UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP.doc

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UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP.

(CORN DIVISION) Petitioner, - versus -

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENTAUTHORITY,Respondent.

GR. No. 191427 May 30,2011

CARPIO MORALES, J.: The present petition for review oncertiorari assails the Court of Appeals Decisiondated October 27, 2009 and Resolution datedFebruary 23, 2010 in CA-G. R. SP No. 107449.

Universal Robina Corp. (petitioner) isengaged in, among other things, the manufactureof animal feeds at its plant in Bagong Ilog, PasigCity.

Laguna Lake Development Authority(LLDA), respondent, through its Pollution ControlDivision Monitoring and Enforcement Section,after conducting on March 14, 2000 a laboratoryanalysis of petitioners corn oil refinery plantswastewater, found that it failed to comply withgovernment standards provided underDepartment of Environment and NaturalResources (DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs)Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990.

LLDA later issued on May 30, 2000 an Ex-

Parte Order requiring petitioner to explain why noorder should be issued for the cessation of itsoperations due to its discharge of pollutiveeffluents into the Pasig River and why it wasoperating without a clearance/permit from the

LLDA.Still later, the LLDA, after receiving a

phone-in complaint conducted on August 31,2000, another analysis of petitioners wastewater,which showed its continued failure to conform toits effluent standard in terms of Total SuspendedSolids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD),Color and Oil/Grease.

Hearings on petitioners pollution casewere thereafter commenced on March 1, 2001.

Despite subsequent compliance monitoringand inspections conducted by the LLDA,petitioners wastewater failed to conform to theparameters set by the aforementioned DAOs.

In early 2003, petitioner notified LLDA of itsplan to upgrade the wastewater treatment facility(WTF) of its corn oil refinery plant in an effort tocomply with environmental laws, an upgrade thatwas completed only in 2007.

On May 9, 2007 on its request, a resampling of petitioners wastewater wasconducted which showed that petitionersplant finallycomplied with governmentstandards.

Petitioner soon requested for a reduction o

penalties, by Manifestation and Motion filed onAugust 24, 2007 to which it attached copies of itsDaily Operation Reports and Certifications toshow that accrued daily penalties should onlycover a period of 560 days.

After conducting hearings, the LLDAissued its Order to Pay[] (OP) dated January 212008, the pertinent portion of which reads:

After careful evaluation of the case

respondent is found to be discharging pollutivewastewater computed in two periods reckonedfrom March 14, 2000 the date of initial samplinguntil November 3, 2003 the date it requestedfor a re-sampling covering 932 days inconsideration of the interval of time whensubsequent monitoring was conducted after aninterval of more than 2 years and from March 152006 the date when re-sampling was done untiApril 17, 2007 covering 448 days for a total of1,247 days.

WHEREFORE, premises considered

respondent is hereby ordered to pay withinfifteen (15) days from receipt hereof theaccumulated daily penalties amounting to a totaof Pesos: One Million Two Hundred Forty-Seven

(Thousand) Pesos Only (PHP 1,247,000.00) prioto dismissal of the case and without prejudice offiling another case for its subsequentviolations. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to reconsider, prayingthat it be ordered to pay only accumulated dailypenalties in the sum of Five Hundred Sixty

Thousand (P560,000) Pesos on grounds that theLLDA erred in first, adopting a straightcomputation of the periods of violation based onthe flawed assumption that petitioner was

operating on a daily basis without excludingamong others, the period during which the LLDALaboratory underwent rehabilitation work fromDecember 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212days); and second, in disregarding the DailyOperation Reports and Certifications whichpetitioner submitted to attest to the actuanumber of its operating days, i.e., 560 days.

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By Orderof July 11, 2008, the LLDA deniedpetitioners motion for reconsideration andreiterated its order to pay the aforestatedpenalties, disposing of the issues thusly:

On the first issue, while it is true that the

Authority failed to state in its OP dated 21January 2008 the basis for actual computation ofthe accumulated daily penalties, the Authoritywould like to explain that its computation wasbased on the following, to wit:

The computation of accumulated daily

penalties was reckoned period [sic] from 14March 2000 the date of initial sampling to 03November 2003 the date when its letter requestfor re-sampling was received which covers 932days computed at 6 days per week operation asreflected in the Reports of Inspection. Sincesubsequent inspection conducted after two (2)years and four (4) months, such period wasdeducted from the computation. Likewise, theperiod when the LLDA Laboratory wasrehabilitated from December 1, 2000 to June 30,2001 was also deducted with a total of TwoHundred Twelve (212) days.

On the second claim, the same cannot be

granted for lack of legal basis since thedocuments submitted are self-serving. The periodfrom 15 March 2006 to 17 April 2007 wascomputed from the date of re-sampling when itfailed to conform to the standards set by law upto the date of receipt of its letter request for re-sampling prior to its compliance on May 9, 2007.

The period covers 342 days.

Hence, respondent is found to be

discharging pollutive wastewater not conformingwith the standards set by law computed fromMarch 14, 2000 November 3, 2003 covering 932days and from March 15, 2006 April 17, 2007covering 342 days for a total of 1,274 days.

Petitioner challenged by certiorari the twinorders before the Court of Appeals, attributing toLLDA grave abuse of discretion in disregarding itsdocumentary evidence, and maintaining that the

lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedyfrom the enforcement of LLDAs order justifiedsuch recourse as an exception to the rulerequiring exhaustion of administrative remediesprior to judicial action.

By Decision of October 27, 2009 theappellate court affirmed both LLDA orders, whichit found to be amply supported by substantialevidence, the computation of the accumulated

daily penalties being in accord with prevailingDENR guidelines. The appellate court held thatwhile petitioner may have offered documentaryevidence to support its assertion that the dayswhen it did not operate must be excluded fromthe computation, the LLDA has the prerogative todisregard the same for being unverifiedhence, unreliable.

The appellate court went on to chidepetitioners petition for certiorari as prematuresince the law provides for an appeal fromdecisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENRSecretary or the Office of the President, a remedywhich should have first been exhausted beforeinvoking judicial intervention.

Petitioners motion for reconsiderationhaving been denied by Resolution of February 232010, it filed the present petition.

Petitioner cites deprivation of due process

and lack of any plain, speedy or adequateremedy as grounds which exempted it fromcomplying with the rule on exhaustion oadministrative remedies.

The petition fails.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies is a cornerstone of our judiciasystem. The thrust of the rule is that courts musallow administrative agencies to carry out theifunctions and discharge their responsibilitieswithin the specialized areas of their respectivecompetence. The rationale for this doctrine is

obvious. It entails lesser expenses and providesfor the speedier resolution ocontroversies. Comity and convenience alsoimpel courts of justice to shy away from a disputeuntil the system of administrative redress hasbeen completed.

Executive Order No. 192 EO 192) wasissued on June 10, 1987 for the salutary purposeof reorganizing the DENR, charging it with thetask of promulgating rules and regulations for thecontrol of water, air and land pollution as well asof promulgating ambient and effluent standards

for water and air quality including the allowablelevels of other pollutants and radiations. EO 192also created the Pollution Adjudication Boardunder the Office of the DENR Secretary whichtook over the powers and functions of theNational Pollution Control Commission withrespect to the adjudication of pollution casesincluding the latters role as arbitrator fodetermining reparation, or restitution of thedamages and losses resulting from pollution.[

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Petitioner had thus available

administrative remedy of appeal to the DENRSecretary. Its contrary arguments to show thatan appeal to the DENR Secretary would be anexercise in futility as the latter merely adopts theLLDAs findings is at best, speculative andpresumptuous.

As for petitioners invocation of due

process, it fails too. The appellate court thusaptly brushed aside this claim, in this wise:

Due process, as a constitutional precept,

does not always and in all situations require atrial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfiedwhen a person is notified of the charge againsthim and given an opportunity to explain ordefend himself. In administrative proceedings,the filing of charges and giving reasonableopportunity for the person so charged to answerthe accusations against him constitute theminimum requirements of due process. Theessence of due process is simply to beheard, or as applied to administrativeproceedings, an opportunity to explainones side, or an opportunity to seek areconsideration of the action or rulingcomplained of.

. . . Administrative due process cannot

be fully equated with due process in itsstrict judicial sense for it is enough that theparty is given the chance to be heard beforethe case against him is decided.

Here, petitioner URC was given ampleopportunities to be heard it was given showcause orders and allowed to participate inhearing to rebut the allegation against it ofdischarging pollutive wastewater to the PasigRiver, it was given the chance to presentevidences in support of its claims, it was notifiedof the assailed Order to Pay, and it was allowedto file a motion for reconsideration. Given these,we are of the view that the minimumrequirements of administrative due processhave been complied with in this case.(emphasis in the original)

In fine, the assailed LLDA orders of January21, 2008 and July 11, 2008 correctly reckoned thetwo periodswithin which petitioner was found tohave continued discharging pollutive wastewaterand applied the penalty as provided for underArticle VI, Section 32 of LLDA Resolution No. 33,Series of 1996.[15] LLDAs explanation thatbehind its inclusion of certain days in its

computation of the imposable penalties that ithad already deducted not just the period duringwhich the LLDA Laboratory underwentrehabilitation work from December 1, 2000 to

June 30, 2001 (covering 212 days) but hadalso excluded from the computation the periodduring which no inspections or compliancemonitorings were conducted (a period coveringtwo years and four months) is well-taken.

It is noted that during the hearing on June

19, 2007, the LLDA gave petitioner theopportunity to submit within fifteen (15days.any valid documents to show proof of itsnon-operating dates that would be necessary forthe possible reduction of the accumulated dailypenalties, but petitioner failed to complytherewith.

As earlier noted, petitioner filed a

Manifestation and Motion to which itattached Daily Operation Reports andCertifications, which voluminous documentswere, however, unverified in derogation of Rule XSection 2 of the 2004 Revised Rules, Regulationsand Procedures Implementing Republic Act No4850. Absent such verification, the LLDA may nobe faulted for treating such evidence to be purelyself-serving.

Respecting LLDAs decision not to attach

any evidentiary weight to the Daily OperationReports or Certifications, recall that the LLDAconducted an analysis of petitioners wastewaterdischarge on August 31, 2000, upon receiving aphone-in complaint. And it conducted too an

analysis on May 3, 2002 in the course of periodiccompliance monitoring. The Daily OperationReports for both August 31, 2000 and May 32002 submitted by petitioner clearly manifesthat the plant did not operate on those dates. Onthe other hand, LLDAs Investigation Report andReport of Inspection dated August 31, 2000 andMay 3, 2002, respectively, discloseotherwise. Petitioner never disputed the factuafindings reflected in these reports. Thus spawnsdoubts on the veracity and accuracy of the DailyOperation Reports.

Petitioner asserts that LLDA had notcredited it for undertaking remedial measures torehabilitate its wastewater treatment facilitydespite the prohibitive costs and at a time whenits income from the agro-industrial business wasalready severely affected by a poor businessclimate; and that the enforcement of theassailed LLDA orders amounted to a grossdisincentive to its business.

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Without belaboring petitioners assertions,it must be underscored that the protection of theenvironment, including bodies of water, is no lessurgent or vital than the pressing concerns ofprivate enterprises, big or small. Everyone mustdo their share to conserve the nationalpatrimonys meager resources for the benefit ofnot only this generation, but of those to follow.

The length of time alone it took petitioner toupgrade its WTF (from 2003 to 2007), a movearrived at only under threat of continuingsanctions, militates against any genuine concernfor the well-being of the countrys waterways.

WHEREFORE, the petition

is DENIED. The October 27, 2009 Decision andthe February 23, 2010 Resolution, of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G. R. SP No.107449, are AFFIRMED.

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UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP.doc