Understanding the Specific Small Modular Reactors Safeguards Issues

INPRO Dialogue Forum on Legal and Institutional Issues in the Global Deployment of Small Modular Reactors

IAEA Headquarters, Vienna. 18-21 October 2016

Meeting Room: VIC M3 (M building)

Brian D. Boyer

SGCP/CCA

Key Objectives

•  To understand the designing of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) in relation to safeguards issues

•  Illuminate safeguards issues unique to classes of SMRs that need attention now for future design and deployment for both suppliers and hosts

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Overview •  Bases and Purpose of IAEA Safeguards •  Significance of IAEA Safeguards for SMR Designs •  Safeguards By Design (SBD) for future facilities •  SMR specific issues for discussion in this forum

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IAEA Safeguards Evolution

Information circulars (INFCIRCs) contain the legal instruments that establish IAEA safeguards objectives and practices

IAEA Founded

INFCIRC/66 Pre-NPT

Safeguards Model

INFCIRC/153 Comprehensive

Safeguards Agreement (CSA) Model

INFCIRC/540 Additional

Protocol (AP) Model

1957 1965 1970 1972 1997

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) INFCIRC/140

The NPT requires NNWS to accept

full-scope safeguards and to conclude a CSA with the IAEA

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IAEA Safeguards Overview •  IAEA determination that all nuclear material remains in peaceful activities is based

on the IAEA finding of no indications of the diversion of declared nuclear material and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole

•  State-level safeguards objectives common to all States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) –  Detect any diversion of declared nuclear material in declared facilities or LOFs –  Detect any undeclared production or processing of nuclear material in declared

facilities or Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs) –  Detect any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole

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Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153 Corr.)

•  INFCIRC/153 Para. 2 state that all safeguards is applied –  on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear

activities within the territory of the State •  INFCIRC/153 Para. 28 established the technical objective of safeguards

–  timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities... and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection

Verify

State's

Declarations

Nuclear Materials Accountancy

C/S and

Monitoring

Independent Inspection and

Conclusion

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Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement – Key Points

•  Safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in a State allows the IAEA to provide credible assurance safeguards objective is met

•  Cornerstone of IAEA safeguards is nuclear materials accountancy –  complemented by Containment and Surveillance (C/S) - Continuity of

Knowledge (CoK) •  Inspection regimes verify continuing effectiveness of safeguards measures

–  Provide bases for IAEA conclusions regarding State compliance and absence of diversion

Verify

State's

Declarations

Nuclear Materials Accountancy

C/S and

Monitoring

Independent Inspection and

Conclusion

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IAEA Safeguards and SMRs •  Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are being designed to meet energy, heating, and

desalinization needs in developed and developing countries –  Information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under the agreement and the

features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material IAEA INFCIRC 153, para 8, articles 42 to 48

–  State provides design information “as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility” with initial information about the design provided at least 6 months before the start of the construction of the project.

•  Consideration of IAEA Safeguards in SMR design –  “IAEA safeguards and physical security of the SMR must be included in the early design

phase in order for the SMR to be an economically feasible solution when built.” Interim Report of ANS President’s Special Committee on Small and Modular Reactor (SMR) Generic Licensing Issues

–  “The supplier should design the nuclear power plant for safeguards friendliness to the current IAEA safeguards regime.”

Common User Considerations (CUC) by Developing Countries for Future Nuclear Energy Systems: Report of Stage 1, NP-T-2.1 (IAEA)

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Design of a Safeguards Approach •  Safeguards approaches developed by the IAEA for each type of nuclear

facility consist of a system of nuclear material accountancy, containment, surveillance, and other measures to meet detection goals

•  Technical Objectives (TOs) serve as guidelines for development of safeguards approaches and detailed procedures for inspection activities including quantity and timely detection goals

•  Model safeguards approaches are adapted to specific facilities, with detailed inspection goals, procedures, and measures specified in subsidiary arrangements and facility attachments

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IAEA Safeguards Needs •  Nuclear material accountancy is basis for deriving a conclusion on non-

diversion of declared nuclear material from declared facilities •  To comply with its verification obligations, at facility level the IAEA will/

may need to use a full range of tools and measures available to it •  SMRs will have unique safeguards issues especially in light of novel

designs and deployments

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Perspective: Generic Safeguards Approach: Type I Large Scale Commercial LWR

From IAEA Technical Report Series 392, Design Measures to Facilitate Implementation of Safeguards at Future Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants

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LWR Type I have the spent fuel (SF) pool within the reactor containment building – many SMRs will use this concept to save space – could have stacked spent fuel racks

Typical Type I Light Water Reactor Layout

Perspective: Generic Safeguards Approach: Type II Large Scale Commercial LWR

From IAEA Technical Report Series 392, Design Measures to Facilitate Implementation of Safeguards at Future Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants

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LWR Type II have the spent fuel pool outside the reactor containment building – some SMRs may use this design for SF storage – could have stacked spent fuel racks - or have separate storage pools or dry storage

Typical Type II Light Water Reactor Layout

Safeguards By Design (SBD) •  SBD definition:

–  integration of features to support IAEA safeguards into the design process for a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning

•  SBD Objectives –  Avoid costly and time-consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear

facilities to implement IAEA safeguards approach –  Improve effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards

•  Challenges –  Lack of IAEA safeguards design requirements or standards –  IAEA Model Safeguards Approach for SMR may change over facility design life

as experience with SMR design and operation accumulates –  Note: Certain minimum requirements will apply

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SBD Structure and Approach •  Anticipate general safeguards needs based upon current safeguards

practices and IAEA guidance •  Incorporate safeguards “infrastructure” measures into plant design to

accommodate a range of IAEA safeguards approaches –  Safeguards approaches rely upon IAEA equipment that plant design needs

to accommodate –  SBD should offer flexibility for differing IAEA safeguards approaches over

plant design life –  SBD can be useful for SMRs since unique features create new situations for

safeguarding nuclear material

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Impacts of Not Being Safeguards Friendly

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Fuel Transfer Systems in LWR

•  Example Issue - Gen 3+ LWR Design –  Design made continuous surveillance of

fuel transfer routes difficult –  Modifications to improve camera

coverage / continuity of knowledge required

–  Additional required penetrations / cable runs for safeguards instrumentation

–  Delays and additional costs for redesign / rework

Anticipated Effects of Designing for Safeguard Friendliness •  Safeguards focus is largely on fresh and spent fuel

storage and handling and on undeclared production –  Potential impact on layout of fresh and spent fuel storage

•  Fresh / spent fuel inventory verification –  Provisions for surveillance of fuel storage / refueling

•  Surveillance of fuel transfer routes •  Equipment mounting locations, cable runs

–  Minor or no effects on Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS)

•  Detection of undeclared irradiation of source material •  There could be application of some joint use non-safety

related power / flux monitoring instrumentation on the NSSS to monitor power to verify no unreported Pu production

–  No anticipated impact on safety

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Collage of SMRs Source: STATUS OF SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED REACTOR DESIGNS – IAEA (Advanced Reactors Information System (ARIS))

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Key Safeguards Related Issues: LWR vs. SMR – Design and Operations Feature LWR SMR

Fueling (FF) (Storage of FF and loading)

On-site – refuel every 12-24 months – 40 year life

On-site or off-site (Factory Site or Service Facility) – refuel few times if ever over lifetime – 40-60 year life

Spent Fuel (SF) (Removal from core and storage)

SF stored in pool to cool – shipped after years to dry storage or reprocessing (May have 40 year old fuel on site)

1)  SF may be stored on-site by reactor or in pools or casks 2) Shipped to supplier State 3) Fuel remains in reactor for life

Reactor core (CF) (Fuel in vessel in operation)

Reactor core access during refueling Reactor core may only be accessible during initial loading – tight spacing may make reactor cores refueled on site difficult to access

Operations – Power levels, continuity of knowledge of CF, SF

Refueling allows for access and analysis of core 12-24 months

With infrequent or no refueling – no information on core fuel status could occur for decades

Decommissioning – Removal of all fuels and essential equipment

D&D activities on-site including defueling and removal of Essential Equipment with IAEA inspection and visitation rights

SMR can be dismantled and shipped complete to supplier

Key Issues of Implementation of SMRs Example of Factory Fuel SMR (FFS) •  Host State – Nonnuclear Weapon State (NNWS) with Safeguards obligations

–  Safeguards obligations –  Export controls

•  Supplier State –  Nuclear Weapon State (NWS)

•  NPT –Voluntary Offer Agreements

–  NNWS •  NPT safeguards agreements

•  Differences in safeguards obligations provide new environments with respect to FFS in terms of safeguards implementation –  Multi-State obligations needed –  Difficult to access FF, CF, SF possible with FFS –  State sovereign status of Factory, Service Facility and Transport of FFS

HOST SUPPLIER

FACTORY NPP Site

REACTOR (FF)

REACTOR(SF)

REACTOR (CF) REACTOR Fueled with FF

SERVICE FACILITY

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Placing a Facility and Nuclear Material (NM) under IAEA Safeguards - Design Information •  Early provision of Design Information / Model A.P. Art 2.a.(ix)(b)

equipment receipt –  FFS would not need A.P. Art 2.a.(ix)(b) reporting – fuel and equipment ship in and out

of State in total

•  State submits a completed Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) –  Used by the IAEA to develop a safeguards approach –  Provision of preliminary design information – as soon as decision to construct –  For new facilities, completed Agency DIQ must be submitted not later than 180 days

prior to the start of construction –  Continuing update and IAEA review during design / construction

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Placing a Facility and NM under IAEA Safeguards Verifying DIQ and Initial NM •  IAEA conducts Design Information Verification (DIV) of declared facility •  Facility Attachment documents safeguards measures and obligations of

State and IAEA •  State provides a declaration of its initial nuclear material inventory •  IAEA performs an ad hoc inspection (if no FA + PIL) to verify the initial

report on the NM subject to safeguards •  IAEA/SSAC or RSAC/Operator – interactions and coordination

–  Create a dialogue for a more efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards

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•  Host State – NNWS with Safeguards obligations –  Safeguards obligations –  Export controls

•  Supplier State –  NWS

•  NPT – with VOAs

–  NNWS •  NPT and CSA etc…

•  Safeguards obligations are different environment with FFS!

Obligations with FFS

HOST SUPPLIER

FACTORY NPP Site

REACTOR (FF)

REACTOR(SF)

REACTOR (CF) REACTOR Fueled with FF

DIQ compilation DIV opportunities FF and CF Verification

DIQ? DIV? SF Verification?

DIQ? DIV? FF CF Verification?

HOST

SERVICE FACILITY

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•  Safeguards obligations of the Supplier and Host State are key factors •  Safeguards obligations for shipping an entire system with fuel 1) without any

opportunity for inspection or 2) need for new inspection tools is a new frontier •  The safeguarding of SMRs that require no core access or refueling for decades

present issues for access and verification including reverification if continuity of knowledge is lost for 2-3 decades.

•  SMRs that are not LWRs or have on-load capabilities present new issues for –  Viable safeguards approaches –  Nondestructive Assay tools/ techniques to verify new composite nuclear materials and

fuel structures –  New SMR facility type safeguards challenges - Thorium cycle, Sodium Fast Reactors,

Molten Salt Reactors, Pebble Bed Modular Reactors, Lead Fast Reactors

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