more striking indication of Muslim interest in democracy and civic pluralism. A meticulous

examination on what the Muhammadiyah and NU have been doing in the course of the last ten

years for society and politics alike provides an important instance on the compatibility of Islam

on the one hand and civil society and democracy on the other.

This finding palpably challenges the prevailing stereotypes that political Islam, as

Gellner pointed out, has been "an inveterate enemy of civil pluralism and liberty," and that

Islam "fails to sanction the existence of countervailing associatious,',5 and underscore that there

are several different, even rival, varieties of political imagination within the Indonesian Islamic

tradition. This instance of compatibility between Islam and civil society in the Indonesian

context, in tandem with one in Turkey, could become the exception to a wider picture of civil

society in the Muslim world where civic activism failed to press the authoritarian governments

for meaningful reforms and bring about any Arab spring of democracy,6 despite the

mushrooming of civil society movements.7

Equally important, the case of both institutious provides an important instance on how

Muslim civil society organizations contribute to the process of democratization, not simply

3 See Karatnycky, "Muslim Countries," 2002; Waterlmry, "Democracy without Democrats?" 1994; Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," 2002; Lakoff, ''The Reality of Muslim ExceptionaIism," 2004;

4 Stepan with Robertson, "An 'Arab' more than 'Muslim' Electoral Gap," 2003; Stepan with Robertson, "Arab, not Muslim, Exceptiona1ism," 2004; Nasr, "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy'," 2005; Ibrabim, "Universal Values and Muslim Democracy," 2006;

5 Emest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, 1994, p. 28. • See Yom, "Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World," 2005. 7 Kubba, ''The Awakening of Civil Society," 2000; Ehtesbami, "Islam, Muslim Politics, and Democracy,"

2004.

203

because of their charismatic leaderships, but also due to their strategic locations and practical

activism in htdonesian civil society. Finally, and most importantly, this study provides an

obvious example on how religious organizations play their roles in a transition from

authoritarian into a more democratic political system without turning the system into a

theocratic state. ht so doing, they do not relinquish their nature as social-religious orgauizations

whose foci are in religious, educational, and social activities. Rather, as this thesis indicates,

they transform their spiritual and ethical vigor into political, social, and intellectual activism

capable of shaking the authoritarian Suharto regime and--during the post-Suharto era­

deepening the process of political change into a more mature and democratic political system.

For roughly the past ten years, most news reports from htdonesia have featured

terrorist attacks, regional insurgencies, and human rights violations. They portray a government

that is dealing ineffectively with these problems and an economy that is falling further behind

its Asian neighbors. Are there grounds for hope in htdonesia? Do we, htdonesians, possess

sufficient cultural resources and social capital to foster the democratization process? Should we

be pessimistic or optimistic about our foreseeable future? Or more specifically, should we be

concerned about the prospect of democracy in htdonesia?

ht my opinion, we do have good grounds for being cautiously optimistic. htdonesia

appears to have all ingredients both to slide into a failed state and for the emergence of virulent

religious fundamentalism. However, htdonesia is not Algeria or Afghauistan, by any measure,

nor even Pakistan. Developments beneath the surface lead to a more hopeful view: htdonesia

has been undergoing a profound political transition. Over the past ten years, its democratic

system has been overhauled quietly but brilliantly, and the foundations for a better system of

204

governance have been put in place. The gove=ent that takes office on 2004 is the people's

choice more than ever before.

No less remarkable, one of the major factors in determining Indonesia's democratic

prospect is Islam. This study shows that Islam has been playing a central role not only in post­

Suharto period, but also in the entire modem Indonesian history. Less widely noted but by no

means no less significant, the long tradition of civic pluralism within Indonesian, particularly

the division of Islam into nominal Muslims of abangan, traditionalist Islam, and modernist

Islam, makes the point that Muslim society in Indonesia differs significantly from those ones in

the Arab world. Indonesia thus offers an excellent example of a plural and contested Muslim

politics. Each group covers a diversity of opinion, political outlook, and religious convictions,

although not mutually exclusive.

Unfortunately, potential danger lies also behind this pluralism. Because each stream

represents very different segments of the Indonesian popUlation - from a sociological,

theological, socio-economic, and political perspective, excessive conflict among them will lead

into a severe co=unal violence. This pluralism will tend to generate a wide range of interests

that exacerbate the principal polarities under two conditions: they are involved in political

conflicts and the state manipulate those conflicts or do not have sufficient capacity to contain

those conflicts. To put it differently, there is a perennial rivalry among those ideological

streams, but political affairs and state manipulation will transform that division into excessive

communal violence. The bloody massacre of communist members in the mid 1 960s involved a

conflict between nominal Muslim of abangan and devout Muslims of santri, while the state

seemed to manipulate it. The series of attacks to many ofMuhammadiyah properties launched

by Wahid supporters during his presidency was a resonance of elite conflict between the PKB

205

and its political rivals, while state also sought to manipulate it and, at the same time, its

capacity was severely paralyzed by a protracted crisis.

Indonesia's democratic transition, known as Refonnasi, began in 1998. Reformasi

may have initially been more of an elite game, but its objectives are to find a viable path to a

just and prosperous society. This study reveals that the results of the 1999 and 2004 elections

showed just how profound an effect Reformasi has had on Indonesia's political system. The

participation of Muslim civil society organizations in the democratization process also reflects

the fact that Reformasi is no longer an elite game. To put it differently, the democratic prospect

in Indonesia will not simply be determined by the state and elite political leaders. The

concerted efforts carried out by those Muslim civil society organizations will also greatly

determine the future of Indonesian society as a whole. While this thesis give emphasis on

Muslim civil society organizations, it calls for further analytical studies with particular

attention to the contribution of Islamic political parties in the democratization process, the role

of Muslim civil society organizations in a decentralized Indonesia, and the relation between

state and Islamic radical groups.

Indonesia has not yet arrived at its hoped-for destination in its democratic transition.

Military, rule oflaw, corruption, economic crisis are among some remaining problems need to

be overcome. Amid all of the miseries and disillusionment of the post-Suharto years, ordinary

Indonesians have shown uncommon good sense and remarkable grace, even when their leaders

have shown neither. The transition to democracy has frequently been clogged up and

frustratingly slow, but by no means stagoant.

206

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Interview:

Interview with Adung Abdurrahman on December 27, 2007 in Jakarta. Interview with Ahmad Suaedy on January 9,2008 in Jakarta Interview with Ahmad Syafii Maarif on December 24, 2007 in Jogjakarta. Interview with Gunawan Hidayat on December 27,2007 in Jakarta. Interview with Hasyim Muzadi on January 10, 2008 in Jakarta Interview with Masdar F. Mas'udi on December 27,2007 in Jakarta. Interview with M. Din Syamsuddin on January 9,2008 in Jakarta Interview with Muhammad AS. Hikam on January 10, 2008 in Jakarta Interview with Rizal Sukma on December 27, 2007 in Jakarta. Interview with Saifu1 Bahri Ansori on December 27,2007 in Jakarta.

222

BIOGRAPIDCAL SKETCH

PRAMONO UBAID TAN1HOWI, he was born on January 17th, 1975, in an NU

family in Central Java, Indonesia. He finished his B.A. in Islamic studies at the State

Institute for Islamic Studies (lAIN1UIN) Jakarta.

During his undergraduate study he was actively involved in the Muhammadiyah

Student Association (JMM). Because Reformasi occurred when he was the chairman of the

IMM provincial leadership of Jakarta (1997-1999), he used to lead junior students in student

movement It was not surprising since students of his generation mllied in street to oppose

Suharto's authoritarianism and clamor for political reform.

From 2000 on, he has published articles widely in the national newspapers,

journals, and books. His publications during these years reflected the diverse array of his

field interests that are Muslim politics, democmtisation, and pluralism. Among his

pUblications are Muslims and Tolerance: Non-Muslim Minorities under Sharia in

Indonesia, (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 2008) and Kebangkitan Politik Kaum Santri: Islam

dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia 1990-2000, (Jakarta: PSAP Press, 2005). He has also edited

three other books: Begawan Muhammadiyah, (Jakarta: PSAP Press, 2005); Membasmi

Kanker Korupsi, (Jakarta: PSAP Press, 2004); and Muhammadiyah Digugat: Reposisi di

Tengah Indonesia yang Berubah", (Jakarta: Kompas, 2000).

Before studying political science at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, he served

as the Executive Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Civilization (2001-

2006). He also taught at the Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta (1999-2001). Then, in

2002-2004 he also served as a political advisor for Deputy Chairman of Indonesian

Parliament (DPR). He was also appointed as the Program Manager of the Muhammadiyah

Institute for Good Governance Program (2003-2006).