Unconscionable Contract  

Lest set aside unviable arguments and attorney arrogance and get to the merit(s). In reviewing the Mortgage (Deed of Trust) or whatever you want to call the Security Instrument, forget not it is not a Security Interest but can be proven within its own wording that the Security Instrument is unconscionable written by learned people. Federal law 1635 allows for recession of a financial obligation and herewith in some circumstances the recession request is made upon the detection that the Security Instrument is unconscionable.

First question presents, how is it determined that the Security Instrument is not valid and enforceable by its own written wording under Contract Law. Review the Covenant that states the agreement is to follow “all applicable” law then advance to another Covenant that states the verbatim reads “The Note or a Partial Interest in the Note [intangible] together with the Security Instrument can be sold”, such having the Security Instrument to follow the intangible obligation goes opposite of SCOTUS opinion in Carpenter versus Logan, such the Security Instrument to follow the securitized intangible obligation result in bifurcation, thus could it be seen that the author of the unconscionable contract would only follow law as long as it suited the authors’ need(s). Would it be true that once statutory law gets in the way of legally making money, attempts are made to not follow any law such as common law (prudential)? Would writing of a contract to include the method and means to avoid statutory and common law be unconscionable?

Clearly it should be seen that the originating lender ceased being the Tangible Obligee and became an Intangible Account Debtor who sold an intangible obligation secured by personal property contract(s) to the Intangible Obligee and thus the Intangible Obligee has not

prudential standing to invoke a court jurisdiction in opposition to a Tangible common law contract.

Consider that signing a Mortgage Note in conjunction with the signing of the Security Instrument constitutes a singular common law contract, would it not be correct that if one violates either Mortgage Note or Security Instrument common law contract the other contract is to be considered violated?, regardless if statutory law also applies.

In allowing the Tangible Mortgage Note as the sole instrument under common law to establish prudential standing should not be allowed in bearer form as a subsequent Payee is unidentified and thus there is not a “Secured Party” identified under statutory law, this author understands that UCC (Uniform Commercial Code) Article 9 has a legal and justified place in the world to allow a Note to be secured by “Personal Property” pledged as an alternate means to collect value, however the statutory application of UCC 9 applies not to tangible or intangible Financial Obligations secured by real property.