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UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CPT Dana Perkins, PhD CPT Dana Perkins, PhD SAFMLS Annual Meeting, 22 March 2010 SAFMLS Annual Meeting, 22 March 2010 Biological Weapons Convention: Biological Weapons Convention: A Primer for Armed Forces A Primer for Armed Forces Medical Laboratory Scientists Medical Laboratory Scientists

UNCLASSIFIED CPT Dana Perkins, PhD SAFMLS Annual Meeting, 22 March 2010 Biological Weapons Convention: A Primer for Armed Forces Medical Laboratory Scientists

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UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CPT Dana Perkins, PhDCPT Dana Perkins, PhD

SAFMLS Annual Meeting, 22 March 2010SAFMLS Annual Meeting, 22 March 2010

Biological Weapons Convention:Biological Weapons Convention:

A Primer for Armed Forces A Primer for Armed Forces Medical Laboratory ScientistsMedical Laboratory Scientists

Biological Weapons Convention:Biological Weapons Convention:

A Primer for Armed Forces A Primer for Armed Forces Medical Laboratory ScientistsMedical Laboratory Scientists

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DisclaimerDisclaimer

The views expressed in this presentation The views expressed in this presentation

are those of the author and do not reflect are those of the author and do not reflect

the official policy or position of the the official policy or position of the

Department of the Army, Department of Department of the Army, Department of

Defense, or the U.S. Government.Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Bottom Line Up FrontBottom Line Up FrontBWC: part of the “web of prevention”BWC: part of the “web of prevention”

““We must look [at the BWC] as part of an We must look [at the BWC] as part of an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an

interlinked array of problems”-interlinked array of problems”- Kofi Annan, 2006 Kofi Annan, 2006

BWCBWCUNSCR 1540

UNSCR 1540INTERPOL

INTERPOL

FAOFAO

WHOWHO

OIEOIE

NGOsNGOs

Scientific OrganizationsScientific OrganizationsProfessional AssociationsProfessional Associations

GovernmentsGovernments

PSIPSI

IndustryIndustry

AcademiaAcademia

IndividualsIndividuals

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Where we are and why it mattersWhere we are and why it matters

BioThreat:

BioThreat:

a clear & present danger

a clear & present danger

Soldier Education

Soldier Education

Misinformatio

n/AntiG

ov

Misinformatio

n/AntiG

ov

Propaganda

Propaganda

Bioterrorism/Biocrimes

Bioterrorism/Biocrimes

Dual-Use Research of

Dual-Use Research of

ConcernConcern

Biosafety/Biosecurity

Biosafety/Biosecurity

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Briefing AgendaBriefing Agenda BWC history

Current BWC status: 2007- 2010

Obama Administration’s approach to BWC (Ref.: National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats)

SAFMLS and its role in responsible stewardship SAFMLS and its role in responsible stewardship of life sciences researchof life sciences research

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Historical tidbitsHistorical tidbits

1969: UK proposal to the UN Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) for the elimination of BW– separate BW and CW within an international agreement– prohibition of production & acquisition of BA in types and quantities that

had no justification for peaceful purposes and equipment designed for hostile purposes

– creation of a complaint & investigation mechanism to address non-compliance and an obligation for all members to assist a State that was attacked with BW

USA: unilateral renouncement of BW by President Nixon on Nov 25, 1969– DOD was ordered to outline plan for disposal of existing BW

Aug 5, 1971: UK, US, FSU submit a joint draft text to the UN General Assembly

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BWC Key Facts and ProvisionsBWC Key Facts and Provisions Convention on the Prohibition

of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC)

Opened for signatures in 1972

Entered into force in 1975

Depositories: UK, US, FSU

15 Articles

States Parties: 163

Signatories: 13

States not Members: 19

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Knowledge CheckKnowledge Check

How many times was Article VIArticle VI invoked to request the UN Security Council to

investigate alleged breaches of BWC?

ZERO / NEVER1997: Article V invoked by Cuba requesting a formal consultation on the alleged use of BW by the US (Thrips palmi infestation)

The Cuban allegations and the US response were distributed to the BWC States Parties for comment. About 20 countries commented, almost all of them agreeing that there was no significant evidence supporting the allegations, and that a natural outbreak was plausible.

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Treaty historyTreaty history

Review Conferences every 5 years (1980, 1986,1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 – next one in 20112011)

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) introduced/revised 1986/1991

Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) est. 1991 to examine verification options

Ad Hoc Group est. 1994 in Special Conference to negotiate verification protocol

Ad Hoc Group negotiations end in failure in 2001

Fifth Review Conference suspended

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Knowledge CheckKnowledge Check

Is there a list of biological agentslist of biological agents controlled under the BWC?

NO““Almost any disease-causing organism (such as bacteria, viruses, fungi, prions or Almost any disease-causing organism (such as bacteria, viruses, fungi, prions or rickettsiae) or toxin (poisons derived from animals, plants or microorganisms, or rickettsiae) or toxin (poisons derived from animals, plants or microorganisms, or similar substances synthetically produced) can be used in biological weapons” similar substances synthetically produced) can be used in biological weapons”

(BWC)(BWC)

““Any micro-organism, virus, infectious substance, or biological product that may be Any micro-organism, virus, infectious substance, or biological product that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology, or any naturally occurring or bioengineered engineered as a result of biotechnology, or any naturally occurring or bioengineered

component of any such microorganism, virus, infectious substance, or biological component of any such microorganism, virus, infectious substance, or biological product, capable of causing death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a product, capable of causing death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a

human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism; deterioration of food, water, human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism; deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or material of any kind..."equipment, supplies, or material of any kind..."

(US BW Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 / US Code Title 18, Part I, Ch.10)(US BW Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 / US Code Title 18, Part I, Ch.10)

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BWC Key EventsBWC Key Events

2007 BWC 6th Review Conference overcame past divisions

Created 2007-2010 intersessional process

o 4 sets of annual meetings prior to the 7th REVCONo Each set includes a one week Meeting of Experts (MX),

followed by a one week Meeting of States Parties (MSP)

Implementation Support Unit (ISU) Action plan for universalization Improving national implementation Improved CBM information exchange process Enhancing provision of assistance Building network of national points of contact

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20072007 20082008 20092009 20102010 20112011

National Implementation;National Implementation;Regional ActivitiesRegional Activities

National Implementation;National Implementation;Regional ActivitiesRegional Activities

Biosafety & Biosecurity;Biosafety & Biosecurity;Oversight, Education, and Oversight, Education, and

OutreachOutreach

Biosafety & Biosecurity;Biosafety & Biosecurity;Oversight, Education, and Oversight, Education, and

OutreachOutreach

Capacity Building for Capacity Building for Disease Surveillance, Disease Surveillance,

Detection, Diagnosis, and Detection, Diagnosis, and ContainmentContainment

Capacity Building for Capacity Building for Disease Surveillance, Disease Surveillance,

Detection, Diagnosis, and Detection, Diagnosis, and ContainmentContainment

Response to Use or Response to Use or Threat of UseThreat of Use

Response to Use or Response to Use or Threat of UseThreat of Use

77thth REVCON REVCON77thth REVCON REVCON

20 Jan 2009: POTUS sworn-in

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BWC Meetings in 2008BWC Meetings in 2008 National, regional and

international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity,biosafety and biosecurity, including lab safety and security of pathogens and toxins

Oversight, education, Oversight, education, awareness raising, and awareness raising, and adoption and/or development adoption and/or development of codes of conductof codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio science/technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by BWC

2008 BWC MX & MSP chaired by the Ambassador Georgi Avramchevof the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

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New features of 2008 BWC MXNew features of 2008 BWC MX Invited observers, NGOs, IGOs,

industry, and academia guests provided statements & briefings and participated in seminars and panel discussions

Unprecedented in the BWC inter-sessional process: all working sessions were open

National papers, statements, and all other BWC MX-related documents available online on the ISU website at: http://www.unog.ch/bwc

Poster session allowed informal interaction and

further discussions

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2008 BWC Meeting of State Parties2008 BWC Meeting of State PartiesConsider the work of the 2008 BWC MX, to discuss, and promote common

understanding and effective action on the 2008 topics.

US Opening Statement ExcerptsUS Opening Statement Excerpts

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2008 BWC MSP Report-2008 BWC MSP Report-Biosafety & Biosecurity HighlightsBiosafety & Biosecurity Highlights

Recognizing that biosafety & biosecurity measures contribute to preventing the development, acquisition or use of BTW & are appropriate means of implementing the BWC, States agreed on the value of:

o National authorities defining and implementing biosafety & biosecurity concepts IAW relevant national laws, regs and policies…

o Ensuring measures adopted are practical, sustainable, enforceable, are readily understood and are developed in concert with national stakeholders, avoid unduly restricting the pursuit of the biological sciences for peaceful purposes, are adapted for local needs, and appropriate for the agents being handled and the work being undertaken

o Building networks between scientific communities and academic institutions and increasing interaction with professional associations and working groups at the national, regional and international level

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2008 BWC MSP Report-2008 BWC MSP Report-Codes of Conduct HighlightsCodes of Conduct Highlights

“States Parties recognized the importance of ensuring that those working in the biological sciences are aware of their obligations under the Convention and relevant national legislation and guidelines, have a clear understanding of the content, purpose and foreseeable social, environmental, health and security consequences of their activities, and are encouraged to take an active role in addressing the threats posed by the potential misuse of biological agents and toxins as weapons, including for bioterrorism”.

“Having considered codes of conduct, States Parties agreed that such codes can complement national legislative, regulatory and oversight frameworks and help guide science so that it is not misused for prohibited purposes. States Parties recognized the need to further develop strategies to encourage national stakeholders to voluntarily develop, adopt and promulgate codes of conduct .”

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BWC Meetings in 2009BWC Meetings in 2009

Enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes

Promoting capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases

Chaired by Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada

SustainabilitySustainabilityIntegrated approach to human, animal, & plant diseasesIntegrated approach to human, animal, & plant diseasesCCoordination of assistance, cooperation, & capacity oordination of assistance, cooperation, & capacity buildingbuilding

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US National Strategy for Countering Biological US National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats is unveiled at the 2009 BWC MSPThreats is unveiled at the 2009 BWC MSP

“The Obama administration’s new strategy for countering biological threats—both natural and man-made—rests upon the main principle of the BWC: that the use of BW is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind”- U/S Tauscher

Advance international security not through a return to the verification protocol negotiations, but through a reinvigorated, comprehensive program and information exchange

Promote confidence in effective treaty implementation / enhanced transparency

Enhance cooperation for building capacity to combat infectious disease

Make the BWC the premier forum for discussion of mutually agreeable steps States can take for risk management of bio threats – including bioterrorism

http://geneva.usmission.gov/2009/12/09/tauscher-bwc/http://geneva.usmission.gov/2009/12/09/tauscher-bwc/

09 Dec 2009: Under Secretary of State 09 Dec 2009: Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher address to the BWCEllen Tauscher address to the BWC

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Further readingFurther reading

Revitalizing BWCRevitalizing BWC

Expanding our international partnerships and bioengagement

Integrating efforts to meet our international obligations

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/National_Strategy_for_Countering_BioThreats.pdfNational_Strategy_for_Countering_BioThreats.pdf

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BWCBWC

UNSCR 1540

UNSCR 1540 INTERPOL

INTERPOL

FAOFAO

WHOWHO

OIEOIE

NGOsNGOs

Scientific OrganizationsScientific Organizations

Professional AssociationsProfessional Associations

GovernmentsGovernments

PSIPSI

IndustryIndustry

AcademiaAcademia

IndividualsIndividuals

SAFMLS ?SAFMLS ?

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SAFMLS and its role in responsible SAFMLS and its role in responsible stewardship of life sciences researchstewardship of life sciences research

Enhance awareness of AFMLSs of their obligations under the BWC and relevant US legislation, policies, and guidelines

Promote biosafety & biosecurity best practices

Provide a forum for discussions of the risk assessment & risk management strategies for dual-use research of concern

Contribute to the development of educational modules and training programs tailored to the AFMLs

Promote a code of conduct for AFMLSs as a guidepost of professional and personal behavior based on the military values that reflect our professionalism

Strengthen the culture of responsibility in Armed Forces medical laboratory sciences

Develop an outreach and education strategy to improve communication with the stakeholders and the general public

Foster collaborations with national scientific and professional organizations (e.g. ASM, AAAS) and SAFMLS-equivalent international organizations for sharing best practices on awareness raising, education and outreach, and oversight of dual-use research of concern

SAFMLS is uniquely SAFMLS is uniquely positioned to strengthen positioned to strengthen public confidence in public confidence in military science and military science and technology, build public technology, build public trust and support for a trust and support for a research enterprise that is research enterprise that is needed to generate new needed to generate new knowledge that can be knowledge that can be applied to countering applied to countering existing and emerging existing and emerging biological threatsbiological threats

SAFMLS is uniquely SAFMLS is uniquely positioned to strengthen positioned to strengthen public confidence in public confidence in military science and military science and technology, build public technology, build public trust and support for a trust and support for a research enterprise that is research enterprise that is needed to generate new needed to generate new knowledge that can be knowledge that can be applied to countering applied to countering existing and emerging existing and emerging biological threatsbiological threats

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Contact informationContact information

Dana Perkins, Ph.D.

Senior Science AdvisorOffice of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and ResponseU.S. Department of Health and Human ServicesTel: 202 205 5716 (office)E-mail: [email protected]

CPT Dana Perkins

Consequence ManagementMedical Support OfficerUSAR Consequence Management UnitTel: 410 446 7256 (mobile)E-mail: [email protected]