481U.S.102107S.Ct.165695L.Ed.2d94

UNITEDSTATES,Petitioner,v.

JOHNDOE,INC.I,etal.

No.85-1613.

ArguedJan.12,1987.DecidedApril21,1987.

Syllabus

UnderUnitedStatesv.SellsEngineering,Inc.,463U.S.418,103S.Ct.3133,77L.Ed.2d743,attorneysfortheCivilDivision(CD)oftheDepartmentofJustice(DOJ)maynotautomaticallyobtaindisclosureofgrandjurymaterialsforuseinacivilsuit,butmustinsteadseekadistrictcourtdisclosureorderunderRule6(e)(3)(C)(i)oftheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedure,whichorderisavailableuponashowingof"particularizedneed."Afteranextensiveinvestigation,agrandjurythathadbeenconvenedbyattorneysfromtheDOJ'sAntitrustDivision(AD)wasdischargedupontheirconclusionthat,althoughrespondentshadengagedinpricefixingviolativeoftheShermanAct,criminalprosecutionwasunwarrantedunderthecircumstances.Subsequently,inpreparationforapossiblecivilactionagainstrespondents,theADattorneysreviewedmaterialsfurnishedtothegrandjuryandconcludedthatrespondentshadviolatedtheFalseClaimsAct,primaryenforcementresponsibilityforwhichrestsintheCD.BecausetheywishedtoconsultwithCDlawyersandalsowiththeappropriatelocalUnitedStatesAttorneybeforebringingsuit,theADlawyersobtainedaRule6(e)orderallowingthemtodisclosegrandjurymaterialtosixnamedGovernmentattorneys.TheDistrictCourtdeniedrespondents'motionstovacatethedisclosureorderandtoenjointheGovernmentfromusingthegrandjuryinformationintheanticipatedcivilsuit.However,afterallowingtheGovernmenttofileacomplaintunderseal,theCourtofAppealsreversedbothaspectsoftheDistrictCourt'sdenialofrelieftorespondents,holdingthat,becausetheADattorneyswerenowinvolvedonlyincivilproceedings,theywereforbiddenfrommakingcontinueduseofgrandjuryinformationwithoutfirstobtainingacourtorder,andthatdisclosuretothesixattorneysforconsultationpurposeswasnotsupportedbyanadequateshowingof"particularizedneed."Nonetheless,thecourttooknoactionwithrespecttothecomplaint,concludingthatitdisclosednothingaboutthegrandjuryinvestigation.

Held:

1.AnattorneywhoconductedacriminalprosecutionmaymakecontinueduseofgrandjurymaterialsinthecivilphaseofthedisputewithoutobtainingacourtordertodosounderRule6(e).TheRuleforbidsaGovernmentattorneyto"disclose"material,whichwordcannotbeinterpretedtoembraceasolitaryreexaminationofgrandjurymaterialintheprivacyofanattorney'soffice.Thus,byitsplainlanguage,theRulemerelyprohibitsthosewhoalreadyhavelegitimateaccesstograndjurymaterialfromrevealingthematerialtoothersnotauthorizedtoreceiveit.Respondents'contentionthatdisclosuretounauthorizedoutsiderswillresultinevitablywhenacivilcomplaintisfiledisrefutedbytherecord,whichindicatesthatthecomplainttheDOJfileddidnotquoteorrefertoanygrandjurytranscripts,documents,orwitnesses,refertotheexistenceofagrandjury,orindirectlydisclosegrandjurymaterial.Pp.107-111.

2.PursuanttotheconsiderationsdescribedinSells,therewasa"particularizedneed"fordisclosureofthegrandjurymaterialstotheCDlawyersandtheUnitedStatesAttorney.DisclosurewasrequestedtoenabletheADlawyerstoobtainthefullbenefitoftheexperienceandexpertiseoftheotherGovernmentlawyers,andthusservesthepublicpurposeofefficient,effective,andevenhandedenforcementoffederalstatutes.Sincethecontemplateduseofthematerialmightresultinadecisionnottoproceedwithacivilaction,thedisclosurecouldhavetheeffectofsavingtheGovernment,thepotentialdefendants,andthewitnessescostlyandtime-consumingdiscovery.Thedisclosure'spublicbenefitsclearlyoutweighitsdangers,sinceitposescomparativelylittlerisktograndjurysecrecy,totheintegrityofthegrandjuryitself,ortothenormalcivillimitationsontheGovernment'sdiscoveryandinvestigativepowers.TheCourtofAppealsexaggeratedthesignificanceofpotentialalternativeinformationsourcesbymeansofdiscoveryundertheAntitrustCivilProcessAct.Widediscretionmustbeaffordeddistrictcourtsinevaluatingtheappropriatenessofdisclosure,andtheDistrictCourtheredidnotabuseitsdiscretion.Pp.111-117.

774F.2d34(2dCir.1985),reversed.

STEVENS,J.,deliveredtheopinionoftheCourt,inwhichREHNQUIST,C.J.,andPOWELL,O'CONNOR,andSCALIA,JJ.,joined.BRENNAN,J.,filedadissentingopinion,inwhichMARSHALLandBLACKMUN,JJ.,joined,post,p.117.WHITE,J.,tooknopartintheconsiderationordecisionofthecase.

LouisR.Cohen,Washington,D.C.,forpetitioner.

PaulR.Grand,NewYorkCity,forrespondents.

JusticeSTEVENSdeliveredtheopinionoftheCourt.

1 InUnitedStatesv.SellsEngineering,Inc.,463U.S.418,103S.Ct.3133,77L.Ed.2d743(1983),weheldthatattorneysfortheCivilDivisionoftheJusticeDepartmentmaynotautomaticallyobtaindisclosureofgrandjurymaterialsforuseinacivilsuit,butmustinsteadseekacourtorderofdisclosure,availableuponashowingof"particularizedneed."Weexplicitlyleftopenthe"issueconcerningcontinueduseofgrandjurymaterials,inthecivilphaseofadispute,byanattorneywhohimselfconductedthecriminalprosecution."Id.,at431,n.15,103S.Ct.,at3142,n.15.Today,wedecidethatopenquestion.Inaddition,forthefirsttime,wereviewaconcreteapplicationofthe"particularizedneed"standardtoarequestfordisclosuretoGovernmentattorneys.

2 *InMarch1982,attorneysintheAntitrustDivisionoftheDepartmentofJusticewereauthorizedtoconductagrandjuryinvestigationofthreeAmericancorporationssuspectedofconspiringtofixthepriceoftallowbeingsoldtoaforeigngovernmentandfinancedbytheDepartmentofState'sAgencyforInternationalDevelopment.Aftersubpoenaingthousandsofdocumentsfromthethreecorporaterespondents,andtakingthetestimonyofnumerouswitnesses,includingthefiveindividualrespondents,theDepartmentofJusticeconferredwithsomeofrespondents'attorneysandconcludedthatalthoughrespondentshadviolated§1oftheShermanAct,15U.S.C.§1,criminalprosecutionwasnotwarrantedunderthecircumstances.InearlyJune1984,thegrandjurywasdischargedwithoutreturninganyindictments.

3 OnJune28,1984,theattorneyswhohadbeeninchargeofthegrandjuryinvestigationservedCivilInvestigativeDemands(CID's),pursuanttotheAntitrustCivilProcessAct,76Stat.548,asamended,15U.S.C.§§1311-1314,onapproximatelytwodozenpersonsandentities,includingthecorporaterespondents,callingfortheproductionofvariousdocuments.TheAntitrustDivisionadvisedeachrespondentthatitcouldcomplywiththeCIDbycertifyingthattherequesteddocumentshadalreadybeenfurnishedtothegrandjury.Twoofthecorporaterespondentsrefusedtodoso,andalsorefusedtofurnishanyadditionalcopiesofthedocuments.

4 Afterfurtherinvestigation,theAntitrustDivisionattorneyscametothetentativeconclusionthatrespondentshadviolatedtheFalseClaimsAct,31U.S.C.§§3729-3731,andtheForeignAssistanceAct,22U.S.C.§§2151-2429(1982ed.andSupp.III),aswellastheShermanAct.BecausetheCivilDivisionoftheDepartmentofJusticehasprimaryresponsibilityforenforcingtheFalseClaimsAct,see28CFR§0.45(d)(1986),theAntitrustDivisiondeemeditappropriatetoconsultwithlawyersintheCivilDivisionbeforeinitiatingacivilaction.Additionally,becauseofthevenueofthecontemplatedcivilaction,theAntitrustDivisionfeltitnecessarytoconsultwiththeUnitedStatesAttorneyfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork.Accordingly,theAntitrustDivisionlawyersfiledamotionintheDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkrequestinganorderunderFederalRuleofCriminalProcedure6(e)allowingthemtodisclosegrandjurymaterialtosixnamedGovernmentattorneysandsuchassociatesasthoseattorneysmightdesignate.Afteranexpartehearing,theDistrictCourtgrantedthemotion,basedonitsfindingthattheGovernment'sinterestincoordinatingfairandefficientenforcementoftheFalseClaimsAct,andobtainingtheCivilDivision'sandUnitedStatesAttorney'sexpertconsultation,constitutedaparticularizedneedfortherequesteddisclosure.

5 OnMarch6,1985,theGovernmentadvisedrespondentsthattheRule6(e)orderhadpreviouslybeenenteredandthatacivilactionwouldbefiledagainstthemwithintwoweeks.RespondentsimmediatelymovedtovacatetheRule6(e)orderand,additionally,toenjointheGovernmentfromusingthegrandjuryinformationin"preparing,filing,orlitigating"theanticipatedcivilaction.TheDistrictCourtdeniedbothformsofrelief.Respondentsimmediatelyappealed,andalsomovedforimmediateinterimrelieffromtheCourtofAppealsfortheSecondCircuit.TheCourtofAppealsgrantedpartialrelief,allowingtheGovernmenttofileacomplaint,butorderingthatitbefiledunderseal.

6 Afterexpeditedconsideration,TheCourtofAppealsreversedbothaspectsoftheDistrictCourt'sorder.InreGrandJuryInvestigation,774F.2d34(2dCir.1985).First,thecourtexaminedtheissueleftopeninSells,andagreedwithrespondentsthat,becausetheattorneyswhohadworkedonthegrandjuryinvestigationwerenowinvolvedonlyincivilproceedings,theattorneyswereforbiddenfrommakingcontinueduseofgrandjuryinformationwithoutfirstobtainingacourtorder.774F.2d,at40-43.Nonetheless,theCourtofAppealstooknoactionwithrespecttothecomplaintthathadbeenfiled,becausethecourtconcludedthatthecomplaintdisclosednothingaboutthegrandjuryinvestigation.Id.,at42.WithrespecttotheDistrictCourt'sorderallowingdisclosuretothesixattorneysforconsultationpurposes,theCourtofAppealsheldthattheorderwasnotsupportedbyanadequateshowingof"particularizedneed."Id.,at37-40.Wegrantedcertiorari,476U.S.1140,106S.Ct.2244,90L.Ed.2d691(1986),andnowreverse.1

II

7 The"GeneralRuleofSecrecy"setforthinFederalRuleofCriminalProcedure6(e)providesthatcertainpersons,includingattorneysfortheGovernment,"shallnotdisclosemattersoccurringbeforethegrandjury,exceptasotherwiseprovidedforintheserules."2Unlikeourpreviousdecisionsinthisarea,whichhaveprimarilyinvolvedexceptionstothegeneralrule,3thiscaseinvolvesamorepreliminaryquestion:whatconstitutesdisclosure?TheCourtofAppealsacknowledgedthat"tocharacterize[attorneys']continuedaccessinthecivilphasetothematerialstowhichtheyhadaccessinthecriminalphaseasdisclosurewithinthemeaningofrule6(e)seemsfictionalatfirstglance."774F.2d,at40.ButtheCourtofAppealsreasonedthattheattorneyscouldnotpossiblyrememberallthedetailsofthegrandjuryinvestigationandthereforetheuseofgrandjurymaterials"torefreshtheirrecollectionastodocumentsortestimonytowhichtheyhadaccessinthegrandjuryproceedingistantamounttoafurtherdisclosure."Ibid.

8 ContrarytotheCourtofAppeals'conclusion,itseemsplaintousthatRule6(e)prohibitsthosewithinformationabouttheworkingsofthegrandjuryfromrevealingsuchinformationtootherpersonswhoarenotauthorizedtohaveaccesstoitundertheRule.TheRuledoesnotcontainaprohibitionagainstthecontinueduseofinformationbyattorneyswholegitimatelyobtainedaccesstotheinformationthroughthegrandjuryinvestigation.TheCourtofAppeals'reasoningisunpersuasivebecauseitstretchestheplainmeaningoftheRule'slanguagemuchtoofar.Itisindeedfictional—andnotjust"atfirstglance"—tointerprettheword"disclose"toembraceasolitaryreexaminationofmaterialintheprivacyofanattorney'soffice.4Forexample,itisobviousthattheprohibitionagainstdisclosuredoesnotmeanthatanattorneywhopreparedalegalmemorandum(whichhappenstoincludesomeinformationaboutmattersrelatedtotheworkingsofthegrandjury)forhisfile,isbarredfromlookingatthememorandumoncethegrandjuryinvestigationterminates.AstheCourtofAppealsfortheEighthCircuitrecentlyconcluded,"[f]ortheretobeadisclosure,grandjurymattersmustbedisclosedtosomeone."UnitedStatesv.Archer-Daniels-MidlandCo.,785F.2d206,212(1986),cert.pending,No.85-1840.

9 BecausewedecidethiscasebasedonourreadingoftheRule'splainlanguage,thereisnoneedtoaddresstheparties'argumentsabouttheextenttowhichcontinuedusethreatenssomeofthevaluesofgrandjuryprivacyidentifiedinourcases5andcatalogedinSellsEngineering,463U.S.,at432-433,103S.Ct.,at3142.Whilesuchargumentsarerelevantwhenlanguageissusceptibleofmorethanoneplausibleinterpretation,wehaverecognizedthatinsomecases"[w]edonothavebeforeusachoicebetweena'liberal'approachtoward[aRule],ontheonehand,anda'technical'interpretationoftheRule,ontheotherhand.Thechoice,instead,isbetweenrecognizingorignoringwhattheRuleprovidesinplainlanguage.WeaccepttheRuleasmeaningwhatitsays."Schiavonev.Fortune,477U.S.21,30,106S.Ct.2379,2384,91L.Ed.2d18(1986).Asforthepolicyarguments,itsufficestosaythat,astheCourtofAppealsrecognized,theimplicationsofourconstructionarenotsoabsurdorcontrarytoCongress'aimsastocallintoquestionourconstructionoftheplainmeaningoftheterm"disclosure"asusedinthisRule.

10 RespondentsurgeinthealternativethatRule6(e)prohibitsattorneys'continueduseofgrandjurymaterialsbecausethefilingofacivilcomplaintitselfdisclosesgrandjurymaterialstooutsiders.Respondentsarguethatsuchdisclosureisinevitablebecauseacivilcomplaint'sfactualallegationswillinvariablybebasedoninformationobtainedduringthegrandjuryinvestigation.Thishypotheticalfearisnotsubstantiatedbytherecordinthiscase.TheCourtofAppealsstatedthattheGovernment'scomplaint"doesnotquotefromorrefertoanygrandjurytranscriptsordocumentssubpoenaedbythegrandjury,anddoesnotmentionanywitnessesbeforethegrandjury,orevenrefertotheexistenceofagrandjury."774F.2d,at37.Nordorespondentsidentifyanythinginthecomplaintthatindirectlydisclosesgrandjuryinformation.WehavenobasisforquestioningtheaccuracyoftheCourtofAppeals'conclusionthatthefilingofthecomplaintdidnotconstituteaprohibiteddisclosure.AGovernmentattorneymayhaveavarietyofusesforgrandjurymaterialinaplanningstage,eventhoughthematerialwillnotbeused,orevenalludedto,inanyfilingorproceeding.6Inthisvein,itisimportanttoemphasizethattheissuebeforeusisonlywhetheranattorneywhowasinvolvedinagrandjuryinvestigation(andisthereforepresumablyfamiliarwiththe"mattersoccurringbeforethegrandjury")maylaterreviewthatinformationinamannerthatdoesnotinvolveanyfurtherdisclosuretoothers.Withoutaddressingtheverydifferentmatterofanattorney'sdisclosinggrandjuryinformationtoothers,inadvertentlyorpurposefully,inthecourseofacivilproceeding,weholdthatRule6(e)doesnotrequiretheattorneytoobtainacourtorderbeforerefamiliarizinghimselforherselfwiththedetailsofagrandjuryinvestigation.

III

11 TheDepartmentofJusticeproperlyrecognizedthatunderourholdinginSellsitcouldnotdiscloseinformationtopreviouslyuninvolvedattorneysfromtheCivilDivisionortheUnitedStatesAttorney'sofficewithoutacourtorderpursuanttoRule6(e)(3)(C)(i).7UpontheDepartment'smotion,theDistrictCourtgrantedanorder,findinga"particularizedneedfordisclosure"pursuanttotheconsiderationsdescribedinSells.TheDistrictCourtacceptedtheGovernment'sargumentthatconsultationandcoordinationbetweentheCivilDivision,theUnitedStatesAttorney,andtheAntitrustDivisionwasnecessarytoensureconsistentenforcementoftheFalseClaimsActand"thefairandevenhandedadministrationofjustice."App.14.TheCourtofAppealsreversedonthispoint,however,concludingthatdisclosurewasunnecessarybecausethesameinformationcouldeventuallyhavebeenobtainedthroughcivildiscovery.

12 InSellswenotedthatRule6(e)itselfdoesnotprescribethesubstantivestandardgoverningtheissuanceofanorderpursuanttoRule6(e)(3)(C)(i)andthatthecaselawthathaddevelopedinresponsetorequestsfordisclosurebyprivatepartieshadconsistentlyrequired"astrongshowingofparticularizedneed"beforedisclosureispermitted.463U.S.,at443-445,103S.Ct.,at3148-3149;seegenerallyDouglasOilCo.v.NorthwestPetrolStopsNorthwest,441U.S.211,222-223,99S.Ct.1667,1674-1675,60L.Ed.2d156(1979).8Althoughweheldthatthissamestandardapplieswhereacourtisaskedtoorderdisclosuretoagovernmentattorney,seeid.,463U.S.,at443-444,103S.Ct.,at3148;Illinoisv.Abbott&Associates,Inc.,460U.S.557,103S.Ct.1356,75L.Ed.2d281(1983),wemadeitclearthattheconcernsthatunderliethepolicyofgrandjurysecrecyareimplicatedtoamuchlesserextentwhenthedisclosuremerelyinvolvesGovernmentattorneys.

13 "NothinginDouglasOil,however,requiresadistrictcourttopretendthattherearenodifferencesbetweengovernmentalbodiesandprivateparties.TheDouglasOilstandardisahighlyflexibleone,adaptabletodifferentcircumstancesandsensitivetothefactthattherequirementsofsecrecyaregreaterinsomesituationsthaninothers.Hence,althoughAbbottandthelegislativehistoryforecloseanyspecialdispensationfromtheDouglasOilstandardforGovernmentagencies,thestandarditselfaccommodatesanyrelevantconsiderations,peculiartoGovernmentmovants,thatweighfororagainstdisclosureinagivencase.Forexample,adistrictcourtmightreasonablyconsiderthatdisclosuretoJusticeDepartmentattorneysposeslessriskoffurtherleakageorimproperusethanwoulddisclosuretoprivatepartiesorthegeneralpublic.Similarly,weareinformedthatitistheusualpolicyoftheJusticeDepartmentnottoseekciviluseofgrandjurymaterialsuntilthecriminalaspectofthematterisclosed.Cf.DouglasOil,supra,441U.S.,at222-223,99S.Ct.,at1674-75.And'undertheparticularized-needstandard,thedistrictcourtmayweighthepublicinterest,ifany,servedbydisclosuretoagovernmentalbody....'Abbott,supra,460U.S.,at567-568,n.15,103S.Ct.,at1361,n.15.Ontheotherhand,forexample,inweighingtheneedfordisclosure,thecourtcouldtakeintoaccountanyalternativediscoverytoolsavailablebystatuteorregulationtotheagencyseekingdisclosure."463U.S.,at445,103S.Ct.,at3149.

14 Inthiscase,thedisclosureswererequestedtoenabletheAntitrustDivisionlawyerswhohadconductedthegrandjuryinvestigationtoobtainthefullbenefitoftheexperienceandexpertiseoftheCivilDivisionlawyerswhoregularlyhandlelitigationundertheFalseClaimsAct,andofthelocalUnitedStatesAttorneywhoisregularlyconsultedbeforeactionsarefiledinhisorherdistrict.Thepublicpurposesservedbythedisclosure—efficient,effective,andevenhandedenforcementoffederalstatutes—arecertainlyvalidandwerenotquestionedbytheCourtofAppeals.Particularlybecausethecontemplateduseofthematerialwastomakeadecisiononwhethertoproceedwithacivilaction,thedisclosureherecouldhavehadtheeffectofsavingtheGovernment,thepotentialdefendants,andwitnessesthepainsofcostlyandtime-consumingdepositionsandinterrogatorieswhichmighthavelaterturnedouttobewastediftheGovernmentdecidednottofileacivilactionafterall.Tobesure,aswerecognizedinSells,noteveryinstanceof"savingtimeandexpense"justifiesdisclosure.Id.,at431,103S.Ct.,at3142.Thequestionthatmustbeaskediswhetherthepublicbenefitsofthedisclosureinthiscaseoutweighthedangerscreatedbythelimiteddisclosurerequested.

15 InSellswerecognizedthreetypesofdangersinvolvedindisclosureofgrandjuryinformationtoGovernmentattorneysforuserelatedtocivilproceedings.First,westatedthatdisclosurenotonlyincreasesthe"numberofpersonstowhomtheinformationisavailable(therebyincreasingtheriskofinadvertentorillegalreleasetoothers),butalsoitrendersconsiderablymoreconcretethethreattothewillingnessofwitnessestocomeforwardandtotestifyfullyandcandidly."Id.,at432,103S.Ct.,at3142(footnoteomitted).Neitherofthesefearsiswellfoundedwithrespecttothenarrowdisclosureinvolvedinthiscase.Thedisclosureofasummaryofaportionofthegrandjuryrecordtonamedattorneysforpurposesofconsultationdoesnotposethesameriskofawidebreachofgrandjurysecrecyaswouldallowingunlimiteduseofthematerialtoallattorneysinanotherdivision—thedisclosureinvolvedinSells.Moreover,thefactthatthegrandjuryhadalreadyterminatedmitigatesthedamageofapossibleinadvertentdisclosure.Seeid.,at445,103S.Ct.,at3149.Finally,becausethedisclosureauthorizedinthiscasewouldnotdirectlyresultinanywitness'testimonybeingusedagainsthimorherinacivilproceeding,thereislittlefearthatthedisclosurewillhaveanyeffectonfuturegrandjurytestimony.

16 ThesecondconcernidentifiedinSellsisthethreattotheintegrityofthegrandjuryitself.Weexplainedthatif"prosecutorsinagivencaseknewthattheircolleagueswouldbefreetousethematerialsgeneratedbythegrandjuryforacivilcase,theymightbetemptedtomanipulatethegrandjury'spowerfulinvestigativetoolstorootoutadditionalevidenceusefulinthecivilsuit,oreventostartorcontinueagrandjuryinquirywherenocriminalprosecutionseemedlikely."Id.,at432,103S.Ct.,at3142.ThediscussionofthisconcerninSellsdealtwithwhethertheCivilDivisionshouldbegivenunfetteredaccesstograndjurymaterials.Wethinktheconcernisfarlessworrisomewhentheattorneysseekingdisclosuremustgobeforeacourtanddemonstrateaparticularizedneedpriortoanydisclosure,andwhen,aspartofthatinquiry,thedistrictcourtmayproperlyconsiderwhetherthecircumstancesdiscloseanyevidenceofgrandjuryabuse.Inthiscase,forexample,oneoftheGovernmentattorneysinvolvedinthecriminalinvestigationsubmittedanaffidavitattestingtotheDepartment'sgoodfaithinconductingthegrandjuryinvestigation,App.17-19,andtherehasbeennoevidenceorallegationtothecontrary.Thefactthatacourtisinvolvedinthismannerlessenssomeoftheusualdifficultyindetectinggrandjuryabuse.SeeSells,463U.S.,at432,103S.Ct.,at3142.Moreover,wethinkthefearofabuseisminimalwhenthecivilusecontemplatedissimplyconsultationwithvariousGovernmentlawyersabouttheprudenceofproceedingwithacivilaction.

17 ThefinalconcerndiscussedinSellsisthat"useofgrandjurymaterialsbyGovernmentagenciesinciviloradministrativesettingsthreatenstosubvertthelimitationsappliedoutsidethegrandjurycontextontheGovernment'spowersofdiscoveryandinvestigation."Id.,at433,103S.Ct.,at3142.Wecontinuetobelievethatthisisanimportantconcern,butitisnotseriouslyimplicatedwhentheGovernmentsimplywishestousethematerialforconsultation.Ofcourse,whentheGovernmentrequestsdisclosureforuseinanactualadversarialproceeding,thisfactor(aswellastheothers)mayrequireastrongershowingofnecessity.Wehaveexplainedthat"astheconsiderationsjustifyingsecrecybecomelessrelevant,apartyassertinganeedforgrandjury[material]willhavealesserburdeninshowingjustification."DouglasOil,441U.S.,at223,99S.Ct.,at1675.

18 Althoughitrecognizedthatthedisclosureinthiscasedidnotseriouslythreatenthevaluesofgrandjurysecrecy,theCourtofAppealsnonethelessconcludedthattherequestfordisclosureshouldhavebeendeniedbecausevirtuallyalloftherelevantinformationcouldhavebeenobtainedfromrespondentsthroughdiscoveryundertheAntitrustCivilProcessAct.9TheCourtofAppealsbelievedthatthedelayandexpensethatwouldbecausedbysuchduplicativediscoverywasnotarelevantfactorintheparticularizedneedanalysis.774F.2d,at39.

19 Whilethepossibilityofobtaininginformationfromalternativesourcesiscertainlyanimportantfactor,webelievethattheCourtofAppealsexaggerateditssignificanceinthiscase.EvenifweassumethatalloftherelevantmaterialcouldhavebeenobtainedthroughthecivildiscoverytoolsavailabletotheGovernment,10ourprecedentsdonotestablishaperseruleagainstdisclosure.Rather,wehaverepeatedlystressedthatwidediscretionmustbeaffordedtodistrictcourtjudgesinevaluatingwhetherdisclosureisappropriate.SeeDouglasOil,441U.S.,at228,99S.Ct.,at1677;id.,at236-237,99S.Ct.,at1681-82(STEVENS,J.,dissenting);PittsburghPlateGlassCo.v.UnitedStates,360U.S.395,399,79S.Ct.1237,1240,3L.Ed.2d1323(1959).Thethreattograndjurysecrecywasminimalinthiscontext,andunderthecircumstances,theDistrictCourtproperlyconsideredthestrong"publicinterestsserved"throughdisclosure.SeeSells,463U.S.,at445,103S.Ct.,at3149;id.,at469-470,103S.Ct.,at3161(BURGER,C.J.,dissenting).AswenotedinSells,thegoverningstandardis"ahighlyflexibleone,adaptabletodifferentcircumstancesandsensitivetothefactthattherequirementsofsecrecyaregreaterinsomesituationsthaninothers."Id.,at445,103S.Ct.,at3149.TheDistrictCourtcorrectlyexaminedtherelevantfactorsandwecannotsaythatitabuseditsdiscretionindeterminingthattheequitiesleanedinfavorofdisclosure.11

ThejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealsis

20 Reversed.

21 JusticeWHITEtooknopartintheconsiderationordecisionofthiscase.

22 JusticeBRENNAN,withwhomJusticeMARSHALLandJusticeBLACKMUNjoin,dissenting.

23 Rule6(e)greatlyrestrictstheavailabilityofgrandjuryevidenceinordertopreservethesecrecyandintegrityofgrandjuryproceedings.Consistentwiththeseconcerns,inUnitedStatesv.SellsEngineering,Inc.,463U.S.418,103S.Ct.3133,77L.Ed.2d743(1983),thisCourtrejectedthecontentionthatgrandjuryinformationisautomaticallyavailabletoanyJusticeDepartmentCivilDivisionattorney.Essentialtothatconclusionwastheprinciplethatautomaticaccesstograndjurymaterialisappropriateonlyforthelimitedpurposeofpermittingaprosecutortoassistthegrandjury,andthataGovernmentattorneyseekingtousegrandjuryinformationforcivilpurposeslackssuchajustification.Id.,at431,103S.Ct.,at3141.Giventhisholding,itissimplyirrelevantwhethertheattorneywhodesirestousegrandjuryinformationinacivilactionworkedwiththegrandjuryatanearliertime.Thecrucialfactisthattheusetowhichthatattorneywouldputthisinformationisinnowayinaidofthegrandjury.Nonetheless,theCourttodayholdsthatanattorney'spastconnectionwiththatbodymakesgrandjurymaterialautomaticallyavailabletothatattorneyforthepurposeofdeterminingwhetheracivilcomplaintshouldbefiled.TheCourtreachesthisresultonlybyadoptingaseverelyrestrictedconstructionoftheword"disclosure"inRule6(e).BecausethisconstructionignoresthesubstantiveconcernsofthatRuleandisflatlyinconsistentwiththereasoninginSells,Idissent.

24 *Thegrandjuryisanexceptiontoourrelianceontheadversarialprocessinourcriminaljusticesystem.Aswehavestated:

25 "[Thegrandjury]isagrandinquest,abodywithpowersofinvestigationandinquisition,thescopeofwhoseinquiriesisnottobelimitednarrowlybyquestionsofproprietyorforecastsoftheprobableresultoftheinvestigation,orbydoubtswhetheranyparticularindividualwillbefoundproperlysubjecttoanaccusationofcrime."Blairv.UnitedStates,250U.S.273,282,39S.Ct.468,471,63L.Ed.979(1919).

26 Byvirtueofthegrandjury'scharacterasaninquisitorialbody,"therearefewifanyotherforumsinwhichagovernmentalbodyhassuchrelativelyunregulatedpowertocompelotherpersonstodivulgeinformationorproduceevidence."UnitedStatesv.SellsEngineering,Inc.,supra,463U.S.,at433,103S.Ct.,at3143.1Personsmaybesummonedtotestifyevenifnochargewhatsoeverispending,Wilsonv.UnitedStates,221U.S.361,31S.Ct.538,55L.Ed.771(1911),andeveniftheyareonlypotentialdefendants,UnitedStatesv.Wong,431U.S.174,179,n.8,97S.Ct.1823,1826,n.8,52L.Ed.2d231(1977).Exceptforprivilegeprovisions,theFederalRulesofEvidencedonotapplytoproceedingsbeforegrandjuries.Fed.RuleEvid.1101(d)(2).Theexclusionaryruleisinapplicableinthegrandjurycontext,UnitedStatesv.Calandra,414U.S.338,94S.Ct.613,38L.Ed.2d561(1974),asistheusualrequirementthatonedemonstratethereasonablenessofasubpoenatoappearandprovidevoiceorhandwritingexemplars,UnitedStatesv.Dionisio,410U.S.1,93S.Ct.764,35L.Ed.2d67(1973).Furthermore,awitnessgenerallyisnotpermittedtohavecounselpresentinthegrandjuryroomwhiletestifying.1S.Beale&W.Bryson,GrandJuryLawandPractice§6:16,p.6-88(1986).

27 Theseexceptionalpowersarewieldednotonbehalfoftheprosecutor,butinaidofthegrandjuryasan"armofthecourt."Levinev.UnitedStates,362U.S.610,617,80S.Ct.1038,1043,4L.Ed.2d989(1960).Theyareemployedtopermitthegrandjurytofulfillits"invaluablefunctioninoursocietyofstandingbetweentheaccuserandtheaccused...todeterminewhetherachargeisfoundeduponreason."Woodv.Georgia,370U.S.375,390,82S.Ct.1364,1373,8L.Ed.2d569(1962).Thus,theinformationgeneratedbythegrandjury'sinquiryis"notthepropertyoftheGovernment'sattorneys,agentsorinvestigators,noraretheyentitledtopossessionoftheminsuchacase.Instead,thosedocumentsarerecordsofthecourt."UnitedStatesv.Procter&GambleCo.,356U.S.677,684-685,78S.Ct.983,988,2L.Ed.2d1077(1958)(Whittaker,J.,concurring).SeealsoInreGrandJuryInvestigationofCuisinarts,Inc.,665F.2d24,31(CA21981)("[G]randjuryproceedingsremaintherecordsofthecourts"),cert.deniedsubnom.Connecticutv.Cuisinarts,Inc.,460U.S.1068,103S.Ct.1520,75L.Ed.2d945(1983).

28 RecognitionoftheuniquepurposeforwhichgrandjurypowersareemployedinformedourdecisioninSells.Inthatcase,werejectedtheGovernment'sargumentthattheprovisioninRule6(e)(3)(A)(i)fordisclosureofmaterialtoanattorneyfortheGovernment"foruseintheperformanceofsuchattorney'sduty"madegrandjuryinformationautomaticallyavailableforusebyJusticeDepartmentcivilattorneys.Subsection(A)(i),weheld,justifiedautomaticaccessonlyforthelimitedpurposeofenablingprosecutorstoperformtheirroleofassistingthegrandjury."Anattorneywithonlycivilduties,"westated,"lacksboththeprosecutor'sspecialroleinsupportingthegrandjury,andtheprosecutor'sowncrucialneedtoknowwhatoccursbeforethegrandjury."Sells,supra,463U.S.,at431,103S.Ct.,at3141(footnoteomitted).Asaresult,"'[f]ederalprosecutors'aregivenafreehandconcerninguseofgrandjurymaterials,atleastpursuanttotheir'dutiesrelatingtocriminallawenforcement';butdisclosureof'grandjury-developedevidenceforcivillawenforcementpurposes'requiresa(C)(i)courtorder."Id.,at441-442,103S.Ct.,at3147(quotingS.Rep.No.95-354,p.8(1977)).

29 Sucharule,weheld,wasasapplicabletoattorneyswithintheJusticeDepartmentastoattorneysinagenciesoutsideit.463U.S.,at442,103S.Ct.,at3147.Thelegislativehistoryofsubsection(A)(ii),permittingdisclosuretotheprosecutor'ssupportstaff,indicated,wesaid,that

30 "Congress'expressionsofconcernaboutciviluseofgrandjurymaterialsdidnotdistinguishinprinciplebetweensuchusebyoutsideagenciesandbytheDepartment;rather,thekeydistinctionwasbetweendisclosureforcriminaluse,astowhichaccessshouldbeautomatic,andforciviluse,astowhichacourtordershouldberequired."Id.,at440,103S.Ct.,at3146(footnoteomitted)(emphasisadded).

31 TheissueofautomaticaccessbyanattorneywhoearlierassistedthegrandjurywasnotpresentedinSells,andwedidnotreachit.Id.,at431,n.15,103S.Ct.,at3141,n.15.Astheabovelanguageindicates,however,Sellsmakesclearthattheautomaticavailabilityofgrandjuryinformationisdeterminednotbytheidentityoftheattorneywhoseekstousethematerial,butbytheusetowhichthematerialwouldbeput.2Thus,itisirrelevantwhetheranattorneyonceworkedwiththegrandjurywhatmattersiswhetherthatattorneynowdoes.

II

32 TheCourttodayevadesthislogicbyfindingthatno"disclosure"underRule6(e)occurswhenanattorneywhoassistedthegrandjuryusesgrandjurymaterialindeterminingwhetheracivilsuitshouldbefiled.ThepremiseofthisconclusionisthatRule6(e)prohibitsonly"thosewithinformationabouttheworkingsofthegrandjuryfromrevealingsuchinformationtootherpersonswhoarenotauthorizedtohaveaccesstoitundertheRule,"ante,at108(emphasisadded).3TheCourtdeclaresthatitneednotinquirewhetheritsconstructionofRule6(e)isconsistentwiththeRule'spurposes,sincetheCourtderivesthatconstructionfromits"readingoftheRule'splainlanguage."Ante,at109.

33 BeforeaddressingtheCourt's"plainlanguage"argument,itisimportanttomakeclearjusthowseriouslytheCourt'sinterpretationoftheRuleisatoddswiththeRule'sunderlyingpurposes.

34 ThefirstinterestfurtheredbythesecrecyimposedbyRule6(e)isencouragementofwitnessestotestifyfullyandcandidly.Sells,supra,at432,103S.Ct.at,3142;DouglasOilCo.v.PetrolStopsNorthwest,441U.S.211,219,99S.Ct.1667,1673,60L.Ed.2d156(1979).TheCourt'sconstructionoftheterm"disclosure"directlyconflictswiththisinterest,for"[i]fawitnessknowsorfearsthathistestimonybeforethegrandjurywillberoutinelyavailableforuseingovernmentalcivillitigationoradministrativeaction,hemaywellbelesswillingtospeakforfearthathewillgethimselfintotroubleinsomeotherforum."Sells,supra,463U.S.,at432,103S.Ct.,at3142.Thefactthattheattorneyutilizingthistestimonyreceiveditdirectlyfromthegrandjury,ratherthanfromanattorneywhoworkedwiththegrandjury,willhardlyberelevanttoawitness.Itisthesubstanceofthewitness'testimonythatwillexposehimorhertocivilliability,nottheidentityoftheGovernmentattorneywhoemploysitforthispurpose.TheCourt'snarrowconstructionoftheterm"disclosure"thuscreatesexactlythedisincentivethatRule6(e)'srestrictionondisclosureisintendedtoprevent.4

35 AsecondmajorinterestservedbyRule6(e)isprotectionoftheintegrityofthegrandjury.Theautomaticavailabilityofgrandjurymaterialforcivilusecreatesatemptationtoutilizethegrandjury'sexpansiveinvestigativepowerstogenerateevidenceusefulincivillitigation.Inoursociety,theinquisitorialcharacterofthegrandjuryisananomalythatcanbejustifiedonlyifthatbody'spowersareusedinserviceofitsuniquehistoricalfunction.Governmentalappropriationofgrandjuryinformationforcivilusethusdiminishespublicwillingnesstocountenancethegrandjury'sfar-reachingauthority.Furthermore,circumventionofnormalrestrictionsontheGovernment'scivildiscoverymethods"wouldgranttotheGovernmentavirtualexparteformofdiscovery,fromwhichitscivillitigationopponentsareexcludedunlesstheymakeastrongshowingofparticularizedneed."Sells,463U.S.,at434,103S.Ct.,at3143.

36 Thisconcernabouttheuseofgrandjuryinformationforcivilpurposesisreflectedthroughoutthelegislativehistoryoftheamendmentaddingsubsection(3)(A)(ii)toRule6(e),whichpermitsdisclosuretononattorneysforthepurposeofassistingtheprosecutor.WerecountedthishistoryindetailinSells,supra,at436-442,103S.Ct.,at3144-47,andthereisnoneedtorepeatitindetailhere.TheHouseofRepresentativesrejectedtheamendmentasoriginallydraftedbecause

37 "[i]twasfearedthattheproposedchangewouldallowGovernmentagencypersonneltoobtaingrandjuryinformationwhichtheycouldlateruseinconnectionwithanunrelatedcivilorcriminalcase.Thiswouldenablethoseagenciestocircumventstatutesthatspecificallycircumscribetheinvestigativeprocedureotherwiseavailabletothem."H.R.Rep.No.95-195,p.4(1977)(footnoteomitted).

38 Inresponse,thefinalversionoftheRulesought

39 "toallaytheconcernsofthosewhofearthatsuchprosecutorialpowerwillleadtomisuseofthegrandjurytoenforcenon-criminalFederallawsby(1)providingaclearprohibition,subjecttothepenaltyofcontemptand(2)requiringthatacourtorderunderparagraph(C)beobtainedtoauthorizesuchadisclosure."S.Rep.No.95-354,p.8(1977),U.S.CodeCong.&Admin.News1977,pp.527,531-532.

40 TheCourt'sconstructionofRule6(e)undercutssuchobjectives.ThefactthattheremaybenoexpansionofthegroupofpersonswhopossessgrandjuryinformationissimplyirrelevanttoaconcernthattheGovernmentmayseektousethegrandjuryforcivilpurposes.Ifanything,thereisevenmoremotivationforsuchmisusewhentheprospectivebeneficiaryinthecivilcontextwouldbetheprosecutor,asopposedtosomeotherGovernmentcivilattorney.TheCourt'sdecisiontodaycreatesanincentivefortheGovernmenttouseprosecutorsratherthancivilattorneystoprepareandfilecivilcomplaintsbasedongrandjuryinformation,apracticedirectlyatoddswithCongress'intentiontominimizetheopportunityforusingsuchinformationoutsidethegrandjurycontext.5ThistemptationtoemploythegrandjuryasacivilinvestigativeunitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeintentionthatRule6(e)operatetoimpedetheuseofgrandjuryinformationforcivilpurposes.6Itisfarmoreconsonantwiththatintentiontofindthatmattersoccurringbeforethegrandjuryare"disclosed"anytimetheyareputtouseoutsidethegrandjurycontext,whetherornottheattorneywhousesthemassistedthegrandjuryatanearliertime.Therewas"disclosure"inthiscaseunderthatstandard.

41 TheCourtavoidsconfrontingtheextenttowhichitsdecisionundercutstheobjectivesoftheRulebymaintainingthatitsconstructionoftheRuleiscompelledbythe"plainmeaning"oftheword"disclosure."Itissurelyunlikely,however,thataconstructionthatproducesresultssoclearlyatvariancewiththeconcernsoftheRuleisrequiredbyits"plainlanguage."ContrarytotheCourt'sapproach,thepurposesoftheRule,notdictionarydefinitions,haveguidedcourtsinconstruingthistermofart.Forinstance,theCourt'sassumptionthat"disclosure"doesnotoccurwhenapartyseekingtoutilizeinformationisalreadyinlegitimatepossessionofitisbeliedby"thewellsettledrulethatawitnessisnotentitledtoacopyofhisgrandjurytestimonyondemand,eventhoughheobviouslywaspresentinthegrandjuryroomduringthereceiptofevidence,sincearuleofautomaticaccesswouldexposegrandjurywitnessestopotentialintimidation"bymakingitpossibleforthosewithpoweroverthewitnesstomonitorhisorhertestimony.BriefforUnitedStates26,n.20(emphasisadded).7See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Clavey,565F.2d111,113-114(CA71978)(treatingas"disclosure"accessofgrandjurywitnesstoownpriortestimony,noting"policyreasonsjustifyingstrictpreservationofthesecrecy"ofgrandjuryproceedings);Bastv.UnitedStates,542F.2d893,895-896(CA41976)(treatingas"disclosure"accessofgrandjurywitnesstoownpriortestimony,notingthat"thesecrecyofgrandjuryproceedingsencourageswitnessestotestifywithoutfearofretaliationandprotectstheindependenceofthegrandjury").Cf.ExecutiveSecuritiesCorp.v.Doe,702F.2d406,408-409(CA21983)(treatingas"disclosure"accesstograndjurymaterialbyapartyfamiliarwithsuchmaterialbyvirtueofearlierRule6(e)disclosureorder).Thus,althoughtheCourt'sconstructionoftheterm"disclosure"wouldnotencompassaccesstograndjurymaterialbypartiesalreadyfamiliarwithsuchmaterial,suchaccessisroutinelyregardedas"disclosure"incertaininstancesbecausesuchaconstructionoftheRulefurthersitsbasicpurposes.

42 Furthermore,evenrelyingondictionarydefinitions,itisjustasplausibletosaythatone"'make[s]knownorpublic...somethingpreviouslyheldcloseorsecret,'"ante,at108,n.4(quotingWebster'sThirdNewInternationalDictionary645(1976)),when,asinthiscase,onetakesinformationfromasecretgrandjuryproceedingandputsittouseintheformoffactualallegationsrecountedinacivillawsuit.Seen.5,supra.Bynow,itshouldbeapparentthattheCourt'sinterpretationoftheterm"disclosure"isnotcompelledbytheRule'splainlanguage.Giventhisfact,theappropriatecourseistodeterminewhichinterpretationisappropriatebyreferencetotheunderlyingpolicyconcernsofRule6(e).Astheprecedinganalysisdemonstrates,theCourt'sconstructionisseriouslydeficientbythatstandard.

43 TheCourt'scrampedreadingofRule6(e)isparticularlyunjustifiedbecausethemoreplausibleinterpretationsuggestedabovewouldnotabsolutelyforeclosetheGovernmentfromutilizinggrandjuryinformationoutsidethegrandjurycontext.Rather,thatinterpretationwouldmerelyprecludeautomaticuseofgrandjuryinformation,requiringadisinterestedcourtineachcasetoweightheneedforgrandjurysecrecyagainsttheneedforciviluseofthematerial.Evenwherejudicialpermissionwasnotforthcoming,significantduplicationoftimeandeffortcouldbeavoidedbyconductingthecivilinvestigationfirst,andthenreferringcasesforcriminalprosecution.ThisistheprocedurefollowedbytheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission,whichconductsaninitialcivilinvestigationandthenreferscasesforprosecutiontotheJusticeDepartmentifwarranted.15U.S.C.§78u(h)(9)(B).Similarly,sincethisCourtheldinUnitedStatesv.Baggot,463U.S.476,103S.Ct.3164,77L.Ed.2d785(1983),thatgrandjurymaterialcouldnotbedisclosedtotheInternalRevenueService(IRS)foruseinataxaudit,theIRSconductsitsowncivilinvestigations,whichmaygenerateinformationusefulinasubsequentcriminalprosecution.Inthiscase,theavailabilityofexpansivediscoverypowersundertheAntitrustCivilProcessAct,15U.S.C.§§1311-1314,wouldmakeiteasytoavoidanypurportedduplicationofeffort.

44 AdoptionoftheinterpretationurgedbyrespondentsthereforewouldimposenosignificantcostontheGovernment,andwouldbemostconsistentwiththeinterestsfurtheredbygrandjurysecrecy.

III

45 IwouldalsoaffirmtheCourtofAppealsinsofarasitheldthattheAntitrustDivisionwasnotentitledtodisclosegrandjurymaterialtotheCivilDivisionandUnitedStatesAttorney'sOffice,althoughforadifferentreasonthanthatofferedbythecourtbelow.TheAntitrustDivisionsoughtthisdisclosureforthepurposeofreceivingadvicewhetherfilingacomplaintonthebasisofcertainevidencewouldbeconsistentwithGovernmentenforcementpolicy.Most,ifnotall,ofthisevidence,however,wasgrandjurymaterial,theuseofwhichinacivilcontexthadnotbeenauthorizedbyacourtorder.Seen.5,supra.Sincethisevidencecouldnotlegitimatelyserveasthebasisforacivilcomplaintwithoutacourtorder,therewasnojustificationforitsdisclosuretothirdpartiesatthatpoint.Ineffect,theAntitrustDivisionsoughtdisclosuretoobtainadviceaboutthestrengthofevidencethattheDivisionhadnotreceivedauthorizationtouseinfilingitscomplaint.Asaresult,therewasno"need"fordisclosurejustifyinganexceptiontoRule6(e)'sgeneralruleofgrandjurysecrecy.

IV

46 TheCourttodayforsakesrelianceonadisinterestedjudgetodeterminetheproprietyoftheciviluseofgrandjurymaterialinthecircumstancesofthiscase.TheCourtthereforeleavesthisdecisionentirelytothediscretionofapartywhostandstogainfromutilizingthegrandjury'senormousinvestigativepowersforthepurposeofpreparingacivilcomplaint.ThisinterpretationofRule6(e)isfundamentallyatoddswiththatRule'smandatethatgrandjuryinformationbeusedforcivilpurposesonlywhen,inparticularcircumstances,theneedfortheinformationoutweighstheinterestingrandjurysecrecy.Idissent.

1TheCourtofAppealsrejectedrespondents'challengetotheexpartenatureoftheinitialRule6(e)hearing.774F.2d,at37.Respondentshavenotcross-petitionedforcertiorarionthatpoint,andwedonotaddressit.

2Rule6(e)provides,inrelevantpart,asfollows:

"RecordingandDisclosureofProceedings.

*****

"(2)GeneralRuleofSecrecy.Agrandjuror,aninterpreter,astenographer,anoperatorofarecordingdevice,atypistwhotranscribesrecordedtestimony,anattorneyforthegovernment,oranypersontowhomdisclosureismadeunderparagraph(3)(A)(ii)ofthissubdivisionshallnotdisclosemattersoccurringbeforethegrandjury,exceptasotherwiseprovidedforintheserules.Noobligationofsecrecymaybeimposedonanypersonexceptinaccordancewiththisrule....

"(3)Exceptions.

"(A)Disclosureotherwiseprohibitedbythisruleofmattersoccurringbeforethegrandjury,otherthanitsdeliberationsandthevoteofanygrandjuror,maybemadeto—

"(i)anattorneyforthegovernmentforuseintheperformanceofsuchattorney'sduty;and

"(ii)suchgovernmentpersonnel...asaredeemednecessary...toassistanattorneyforthegovernmentintheperformanceofsuchattorney'sdutytoenforcefederalcriminallaw.

"(B)Anypersontowhommattersaredisclosedundersubparagraph(A)(ii)ofthisparagraphshallnotutilizethatgrandjurymaterialforanypurposeotherthanassistingtheattorneyforthegovernmentinperformanceofsuchattorney'sdutytoenforcefederalcriminallaw.Anattorneyforthegovernmentshallpromptlyprovidethedistrictcourt,beforewhichwasimpaneledthegrandjury...withthenamesofthepersonstowhomsuchdisclosurehasbeenmade.

"(C)Disclosureotherwiseprohibitedbythisruleofmattersoccurringbeforethegrandjurymayalsobemade—

"(i)whensodirectedbyacourtpreliminarilytoorinconnectionwithajudicialproceeding;or

"(ii)whenpermittedbyacourtattherequestofthedefendant,uponashowingthatgroundsmayexistforamotiontodismisstheindictmentbecauseofmattersoccurringbeforethegrandjury."

3See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Procter&GambleCo.,356U.S.677,78S.Ct.983,2L.Ed.2d1077(1958);PittsburghPlateGlassCo.v.UnitedStates,360U.S.395,79S.Ct.1237,3L.Ed.2d1323(1959);Dennisv.UnitedStates,384U.S.855,86S.Ct.1840,16L.Ed.2d973(1966);DouglasOilCo.v.PetrolStopsNorthwest,441U.S.211,99S.Ct.1667,60L.Ed.2d156(1979);Illinoisv.Abbott&Associates,Inc.,460U.S.557,103S.Ct.1356,75L.Ed.2d281(1983);UnitedStatesv.SellsEngineering,Inc.,463U.S.418,103S.Ct.3133,77L.Ed.2d743(1983);UnitedStatesv.Baggott,463U.S.476,103S.Ct.3164,77L.Ed.2d785(1983).

4Theword"disclose"isnotdefinedintheRule,butthecommondictionarydefinitionsincludeto"openup,"to"exposetoview,"to"openuptogeneralknowledge,"andto"makeknownorpublic...somethingpreviouslyheldcloseorsecret."SeeWebster'sThirdNewInternationalDictionary645(1976);Webster'sNewCollegiateDictionary325(1977).

5InProcter&Gamble,theCourtlistedthefollowingreasonsforgrandjurysecrecy:

"'(1)Topreventtheescapeofthosewhoseindictmentmaybecontemplated;(2)toinsuretheutmostfreedomtothegrandjuryinitsdeliberations,andtopreventpersonssubjecttoindictmentortheirfriendsfromimportuningthegrandjurors;(3)topreventsubornationofperjuryortamperingwiththewitnesseswhomaytestifybeforegrandjuryandlaterappearatthetrialofthoseindictedbyit;(4)toencouragefreeanduntrammeleddisclosuresbypersonswhohaveinformationwithrespecttothecommissionofcrimes;(5)toprotectinnocentaccusedwhoisexoneratedfromdisclosureofthefactthathehasbeenunderinvestigation,andfromtheexpenseofstandingtrialwheretherewasnoprobabilityofguilt.'"356U.S.,at681,n.6,78S.Ct.,at986,n.6,quotingUnitedStatesv.Rose,215F.2d617,628-629(CA31954).

6JusticeBRENNANarguesthat"therecanbelittledoubtthatgrandjuryinformationwasused"inpreparingthecomplaint.Post,at124,n.5.Mere"use"ofgrandjuryinformationinthepreparationofacivilcomplaintwouldnotconstituteprohibiteddisclosure.Inthiscase,forexample,onecannotsaywhethertheGovernmentreliedatallonthegrandjuryinformation.TheGovernmentobviouslyhadsomeevidenceofwrongdoing(oratleastsuspicion)beforeitconvenedthegrandjury.ThegeneralallegationsofthecivilcomplaintmaywellhavedisclosednothingthattheGovernmentattorneysdidnotalreadyknowbeforetheyconvenedthegrandjury,eventhoughthegrandjuryinvestigationcorroboratedthepreviouslyknownfacts.Tobesure,theGovernment'sdecisiontobringacivilactionwas"basedontheevidenceobtainedinthecourseofitsgrandjurytestimony,"ibid.,butthisdoesnotmeanthatthecomplaintdisclosedanyofthatinformation,orthat,asJusticeBRENNANbelieves,post,at128,theGovernmenthasnointerestinthematerialunlessitactuallyintroducesitorotherwisedisclosesitattrial.

7Rule6(e)(3)(C)(i)provides:

"(C)Disclosureotherwiseprohibitedbythisruleofmattersoccurringbeforethegrandjurymayalsobemade—

"(i)whensodirectedbyacourtpreliminarilytoorinconnectionwithajudicialproceeding."

8InDouglasOil,wedescribedthestandardasfollows:

"PartiesseekinggrandjurytranscriptsunderRule6(e)mustshowthatthematerialtheyseekisneededtoavoidapossibleinjusticeinanotherjudicialproceeding,thattheneedfordisclosureisgreaterthantheneedforcontinuedsecrecy,andthattheirrequestisstructuredtocoveronlymaterialsoneeded...."441U.S.,at222,99S.Ct.,at1674.

9TheCourtofAppealswasalsoconcernedaboutthespecificityoftherequesteddisclosure.Whilethisconcernwasappropriate,thelackofparticularitywasnotoverlydangerousinthissettingbecausetheinterestinpreservingsecrecyfromCivilDivisionlawyerswasminimal,andtheAntitrustlawyersobviouslywouldnothaveanyreasontoburdenthemwithportionsoftherecordthatwerenotrelevanttotheadvisorytaskthattheywerebeingaskedtoperform.

10Itisfarfromclearthatthisassumptionisaccurate.Onlyin1986didCongressamendtheFalseClaimsActsoastoallowtheuseofCID'sforinvestigationsofviolationsofthatAct.SeePub.L.99-562,100Stat.3153.Inaddition,theGovernment'sopportunitytoproceedwithcivildiscoverybeforedecidingwhethertofileacivilcomplaintwassignificantlyhamperedbythefactthatthestatuteoflimitationsononeoftheclaimswastorunshortlyafterthegrandjurywasdismissed.

11Basedonhisassumptionthatanycomplaintfiledwouldnecessarilydisclosegrandjuryinformation,JusticeBRENNANconcludesthattherecouldbenolegitimatejustificationfordisclosuretotheCivilDivisionlawyersandtheUnitedStatesAttorneyforconsultationpurposes.Thisargumentmissestwopoints.First,theAntitrustDivisionmayhavewantedtheattorneys'adviceonthemattereveniftheywouldnothavebeenabletodisclosetheactualgrandjurymaterialsinasubsequentcivilproceeding.Seen.6,supra.Second,intheeventthattheconsultationsconfirmedthepositionthatacivilsuitwasappropriate,theAntitrustDivisionattorneysmayhaveplannedoneventuallyseekingasecondcourtorderthatwouldallowthemtodisclosethematerialinacivilsuit.Seepost,at127(Governmentmay,ofcourse,seekcourtorderpermittingdisclosureincivilcase).Thepurposeoftheconsultation,therefore,wasnotnecessarilyintertwinedwithanydisclosurethatJusticeBRENNANbelievesisprohibited.

1SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Calandra,414U.S.338,343,94S.Ct.613,617,38L.Ed.2d561(1974)("Thegrandjurymaycompeltheproductionofevidenceorthetestimonyofwitnessesasitconsidersappropriate,anditsoperationgenerallyisunrestrainedbythetechnicalproceduralandevidentiaryrulesgoverningtheconductofcriminaltrials");2S.Beale&W.Bryson,GrandJuryLawandPractice§7:01,p.7-4(1986)("[T]hegrandjuryhasthemostextensivesubpoenapowerknowntothelaw").

2SeealsoUnitedStatesv.SellsEngineering,Inc.,463U.S.,at428,103S.Ct.,at3140("[I]tisimmaterialthatcertainattorneyshappentobeassignedtoaunitcalledtheCivilDivision,orthattheirusualdutiesinvolveonlycivilcases.If,forexample,theAttorneyGeneral(forwhateverreason)weretodetailaCivilDivisionattorneytoconductacriminalgrandjuryinvestigation,nothinginRule6wouldpreventthatattorneyfromdoingso;heneednotsecureatransferoutoftheCivilDivision").

3TheCourtalsorejectsthepositionthat,whereanattorneywhofilesacivilsuitwaspermittedtousegrandjuryinformationtodetermineifthatsuitshouldbefiled,acomplaintrelatingtoconductthatwasthesubjectofthegrandjuryinvestigationnecessarilydisclosesgrandjuryinformation.Instead,theCourtnotesthatthecomplaintinthiscasedidnotspecificallyidentifyanyinformationastheproductofgrandjuryproceedings,norhaverespondentsidentified"anythinginthecomplaintthatindirectlydisclosesgrandjuryinformation."Ante,at110.Determiningsomehowwhetheracomplaintutilizesgrandjuryinformationisaninherentlyuncertainexercise,however,asisindicatedbytheCourt'sspeculationaboutthepossiblescenariosunderwhichtheGovernmentmightnothavereliedongrandjuryinformationinfilingthecivilcomplaintinthiscase.Ante,at110,n.6.TobasethedeterminationwhethertherehasbeendisclosureonsuchshiftingsandsisfundamentallyinconsistentwiththespiritofRule6(e)'sstringentandcategoricalprohibitiononautomaticaccesstograndjurymaterial.Thisiswhyitispreferable,asissetforthinfra,toimposeabright-lineprohibitiononautomaticaccesstograndjurymaterialforanycivilattorney.

4TheGovernmentisunpersuasiveinarguingthatthisprospectisnomoreofadisincentivethanthepossibilitythattestimonywillberevealedundertheJencksActorunderaRule6(e)courtorder.TheJencksActauthorizesthedisclosureofgrandjurystatementsonlyifthewitnessiscalledbytheUnitedStatestotestifyattrial,onlytothecriminaldefendant,andonlytotheextentthatthestatementrelatestothesubjectmatterofthewitness'testimonyattrial.18U.S.C.§3500.DisclosureunderaRule6(e)courtorderrequiresajudicialdeterminationthattheneedfordisclosure"outweighsthepublicinterestinsecrecy,"DouglasOilCo.v.PetrolStopsNorthwest,441U.S.211,223,99S.Ct.1667,1675,60L.Ed.2d156(1979).Theseprovisionsfordisclosureunderlimitedcircumstanceshardlycomparewiththeautomatic,wholesaleavailabilityofgrandjuryinformationforthepurposeoffilingacivilcomplaint.

5ContrarytotheCourt'sassumption,therecanbelittledoubtthatgrandjuryinformationwasusedasthebasisforthecomplaintinthiscase.Thegrandjuryinvestigationproducedsome250,000pagesofsubpoenaeddocumentsandtranscriptsofthetestimonyof"dozensofwitnesses."InreGrandJuryInvestigation,774F.2d34,40(CA21985).TwoofthethreerespondentsrefusedtocertifyinresponsetoaCivilInvestigativeDemand(CID)bytheGovernmentthatalldocumentsrequestedbytheCIDhadbeensubmittedtothegrandjury.TheserespondentsfurnishednodocumentsinresponsetotheCID's,nordidtheGovernmentattempttoenforcesuchdemands.Atleastastothesetwocorporations,therefore,grandjurymaterialistheonlyinformationthatcouldhaveservedasthebasisforthecivilcomplaint.TheprominentroleofgrandjurymaterialinpreparingthecomplaintagainstrespondentsisunderscoredbytheAntitrustDivision'srequestforaRule6(e)orderauthorizingdisclosuretotheCivilDivisionandtheUnitedStatesAttorney'sOffice.AstheGovernmentstatedinthatrequest,"TheAntitrustDivisioncurrentlyisconsideringwhethertobringacivilaction,basedontheevidenceobtainedinthecourseofitsgrandjuryinvestigation,allegingviolationsof[theSherman,FalseClaims,andForeignAssistanceActs]."App.10(emphasisadded).

6Itistruethatanygivengrandjuryinvestigationmaybechallengedonthegroundthatitisintendedtogenerateinformationforacivilsuit.UnitedStatesv.Procter&Gamble,Co.,356U.S.677,683-684,78S.Ct.983,986-87,2L.Ed.2d1077(1958).However,theneedforaprophylacticruleagainstautomaticdisclosurerestsonrecognitionofthefactthat"ifandwhen[grandjurymisuse]doesoccur,itwouldoftenbeverydifficulttodetectandprove."Sells,463U.S.,at432,103S.Ct.,at3142.

7Theprosecutorandthewitnessobviouslydifferintheirrespectivebasesforpossessionofgrandjuryinformation.Theprosecutor'saccesstoitisauthorizedbyRule6(e)(3)(A)(i);nosuchexplicitauthorizationisnecessaryforthewitness,ofcourse,sinceheorsheisthedirectsourceofthisinformation.