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University of Groningen
The social impacts of large projects on Indigenous PeoplesHanna de Almeida Oliveira, Philippe
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Citation for published version (APA):Hanna de Almeida Oliveira, P. (2016). The social impacts of large projects on Indigenous Peoples:Procedures, processes and protests. University of Groningen.
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2
CHAPTER 2Humanrights,Indigenouspeoples and the concept
ofFree,PriorandInformedConsent
Philippe Hanna
FrankVanclay
24
Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of free, prior and informed consent
ABSTRACT
Thehumanrighttoself-determinationisenactedinvariousinternationaltreatiesandconventions.
In order to facilitate self-determination, it is necessary to provide Indigenous peoples with
opportunities to participate in decision-making and project development. The obligation for
governments and companies to engage impacted communities is recognized in international
law, especially with the principle of ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’, which is outlined
in the United NationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoplesandintheInternational
LabourOrganizationConvention169.Theencounterbetweenhumanrights,Indigenouspeoples
andminingandotherextractiveindustriesisdiscussed,especiallyasitishasplayedoutinBrazil.
Werecommendthatcompaniesshouldfullyendorseandrespecttheseinternationallyrecognized
human rights, including self-determination, even where not required by national or local
legislation. We also discuss the relationship between Free, Prior and Informed Consent and
ImpactsandBenefitsAgreements.
KEYWORDS
Social impact assessment; Right to have rights; Social licence to operate; Corporate social
responsibility;Human rightsimpactassessment
25
2
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Thispaperdiscussesvariouscontemporary issues surroundinghumanrights, Indigenouspeoples
andtheirrelationshipwiththeextractiveindustries,focusingontheBraziliancontext.Inparticular,
theconceptof‘Free,Prior andInformedConsent’(FPIC)isdetailed.AmajordemandofIndigenous
peoplesfacingdevelopmentprojectslikelytoimpacttheirlivelihoods(e.g.mines, dams)istobeable
tohaveasayaboutwhetherandhow theprojectshouldproceed.Ineffect,thisdemandhasbeen
providedforwiththeprovisionofFPIC.However,thepracticalimplementationofFPICisoftenvery
far short of theideal.
FPIC “recognizes indigenouspeoples’ inherent and prior rights to their lands and resources and
respectstheirlegitimateauthoritytorequirethatthirdpartiesenterintoanequalandrespectful
relationshipwiththembasedon theprincipleof informedconsent.Procedurally, free,prior and
informed consent requires processes that allow and supportmeaningful choices by indigenous
peoplesabout theirdevelopmentpath”(UNSub-CommissiononthePromotionandProtectionof
HumanRights2004,p.5). FPICis intrinsicallyconnectedtotheideaofself-determination,which
basicallyarguesthat‘humanbeings, individuallyandasgroups,areequallyentitledtobein control
oftheirowndestinies,andtolivewithingoverning institutionalordersthataredevisedaccordingly’
(Anaya 2009,p.187).As stated in theCharterof theUnited Nations (UnitedNations1945)and
in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNGeneral
Assembly1966),self-determinationistobeprovidedto‘allpeoples’.
The history of the relationship between the human rights discourse and Indigenous peoples is
described, includingadiscussionoftheanthropologicalcontribution tothistopic,particularlyinthe
contextofhowithasplayedoutinBrazil.Inthefirstsectionofthispaper,theprocessofrecognizing
humanrights for Indigenous peoplesascollectiverights isdescribed.Theactivitiesof companies
anddevelopmentagenciesinrelationtothis issuearepresentedinthesecondsection.Inthethird
section,theconceptofFPICanditsoriginsaredescribed. Recommendationsforcompanieswishing
torespecthumanrights,particularlytowardsIndigenouspeoples, areprovidedintheconclusion.
2.2. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ STRUGGLE FOR THE ‘RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS’
‘Human rights are commonly understood as inalienable fundamentalrightstowhichaperson
isinherentlyentitled simplybecausesheorhe isahumanbeing’ (Sepúlvedaetal.2004,p.3).
Theserights,whichareconsideredtobe indivisible (apply equally to everyone) and inalienable
(always apply and cannot be voided or extinguished), include the right to life, property,
health, education, free association,amongothers (Sepúlvedaetal.2004).Human rights are
intendedtobeuniversal,‘withoutdistinctionof any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
26
Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of free, prior and informed consent
Table 2.1. | SelectionofthekeyinternationalagreementsthataddressIndigenousrights
Charter of the United Nations (1945)–Article1,
Clause2articulates‘theprincipleofequalrights
andself-determinationofpeoples’,whichis
stilloneofthemajordemandsofIndigenous
peoples(UnitedNations1945).
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948)
–Thisdeclarationaddressesseveraluniversal
rights,whichalsoapplytoIndigenouspeoples,
suchastherighttolife,property,health,edu-
cationandfreeassociation,amongothers(UN
GeneralAssembly1948a).
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (1948) –Article
2definesgenocideas‘actscommittedwith
intenttodestroy,inwholeorinpart,anational,
ethnical,racialorreligiousgroup’.Indigenous
peopleshistoricallywereandstillaretargets
ofgenocide,perpetratedindifferentwaysby
variousnationalgovernmentsandracistgroups
(UNGeneralAssembly1948b).
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (1965) –Thisconvention
promotestheeliminationofracialdiscrimina-
tionagainstethnicgroups,includingIndigenous
peoples(UNGeneralAssembly1965).
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1966, entered into force in 1976)
– Article1ofthisUNcovenantstatesthat‘all
peopleshavetherighttoself-determination’,and
thusto‘freelydeterminetheirpoliticalstatusand
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development’(UNGeneralAssembly1966).
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention – Inter-
national Labour Organization C169 (1989) – This
conventionisarevisionofthe1957Indigenous
andTribalPopulationsConvention(ILOC107).
AlthoughC169hasbeenratifiedbyonly20
countriestodate,itisthemostimportant,legally
bindinginternationaldocumentaboutIndige-
nousrights.Itpromotesrightsindifferentareas
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’
(UNGeneralAssembly 1948a,Article2).However,Indigenouspeoplesstillexperienceunequal
accesstohumanrightsandsystematicethnicdiscrimination(Cobo1986;Stavenhagen2009;ILO
2012).Theyfacehigherlevelsofinfantmortalityandfareworseonmosthealthindicatorswhen
compared with non-Indigenous groups (Stavenhagen 2003; Montenegro & Stephens 2006;
Gracey&King2009),asituationoften describedasthe‘fourthworld’(Dyck1985;Wright1988;
Watkins 2005). Anaya (2004) classifies it as a dual discrimination – there is denial of access
to land,basic resourcesandservices,leadingtodifficultiesinsustainingtraditional ways of life;
in addition, there is systematic discrimination that arises especiallywhen Indigenous peoples
attempttoparticipateinthedominantsociety.
TheIndigenouspeoples’struggletoensurerespectfortheirhumanrightsstartedwiththedemand
forthe‘righttohaverights’(Stavenhagen2003,linkingtoArendt1951),and has culminated in
thedrafting andendorsementofseveralinternationalconventionsandagreementsthatwere
conceived to guarantee the access of Indigenouspeoplestohumanrights.Alistofthevarious
international documentsthatdirectlyorindirectlyaddresstherightsof Indigenouspeoplesis
providedinTable2.1.
27
2
(e.g.education,healthandland).Itrequiresgov-
ernmentstoconsultIndigenouspeoplesregard-
inganyadministrativeorlegislativemeasures
thataffectthemdirectly,andtoguaranteethat
Indigenouspeoplescanparticipateinthepro-
cessofdecision-making(ILO1989,Article6).
World Bank Operational Directive 4.20 (1991)
–ThisOperationalDirectiveregulateshow
borrowersfromtheWorldBankshouldproceed
whentheirprojectsaffectIndigenouspeoples
(WorldBank1991).
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging
to National or Ethnic Religious and Linguistic
Minorities (1992) – Themainprovisionofthis
UNDeclarationisstatedinArticle4,which
require states to take measures to ensure that
‘minoritiesmayexercisefullyandeffectively
theirhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms
withoutanydiscriminationandinfullequality
beforethelaw’(UNGeneralAssembly1992a).
Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development (1992) – ThisDeclarationisa
productoftheUnitedNationsConference
onEnvironmentandDevelopment(orEarth
Summit)heldinRiodeJaneiroin1992.
Principle22establishesthecrucialrole
ofIndigenouspeoplesinenvironmental
managementbecauseoftheirtraditional
knowledge(UNGeneralAssembly1992b).
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) –
LiketheRioDeclaration,thisConventionwas
signedattheEarthSummit.Itrecognizes
theroleofIndigenouspeoplesinpromoting
biodiversitythroughtheirtraditional
knowledge(UNEP1992).
Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action (1993) –Article1.20outlinedsome
basicprinciples,whileArticle1.28called
fortheestablishmentofaWorkingGroup
toprepareaDeclarationontheRightsof
IndigenousPeoples(whichwasnotfinalized
until2007).Article1.2statesthat‘TheWorld
ConferenceonHumanRightsconsidersthe
denialoftherightofself-determinationasa
violationofhumanrightsandunderlinesthe
importanceoftheeffectiverealizationofthis
right’(UNGeneralAssembly1993).
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural
Diversity (2001) – ‘The defence of cultural
diversityisanethicalimperative,inseparable
fromrespectforhumandignity.Itimplies
acommitmenttohumanrightsand
fundamentalfreedoms,inparticularthe
rightsofpersonsbelongingtominoritiesand
thoseofindigenouspeoples’(UNESCO2001,
Article4).
Equator Principles (2003) – Avoluntarysetof
standardsdevelopedbyseveralmajorbanks
forassessingandmanagingrisksrelatedto
developmentprojects.Indigenouspeoples
areconsideredtobeastakeholderneeding
tobefullyconsidered(EquatorPrinciples
Association2003).
World Bank Operational Policy (OP) and Bank
Procedure (BP) 4.10 (2005) –TheOP/BP4.10
replacesOD4.20forinvestmentprojects
financedbytheWorldBankthataffect
Indigenouspeoples(WorldBank2005).
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
Performance Standard 7 (2006, updated in
2012) – IFCPerformanceStandards(PS)are
similartoWorldBanksafeguardpolicies,
butareadaptedtobeapplicabletoIFC
borrowers.PS7isrelatedtoIndigenous
peoplesandarticulatesspecificprocedures
forprojectsthataffectthem(IFC2006,
2012).
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP) (2007) – This
Declarationaddressesalargerangeof
rightsofIndigenouspeoples.Itaffirmsthat
governmentsshouldobtain‘free,priorand
informedconsent’fromIndigenouspeoples
aboutanyprojectthatmayaffecttheir
livelihoods(UNGeneralAssembly2007a,
Articles10,19,29and32).
28
Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of free, prior and informed consent
It is important to clarify that these documents do not provide Indigenous peoples with any
‘extra’humanrightsthatarenotalsoaccordedtonon-Indigenouspersons;neverthelessthese
documents are intended to guarantee that Indigenous peoples have equal access to human
rights(Anaya2009).However,aspresentlyunderstoodinalegalsense,FPICiscurrentlyprovided
exclusively for Indigenousandother ‘traditionalpeoples’, suchas thedescendantsofescaped
slaves(quilombolasinBrazil)andtribalpeoplesinAfrica,althoughthereisapushtowidenthe
applicationofFPIC(Goodland2004;Hilletal.2010;Vanclay&Esteves2011).FPICisnota‘right’
perse,butamechanismtoensureprogresstowardstherightofself-determinationforIndigenous
Peoples(Anaya2009).EventhoughFPICitselfmaynotbearight,Indigenouspeoplesdohavethe
righttobeconsultedonissuesthataffecttheirlives,whichwewillrefertoastherighttoFPIC.
The process of establishing this international body of law (Table 2.1.) has been controversial
from thebeginning.Anthropologists in general – as reflected in anAmericanAnthropological
Association (AAA) statement of 1947 (AAA, The Executive Board 1947) –were critical of the
conceptofuniversalhumanrights,whichtheyconsideredtobeaWesternethnocentricconcept
(Messer1993;Preis 1996;Riles2006). Themajor argumentsof theAAA statementwere that
rights are culturally relative and thatWestern notions of progress should not be imposed on
othercultures.Anotherreasonthat ledtoanthropologistsboycottingthe internationalhuman
rightsagendawasthepredominantlylegalapproachthatprevailed,alliedtoanexclusivefocuson
individualsratherthancollectivegroups.However,withtheIndigenousstruggleforrightsinthe
1980s,anthropologistswereaddressinghumanrightsthroughasocioculturalandpoliticalrather
thanlegalframework(Messer1993).Theyadvocatedforcollectiverights.Thisledtoachangein
theperspectiveofbothsides,astheinternationaldiscourseonhumanrightshasnowaccepted
theideaofcollectiverightsandhasevenaccepted‘someformofweakculturalrelativism;thatis,
onafundamentaluniversalityofbasichumanrights,temperedbyarecognitionofthepossible
needforlimitedculturalvariations.Basichumanrightsare,touseanappropriatelyparadoxical
phrase,relativelyuniversal’(Donelly1984,p.419).
The anthropological perspective has also broadened, particularly around the formulations of
socialtransformationandtheanthropologyofdevelopment(Messer1993).Inits1999Statement
about Human Rights, the AAA embraced the human rights discourse; however, it pointed
to theneed foradvocating for collectiveandcultural rightsand for toleranceacrossdifferent
cultures(Messer1993;AAA1999;Engle2001;Riles2006).Wright(1988)discussedthedilemmas
anthropologyfounditselfinduringthosedecades,asthenativepeoplesitstudiedwerefacinga
rangeofproblems,asdescribedabove,andoftentheirverysurvivalwasinquestion.Although
Indigenouspeoplesplayedamajor role themselves (Miranda2010),Wright identifiedways in
whichanthropologistswereengagedinadvocacyforIndigenouspeoples.Onewaywasthrough
influence international organizations and international law; and some positive results have
occurred,suchastheapprovaloftheUNDRIPbyalargenumberofcountries,somethingthatcan
beconsideredtobeamajorvictoryforIndigenouspeoples,evenifitwasalongtimecoming.
29
2
The debate around collective and cultural rights was very important in the lead-up to and
thedraftingof theUNDRIP,astheserightsclashedwiththeWesternconceptofindividualrights
(Clinton1990;Anaya2004).AsexplainedbyWiessner(2011,p.124):
one of the major objections to the novel rights of indigenouspeopleshasbeen
thattheyarelargelyrightsofcollectivities, not individuals. Thus, they appear to
situneasilywith the traditional human rights regime,whichintheeyesofmanyis
constructedaroundtheinterestsandconcernsofindividualhumanbeings.
The human right to self-determination is provided for in several international instruments.
Many countries were reluctant to recognize the collective right of Indigenous peoples to
self-determinationbecausetheyfeared itcould threaten state sovereignty and lead to an
escalation in claims for independence by Indigenous peoples (Engle 2011). A complicating
factor is that there is a difference betweeninternalandexternalself-determination.External
self-determination refers to the aspiration of an ethnicgrouptoclaimstatehood,sovereignty
or secession, while internal self-determination provides some level of autonomy to
operate within the existing state (Sterio 2009). The UNDRIP provides only for internal self-
determination, which is comprehended by Engle (2011,p.148)asa‘collectivehumanrights
demandratherthanaclaimforstatehood’.
Another important argument towards collectivehuman rights is that an individual cannot
exercise their culturealone(Anaya2004).Thisleadsustothequestion ofculturalrights,which
alsobecameanimportantclaimandoneofthemajorstrategiesofIndigenousrightsadvocates
sincethe1990s(Engle2011).Culturalrights,that is, the rightof a particular ethnicgroupto
maintain its ownculture,arebroad.Forexample,forIndigenouspeoples,access to landand
natural resources are fundamental to exerciseandreproducetheirculture.Thus,thehuman
right toculturenecessarily includesrightstolandandits resources(Wiessner2011).
The UNDRIP does not establish any new rights for Indigenouspeoplesthatarenotalready
providedbyotherinternational human rights instruments; however, it synthesizeshowthese
rightsneed tobeappliedas amapof action for human rights policies towards Indigenous
peoples (Stavenhagen 2009). Several authors (e.g. Royo 2009;Stavenhagen2009;Wiessner
2011),aswellmostof the states voting in favour of the UNDRIP, clearly comprehend the
Declaration as a non-binding legal instrument, or ‘soft-law’, which does not require
ratification and for which non-compliance by its signatories would not result in any
sanctions. Burger (2009) argued that theDeclarationbroughtno substantial change towhat
already existed, unless states would make changes to their own legislation and, above all,
have the political will to do so. However, various authors (e.g. Anaya &Williams 2001;
Royo2009;Stavenhagen2009) expect that,withtime, full compliancewith theUNDRIP and
relatedinstrumentsislikelyasitwillbecomepartof customary international law(cf. Bradley
& Goldsmith1997),andthusbefullyapplied.
30
Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of free, prior and informed consent
2.3. THE ROLE OF CORPORATIONS
Most transnational corporations in the extractives sector have adopted Corporate Social
Responsibility standards for regulating their activities, sometimes including specific policies
relatingtohumanrightsand/orIndigenouspeoples.DespitetheUNDRIPandCorporateSocial
Responsibilitystandards,humanrightsviolationstowards Indigenous peoples keep occurring,
and the direct and indirectconsequencesof resourcesextractionbycompaniesinornearby
Indigenouslandsremainoneofthemajorproblems that Indigenous peoples continue to face
(Stavenhagen2003;ILO2012;Verdum2012).
Professor JohnRuggie, theSpecialRepresentativeof the UN Secretary-General on Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises between 2005 and
2011,determined that companies should respect internationally recognized human rights,
even if it was not required by host governments. In the GuidingPrinciples,Ruggie (2011)
specified theminimum standards that companies should follow,specifically those expressed
in the InternationalBill ofHumanRights and theprinciplesconcerningfundamentalrightsset
outinthe International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
RightsatWork.The right to self determination is thus included in the minimum standards.
The lack of regulation or enforcement in national legislation to ensure that transnational
companies comply with these standards is what Ruggie called a ‘governance gap’ (B&HRI
2010), which provides opportunities for companies to perform ‘wrongful acts’withoutany
legalconsequences.Asimilarphenomenonis described by Stavenhagen (2009, p. 367) as
the ‘implementationgapbetween lawsandpractical reality’. Thissituationcanbeworsened
inhybridstate–corporateenterpriseswhereconfluencesofinterestleadtoconflictsofinterest
androleconfusion,ashighlightedbyMiranda (2007,p.139):
Arguably,themostsignificantviolationsofindigenouspeoples’landrightsoccurinthe
contextofahybridstate– corporateenterprise,wherethroughacollaborativelegal
arrangement,astateeffectivelydelegatesmanyof itshumanrightsresponsibilities
towardindigenouspeoplestoajointcorporateactor.
Thegovernancegapisthat,inthesecircumstances,thestatefailsinitsdutytoprotect,partlybecause
there frequently is nomechanism to verify compliancewith human rights responsibilities. Also,
thereisnoentityorlegalinstrumentattheinternationalleveltoenforcecompaniestocomply.As
mentionedearlier,theUNDRIPisnotlegallybinding.Manyauthorshaveexposedavastnumberof
caseswhereIndigenousrightsarethreatenedbyindustryactivities(e.g.Colchester2010;Haalboom
2012;Coumans2012).Miranda(2007)warnsoftheneedtocreateaccountabilitymechanismsto
ensurethatcompaniesrespecttheinternationallyrecognizedrightsofIndigenouspeoples.
A solution that has been proposed to address and prevent human rights violations in the
development of large projects is to conduct a human rights impact assessment (HRIA)
prior to project implementation. MacNaughton and Hunt (2011, p. 362) define HRIA as ‘a
process ofpredicting thepotential consequencesof aproposedpolicy,programorprojecton
31
2
theenjoymentofhumanrights’.Maassaranietal.(2007)seethepotentialofHRIAtocontribute
totheprogressiverealizationofhumanrights,ifitisintegratedintotheearlystagesofcompany
decision-makingprocesses.TheUNGlobalCompact(2011)createdaGuidanceToolforcompanies,
basedonRuggie’sGuidingPrinciples(Ruggie2011).Thefirststepoftheirapproachistoidentify
potentialviolationsofhumanrightsthroughoutthecompanyproductionchain,includingtaking
intoaccountindirectviolations,suchasfromsuppliersorcontractors.Thiscanbeachievedusing
thetechniquestypicallyusedinHRIAandsocialimpactassessment(SIA)(Esteves&Vanclay2009;
Estevesetal.2012).Afterassessingtheimpacts,theGlobalCompactGuidanceToolemphasizes
theneedtoinvolvethetopmanagementofthecompanyinordertohavearealcommitmentto
respectinghumanrights. Inadditiontomanagementsupport,training isneededforemployees
andcontractors.Grievancemechanismsforaffectedcommunitiesandperformanceindicatorsare
necessarytomonitorifhumanrightsarebeingrespected,andtocheckwhetherimprovements
arebeingmade(B&HRI2010).ThisapproachiswellalignedwithMesser’s(1993)proposal,where
anthropologistswereseenashavinga role inpreventing, rather thansimply reporting,human
rightsabusesincontextsofinter-ethnicconflict.
HumanrightsviolationstowardsIndigenouspeoplesinBraziloftenoccur in thedevelopmentof
largeprojects,particularlyminesanddamssponsoredbyBrazilianstate–corporateenterprises.
These situations canbe characterizedascontextsofinter-ethnicconflict,oraformof ‘internal
colonialism’(CardosodeOliveira1978).Thisarises partly because of the perception ofmany
LatinAmericanelitesthatIndigenousculturesare‘backwards’,andthelackofrespecttheyhave
forIndigenouspeoples, often believing that greater attention to Indigenous peoples’rights
wouldslowdownthedevelopmentofthenation.Thiscontextofclassstruggleor‘inter-ethnic
friction’ (Cardoso de Oliveira 1978) has led to several conflicts, including deaths, violence
and protracted legal battles (Coelho dos Santos 1981; Miranda 2007; Jampolsky 2012).
The ‘national interest’ is often advocated as a reason to ‘legitimately’ violate Indigenous
rights, especially in largedevelopmentprojects. This reasonwasevenstated inarecentand
controversial government act, Ordinance 303 (Portaria 303 da AGU), which was enacted on
16 July2012andstates: ‘the enjoymentof the richesof thesoil, riversand lakes existing in
indigenous lands (art. 231, §2 of the Constitution) can be relativizedwhenever, as in art.
231, 68, of the Constitution, there is relevant public interest of the Union, in the form of
a supplementary law’ (Brasil 2012,Article 1.1). Followingprotests, thisOrdinancehas been
suspended,butnotrevoked(Mongabay2012).
Another example,which has also been the subject of muchcontroversy, is theplannedBelo
Monte dam in the State of Para,Brazil. Ifbuilt,BeloMontewouldbe thethird largest dam in
theworld, would displace between20,000and40,000people,andwouldimpact,directlyor
indirectly, on some 10 different Indigenous groups (Jampolsky 2012). The major argument
against the construction of the BeloMonte dam (and other large projects) is the lack of
genuine commitment to the principle of FPIC by the developers, and consequently a denial
oftherighttoself-determination,arguablythemost violated Indigenous right in the Brazilian
development context(ILO2012).
32
Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of free, prior and informed consent
2.4. FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT
Itishardtodeterminewhentheterm‘Free,PriorandInformedConsent’firstappeared,butthe
literaturesuggeststhattheFPICideaaroseinthemid1980saspartoftheIndigenouspeoples’
struggle for self-determination (Colchester& Ferrari 2007).Goodland (2004) concurs that FPIC
appeared in the1980s, particularly related to casesof involuntarydisplacementof Indigenous
peoples.Theterm‘FreeandInformedConsent’,aprecursortothecurrentconceptofFPIC,first
appeared in the International LabourOrganization (ILO)Convention Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,C169/1989.Theconcepthasdevelopedovertime,with
VanclayandEsteves(2011,pp.6–7)describingitasfollows:
In both the formal and more general utilization of FPIC, each word contributes
meaningtotheconcept.Free,meaningthattheremustbenocoercion,intimidation
ormanipulation by companies or governments, and that should a community say
‘no’theremustbenoretaliation.Prior,meaningthatconsentshouldbesoughtand
received before any activity on community land is commenced and that sufficient
timeisprovidedforadequateconsiderationbyanyaffectedcommunities.Informed,
meaning that there is full disclosure by project developers of their plans in the
language acceptable to the affected communities, and that each community has
enoughinformationtohaveareasonableunderstandingofwhatthoseplanswilllikely
meanforthem,includingofthesocialimpactstheywillexperience.Consent,meaning
thatcommunitieshavearealchoice,thattheycansayyesifthereisagoodflowof
benefitsanddevelopmentopportunitiestothem,ortheycansaynoiftheyarenot
satisfied with the deal, and that there is a workable mechanism for determining
whether there is widespread consent in the community as a whole and not just a small
elitegroupwithinthecommunity.
TherighttoFPICis intrinsicallylinkedtotherighttoself-determination,whichisarticulatedin
the945Charterof theUnitedNations: ‘Todevelop friendly relationsamongnationsbasedon
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determinationof peoples, and to take other
appropriatemeasurestostrengthenuniversalpeace’(UnitedNations1945,Article1).Later,the
UNDRIPwould refer specifically to the rightsof Indigenouspeoples to self-determination (UN
GeneralAssembly2007a).Thisrightisabouthavingtheabilitytochoosetoliveaccordinglytoa
group’sinstitutionsandtraditionalorganization,andaboveall,byitsownwill.Therighttoself-
determinationmaybeseenasthebasisorinspirationbywhichtherighttoFPICwaselaborated
andclaimedbyIndigenouspeoples,scholarsandactivists(Page2004).
FPICisalsorelatedtotheconceptofethnodevelopment,whichwaselaboratedbyStavenhagen
(1985) around the same time as FPIC emerged, and was adopted into Brazilian law in 2004
(ResoluçãoCONDRAFno.44,Brasil2004).Ethnodevelopmentproposesthatdevelopmentshould
bedefinedaccordingtoeachculturalcontext,givingtherighttocommunitiestodecideovertheir
33
2
ownfutureandtheuseoftheirresources,asguidedbytheirowncultural frameworks,which
maydifferfromtheWesternnotionofeconomicdevelopment(Stavenhagen1985).Ofcourse,
insidethesamecommunitytheremaybepoliticalandinter-generationalconflicts,withdifferent
perspectives for development. Even despite these possible divergences, ethnodevelopment is
definedbythecommunityitself,byitsownculturalframework.
The terms self-determination, ethnodevelopment and FPIC are now embedded into
internationalandnationallaws and have been incorporated into the discourse ofIndigenous
peopleswhenclaimingtheirrights(e.g.Brasil 2004;Tauli-Corpuzetal.2010;Hilletal.2010).As
previouslymentioned, the ILO addresses it in its Convention169,whichstatesinArticle6(1):
Governments shall: (a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate
procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever
consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measureswhich may
affect them directly; (b) establish means by which these peoples can freely
participate,toatleastthesameextentasothersectorsofthepopulation,atalllevels
of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies
responsible for policiesandprogrammeswhichconcernthem.(ILO1989,p.4)
AccordingtoMacKay(2004),theILOConvention169doesnotrequire‘consent’,althoughArticle
6obliges governments to ‘consult’ Indigenouspeoples.Article7(1) states that: ‘Thepeoples
concernedshallhavetherighttodecidetheirownprioritiesfortheprocessofdevelopment as
it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritualwell-beingandthelandstheyoccupyor
otherwiseuse,and toexercisecontrol,totheextentpossible,overtheirowneconomic,social
andculturaldevelopment’.Thiscouldbe regardedasbeingarighttoFPIC.
Tugendhatetal.(2009)considerthattheILO169istheonlylegallybindingdocumentregarding
therightsofIndigenous peoples. Besides this Convention, the UNDRIPisthemostreferred
to international document regarding the Indigenous right to FPIC, despite the fact thataUN
Declarationdoesnothave thesame legal status as an ILO Convention. The Declaration is
not legally binding,whiletheConventionprovisionscanbeenforced incourt.Thismaybeone
ofthereasonswhythereareonly 20 signatories to ILO Convention 169, but theUNDRIP was
endorsedin2007byavoteof143countriesinfavour, 11 abstaining (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan,Burundi, Colombia,Georgia,Kenya,Nigeria,RussianFederation, SamoaandUkraine),
andfouragainst(Australia,Canada, New Zealand and the United States). The four countries
thatvotedagainstthedeclarationarguedthat ‘theycould notsupportitbecauseofconcerns
overprovisionsonself-determination, land and resources rights and, amongothers,language
giving indigenouspeoples a right of veto over national legislation and State management
of resources’(UNGeneralAssembly2007b,p.1).Between 2009and2010,thefouropposing
countrieschangedtheirpositionandarenowsignatoriestotheDeclaration,alongwith two of
theabstainingcountries,ColombiaandSamoa.Nevertheless,attheirrespectiveannouncements
ofendorsement, Australia, Canada, the United States andNewZealand all emphasized that
34
Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of free, prior and informed consent
theydidnotconsiderUNDRIPtobealegallybindingdocument,butratheranaspirationalgoal
(Engle2011;Wiessner2011).
FPICisaddressedinseveralplacesintheUNDRIP.AccordingtotheDeclaration,governmentsneed
toconsultIndigenouspeoplesinordertoobtaintheirconsentaboutthefollowingtopics:relocation
(Article10),administrativemeasuresthataffectthem(Article19),thestorageofhazardousmaterials
insideIndigenousland(Article29)andutilizationoftheirresources,asstatedinArticle32:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concernedthroughtheirown representative institutionsinorder toobtain their
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their
lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the
development, utilizationorexploitationofmineral,waterorotherresources.(UN
GeneralAssembly2007a,p.12)
SomeinternationalentitiesthatrecognizetherighttoFPICaretheInter-AmericanCommission
onHuman Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Linde 2009). The World
Bank’s position on FPIC, however, isverycontroversial.Despite recommendations from the
World Commission on Dams and the World Bank’s own Extractive Industry Review, after
avery long debate and an arguably inadequate consultation with Indigenous organizations
(Linde 2009; Cariño & Colchester 2010), the World Bank adopted a lower standard – that
of ‘free, prior, and informed consultation resulting in broad community support’ – in their
Operational Policyon IndigenousPeoples,OP4.10 (WorldBank2005).OP4.10iscriticizedby
Indigenousorganizations,nongovernmental organizations, academics and activists because it
doesnotclearlyrecognizeFPIC,butinsteadproposesthis dubious concept of ‘FPICon’ (free,
prior and informed consultation)(Carusoetal.2003;MacKay2005;Griffiths 2005).Goodland
(2004),however,arguesthat‘meaningful participation’,asrequiredbytheWorldBank,canlead
to FPICifappliedingoodfaith.
The World Bank’s adoption of FPICon gave a mandate to other agencies to adopt similar
requirements, including the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in its Performance
Standard7(PS7),whichprovidesguidelines for engagementbetween Indigenous peoples and
the companies/projectsitfinances(IFC2006).However,the 2012 revision of PS7 recognized
the right to FPIC inspecial circumstances, such as ‘Impacts on Lands andNaturalResources
Subject to Traditional Ownership or UnderCustomaryUse’,‘RelocationofIndigenousPeoples
fromLandsandNaturalResourcesSubjecttoTraditional OwnershiporUnderCustomaryUse’
andforprojectsthat impact‘CriticalCulturalHeritage’(IFC2012).
Anotherinstitutionthathasadoptedaconceptsimilar to FPICon is the International Council
on Mining and Metals (ICMM), with its ‘Community Development Toolkit’ containing
guidelines for mining companies to engagewithcommunities.RegardingIndigenouspeoples,
itproposedthat ‘alldevelopmentprogramsshouldbe basedonengagingandconsultingwith
IndigenousPeoples inafair,timelyandculturallyappropriatewaythroughout theprojectcycle’
35
2
(ICMM 2012, p. 22). In an earlier document focused exclusively on Indigenous peoples and
mining,theICMMstatedthatitagreedwiththe‘free,prior andinformed’elementsofFPIC,but
notwiththe ‘consent’ component. ICMM members are expected to engage in FPIC only
where it is required by national legislation. Their argument is that the right of FPIC is not
feasibleat present owing to the difficulties in implementation and definition (ICMM 2010).
The position ICMM is taking could leadtobreachesof internationalhumanrights standards,
as companies might only do the minimum necessary to meet the requirements of local
legislation (Haalboom2012),potentiallyfailingtorecognizetherighttoFPIC,andthusinfringing
theIndigenousrighttoself-determination.
Arguably, the Philippines and Australia (somewhat ironicallygiventhatAustraliawasoneof
fourobjectorstoUNDRIP)werethefirstcountriestorequireFPICorconsent in local legislation
(MacKay 2004). In thePhilippines, the right to FPIC is provided by the IndigenousPeoples’
Rights Act of 1997 and is effected throughthemediationofagovernmentagencyresponsible
forIndigenouspeoplesinthecountry(NationalCommissiononIndigenousPeoples,NCIP).The
ActdefinesFPICas:
FreeandPrior InformedConsent – asused in thisActshallmeantheconsensusof
allmembersoftheICCs/IPs[IndigenousCulturalCommunities/IndigenousPeoples]to
be determined in accordance with their respective customarylawsandpractices,
free from any external manipulation, interference and coercion, and obtained
afterfullydisclosingtheintentandscopeoftheactivity, ina languageandprocess
understandabletothecommunity.(IndigenousPeoples’RightsActof1997,section3)
MacKay(2004)suggeststhatFPIChasbeenrequired(albeitimplicitly)intheNorthernTerritory
ofAustralia formorethan30yearsthroughtheAboriginalLandRights (Northern Territory) Act
1976. Since then, New SouthWales,Queenslandandsomeotherstateshave adopted similar
regulations. However, while FPICmaybeinferredtoapply(andconsentisspecifimentioned),
noneofthislegislationspecificallymentions FPICperse,butrequiresaminingentrepreneurto
formalize‘consent’ inanagreementwiththeAboriginal ‘traditionalowners’,usuallymediated
byaLandCouncil orsimilarbody.
Carino and Colchester (2010) note that Bolivia,Venezuela, Colombia and Guyana adopted
national laws recognizing the Indigenous right to FPIC and that New Zealand requires it for
mining activities. InVenezuela,FPICisimpliedinalawonbiologicaldiversitythatalsoprotects
culturaldiversity(Gupta2002).In2012theInterAmerican Court of Human Rights decided on
a decadelongjudicialbattle,Sarayaku v. Ecuador,whichwasabout rights over oil exploration
in the Kichwa Sarayaku territory. With the Ecuadorian Government losing, this casecanbe
consideredanimportantlegalprecedentasitestablishesalegalmeaningonhowandwhenFPIC
should beapplied(AmnestyInternational2012).
Despite the fact that local law inmany places requires FPIC, experience in the Philippines
demonstrates that a regulatoryprocessonitsownisnotenoughtoensurethatit is applied
36
Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of free, prior and informed consent
properly, as community consent has been manipulated through bribery or other coercion
methods,asCarino(2005,p.39)informs:
The experience of indigenous communities in the Philippines stands as a
vehement reminder that surface level [i.e. superficial] change is not sufficient;
despiteprogressive law that promises to involve indigenouscommunities in the
future of their ancestral lands, theindigenousvoicecontinuestobemanipulated
andignoredinthefaceofforeignownedminingfirms.Whenindustryinterestsclash
withlocalinterests,theformercontinuestoprevail.
ThereisalsotheriskofFPICbecomingabox-ticking proceduremadejusttocomplywithlocal
legislation,butwithnorealcommitmenttogetaclearstatementofconsentfromtheimpacted
party. Cariño and Colchester(2010) call this kind of process the ‘engineering of consent’. As
shownincaseofthePhilippines,achievingFPICmightbedonejusttocomplywithgovernment
requirements, sometimes including the bribery of community leaders and government
employees, in order to ‘tick the box’ of FPIC in the list of project requirements (Colchester
&MacKay2004;Carino&Colchester2010).AccordingtoColchesterandMacKay(2004,p.26),
‘extractive industries have consciously manipulated communities, introducingfactionalism,
dividing communities and promoting individuals, who may have no traditional authority as
leaders, to represent the communities. The illusion of free, prior and informed consent is
thus achieved by the exclusion of the majority of community members from effective
participation in decision-making’.
DespitebeingasignatorytotheILOConvention169andtheUNDRIP,theonlylegislationinBrazil
that impliesFPIC toanydegree is theBrazilianConstitutionof1988, specificallyArticle231§3
(Brasil1988).Even thoughnot specifically referring to ‘consent’, it states that theuseofwater
resources,potentialforhydropowerormineralrichesinIndigenouslandsmayonlybeexploited
‘after hearing the communities involved’.However, there areno guidelines regardinghowand
whenanyconsultationprocessmustbeapplied.Forthatreason,inJanuary2012aworkinggroup
wasformedbythegovernmenttodevelopandpresentaproposalforregulation(Verdum2012),
whichatthetimeoffinalizingourpaperinearly2013wasyettoreport.
InBrazil,miningcantakeplacenearIndigenouslands,butnotinsidetheirlandsowingtoregulatory
restrictions.Becauseofthis,variousquestionsarise.Forexample,despiteIndigenouspeoplesbeing
directlyaffectedbyoperations,where theyarenot the landownersof theactualmining lease,
should their consentbe required?Should thecommunityhaveavetopowerover theproject?
Whatdefinesconsent,especiallyiftheprojectisopposedbyonlyafewcommunitymembers?
Inordertoanswerthesequestions,andnotwithstandingourviewthatFPICisnotinitselfaright
butisineffect‘therighttobeconsulted’,webelieve,consistentwithmanyothers(e.g.Vanclay&
Esteves2011),thatFPICshouldbecomprehendedasaphilosophyratherthanalegalprocedure.
IfoperationsaffectIndigenouspeoples’ lives,theyshouldhavetherightfortheirviewstobe
considered and respected, regardless of the national legislation requirements. Cariño and
37
2
Colchester(2010,p.434)proposethat“thespiritofFPIC isthatdevelopmentshouldbecome
accountabletopeoples’distinctivecultures,priorities,anduniquepathstoself-determination,
notendangertheirverysurvival”.However,speakingaboutthepracticaloperationalizationof
FPIC,Goodland(2004)suggests thatconsentshouldberegardedas thesupport from51%or
moreofcommunitymembers.However,thismajorityvoteisaWesternconceptionofdemocratic
decision-making,and isnot likely tobeendorsedbymany Indigenouspoliticalorganizations,
who,forexample,dependingontheethnicgroup,maypreferthatdecisionsbebasedonthe
elders’opinionsorby reaching consensusbetweenmembers (Bauman&Williams2004; van
Dam2008).
Despite being recognized by international treaties, as atthetimeofwritinginlate2012,only
asmallnumberofcompanieshavemadepublicstatementsofcommitmentto FPIC, including:
Inmet, Newmont, Rio Tinto, Talisman and Xstrata (Voss & Greenspan 2012). Despite the
expressed support of Talisman Oil for FPIC, Amazon Watch is criticizing them for their
operations close to the Achuar Indigenousgroupon theborderbetweenPeruand Ecuador.
Talismanallegesthattheyhavecommunityconsent,althoughaccordingtothenongovernmental
organization,theAchuaropposetheproject(AmazonWatch2012).
This low level of corporate commitment to FPIC to datemaybebecause companiesmight
considerthattheirinterestsarethreatenedbyrecognitionofanIndigenouscommunity’sright
toFPIC.Theargumentprovidedisthe same espoused by ICMM (2010), asmentioned earlier,
for whom the consent part of FPIC was unclear and/or not feasible to be implemented in
practice. Besides this argument, giving the power of veto to communities is seen as a
menace that could tip the power balance infavourofcommunitiesandrestrainpossibilities
for new ventures. Relations between companies and Indigenous communities are usually
difficult, but that should not become a barrier to companies in adopting best practices and
respecting internationally recognized human rights suchasFPIC.Inanycase,we arguethat
when undertaken, FPIC can provide benefits to both sides. Companies that apply FPIC are
likely to benefit from an improved social licence to operate and are likely to have abetter
publicimagethanthosewhodonotrecognizethe righttoFPIC.Communitiesthatenjoytheir
rightofbeing informed, consulted andheardby the project proponents are able to provide
positive feedbackonprojectdesign, for example, that could contribute to cost savings. The
enjoyment of this right also raises a community’s confidence, as it becomes an important
stakeholder during the whole project development process and puts it into a position that
enablesittohavearealopinionabouttheproject’s impactsandpossiblemeasurestoavoidor
mitigate these impacts. This could lead to simpler and cheaper solutions, as social impacts
are identified at an earlierstage.ApplyingFPICcanalsoavoidconflictswith communities(De
Echave2010)andreducecostsand risksforcompanies(Davis&Franks2011;Vanclay2012).
VariousauthorssuggestthattheconceptofFPIC shouldnotbelimitedtoIndigenouspeoples,
recommending itsadoption toprojects affectingall local communities (Goodland 2004; Hill
et al. 2010; Vanclay & Esteves 2011; Langbroek & Vanclay 2012). According to Goodland
38
Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of free, prior and informed consent
(2004),we cannot advocate democracy only for some,leavingautocracytotheothers.Thus,
everyaffected community should have the right to be informed and to haveitsopinionon
thedevelopmentsthataffecttheirlives fullyconsidered.UsefultoolsformakingtheFPICprocess
moreeffectiveareSIAandHRIA,whichcanbeperceived asthe‘informed’componentofFPIC,
allowing both companies and communities to comprehend what the expected impacts are
and, if they are acceptable to the community, the possible ways of avoiding or mitigating
them.VanclayandEsteves(2011)perceivethattheFPICandSIAprocessesaresimilarandthat
the basic steps for accomplishing them are fundamentally the same. Additionally, where
there are unavoidable impacts, SIA canhelpascertainwhatwouldbefaircompensationtothe
community,andtoformalizethisinanImpactsandBenefitsAgreement.
2.5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FPIC AND IMPACTS AND BENEFITS AGREEMENTS
ImpactsandBenefitsAgreements(IBAs)areaformofcommunitydevelopmentagreementthat
communities negotiate with developers, usually without the mediation of government. They
emerged inCanadaandAustraliaasawayof formalizing thenegotiationsbetweenextractives
companies and Indigenous peoples. Earlier forms of arrangements failed to guarantee respect
for Indigenous rightsand/or theiradequateparticipation in theprocess (O’Faircheallaigh1999;
O’Faircheallaigh&Corbett2005).BeforetheIBAmodel,thesocialandenvironmentalimpactsof
developmentprojectsoncommunitiesusedtobeaddressedonlythroughenvironmentalimpact
assessmentprocedures, regulatedby thegovernment (Galbraithetal.2007).Prnoetal. (2010)
considerthatIBAsemergedasacommunityresponsetothe‘businessasusual’modusoperandithat
existedinCanadaduringtheenvironmentalimpactassessmentregime.IBAshavenowbecomethe
standardmodelofnegotiationbetweenextractivecompaniesandIndigenouspeoplesinCanada
andAustralia,andarebeingimplementedinmanyothercountriesandcontexts(O’Faircheallaigh
2010).InBrazil,althoughcurrentlawsforbidmineralextractionwithinIndigenouslands,aconcept
similar to IBA exists forwhere Indigenous peoplesmay be affected by developments close to
theirlands.BecauseofthecontextspecificityandchangingnatureofIBAs,weendorseCaineand
Krogman’s (2010,p.80)definitionthat IBAsare ‘agreementsthatestablish formal relationships
betweensignatories,mitigatenegativedevelopmentimpacts,andenhancepositivedevelopment
outcomesforAboriginalcommunities’.
Intheliteratureonthetopic,IBAsaregenerallyseenaspositivetoolsformitigatingimpacts,but
somestudiesdemonstratethatimportantissues,suchasgovernanceandimplementationofthe
provisions,areoftenleftout(Siebenmorgen2009;O’Faircheallaigh2010).Hitch(2006)alsoconsiders
IBAstobeaninnovativetoolforpromotingmoreequitableandsustainabledevelopmentforall
stakeholders,butsuggeststhat,forIBAstobesuccessfulinachievingtheirgoals,itiscrucialthat
companieshavehighlevelsofculturalsensitivity,applyparticipativeandtransparentapproaches
39
2
to decisionmaking andwork in collaborationwith the communities. Similarly,O’Faircheallaigh
(2010,p.70) suggests thatagreements canprovide substantialbenefits,butmany issuesneed
tobeaddressed,‘includingconfidentiality,Aboriginalsupportforprojects,andAboriginalaccess
to judicialand regulatory systems.Alsovital is theneed tobreakdown thebarriers thatoften
existbetweenprocessesfornegotiatingprojectagreementsandbroaderprocessesforcommunity
planninganddecisionmaking’.
TheexistenceofasignedIBAbetweenacompanyandacommunitydoesnotnecessarilyconfirm
thattheconditionsofFPICwereapplied.Forexample,asignedagreementcouldbetheresultof
coercionofvariouskinds(i.e.notfree).Companiesmaynothaveactedingoodfaithbynotrevealing
allrelevantinformationand/orcommunitiesmightnothaveunderstoodtheimplicationsofwhat
wasgoingtohappen(i.e.notinformed).Andquiteoften,agreementsmayhavebeenfinalized,and
insomecasesnotevenstarted,untilafterprojectactivitieshadcommenced(i.e.notprior).Thus
thedevelopmentofanIBAneedstobeconsistentwiththephilosophyofFPIC.Becauseofpotential
futurelitigation(refertotheexamplesofhumanrightsabuseinKemp&Vanclay2013),anissuefor
companieswillbetoensurethattheycanestablishintothefuturethatFPICwasobservedandfully
applied.AlthoughthemereexistenceofanIBAisnotproofofFPIC(asdiscussedabove),whereIBAs
arecarefullywrittenanddocumentalltherelevantdetails,itislikelythatanIBAcanestablishthat
FPICwasobserved.AnIBAisanappropriateconclusiontoanFPICprocess.
2.6. CONCLUSION
Theconceptof‘Free,PriorandInformedConsent’isafundamentalcomponentoftheIndigenous
right to self-determination.Unfortunately, neither FPIC nor the right to self-determination are
beingrespectedinBrazilandmanyothercountries.Violationsoftheserightsareoverlookedby
governments,especiallyinthecaseof‘projectsofnationalinterest’,andparticularlyinrelationto
Brazil’shybridstate–corporateenterprises.Violationscanalsohappenwhencompanies,asabox-
tickingprocedure,onlydotheabsoluteminimumrequiredbyenvironmentallicensingprocesses
andignoreinternationalhumanrightsstandards.
FPICshouldbetakenseriouslybycompaniesthatinterfacewithIndigenouspeoples.Inorderto
achievealegitimatesociallicencetooperateandtorefrainfromviolatinghumanrights,companies
need to respect FPIC, arguably with non-Indigenous as well as Indigenous communities. The
righttoself-determinationisconceivedasbeingapplicabletoallpeoples(UnitedNations1945),
thusrespectingFPIC in relationtoall localcommunitieswouldbecomplyingwith international
humanrightsstandards.ComplyingwithFPICshouldnotbeseenasbeingavoluntarymeasure
thatcompaniescanchoosetofollowornot–itisnecessarytoensuretheself-determinationof
Indigenouspeoples.
40
Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of free, prior and informed consent
Ifcompaniesarecommittedtofullyrespectinghuman rights, recognizing the right to FPIC,
and actually implementing it, are important steps. The alleged difficulties in applying
FPIC result from a lack of experience,withfewinitiativessofar.Withgoodfaithand qualified
professionals,anycompanythatchoosestoadheretoFPIC,orisforcedtobylegislation,should
be abletoimplementit.Also,therearenowmanyhandbooks availableonhow to implement
FPIC, describing the successes and difficulties in different situations (e.g. Colchester and
Ferrari 2007; Colchester 2008;Hill et al. 2010;LehrandSmith2010;Weitzner2011;Persoon
and Minter 2011). Therefore, although it can be considered as being difficult, as company–
communityrelationsusually are,it isnotinfeasible.Infact,relationships between companies
andcommunitiesmaybecomeeasierifFPICis applied,astheywillprobablybebasedontrust
insteadofconflict. However, companies need to be ready to listen and to accept ‘no’ as an
answer sometimes, as not every community will be agreeable to accept all development
projects affecting them, despite the potential benefits they might receive. Organizations
(corporateandgovernment) should not try to coerce communities into accepting aproject.
SIA and HRIA can be useful tools for ensuringthat human rights are being respected in a
company’sprojectsandoperations,ifperformedatanearlystageandinaparticipatorymanner.
Companies thatadopt theFPIC philosophy and fully implement it in practice, in addition to
respecting the right of communities to participate in decisions that affect their lives,will
probablybenefitfrom reduced conflict, reduced likelihood of reputational damage,aswell
reducedrisksandcosts.
41
2
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