HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !1 34

HWA CHONG CONFLICT RESOLUTION & INQUIRY 2017

U N I T E D N AT I O N S S E C U R I T Y C O U N C I L

Dais introductions

Cheyenne Ong Head Chair A Year 6 student in the Humanities Programme, Cheyenne is honoured to be the Head Chair of the United Nations Security Council for HCCRI 2017.

Having joined the Model UN circuit in 2015, Cheyenne looks back fondly on her first MUN experience, in which she distinctly remembers raising her placard three times over three days. Since then, she’s been to a few more MUNs, including chairing the Crisis Committee at last year’s edition of HCCRI.

As an FHLKI student, she finds joy in expressing extremely sincere sympathy for the people whose math/econs notes and GCs are strewn all over the classroom. Cheyenne also likes debating, but doesn’t necessarily like all geopol motions. After HCCRI, she will be panicking over her four incomplete research papers, and is hence looking forward to making the conference a great calm before the storm. More importantly, she hopes that delegates will gain something from their experience at HCCRI 2017!

Tan Wei Heng Vice-Chair A Year 5 student in the Humanities Programme, Tan Wei Heng is a member of both HACAS and the English Literature, Drama, Debate and Film Society (ELDDFS). In school, he is currently taking the KiLMH subject combination. His MUN journey began as an administrative staff at THIMUN Singapore 2014, followed by his first conference as a delegate at IMUNC 2015. To date, he has participated in a number of conferences such as RMUN 2015 and THIMUN Hague 2016, from which he has attained various accolades such as ‘Best Delegate’ in IMUNC 2016. Apart from MUNs, Wei Heng enjoys reading about philosophy and existentialism. Outside of academics, Wei Heng enjoys binge watching shows such as Doctor Who and How to Get Away With Murder.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !2 34

Wei Heng is extremely honoured to be chairing this year’s UNSC. He hopes that the conference will be an enriching experience for all delegates and looks forward to meeting everyone at HCCRI.

Jordan Lim Vice-Chair A Year 5 student at Hwa Chong Institution, Jordan is greatly honoured to be vice-chairing the Security Council in HCCRI 2017! Participating in his first ever MUN, NTUMUN 2016, Jordan recalls his experience as nothing short of terrifying. Yet, he remained undaunted, moving on to participate in various local and international MUNs such as IMUNC 2016 and THIMUN(Hague) 2017 within the past year.

Having torn a grand total of 3 out of 4 ligaments in his left knee, Jordan's career as a shotput thrower in the Track and Field team has been indefinitely put on hold. However, while Jordan attempts to recuperate his leg through daily physiotherapy exercises, one should not be alarmed to find him singing and dancing to K-Pop as and when the opportunity arises.

This being his first chairing experience, Jordan looks forward to meeting all delegates! Jordan wishes that all delegates would be able to step out of their comfort zones and forge a memorable experience in this year’s edition of HCCRI!

Contact the chairs You may contact the Chairs of UNSC at hccri2017+UNSC@gmail.com.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !3 34

The United Nations Security Council

Committee History The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the most powerful organ created by the

1945 UN Charter, is tasked with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of

international peace and security”. Upon its inception, the first session was held on 17

January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, London before moving to its permanent

residence at the UN Headquarters in New York City While the Council started out with 1

six non-permanent members, it eventually expanded to its present ten after talks

concerning reform in 1965 3. During the first 45 years of its existence, the world saw the

paralysis of the council by the Cold War, which polarised many member states,

impeding their performance and ability to achieve its responsibility.

With the end of Cold War, the UN saw a significant change with the status quo, marked

by increased peacekeeping duties and greater involvement with the international

community. Issues ranging from prosecuting war crimes to facilitating political process

such as that in South Sudan have demonstrated the importance of the UNSC in the

global community.

Mandate The Council comprises 15 Members, of which 5 are permanent members while the

remaining 10 are non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. The remaining ten seats are allotted regionally – two to Asia, two Latin America, two to Western Europe, one to Eastern Europe, and three to Africa . The 5 2

permanent members of the Council bear the power of veto, enabling to prevent the adoption of any resolution. In the council, resolutions are legally binding. The 15

"Security council, SC, UNSC, security, peace, sanctions, veto, resolution, president, united 1

nations, UN, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, prevention," United Nations, accessed February 11, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/.

Michael Teng and Bruce Lusignan. "United Nations Security Council Reform." EDGE Autumn 2

(2003).

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !4 34

members are: 3

Permanent Members (P5):

● China

● France

● Russian Federation

● United Kingdom

● United States of America

Non-Permanent Members:

● Bolivia (2018)

● Egypt (2017)

● Ethiopia (2018)

● Italy (2018)

● Japan (2017)

● Kazakhstan (2018)

● Senegal (2017)

● Sweden (2018)

● Ukraine (2017)

● Uruguay (2017)

The duties of the Council, as established by the Charter, are to “investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is

likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security” . In 4

accordance with Article 24 of the UN Charter, all members of the UN bear the

responsibility of preserving the peace and security of the world. To address the varying threats to peace, measures the Council could adopt: 1) Sanctions (e.g. economic sanctions and travel bans), 2) Diplomatic tools (peaceful negotiations), 3) Military action

"Security council, SC, UNSC, security, peace, sanctions, veto, resolution, president, united 3

nations, UN, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, prevention," United Nations, , accessed February 11, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/.

"The UN Security Council," United Nations Foundation, accessed February 11, 2017, http://4

www.unfoundation.org/what-we-do/issues/united-nations/the-un-security-council.html.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !5 34

(peacekeeping forces to reduce tensions and enforce ceasefire), and 4) Partnerships (work with relevant organisations).

Significant Resolutions Resolution 82, the resolution that led to the eventual US intervention in the 1950

Korean War. Despite being in its early years of conception, the resolution

demonstrated the power and authority of the Security Council in addressing

international security concerns. However as a result the Soviet Union committed to

veto all further resolutions addressed at North Korea. In doing so led to the

materialisation of the General Assembly procedure “Uniting for Peace Resolution”,

introduced by then U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson . This allows a member state 5

to circumvent the Security Council and use the General Assembly to access powers

typically reserved for the Security Council. Apart from allowing emergency special

sessions, the action can be enacted when the disagreement within the Security Council

inhibited the ability of the council to uphold its duties.

Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, passed in 2000, revamped the nature

of warfare, thereby addressing the impact of war on women and their pivotal role they

play in sustaining peace . Given the prevalent exclusion of women from peace 6

processes, this landmark legal framework established the importance of their

involvement. As such the resolution calls all actors to: (1) take measures to protect

women and girls from gender-based violence, (2) increase participation of women in

peacekeeping efforts, and (3) greater inter-agency coordination through the

Interagency Taskforce on Women, Peace and Security . 7

Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, adopted in April 2006,

Colum Lynch, "The 10 worst U.N. Security Council resolutions ever," Foreign Policy, May 21, 5

2010, accessed April 09, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/21/the-10-worst-u-n-security-council-resolutions-ever-2/.

“What is U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 and Why is it so Critical Today?," United 6

States Institute of Peace, April 14, 2016, , accessed April 05, 2017, https://www.usip.org/gender_peacebuilding/about_UNSCR_1325.

"Landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security (Security Council resolution 1325)," 7

United Nations, accessed April 09, 2017, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !6 34

made the first official reference to the responsibility to protect . Beyond endorsing the 8

agreement by leaders seeking to prevent tragedies similar to the 1994 Rwandan

Genocide from recurring, it integrated the premise for humanitarian intervention into

international law . With its adoption, the resolution provided the premise for future 9

intervention such as Resolution 1970 which imposed a series of international sanctions

in hopes of reducing the violence in Libya8. Specifics of the resolution include: (1)

defining the deliberate targeting of civilians as a violation of international law, (2)

ratifying and adhering to international conventions such as the Hague Conventions of

1899, and (3) aid from the international community to fulfill obligations concerning the

protection of refugees . 10

Resolution 2334 was the first progress in recent times, after years of stagnation due to

US exercising Her veto rights, concerning the issue of Israel. Within it, the Security

Council declared the Israeli Settlements in Palestinian territory were a violation of

international law . These settlements have long posed a significant obstacle to the 11

peace and stability of the two-state solution previously set out by the Security Council.

As such it, opens Israel up to further potential prosecution and prevents them from

further normalising the occupation and settlement enterprise. Given Israel’s refusal to

comply, developments would include the involvement of the International Court of

Justice (ICJ) or the International Criminal Court (ICC) on matters including the

settlement dispute and the systematic war crimes committed.

"Rwanda, genocide, Hutu, Tutsi, mass execution, ethnic cleansing, massacre, human rights, 8

victim remembrance, education, Africa," United Nations, accessed April 09, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml.

Edith M. Lederer. "U.N. Affirms Duty to Defend Civilians," The Washington Post, April 29, 2006, 9

accessed April 09, 2017, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/28/AR2006042801833.html.

UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) [on protection of civilians in 10

armed conflict], 28 April 2006, S/RES/1674 (2006), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4459bed60.html [accessed 9 April 2017].

"Israel's Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International 11

Law, Security Council Reaffirms | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases," United Nations, December 23, 2016, , accessed April 09, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12657.doc.htm.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !7 34

The Question of Taiwan

" Fig 1. Location of Taiwan in relation to China

Overview of topic

The question of Taiwan is a thorny issue that refers to the present ambiguity over the

political and legal status of the island. The current contention centres on whether the island of Taiwan and Penghu should be unified with mainland China under the rule of (a) the Republic of China, (b) the People’s Republic of China, or (c) declare

independence to become the Republic of Taiwan.

The roots of the question can be traced back to the dusk of World War II, in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War . After decimating most of the Kuomintang (KMT) 12

army, the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s army captured the KMT capital, Nanjing,

on the 23rd of April 1949. Thereafter, by late 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and approximately two million Nationalist Chinese had retreated from mainland China to the island of

Taiwan. In December the same year, Chiang proceeded to declare Taipei, Taiwan, as the temporary capital of the Republic of China (ROC) and assert his government as the sole legitimate authority of China. Although the ROC government was still granted

recognition by international bodies, their position was only safeguarded due to the

“Milestones: 1945–1952,” Office of the Historian, accessed February 19, 2017, https://12

history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !8 34

American interest to contain the communist influence the PRC had on the international stage. Hence, this meant that the US-led alliance repeatedly blocked attempts by the Soviet Union to replace the ROC delegate with the PRC delegate in the United

Nations.

At present, however, representatives of the ROC are not recognised as representatives of China, and have not been so since its expulsion from the United Nations General Assembly in October 1971. Although this has left Taiwan in a global legal vacuum,

other countries have chosen to employ creative workarounds in adopting a policy of deliberate ambiguity. This means that countries generally treat Taiwan (unofficially) as a

state, without any stance on whether or not they would support a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan. For instance, since the 1984 Olympic Games, athletes of the ROC have competed under the deliberately ambiguous banner of “Chinese Taipei”. 13

Furthermore, while the PRC is regarded as the official government of China, there is little clarification on whether Taiwan is included in China as well.

! Fig 2. The then deputy foreign minister of PRC Qiao Guanhua(L) and then diplomat of PRC Huang Hua(R) laugh upon receiving the news that the UN General Assembly had passed Resolution 2758, thus recognizing the PRC

government as the sole representative of China to the UN 14

Philip A. D’Agati, The Cold War and the 1984 Olympic Games: A Soviet-American Surrogate 13

War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

“45th Anniversary Since People’s Republic of China Took up Its Lawful Seat in United 14

Nations,” October 25, 2016, accessed February 19, 2017, http://english.cri.cn/12394/2016/10/25/3621s943371.htm.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !9 34

Taiwanese claims to independence

Due to the suppression of nationalist sentiments during the Japanese Occupation and

martial law that ended only in 1987, the notion of Taiwanese independence can be

considered a relatively new concept. With the primary goals of the ROC being recovery

of the mainland and national unification until 1991, there was no room in the political

scene for the entrance of ideals of independence; for between 1949 and 1991, the

official position of the ROC government on Taiwan was that it was the legitimate

government of all of China.

With the rise to power of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Fig. 3) in 1991,

however, the notion of Taiwanese independence began to gain political traction. By the

end of the 1990s, independence was supported by a growing base of voters who were

increasingly vocal about their objectives . This has led to a surge in focus on identity 15

politics, whereby policies that involved the prioritisation of Taiwanese culture in forming

the nation’s identity were encouraged and implemented: for instance, in the use of

mother tongue education in schools.

With the sweeping victory of the DPP over the incumbent KMT in the elections of

January 2016 , it is evident Taiwanese voters are increasingly inclined towards the 16

notion of independence the DPP stands so proudly for. The elected president, Tsai Ing-

wen, is not known to have fundamentally deviated from the party line, and said in the

election that she would be focusing her attention on maintaining the status quo.

Nonetheless, she has since called for renewed negotiations between China and Taiwan.

“‘Taiwan independence’ Doesn’T Mean What You Think,” April 11, 2016, accessed February 15

19, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/11/taiwan-independence-china-republic-huadu-taidu/.

“Time to Start Worrying about Taiwan,” The National Interest, June 12, 2016, accessed 16

February 19, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/time-start-worrying-about-taiwan-16551.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !10 34

" Fig 3. Logo of the Democratic Progressive Party

Taiwan’s foreign relations since the Chinese Civil War

Relations between China and Taiwan remain complex. In spite of the fact that the Chinese Civil War was officially declared as over by the ROC in 1991, both the ROC and PRC have never signed any agreement to legally put an end to the war. In

addition, the DPP gained the presidential seat in its election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000, marking the first time a party other than the KMT had elected its president to power.

This caused a rise in tensions, although the effect of these tensions appears to have been generally minimal, without significant impact on their relations. Broadly-speaking, economic relations have taken a positive turn. This is notable in the cross-strait talks

and economic cooperation which were resumed under the leadership of China’s Hu Jintao and Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou.

In January 1979, the US established diplomatic relations with the PRC as a strategic 17

move to keep a check on the Soviet Union’s political influence. Following this move,

Carter’s administration ceased to recognise the government of the ROC, therefore annulling the Sino-American Mutual Defense treaty, which previously guaranteed

support from the other party if either party was attacked, in January 1980. However, with the passing of the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979, Carter was able to 18

maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan, setting the precedent for the policy of

deliberate ambiguity. For instance, this act has granted the US and Taiwan the mandate

“China-U.S. Relations,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of 17

America, July 1, 2012, accessed February 19, 2017, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/ocusr/t946195.htm.

“Taiwan Relations Act,” accessed February 10, 2017, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/china/18

taiwan_relations_act.pdf.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !11 34

to establish respective “representative offices” in both countries; furthermore, this act has also permitted commercial ties between Taiwan and the US to be expanded, with the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) as facilitator.

Although the US has expressed support for the One-China Policy, this does not stand

to mean that they agree or support all of the PRC’s claims to sovereignty over Taiwan . 19

Furthermore, US support for the One China Policy under the Trump administration is now tenuous , with President Trump stating that the policy was under negotiation but 20

later reaffirming his commitment to it. Given the past threats President Trump has made in only wanting to uphold the agreement if concessions on trade could be

secured from Beijing, it is unclear if the diplomatic stance that has been adopted by US presidents since 1979 will remain unchanged under the current presidency.

Timeline of relevant events

Date Description of Event Significance of Event

1 August 1927 Chinese Civil War commences Victor of the war would be the one

to decide the political fate of the

Chinese Mainland;

25 October 1945 Taiwan was handed over to the

ROC with the signing of the

Instrument of Surrender following

Japan's defeat in World War II

Taiwan becomes a province of

China; Chinese Civil War resumes;

1 October 1949 Nationalist Party (KMT) is defeated

and flees to Taiwan

Establishment of the current status

q u o w h e r e t w o C h i n e s e

governments are fighting for

legitimacy to be the rightful

government of China;

John Tkacik, Stating America’s Case to China’s Hu Jintao: A Primer on U.S.-China-Taiwan 19

Policy, (n.p.: The Heritage Foundation, 2002), http://www.heritage.org/asia/report/stating-americas-case-chinas-hu-jintao-primer-us-china-taiwan-policy.

Eugene Scott, “China: No Negotiation on ‘One China’ Policy Despite Trump Remarks,” CNN, 20

January 14, 2017.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !12 34

25 October 1971 The UN General Assembly passes

Resolution 2758 recognising the

People’s Republic of China (PRC) as

the sole government of China

ROC loses diplomatic recognition

and international prestige;

1 January 1979 J o i n t C o m m u n i q u é o n t h e

Establ i shment of Dip lomat ic

Relations signed between the US

and PRC

Relations between the countries

a re nor ma l i sed ; D ip lomat i c

r e c o g n i t i o n o f R O C w a s

exchanged for that of PRC;

10 April 1979 The Taiwan Relations Act is passed

by the US Congress

US maintenance of final vestiges of

substantive relations with Taiwan

f o r s e c u r i t y a n d e c o n o m i c

interests;

21 July 1995 - 23

March 1996

The 3rd Taiwan Strait Crisis takes

place

Re-escalation of cross strait

tensions; Necessity for a military

response underscored the high

level of tensions between parties

involved;

20 May 2016 Pro-independence Democratic

Progressive Party candidate, Tsai

Ing-wen, who won the January

2016 presidential election, takes

office

Turning point for what had

previously been warming relations

between China and Taiwan;

3 December 2016 President Donald Trump answers a

congratulatory phone call from

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen,

triggering protests from Beijing

Portrays Tsai’s willingness to defy

the conventional stance of Taiwan

with regards to foreign relations;

11 January 2017 China sails its sole aircraft carrier,

the Liaoning, through the Taiwan

Strait

Chinese display of military muscle

reflects an opposition towards

recent actions undertaken by

Taiwanese government and is a

show of assertiveness for Taiwan;

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !13 34

Chinese Civil War The tumultuous past of Taiwan can be traced back to its roots during the days of the Chinese Civil oWar. This period of conflict, which took from April 1927 - May 1950, saw the Communist Chinese Communist Party (CPC) led by Mao Zedong engage the

Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-Shek in a battle for legitimacy as the government of China.

However, with the CPC emerging victorious after a series of successful campaigns against the KMT on the Chinese Mainland, the latter was forced to make a retreat to Taiwan. Taiwan was subsequently established as a base of operations in an effort to 21

wrestle back control over the Chinese Mainland; similarly the PRC began preparations for an assault with the intent of “liberating” Taiwan by military force. However, United

States intervention in 1950, which comprised of the sending of the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait , prevented a PRC attack on Taiwan from ever materialising. 22

From thereon out, cross-strait conflict has largely come to a standstill, with both parties

vying to be the legitimate government of China.

The conflict of interest and ideology between the two parties would thus form the

fundamental basis by which the question of Taiwan would be deliberated today.

"

Fig 4. Flags of the People’s Republic of China (left) and the Republic of China (right)

“Chinese Civil War Part 2: 1940-1950,” News & Issues, March 25, 2014, accessed February 21

19, 2017, http://chineseculture.about.com/od/historyofchina/fl/Chinese-Civil-War-part-2-1940-1950.htm.

“Milestones: 1953–1960,” 1960, accessed February 19, 2017, https://history.state.gov/22

milestones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !14 34

The Republic of China in the United Nations and the One China Policy As one of the victorious Allies of World War II, the ROC joined the United Nations (UN) at its founding in the San Francisco Conference of 1945. However, with the 23

subsequent establishment of the PRC in 1949 and the defeat of the ROC, the latter’s

place as the rightful representative of China was put into question. Such is underscored by the One-China policy, which precluded double representation within the UN as both

governments assert to be the sole rightful and legitimate government of the state of China. However, given the initial circumstances of the ongoing Cold War and Korean War, it became in the best interest of the United States and its allies to continue

recognising the ROC and opposing its replacement in the UN.

Despite that, with the buildup of pressure during the 1960s owing to the admission of

newly independent developing nations in the UN who were sympathetic of Beijing, calls for the expulsion of the ROC from the UN grew in strength. Eventually, on 25 October 1971, the United Nations passed Resolution 2758, withdrawing recognition of

Chiang Kai-shek and his government as the legitimate representative of China, and recognizing the government of PRC as the only legitimate representative of China to

the United Nations . 24

The United States and the Paradigm Shift in Relations As a nation seeking to prevent the further spread of communism in Asia, the United States had previously intervened in the cross-strait conflict in 1950, coming to the

defence of the ROC.

However, US relations with the ROC and PRC began to experience a paradigm shift from 1972 onwards. Under President Richard Nixon, the Shanghai Communique was

signed where both nations pledged to work toward the full normalization of diplomatic

“1945: The San Francisco Conference,” accessed February 19, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/23

sections/history-united-nations-charter/1945-san-francisco-conference/index.html.

“General Assembly Resolutions 26th Session,” accessed February 23, 2017, http://24

www.un.org/documents/ga/res/26/ares26.htm.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !15 34

relations. This would be followed by President Jimmy Carter, who oversaw the signing 25

of the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on 1 January 1979, thereby transferring diplomatic recognition of the United States from Taipei to

Beijing. 26

The Taiwan Relations Act was subsequently passed by the US Congress on 10 April 27

1979, proclaiming American support for the peaceful reunification of Taiwan and the mainland while re-defining the non-diplomatic relations between the United States and the governing authorities of Taiwan. Within the Taiwan Relations Act, the US also

committed itself to helping Taiwan defend itself in case of Chinese aggression and requiring itself "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character".

Military Escalation and Confrontation Given the tenacious conflict between the PRC and ROC, cross-strait tensions were

inadvertently reignited following the private visit of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to a Cornell University reunion in June 1995, where Lee made a speech on “Taiwan’s

Democratization Experience”. His repeated use of the terminology "Republic of China on Taiwan", in particular, was taken by Beijing as a challenge to the One-China Policy, and evoked a stream of invective from the Mainland Chinese media denouncing the

visit.

The above also set the stage for the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, which saw the PRC

conduct a series of missile tests in the waters along the Taiwan Strait, coupled with various military training exercises and live-firing drills near the coast of Taiwan between 1995 and 1996. Such provocative acts would eventually compel the US to come to the

ROC’s defence in response to the rising tensions. Hence, on 19 December 1995 the US

“Joint Communique of the USA and the People’s Republic of China, 1972 (Shanghai 25

Communique),” February 10, 2012, accessed February 19, 2017, http://www.cfr.org/china/joint-communique-usa-peoples-republic-china-1972-shanghai-communique/p845

“Joint Communique of the USA and the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of 26

Diplomatic Relations, 1979,” February 10, 2012, accessed February 19, 2017, http://www.cfr.org/china/joint-communique-usa-peoples-republic-china-establishment-diplomatic-relations-1979/p8452.

“H.R.2479 - 96th Congress (1979-1980): Taiwan Relations Act,” October 4, 1979, accessed February 27

19, 2017, https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !16 34

sent the USS Nimitz from the Eastern Pacific to the Taiwan Straits, effectively stemming the crisis as the PRC leaders acknowledged their inability to prevent the US from coming to Taiwan’s assistance. 28

As of August 2014, US arms sales to Taiwan, has totalled more than $46 billion since 1990 , thus leading to increased US-China friction and an upsurge in bellicose 29

rhetoric across the strait. This has only been further exacerbated in recent years, with the US conducting a $1.83 billion arms sale to Taiwan in 2015 despite Chinese objections. In retaliation, China has deployed missiles along the Taiwan Strait and

continues to modernize the bulk of its military capabilities, most recently revamping the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to accommodate developments in weapons

technology and support systems. Furthermore, the potential conflict in the Taiwan 30

Strait has also been credited as the primary driver of the PRC’s military investment.

The Democratic Progressive Party and renewed Cross-Strait Tensions

"

Fig 5. Liaoning, PRC’s sole aircraft carrier

The election of Tsai Ing-wen as President of Taiwan in January 2016 has heralded a new

era of relations between the mainland and Taiwan. Even though President Tsai has adopted a moderate policy towards the mainland and has vowed to maintain the status quo in order to placate Beijing, her reluctance to adhere to the 1992 Consensus has

“Taiwan Strait,” May 2007, accessed February 19, 2017, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/28

ops/taiwan_strait.htm.

“Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” August 29, 2014, accessed February 15, 2017, 29

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf.

Kor Kian Beng, China Begins Major Military Restructuring, (The Straits Times), January 19, 30

2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-begins-major-military-restructuring.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !17 34

prompted Beijing to suspend cross-strait communication mechanisms with the main Taiwan liaison office since June 2016. 31

Furthermore, in a deviation from the predicted policy stance of Taiwan, President Tsai

had made a congratulatory phone call to US President Donald Trump in Dec 2016 . 32

This has led to recent military manoeuvres conducted by China along the Taiwan Strait,

such as the passing of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, just 90 nautical miles south of Taiwan, as a form of direct opposition to the President’s actions.

Economic Implications The aforementioned developments have also had repercussions on Taiwan’s economy.

Within 5 months of Tsai’s inauguration, restriction of tourist by Beijing to Taiwan had led its number to fall 27.2% year-on-year . Such reflects China’s intent on stifling Taiwan’s 33

tourism revenue, thereby increasing political pressure on the island for the purpose of

obtaining concessions on the 1992 Consensus.

Given that cross-strait communication has been indefinitely severed, the future of

economic ties between the two parties has also become increasingly perilous. Should the above continue to hold out, Taiwan will find itself at the losing end. Further decisions, if any, made by Beijing to suspend trading or investments, will be

devastating to the Taiwanese economy, as the latter has come to be heavily reliant on the Chinese market for continued economic growth in recent years.

However, Tsai’s administration has been looking to avoid economic overdependence on China, and has since turned to Southeast Asia to deepen trading relationships and

“Tsai’s Refusal to Affirm the 1992 Consensus Spells Trouble for Taiwan,” August 26, 2016, 31

accessed February 19, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/tsais-refusal-to-affirm-the-1992-consensus-spells-trouble-for-taiwan/.

Jon Sharman, “China Sends Aircraft Carrier ‘Liaoning’ Through Taiwan Strait as Tensions 32

Remain High,” The Independent - Asia (Independent), January 1, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-sends-aircraft-carrier-liaoning-taiwan-straits-tensions-south-china-sea-one-china-a7521366.html.

"Decline in Mainland Chinese Tourists Hits Taiwan Hard," Time, , accessed April 02, 2017, 33

http://time.com/4574290/china-taiwan-tourism-tourists/.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !18 34

further economic growth . 34

Conclusion Hence, it remains to be seen whether tensions will continue to rise given the dynamics

between the Democratic Progressive Party and Beijing in the coming years. This would

ultimately determine cross-strait relations, and by extension the peace and stability of

the region.

Possible Outcomes In addressing the stability of the status quo, it is vital to assess the possible outcomes

that may arise from varying courses of action. Delegates should note that these are

only some of the possible outcomes the Chairs see as essential for delegates to

consider during debate. In addition, the plausibility of these outcomes is certainly not

uniform across all possible scenarios, and it is therefore up to the delegates to assess

the extent of plausibility of outcome for each action they choose to undertake. In

examining these potential developments, delegates should consider their implications

for the stakeholders involved, determine if they are more or less desirable, and make a

decision from there.

Declaration of Taiwanese Independence The pro-independence movement is Taiwan has gained significant traction in recent years. For one, there has been a major shift in the political landscape post-2016

elections, with the DPP gaining a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Even though this has not given President Tsai the capacity to alter the status quo, it has provided the DPP

"Financial Times," Subscribe to read, , accessed April 02, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/3fe468f2-34

e37d-11e6-8405-9e5580d6e5fb.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !19 34

with “significant political capital and freedom of action” to forward its pro-nationalist 35

agenda. Furthermore, the above has coincided with a surge of national identity among Taiwan’s population. Based on polls conducted by the National Chengchi University on

political attitudes in 2015, those who identified themselves as “Taiwanese” amounted to 59% of the population, skyrocketing from a figure that stood only at 17.6% in

1992. 36

Such a disparity reflects the shifting sentiments among the Taiwanese population towards a nationalist and pro-independence one, which coupled with the DPP’s slow

but steady reform of the ROC institutions, can eventually lead to the Taiwanese population coming to identify themselves as a separate, self-ruling political community

from the PRC. This would potentially come to incite the PRC and reignite cross-strait tensions. Hence, given the above context, it is paramount that the UNSC would have to (1) determine the severity of cross-strait tensions and its threat to peace in the

region (2) look towards measures that will defuse tensions and ensure cross-strait stability;

Declaration of Taiwanese Independence: Outbreak of Conflict Given a Trump presidency with extremely volatile foreign relations with Mainland

China, it is possible that US would no longer pledge their assistance to Taiwan in the event of war. As such, should a confrontation break out, China would defeat Taiwan

forces and gain the gate to the Pacific. Assuming that China is able to maintain the same degree of productivity Taiwan had between reunification, this would provide a significant economic leveler to China. However it is likely that the ravage of war would

cause significant infrastructural and economic damage to the extent that a large amount of financial assistance if required to revitalise the economy. Within such a

situation, as the UNSC, it is important to raise: (1) whether the international community has a duty to intervene or provide assistance to any party; (2) possible approaches to eliminate such a possibility to maintain the stability of the region.

“Time to Start Worrying about Taiwan,” June 12, 2016, accessed February 23, 2017, http://35

nationalinterest.org/feature/time-start-worrying-about-taiwan-16551.

“‘Taiwan Independence Doesn’t Mean What You Think,” April 11, 2016, accessed February 36

23, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/11/taiwan-independence-china-republic-huadu-taidu/.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !20 34

In effect, the prevention of Taiwan’s independence is critical to the legitimacy of the PRC regime. Even without the anti-secession laws, the outcry from their nationalistic leaders is a significant force driving this campaign. As such, even with the knowledge

that the U.S. would intervene, they would be willing to engage in what can be termed as “self-defeating military adventures” to prevent the endpoint established above . 37

However it is important to note that such advances would likely occur under the rise of secessionist forces within Taiwan that may could potentially escalate into a military confrontation with Mainland China in a fight for independence. However should the

unfortunate circumstance elapse, there are three key ways to look at this situation (these are not all the possible outcomes, but rather those seen to be of significant

concern): (1) the precipitate attack would destabilise Asia, destroy the economy of Taiwan, with the U.S. caught in a regional conflict that would end with a Taiwan reigned with chaos; (2) a conventional breaks out with the US being defeated, leaving a united

China which eventually becomes the undisputed superpower in the Asia Pacific and possible the world; (3) as the war progresses with China losing its footing, the decision

for a nuclear retaliation goes underway, leaving major cities in both nations destroyed, requiring both nations a significant amount of time to recover from the nuclear holocaust.

Regardless of the circumstance the war would prove to be a significant destabilising force within the region, and more importantly would devastate Taiwan. As such the key

consideration would be how the international community like mentioned previously could mitigate the possibility of a war via means such as diplomacy. The underlying issue here would also be the legitimacy of US intervention - whether such an

intervention would even be justified or would contravene international law.

Assimilation into Mainland China The ideal scenario for the PRC would be to annex Taiwan without the use of force. In

this line of development, one would observe an increased economic dependency coupled by diplomatic isolation in order to pressure make Taiwan susceptible to influences from Beijing. More importantly, with the signing of the 2010 Economic

David Lamptom, interview, Autumn 2001, , accessed February 21, 2017, http://www.pbs.org/37

wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/china/interviews/lampton.html.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !21 34

Cooperation Framework Agreement, the future of unification seems to be closer . 38

Regardless, the eventual outcome would be Taiwan's development into a special administrative region, similar to the “one country, two systems” first introduced by

Deng Xiaoping in 197926. While in theory such a framework would preserve some aspects of Taiwan’s democracy and free-market economy, the case study of Hong Kong

proves otherwise. Under such a system, the unification would undermine the democratic processes in Taiwan, while leaving its economy structure largely intact considering its potential in boosting Mainland China’s economy. Beyond this, such a

move would allow Taiwan access to international platforms that would be favourable to Taiwan and thereby by extension China.

Recognising that the general populace of Taiwan displayed a clear opposition towards reunification, a scenario of willing unification is unlikely. While in such a process the international community and the UNSC has no jurisdiction upon, there is an area of

consideration that could mitigate this scenario: increased participation in international organisations and greater cooperation. In this case with increased cooperation with

other nations, access to key regional organisations and international platforms, it would better prevent a situation where Taiwan has to turn to PRC for support.

Improved Bilateral Relations with Mainland China While there is a clear possibility of increased negotiations that would lead to favourable

terms for both sides, a plausible situation that could arise from this would be Finlandisation. THe term arises from Finland’s 1948 agreement with the Soviet Union, where Finland agrees to not join alliances challenging Moscow or serve as a base for

any country in opposition to soviet interests, which then guarantees their autonomy and respect of their democratic system . In this case, the most strategic action was 39

seen to be making concession with larger nations in order to secure their long-term interests due to the geographic proximity of Finland and the superpower Russia. The similarity of Taiwan to Finland’s situation begs the question of seeking security through

integration rather than confrontation which could be achieved via this method. This is

Lung-chu Chen, The U.S.-Taiwan-China relationship in international law and policy (Oxford: 38

Oxford University Press, 2016).

Bruce Gilley, "Not So Dire Straits," Foreign Affairs, December 21, 2009, , accessed February 39

23, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2010-01-01/not-so-dire-straits.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !22 34

in recognition that despite past explicit stance that US would aid Taiwan, the Trump administration may very well back away from this policy. As such, this movement would involve reposition Taiwan as a neutral power, thereby reducing connections with the

US, eliminating Beijing’s fears that the island would become an obstacle to China’s interests. In return, the PRC could back down on its military threats and allow Taiwan to

expand their participation in international organisations.

Regardless of the case, should bilateral ties improve, it would seem to set the stage for future unification. However such a development may see that cross-straits tension

being reduced, with the possibility of maintaining status quo, with the only difference being improved foreign relationship ties between the two nations. The most important

factor would be terms dictating the compromise in the interest of peace between the parties involved and the region.

Eroded Bilateral Relations with Mainland China Even with the status quo maintained, cross-strait relations could deteriorate further due

to the current circumstances and the underlying tensions between the governments involved. This is especially so given Beijing’s intolerance of President Tsai and the DPP’s failure in recognising the 1992 Consensus and accepting the “one-China” policy, which

has led the former to mete out a slew of measures to pressure the Taiwanese government into submission.

For one, Beijing has been persistent in its attempts to outmaneuver Taiwan on the international stage. This has been achieved through the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies, thereby forcing these

countries to relinquish their recognition of Taiwan as a legitimate and sovereign state. As such, in December 2016, Taiwan lost another one of its allies, Sao Tome and

Principe, who severed ties with Taipei before switching recognition to Beijing. Furthermore, Beijing has been flexing its military muscle as a means to coerce Taiwan to oblige to their demands. Through military exercises involving live-fire and island-

landing operations, it is a show of strength from Beijing that could further aggravate

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !23 34

pre-existing cross strait tensions. 40

Hence, given the relatively unstable and potentially volatile relations between Beijing and Taipei, it would be a requirement of the UNSC to analyse the deterioration of

relations and the potential implications on peace and security in the region, as well as come up with responses to defuse tensions should it rise out of the control of the two

parties involved.

Key Stakeholders

People’s Republic of China (PRC) Having defeated the Nationalists (Kuomintang) at the end of the Chinese Civil War, the

victorious Communist began ruling the mainland as the PRC . With that came the 41

‘One China’ policy – the diplomatic acknowledgement of the PRC as the only legitimate Chinese government. Under this policy, Taiwan is seen as a breakaway

province that will inevitably be reunified with Mainland China in the future.

Despite existing clashes, Beijing favours a steady deepening of ties with Taiwan,

recognising that the economic prosperity Taiwan enjoys would bring about benefits for the PRC if economic links were forged between the two countries. However it is important to note that upon transitioning to President Xi Jinping’s rule, the PRC has

largely embraced a tougher, more nationalistic stance towards Taiwan. In terms of cross-strait ties between the two parties, the PRC has enforced necessary measures to

prevent the ROC from changing the island’s relations with the mainland – an example would be the suspension of a cross-strait communication mechanism with the liaison office of Taiwan in June 2016 due to ROC’s reluctance to adhere to the 1992

Consensus . 42

“A Bumpy Road Ahead for China-Taiwan Relations,” September 22, 2016, accessed February 40

23, 2017, http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/a-bumpy-road-ahead-for-china-taiwan-relations.html.

"What is the 'One China' policy?," BBC News, February 10, 2017, accessed February 12, 41

2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354.

Eleanor Albert, "China-Taiwan Relations." Council on Foreign Relations, December 7, 2016, 42

accessed February 12, 2017, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-taiwan-relations/p9223.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !24 34

With the promulgation of the Anti-Secession Law on 14 March 2005, it highlights PRC’s interest in promoting cross-Straits relations, but will take military action should secessionist forces cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China . Of importance are 43

the matters concerned during future negotiations: “(1) officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides; (2) mapping out the development of cross-Straits

relations; (3) steps and arrangements for peaceful national reunification; (4) the political status of the Taiwan authorities; (5) the Taiwan region's room of international operation that is compatible with its status; and (6) other matters concerning the achievement of

peaceful national reunification.”34

Republic of China (ROC) According to Taiwan/ROC, they are the legitimate government of the Chinese people.

As a self-proclaimed independent nation referred to as "Republic of China", any country that seeks diplomatic relations with PRC must break official ties with the ROC32. Under President Ma Ying-jeou, there was mention of the Three-Noes policy, where

Taiwan would stand for “no unification, no independence, no use of force” . This 44

means to say that within his term, he would not “handover Taiwan’s sovereignty” to

China thus uphold the “no unification negotiations” pledge and would not unilaterally achieve Taiwan’s independence 34.

While no major agreements or deals were achieved during talks between China and

Taiwan leaders in Singapore (2015), it is important to note that an overwhelming majority of Taiwanese believe that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation . This 45

is based upon a poll released by the Taiwan Brain Trust think tank, revealing that 75.8% of the respondents supported the sentiment, while only 18.9% disagreed . This 46

presents a major obstacle for the government should they wish to negotiate with the

"Asia-Pacific, “China's anti-secession law," BBC News, March 14, 2005, , accessed February 43

15, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4347555.stm.

Ralph Cossa, "Looking behind Ma's 'three noes'" Taipei Times, January 21, 2008, accessed 44

F e b r u a r y 1 2 , 2 0 1 7 , h t t p : / / w w w. t a i p e i t i m e s . c o m / N e w s / e d i t o r i a l s / a r c h i v e s /2008/01/21/2003398185.

"China and Taiwan leaders hail historic talks," BBC News, November 07, 2015, accessed 45

February 12, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34742680.

Chung Hung-ta and William Hetherington, "Majority says Taiwan is independent." Taipei 46

Times, 29 October 2016, Accessed 12 February 2017, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/10/29/2003658136.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !25 34

PRC on the terms for reunification.

United States of America (USA) In practice, USA recognises that the PRC is the sole legal government of China, thereby accepting that the ROC/Taiwan is part of China. However this is not an endorsement of

Beijing’s position and has maintained a “robust unofficial” relationship with Taiwan 33. While the US does not support Taiwan independence, they maintain a strong, unofficial

relationship with Taiwan as part of the US desire to achieve peace and stability in Asia . As part of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, US affirms its commitment to assist Taiwan 47

in maintaining its military capabilities to defend itself 30. In resolving the inherent

discrepancy between its adherence to the ‘One China’ policy and its relations with Taiwan, the US urges both parties to engage in peaceful resolution of cross-strait

differences and hopes for constructive dialogue to improve the current stalemate.

With the inauguration of President Trump, who had previously claimed “don’t know why we have to be bound by a one-China policy unless we make a deal with China

having to do with other things”, the involvement of the US in the current status quo is called to question . While the US has rescinded their previous statement and 48

reaffirmed their recognition of the one-China policy, this is simply one of the many disagreements China had with US, with this reassurance possibly respite from tension than an end.

Russian Federation Following the collapse of the 1945 Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, Russia has no official relations with Taiwan . While adhering to the “One China” policy, Russia 49

affirms a political solution to deal with the current status quo. Nonetheless, unofficial

contact between the two parties began at the end of the 1960s49. Following the

"Taiwan," U.S. Department of State, September 13, 2016, accessed February 14, 2017, 47

https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm.

“Donald Trump grants China's fervent wish," The Economist, February 13, 2017, , accessed 48

February 14, 2017, http://www.economist.com/news/china/21716899-one-china-policy-back-who-blinked-donald-trump-grants-chinas-fervent-wish.

Sergey Vradiy. "Russia’s unofficial relations with Taiwan." Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia 2 49

(2007): 219-34.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !26 34

abolished restrictions on direct trade investments in the USSR in 1990, increased cooperation in the timber industry and fishery between Taiwan and USSR occurred. In 1992, with the signing of the “Relations between the Russian Federation and Taiwan”,

unofficial economic and culture coordination commissions were created. Within which the commission would serve as a communication channel, support cultural exchange

and economic trade relations. It is important to note that these activities were conducted by non-governmental organisations, private companies, and trade associations, allowing Russia to maintain Her stance of the status of Taiwan. While the

overall growth of trade and economic relations has increased over the years, this is minimal in comparison to the volumes of their overall foreign trade. In 2005, Taiwanese

exports to Russia only accounted for 0.27% of its overall volume. In addition, there are only 10 Taiwanese midsize companies operating in Russia.With the low level of investment by the Taiwanese, the significance of the trade relations has to be taken

with a pinch of salt.

Africa The recent years have witnessed an increasing trend of African countries pivoting away

from diplomatic relations with Taiwan towards the economically attractive option of China. This is primarily due to the shared problem of economic recession between these countries, mainly oil-producing countries hit by the slump in the price of crude

oil. Motivated by the financial incentives of direct investment offered by China, both Gambia and the island of Sao Tome and Principe had, according to the Taiwanese

foreign ministry, made unacceptable and unreasonable financial requests to Taiwan 50

before shutting down their respective embassies and forging stronger bonds with China. In addition, Nigeria (which has severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan) is

reportedly going to receive $40 billion worth of investment pledged by China . 51

These developments have left Taiwan with two remaining partners; Swaziland and

York, Geoffrey. "China scores new victories in Africa as Taiwan handed diplomatic blow." The 50

Globe and Mai l , January 12, 2017. Accessed February 12, 2017. h t tp : / /www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/china-scores-new-victories-in-africa-as-taiwan-handed-diplomatic-blow/article33612696/.

Bax, Pauline, Simon Gongo, and Lungile Dlamini. "Chinese Billions Fail to Sway Taiwan’s 51

Last Two Allies in Africa." Bloomberg, January 25, 2017. Accessed February 12, 2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-24/chinese-billions-fail-to-sway-taiwan-s-last-two-allies-in-africa.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !27 34

Burkina Faso, who have since reaffirmed their commitment to relations with the latter. In contrast to the rest of their regional counterparts, Taiwan’s remaining African partners remain seemingly unaffected by the lucrative Chinese offers, with the foreign minister

of Burkina Faso even remarking that the proposals they had gotten from China were “outrageous” . 52

United Nations (UN) Taiwan is not currently a member of the United Nations. As UN membership would

accord members recognition as a fully-fledged independent country, Taiwan’s lack of membership would thus undermine their claims to sovereignty. While Taiwan was

previously a member of the UN, General Assembly Resolution 2758 establishes that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China, thereby expelling Taiwan from future representation on this international platform . 53

International Organisations Given Taiwan’s ambiguous international status, Taiwan is unable to reap the benefits of participating in international/regional organisations, maintaining full membership in only 38 intergovernmental organisation (IGO), observership in 1532. This presents as a

significant obstruction to Taiwan’s international competitiveness and economic liberalization of the domestic economy. Furthermore, Taiwan would have a limited

ability to voice its concerns with regards to domestic and global affairs, as such matters of importance to Taiwan would be initiated without consideration for Taiwan’s interest. This thus reduces its attainment of increased legitimacy in international platform, with

many states are unwilling to risk Beijing’s ire by lobbying on Taiwan’s behalf in international organisations. This situation is further exacerbated when endangers the

safety of Taiwan’s population – During the 1998 outbreak of a virulent strain of enterovirus type-71 spread from Malaysia to Taiwan, there was a delayed assistance to Taiwan given that the island is excluded from the World Health Organisation’s (WHO)

ibid52

General Assembly resolution 2758, The rule of law at the national and international levels, A/53

RES/2758(XXVI), 25 October 1971, available from http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/RES/2758(XXVI)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION/.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !28 34

Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) . Furthermore, while Taiwan 54

has become an observer of the World Health Assembly, its health experts have been denied participation in WHO technical meetings 15. This would force Taiwan to increase

reliance on Beijing, thereby diminishing its credibility both domestically and at the international stage.

On this matter, the US supports Taiwan’s membership in organisations that do not require statehood as a condition of membership. Beyond this, PRC likewise sees that participation in any organisation should not lead to the conclusion that Taiwan is an

independent state independent from China.

ASEAN Since the proclamation of the Go South policy under the presidency of Lee Teng-hui in 1993, Taiwan and ASEAN have seen a general deepening in economic ties. However, against the backdrop of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the rise of China’s

economy which made the latter a viable economic alternative for Taiwan to turn to, the Taiwanese government undertook a shift in focus of overseas investment from ASEAN

to China . While this has culminated thus far in China being Taiwan’s largest trading 55

partner, Ms Tsai Ing-wen has promised to expand ties with Southeast Asian nations through her New Southbound policy , formulated with the intention to be included in 56

the process of economic integration of that region. One of the adopted approaches includes the prioritization of tourism, wherein visa-free access is granted to Southeast

Asian tourists in hopes of attracting more of the latter to the island-state . 57

Bonnie S. Glaer, Taiwan's quest for greater participation in the international community, 54

Rowman & Littlefield, 2013.

http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/taiwans-2016-elections-and-relations-with-asean55

http://thediplomat.com/tag/new-southbound-policy/56

http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/taiwan-woos-asean-tourists-in-boost-for-new-southbound-policy/57

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !29 34

Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) According to Taiwanese news sources , a low-profile national security conference that 58

took place in September 2016 involved an elite group of international experts from countries such as Italy, Greece, the UK, Belgium, Egypt and Japan. Reportedly, NATO

representatives were also present at the meeting for the first time.

Questions to Ponder 1. What are the merits of the existing approaches countries adopt in their relations

with Taiwan?

a. What do you think are the incentive structures for countries to adopt a

certain approach (whether pre-existing or potential)?

2. How do you think President Tsai’s stance on the issue of independence will

evolve over time?

a. Do you think the people of Taiwan will be contented with sustaining

status quo? Why or why not?

3. How do you foresee President Trump’s stance on the one-China policy changing

in the near future?

a. What kind of implications will his stance have on Taiwan-US relations and

China-US relations?

4. How do you foresee the Mainland Chinese stance on the one-China policy over

the next few years?

a. Is there a possibility that the PRC will become more compromising in its

stance? Why or why not?

Tang, Pei-chun, and Lilian Wu. "NATO experts take part in Taipei security meeting for first time." 58

FocusTaiwan. September 17, 2016. Accessed February 12, 2017. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201609170021.aspx.

HCCRI 2017 | Page ! of !30 34

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