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UnderstandingHumanitarianNegotiation:

FiveAnalyticalApproaches

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UnderstandingHumanitarianNegotiation:FiveAnalyticalApproaches

2 ATHAWhitePaperSeries

Introduction

Despite increased focuson thecrucial role thatnegotiationplays inhumanitariansettings,a

dearthofscholarshipandanalysishasbeendevotedtothisissue.1Whileawealthofliterature

existsaboutnegotiationsinothercontexts—politicalandcommercialsettings,forexample—

the analytical frameworks elucidated in this rich body of literature have yet to be

systematically applied to negotiations that occur in the context of humanitarianoperations.

Indeed,existing literatureonhumanitariannegotiationsconsistsprimarilyofcontext-specific

casestudies.2Thesecasestudiesoffervaluable insights into thedilemmasthathumanitarian

negotiatorshave faced inparticularoperations.However,existing literature leaves roomfor

comparativeanalysisacrossdifferentcontexts.

Thisbriefingnoteaimstoofferatoolforpromotingfurtherscholarshipandanalysistoclose

this researchgap. Toward this end, it presents anoverviewof five analytical approachesby

which humanitarian negotiations can be understood, drawing on insights elaborated in

literatureproducedoverthepastseveraldecadesonnegotiationinpolitical,commercial,and

legal contexts. The five analytical approaches on which this briefing note focuses are: (1)

distributive, or power-based, negotiation; (2) integrative, or interest-based, negotiation; (3)

basic human needs-based negotiation; (4) the behavioral approach to negotiation; and (5)

cultureasafactorinnegotiation.Someoftheseapproachesareconceptuallyrelatedoreven

1SeegenerallyRobGrace,“HumanitarianNegotiation:ChallengesandLessonsLearnedinanEmerging

Field,”AdvancedTrainingProgramonHumanitarianAction,

http://www.atha.se/sites/default/files/humanitarian_negotiation_-

_key_challenges_and_lessons_learned_in_an_emerging_field.pdf.2Forexamples,seegenerallyClaireMagone,MichaelNeuman,andFabriceWeissman,eds.,

HumanitarianNegotiationsRevealed(London:Hurst&Company,2011);AshleyJacksonandAbdi

Aynte,“Talkingtotheotherside:HumanitariannegotiationswithAl-ShabaabinSomalia,”HPG

WorkingPaper,HumanitarianPolicyGroup,December2013,

http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8744.pdf;andMark

Cutts,“ThehumanitarianoperationinBosnia,1992-95:dilemmasofnegotiatinghumanitarian

access,”NewIssuesinRefugeeResearch,WorkingPaperNo.8,UNHCR,May31,1999,

http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6a0c58.pdf.

ExecutiveSummary

Thisbriefingnoteaimstosupportthehumanitariansector’seffortstoapplyadeeper

levelofanalyticalandstrategicthinkingtohumanitariannegotiation.Towardthisend,

itprovidesanoverviewofhowtherichbodyof literaturefocusedonnegotiations in

othercontexts—political,commercial,andlegalsettings,forexample—caninformour

understandingofhumanitariannegotiation.Inparticular,thisbriefingnotefocuseson

fiveanalyticalapproachestonegotiation:(1)distributive,orpower-based,negotiation;

(2) integrative, or interest-based, negotiation; (3) basic human needs-based

negotiation;(4)thebehavioralapproachtonegotiation;and(5)cultureasafactorin

negotiation. By examining humanitarian negotiation through the lens of these five

approaches,thisbriefingnote seeks to shed lighton thepotential factors thatdrive

humanitariannegotiationsandtopromotefurtherscholarlyanalysisandprofessional

reflectioninthisfield.

Thisbriefingnoteaimstosupportthehumanitariansector’seffortstoapplyadeeper



overlapping (e.g., insights drawn from the integrativemodel are relevant to the behavioral

approach),andothersmightnotbeuniversallyrecognizedasconstitutingadistinct“theory”

of negotiation (e.g., issues of culture).However, these five approaches constitute themost

dominantandrelevantapproachesdiscussedintheacademicliterature.3

The overall objective of this briefing note is to support the humanitarian sector’s efforts to

applyadeeperlevelofanalyticalandstrategicthinkingtowardhumanitariannegotiation.For

researcherswithaninterestinthistopic,thisbriefingnotetakesafirststeptowardmarrying

thesmallbutgrowingbodyofliteratureonhumanitariannegotiationwithbroadernegotiation

theory, paving the way for further scholarly work. For humanitarian practitioners, the

analyticalapproachespresentedhereofferanopportunity todeepentheirunderstandingof

their own negotiation experiences, in support of measures to hone and refine their

negotiation skills and to carry forward lessons learned to other colleagues in the field. For

policymakers,thedifferentapproachesandviewsofnegotiationdiscussedinthisbriefingnote

could inform the further development of policy guidance, as well as organizational

approaches,tohumanitariannegotiation.

I. Distributive,orPower-Based,Negotiation

Themain underlying assumption of distributive negotiation is that a fixed amount of value

exists on the negotiating table to be distributed among the negotiating parties. This

assumption implies thatwhatever one party gets as a result of the negotiations is equal to

whatevertheotherpartyloses—inshort,thatnegotiationisa“zero-sum”game.Sincepower

plays an important role in the distribution process, this type of negotiation is often called

power-based. Beginning in the 1960s, when literature systematically analyzing negotiations

first emerged, early negotiation theory generally focused on international scenarios and

placedemphasisonthiscompetitive,“zero-sum”approachtobargaining.4Thekeysteps ina

negotiationprocessdefinedbypower-basedbargainingare:

1. Thepartiesmakeinitialoffers.

2. Thepartiestakestepstosignaltheircommitmenttotheirinitialoffers.Thisstep,called

“anchoring,”canbeachieved inmanydifferentways—forexample,byclaimingthat

3Additionalanalyticalstrandsmaybefoundinnegotiationliterature.Forinformationontherolethat

genderplaysinnegotiation,seegenerallyNatalieB.Floreaetal.,“NegotiatingFromMarsto

Venus:GenderinSimulatedInternationalNegotiations,”Simulation&Gaming34,no.2(2003):226-

48;SaraiB.Aharoni,“Thegender-culturedoublebindinIsraeli-Palestinianpeacenegotiations:A

narrativeapproach,”SecurityDialogue45,no.4(2014):373-90;AbigailE.Ruane,“‘RealMen’and

Diplomats:InterculturalDiplomaticNegotiationandMasculinitiesinChinaandtheUnitedStates,”

InternationalStudiesPerspectives7,Issue4(2006):342-59;andKarinHederosErikssonandAnnaSandberg,“GenderDifferencesinInitiationofNegotiation:DoestheGenderoftheNegotiation

CounterpartMatter?”NegotiationJournal28,Issue4(2012):407-28.Forliteratureaddressingthe

roleoflanguageinnegotiation,seegenerallyDavidV.J.Bell,“PoliticalLinguisticsandInternational

Negotiation,”NegotiationJournal4,Issue3(1998):233-46;andRaymondCohen,“Resolving

ConflictAcrossLanguages,”NegotiationLanguage17,Issue1(2001):17-34.4SeegenerallyP.TerrenceHopmann,“TwoParadigmsofNegotiation:BargainingandProblem

Solving,”TheAnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience542,no.1(1995):24-47.



the public or a superior decision-makerwill not agree to a deviation from the initial

offer.Thisstepreducestheparties’abilitytocompromise.5

3. Thepartiespressureeachother tomake concessionsby issuing threatsor sanctions

andalsobyprovidingincentivesthroughproposedrewards.Powerplaysacriticalrole

inthecoerciveeffortsinherentinthisstep.

4. Afteraperiodoftime,thepartiesmakeconcessionsthatbegintobringtheirpositions

closer together. However, this process is dynamic; previous concessions can be and

often arewithdrawn,moving the parties further apart fromone another again. The

processofapplyingpressureandofferingincentivesforconcessionsthencontinues.

5. Thepartiesagreetoafinalcompromiseandstrikeadeal.

6

As the steps presented above suggest, in the distributive model, power influences the

dynamicsateachstepofthisprocess.How,then,canpowerbedefinedandconceptualized?

Manydifferent approaches exist,7but onewidely cited conceptualizationbelongs to Joseph

Nye, who defines power as the ability to influence the behavior of others to realize the

outcomesonewants.8Nyedistinguishesbetweenthreegeneralformsofpower:(1)thepower

to coerce through threats of force; (2) the power to induce a desired outcome through

payment; and (3) the power to co-opt another party to do what one wants.9Distributive

negotiation emphasizes the first two of these types, which together can be called “hard

power.” The third type, “soft power,” is more commonly associated with integrative

negotiationandisexaminedingreaterdetailinSectionIIbelow.

Consider thedistributivemodel—andtheroleof“hardpower”—inrelationtothe following

example: A humanitarian organization is negotiatingwith a representative from a non-state

armed group (NSAG) for access to territory under the NSAG’s control. The NSAG

representativetakestheinitialpositionthataccesstobeneficiarieswillnotbegrantedunless

theNSAGisabletodistributetheaiddirectly.Thehumanitarianorganizationinitiallydemands

unconditionalaccess.Bothsidesinitiallyclaimthattheywillnotandcannotdeviatefromthese

initial positions. As part of this process, the NSAG representative exploits his or her “hard

power” advantage by threatening to compromise aid worker security—for example, by

refusingtoguaranteesafepassagethroughtheterritory.Thehumanitarianorganizationhasa

lever of coercion at its disposal in the formof a threat of public denunciation. Both parties

5Fordiscussionoftheroleofdomesticconstituentsininternationalnegotiations,seegenerallyRobert

D.Putnam,“DiplomacyandDomesticPolitics:TheLogicofTwo-LevelGames,”International

Organization42,No.3(1988):427-60.6Hopmann,“TwoParadigms,”26.AlsoseegenerallyCharlesWalcottandP.TerrenceHopmann,

“InteractionAnalysisandBargainingBehavior,”inTheSmallGroupinPoliticalScience,ed.RobertThomasGolembiewski(Athens:UniversityofGeorgiaPress,1978),251-58.

7Forexamples,seegenerallyFelixBerenskoetterandM.J.Williams,eds.,PowerinWorldPolitics

(London:Routledge,2007);andStevenLukes,Power:ARadicalView(Basingstoke:Palgrave

Macmillan,2005).8JosephS.Nye,BoundtoLead:TheChangingNatureofAmericanPower(NewYork:BasicBooks,1990),

25-35.9Ibid.



thenbegintomakecompromises.Thehumanitariannegotiator,forexample,mightagreeto

paytheNSAGa“fee”or“tax”(intheformofmoneyormaterialaid,forexample)inorderto

gain territorial access tobeneficiaries.10In theend, although theNSAG representativemight

notgeteverythingheor shewanted in the initial offer, thehumanitarianorganizationdoes

concedetoconditionalaccess.

One can see that, in such scenarios, as thepartiesmove through the five negotiating steps

elaboratedabove,theasymmetricpowerdynamicsofthenegotiatingpartiesyieldsascenario

unfavorable to humanitarian organizations, which either cannot or categorically will not

compete on a “hard power” level, limiting their ability to extract concessions from their

interlocutors. Furthermore, distributive negotiations can and usually do become quite

protracted,afactthatfeedsintotheasymmetricpowerdynamicmentionedabove.Inorderto

reachacompromise ina“zero-sum”game,negotiatorsonbothsidesgenerallyhavetogive

somethingup.However,given the confrontational approachof thedistributivemodel,both

parties are reluctant tomake concessions, and theparty feeling less timepressuregains an

advantage.Returningtothehumanitariannegotiationexamplediscussedabove,becausethe

needsoftheaffectedpopulationareimmediate,thehumanitarianorganizationdoesnothave

timeonitsside.TheNSAGrepresentative,however,maynotfeelthesamepressurebecause

heorsheispersonallyunaffectedbyrefusingtoallowaccesstothehumanitarianorganization

(exceptincircumstancesinwhichtheNSAGitselfisinneedofaidandhopestobenefitdirectly

fromthegoodsthatthehumanitarianorganizationseekstodeliver).Overall,thesedynamics

tendtostrengthentherelativepowerpositionoftheNSAG.

Indistributivenegotiation, somecompromise fromeachparty is required foreitherparty to

receiveanything,andadverseconsequencesmayresultifonepartybelievesthattheotherdid

notcompromiseenough.AsRogerFisherandWilliamUryexplainintheirbook,GettingtoYes

(the seminal work outlining the integrative approach, to be discussed in greater detail in

Section II), the relationship between negotiating parties can suffer under “zero-sum”

conditionsifaninitialsettlementhasleftonepartyfeelingthattheydidnotreceivetheirfair

shareofthenegotiatingpie.Thesenegativefeelingsmaypreventthepartiesfromdeveloping

a positive relationship with one another, potentially influencing both parties’ negotiation

strategiesandtacticsinfuturenegotiations.11Suchconsiderationscanbeespeciallyimportant

duringprotractedcrises,whenhumanitariannegotiatorsseektoforgelong-termrelationships

withtheirinterlocutors.

II. Integrative,orInterest-Based,Negotiation

Thedistributivemodelofnegotiationisdrasticallylimitedbyitsrigid,singularfocusonpower

and positions, as well as its limited room for compromise. As such, it has inspired a rich,

alternative body of literature that discusses more holistic or integrative interest-based

negotiationstrategies.PopularizedbytheaforementionedFisherandUrybook,GettingtoYes,

integrativebargaining is a strategybywhichparties collaborate to find“win-win” solutions.

10SeeJacksonandAynte,“Talkingtotheotherside,”9-10,whichdiscusseshumanitariannegotiators

agreeingtothisconditiontogainaccesstoterritoryinSomaliacontrolledbyAl-Shabaab.11RogerFisher,WilliamUry,andBrucePatton,GettingtoYes:NegotiatingAgreementWithoutGivingIn,

2nded.(NewYork:HoughtonMifflin,1991),157-59.

http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/win-lose



The focus is on developing mutually beneficial agreements based on the interests of the

negotiators, with the understanding that interests are the underlying reasons that people

becomeinvolvedinaconflict.Thegoalofintegrativenegotiationisforbothpartiestocreate

joint value, also called “enlarging the pie.” This is usually possible when there aremultiple

issues involved in the negotiation, making it possible for parties to trade-off between the

issues so that both sides can be satisfied with the final outcome. Generally, integrative

bargaining may be used when parties are willing to adopt a forward-looking or problem-

solvingapproachthatwillbenefitbothsides.12Thisapproachalsogenerally requiresthatthe

parties foster anongoing relationship anddevelop a sharedunderstandingofwhat is tobe

accomplished.Integrativebargainingemphasizesfourmainprecepts:

1. Separatethepeoplefromtheproblem.Inotherwords,partiesshouldworktogether

toattackaproblem,noteachother.Negativeemotionsareoftenseenasobstaclesto

thisapproach.13

2. Focus on interests, not positions. The idea behind this precept is that the goal of

negotiation is to satisfy each party’s underlying interests, which can be reconciled

throughgathering information and finding creative solutions, even if initial positions

seem fundamentally at odds with one another. By reframing the issue in terms of

parties’ interests, rather than their bargaining positions, it may be easier to find

commonground.14OneexamplediscussedinGettingtoYesisthenegotiationbetween

Israel and Egypt over possession of the Sinai Peninsula at the 1978 Camp David

Summit.Sinceonlyonestatecouldcontroltheterritory,thetwocountries’positions

seemdeadlocked.Yettheinterestsbehindthesepositions—namely,Egypt’sdesirefor

historicterritoryandIsrael’sdesirefornationalsecurity—werenottrulyincompatible.

Ultimately, the negotiations were successful, endingwith the return of the Sinai to

Egyptundertheconditionofitsfulldemilitarization.15Asthisexampledemonstrates,it

ispossibletoreachacompromisesolutionthatsatisfiesbothparties’interests,which

mightnotactuallyconflictatall.

3. Generate a variety of possibilities beforedecidingwhat todo. Fisher andUry’s Sinai

exampleillustratesthispreceptaswell.It is importanttobrainstormcreativeoptions

for mutual gain in negotiation and to avoid becoming locked into premature

judgments,searchingforjustasingleanswer,orassumingthatthereisa“fixedpie.”

4. Insist that the result bebasedon someobjective standard. This preceptmeans that

thesolutionshouldbebasedonprinciple,ratherthanpressure,usingsuchstandards

12Formoreonforward-andbackward-lookingapproachestonegotiation,seeDanielDruckman,

“NegotiatingintheInternationalContext,”inPeacemakinginInternationalConflict:Methods&

Techniques,rev.ed.,ed.I.WilliamZartman(Washington,D.C.:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,

2007),140-41.13See“SectionIV:TheBehavioralApproach”foramorethoroughdiscussionoftheroleofemotionin

negotiations.14OliverRamsbotham,HughMiall,andTomWoodhouse,ContemporaryConflictResolution,3rded.

(Cambridge:PolityPress,2011),187-88.15ForananalysisoftheCampDavidnegotiations,seegenerallyHowardRaiffa,“TheCampDavid

Negotiations,”inTheArtandScienceofNegotiation(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,

1982),205-17.



as fairness, efficiency, market value, or scientific merit. This focus helps preserve

relationships and obtain settlements by tying the negotiated outcome to some

externallyverifiablebenchmark.16

As the above points indicate, interests, communication, and relationship building are key

aspects of integrative bargaining.17By identifying one another’s interests, the negotiating

parties increase their ability todevelop“win-win” solutions that aremutually acceptable. In

order to identify these interests, a negotiator must uncover the roots of the interests and

prioritiesofthepartyheorsheisrepresenting,aswellasthoseoftheopposingparty.After

interests are identified, the parties must work together to determine the best method for

reaching a compromise that takes all of these interests into account. One method is to

brainstorm possible solutionswithout initially criticizing or dismissing any options, with the

goal of allowingparties todevelop creative ideas formeeting the various relevant interests

andneeds.Thepurposeistodeviseasettlementthateachpartyseesasawinratherthana

loss.Thiscoreattribute—thatnegotiationisseenasa“positivesum,”asopposedtoa“zero-

sum,”game—distinguishes the integrative approach from thedistributivemodel detailed in

SectionI.

Existing policy guidance on humanitarian negotiation draws heavily on the integrative

approach. For example, a handbook produced by theHD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

notes, “Talks can easily reach deadlock if they follow a single path or continually look at

problemsinthesameway.Successfulnegotiatorsareoftenagileandcreativewithrespectto

thewayinwhichtheytreatthesubstanceofdiscussion,ateverysignofdeadlockfindingways

tolookatfactsdifferently,changingtheemphasisinanargument,andmakingnoveloffers.”18

Regarding the importance of rationalism and objectivity, the handbook states, “Many

negotiationtheoristsadviseshiftingthesubstantivefocusofnegotiationsfromsubjectiveto

objective matters whenever emotions are rising and threatening to produce a stalemate.

Moving the discussion from feelings to facts can present greater opportunities for problem

solving.”19In a similar vein, a United Nations handbook on humanitarian negotiation

emphasizes the possibility of evoking humanitarian principles to promote integrative

approaches, and in particular states, “Humanitarian principles help to frame humanitarian

negotiations...byprovidingasetofcriteriafordevelopingoptionsforconsiderationbythe

negotiatingparties.”20

However, there are limits to the integrative model, as demonstrated, for example, by

negotiationsincertaincross-culturalcontexts,aswillbeexaminedfurtherinSectionVbelow.21

16Fisher,Ury,andPatton,GettingtoYes,10-11.

17SeeBernardMayer,TheDynamicsofConflictResolution:APractitioner'sGuide(SanFrancisco:Jossey-

BassInc.,2000),151-54.18HumanitarianNegotiation:AHandbookforSecuringAccess,AssistanceandProtectionfor

CivilianinArmedConflict,HDCentreforHumanitarianDialogue,2004,93,

http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/188HumanitarianNegotiation.pdf.

19Ibid.

20HumanitarianNegotiationswithArmedGroups:AManuelforPractitioners,UnitedNations,2006,23,

https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/HumanitarianNegotiationswArmedGroupsManual.p

df.21SeegenerallyGeraldB.Wetlaufer,“LimitsofIntegrativeBargaining,”GeorgetownLawJournal85

(1996):369-95;andRussellKorobkin,“AgainstIntegrativeBargaining,”(paperpresentedatthe



Wheninterestsarelinkedtocoreassumptionsabouttheworld,deeplyheldvalues,ideologies,

orreligiouslyinspiredbeliefs,andwhenthesevaluesandbeliefsdifferacrossnegotiatorswith

differentculturalbackgrounds,theprocessofuntanglinginterestsfrompositionscanbemore

difficult.22In this regard, humanitarian actors negotiating cross-culturally—for example,

Westernhumanitarianaidworkersnegotiatingforaccessinthecontextofhumanitariancrises

inAfricanorMiddleEasterncountries—mightstruggletosucceedinimplementingintegrative

approaches. Furthermore, among the numerous challenges facing the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), some relate to understanding the context and the

rationality of counterparts.23This fact suggests the difficulties in approaching negotiations

from a purely integrative angle. Through relationship building and long-term acceptance

strategies, a humanitarian negotiator might be able to cultivate an environment in which

integrative strategies can eventually be employed, but from the outset, humanitarian

negotiatorsevidentlyshouldnotexpecttheprocesstounfoldinanautomatically integrative

manner.

III. BasicHumanNeedsTheory

The theory of basic human needs, pioneered by John Burton in the 1960s, asserts that the

repression of certain non-material universal social needs—namely identity, participation,

recognition, and security—leads to conflict.24Basic needs, rather than “differences of

observableinterestsandmisperceptionsaboutthem,”arethesourceofdeep-rootedconflicts.

Iftheseneedsarenotaddressed,Burtonargues,conflictcannotberesolved.25Consequently,

thisschoolofthoughtargues,interest-basednegotiationislimitedinitsabilitytoidentifyand

resolvebasicnon-materialneeds,andhence,initsabilitytoresolveconflicts.Inthissense,just

as the integrative approach seeks to delve “below” positions to understand interests, the

humanneedsmodelseekstodelveevendeepertodiscerntheunderlyingneedsatstake.

This theory has led to the development of interactive conflict resolution as an alternative

methodology to respond to conflicts arising from unmet basic needs. For instance, Herbert

Kelman integrated John Burton’s human needs theory into social psychology research on

intergroup and identity relations to developproblem-solvingworkshops,which he has used

with Israelis and Palestinians since the 1970s.26Theworkshopswere designed to encourage

ThirdAnnualCenterforInterdisciplinaryStudyofConflictandDisputeResolutionDistinguished

Scholar-in-ResidenceLecture,CaseWesternUniversity,Cleveland,Ohio,October3,2007),

http://apps.law.asu.edu/files/!NoTemplate/AALS/Korobbkin.pdf.22KevinAvruch,“CultureasContext,CultureasCommunication:ConsiderationsforHumanitarian

Negotiators,”HarvardNegotiationLawReview9(2004):391.Also,seegenerallyR.E.WaltonandR.

B.McKersie,ABehaviouralTheoryofLaborNegotiations(NewYork:McGrawHill,1965).23ICRCPolicyPaper,HumanitarianNegotiationExchange(HNx),InternationalCommitteeoftheRed

Cross,2015,10.24DennisSandole,“ExtendingtheReachofBasicHumanNeeds:AComprehensiveTheoryforthe

Twenty-firstCentury,”inConflictResolutionandHumanNeeds:LinkingTheoryandPractice,eds.

KevinAvruchandChristopherMitchell(NewYork:Routledge,2013),23.

25RonaldJ.Fisher,InteractiveConflictResolution(Syracuse,NewYork:SyracuseUniversityPress,1997),

31.

26EileenF.Babbittetal.,“CombiningEmpathywithProblem-Solving:TheTamraModelofFacilitationin

Israel,”inBuildingPeace:PracticalLessonsfromtheField,eds.CraigZelizerandRobertRubenstein



conflictpartiestomovebeyondincompatiblepositionsandexplorethebasicneeds—suchas

identity and security—as the true sources of conflict. Since basic needs are not inherently

“zero-sum,”thisprocesscanfacilitatethedevelopmentofmutuallysatisfactorysolutions.27In

relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kelman’s work has been cited as laying the

groundworkfortheOsloAccords,thoughofcoursehisworkshopswerejustoneelementofa

complexpolitical landscapeandbearsole responsibilityneither for theadoptionof theOslo

AccordsnorthebreakdownoftheOsloprocess.28

Problem-solvingworkshopsgenerallyassume the formof smallgroup“discussionsbetween

unofficialrepresentativesofidentitygroupsorstatesengagedindestructiveconflictthatare

facilitatedbyanimpartialthirdpartyofsocialscientist-practitioners.”29Theseworkshopsand

relatedsmaller,more informaldiscussionsconstituteamethodfortransformingthepolitical

process and environment by replacing violent conflict with positive debate in the affected

communities.30This transformative method of communication can help the parties move

closer together through cooperative efforts to overcome obstacles to negotiation and can

help to bring about a more stable and permanent change in the overarching political

environment.31

Interactiveconflictresolutionandproblem-solvingworkshopsofthisnaturearemostusefulin

protracted conflicts, especially when one or both parties perceive their ethnic or national

identities to be at risk. These conflicts are often based on a national or community-based

perceptionofpolaritythatrepresentsmoreofapsychologicalbarrierthanagenuineobstacle

toagreement.Aslongasthereissignificantsupportforconflicttransformationorresolution

in each community, interactive problem-solving workshops offer an alternative and more

feasible route to peace. By allowing parties to recognize mutual interests in a low-risk

environment, these workshops promote mutual reassurance through communication and

gradualrelationshipbuildingbetweenconflictingparties.32

Howaretheseconceptsrelevanttohumanitariannegotiation?Incasesinwhichgovernmental

or non-state entities are denying or inhibiting access to beneficiaries, recognition of the

government’sorNSAG’sunderlyingsocialneedsof identity,participation,andsecuritycould

informtheapproachofahumanitarianorganizationtothenegotiation.Assumingapproaches

andstancesthataresensitivetothesesocialneedscanbean importantmodeoffacilitating

the creation of positive, stable relationships with interlocutors to further the objective of

securingafavorablenegotiatedoutcome.

(Sterling,VA:KumarianPress,2009),160.Also,seegenerallyHerbertC.Kelman,“TheDevelopment

ofInteractiveProblemSolving:InJohnBurton’sFootsteps,”PoliticalPsychology36,no.2(2015),http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hckelman/files/development_of_ips_burton_politicalpsychology_20

15.pdf.27HerbertC.Kelman,“InteractiveProblem-Solving:InformalMediationbytheScholarPractitioner,”in

StudiesinInternationalMediation,ed.JacobBercovitch(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2002),185.

28SeegenerallyHerbertC.Kelman,“InteractiveProblemSolvingintheIsraeli-PalestinianCase:Past

ContributionsandPresentChallenges,”inPavingtheway:Contributionsofinteractiveconflict

resolutiontopeacemaking,ed.RogerFisher(Lanham,MA:LexingtonBooks,2005).29Fisher,InteractiveConflictResolution,8.

30Kelman,“InteractiveProblem-Solving,”168.

31Ibid.,169.

32Ibid.,187.



IV. TheBehavioralApproach

In sharp contrast to the integrative model discussed in Section II, the behavioral approach

focuses on the personalities, characteristics, and emotions of the individuals engaged in a

negotiation.33Whereas the integrative model assumes that negotiators are rational actors

capable of seeking whatever cooperative outcomes will most maximize their gains, the

behavioralapproachemphasizesthe impactofpersonalandpsychologicalattributes,aswell

astacticsandstrategies,ontheoutcomesofnegotiations.

One aspect of negotiation onwhich this literature focuses is the extent towhich individual

negotiatorspursuecompetitiveor cooperativeapproaches.34Ina competitiveapproach, the

negotiator is rigid, uses deceit and threats as tactics, and conceals information during the

negotiationinordertogainorsecureadvantages.35Inacooperativeapproach,thenegotiator

shares information, seeks creative solutions, iswilling to disclose sensitive information, and

overall, seeks tocultivateanenvironmentofmutual trustandfairness.36Onecouldconsider

thattheseapproachescorrelatewiththedistributiveandintegrativemodelsofnegotiation.If

negotiatorspursue competitive approaches, thenegotiationwill assumeamoredistributive

form. In contrast, if negotiators pursue cooperative approaches, the negotiation will more

closelyapproximatetheintegrativemodel.

Essentially, though, the behavioral approach considers that the form that the negotiation

assumes—integrative versus distributive—dependson the characteristics of the negotiators

themselves.Thus,“hardliners”willpursuecompetitiveapproaches,whilemoderatesor“soft

liners”willseekcooperativeavenues.37Inthissense,theverymodelthatthenegotiationwill

approximate—distributive or integrative—is itself open to negotiation and is heavily

dependentonthenegotiators’attributes.Indeed,agreatdealofexistingliteraturefocuseson

this link between personality and negotiating style. One classification system situates

personalitytypesonacontinuumoffourparticularorientations,aselaboratedbelow:

• Individualistic–Concernedsolelyaboutone’sownwell-beingandoutcomes

• Altruistic–Concernedsolelyaboutthewell-beingandoutcomesofotherparties

33Foranoverviewofthisapproach,seeTanyaAlfredsonandAzetaCungu,“NegotiationTheoryand

Practice:AReviewoftheLiterature,”FAOLearningProgramme,January2008,20,

http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/550/4-5_negotiation_background_paper_179en.pdf.Fora

relatedperspective,seegenerallyDanielDruckman,ed.Negotiations:Social-Psychological

Perspectives(BeverlyHills:Sage,1977).34DavidLaxandJamesSebenius,TheManagerasNegotiator:BargainingforCooperationandCompetitive

Gain(NewYork:FreePress,1986),49-62.35GaryT.Lowenthal,“AGeneralTheoryofNegotiationProcess,Strategy,andBehavior,”Universityof

KansasLawReview31(1982-1983):90.36Ibid.AlsoseegenerallyCeciliaAlbin,“Theroleoffairnessinnegotiation,”NegotiationJournal9,no.3

(1993):223-44.37AlfredsonandCungu,“NegotiationTheoryandPractice,”13-14.



• Cooperative–Concernedwiththewell-beingandoutcomesofbothparties

• Competitive – Concernedwith obtaining an outcome for oneself that is better than

thatwhichtheopponentgains38

One related aspect of negotiation dynamics is known as the “Negotiator’s Dilemma.”39The

dilemma is that a negotiatorwho adopts a competitive, or “hard line” stance ismore likely

thanacooperativeor“soft line”negotiator toobtainbeneficialoutcomes in thenegotiated

agreement.However,adoptingacompetitive,“hardliner”stancedecreasesthelikelihoodof

successfully reaching any agreement, especially if theother party also adopts a competitive

stance.40In this sense, a predisposition for either approach—cooperative or competitive—

doesnotguaranteesuccess.

There is one type of scenario, though, that tends to facilitate the adoption of cooperative

approaches. Namely, when negotiators have an ongoing relationship that transcends the

current negotiation, there tends to be a lower level of contentiousness that defines the

competitiveorientation.Inparticular,empiricaltestsindicatethatfriendsnegotiatingwithone

another exhibit apredisposition to seekingoutcomes that are equitable.41In this sense, the

abilitytoforgealong-termrelationshipwithaninterlocutorcouldprovetobeavaluableasset

intermsofsecuringbetteroutcomesforoneself innegotiation,especially ifnegotiationsare

likelytorecur.

One final important point to mention is the role that emotions play in negotiations. Some

analysts caution against letting emotions influence negotiations under the assumption that

emotions are a distraction that prevents negotiating parties from addressing the relevant

problems directly.42Conversely, however, emotions may be harnessed to the negotiator’s

benefit insomesituations.43Adistinction ismade in literaturerelevanttothistopicbetween

negativeandpositiveemotions.Negativeemotions suchasanger, resentment, and jealousy

can be destructive in a negotiation, since expressing such emotions can diminish trust in a

relationship, divert attention from substantial issues, damage a relationship, and provide

insightintoemotionaltriggersorweakpointsthattheotherpartymayidentifyandexploit.44

38Ibid.,14.

39Mayer,DynamicsofConflictResolution,215-18.

40LaxandSebenius,TheManagerasNegotiator,29-45.

41W.R.MorganandJ.Sawyer,“Bargaining,Expectations,andthePreferenceforEqualityoverEquity,”

JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology6(1967):140.42SeegenerallyRobertS.Adler,BensonRosen,andElliotM.Silverstein,“EmotionsinNegotiation:How

toManageFearandAnger,”NegotiationJournal14,no.2(1998):161-79.43RogerFisherandDanielShapiro,BeyondReason:UsingEmotionsasYouNegotiate(NewYork:Penguin,

2005),3-21.Also,seegenerallyRussellCropanzano,WilliamJ.Becker,andJoelFeldmen,“Specific

EmotionsandNegotiation,”inThePsychologyofNegotiationsinthe21stCenturyWorkplace:New

ChallengesandNewSolutions,eds.BarryGoldmanandDebraL.Shapiro(NewYork:Routledge,

2012),157-71.Additionally,seeDanielDruckman,“Negotiation,”inConflict:FromAnalysisto

Intervention,eds.SandraI.Cheldelin,DanielDruckman,LarissaFast(NewYork:Continuum,2003),

202,whichstates,“Thetougherposturesmayalsoincludeexpressionsofangerwhichcanactually

bequitebeneficialiftheyaredirectedatthetaskandconveystronglyhowanegotiatorfeels.”44FisherandShapiro,ibid.,5.



Positive emotions such as pride, hope, and happiness, in contrast, can be constructive in a

negotiation,sinceexpressingsuchemotionstowardtheotherpartycantransformnegotiating

adversariesintocolleagues,facilitateopennesstolisteningandunderstandingtheotherside’s

interests, and enhance the negotiators’ relationshipwith one another by creating a “safety

net” that allows disagreement without a real threat of upset to the negotiation process

overall.45However, positive emotions could also cloud a negotiator’s judgment, potentially

motivatingstrategicallyunwiseconcessions.46

Relationships, behaviors, and emotions can be particularly important considerations for

humanitariannegotiators.Indeed,humanitarianpractitionersoftenoperateincontextswhere

they are viewed with suspicion. Many NSAGs have no inclination to perceive humanitarian

practitionersasneutral,impartial,andindependentactors,butrather,mayviewhumanitarians

as potential spies, profiteers or allies of the state.47These negative perceptions can lead to

negotiations that, at least at first, assume a distributive form, with NSAGs adopting

competitiveapproaches.Thedesiredapproachforhumanitariannegotiatorsinsuchscenarios

doesnotappeartobetopushbackwithanequallevelofdistributivefervor.Rather,thekey

strategic avenue seems to be tomitigate these negative perceptions, an end that could be

served through attention to the human element of negotiation—for example, through the

strategicuseofpositiveemotionsandrelationshipbuildingtocultivatetrust.

V. TheRoleofCulture

AsnotedattheendofSectionII,culturaldifferencesbetweennegotiatorssometimesfunction

as a barrier to successfully implementing an integrative approach to negotiation. Although

scholars disagree about the extent to which cultural difference can constitute a deciding

factor inanygivennegotiation’ssuccessorfailure,48agreatdealof literaturefocusesonthe

nature of, and solutions for closing, this “cultural gap” between parties to a negotiation.49

45Ibid.,8.

46Ibid.,17.

47Forexample,seeAshleyJackson,“Negotiatingperceptions:Al-ShabaabandTalibanviewsofaid

agencies,”PolicyBrief61,HumanitarianPolicyGroup,August2014,2,

http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9104.pdf.48KevinAvruch,“TypeIandtypeIIerrorsinculturallysensitiveconflictresolutionpractice,”Conflict

ResolutionQuarterly20,no.3(2003):352;StephenBochner,ed.,TheMediatingPerson:Bridges

BetweenCultures(Boston:G.K.HallandCo.,1981),1;andZartman,“ASkeptic'sView,”17.49Foranoverviewofframeworksofculturalmeasurementandunderstanding,seeKevinAvruch,

“Culture,”inConflict:FromAnalysistoIntervention,eds.SandraI.Cheldelin,DanielDruckman,and

LarissaFast(NewYork:Contiuum,2003),139-51.SeealsoJeswaldW.Salacuse,“SpecialBarrierNo.

2:Culture,”inTheGlobalNegotiator:Making,Managing,andMendingDealsAroundtheWorldinthe

Twenty-firstCentury(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2003),89-115;PaulE.Salem,“ACritiqueof

WesternConflictResolutionfromaNon-WesternPerspective,”NegotiationJournal9(1993):361-69;WendiLynAdairandJeanneM.Brett,“CultureandNegotiationProcesses,”inTheHandbookof

NegotiationandCulture,eds.MicheleJ.Gelfandetal.(Stanford:StanfordBusinessBooks,2004),

158-76;RaymondCohen,NegotiatingAcrossCultures,2nded.(Washington,D.C.:U.S.Instituteof

Peace,1997),9-43and215-26;RaymondCohen“Meaning,InterpretationandInternational

Negotiation,”GlobalSociety14,no.3(2000):317-35;KevinAvruch,“CultureasContext,”391;I.

WilliamZartman,“ASkeptic'sView,”inCultureandNegotiation,ed.G.O.FaureandJ.Z.Rubin

(NewburyPark:Sage,1993),17-21;IanMacduff,“YourPaceorMine?Culture,Time,and



Throughout the literature, amajor caveat is almost universallymentioned: the definition of

cultureandthedelineationofwhichcharacteristicscanbeascribedtocertainculturesarenot

onlysubjectivebutalsooftentheresultofover-simplification.50Perhapsforthisveryreason,a

substantial amount of literature focuses on the different negotiation styles of specific

nationalities.51Ingeneral,scholarshavearguedthatnegotiators,whenfacingan interlocutor

fromanotherculture,should,atleast,haveasolidunderstandingofhowaspecificculturewill

affectthenegotiation,andatmost,shouldadapttheirnegotiationstyleorapproachinorder

to find common ground. Regarding negotiations in humanitarian settings, one overarching

issueisthathumanitarianorganizationshaveoftendevotedlimitedresourcestopromotingan

understanding of the local culture in the environments in which humanitarians operate,

hindering theability toadoptwell-informed,culturally sensitivenegotiatingapproaches.52As

humanitarianorganizationsworktowardimprovingapproaches inthisarea,fourkeyaspects

of culture are important to consider. The rest of this section discusses these factors—

individualisticversuscommunalparadigms,negotiatingstyle,conceptoftime,andreligion—

whichareemphasizedinthebroaderbodyofnegotiationliterature.

a. IndividualisticversusCommunalParadigms

Onemajorsourceofculturaltension,asnotedbyRaymondCohen,isthedifferencebetween

individualisticandcommunalculturalparadigms.53Individualisticcultures,Cohenwrites,“hold

freedom, the development of the individual personality, self-expression, and personal

enterprise and achievement as supreme values.”54In contrast, a communalistic culture “has

the welfare of the group and cooperative endeavor as its guiding themes ... individual

freedomisconstrainedbydutiestofamilyandcommunity.”55Inpracticalterms,forcollectivist

cultures,allcommunication,includingnegotiations,are“highcontext”inthattheyarehighly

Negotiation,”NegotiationJournal22,no.1(2006):31-45;RobertJ.Janosik,“RethinkingtheCulture-

NegotiationLink,”NegotiationJournal3,no.4(1987):385-95;StellaTing-Toomey,“TowardaTheory

ofConflictandCulture,”inCommunication,Culture,andOrganizationalProcesses,eds.WilliamB.

Gudykunstetal.(BeverlyHills,CA:Sage,1985),71-86.50Zartman,“ASkeptic'sView,”17-18;Cohen,“InternationalNegotiation,”120;LeBaron,“Culture-Based

NegotiationStyles,”1;andStellaTing-ToomeyandAtsukoKurogi,“Faceworkcompetencein

interculturalconflict:Anupdatedface-negotiationtheory,”InternationalJournalofIntercultural

Relations22,no.2(1988):216-17and219-20.51OnChina,seegenerallyRichardH.Solomon,“China:FriendshipandObligationinChineseNegotiating

Style,”inNationalNegotiationStyles,ed.HansBinnendijk(Washington,DC:DianePublishing,1987),

1-16;andPaulH.Kreisberg,“China'sNegotiatingBehaviour,”inChineseForeignPolicy:Theoryand

Practice,eds.ThomasW.RobinsonandDavidShambaugh(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,

1994),453-78.OnNigeria,seegenerallyDanielA.Offiong,“ConflictResolutionAmongtheIbibioof

Nigeria,”JournalofAnthropologicalResearch53,no.4(Winter1997):423-42.OnArabcultures,see

generallyPaulE.Salem,“ACritiqueofWesternConflictResolutionfromaNon-Western

Perspective,”NegotiationJournal9(1993):361-69.52SeeGrace,“HumanitarianNegotiation,”8.

53Cohen,NegotiatingAcrossCultures,29.SeealsoLynnE.MetcalfandAlanBird,“Integratingthe

Hofstededimensionsandtwelveaspectsofnegotiatingbehaviour:Asixcountrycomparison,”in

ComparingCulture:DimensionsofCultureinaComparativePerspective,eds.HenkVinken,Joseph

Soeters,andPeterEster(Leiden:Brill,2004),251-69.54Cohen,ibid.

55Ibid.,30.



context-sensitive and dependent on the relationships involved, as well as the overall

circumstances in which communication occurs. In contrast, communication within

individualisticculturesisdeemedtobe“lowcontext,”orevaluatedbasedonobjectivecriteria,

rather than complex and ambiguous circumstantial factors; negotiations are likely to be

straightforwardandresults-based.56Duetothesedifferences,therecanbenosingleuniversal

problem-solvingmethodologyapplicabletoallnegotiations.Instead,successcouldhingeona

negotiator’sabilitytoevaluateandanticipateaninterlocutor’sculturallyrootedbehaviorsand

preferences.57

b. NegotiatingStyle

Culturecanalsoshapeone’snegotiatingstyle.Whilecertainculturesstresstheimportanceof

acontract,decision,oragreementasthefinalproductofnegotiations,otherculturesperceive

that building a relationship holds greater value.58This difference could explainwhy the pre-

negotiation stage ismore important to some cultures,while the deal-making stage ismore

important to others. Similarly, differences in the formality, attitude, and directness of

communication between negotiating parties can be culturally based impediments to

negotiation.Culturalattitudestowardsformality, time,emotionalexpression,andrisktaking

canvarybroadly,anditcanbeimportantfornegotiatorstobepreparedtoshowrespectfor

culturebyengaging innegotiations inamanner thatwillbeunderstoodandappreciatedby

the other party. Miscommunication in this regard can delay, or prevent the adoption of,

agreementsbetweenpartiesanddamagerelationships,withlong-termramificationsforboth

sides. Humanitarian negotiators have acknowledged the important connection between

cultureandnegotiatingstyle.Forexample,oneauthorwritesabouthumanitariannegotiations

withtheauthoritiesoftheDemocraticPeople’sRepublicofKorea:“Decisions,oncemadeand

communicated, were never retracted, which meant that pushing too hard in negotiations

carried a high risk. If a confrontational approach was taken, the Koreans became

confrontationalaswell,refusingtobudge,andthatwastheendofthenegotiations.”59

JeswaldW. Salacuse discusses four related ways that negotiators can bridge cultural gaps.

Oneoptionentails showing ties toorappreciation for theother side’s culture (forexample,

quotingaliteraryicontreasuredbytheinterlocutor’sculture).60Alternatively,itmaybemore

feasible forone toexplainone’sownculture to an interlocutor in aneffort to convince the

othersidetoadaptone’sownculturalapproachorstyle.Athirdoptioninvolvesacompromise

ofboth cultures inwhichelementsof each culture arebrought together to formablended

negotiation style. However, this option requires that both sides in the negotiation have a

56Ibid.,36-37;KevinAvruch,“Sources,”inConflict:FromAnalysistoIntervention,eds.SandraI.Cheldelin,

DanielDruckman,andLarissaFast(NewYork:Contiuum,2003),149-51.57LeBaron,“Culture-BasedNegotiationStyles,”6.

58Salacuse,“SpecialBarrierNo.2:Culture,”96.

59DavidMorton,“SteepLearningCurvesintheDPRK,”inHumanitarianDiplomacy:

PractitionersandTheirCraft,eds.LarryMinearandHazelSmith(Tokyo:UnitedNationsUniversity,

2007),207.

60StephenWeiss,“OpeningaDialogueonNegotiationandCulture:A‘Believer’ConsidersSkeptics’

Views,”inNegotiationEclectics:EssaysinMemoryofJeffreyZ.Rubin,ed.DeborahM.Kolb

(Cambridge,MA:PONBooks,1999),77-79.



degree of understanding and flexibility that is not always possible to achieve.61Finally,

negotiators can create or use an alternative third culture to overcome incompatibilities

betweenthetwonegotiators’cultures(exemplifiedbyonenegotiationinwhichChineseand

AmericansusedaFrenchstyleinnegotiations).62

c. ConceptofTime

The concept of time has been widely studied as both a reflection of culture and a strong

influenceonthenegotiationprocess.63Severalkeyissuesareimportanttoconsider.First,time

affectsanegotiations’day-to-daylogistics(forexample,theneedtostartorendataspecific

time and the rigidity of the overall timeline for the negotiations). Second, the substantive

content of the negotiation, and the agreements reached, frequently must be rooted in a

culturally specific timeline of events—for example, questions surrounding when a conflict

began, or how long remedies should remain active or accessible, can havewidely different

answers depending on cultural understandings of time. Third, the amount of time spent on

certain points within the negotiation process (e.g., pre-negotiation, discussion, contract

adoption,andenforcement)canvaryaccordingtotheparties’“high-context”/“low-context”

paradigm.64

d. ReligionTheroleofreligionisalsointegraltohowvariousculturesconductnegotiations.Forsome,the

“continuingabilityofancestorstoaffectpeople’slivesmaintainssocialcontrol,andmakesthe

needtohaveformal lawsor regulationsminimal.”65Toothers,however, thisworldviewmay

seemirrationalinasettingwhere“standardsoflawandreligionaredifferent.”66Inrelationto

this issue, Ira William Zartman suggests that negotiators ask the question: “Do different

groupshavedifferentnotionsaboutfairnessandjusticeinregardtodivisions,exchanges,and

creation,whicharedeterminedbysomeexternalfactor?”67Suchissuesaredirectlyapplicable

tohumanitariannegotiators.Indeed,therehasbeenmuchdiscussionwithinthehumanitarian

sectorabouttheuseof Islamic lawasaframeworkforhumanitariannegotiations.The ICRC,

forexample,hashiredIslamicreligiousscholarsandexpertstobetterequipteamsoperating

in predominantly Muslim areas. However, these efforts remain somewhat controversial,

especiallyduetoconcernsthatIslamicprinciplesandthoseofinternationalhumanitarianlaw

61JudeeK.Burgoon,LesaA.Stern,andLeesaDillman,InterpersonalAdaptation:DyadicInteraction

Patterns(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995),4-6.62Salacuse,“SpecialBarrierNo.2:Culture,”114.

63LeBaron,“Culture-BasedNegotiationStyles,”2.

64Macduff,“YourPaceorMine?”40.

65LeBaron,“Culture-BasedNegotiationStyles,”6.

66Macduff,“YourPaceorMine?”36,quotingP.M.Belbutowski,“Strategicimplicationsofculturesin

conflict,”Parameters:USArmyWarCollegeQuarterly(Spring1996):39–42.67Zartman,“ASkeptic'sView,”21,citingDanielDruckman,etal.,“Culturaldifferencesinbargaining

behavior:India,Argentina,andtheUnitedStates,”TheJournalofConflictResolution20,no.3

(September1976):413-52.



mightnotbeentirelycomplementary.68Furthermore,membersofarmedgroups(eventhose

rooted in Islamic ideology)maynot actually have a firmunderstandingof Islamicprinciples,

suggestingthelimitedutilityofthisapproach.69

VI. ConcludingObservations

Thefiveanalyticalapproachespresentedinthisbriefingnotedrawonliteraturethatexamines

negotiationsinpolitical,legal,andcommercialsettings,abodyofscholarshipthathasnotyet

beenmarried to the growing field of humanitarian negotiation.While this briefing note has

offered somepreliminary comments on how the insights from this body of literaturemight

informthe furtheranceofourunderstandingofhumanitariannegotiations, the intent is that

this literature review will serve as a starting point for additional analysis and professional

reflection.

Inwhat contexts do humanitarian negotiators find themselves facing negotiators that view

bargaining in“zero-sum” terms? Inwhat circumstanceshavehumanitariannegotiatorsbeen

able to engage in creative problem solving to foster integrative approaches? What factors

determinewhetherhumanitariansareabletoreachfavorableoutcomesthroughnegotiations?

Is the key factor power dynamics, successful communication about interests, the ability to

grapple with fundamental human needs, relationship building skills, or bridging cultural

divides?Inwhatwaysdoesthescholarshipdiscussedinthisbriefingnoteinformhumanitarian

negotiation, and in what ways is humanitarian negotiation distinct from these other fields?

Questions such as these constitute the next frontier in the study of the practice of

humanitarian negotiation. Indeed, as the humanitarian sector grapples with surmounting

obstacles to territorial access tobeneficiaries, thesequestionswill continue tobeof critical

importance.

68HebaAly,“CanIslamiclawbeananswerforhumanitarians?”IrinNews,April24,2014,

http://www.irinnews.org/report/99989/can-islamic-law-be-an-answer-for-humanitarians.69Ibid.



AbouttheAuthors

RobGrace,SeniorAssociateattheHarvardHumanitarianInitiative,servedastheleaddrafter

ofthisbriefingnote.KatherineAkkaya,Amna-NoorAl-Gallas,AdelaidaBaghdasaryan,Melissa

Freeman,EitanPaul,ThomasPols,andBrittanyReidalsocontributedtotheresearch,drafting,

and editing. The Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action would like to thank

ProfessorAlain Lempereur for useful commentsprovidedon an earlier draft of this briefing

note.ThepaperalsobenefittedfromeditsofferedbyJuliaBrooks.

AbouttheAdvancedTrainingProgramonHumanitarianAction

The Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action (ATHA) seeks to build operational

capacity,tofacilitatelearningacrossorganizationsinthehumanitariansector,andtomobilize

changethroughacommunityofpractice.ATHA’suniquesetofonlineand in-personlearning

tools,trainings,andengagementwiththeprofessionalcommunitysupporttheexpansionand

deepeningofkey legalandpolicyexchangeswithinandacrossagencies inorder tocreatea

dynamicandcreativespaceforlearningandinnovation.

ATHAisbasedattheHumanitarianAcademyatHarvard,theeducationalandtrainingbranch

of theHarvardHumanitarian Initiative.ATHA is supportedby thegenerosityof the Swedish

International Development Cooperation Agency. For more information about ATHA, visit:

atha.se.