Union decertification election outcomes: Bargaining unit characteristics and union resources

Union Decertification Election Outcomes: Bargaining Unit Characteristics and Union Resources

DAVID M E Y E R

University of Akron, OH 44325

T R E V O R B A I N

University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487

Previous analysis using aggregate data has concluded that union decertification activity is "exclusively a product of market conditions." We employ data disaggregated by local (county) labor market which permits a preliminary investigation of the importance of potential nonmarket influences that are not measurable using aggregate data, namely, the type of bargaining unit, the type of union, the type of employer, and proxies for union resources. It also allows a more precise specification of the labor market characteristics previously found to influence decertification. Our results confirm the importance of market conditions in decertification activity and outcomes, but they also suggest that the likelihood of decertification is much greater in independent unions and in industry-county combinations in which the typical employee works part-time and has limited alternative income opportunities. Institutional characteristics of the union and employer, individual characteristics of bargaining unit members, and local economic conditions are important determinants of decertification.

I. Introduction

Union decertification elections have been the topic of considerable study in recent years, for several reasons. First, although ousting a union is a dramatic and difficult step for union members, it is increasingly common: decertification elections as a fraction of all union elections in the U.S. rose from an average of less than 10 percent annually in the 1970s to an average of about 20 percent during the 1980s (Levine, 1989). Second, the step, once taken, is usually successful: unions lost 77 percent of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)-sponsored decertification elections conducted between 1977 and 1981. Finally, decertification activity has a substantial negative impact on the profitability of a company: a decertification election reduces return on sales by 11 percent (Cooke and Meyer, 1990, p. 388).

The literature on correlates of union decertification activity and outcomes has focused primarily on the effects of highly aggregated market variables on the number of these elections and their outcomes (Heneman and Sandver, 1983). In fact, a heavy

JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH Volume XV, Number 2 Spring 1994

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emphasis on market conditions is common to most of the investigations conducted to date, despite the wide variety of research approaches employed: survey-based, how-to reports (Lewis, 1986), multiple case studies (Fulmer, 1978; Chafetz and Fraser, 1979), combinations of case studies and econometric modeling (Anderson et al., 1982), and other empirical research (Ahlburg and Dworkin, 1984; Pearce and Peter- son, 1987). The results of this body of research can perhaps best be summarized by the findings of Lawler and Hundley (1983, p. 336): "Decertification activity . . . is exclusively a product of market conditions."

Theory suggests, however, that a variety of nonmarket factors may play a role in decertification. In this study we offer an exploratory test of this alternative explanation - - that, in addition to market conditions, characteristics of the bargaining unit, the union, the employer, and the employees may also be significant predictors of decertification election outcomes.

To test this proposition, we construct a model for election outcomes that specifies not only the usual product market measures (such as sales, change in sales, employment, and wages) but also (1) the size of the bargaining unit, (2) the affiliation status (AFL-CIO, Teamsters, or independent) of the union, (3) voter turnout, (4) the unit type, and (5) the total wages of the average industry employee working in the bargaining unit's local (county) labor market. These variables serve as proxies for influences hypothesized in the literature and detailed in the next section: union power, union resources, union resources utilized (all three of which are hypothesized to affect employees' perceptions of union instrumentality), employee power (which is hypothesized to affect whether unit members can influence the employer without a union), and employees' disposable income available for paying union dues (which is hypothesized to affect employees' perceptions of the cost of union membership).

For obvious methodological reasons, the influence of factors such as these cannot be determined from aggregate data on the national labor and product market. Moreover, firm-specific employment and earnings data are not available, given the reluctance of employers and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to reveal such data. Therefore, we used data matching individual decertification elections with labor and product market conditions in the corresponding locality (county).

More specifically, for the 3,197 bargaining units holding a NLRB-supervised decertification election between 1977 and 1981, we collected data on employment and wage levels across industries and in the unit's industry in the county and time period corresponding to each election. Although these data do not permit direct inferences regarding the perceptions underlying bargaining unit members' vote for or against decertification, they do offer insights into the characteristics of the labor market within which the members were employed and, therefore, into their employment and income opportunities. Thus, in addition to allowing us to include unit-specific information on the type of unit, union, employee, and employer, these disaggregated data also permit a more precise specification of employees' alternative job and wage opportunities than do the aggregate data traditionally used in research on decertifications.

DAVID MEYER and TREVOR BAIN 119

II. The Propensity to Decertify

We assume that the propensity to decertify a union is based on members' desires to maximize their utility (Elliott and Hawkins, 1982, p. 155). We hypothesize that union members will attempt to decertify their union when they perceive a change in the utility they can derive from one or more of the following factors: (1) alternative employment opportunities; (2) relative income opportunities; (3) the employer's competitiveness in the product market; (4) union instrumentality; and (5) the employees' power to influence the employer without a union. In addition, we hypothesize that two other factors play an intervening role: the employees' "time horizon," or attachment to the employer, and environmental factors, such as location in a state with "right-to-work" laws. We investigate the potential influence of all these factors on employees' perceptions whether they will derive greater utility without their union than with it, that is, whether the costs of unionism outweigh its benefits. The Appendix Table presents the definitions of the variables used as proxies for each construct and the data sources used in constructing the variables.

Alternative Employment Opportunities. As alternative employment opportunities increase, the utility of employees increases for two reasons. First, the greater the number of job opportunities an employee has, the higher the likelihood that some will offer higher utility than when there is only one (or no) employment opportunity. Second (and a component of the first), the greater the number of jobs open, the more attractive the wages, benefits, employment conditions, or job security an employer must offer in order to recruit a sufficient number of qualified employees. As a result, in labor markets in which labor is in high demand, the average utility of all employees is increased (Osterman, 1987, p. 47).

There are, however, constraints on this basic theory. A labor market with a large number of unfilled jobs can also have a large number of unemployed persons who lack the required job skills (Sabel, 1982, Chap. 3). In this case increased job opportunities yield increased utility not for the unqualified workers, but only for the qualified workers. Thus, the utility of those workers who are qualified to accept the increased employment opportunities rises, and the utility of the average worker in that labor market also increases. Although the utility of the unqualified workers remains the same, the total utility of all employees is higher than before. This increased average utility is not affected by the presence or absence of unions.

Research findings generally support this basic theory and its implications for union decertification. Elliott and Hawkins (1982) found a positive relationship between a growing labor force and decertification, and Ahlburg and Dworkin (1984) found that as labor markets tighten, decertification activity declines. Anderson et al. (1980), however, found a positive relationship between the unemployment rate and decertification, and Lawler and Hundley (1983) reported a positive relationship between the layoff rate and the decertification rate. We expect our disaggregated analysis to support the more general theory, because our test separates employment


opportunities into local labor market and national product market components. Regarding the former, we test the following:

HI: As local employment opportunities (AC-EMP) increase, support for retaining the union (SUPPORT, U-WON) decreases. 1

The national product market poses a different set of constraints on the theory. Specifcally, it is much more difficult for workers to take advantage of increased opportunities in distant labor markets than it is in their local labor market; to do so, they have to relocate. If, however, the utility derived from accepting a distant employment opportunity offsets the decreased utility of the move, workers are likely to move.

But there is a threshold effect. Unless the present value of the increased utility offsets at least the moving costs, the resultant change in utility will be negative. Thus, the utility available from non-local job opportunities must be relatively high to increase workers' utility. Moreover, we must also assume that workers are more aware of, and more qualified for, job opportunities in the product market in which they are currently employed. Again, the presence or absence of unions does not affect this increased opportunity. Thus, regarding employment opportunities nationally, we test the following:

H2: As employment opportunities in the national product market increase (d~SIC-EMP), support for retaining the union (SUPPORT, U-WON) decreases.

Note that, as explained below, we control for the effects of union instrumentality on the size and direction of the influences hypothesized.

Relative Income Opportunities. The greater the relative income opportunities available to workers, the greater their total utility. And, if employment opportunities and union instrumentality are held constant, the greater the relative wages available to the average employee facing a decertification vote, the greater the perceived utility of the union, that is, the more likely that the employee will perceive the union as positively influencing that relative wage. The union can and will contend that its negoti- ations on behalf of employees caused the increased wage opportunities, even if the union's influence was only peripheral. Thus, higher (lower) relative income opportunities will lead to increased (decreased) support for retaining the union (Chafetz and Fraser, 1979, pp. 62-63). So far, only Lawler and Hundley (1983) have explicitly tested the relationship between wage data and decertification, and their findings supported these propositions. In our analysis we examine two relative income opportunities: those in the local labor market and those in the national product market.

More specifically, if the income opportunity of a group of employees in the local labor market is below the market average, the employees will perceive the utility of their employment as below average. This circumstance may have led the group to certify a union as their bargaining representative in the first place, since unionization is one means of increasing the utility of one's employment. But if the same employees must later decide whether to retain the union or not, and the average employee still


has below-average income opportunities, support for the union, on average, is likely to decrease, for two reasons. First, the union may be perceived as not having been successful at improving members' wage opportunities. And, second, the employees can less afford the costs of the union (Chafetz and Fraser, 1979). Conversely, if the average employee making the decision faces above-average income opportunities, support for retaining the union, on average, will increase. This leads to the following:

H3: If product market income opportunities in the local labor market (OUR-WAGE/LOC-WAGE) are relatively lower than the local labor market average, support for retaining the union (SUPPORT, U-WON) decreases.

We make a similar hypothesis regarding the typical income opportunities of employees working for employers elsewhere in the same product market. This stems from the oft-stated union goal of "taking wages out of competition." Typical income opportunities in the national product market are a point of reference as to whether the union has increased the utility of the average employee in the local product market enough. If this comparison is above (below) the average of the product market, support for retaining the union increases (decreases). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H4: If product market income opportunities in the local labor market are lower than average income opportunities in the national product market (OUR-WAGE~SIC-WAGE), support for retaining the union (SUPPORT, U-WON) decreases.

The Employer's Product Market Conditions. As conditions in the employer's product market become more favorable, the utility of employees rises. This increased utility is typically found in increased employment opportunities or increased income opportunities, or both - - factors already examined and controlled for. Thus, the question is, given particular product market conditions, which conditions will increase the likelihood that the union can improve employees' utility (by greater than the average increased employment and income opportunities)? Under these conditions employees will be more likely to support the retention of the union. Two aspects of product market conditions are examined: relative productivity and the rate of sales growth (in dollars) in the market.

We defined productivity as the dollar value of the output per hour worked (OUTPUT~HOUR) in the employer 's three-digit SIC code. Gains in productivity come from two sources: increased utilization of existing capital or improved technology by adding more labor or by using the existing labor more efficiently, or increased capital or improved technology available to the given amount of labor. Since we already have proxies for changes in employment and one aspect of increased efficiency of labor utilization (increased effort or ability due to higher pay), our measure OUTPUT/HOUR is a proxy for the extent of capital investment.

In general, greater capital investment, given a particular level of union instrumentality and controls for any increased utility due to greater employment and income opportunities, will reduce employee power relative to employer power (Sabel, 1982, p. 90). Thus,


H5: As OUTPUT~HOUR increases, support for retaining the union (SUPPORT, U-WON) decreases.

Regarding the second aspect of product market conditions, we assume that a higher rate of sales growth in the product market will increase employee power, thereby increasing the likelihood of support for retaining the union. More specifically, the increased production (not productivity) necessary to satisfy increased demand must come from a more efficient utilization of labor, if increased employment and capital investment have already been taken into account. When it is necessary to increase the efficiency of labor utilization, a union, given a particular level of instrumentality, can increase the utility of its members. Since we have already included increased income opportunities, this utility arises from increased employment security - - over and above the increased employment opportunities generally available. As the market grows, the employer will be more willing to support the increased utility demanded by the union. Thus,

H6: As sales growth in the product market increases (APM-SALES), support for retaining the union (SUPPORT, U-WON) increases. (We control for the size of the market (PM-SALES) in our equations, so that the growth rate measure would be comparable across markets.)

By providing proxies (albeit weak ones) for increases in both productivity and production, and controlling for other factors, we hope to specifically test these two divergent points in the literature. Elliott and Hawkins (1982) hypothesized and found a negative relationship between production and decertification; Lawler and Hundley (1983) hypothesized a negative relationship between the rate of sales growth and decertification but found a positive one.

Union Instrumentality. In examining the instrumentality of the union we consid- ered two different constructs: the resources available to the union, and the utilization of those resources. Unions which have more resources and those that make better use of their resources are more likely to be perceived as instrumental (Block, 1980, p. 104). In general, a union that enhances the utility of its members is more likely to be retained (Cooke, 1985a).

We used two variables as proxies for available resources: the unit's affiliation status and bargaining unit size. These measures are interrelated, since the larger units in our sample were much more likely to be affiliated with an AFL-CIO national union (mean = 61.44 members) or with the Teamsters (mean = 40.03 members) than to be independent unions (mean = 13.41 members). Perhaps the AFL-CIO nationals and the Teamsters were not interested in organizing smaller units, or the smaller units did not seek affiliation (possibly to limit their costs of unionization). These points are well supported in the literature (Fulmer, 1978, p. 164; Chafetz and Fraser, 1979; Lawler and Hundley, 1983, pp. 345-46; Lynch and Sandver, 1987, p. 87; Pearce and Peterson, 1987, p. 267).

With regard to available resources, we are concerned with the expertise and power of the union. The more expertise available, the more likely the union will be


instrumental in increasing its members' utility (Elliott and Hawkins, 1982, p. 155). For example, a union with expertise is less likely to make mistakes in negotiating to obtain a first contract. And, the more power a union has available, the more likely that a union can use that power to increase the employees' utility. Larger units are thought to have more power than smaller units (Lynch and Sandver, 1987, p. 87); and affiliated units are more likely to receive expert assistance from national staff than are unaffiliated units (Cooke, 1985a, pp. 165, 175-77). These propositions lead to the following:

H7: The larger the unit (N-ELIG), the greater the support for retaining the union (SUPPORT, U-WON). 2

HS: Affiliated unions (AFL-CIO, TEAMSTERS) will be more likely to retain support (SUPPORT, U-WON) than unaffiliated unions (INDEP).

Furthermore, AFL-CIO affiliates have more expertise available and deployed than do Teamsters affiliates because the structure of the AFL-CIO places locals in nationals that are designed to cover employees in specific product markets, whereas the Teamsters are not organized in this way. Another reason, suggested by Lynch and Sandver (1987, p. 88), is that the Teamsters' resources are more taxed than those of AFL-CIO affiliates. Thus,

H8a: AFL-CIO affiliates (AFL-CIO) will be more likely to retain support (SUPPORT, U-WON) than Teamsters affiliates (TEAMSTERS).

Having resources available does not necessarily lead to the union being instrumental; resources must still be effectively utilized. Pearce and Peterson (1987, pp. 255- 56) found that many units were abandoned by their union, some before they filed decertification petitions and some after. A proxy for resource utilization is the voter turnout. We assumed that higher voter turnout represents a greater utilization of union resources. Since 30 percent or more of the unit's members signed cards indi- cating that they no longer desired to be represented by their union, and research shows that card-signing is a good indicator that those members will later vote against retaining the union (Montgomery, 1989, p. 278), the union must obtain the support of at least five-sevenths of the remaining 70 percent (or 50 percent of the entire unit) to be retained. Additionally, card signers have already shown that they are more likely to take action than the other members, and, therefore, they are more likely to vote (Kochan, 1980, p. 144). Thus, if the union is to be retained, it must deploy its available resources to get out the vote. Furthermore, since union events (decertification elections) with more certain results typically result in lower (voter) participation (Tannenbaum and Kahn, 1958, pp. 198-200), higher turnout may indicate that decertification is not as likely. This leads to the following:

H9: The greater the utilization of a union's resources, the greater the number of eligible voters voting (PROP-VOTE), and the greater the support for retaining the union (SUPPORT, U-WON).

Employees' Power Within given product and labor markets, some types of employees have greater power vis-h-vis their employer than others. Generally speaking,


employees have greater power if their work has a greater impact on organizational outcomes, and such employees usually have higher skill levels. Employees with greater job power should be more able to obtain utility - - without a union - - than employees with less job power.

Nine categories of units were available in the NLRB data (See Appendix Table). Among these, we assumed, on average, that craft and professional/technical units had higher skill levels than others. Thus,

H10: Craft units (CRAFT) and professional/technical units (PROF-TECH) are more likely to support retaining the union (SUPPORT, U-WON) than are other units (DEPARTMENT, DRIVERS, GUARDS, OFFICE, P+ M, and OTHER). 3

This hypothesis is also supported by results found by Lawler and Hundley (1983) and Lynch and Sandver (1987).

Intervening Variables. We also examined the potential influence of two intervening variables: a proxy for the environment, location in a "right-to-work" state, and a proxy for the type of worker employed, part-time.

Environmental factors have long been hypothesized to influence decertification results (Koeller, 1991). Two of the factors examined in the literature are regionality, typically South and non-South (See Anderson et al., 1979; Lynch and Sandver, 1987; Pearce and Peterson, 1987), and location in a "right-to-work" state (Hunt and White, 1983). Prior research suggests that the construct correlating with decertification is location in a "right-to-work" state rather than location in a southern state. This leads to the following:

Hll: Location in a "right-to-work" state (RTW) decreases support for retaining the union (SUPPORT, U-WON). 4

Regarding the type of worker, Sabel (1979, p. 25) has shown that some employees only partially attach themselves to the labor force and adopt precise, short-term financial goals. These "peripheral" employees maximize their income opportunities even at the expense of their employment security and are typically low skilled (Sabel, 1979, p. 24), work part-time, and have limited income requirements (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, pp. 164, 167, 170; Sabel, 1982, p. 99). They are also expected to view unions, and collective action, differently from employees more permanently attached to the labor force (Sabel, 1982, pp. 114, 117). Peripheral employees are more likely to view unions as costly impediments to their income needs and are less likely to value union services. Both employers and unions have reasons to treat peripheral employees differently from others, because of their peripheral attachment to the labor force.

Employers offering low-wage, part-time employment are also more resistant to union efforts to reduce flexibility (Osterman, 1987, p. 57). A classic example of how a casual employment system was transformed into a regulated system by a union is provided by Doeringer (1983). Doeringer and Piore (1971, p. 174) discuss reasons why unions avoid these employment settings. Further, as discussed above, if the aver-


age total income derived from employment is small, due to the limitations of part- time work and low-wage opportunities, the costs of unionization will be a significant part of the income and, given these limitations, unions do not enhance total utility much. This leads to the following:

H12: Units in which the typical employee works part-time (PART-TIME), will exhibit less support for retaining the union (SUPPORT, U-WON). 5

III. M o d e l Speci f icat ion

Data for this study were taken from several sources: AFL-CIO records of all the NLRB-supervised decertification elections held between 1977 and 1981 ("NLRB" in Appendix Table); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data on employment and wage rates by two-digit SIC code, by county and by month for all U.S. counties for the same years ("BLS"), and data from various Industrial Census publications on product markets by three-digit SIC code ("Industrial Census"). More recent data are not available because of changes at BLS.

The equations we estimated are: 6

SUPPORT, U-WON = a 1 + b 1 AC-EMP + b 2 ASIC-EMP

+ b 30UR-WAGE/LOC-WAGE + b 4 OUR-WAGE~SIC-WAGE

+ b 5 OUTPUT/HOUR + b 6 APM-SALES + b 7 PM-SALES + b 8 N-ELIG

+ b9INDEP + blo TEAMSTERS + bll PROP-VOTE + b12 CRAFT

+ b13 DRIVERS + b14 GUARDS + b15 P + M + bl6 PROF-TECH

+ b17 RTW + b18 PART-TIME.

The variables are defined as in the Appendix Table. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics.

IV. Resul ts

Table 2 presents the empirical results from our double-truncated Tobit estimation of the SUPPORT equation and our Logit estimation of the U-WON equation. Tobit is the appropriate estimation technique when, at some value of the dependent variable, the probability of that value (or higher or lower) is zero. In the SUPPORT equation, the dependent variable is constrained between 0 and 1, but is continuous between those extremes. Logit is the proper technique when the dependent variable is measured discretely. Both equations reach high levels of significance, as indicated by the log-likelihood ratio.

Only the local employment (AC-EMP) and the relative local income (OUR-

WAGE/LOC-WAGE) opportunities were significantly related to SUPPORT, and only the relative local income opportunities (OUR-WAGE/LOC-WAGE) were significantly related to U-WON. All the union resources variables (N-ELIG, INDEP, TEAMSTERS,

and PROP-VOTE) were significantly related to both S U P P O R T and U-WON. In addition, RTW and PART-TIME were significantly correlated with SUPPORT, in the hypothesized direction. That is, elections that took place in "right-to-work" states


Table 1 Descriptive Statistics

(N=2,177)

Proport ion S tandard

Variable or Mean Deviat ion Range

SUPPORT .302 .252 0 - 1

U-WON .227 .419 0 or 1

AC-EMP 1.004 .026 . 6 7 4 - 1.190

~SIC-EMP 1.003 .021 .641 - 1.205

OUR-WAGE/LOC-WAGE 1.082 .340 .244 - 3 .606

OUR- WAGE/SIC- WAGE .995 .203 .280 - 2.112

OUTPUT~HOUR $17.229 13.496 $4 - 90

PM-SALES (in '000s) $65,574 67,361 $1,131 - 268,100

~tPM-SALES 1.117 .074 .777 - 1.542

INDEP .233 .423 0 or 1

TEAMSTERS .222 .416 0 or 1

AFL-CIO .522 .500 0 or 1

N-ELIG 44.567 91.415 2 - 1,572

PROP-VOTE .882 .142 .189 - 1.000

CRAFT .040 .195 0 or 1

DEPARTMENT .072 .259 0 or 1

DRIVER .100 .300 0 or 1

GUARDS .007 .083 0 or 1

OFFICE .037 .188 0 or 1

OTHER .218 .413 0 or 1

P+M .452 .498 0 or 1

PROF/T .046 .209 0 or 1

RTW .288 .453 0 or 1

PART-TIME .429 .495 0 or 1

WAGES $1,813.0 2,581.1 $17 - 5 ,358

DAVID M E Y E R and TR EVOR BAIN 127

Tab le 2

Estimations o f the Effects o f Employment and Income Opportunities and Union Resources on (1) the Proportion o f Voters Supporting Retention

o f the Union in NLRB-Sponsored Decertification Elections (Tobit) and (2) Whether the Union Won or Lost the Election (Logit), 1977-1981

( s t a n d a r d e r ro r s in p a r e n t h e s e s )

(1) (2) SUPPORT 6 U- WON 6

AC-EMP -.365* -2.675 (.204) (2.013)

ASIC-EMP -.073 - 1.698 (.229) (2.629)

OUR- WAGE/LOC- WAGE .031 ** .392"* * (.013) (.126)

OUR-WAGE~SIC-WAGE .013 -. 148 (.022) (.214)

OUTPUT~HOUR -.0006 -.008" (.0004) (.005)

APM-SALES .162"* .500 (.070) (.715)

PM-SALES -.002 -.016 (.004) (.035)

N-ELIG .589*** 6.023*** (.068) (1.032)

INDEP -.578*** -2.014"** (.018) (.267)

TEAMSTERS -.034** -.508*** (.016) (.148)

PROP-VOTE .366*** 2.223*** (.036) (.460)

CRAFT -.090*** -.620* (.032) (.323)

DRIVERS -.012 -. 142 (.024) (.225)

GUARDS .233*** 1.167" (.062) (.619)

P+M -.037*** -.342*** (.013) (.124)

PROF-TECH .067*** -.396 (.024) (.289)


Table 2 - - continued

(standard errors in parentheses)

(1) (2) S U P P O R T 6 U - W O N 6

RTW -.022* -.022 (,012) (.122)

PART-TIME -.033** -.080 (.014) (.131)

INTERCEPT .480 2.243 (.293) (3.000)

N 2,177 2,177

-2x log-likelihood 360.0 2061.6

*(**,***) Significant at the. 10 (.05, .01) level or better in a two-tailed test.

were less likely to retain the union (by 2.2 percent) than those in other states, which supports Hypothesis 11. And units whose members typically worked only part-time demonstrated significantly less support for retaining their union than those with full- time, higher-wage members, even taking into account the effects of alternative wage and employment opportunities. Hypothesis 12 is therefore supported.

The local labor market wage comparison (OUR-WAGE/LOC-WAGE) was highly significant in both equations, in the direction predicted in Hypothesis 3. For every 10 percent increase in relative wages in the local labor market, there was a 3.1 percent increase in support for retaining the union. The product market wage comparison (OUR-WAGE/SIC-WAGE), on the other hand, was not related significantly to either outcome. Hypothesis 4 is thus not supported. The local labor market employment measure's (AC-EMP) coefficient has the expected sign in both equations and was correlated significantly with SUPPORT. When local labor market opportunities increased by 10 percent, there was a 3.7 percent decline in support for retaining the union, ceteris paribus. Hypothesis 1 is therefore somewhat supported. Finally, the product market employment measure (ASIC-EMP) was not significant, and Hypothe- sis 2 is thus not supported.

Among measures of the employer's product market conditions, APM-SALES was significant in the SUPPORT equation in the hypothesized (#6) direction, and OUTPUT/HOUR was significant in the U-WON equation, again in the hypothesized (#5) direction. Thus, both hypotheses 5 and 6 regarding product market conditions receive some support.


The union resource measures were correlated very significantly with both SUP- PORT for retaining the union and whether the union won (U-WON), which supports hypotheses 7, 8, 8a, and 9. First, independent locals lost by landslides. An election involving an independent local union yielded 58 percent less support for retaining the union, and a much greater chance of losing, than an election involving an AFL-CIO affiliate. An election involving a Teamsters affiliate yielded 3.4 percent less support for retention, and an increased chance of losing, than did elections involving AFL-CIO affiliates. Second, unions were more likely to lose support and elections in smaller units; N-ELIG was extremely significant in both equations. Third, the greater the percentage of voters actually voting in the election (PROP-VOTE), the greater the support for retaining the union and the better the union's chances of winning the election. For every 10 percent increase in eligible voters voting, support for retaining the union increased by almost 4 percent.

The type of unit was also significant in both equations. The fifteen elections involving GUARDS were significantly different from the comparison group (units coded OFFICE, PROFESSIONAL~OFFICE, DEPARTMENT, and OTHER) in both the increased support shown and the increased likelihood of winning. This may be due to the isolating legislation restricting units of guards (See NLRA Section 9(b)(3)). Both production and manufacturing (P+M) and CRAFT units showed significantly less support (about 4 percent and 9 percent respectively) and a significantly lower likelihood of retaining the union than the comparison group. Units classified as professional/technical (PROF-TECH) showed significantly greater support for retaining the union (7 percent) than the comparison group, but bordered on significance at having a better chance of losing the election. This may be due to the closeness of the loss.

V. Conclusions

Our results support four main conclusions regarding correlates of support for retaining a union and win-loss rates in decertification elections. First, the affiliation status of the local union involved in the election was important; unions with greater available resources and greater resource utilization were more likely to hold member support and the ultimate retention of the union. Second, local - - not national - - employment and income opportunity factors were also significantly related to those outcomes. Third, employer competitiveness in the national market also predicted election outcomes. Finally, the type of unit affects election outcomes.

The first of these results was the most striking: In 440 of the 492 elections involving an independent local union there was no support for retaining the union (zero votes for retention). By contrast, in only 36 of 1,155 elections involving AFL-CIO affiliates was there no support for retaining the union. AFL-CIO affiliates have more resources at their command than Teamsters affiliates or independent locals. The question for future research is whether this is because workers choose to seek out affiliation or not, or whether affiliated unions are not interested in organizing some units.


A factor associated with this conclusion is the size difference between independent locals and affiliated locals; independent locals are much smaller. We found that size did not affect the support among affiliated locals, yet both size and the independent status of the local negatively affected support among the (smaller) independent local unions. The question for future research is, to what extent do group dynamics or union resource differences affect the success or failure of unions in decertification elections? Our results suggest that only among units with 20 or fewer members is size a significant predictor.

As a proxy for the union's resource utilization, we used the percentage of eligible voters who actually voted. The results indicated that when the eligible voters get to the polls in large numbers, the union is more likely to be retained. Resource utilization is, however, only one of several possible reasons why voters turn out. Low turnout may stem from the election results being a foregone conclusion, layoffs, vol- untary or involuntary quits, or apathy. Future researchers must pinpoint which of the above is the primary cause. As a point of departure, Cooke's (1985b) work on discrimination suggests that an employer who discriminates against union activists may cause poor turnout.

The significant effects of local employment and income opportunities were straightforward. First, as employment opportunities increased, controlling for wages, there was a reduced likelihood of supporting the retention of the union. This may be due to unions having little to do with creating increased employment opportunity. Second, as income opportunities exceed the average, there is increased likelihood of supporting and retaining the union. These factors may be behind the increased move- ment of companies to small southern towns, with no labor market competition, in the 1970s and 1980s. Such work forces do not support continued unionization.

Third, among those units facing income and employment opportunities limited to part-time, low-wage employees, support is significantly lower. As Chafetz and Fraser (1979, p. 69) concluded: "Those who could perhaps benefit the most from collective action are, in fact, the ones who have the most difficulty in retaining the legal right to it." The expense of supporting the union for some of these employees may be too significant and the benefit too small relative to their incomes. This view is supported by our data. Employers of union members in our PART-TIME category expected high productivity (average OUTPUT/HOUR was $23.69 compared to $13.54 for the other union members studied), and these employers paid a 19 percent premium over local wages to get that productivity. But with an income of only $236 a month, the PART-TIME union member was far below the poverty level. These fig- ures, and the results presented earlier, offer compelling support for the theory on peripheral workers presented earlier. Under such employment conditions, it seems that even union representation cannot improve the circumstances of these employees. If these workers are not peripheral workers, the policy implications of this are far reaching. The shift to increased part-time employment is accelerating. This may result in increased poverty.


One possible explanation for the 19 percent wage premium may be that no benefits are offered to part- t ime employees . Hence, in compar i son to compet i tors employing full-time employees, employers employing part-time employees are still at a distinct advantage.

One area to examine for some of the reasons for the above is skill. The unit types significantly affect S U P P O R T and U-WON, yet the theory is ambiguous and

the measures poor as to their specifications.

In summary, this study demonstrated the value of examining local employment and income opportunities and union resource factors in efforts to explain decertification election outcomes. We also recommend caution in interpreting those outcomes using only highly aggregated data, without reference to local conditions.

Appendix Table

Variable Names, Constructs, Variable Definitions, and Data Sources

Variable Definition/Data Variable Construct Source (in brackets)

Propensity to Retain Union

SUPPORT (dependent variable, eq. 1)

U- WON (dependent variable, eq. 2)

Members' support for union (propensity not to decertify)

Probability of retaining union (propensity not to decertify)

Votes cast for the union as a percentage of all votes cast [NLRB]

= 1 if the union was retained, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

Employment Opportunities

AC-EMP (independent variable)

Local alternative employment opportunities

Change in the employment rate in the county from the month prior to the election (m-l) to the month of the election (m), for all reported employees in the county, measured as:

99 Number of Employees m

SIC=01/county 99 ~] Number of Employeesm.1

SIC=01/county [BLS]

132 J O U R N A L O F L A B O R R E S E A R C H

A p p e n d i x T a b l e - - c o n t i n u e d


Employment Opportunities - - continued

~LSIC-EMP (independent variable)

National alternative employment opportunities

Change in the employment rate in the unit 's two digit SIC from the month prior to the election (m-l) to the month of the election (m), for all reported employees, measured as:

N Y~ Number of Employees m

County= 1/SIC

N

]~ Number of Employeesm_ 1 County= 1/SIC [BLS]

Income Opportunities

LOC-WAGE (used in construction of the ratio below)

SIC- WAGE (used in construction of the ratio below)

OUR-WAGE (used in construction of the ratios below)

The average wage in the unit's county, across all industries, in month m, expressed as:

99 Z WAGES

SIC=01/county 99 Y, Number of Employees

SIC=01/county [BLS]

The average wage in the unit's two-digit SIC industry, across all counties, in month m, expressed as:

N ~_~ WAGES

County= l/SIC N Y, Number of Employees

County=l/SIC [BLS]

The average wage in the unit's two-digit SIC industry, in the unit 's county, in month m, expressed as:

WAGES sIc, county

Number of Employees sic, county [BLS]

DAVID M E Y E R and T R E V O R B A I N 133

A p p e n d i x T a b l e - - cont inued


Income Opportunities -- continued

I OUR- WAGE LOC-WAGE 1

(independent variable)

OUR-WAGE 1 SIC-WAGE

(independent variable)

OUTPUT/HOUR (independent variable)

PM-SALES (control and used in construction of the independent variable below)

APM-SALES (independent variable)

Local income opportunities

National income opportunities

National industry productivity and product market conditions

Percentage sales growth (decline) over the last year

OUR-WAGE (see above) divided by LOC-WAGE (see above) [BLS]

OUR-WAGE (see above) divided by SIC-WAGE (see above) [BLS]

Average dollar value of the output per hour of all employees in the unit 's three-digit SIC in the year of the election. [Industrial Census]

The dollar value of the total output of all employees in the unit 's three-digit SIC, in the year of the election (y). [Industrial Census]

PM-SALESy (see above) divided by PM-SALESy_I [Industrial Census]

Union Resources, Expertise, Power, and Solidarity

N-ELIG (independent variable)

INDEP (independent variable)

TEAMSTERS (independent variable)

AFL-CIO [independent variable (in constant)]

PROP- VOTE (independent variable)

Bargaining unit size; Union resources and union power available

Scant union resources, expertise, and power

Union resources, expertise, and power are greater than in 1NDEP

Union resources, expertise, power, and solidarity are greater than in TEAMSTERS and INDEP

Union resources deployed

The number of employees eligible to vote in the election. [NLRB]

= 1 if unit was independent, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

= 1 if unit was affiliated with the Teamsters, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

= 1 if unit was affiliated with the AFL-CIO, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

The number of unit members voting in the election as a percentage of N-ELIG. [NLRB]

134 J O U R N A L OF LABOR RESEARCH

A p p e n d i x Tab le - - c o n t i n u e d


Employee Power

CRAFT (independent variable

DEPARTMENT [independent variable (in constant)]

DRIVERS (independent variable)

GUARDS (independent variable

OFFICE [independent variable (in constant)]

OTHER [independent variable (in constant)]

P+M (independent variable)

PROF-TECH (independent variable)

Employee power

Employee power

Employee power

Employee power

Employee power

Employee power

Employee power

Employee power

= 1 if the unit was classified as a craft unit, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

= t if the unit was classified as a department, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

= 1 if the unit was classified as a drivers unit, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

= 1 if the unit was classified as a unit of guards, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

= 1 if the unit was classified as an office unit, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

= 1 if the unit was classified as other, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

= I if the unit was classified as a production/manufacturing unit, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

= 1 if the unit was classified as a professional/technical unit, 0 otherwise [NLRB]

Environment

RTW (intervening variable)

PART- TIME (intervening variable)

Environmental factor

Average worker in the national product market was part-time.

= 1 if the state in which the election was held was a "right-to-work" state, prohibiting union shops, 0 otherwise

= 1 if the average monthly wages paid to employees in the unit's three-digit SIC nationally were less than the minimum wage times full-time hours in a month (40 hours x 4 weeks), 0 otherwise (see note 5 in text) [Industrial Census]

DAVID M E Y E R and T R E V O R B A I N 135

N O T E S

1Tests examining the effects of the level of and change in unemployment (in Standard Metropolitan Statis- tical Areas) did not yield significant effects for either of these factors• Theoretical reasons for this stem from the specific attributes of the population not reported here: These employees have, on average, only part-time employment opportunities and low-income opportunities. They may not be, for the most part, primary bread winners•

2From Seeber and Cooke's (1983) conclusions, this variable follows a hyperbolic transform: -1/N-ELIG. The smaller units of 2, 3, 4, and so on are thought to exhibit a much greater magnitude of effect than units of 100, 101,102, and so on.

Separate analyses of AFL-CIO-affiliate elections only (not reported here) indicated that the size of the unit had no significant effect on SUPPORT or U-WON. Furthermore, national union membership levels, and changes in national union membership (union resource variables) were positively, but not significantly, related to both SUPPORT and U-WON.

3The omitted category of PROFESSIONAL/OFFICE had an N of only 4•

4Tests examining the effects of the variable South-non-South (SNS), both alone and with RTW, not reported here, did not yield significant effects for SNS when RTW was also included. When SNS was included without RTW,, SNS approached the. 10 significance level in the expected direction.

5PART-TIME is set to = 1 for total monthly income less than full-time hours times the minimum wage in the relevant month• Because the minimum wage rose ~,early from $2•30 in 1977 to $3.55 in 1981, this cal- culation changed over the time period studied.

6The omitted benchmark category represents elections involving AFL-CIO affiliated unions; units with average wages in their corresponding product market nationally greater than the minimum wage times 160 hours (full-time monthly hours); and units coded as DEPARTMENT, OFFICE, PROFESSIONAL~OFFICE, or OTHER•

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Documents

Union decertification election outcomes: Bargaining unit characteristics and union resources