The Africa Local Council Oversight and Social Accountability

Project (ALCOSA) – World Bank

Makerere Institute of social Research P.O.Box 16022, Kampala, Uganda Tel: 256-414-554582 Fax: 256-414-532821 Email: director@misr.mak.ac.ug

June 2008

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Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................. 2 1.0 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... 4

1.1 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY .............................................................................................. 4 1.2 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................ 4 1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT................................................................................................................ 5

2.0 POLITICAL SETTING................................................................................................................. 6

2.1 DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE AFTER INDEPENDENCE .............................................. 7 2.2 DECENTRALIZATION DURING THE MOVEMENT SYSTEM. ...................................................................... 9 2.3 LOCAL GOVERNANCE UNDER THE MULTIPARTY SYSTEM ................................................................... 11 2.4 LOCAL POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS FINANCING ....................................................................................... 12

3.0 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN UGANDA .............................................. 14

3.1 PYRAMID STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT................................................................................ 14 4.0 FUNCTIONING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN UGANDA............................................. 18

4.1 ACTORS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.................................................................................................... 18 4.2 THE ROLES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS .............................................................................................. 20

4.2.1 Council Oversight in Planning and Budgeting .......................................................................... 20 4.2.2 Council Oversight in Procurement ............................................................................................ 24 4.2.3 Council Oversight over Human Resource.................................................................................. 25 4.2.4 Council Oversight in Monitoring Project Performance............................................................. 26

4.3 POWER RELATIONS ............................................................................................................................ 27 4.3.1 Powers Devolved and Retained by the Central Government ..................................................... 27 4.3.2 Fiscal Decentralisation.............................................................................................................. 27 4.3.3 Relations between the Centre and Local Governments.............................................................. 29 4.3.4 Relations between Elected Leaders and Members of the Public................................................ 31 4.3.5 Relations between Elected Leaders and Appointed Officials..................................................... 32 4.3.6 Marginalized Groups and Local Government- .......................................................................... 33 4.3.7 Elites and Local Government..................................................................................................... 33

5.0 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 35

5.1 POWERS OF RECALL FOR ELECTED LEADERS ...................................................................................... 35 5.2 THE ROLE OF SECTORAL COMMITTEES ............................................................................................. 36

5. 2. 1 Education and Sports Committee............................................................................................. 36 5.2.2 Health and Environment Committee .......................................................................................... 37 5.2.3 Water and Sanitation Committee .............................................................................................. 37 5.2.4 District and Community Roads Committee ................................................................................ 38 5.2.5 Production, Marketing and Industry Committee........................................................................ 38 5.2.6 Other Sectoral Committees ........................................................................................................ 38 5.2.7 Limitations of Sectoral Committees ........................................................................................... 39

5.3 THE ROLE OF NGOS IN ADVOCACY.................................................................................................. 40 5.4 INDEPENDENT MONITORING.............................................................................................................. 41 5.5 IMPEDIMENTS TO COUNCIL OVERSIGHT ............................................................................................ 41 5.6 IMPEDIMENTS TO SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ............................................................................................. 44

6.0 CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................................... 51

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7.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................. 52 8.0 ANNEX 1: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS ....................................................................................... 57

9.0 ANNEX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDES ....................................................................................................... 58

10.0 ANNEX 3: INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS ........................................................................................ 65

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1.0 Introduction 1.1 Objectives and Scope of the Study The Africa Local Council Oversight and Social Accountability (ALCOSA) Project, covering four East African countries- Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Kenya - aims at :

(a) improving knowledge and increasing awareness about oversight of elected local councilors and citizens on local governments; and

(b) Supporting in-country and regional dialogues and building partnerships among

the local councils, executive branch of local governments, NGOs, and community based organizations towards building more transparent and accountable local governance mechanisms.

The project focuses on oversight and accountability relationships between:

(a) local elected representatives (councilors) and the local appointed officials (b) citizens and local elected representatives

The focus on elected councilor oversight complements ongoing in-country activities that center on civic engagement and community based capacity building. It fosters social accountability agenda that is currently mostly defined in relation to executive decision making processes and service delivery (i.e. budget literacy, citizen report cards). 1.2 Approach and Methodology (a) Literature Review An in-depth literature review was done to examine the role of elected local council leaders in planning, overseeing service delivery and involvement in the financial management processes of local governments. The documents that were reviewed included but were not limited to: the Local Government Act 1997 (and amendments 2000), Local Governments Financial and Accounting Regulations 1998; the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003; the Public Finance and Accountability Regulations 2003; Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995; Harmonized Participatory Planning Guide for Higher and Lower Local Governments; Guide for Local Governments’ Financial Management 2004; Fiscal Decentralization in Uganda 2000; National Service Delivery Survey Reports; Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) implementation guidelines; local government bylaws and internal audit reports; Reports of Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments; Joint Annual Review of Decentralization Reports; relevant research reports and journal articles on the country’s decentralization programme. In addition, a review of Electoral Law; The Media Law; Education Act; Health Sector Policy Document; Plan for Modernization Of Agriculture Document; the

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Land Act 1998 (and amendments); Code of Ethics (for local councils) and the nation’s Leadership Code was done. The focus of the literature review has been to characterize and assess current decentralization framework and accountability systems in Uganda as well as factors enhancing responsiveness of local councilors and local government executives to citizens, the poor and vulnerable in particular. While the review attempts to demonstrate the impact of the de jure and power structures on service delivery, it also makes a distinction between the de jure and de facto structures in Uganda’s local government system; for example, in relation to the youth, women, persons with disabilities and elderly councils within a multi-party governance system. In addition, it illustrates how the laws impact on discretionary space provided to local governments. The review further demonstrates the relationship between different local government institutions and how they interact with each other. The report examines social accountability under fiscal, administrative and political mechanisms. (b) Key Informant Interviews In order to establish the status of the operationalisation of the laws, policies and guidelines embedded in the reviewed literature, some key informant interviews were conducted at national level among pre-selected informants from both the public and private sectors. This was in addition to interviews held with key district officials from Mukono and Wakiso Districts [see Annexes 1-3 for list of informants, interview guides and transcripts]. 1.3 Structure of the Report The report is organised in three analytical chapters. The first chapter examines the political setting in Uganda; the second chapter delves into the local government structures; the third chapter examines the functioning of the local governments in Uganda; the forth chapter describes the accountability relationships in the local government system; while the sixth chapter discusses the oversight and accountability mechanisms.

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2.0 Political Setting Uganda became independent in 1962. At independence, the country had a multi party political system composed of with three dormant political parties in the country. These were: the Uganda Peoples Congress, (UPC) Democratic Party (DP) and Kabaka Yekka (KY). Each of these parties was founded on varied ideological interests and therefore represented various view points. The UPC, for instance, represented those of the Anglicans; D.P represented the catholics while KY represented the interests of the royalists in the Buganda Kingdom. In the first four years after independence, the country witnessed steady growth and political stability. However, all this was short lived as disagreements between Buganda and Central government emerged, leading to the 1966 crisis. 1 From 1971 to 1979 Uganda was governed under a military dictatorship of Idi Amin. Under this dictatorship the country was ruled by decree, with all power centered in the hands of the president. After the over throw of Idi Amin in 1978, a government of “national unity”, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), was formed in order to pave way to the return of democratic rule in the country. In 1980, general elections were organized and UPC emerged the winner. The 1980 elections have been referred to as gross-flowed and it was on this basis that political discontent emerged, culminating into a wave of instability and economic decline. Similarly, it is in this context that Uganda came to be referred to as failed/collapsed state, to the extent that when the rebel outfit, the National Resistance Army {NRA} took over power in 1986, it was largely seen as a fundamental change and a unique event in Africa. For the NRA was able to capture power mainly through winning the confidence of the population. As Ngoga (1999) observed, part of the reason why the rebel outfit was able to win the majority of the people’s confidence lay in its tight discipline especially during the time of the insurgency. Based on this, the NRA and its political wing, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), was widely accepted and continues to rule till today. In the first twenty years (20) years of its rule (1986-2006), the NRM ruled under a movement system of governance. Under this system, all Ugandans irrespective of their political beliefs and backgrounds were given an opportunity to participate in political and economic governance of their country. This is what has been referred to as broad based governance. Although there have been several reasons advanced for this kind of

1 In 1962, Uganda attained independence from Britain, with Buganda granted a federal status within a United Uganda. However, because of Uganda’s “super state” nature, there was continued acrimony between Buganda and the Uganda government headed by the new Executive Prime Minister, Militon Obote, a Langi from Northern Uganda. This acrimonious relationship climaxed with the 1966 political crisis which led to the attack on the Lubiri in Mengo, the headquarters of the Buganda Kingdom and seat of Kabaka. The monarchists had asked Obote to take away his central government from the capital Kampala to another location outside Buganda. They even called on the Baganda for mass defiance against the Milton Obote administration. In short, the Buganda called for a secession, which culminated into the invasion of Mengo in 1966 and subsequently, the abolition of all the kingdoms[by the Obote government] that were by then existing in the country.

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governance system such as the need to uphold national unity (Museveni 1998), the same style of governance came under severe critism for suffocating other political freedom (Mujaju 1997; Oloka-Onyango 2002, Mukwaya 2003). It was partly a result of such criticism that in 2004, referendum on political parties/movement was held and citizens voted for a return to multi parties. Hence since 2006, multi party system of governance was adapted. It is also right to note that for the last 22 years the country has been governed under the local government system, with powers devolved from the centre to the local level units. It is also note worth to mention that such a system of governance has been undergoing transformation as will be illustrated in the subsequent paragraphs.

2.1 Decentralization and Local Governance after Independence At independence, the 1962 constitution became the country’s supreme law. This constitution provided for a comparatively strong local government system, which devolved significant powers to the local authorities at the time. The constitution also granted adequate powers to local authorities and such power included control over personnel under separate staffing arrangement. Similarly the constitution also provided for financial arrangements that included block and equalization grants, generation of local revenue as well as its usage. Apart form local revenue; there was a Local Authority Loan Fund (LALF) as a source of funds for capitalizing development programs und the local Local Authorities. The 1962 constitution also provided for conflict resolution mechanisms between the local governments and the centre, as well as among the varied localized units and territories. Indeed such funds helped in improving localized services. Such as transport and roads, education, health. In short, local governments also enlisted a spirit of local ownership given the high degree of public participation in decision-making at the time. We must, however, note that soon after independence, the local government (Amendment) Act of 1962, produced a series of legislative reforms that stripped the local governments of most of their powers and autonomy (Golooba-Mutebi 2007). For instance as Golooba-Mutebi 2007 puts it, the amendment bestowed on to the minister of regional administration powers to approve the appointment of chiefs, powers that were previously enjoyed by the colonial governor and the provincial commissioners. In fact, although the majority of their members were democratically elected, the district council was to have no power at all over the recruitment of chiefs or administrative officials. Further still in 1963, the government passed the Local Administration (Amendment) Act, and before it was passed into law, two civil servants were appointed by the Local Appointment Board, employed and controlled by the district councils and these were: The Secretary General who was responsible for administration, and the treasurer who was responsible for financial matters. The Act, gave the power of appointment and dismissal by a simple majority vote to district councils. (ibid). The above appointments were not without shortcomings. This can be illustrated by the Secretary General’s Power over the district council, hence the Secretary General became the most supreme organ in the district. More so, the perceived close relationship between the Secretary

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General and the ruling party gave birth to political rivalry between the ruling party and the opposition at the local level. As expected, such rivalry and ensuing conflicts resulted into a several reforms and one such reform was the dismissal of all Secretary Generals, Finance Secretaries and Chairman of District Councils. These dismissals resulted from the Local Government Amendment Act, (No. 2) 1963. Subsequently the appointment of Secretary General, Finance Secretaries was to be done through the Minister of Regional Administrations. In so doing, the Minister acquired powers to appoint people in such positions without contest. Such reforms reduced the autonomy of local governments, because they were at the mercy of the central government. Similarly, more changes in regard to the local governance came after the 1966 crisis in what come to be the Local Administration Act 1967. These changes can be summed up as a complete more from decentralization to centralization. But the significant feature, other the 1967 administration Act, is that central government boosted its power by fusing the local administration with the local branches of the ruling party. In addition, the changing fortunes of UPC as a ruling party in Uganda, and particularly in Buganda, increased the central government’s appetite to galvanize itself from any impending locally generated opposition, given its increasing unpopularity. Therefore, one can argue that the need to control local defiance from locally elected officials, partly accounts for the central government’s greater control over local administration. In 1971, Idi Amin took power after staging a military coupd’tat. His reign was characterized by military dictatorship. He ruled by decree and, inevitably, local governance suffered. Unlike his predecessor, Amin and his administration centralized all appointments including those of provincial commissions, who were in most cases military officers who were given far reaching powers. It must, however, be noted that despite the over centralization of appointments and further militarization of administration, there was a considerable breakdown of previously bigger administration units into somewhat smaller ones. However, most of these smaller units followed an ethnic line, giving birth to some ethno-guided local governance. Because of increasing domestic and international pressures, widespread brutality became a major characteristic of Idi Amin’s reign. This culminated into his final overthrow by a joint force of Ugandan exiles and the Tanzanian People Defense Forces in 1979. The fall of Idi Amin in 1979 paved way for state reconstruction in Uganda, given the political and economic decline. As a result, the post Amin the” umbrella” government organized the 1980 multi party elections whose outcome was heavily contested, after UPC was declared winner, giving birth to what is commonly known as the Obote II government. The disputed electoral results threw the country into a deep political divide. This political divide sowed the seeds for the rebellion in central Uganda, which remained a major re-occupation of the Obote II government. The Obote II government was overthrown in 1985 by another coup led by General Tito Okello. Tiito Okello’s reign was short-lived as it was also overthrown in 1986 by the National Resistance Army (NRA), giving birth to the establishment of the Movement system of

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governance in the County, under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni who, later became President of Uganda from 1986 till to date. 2.2 Decentralization during the Movement System. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) took over power after a five year protracated war (1981 – 86). It was during this war that the NRM established the local governance system that was first known as Resistance Councils (RCs). The RCs were constituted of popularly elected leaders who offered people an opportunity to participate in the political and other community affairs. but prior to taking over power the RCs acted as agents for organization especially in the “Liberated” areas.*

On seizing power in 1986, the NRM established a decentralized system based on the philosophy of popular participation. One of the NRM defensive arguments for this local governance system was that Uganda’s democracy was being built not by reinstating divisive politics – (Multiparty Politics) but through local participation which begun at the local level community within a decentralized political structure. Indeed as Pinkney has noted, decentralization was seen as a key to solving several interrelated problems. (Pukney 2001). Decentralization and/or good local governance was seen as a path way to not only service delivery but also economic bounty, social justice political capacity. To many western donors, this was seen as a means of restoring stability (political, social and economic), greater administrative efficiency and above all a very clear avenue through which efficient disbursement of foreign aid could be maintained (Ibid:170). Pinkneny’s argument is made in relation to the fact that international lenders, especially financial institutions, were willing to offer support on the basis of reforms, especially those that were found to promote good governance development strategies. The bottom-up local government system in Uganda was, therefore, viewed as a mechanism for involving local people in the development process. Nsibambi (1998) argues that the Ugandan decentralization system aimed at devolving powers and functions to the local governments. Such devolved powers were categorized into: political, financial and administrative powers. For instance, political powers relating to election of people’s representatives who, with input from their electorates, make decisions and set policies and exercise political oversight in policy implementation. Administrative powers relate to recruitment and management of staff, while financial powers relate to collection of revenue, budgeting, accounting and reporting. The other category of powers include planning powers which involve the formulation of development plans; legislative powers which involve the making of bye laws and ordinances; and lastly judicial powers which give local government mandate to exercise limited judicial functions through local council courts. The other rationale for establishing decentralization in Uganda by the NRM was to provide a conduit for service delivery. The fragile nature of Uganda after the war left no available means for service delivery and as a result breaking the monopoly of central government over the social, economic and cultural life of society and allowed the local government enough room to manage the interface of social, political and cultural institutional pluralism to foster people participation and development. In short,

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decentralization aimed at moving away from the old tenets of centralization which were considered as anti developmental in that it deprives people, especially the bulk of society, of easy access to institutions that allocate goods and services. Centralization was also seen to undermine democratic control over the allocation of resources because it over rides local mechanism and centers of public accountability (GOU, 1993:5). The other basis for decentralization is rather philosophical one. It (is) was rooted in the belief that human beings can govern themselves in peace and dignity in the pursuit of their collective, well being (public good) once entrusted with their own destiny through a medium of popular democratic localized institutions. The central government only defines rules of the game and only proceeds to vest responsibility to the local authorities and other local organizations. It was envisaged that this arrangement holts the emergence of a zero-sum game – winner takes it all situation, in the management of the public affairs and priorities. Based on the above justifications, Uganda under the NRM took the first steps towards the revival of the local governance in Uganda. The first attempts were contained in the 1987 Resistance Council (RC) Statute No. 9 which legalized the resistance councils and gave them powers of jurisdiction at the local level. The RC system was further institutionalized when the 1995 constitution re-named RC, local councils giving this system of governance a legal backing as evidenced by of the 1995 constitution. Decentralized local governance system is also augmented by articles 176(2 and 3) of the constitution. Following the promulgation of the 1995 constitution, parliament enacted the Local Governments Act 1997 to operationalise the local governance system. In effect, the provisions of the constitution empower local governments to carry out varied political, administrative, judicial, planning, financial and legislative powers to oversee the execution of a number of functions which will later be discussed. The reforms that led to the development of the current local government system in Uganda commenced in October 1992 and were first legislated for under the Decentralization Statute 1993. Their main objective was to develop a decentralized system of local government to which powers, functions and responsibility (for service delivery) would be transferred from the centre to sub-national governments. This can also be seen in the broader framework of the worldwide demand by the people not only to have an increased role in decision-making, but also as an attempt by governments to run away from the tenets associated with inefficiency and ineffectiveness (Azfar 1999). Burki et al. (1999) argue that one other important rational for establishing decentralization as a system of governance was due to the fact that it would lead to an automatic influence of all strata in the in society. Since its inception, decentralization has been undergoing continuous transformations. The most significant of these has been the creation of an enabling legal framework which has enabled the decentralized system to be well rooted and well secured. First, decentralization and local governance is well recognized by the 1995 constitution. Second, the Local Government Act (1997) and subsequent 2001 amendments outlined the key provisions that relate to the management of local governments in the country. Some of the key provisions relate to judicial functions of local councils, financial

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management, procurement of goods and services, mobilization of resources, democratic decision-making, and human resource management, among others. Based on the above institutional and legal frame works, there has been great strides in the implementation of democratic process in Uganda, a scenario that Golooba – Mutebi has, for instance, referred to as a radical shift. He, for example, notes that such reforms brought about fundamental changes in the management of service delivery (Golooba-Muteebi, 2007:146) contrary to the previous over centralization of power in the hands of the central government. With the coming up of reforms, decision-making authority was transferred from centrally appointed officials, the Ministry of Local Government and other ministries to democratic local structures with elected leaders (Ibid). In essence, centrally appointed officials lost much of their previous influence in directing local government matters. To date, elected district councils chairpersons are the political heads of districts and, with the assistance of elected councilors, they are able to make decisions without the political interference of central government. A vivid example relates to the appointment of district-level civil governments which is done by the District Service Commission (DSC), making all district level civil servants appointed, supervised and disciplined by the DSC. This is a clear shift from the previously centralized system where line ministries had control over district level civil servants. The other transformation relates to the financing of local governments. To date, there have been increased efforts to support local government through financial resources from the centre. The mandatory conditioned and unconditional grants from the centre were introduced as provided for in the 1995 constitution. This implies that the previous role played by sector ministries as the pathways for financial resources was checked, hence making districts acquire overall control of their resource envelops. It is, however, important to point out that although districts have the lee way to spend as they wish, such expenditures must be within the revenue and Financial Accounting regulations regarding grants from government as provided for by the 1997 Local Government Act. 2.3 Local Governance under the Multiparty System

Effectively, before 2005, Ugandans had not had experience with multiparty democracy at the local level for 20 years. Suddenly, without even minimum preparation of the stakeholders, multiparty politics was unleashed on the population. This represented a high degree of unpreparedness on the side of the population since local structures and institutions on which to operationalize the multiparty system of governance, and more so in the context of decentralization, were lacking. However, this lack of preparedness was not confined to the population alone, it also extended to the government itself, considering that for a whole two decades local governments had operated under the movement system and election of office bearers was done on the basis of individual merits system.2

2 The individual merit system was practiced during the movement system. In this respect, various candidates were allowed to compete for the same political system regardless of their former political party affiliations.

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Ever since multi-parties were re-introduced, there has been no legal framework to accommodate multiparty governance at the grassroots level. It was as recent as 2nd May 2008 that amendments in the Local Government Act were made with regard to local government elections under the Multi-party system of governance. These amendments are yet to be implemented. More so, there is absence of a deliberate plan and mechanism for awareness creation among the population with regard to how local government works under a multi- party arrangement. Similarly, one can rightly argue that those elected into office in local government councils, are operating on a trial and error basis. This has implications on nurturing multiparty democracy, as well as enhancing the capacity of councils and councilors to deliver on their roles efficiently and effectively under a multiparty dispensation. The other important issue is that several political analysts have argued that in a multiparty system, transparency and accountability by those in office would improve. But the most salient questions worth asking are: how this would be achieved? How would local leaders belonging to varied political parties account to the local people? It is true that under the multiparty political dispensation, local leaders are elected under their respective political parties. The implication is that local leaders are bound to be more accountable to their political parties that enabled them to win political offices at the local level, as opposed to representing the interests of the wider populace in their respective constituency. This implies that party allegiance will be paramount, eroding other considerations including accountability, and service delivery will be secondary under multiparty politics. Furthermore, in the absence of clear guidance on how to conduct council business under a multi-party system, it is important to ask: what happens in a situation where council has divided representation based on varied political inclinations? This implies that exemplary behavior at the national level would be required to encourage local council leaders to be accommodative of political opponents, respect minority views, and privilege teamwork. However, signals from the centre tend to encourage exclusion [rather than inclusion] of political opponents from the transaction of public affairs. Indeed, the 2006/2007 ULGA position paper points out, that the mere fact that the newly elected councils are already functional but have not been guided on how to manage multiparty political arrangement is a challenge. The paper argues that the absence of clear guidelines under a multiparty political arrangement is likely to lead to instability in some council (ULGA 2007:3).

2.4 Local Political Campaigns Financing

Political parties are expected to have their internal mechanisms for selecting candidates for election. The most popular one are the party primaries whereby aspiring candidates offer themselves to the specified party structures that vote to determine a party’s candidate. Candidates expect to be provided with campaign funds by their parties. However, due to scarcity of resources, this does not always happen, and where resources are provided, they are inadequate. Consequently, candidates have to mobilize their own finances. These could be from their personal resources or contributions solicited by candidates from supporters and well wishers. Contributions could be in cash or in kind,

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such as transport, campaign posters, brochures, fliers, t-shirts, air-time (phones and electronic media) etc. There is a tendency for those who lose contests during primaries to grumble and cry foul that they have been cheated, and therefore to declare themselves “Independents”. Such candidates have to sponsor themselves fully without any support from the party they have deserted. In very rare cases, the party can support the winner openly but clandestinely extend support to the “independent” candidate on sensing that he/she stands better chances of winning than the official candidate. Incumbent leaders seeking re-election stand chances of having access to public facilities belonging to their local councils such as money and fuel. This constitutes abuse of office in which technical staff collaborates willingly or as a result of arm-twisting, blackmail or anticipated favours from the candidate after winning.

Commercialization of elections developed rapidly under the movement system with its attendant individual merit principle. It has now developed strong roots and, in spite of the party discipline associated with multi-partysm, it cannot be easily stamped out. Unfortunately, it has gone as far as “buying” votes by paying cash or distributing essential goods among voters by candidates or their agents (Golooba-Mutebi 1999). When that is done extensively, it implies that accountability by the elected representative to the electorate is fatally damaged. In general terms, the way local political campaigns are financed justifies the prediction that unless the trend is reversed quickly and decisively, election on merit will become irrelevant and representation will be confined to the rich and those who have access to public funds and facilities which they can divert. If this happens, it would have a severe blow to accountability.

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3.0 The Local Government Structures in Uganda 3.1 Pyramid Structure of Local Government Decentralized local governance (DLC) in Uganda is facilitated by a five tier pyramidal system [fig 1] which shows the hierarchical system of local councils. Administratively, all the 81 districts (includes 1 city) in Uganda share this common structure and are divided into 151 counties, 911 sub-counties, 5,500 parishes and 45,5000 villages. The districts and sub-counties form what is referred to as the rural local governments, while the 13 municipalities, 34 municipal divisions and 98 town councils constitute what is known as the urban local governments. The DLC system is a form of local government organized in 5 tiers with the topmost Local Council (LC) providing a link between local and Central government authorities. The 5 tier LC system is as follows: District - LC5; County LC4; Sub-county LC3; Parish LC2; and village LC1 (LGA, 2007). Under this structure, at the lowest level, the Local Council 1, which is the village, is constituted by all Uganda citizens of 18years old residing in that area. Hence, at that level, every citizen in the village is a councilor, and through village meetings, people are able to maintain contact with their locally elected leaders. At the very top is a deliberative assembly known as the District council where all councilors meet. These councilors are drawn from the respective lower local governments. At this level, all issues of local importance within a particular district are discussed. Currently, there are over 81 district councils each with its own composition of lower local councils as well as administrative councils. It is important to note that the memberships to these councils vary from district to district because the number of councilors is linked to the number of electoral areas (JARD 2004). All councilors are elected either through universal adult suffrage or through electoral colleges. Those elected under electoral colleges include: women councilors, youths and people with disabilities. The rationale for electoral colleges is to facilitate affirmative action especially regarding the marginalized groups in society. The following figure illustrates the pyramidal structure of the Ugandan decentralized governance system.

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Figure 1: Decentralized governance structure in Uganda Urban National Rural

(Parliament & Legislation)

District LC V District

Municipal LC IV County

Division LC III Sub-county

Ward LC II Parish

Cell LC I Village

Currently, the entire local government structure is made up of 80 Districts (including the Capital City), 13 Municipalities, 5 City divisions, 911 Sub-county Councils, 98 Town Councils 5,500 parishes/wards, and 45,000 Villages. Apart from lower level local governments, all the positions in the above structures are fully occupies by elected officials. The districts are managed and administered in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 and the Local Government Act 1997. Districts are administered through politically established and administrative civil service structures. The political structure, which is the District Council (policy making organ), is constituted by elected councilors headed by a Chairperson, and all council proceedings are presided over by the speaker, just like the parliamentary format. The Chairperson is supported by an Executive of a maximum of 5 members, which executive cannot exceed a third of the council for purposes of protecting the powers of the council against the executive committee. In addition to the executive committee, the Chairperson is supported by 5 Policy/ Sectoral Committees which deliberate policy matters and make recommendations to the full Council, which is composed of Councilors (peoples’ representatives) whose number varies from district to district (Kisembo 2006). The five sectoral committees include: Finance and Planning; Health and Environment; Production, Marketing and Industry; Works and urban Planning; and Education and Sports (LGA 1997, section 27). The above mentioned sectoral committees, headed by Executive Secretaries, oversee the civil savants and other technocrats in the districts and other lower local governments such as sub-county. District Councils have the power to create other sectoral committees as they deem necessary to facilitate their functions. The role of sectoral

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committees is to supervise, monitor and follow up the implementation of policies, as well as developing work plans together with respective technical departments. They are not empowered to make policies on behalf of council and their decisions are subject to approval of council.

The administrative structures, on the other hand, relate to the appointed officials who work in the respective departments for instance, health, education, roads and transport, finance and Planning. These are headed by departmental heads who are appointed by the district service commission.

Article 55(2) of the LGA stipulates that there shall be a district service commission which shall consist of other members as the District Council shall determine. Similarly Article 56(1) outlines the powers of the district service commission. The district service commission is empowered to recruit and discipline employees on behalf of the district and urban authorities. In principle, the District Service Commission is the structure in charge of all technocrats in the districts. Local Government Councils are categorized into two (LGA 1997, Article 179). The first category comprises of the Higher-level Local Government Councils (HLG), which constitute the District Local Government Councils in the rural areas, and City Council in the urban areas. The city councils such as the one in Kampala take the same status of a District. On the other side, there are the Lower-level Local Government Councils which take the form of Municipal Councils in urban areas, City Division and /or Municipal Councils also in urban areas, Town Councils (urban areas) and Sub-county Councils (rural). The second category of local government councils are the Administrative Unit Councils which take the form of County Councils (rural), Parish (rural) or Ward Councils (urban), Town Boards (urban), Village Councils (rural and urban) as contained in LGA 1997, Article 176. In short, there are two categories of councils: Those which are corporate legal entities (LC 5 and LC 3), and can sue and be sued; and those that are purely administrative (LCs 4, 2 and 1). The purpose of the above structures is to provide linkage roles regarding various agencies for example local government contract committees [formally tender boards], district service commission, and local government account committees. The structure emphasizes democratic representation and also takes into consideration the principles of decentralization where services are taken nearer to the people. At each level, there are mandates (oversight roles and accountability) which are well detailed in the second schedule of the LGA. The higher local governments have powers to delegate to lower local governments some of the responsibilities under the law. Similarly the structures also demonstrate the need to account to the people through elected representatives. But it is also noteworthy to point out that the structures provide an opportunity for the citizens to participate in the decision-making process from the lowest level - the village, and the highest level - the district. The oversight functions of the lower local governments [executive committees] are outlined in Section 27 of the LGA, whereas those of the higher local governments, as implied in the District executive Committee, are outlined in Section 18 of the Act.

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A district Local Government Council and a Sub county Local Government Council are corporate bodies with perpetual succession and a common seal (LGA 1997, section 18). They may sue or be sued in their corporate names. Each has a directly elected Chairperson; directly elected councilors representing demarcated electoral areas; two councilors (male and female) representing the youth; two councilors (male and female) are representing people with disabilities; and women councilors forming one third of the whole council. The elderly are represented by two persons (male and female), above sixty years of age, elected by the executive committees of the respective associations of the elderly. The LGA 1997, Article 10 -11 stipulates that each local government council elects from among its councilors a Speaker who presides over all Council meetings, while a Higher-level Local Government Council elects a Deputy Speaker (LGA 1997, Article 10-11). Every Local Government Council and Lower-level Local Government Council is obliged to have an Executive Committee appointed by the Chairperson from among Councilors with approval from the Council. At least one third of the Executive Committee must be women. The Chairperson chairs all Executive Committee meetings. The Executive Committee initiates and formulates policy for approval by the council; monitors and oversees implementation of policies and programmes; and recommends persons to the council for appointment to statutory Commissions, Boards and Committees. Every council has Standing Committees whose role is to examine in detail all proposals and recommendations. Administrative councils are not corporate bodies and therefore can neither sue nor be sued (LGA 1997, Article 12). Their functions include: resolving disputes or solving problems; monitoring the delivery of services, assisting in the maintenance of law, order and security; mobilizing communities for communal work (LGA 1997, Articles 176 – 187). These councils through their respective committees are also involved in the planning processes for their respective local governments. This planning process gives then a chance to interaction since the planning process within the local governance set up in Uganda follows a hierarchical structure, which allows room for participation and interaction, given the intersection of power centers at the L C IV (County level) as well as administrative units at LC I (village)and LC II ( parish). The following figure gives an overview of the accountability linkages between the local government structures.

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4.0 Functioning of Local Governments in Uganda

4.1 Actors in Local Governments There are varied actors in the management of local government in Uganda. The first major set of the actors in this realm are those that run the local governments and these include elected representative (those that are directly elected leader and those elected by Electoral Colleges). These acquire the position of actors by virtue of their positions, their actions, inputs and decisions which have far reaching impacts on their respective local governments. As pointed out earlier, the elected leaders constitute the councils both in the High Local governments as well as the lower local governments. It is through such councils that legislative decisions are made. By virtue of the authority entrusted onto them, elected representatives are responsible for the formation of the statutory bodies such as the Local Government Public Accounts Committee (LGPAC). The LGPAC consists of four members appointed by the district council on the recommendation of the District Executive Committee (section 89 1997 LG A). The office of the Clerk to the District Council is the secretariat to the LGPAC. The LGPAC examines the reports of the Auditor General, Chief Internal Auditor and any reports of commissions of inquiry and submits its report to the council and the minister responsible for Local Government, who is supposed to lay the report before Parliament. Similarly, Article 198 of the 1995 Constitution and Section 55 of the LGA 1997 mandate the district executive, through the district council, to appoint members of the District Service Commission (DSC) for subsequent approval by the Public Service Commission (PSC). The other statuary bodies that are constituted by the district executive, on the recommendation of the elected representatives, include the District Land Board (DLB). The District Land Board is a statutory body responsible for holding, allocating and facilitating the registration and transfer of interests in land in the district in accordance with the laws made by the parliament of Uganda. The other categories of actors in the realm of local governance are the international development actors popularly known as ‘donors’. Largely, donors in Uganda have operated on two fronts: The first was the need to continue the structural adjustment programmes as part of the global neo-liberal agenda that had been initiated during the Obote II regime. The second was the need for funds to rehabilitate all sectors of the economy that had been destroyed during the NRM war (Sewakiryanga, 2006). Although their role is not overtly seen in the day to day management of local governments in Uganda, they play a facilitation role especially in the provision of resources that are used in the day to day running of local government. Some of the donors do this through what is called the Donor Democracy and Governance Group ( DDGG). Other multilateral donors such as UNICEF, UNHCR, The European Union, DANIDA, IRISH AID and DFID among others are involved in the direct funding of development projects in various local governments especially in the conflict and other

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vulnerable districts3. It should also be noted that due to resource mismanagement at the centre, most donors prefer channelling their resource directly through the local government, making donors critical actors in decentralisation.

Donors are also involved in advocacy for good governance within the wider decentralisation framework. This is done by contributing towards some of the legislative guidelines that relate to local accountability. Donors such as the European Union and DANIDA have significantly played a crucial role in enhancing the capacities of civil society organisations in local governance processes and outcomes. Such efforts are premised on the understanding that, although decentralisation is a conduit for good governance, it is not synonymous with good governance especially if it does not lead to the empowerment of people (Tukahebwa 2000: 8). Therefore, a strong civil society is an important role in influencing the formulation and implementation of public policy. At the same time, a strong civil society shapes the character of political and economic life at the local level and in the country as a whole (Ibid). Hence, donors’ empowerment of civil society implies empowering another set of actors in the realm local governance. The other category of actors is the Local Government Associations (LGAs). There are two Local Government Associations in Uganda. These are the Uganda Local Government Association (ULGA) and Urban Authorities Association of Uganda (UAAU). ULGA and UAAU are key non-government advocacy institutions for decentralization. The local government associations play a cardinal role especially in terms of advocacy for decentralization in general. These associations also focus on capacity building, policy analysis and conflict resolution for their members. In a number of cases, Local Government Associations have collaborated with Ministry of local Government and Local Government Finance commission on varied issues of concern such as financing the capacity constraints of districts (JARD 2005). Each of the above association champions the interests of the local government in their respective category. The Associations also play a mediatory as well as advisory role to their respective members. The organizations also hold Annual General Meetings (AGM) for their member. Both ULGA and UAAU have executive committees that oversee the implementation of planned activities. As an example, ULGA has 10 members composing its executive and these are mostly district chairpersons, four regional chairpersons and four regional Chief Administrative Officers. The executive committee of UAAU, on the other hand is composed of 17 urban councils (including Kampala City Council), nine municipal councils and seven town councils (DEGE 2004:52). The existences of the above two bodies as actors in the realm of local governance has fostered good working relations among the members and, above all, has helped in harmonizing the conflicting roles of actors in local government as well as facilitating accountability among the local governments (ULGA 2007). Other actors involved in decentralization are the Members of Parliament (MPs) and Residence District commissioners (RDCs). MPs are ex-officios on the respective local

3 Vulnerable districts in this context refer to those districts that are characterized by disasters such as HIV/AIDS [e.g. Rakai District] and War [e.g. Northern and North Eastern Uganda].

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councils and as a result have no concrete powers in regard to the management of council business although they can offer advice to the councilors, which advise might be ignored or taken. On the other hand, RDCs are provided for under section 72 of the 1997 LGA. The section spells out that RDCs are appointed by President and represent the central government in the district. Their roles include coordination of central government services in the district, inspection of the activities of local government and call upon the office of the auditor general and the inspector General of Government or line ministries to intervene if deemed necessary. As a result the RDC can be interpreted both as an actor and an overseer for implementation of non-devolved operations on behalf of the central government. However, there have been cases where differences in the interpretation of the roles of RDCs have led to antagonism between the office of the RDC and those of the local governments (JHARD 2004). 4.2 The Roles of Local Governments 4.2.1 Council Oversight in Planning and Budgeting In terms of planning, the plans for the high local government at the LCV benefit from the planning inputs from the lower local governments in the form of bottom-up planning. For instance, plans from lower local governments at parish level (ward) and the village level also feed in to the plans at the Sub-county or LC III. In essence the powers regarding the initiation, development and implementation of development plans at various levels are derived from Article 36 of the Local Government Act. This article gives the district powers to prepare comprehensive plans that incorporate all the plans from the lower levels in their respective areas of jurisdiction. This is premised on the understanding that at the end of the day, the process will bring together the respective committees at the varied levels of the local government (Saito, 2000). In principle, Article 36 empowers the local people to take charge of their development priorities, through locally constructed plans as well as locally adapted solutions. This is premised on the assumption that the locally generated development plans will foster local ownership and sustainability. It is also right to add that under section 78, local governments are given the right and obligations to formulate, approve and execute their own budgets. As implied above, planning and budgeting is supposed to be carried out in a participatory manner. When planning or budgeting, District Councils are compelled by the LGA and the Planning and Budgeting Guidelines to incorporate views and priorities of the people (either through their elected representatives or directly) at the various levels of LG. However, there are reports that indicate growing apathy towards these consultative processes. This is mainly attributed to the non-fulfillment of set targets and or identified priorities. This is often the case owing to the fact that LGs have very limited resources of their own to fund local priorities. Hence, the bulk of the services delivered by the LGs are primarily determined by the Central Government priorities rather than the local population. In this respect, one district key informant made a comment:

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…There are areas that I find wanting in the management of finance under the local government structure. The Center sets its own national priorities against which districts plan. So we plan on basis of the priorities of the Center and we call it our own planning, which is ridiculous (Key informant interview, March 2008).

Furthermore, weaknesses in coordination of planning meetings, particularly lack of adequate and timely information to all the stakeholders, often results into poor participation in these consultations. Participation is also sometimes compromised by technocrats during the prioritization of development plans who hijack the opportunity for inclusive and bottom up planning. Councils have also been known to undertake the planning and budgeting in isolation of their electorate, further reducing the logic of bottom up planning and the identification of development programs by the targeted beneficiaries (Nyirinkindi 2007). The Constitution (1995), the Local Governments Act (1997), the Planning and Budgeting Guidelines and the LGDP implementation Guidelines provide the necessary framework and mechanisms for enhancing wider and effective participation by communities, the private sector, CSOs, NGOs, CBOs in decision-making and in the management of public services. This process also involves elected representatives of the people at all levels of Local Councils, from District to Village level. It also involves the public servants within Local governments. Ideally, this participatory process is intended to reflect the real needs of the beneficiaries of services in the plans and budgets and also to enable stakeholders to continuously and meaningfully oversee implementation of plans and budgets. A bottom-up approach is embedded in planning guidelines for Local Councils. Every Higher-level Local government (District) and Lower Local government Council is obliged to have in place a three year rolling development plan formulated in the laid down bottom-up approach. This forms the basis for annual plans and budgets. A report on “Building Municipal Accountability in Uganda 2002” shows that although many of the local governments in Uganda endeavor to under take these guidelines, the afore mentioned actors such as the NGOs and CBOs, often seen as the institutional solution to people centered pro-poor developments, seem not to have experience in working with government in order to lobby for change (DFID 2002). In many cases these critical factors are left out of these crucial process such as budgeting and planning. This same scenario was highlighted in another study by Uganda Debt Network (UDN). “How pro-poor are local government budget in Uganda? (2006)” The study points out that in much as there is provision for stakeholder participation in the budgetary process, the national budgeting process is devoid of real participation including CSOs as required by the various legal frameworks ((UDN 2006). Therefore, in unison with other scholars in the area such as Cornwall and Gaventa (2000), and MISR (2005), participation in local government budgetary planning remains a far cry from reality in many decentralized systems in Africa. On the other hand, the National Synthesis Report on Minimum Conditions and performance Measures of Local government points out that: “overall there had been an improvement especially in regard to the participatory planning with and among the different units of the local governments” (GoU 2005: 28). However, the same report

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noted that one of the issues that comes up as a drawback is the role of women in the planning process especially due to lack of awareness regarding gender balance and the establishment of gender focal persons in districts. This implies that the women councils are non operational. This drawback also has implications on the budgetary priorities and allocations for the women in the local governments. This same observation was made by Byamukama (2006). Byamukama points out that decentralization in Uganda does not seem to offer opportunities for marginalized social actors like women to participate.” Byamukama goes ahead to illustrate her argument by using a gender profile of the upper level local governments. In all the LV councils, men accounted for 98.87% while the women accounted for a marginal 1.44%. At the Municipality and/or County level, the women accounted for 5.55% compared to the 94.44% while at the Sub-county level, the women accounted for dismal 1.12% as while the men accounted for 98.87%. Overall, Byamukama’s findings give a disturbing picture regarding the participation and performance of women in the decentralization in Uganda as a whole and in the broader sense it affects women’s right to political participation under decentralization and remains a great obstacle to the emancipatory project for the rural women, since their role in political decision-making at the lower level is skewed. Furthermore, it should be noted that though many local governments are trying their best to conform to the requirements of planning and implementation process in the decentralized system, where local governments system formulate local government development programs, there are problems related to implementation especially at the LC III level. This is due to the lack of capacity and effective supervision of the sub-county personnel by sub county political leaders (Kisembo 2005). This further illustrates one of the greatest impediments to the oversight mechanisms that characterize the decentralization programme in Uganda. It actually accentuates what Ribot (2004) referred to as low level capacities – Ribot noted that:

Capacity is an illustrative quality linked to skills, knowledge and legitimacy. Local institutions receiving powers they have never held may not have the skills to exercise those powers effectively. Capacity is essential to the exercise of power and to be responsiveness. To be responsive to the needs of its constituents, local governments may require the following: Technical knowledge and skills, financial management skills, ability to call technical experts, ability to negotiate and ability to use courts (2004: 26).

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A Summary of the Local Government Budget Planning Process

Timing Event ResponsibilityCenter

Oversight Function Centre

September - District Local Government Committee agrees on the rules, conditions and flexibility of the coming planning and budgetary process

DFD DBC

October - Holdng of the National Budget Conference - Holding Regional, Local government Framework Paper Workshop - Determine sector priorities as identified in the previous DDP and to fix inter sectoral allocations

Sector Ministries

MFPED

November - L.G. Budget Call nd Submission of Budget to the executive for approval - Budget call is circulated to lower local governments- Sectors start preparing for budget framework paper, reviewing performance and prioritizing planning and budgeting for future programmes -LLG identify investments prepare draft development plans- DPU compiles LLG development activities into DDP and presents them to Heads of Department who before compiling them into sector budget frame work papers (BFP). These include full and complete work plans for all district level activity linked to the DDP.

DPU/DFD Executive Committee

December - Draft Sector BFP - Budget Desk Compiles Draft BFP - Examination of BFP - Holding of Budget Conference - Incorporation of Inputs from Budget Conference

Sectoral Committees, DPU/DFD

Executive Committee,

January - May - MFPED and line ministries examine the budget drafts MFPED MFPED May - Budget Desk incorporates grant ceilings and comments received

from MFPED in annual budget work plans and draft Sectoral Committees, DPU/DFD

Executive Committee,

Source: Citizens’ guide to the Uganda Budgeting Process-Ministry of Local Government The above conceptual diagram illustrates the elaborate nature of the budgeting and planning process under the decentralized planning framework. In the diagram it can be observed that the local governments have the power to formulate, approve and execute their budgets plans and to collect their revenue and spend it. As earlier noted, budgets have to be rolled out of a three year development plan that has to be in line with the Poverty Eradication Action Plan ( PEAP). However, despite the elaborative nature of the budgetary planning, many budgets still don’t capture the local priorities especially due to the over dependence of local governments on to the central government. According to UDN’s report of 2006 on local governments budgets in Uganda:

Local governments are obliged to consult the communities on their priorities during development planning and budgetary process. The current practice of local government greatly deviates from this principle. This is because local governments and their structures, such as the parish development committees, lack capacity to engage with communities and also to work within the tight schedule which does not favor extensive consultation with the communities (2006: 25)

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In relation to the above, an Assessment of the Information and Planning Decision-Making Process at District Level under Decentralization in Uganda, undertaken by the MISR in 2005, demonstrates that the increased reliance of the districts on conditional grants is one of the reasons that has undermined the local communities oversight functions as well as promoting the Local governments role in undermining them. For instance, the report notes that stringent conditions are attached to conditional grants and donor funds compared with the unconditional grants. The only major conditionality on the “unconditional” funds is that before any expenditures are incurred, the wage bill for the district staff must be settled as a first priority and the balance split equally (50/50) between the programme priority areas (PPAs) and other miscellaneous activities as may be decided upon by the District Council. Unfortunately, paying the wage bill almost completely wipes out the unconditional grants leaving the districts with nothing much to finance other district priorities. In some cases, like in Jinja Municipality, it was reported that unconditional grants do not even entirely cover the wage bill and the local governments have to top up from other sources.

The MISR report further notes that even the donor funds carry conditionalities, for they must go to the programmes they are intended for. However, some donor funds like LGDP and PMA give some bit of flexibility in the conditionalities unlike the grants from the central government. LGDP funds are conditioned to being used only on programme priority areas, but the district has the discretion to shift funds between different line items as long as the shift addresses the programme priority areas. Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) money too, (e.g. non sectoral conditional grant) is conditioned to addressing the programme priority areas, but it can be used on crops, livestock, fisheries, bridges, feeder roads etc. as the district may find it necessary. With regard to the appropriateness of conditionalities, the MISR report (2005) points out that opinions were sharply divided among officials across all the study districts/municipalities on the relevance of these conditionalities. Those in favour of conditionalities argued that attaching conditionalities ensures that funded activities are implemented and funds do not get diverted. It was further observed that conditional grants reinforce accountability among the technocrats, as failure to submit proper accountabilities might have adverse repercussions both to the affected municipality/ district and the individual (s) responsible. However, it is important to note that while conditionalities were an avenue that aimed at fostering accountability, an overt analysis of the role of conditionalities indicates that the oversight roles of the local communities seem to have been replaced, as the technocrats seem to be more accountable to the donors and the central government than to the local communities. 4.2.2 Council Oversight in Procurement Initially, the procurement function had been devolved to Local Governments and this function was played by the Local Government Tender Boards (LGTB). However, as a result of outcries of abuses and corruption, sometimes involving awarding tenders or influencing their outcomes in favor of political cronies and supporters, Local Government Tender Boards were abolished and replaced with Contracts Committees which are subjected to control by the centre. Contracts Committees are provided for in

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the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, 2003. They consist of five members nominated by the CAO from among public employees in the District and they are approved by the Secretary to the Treasury (national level). This implies that the local councils have no power regarding the constitution of the contracts committees and hence their roles in questioning the decisions of the contracts committee are limited. Councils have limited powers regarding the award of tenders and procurement contracts. This limited power is retained in the council’s standing committee on finance which is mandated to review all minutes of the contracts committee and awards made on a quarterly basis to ensure that care is exercised by the contracts committee to safeguard the interests of council. The implication here is that the CAO, together with the chairperson of the contracts committee, have the final say in the award of contracts. In any case, councils meet after every quarter to review and discuss the minutes of the contracts committee after the awards have already been made. This is a great limitation in the council’s oversight function because 75% district councils are unable to meet even once a year because of budgetary constraints (Monitor 18th May 2008). What is even more limiting, is the fact that Council has no power to nullify an awarded contract – Local Councilors can query decisions of the Contract Committee but cannot reverse them. This means that even citizens who are represented by elected leaders are inadvertently disempowered and have almost no role in the procurement process, hence the extent to which they can hold local governments accountable is extremely limited. Information obtained from both the key informant interview and available literature such as Niwagaba (2004), points to the fact that abolishing Local Government Tender Boards (LGTB), seems to have weakened the council oversight on the procurement processes in the districts. Discussion with districts councilors in Mukono indicated that although Council retains some oversight role in the procurement process, their role is limited. For instance, the councilors talked to gave an example of the district contract committee which is largely constituted by technocrats and to a large extent exclude the councilors, a scenario that gives the technocrats powers to make what they called `unscrupulous decisions’, say in the award of tenders. The councilors noted that because the law restrains their participation, their concerns are sometimes misinterpreted as `political interference’. In essence, the 2006 Local Governments Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Regulation presents limitations to council oversight in local government procurement process. 4.2.3 Council Oversight over Human Resource Decentralization led to the creation of an almost separate human resource management system. Under this system, matters relating to human resource management are handled independently by the respective districts. The human resource function, as a whole, is the responsibility of the District Service Commission (DSC). The DSCs are provided for in the 1995 constitution under article 200(1 and 2) and under sections 55, of 1997 LGA. The central mandate of the DSC is to recruit, remunerate, confirm, promote, discipline as well as firing of incompetent or undisciplined civil savants. District Local Governments are empowered to determine their staffing levels, structures and positions.

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The DSC also has the ability to abolish positions that are seen to be of no relevance to the district. In essence, the district councils are able to oversee the civil servants through the DSC as a statutory body responsible for the management of human resource. Similarly, the Secretary to the DSC provides the political oversight function, while the CAO, with the assistance of a personnel officer, is responsible for the day to day running of the district personnel. In the recruitment of personnel, the DSCs are required to use checklists and regulations currently in force by the Public Service Commission (PSC). However, it is hard to tell how and when citizens oversee the work done by the appointed officials, apart from those that have frequent interface with the communities such as the agricultural extension staff, medical staff, teachers, community-based service officers among others. Furthermore, the citizen’s oversight functions are limited by their inability to tell whether an employee is performing the right task or not. Similarly, the citizens don’t have a common forum through which they can perform their oversight function – they can only do this through informal complaints to say their area MPs. Sometimes complaints go as far as the President during his local tours. Nonetheless, such complaints are, in most cases, limited to teachers’ and nurses’ absenteeism (The Monitor, 23 May 2008).

4.2.4 Council Oversight in Monitoring Project Performance

The second schedule of the 1997 Local Government Act defines the functions which have been devolved to the local governments in relation to project supervision and monitoring. Monitoring and supervision of project performance involves the overseeing the implementation and performance of various projects, staff performance on projects, delivery of services by the identified projects as well as accountability and identification of problems and opportunities for development projects. The responsibility for overseeing of projects is vested in the district and municipal councils for the urban and rural local governments respectively. It is, however, imperative to point out that while the overall oversight function regarding projects is done by district and municipal councils, the core day to day supervision and project implementation is vested in the hands of the CAOs/ Town Clerks as stipulated in section 65(1), 2(a), (b), ( c) and (e). This responsibility is in turn delegated to the District Technical Planning Committee (DTPC). In addition the implementation and supervision is jointly undertaken by the funding agencies. If an NGO, for example, happens to be one of the funding agencies, then it will also constitute the supervision team (GoU 2003). The political leadership through the District Chairperson performs its oversight function by overseeing the performance of the persons employed by the council in accordance with Section 14(e) of the 1997 Act. In essence that the District Executive Committee oversees the overall implementation of Local Government Projects in respective districts. As noted earlier, it is hard for citizens especially in the rural areas to evaluate and appraise projects, indicating an impediment to oversight on the side of the service users. However, NGOs like Uganda Debt Network (UDN), are equipping communities with project monitoring and evaluation skills. During a Key Interview with a respondent at UDN it was pointed out that:

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UDN has gone ahead to formulate the Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation System which is referred to as a participatory learning and action mechanism for tracking the performance of government expenditures on projects. This system is built on the premise that the local communities will form their own groups which participate in the monitoring of local government projects. (Key Informant Interview Kampala 26th March 2008).

From the above postulation, it is expected that the citizens as local monitors are equipped with skill of monitoring and appraising projects. Through such skills, local people would get political support from the leaders in the local government and such leaders would take action on the reported cases. While it is such innovations that will ultimately increase the citizens’ oversight roles/functions, it calls for close collaboration between the citizens, as local monitors, and the local leaders especially at the LC1 and 2 levels. 4.3 Power Relations 4.3.1 Powers Devolved and Retained by the Central Government The 1995 Constitution outlines how the decentralization process should be implemented. The constitution elaborates on the powers that were to be devolved to local governments under the local government system. There is no doubt that the powers and functions assigned local governments are enormous. However, the constitution also grants the central government wide-ranging powers and functions which are performed and retained by the center. These are outlined in the sixth schedule of the constitution. Specifically, Section 189 provides an overview of these roles and powers that were retained by the central government. The major critical functions that were retained by the central government include, but not limited to: defense and security, banks and banking, land, mines and mineral development, citizenship and immigration, foreign relations and external trade, public services, energy policy, election management, judicial services and national planning among others. Under decentralization, the local governments were left to perform the functions related to education, Health, water supply, environment and sanitation, rural and feeder road, as well as agricultural extension. As pointed out earlier, these functions are categorized as Program Priority Areas (PPA), and a bulk of the funding for these programmes comes from the center in form of conditional grants. At the district level, the functions are executed under varied sectors and under different departments. The different departments also work hand in hand with the line ministries at the center. 4.3.2 Fiscal Decentralisation The Local Governments Act 1997 provides for Central Government transfers to Local Governments of three kinds of grants: conditional, unconditional, and equalization grants. These grants are a product of the need to widen autonomy, efficiency and participation. In here local councils are charged with the responsibility to oversee the utilization of the money as per the work plans approved by the Higher Local Councils.

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These transfers fall with the wider context of the Fiscal Decentralization Strategy (FDS). The FDS councilors and other stakeholders exercise more democracy and discretion and their role is more pronounced as they have gained more experience on how to distribute resources (UDN 2006). In a comparative study carried out by Uganda Debt Network (UDN) in two districts (Tororo and Bushenyi) regarding the implementation of Fiscal Decentralization Strategy (FDS), it was found out that FDS Acted as a tool for increasing transparency , although some officials felt that the FDS was still hazy (UDN 2006). The study also notes that the input from the civil society was still limited. The report suggests that there is need to empower the civil society in order to put more pressure on the councilors for increased budgetary transparency. Article 191(1) of the Local Government Act 1997 states that: “Local governments shall have power to levy, charge, collect and appropriate fees and taxes in accordance with any law enacted by Parliament by virtue of Article 152 of this Constitution”. The types of taxes to be levied are defined under Article 191(2) which states that: The fees and taxes to be levied, charged, collected and appropriated under Clause (1) of this article shall consist of rents, rates, loyalties, stamp duties, personal graduated tax, fees on registration and licensing and any other fees and taxes that Parliament may prescribe. However, Article 152 prohibits the imposition of any tax unless it is authorized by an Act of Parliament. It is worth noting that for the rural Local Governments and Lower Local Governments, personal graduated tax (GT) used to contribute 80-90% of locally generated revenue (Commack et al. 2007). Commack and his collaborator note that when this tax was abolished in 2005 at the central government’s political expedience, the Local Governments were plunged into financial difficulties, as the resources accruing from it were used mostly for facilitating operations of Councils. During the interviews with the councilors in one of the study districts, it was found out that despite the abolition of Graduated tax, the local government has tried to find alternative avenues for generating revenue in order to supplement the grants that are obtained from the central government. When asked about how the revenues are managed and whether there were mechanisms to ensure that transparency and accountability was maintained in remitting monies to the lower local governments, the key informants (councilors) informed that 25% remittances were handled with a lot of transparence and that this was done in accordance with the requirements of the Local Government Act. The law requires that 25% of directly related revenue be remitted to the lower local governments. The councilors informed the study team that information regarding the amount to be remitted is usually known to a particular LC1 executive committee. For instance, the local area representatives at the sub county always make a follow up to ensue that the correct figure is computed and remitted to the respective local council (key informant interviews March 2008). Similarly, the study team was informed that public notice boards were used as avenues for communications, which local people would use as reference points to confirm remittances. It was also established that the same information was simultaneously communicated to the elected representatives at LC II at the sub county. It was also interesting to find out that as away of remaining accountable to the masses, the councilors especially those at LCIII used opportunities like church ceremonies to make

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announcement regarding the said remittances (Ibid). In a contrast of opinion, the second Uganda Participatory Assessment Poverty (UPPAP) Report points out that while in principle concensus regarding the way to spend the 25% by the LC I chairpersons or sub county or division development projects was equated to transparency, the report pointed out that in many districts there were no such attempts by LCI chairpersons. The UPPAP report further makes note of the fact that LCI chairpersons did not consult with their constituents to seek their opinions and authorizations. The report cited multiple cases of local persons who were not aware of any consultations regarding the usage of the 25% remitted to the lower levels (GoU 2002). The above represents discernible degree of absence of transparency regarding the release of 25% because the people at the grassroots were generally not informed about its release and neither were they involved in deciding how it was to be spent. In short, the local leaders were not transparent about the 25% remittances and were neither accountable to the people. Article 192 obliges Parliament to enact a law to enable local governments retain a specified proportion of the revenues collected for and on behalf of the Government from a district. Today, 13 years since the 1995 Constitution was promulgated, no such law has been enacted. The Local Government Finance Commission and Local Government Associations continuously demand for this but it continues to be resisted by the Ministry of Finance. But Local Governments continue to collect PAYE, VAT and other revenues which they wholly pass on to the national treasury. Section 83(2) of the LG Act prohibits the withdrawal of money by a local government from the general fund account or any other accounts of the district unless the withdrawal has been approved by the Auditor General or his/her representative. The legal framework provides for borrowing powers of Local Governments. Article 195 of the Constitution provides for borrowing and acceptance of a grant or assistance for carrying out the functions and services of a Local Government in a manner prescribed by Parliament. The Local Government Act, Section 85 and Regulation 20 of the Fifth Schedule prescribe the prerequisites for borrowing. They are characterized by strong controls and conditionalities imposed by the Central Government. 4.3.3 Relations between the Centre and Local Governments The technical argument in favour of Ugandan decentralization is that of taking planning and decision making down to the lowest area-level. This is rooted in the thinking that decentralization is supposed to increase both the accuracy of problem-and-opportunity specification and the commitment of involving people to implement their plans (JARD 2005). In essence, decentralisation in Uganda resulted into the devolution of varied powers from the central government to the local governments. Nonetheless, the local governments and the centre do maintain relations. Regardless of the devolution of powers, there are a number of institutions at the central government level responsible for supporting the Local Governmrnts in the delivery of their constitutionally mandated functions as outlined in the the decentralized system.

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These include the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), Ministry of Public Service (MPS), Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) and line ministries in the Programme Priority Areas (PPAs), such as education, health, water and sanitation, roads, agriculture. These line ministries are responsible for, among others, ensuring implementation of national policies and adherence to performance standards on behalf of Local Governrmrnts, inspection, monitoring, offering technical advice, support supervision and training (LG Act 1997 section 97). The Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) plays the coordination role between local governments and the central government. This role is also provided for in the 1997 LG Act. Section 96 of the LG Act overtly points out that the coordination and advocacy of Local Governments shall be the responsibility of the Ministry responsible for Local Governments, although the same Act does not specify the relation between MoLG and the line Ministries, yet this is very crucial given the number of ministries and statutory bodies that interface with the local governments. In executing its coordination roles, the MoLG works hand in hand with the Local Government Finance Commission LGFC), a constitutional body charged with advising the President on matters concerning the distribution of revenue between central and local governments. Apart from coordination and advocacy, the MOLG also inspects and mentors Local Governmrnts. This support is mainly delivered through the Department of Local Government Inspection. According to the MoLG structures, there are supposed to be 14 positions of LG Inspectors. The LG Inspectors give particular attention to issues of financial management, revenue enhancement, procurement, monitoring and evaluation and compliance. Also at the center, the department in charge of local councils offers support and capacity to the elected leaders in the districts. In addition, the department of district and urban administration offers support to the Chief Administration Officers, Town clerk and Mayors. Furthermore, the Programme Coordination Unit at the center oversees the implementation of the Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) through conducting of technical audits on behalf of the Ministry of Local Governments. Other institutions/ offices through which the center exercises power (links with) local governments are the office of the inspector General of Government (IGG) which plays the role of a government watchdog, most times relating to corrupt practices in local government. The office of the IGG is also supported by the office of the Auditor General (AG), which audits financial reports relating to accountability of government funds especially conditional and unconditional grants. The Parliamentary committee on Local Government Accounts (PAC) plays an important oversight function of reviewing local government financial accountability reports. On the other hand, Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), appointed by the Office of the President, oversee the proper implementation of government programmes within the district, as well as overseeing the functions that are not yet decentralized, especially those related to security and maintenance of law and order. Hence, Central Government is able to maintain its oversight function over the Local Government through the office of the RDC. (Article 203 of the 1995 Constitution, Article 71 of the 1997 LG Act).

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With regard to power relations between the Members of Parliament (MP) and local councilors, where there is mutual appreciation of each other’s roles, local government representatives enjoy smooth relations with their Members of Parliament (Okidi & Guloba 2003). Local government representatives appreciate that MPs advocate for them and assist their areas by lobbying for resources for local development at the centre. Members of Parliament also appreciate that local representatives play a vital role in enhancing their standing at constituency level by providing the requisite services in the locality and therefore simplifying their accountability to the electorate (Ahire 2002). Where mutual understanding is lacking, relations tend to be rocky (Okidi & Guloba 2003). This may be the outcome of local representatives failing to do what is expected of them. It could also be due to the difficult personality of a Member of Parliament or when personalities on either side are difficult. Alternatively, it could be due to poor communication. Whatever the cause may be, such a situation complicates the relationship between both categories of representatives on the one side, and the electorate on the other. 4.3.4 Relations between Elected Leaders and Members of the Public The public elects leaders in order to have their voice heard and in most cases this voice relates to the access to the provision of services. Therefore, the nature of the relationships between the elected leaders and the public has got an important bearing on the delivery of services. This is further rooted in the thinking that the recipient communities elect representatives to the councils with the expectation that they will represent their needs and priorities that have been identified in the planning process or probably as previously presented by the elected leader’s election manifestos. It is further expected that the elected leaders monitor the appointed officials to ensure that the required services are delivered both in adequate and qualitative terms. However, in most cases the limitations in resource distribution, as well as constraints in articulation of the electorates’ needs, may lead to a failure in delivery of the desired services (Nsibambi 1998). In most cases, this failure to articulate or voice the interests of the community breeds bad relations between the electorate and the elected officials. Furthermore, elected officials are expected to convey information regarding local issues downward to the electorate explaining what will and/ or will not be delivered and why. But again, apart from the village council meetings where the elected leaders can provide information regarding constituency issues and where local people can also question their elected representatives, there is no recognized forum through which the elected leaders can convey this information down wards. Yet, increased interaction between citizens and their local governments was one of the cardinal reasons for adopting the LC system as a specific mechanism to increase communication between the elected officials and the public. In absence of such forums, the communities are increasingly using all available mechanisms to air out their dissatisfaction. For instance at budget conferences, people are increasingly willing to speak out and challenge their leaders. Indeed, this was documented by a study on Local Government Decision-making, citizen Participation and Local Accountability in Uganda. The report pointed out that: “There is generally a positive feeling from people who have attended budget conferences that they provide an opportunity for accountability on project implementation” (DFID 2002: 8)

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The absence of information, together with absence of service delivery, in a local area is interpreted as a failure of representation on the side of the elected officials and puts the relationship between electorate and the elected officers on parallel fronts (JARD 2004). In several evaluation workshops conducted by the MoLG to evaluate the role of elected officials in the execution of their duties, it was reported that elected officials were not fully accountable to the electorates. In a way this points to the need to improve downward accountability (JARD 2005). While the electorate has fully exercised their right through periodic elections, the justification for electing and re-electing representatives is rarely connected with service delivery. Under circumstances of dissatisfaction in the representation on the side of the elected leaders, the electorate has two fallback positions. They can exercise their power by either recalling their elected representatives, or vote them out of office in the subsequent elections. In practice, however, there has been no elected representative who has ever been recalled during his/her term of service. The only available alternative through which elected leaders have been “recalled” is by voting them out of office during the elections. However, elections held every five years are an imperfect mechanism of encouraging accountability. 4.3.5 Relations between Elected Leaders and Appointed Officials The relationship between the elected leaders and appointed officials is not very amicable. Varied media reports have indicated a situation where the elected officials are suspicious of the appointed officials. For example, there have been reported conflicts between the elected official and the CAOs. The current impasse between the Sembabule LC 5 chairman and the Acting CAO is a case in point (The weekly Observer 17th-24 May 2008). In some cases, these conflicts have either led to sanctions being applied onto the local governments, or the CAOs being interdicted/ transferred. The major cause for the constant clashes between the CAOs and the council is due to failure of the elected leaders to stick to their defined roles and responsibilities (DEGE 2004). Sometimes the relationships culminate in disruption of services to users when appointed officials are suspended, or interdicted on recommendations of councils. The implication is that the communities end up failing to access the required services as a result of these actions. Another example of conflict between elected and appointed officials is that of the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) and the District Chairperson (DC). Article 183(3) (d) of the Constitution requires the District Chairperson (DC) to “coordinate and monitor Government functions between the district and the Government”. On the other hand, Article 203 (1) (a) of the same Constitution requires the RDC “to coordinate the administration of Government services in the district”. Although there seems to be some difference between the two provisions, it is evident that the 1995 Constitution allows an overlap between the two officials. This overlap in roles is increased in circumstances where the DC is from an opposition party as the case is in Gulu District. Although the RDC does not take part in council debates and does not initiate policy, articles 183 [3] [d] and 203 [1] [a] of the 1995 Constitution give him power to oversee government projects, a role that throws him in parallel lines with the DCP.

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The other problem relates the power. Although Article 183 [1] [a] of the Constitution states that the DC is `the political head of the district’, issues of protocol and precedence sometimes do arise between the representative of the central government [RDC] and the elected representative of the people in the district [DC]. 4.3.6 Marginalized Groups and Local Government- The 1997 LGA and amendment 2 (2001) of the same Act provides a legal framework for reserved seats in all Local Councils for representatives of the marginalized groups [i.e women, youths, people living with disabilities (PLWD), and the elderly. Section 118 of the Local Government Act 1997 stipulates that marginalized groups shall participate in the council activities. Article 11(e) of the Local Government Act points out that women councilors shall form one third of the council elected under paragraphs (b, (c) and (d). An examination of the above articles underscores the marginalized groups [such as women] as important actors in decision-making process. In his works on the politics of Social Protection in Uganda, Golooba-Mutebi (2007), points out that Uganda’s local government system was designed to be responsive to people’s needs and aspirations. It was intended that responsiveness would ensue not only from subjecting local political leaders to regular elections, but also ensuring direct participation by ordinary members of the public including the marginalized in decision-making processes through regular meetings and other contact with their leaders. Indeed, Golooba-Mutebi argues that in theory, this opened the way for people, including the poor and marginalized, to influence decisions [through popular participation] that directly impacted on their lives. At face value, this kind of system seems suited to the delivery of social protection. This assumption is premised on the belief that the poor are able and willing to take part in participatory processes and to exert the necessary influence (2007:15). In fact, Golooba-Mutebi is right when he refers the marginalized peoples’ participation in local governance as “theoretical”. While the 1997 LGA provides for the representation of marginalized groups, a quick scan at their representation reveals a different picture. For instance, currently there are no elected representatives for PLWD at lower level local governments. In addition, although women representation is provided for under the 1997 LGA, a previous look at their educational levels revealed that up to 70% of the women representatives did not attain secondary level education, a fact which points to constraints in real representation (Byamukama 2006). Inevitably, the level of debate for such representatives is bound to been low, especially given the gender inequities that characterize the political landscape at the local level (ibid). 4.3.7 Elites and Local Government Article 176(3) of the constitution emphasizes democratic elections based on universal suffrage. However, although local masses are involved in the electoral process based on adult suffrage, it does not translate into real power to participate in the decision-making process as there is a significant role played by the local elites, which Ribot (2001) has

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referred to as elite capture. This role played by the elected local elites is multi faceted but in most cases erodes the intended power of the local population, a fact that leads to limited accountability on the side of the local elected elites to their constituencies. An intriguing role played local elite capture in Uganda’s local governance system was unveiled by Reinikka and Svensson (2004). The two analyzed the role of local elite capture from a service delivery and neo-patrimonial perspective in local governments. Focusing on public educational program funded by the central government, through the capitation grant, to local governments to covers non wage expenditures, Reinikka and Svensson found out that only 13% of the central governments spending actually reached schools. Most schools received nothing as the bulk of the capitation grants was captured by district politician and local government appointed officials (2004: 681). The duo also observed that local elite capture takes place in situations where local politicians and appointed officials take advantage of the information gap on the side of the local populace (Ibid). The above findings collaborates with Muhumuza‘s (2003) views on the implication of low empowerment and poor civic competence of the local electorate as facilitating factors to local elite capture. All the above have a negative implication on downward accountability because local politicians and appointed officials are aware that, they are dealing with an uninformed electorate. But the most bizarre implication arising from elite capture and specifically from Reinikka and Svensson (2004)’s study is the fact that locally appointed official and locally elected officials can join hands to fleece the electorate whom they are supposed to protect and therefore account to. The connivance of locally elected leaders and with appointed ones also points to an ultimate failure in the oversight role played by the elected officials over the appointed officials.

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5.0 Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms in Local Government One of the merits of decentralization was to set up institutions and mechanisms that would become accountable to the people both politically and financially. In this regard, some of the institutions and mechanisms set up to enhance accountability were local councils. The mechanisms for ensuring accountability are also enshrined in the guidelines given to the local government by the central government. However, study findings, especially those from the key informants, reveal that periodic local council elections were used as one of the mechanisms [and popular way] of ensuring political accountability to their constituents, although they were also found to be less effective. This ineffectiveness stems from the weaknesses already identified as bedeviling the electoral system. For example, the commercialization of elections involving “vote buying” and therefore the greater chances for the well-to-do to win not on their own merits, but because they are able to buy votes (Tusasirwe 2007). This weakens downward accountability, which in turn impacts negatively on service delivery. The intention behind the provision for independent Councilors was to accommodate candidates who, as a matter of principle, do not subscribe to any of the existing political parties. It was considered that election to public office with or without the endorsement of a political party was a democratic right which would also enrich the process of decision-making, planning and overseeing implementation of service delivery (Kabwegyere 2000). However, the assumption is valid in only very few cases. The majority of supposedly independent councilors start their bid for office by subscribing to one or other of the parties fielding candidates in an election. Only after they have been defeated in the party primaries or selection processes that they opt to contest for office as independents (KI Interview March 2008). It seems safe to conclude that they present themselves as independents in pursuit of purely personal interests, not as holders of views which diverge from those of political party candidates. Consequently, the so-called independents are a legacy of individual merit politics on which the “movement system” was built and which tended to favor those with means or social status rather than those necessarily with merit from the point of view of leadership skills, for example. Moreover, many of the so-called independents often seek to re-join their original parties after elections, especially if such parties have the majority of seats in their respective councils (Ibid). Therefore, the impact of these independents on local service delivery should not be taken for granted, but rather investigated empirically. 5.1 Powers of Recall for Elected Leaders Article 176(2) a, b and c of the 1995 Constitution compels government to establish and promote democratic principles and policies that empower and encourage the active participation of all citizens at all levels of their own governance. Article 176(3) further

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elaborates on the need to have local governments based on democratically elected councils through universal adult suffrage. This accentuates the view that in order for participation to be meaningful, there must be spaces and mechanisms for civic engagement in the public arena (Saito 2000). In an effort to further embed people’s power, Article 180 of the Ugandan constitution provides that local councils be elected once every four years. Other articles such as 196, point out the need for the local councils to be accountable to the population. In that respect, the law provides that the local governments must be accountable to the councils. This is further strengthened by article 182 which stipulates that the mandate of an elected member of a local government may be revoked by the electorate. Recalling Councilors is provided for in Regulation No. 7 of the Third Schedule of the Local government Act. But its usefulness is judged on the basis of several assumptions. First, it is assumed that the electorates are aware of this provision which is not always the case. Secondly, it is assumed that constituents who are aware of its existence are willing, eager and capable of invoking it, which is also not always the case. The greater inhibition is the impracticability of enforcing the regulation. Ordinary people lack the capacity to collect the one third of signatures of the total electorate in a given constituency, be it a parish or a sub-county, for the purposes of instituting the necessary recall proceedings. Worse still, accurate voters’ registers are difficult to come by in Uganda during elections. 5.2 The Role of Sectoral Committees Under the decentralization, a couple of functions were devolved to the lower levels. These include: primary education, primary health care, water and sanitation, rural and feeder roads and agricultural extension. These programme priority areas constitute the sectors where decentralized services are delivered. For instance, the Education falls under the Education sectoral committee, Health falls under the Primary Health Sectoral committee, Agriculture falls under the production sectoral committee, rural and feeder roads falls under the Technical services sectoral committee. In the execution of their oversight functions, the elected officials constitute the sectoral committee and these committees oversee the various technical departments in the provision of the services as outlined in the subsequent sub-sections. 5. 2. 1 Education and Sports Committee To begin with, the current policy on Education ensures primary and secondary education is accessible to all irrespective of one’s gender, disability and categorization. Part 2 paragraph 1 of the second schedule of the 1997 LG Act indicates that District Councils, through the Education Sectoral Committees, are responsible for the provision of education services, which cover nursery, primary, secondary, trade, special education and technical education. Similarly, part 4 of the second schedule points out that the lower local government councils are responsible for nursery and primary education. In addition, the Education Act Cap 127 and the Education Service Act 2002 provides for the development and regulation of education, the registration and licensing of teachers in public schools and related matters.

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The LG Act recognizes the District Education Sectoral Committees as overseers of the management of education in districts. .Section 4 of the Education Service Act, recognizes that this committee is responsible for the administration of any educational services transferred to a district or urban authority. In the same regard, the education Service Act elaborates on the roles and responsibilities of the Education Service Commission established under articles 167 and 168 of the Constitution. Contrary to part 2 paragraph 1 of the second schedule of the 1997 LG Act, secondary education has never been devolved by the central government. The management of secondary education remains the preserve of the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES). The argument for retaining secondary education at the center is based on the challenges experienced by the districts in the management of the UPE. 5.2.2 Health and Environment Committee Under the decentralization framework, public health care was devolved to the local governments. Accordingly, Local Governments Act, in line with the provisions of the 1995 constitution, provides for decentralized health service delivery. It is in this line that the National Health Policy was formulated. Therefore, in order to achieve the policy objectives, the government undertook to provide additional resources for Primary Health Care in the form of Conditional and Equalization Grants; decentralize operational responsibilities for integrated health promotion, disease prevention, and curative and rehabilitative services; and build capacity for improved health care delivery. The Health sector committees, under the local government framework, are responsible for the political oversight of the health sector services in the districts. However, there appears to be some health services whose oversight functions are not clearly spelt out. Under the strategy to provide health services, the Ministry of Health created health sub-districts which are health service units at the LG-4 level, which is an equivalent of county level for rural Local Governments. While the Health Center 4 is supposed to provide critical services within the district, it is located at the county level which is an administrative and not a service delivery unit. Another interesting scenario relates to the management of the District referral hospitals such as Mulago, Kawolo or Masaka referral hospitals. Although these hospitals are supposed to be at LC 5 level, they are not provided for in the decentralization health structure. Hence, it is still unclear as to who oversees these hospitals under the decentralized framework. 5.2.3 Water and Sanitation Committee Under the LG Act second schedule, paragraph 2 section 3, District councils are responsible for the provision and maintenance of water supplies in liaison with the Ministry responsible for water and natural resources where applicable. At the national level, the National Water Policy guides the local governments on the management of water resources in the country. The policy is based on an integrated approach to manage the water resources in ways that are sustainable and most beneficial to all the people of Uganda. In line with the decentralization framework, Technical Support Units

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in the water sector were established and are engaged in monitoring and providing technical support to Local Governments. Within the decentralization framework, the sectoral committee on water and sanitation oversees the water department in the districts. 5.2.4 District and Community Roads Committee Under the 1997 LG Act (second schedule, part 2 section 4), district councils are responsible for the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of roads that do not fall under the responsibility of the Central Government. This includes all roads that don’t fall in the realm of regional, national and international trunk roads. In the same regard, the Urban councils are responsible for maintenance of roads as provided under the second schedule part 3 (1) of the 1997. These are the roads which are found within the demarcated urban area. The Lower Local Governments are responsible the management of community roads and other access/ feeder roods in their respective areas. Under the district local government, the sectoral committee on works oversees the roads and work department, which is headed by a district Engineer. The District Local Governments are supported by Central Government through the Ministry of Works to enable them to sustainably manage district, urban and community access roads. However, although the 1997 LGA is explicit on issues regarding roads, the existing sector legislation on roads, the Roads Act, Cap 358 is silent on management of roads under a decentralized system. 5.2.5 Production, Marketing and Industry Committee The Sectoral Committee on Production addresses the fifth programme priority area. This committee takes care of agriculture, veterinary, entomology, trade and industry, fisheries as well as forestry and natural resources. The production department works under the oversight role of the Secretary for Production who represents the interests of the electorate. 5.2.6 Other Sectoral Committees Apart from the Sectoral committees in the realm of the Program Priority Areas (PPA), there are other committees such as: i) the sectoral committee for finance and planning; ii) the sectoral committee on personnel and human resources, which oversees management and support services; and iii) the sectoral committee on community services, which oversees issues of gender, youths, culture, community development as well as the probation and social welfare. Kisembo (1996) points out that among all the sectoral committees of the district council, the finance committee is the most powerful. It has not only dwarfed other committees but it even holds them at ransom. For example, in districts like Mbale, the finance committee has continued to usurp the powers of other committees. The above scenario

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undermines the democratic process and division of labor among committees as embedded in the decentralization principles. Indeed it contrary to the law. 5.2.7 Limitations of Sectoral Committees

While decentralization gives powers to the local governments and their respective sectoral committees to oversee the execution of their functions, in principle many of the local government councilors at the district, together with their respective counterparts at the lower local governments, do lack the capacity to ensure that their respective functions are carried out. Many of the local councilors lack the minimum conditions to perform their functions (GoU, 2005). This is largely a product of two important issues. The first is the fact that councilors lack the desired academic qualifications which can enable them to carry out their oversight supervisory roles very well. Currently, with the exception of the Chairperson who must have attained a minimum qualification of “A” level, there is no minimum qualification for councilors to be elected to council, yet the same councilors are overseeing and/or supervising appointed officials who are graduates while others are postgraduates. Indeed, it was the view of several key informants the study team talked to that the education level of councilors be fixed for both district and lower levels so that there is no excuse for poor oversight functions. From their experience, those who are university graduates capture issues better than school certificate holders (key informant interviews, March 2008). By the very nature of their qualifications, councilors are sometimes incapacitated to engage in serious debates and also to oversee the respective departments under their respective sectoral committees. The same concerns were echoed by the survey undertaken by the Uganda Local Government Authorities Association (ULGA) to seek the opinion on minimum qualification of local councilors. The study found out that only 42% of the local councilors in the Higher Local Governments had attained secondary level education, while 55% had at least acquired some professional skills or had attained post secondary education. The survey further noted that at least 3% of the councilors didn’t go beyond primary education. The same study noted out that the education level of the female councilors was below average. For example, 70% of the women councilors did not go beyond primary school. It is needless to mention that the above level of academic qualifications have a great bearing on the oversight function of the councilors. The other issue that constrains the councilors’ oversight roles relates to the budgetary constraints. Seventy five percent (75%) of the district councils cannot meet due to financial constraints. This implies that the district sectoral committees are not in a position to perform their expected oversight roles. The capacity problem facing sectoral committees equally and inevitably faces the communities who are also expected to play an oversight and evaluation role over projects implemented by the technocrats. In this respect, Golooba-Mutebi (2006) notes that most communities lack the capacity to evaluate projects and demand for accountabilities. However, a key informant discussion with a NGO senior representative revealed that:

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Through the community based monitoring and evaluation training conducted by UDN, the civil society which largely includes local people is trained and equipped with capacity, tools, strategies and skills to demand for accountability in form of value for money services. This has helped to enhance the empowerment of local communities especially in relation to accountability (key informant interverview March 2008).

The same voice was echoed by another key informant from the private sector. He noted that:

The essence of decentralization is to sensitize the citizens about their duty to demand for accountability and that is why there is a duty to build citizens’ capacity in demanding for their rights from the public servants because public servants have roles and responsibilities.

5.3 The Role of NGOs in Advocacy Golooba-Mutebi (2007) notes that in addition to paying an important supply-side role of service delivery, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) also engage in demand-side activities, such as advocacy, to champion the interests of the weak sections of society which in most cases includes building their capacity to participate in decion-making as well demanding for accountabilities from the leaders. Civil Society Organizations, including non-governmental organizations, have in many ways intensified and deepened their advocacy work both at national and sub national level. This implies that CSOs have tremendous potential for fostering good governance and development at the local level. As documented in the DENIVA study on civil society and decentralization in Uganda, it was stressed that civil society in Uganda is a necessary counterbalance for good governance and efficient demand-driven service delivery, although there remains some challenges (DENIVA 2005). The NGOs’ service coverage spans beyond conventional service areas, such as health and education, to include, to a limited extent, areas of advocacy and oversight of local government. The rising and increasing role of the NGO sector does not seem to be merely in response to state incapacity to address local demands and service needs, it is also evidence of the growing resilience of NGOs involvement in both in advocacy and service delivery. Through district Networks, NGOs have increasingly got involved in the processes of policy formulation planning and implementation. It must, however, be noted that although NGOs stand to represent the interests of the electorates they have no direct linkages to the elected leaders especially at LC 3 and LC 5. This equally means that NGOs will always find their role of being accountability watchdogs too demanding and too difficult. Furthermore, according to the 1997 Local Government Act, it is generally understood that local governments are supposed to monitor the NGOs. However, the framework in which this coordination must take place is again not well articulated. In some cases, this failure to articulate the framework of coordination has sometimes led to a clash between the local governments and the NGOs and some CSOs. For example, civil society involvement in monitoring of Poverty Action Funds (PAFs), through the formation of PAF Monitoring Committees (PMCs) now established in several districts to monitor poverty eradication expenditures, seem to

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have caused some uneasy relationship between the NGOs and the district technical staff. This inadvertently constrains the oversight and advocacy role of NGOs. 5.4 Independent Monitoring It is imperative to note that though the Local government Act 1997 gives autonomy to the urban authorities, this autonomy comes with financial accountability. Urban authorities, as outlined above, must report to their councils and their accounts must be audited by the Auditor General (LGA 1997). The law thus provides that as in the case of the districts, urban authorities must employ an internal auditor. Once the books of accounts are audited, the Local Government Public Accounts Committee at the district is empowered to investigate and recommend the findings to both the auditor general and the internal auditor. This is in line with study findings from key informant interviews both at district and national levels (Key informant interview, March 2008). It was further ascertained by the study team that local councils have the power to initiate hearings or inquiries, say on procurements and any other questionable transactions, as long as there is an established proof of anomaly. This is, however, done with the awareness and consent of the CAO as it is not always right to assume that whatever is done by the council is always right. Nonetheless, one informant from the Center made a remark that they had not heard any local government instituting a committee of inquiry (Key informant interview, March 2008). By virtue of the authority entrusted to them, elected representatives are responsible for the formation of the statutory bodies such as the Local Government Public Accounts Committee (LGPAC). The LGPAC consists of four members appointed by the district council on the recommendation of the District Executive Committee (section 89 1997 LG A). The office of the Clerk to the District Council is the secretariat to the LG PAC. The LG PAC examines the reports of the Auditor General, Chief Internal Auditor and any reports of commissions of inquiry and submits its report to the council and the minister responsible for Local Government, who is supposed to present the report before Parliament. 5.5 Impediments to Council Oversight Section 10 of the LGA stipulates that the council is the sovereign body of any local government. According to this section, councils among other things are responsible for the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and all development programmes within the respective local governments. The responsibility is further buttressed and made operational by Section 7 which grants substantial autonomy to the local governments in local decision-making. Section 46(2) allows the formation of local councils and section 8 outlines the duties of a councilor which among, other things, includes consulting the people and organizing meeting with the people in their local areas. While Article 176(2) of LGA gives powers to the local governments and their respective units to oversee the execution of their functions, in principle many of the local

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governments together with their respective lower units do lack the capacity to ensure that their respective functions are carried out. Many of the local councils lack the minimum conditions to perform their functions (GoU, 2005). For example, the 2005 National Synthesis Report pointed out that; nationally there were 201 observations out of the 923 sub-counties and local governments which failed the Technical Planning Indicator (TPC). The report further alludes that among both districts and municipalities, TPCs is the most failed indicator among the lower local governments. This shows that local government units without minimum resource and capacity requirement are not in a position to effectively deliver on their responsibilities as mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Act. The district civil service structure is headed by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and has functional directorates (headed by sectoral heads) that are more or less aligned to the sectors that are headed by the Sectoral Committees (GoU 2001). In addition, the civil service wing has heads of departments and other members of technical staff at the district, while at the lower level there are Sub-county chiefs, Sub-Accountants, extension staff, and Parish Chiefs. However, despite the above arrangements the urban authorities handle their own employees independently (Uganda Constitution, Articles 198-200). The second issue is that the CAO is the immediate link on personnel matters and head of the district service commission which includes lower local governments and by definition such local governments include urban authorities. It is also significant to note that decentralization has been undergoing numerous changes and part of the changes relate to the powers regarding the appointment of political and administrative heads such as chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and the Deputy CAO, the Town Clerk and his/her Deputy in the City, and Municipal Council whose recruitment is now the responsibility of the central government Public Service Commission1. This implies that in practice, the districts, through their respective councils, no longer have the power to choose who they think is best suited to serve the interests of the local people, an issue that threatens downward accountability and local council oversight over CAOs. Almost half the number of key informants the study team talked to were of the view that centralization of CAOs would compromise the downward (local) accountability because the CAOs no longer feel obligated to account to the council. One key informant from the private sector overtly put it:

The CAO is the Chief Executive officer of the District. By government appointing the CAO, amounts to diluting the oversight function played by the council. By virtue of the fact that the CAO is appointed from the Center, he is protected and therefore accountable to the centre and not the local council …for he has job security from the center other than from the people (Key Informant interview, March 2008).

1 Govt had the following reasons to centralize the appointment of CAOs according to one key informant from MoLG: 1. To standardize workforce at that level. Indeed, some of the CAOs and DCAOs during revalidation were retired in public interest because they could not measure up to the set standard; 2. Free strategic technical managers from unprincipled local politics; and 3. To depoliticize recruitment of that cadre of staff.

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Another district key informant (technocrat) had this to say:

I for one, I am not happy with the centralisation of the appointment of CAOs. You still serve the same people from whom you were detached and you are answerable to the same local council. The only difference is that your appointment papers come from the Centre. Even then, if the council says they don’t want you, they will still do it…and the Center will struggle to find an alternative district to relocate you, which is an embarrassing and frustrating situation. We are now torn between two masters: the Center and Local Government, and this is not healthy (Key Informant interview, March 20082).

The above analysis further demonstrates a deviation from earlier intentions of this system of governance, where people were expected to demand accountability from administrative heads that they were familiar with. This centralization of CAOs negates the true intensions of decentralization. Decentralization has been viewed as a democratic reform, which seeks to transfer political, administrative and financial and planning authority from the center to the local government councils. It seeks to promote popular participation, empower local people to make their own decision and enhance accountability and responsibility (GoU 1994). hange in regard to the appointment of such heads implies that centrally appointed officers are more accountable to the central government and more importantly to their party leader, than to the people they are appointed to serve. This is premised on the fact that subscription to the ruling political party is an important pre-requisite for one to be appointed to such position. This automatically determines where allegiance is directed. On the other hand, the second group of key informants who were for centralization of CAOs argued that it has led to taking administrative decisions quickly, that before the recentralisation of the CAOs, even small issues had to go through Council although the law did not require so. Another factor that they considered as being important for centralization of CAOs was the fact that local governments almost exclusively depend [over 90%] on the Central government for financial resources. It, therefore, makes sense for the CAOs to account to the Center (Key Informant interview, March 2008). The key informants from the political wing in one of the study districts, however, pointed out that despite their political oversight role, the laws restrain them from getting involved in the primary financial transactions of the local governments. This was noted as a shortcoming which they termed as a legal constraint. For instance, the councilors gave an example of the district contract committees which are largely constituted by technocrats and to a large extent exclude the councilors, a scenario which gives the technocrats power to make what they (councilors) called `unscrupulous decisions’, say in the award of contracts. The councilors noted that because the law restrains their participation, their concerns are sometimes misinterpreted as `political interference’. Nonetheless, it is important to note that councilors can query outcomes and institute investigations if they feel civil servants are committing fraud or awarding tenders corruptly.

2 The study team is of the view this view should be balanced by what other CAOs think.

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5.6 Impediments to Social Accountability Under decentralization, all Ugandans are incorporated in their local governments through the village/local councils (LC1) and they can attend meetings called by the LC1 Executive (Kisakye 1996). Due to its physical proximity, the LC1 ideally offers the most strategic place for the beginning of civic action. For instance, Article section 3(1) of the LGA attempts to foster participation by creating structures and mechanisms for civic engagement through the elections of councilors and by setting up consultative processes and fora in the various planning processes. The first attempt to institutionalize people participation was in 1987 and this was contained in the Resistance Councils and Committees Statute. Under this law, a five tier system of resistance councils was established with the duties and functions stipulated. Muhumuza and his collaborators argue that the cardinal objective in relation to establishment of this law was to enable the people’s participation at various levels within the local government system. In addition, the laws empowered the people at the grass roots to make their local governments institutions responsive and accountable. The specific areas of empowerment related to recalling their elected leaders, formulation and review of development plans as well as their implementation. What is not very clear is whether the local masses to whom these massive powers were given, actually knew about them. It is also logical to ask whether, 10 years after the enactment of the Local government Act, there has been any changes in the local people’s knowledge regarding their right to participate and holding their leaders to account. An overt analysis of the legal provisions in the Local government Act demonstrates that civic action would naturally be rooted in this legal instrument and therefore forms the foundation of the oversight role that the local people have over their elected leaders. However, the analysis provided by Muhumuza (2003) proves otherwise. In fact, Muhumuza notes that people participated through interacting with their local leaders informally. The most notable form of participation that Muhumuza notes was through appeals and petitions to higher local government especially in regard to inaction by lower local governments. This analysis seems to point out to the fact that the lower local governments are almost dysfunctional (Golooba-Mutebi 2006). It is rather disturbing to find out that despite the extensive participation of the local people, especially through the election of their leaders, the local people cannot actually demand for services from them with much success. This also points out the weakness and inability of the elected local councilors to demand for services for their citizens especially at LC III. From the available sources, it is clear that the people at the local government level are theoretically empowered because their awareness of this power is limited. It is also clear that the citizens lack information that pertains to their legal empowerment and that is why they probably cannot use their power to demand for what ought to belong to them in terms of services. In fact this is well supported by responses from one key informant from the private sector who noted that:

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Local people have a feeling that they are not supposed to question their leaders and as a result they remain in a world of dissatisfaction as their leaders remain less accountable(Key informant interview, March 2008). NB: The issue here is political culture and a sense of civic incompetence.

This pessimistic outlook shows that accountability of the elected leaders towards their electorate is very minimal since many of them knowing or unknowingly are aware that their people do lack the information regarding their power as tools of local government oversight. However, during the key informant interview with selected local councilors (Mukono and Wakiso Districts), it was understood that although some of the local people did not openly question their local councilors, they quietly took stock of the local leaders’ outputs and for some reason this made most of the local leaders to respond to local needs of the people. This is one of the hidden factors that drives the performance of local councilors because they know people are watching them. One technocrat made an interesting remark that somehow explains why some political leaders fail to account to the electorates. He stated:

People are always aware, from experience, that coucillors, once they get elected, do not necessarily bring anything back the electorates, so the relationship between them and the lected leaders remains cordial and interactive. After all, for those politicians who corrupted the electoral process through buying votes, they have to fill up gaps – so on what basis can the same communities whose votes were bought turn around to demand for services?(Key informant interview March 2008).

Although the electorates may not have the courage to demand for services directly from the elected leaders, this does not necessarily mean that the electorates totally ignore the matter as illustrated by one key informant from the district political wing:

Its true local people may not openly ask you to account but will document all your outputs in form of ‘physical accountability” and this is exactly what you present to the electorate at the time of voting …service delivery must be visible and felt otherwise you will not be voted again?(Key informant interview March 2008.

The above revelation points out the fact that although local people may not be in a position to openly hold their local leaders accountable, voting still remains one of the ways through which local people can indirectly drive their local leaders to be accountable. However, as observed by one informant, in practice people do not necessarily vote on basis of issues. In Uganda, decentralization efforts remain dependent on formal government structures and formalized policy. These innovations have focused on administrative reform and are heavily dependent on a well-functioning central government willing, and able to develop local autonomy. These strategies have been centered on managerial initiatives and technical implementation of a division of responsibilities between national and local governments, with little regard to particular political and economic circumstances of particular communities (Weetaka-Wadala 2007). Much of the recent literature on local governance, public participation and service delivery has dwelt on the inability of the

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local people to play their primary oversight role due to lack of capacity (Golooba-Mutebi 2006; Dauda 2008). For instance, Dauda points out that in the Ugandan scenario, often there are scant ties between community-based associations and local government as well as a reluctance to cooperate. This observation has been previously pointed out by Tripp (1997). Our key informant interviews too revealed that NGOs or CBOs prefer dealing direct with local communities, rather than through the local councils, partly for avoidance of corruption and the associated bias among political leaders. In order to improve social accountability, the processes to produce outputs are at least as equally significant as outputs themselves. It may appear more suitable in the short term from the point of view of the central government to centralize policy contents, but long-term consequences may erode the entire base of the LC system on which the current NRM government is based both politically and administratively. The devolution of fiscal, administrative and political powers has facilitated a more focused approach to the problems and needs of local areas (Mugabi 2006). Choice and priorities have been made more relevant to the localities than was the case before decentralization. Similarly the allocation of the meager resources available at the local level is more rational. Much as control of resources has not reached the ideal level, it has increased tremendously (JHARD 2004). Service and infrastructure provision is widespread to all corners of the country and is more or less simultaneous. For instance, when resource transfers are made from the centre to local governments, they are released to each and every District at the same time. If the release is for feeder roads maintenance, each local government will receive its share and that activity is supposed to be carried out regardless of the remoteness of any particular location. This is true to all the National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs) which include education; feeder roads; primary health care; agricultural extension services; water and sanitation; and community development. Of course, the level of efficiency and effectiveness differs from place to place. In order for decentralization of fiscal, administrative and political powers to have an impact on service delivery, it was assumed that local people would participate in decision-making, planning, and monitoring (LGA 1997). Without popular participation, the success and impact of decentralization was expected to remain minimal. The assumption that communities which are the consumers of devolved services would be vibrant and eager to participate in decision-making, planning and monitoring worked briefly when the decentralization and reforms had just been introduced roughly between 1987 and the early 1990s (Kisembo 2006). Here, communities were organized under the Resistance Council (RC) system and many of those elected as RCs served as volunteers especially by mobilizing people to take part in self help projects. However, this spirit of voluntarism was short-lived and by the beginning of the 1990s it was on its wane. The reasons for that short-lived success partly lie in the fact that people were eager to end the suffering and deprivation they had lived through for almost two decades. Once the situation normalized with the National Resistance Army in power, people started to relax and stopped regarding participation as a priority (Golooba-Mutebi 2004). But partly the explanation could be that participation was more induced

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than spontaneous. For instance, when the people’s councils were introduced after the National Resistance Army or National Resistance Movement (NRA/NRM) had just captured state power in 1986, they were responsible for the distribution of essential commodities which had become scarce for more than a decade. This was a big incentive for people’s participation. Furthermore, with massive donor support, Resistance Council meetings and activities were accompanied by free refreshments and in some cases cash refunds for transport, etc (Golooba-Mutebi 1999). When those inducements dwindled and eventually stopped, participation went down drastically (Ibid). Participation was taken for granted without taking into account some of the inhibiting social/cultural factors. For instance, some of the communities [e.g. Baganda] which had/ have strong hierarchical social and political relations among the structures of their community where chiefs would make decisions on behalf of the subjects [who would be expected to follow without questioning the leaders/chief], members of communities with such traditions would not understand why they should be “bothered” with consultative meetings for making decisions (Ibid). A long history of dictatorship and brutal rule caused people to adopt various survival strategies such as ‘orientation towards government” (Asiimwe & Nakanyike-Musisi 2007). This entailed being docile towards leaders and avoidance of politics for personal safety, which was assumed that the people have the requisite capacity for effective participation (Ibid). In reality, the bulk of the population lack knowledge and information about their rights and obligations as citizens. Consequently, they are incapable of taking their elected leaders and service providers to task and to make them accountable. The national constitution (1995) and the Local Government Act (1997) do recognize Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) as leading actors in national development. In the context of this study, as well as in the context of the Local Government Act, CSOs are defined as local and Non-Governmental Organizations, Community Based Organizations, business and professional organizations as well as grass root organizations. The first concerted effort to make CSOs effective in their social accountability oversights role was through the UNICEF 2000-2005 country programme. The programme established district level management units, under the headship of the District Planning Unit on one hand and project management committees on the other. The project management committees would serve as conduits through which citizens could follow up on the development and implementation of projects. In short, these project management committees were instituted as anchors to promote local accountability, by for instance demanding for progress on the side of the district management unit and the planning units (Sewakiryanga 2004). Unfortunately, many of the local people who constituted these planning committees were illiterate and could hardly face the District focal persons to demand for accountability in case of inadequate service delivery (Ibid). An evaluation exercise carried out by UNICEF regarding this programme reveals that these incapacitated committees at the lower levels explain some of the strictures in local accountability and therefore point to the need to strengthen committees’ capacity to

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monitor the implementation of projects by say the District planning units. This same problem is well documented by the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment (UPPAP) Report. The report points out that:

Lack of civic competence was a major constraint to accountability since many members of the community did not have information to take particular interest in how public resources are being managed. Yet the local people see information as essential for development. (2000: 104).

Needless to emphasize, local people see decentralization process as a good thing although understanding it fully in certain areas is limited. In fact, the UPPAP report notes that barriers do exist for full participation of some citizens particularly women, the very poor, illiterate people, the elderly and certain ethnic groups (UPPAP 2000: 105); and while citizens’ participation in making the local governments accountable is a laudable and well pronounced in the local government Act, there are salient constraints such as lack of information and lack of civic competence especially in regard to the local committees. These facts weaken the local oversight function of the committees. Moreover, community development approaches such as those used by most development NGOs like Oxfam, Action Aid and others, always take advantage of community-led development initiatives. As such, these development strategies make use of community development committees akin those found at local councils (I, II and III). Such representative committees are chosen by programme beneficiaries and in most cases operate under democratic principles. What is, however, imperative to point out is that such committees are not legally secured and not well rooted in the legitimate local government structures, although they operate under the supervision of the local governments as pointed out by the section 27(i) of the Local Government Act. The Act stipulates that the executive committee shall be responsible for the supervision of the implementation of policies and decisions made by its council and shall generally monitor and supervise projects and other activities undertaken by government, local governments and non governmental organizations in their areas. An expert opinion by a key informant from the NGO sector pointed out that the establishment of parallel structures in form of community development committees was a product of the weakness that continue to bedevil the local authority systems (KI interviews March 2008). For instance, a look at most of the programs offered by many NGOs such as NUDIPU and Uganda Debt Network shows that there are parallel structures and systems that tend to work side by side with those at the local government. As an example, UDN established the Community Budget Initiative (CBI) to act as a parallel structure that would facilitate community involvement in the budget planning as well as understanding of the salient issues in the budgets drawn. NUDIPU on the other hand established both community and district level monitoring committees to act as overseers for the plans of the people with disabilities [PWD]. Though the above examples represent the emergence of alternative oversight mechanisms at the local level, they also point out the weakness embedded in the local authorities. Such alternative oversight mechanisms are in part a response mechanism to the declining oversight role of the local authority systems as well as the low oversight outputs of elected local councils. Whereas it is important to appreciate these new

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innovations especially as regards social accountability, it is prudent to ask why CSO seem to be working in parallel to the established norms as set out by Constitutional and Local government Act. Indee, this represents another school of thought as postulated by the report on civil society’s input into the 2003/4 PEAP Revision. The report put it this way:

Despite the constitutional provisions, evidence shows that the relationship between local governments and CSO are still characterized by mistrust, conflicts, marginalization, poor communication and lack of transparency. Participation in policy making by the CSOs at the lower local governments is still lacking and when it occurs, it is still top-down and it is directed. In most cases, CSOs and Citizens in general are receivers of policies and not makers or initiators or makers of policy (2004:77).

Another interesting yet contradictory scenario relating to the relationship between CSOs and the Local Government is provided by the study on CSO and local government Relationship in West Nile, Lango and Teso Sub-Regions 2001 which revealed that:

There is an informal sub-contracting relationship whereby CSOs are sub-contracted by local governments to provide services. This has been evident in the NAADS programme where CSOs have been contracted to provide training of farmers’ groups and in health to provide health services in areas where government cannot reach… CSOs participating in sub-contracts do reduce their activities of questioning government officials because they are now business partners (2001: 22.)

The above two quotations point to key elements in the relationship between CSOs and LGs which would have serious implications for oversight purposes. First is the conflict, mistrust and marginalization traits exhibited by relationship between local government and CSOs demonstrates a friction in the oversight role that is supposed to be played by the citizens through the CSOs. Similarly, the cliental roles played by the CSOs during service delivery further compromises their would-be oversight role. This same fault was observed by the key informants interviewed by the study team at national level. One of them observed that:

There is a friction between CSOs and Local governments and that part of the friction emanates from resources. Both the CSOs and the Local governments never have honest towards each other. For instance CSOs believe that local government officials are corrupt and this negative perception weakens their relationship and oversight functions (key informant interview, March 2008).

It is further imperative to ask why for instance in the post decentralization era, there seems to be a steady decline in the oversight roles played by the local authorities. The analysis provided by Golooba – Mutebi (2004) is very insightful in helping us to appreciate this trend. In the article ‘’Reassessing popular participation in Uganda’’, Golooba – Mutebi points out that there is a wide spread apathy among village leaders regarding their constitutional oversight role. Mutebi’s analysis seems to highlight two sides of the problem. On one side he points out that the council leaders claimed that the apathy shown by the villagers towards meetings discouraged them from convening them altogether. On the other side he also notes that villagers blamed the demise of meeting on the lack of commitment to duty and incompetence on the part of the council leaders. In summary, Mutebi argues that the greater cause of the problem lay in lack of

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incentives to pay for the council leaders’ time. Voluntarism is a major factor explaining the failure to convene meetings regularly and therefore factors in explaining the declining role of the local oversight functions (Ibid). Despite the challenges related to local authority oversight, some local communities feel that decentralization created a space for their participation in the local area governance issues. This is exemplified by the UPPAP report “Learning from the Poor” (GoU 2000) which documents the voices of the poor people from Kotido District. Local people felt more involved in the decisions that affected their community as a result of decentralization. The report points out that community members felt more in control at least to identify their problems and to arrive at their own solutions (Ibid).

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6.0 Conclusions

Reforms in Uganda’s local government system over the last 22 years have changed radically, the way in which local and national politics are practiced. In addition to making local government democratic with people electing their own representatives, it has accorded communities avenues through which they are able to participate in decision making and implementation, including recalling local leaders who do not perform to popular expectation. In addition, they have created modalities through which local governments enjoy great autonomy in recruitment and firing of personnel, planning, budgeting and policy implementation. Further, they have reconstituted centre-local relations in such a way that the central government is unable to fully dictate what happens at local government level, thereby creating a truly devolved system of local government. Furthermore, avenues have been created for civil society actors and others outside the sphere of government, such as business, to play a role in holding leaders to account. In order to reflect what is currently going on at the local level as well as in relations between the two spheres of government, an empirical investigation is essential, which justifies phase two of this project.

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7.0 Bibliography Ahire., J. (2002).Decentralization in Uganda Today: Institutions and Possible outcomes in the context of Human Rights. A Paper Presented to the International Council of Human Rights Policy. Geneva Ake, C. (1996). Democracy and Governance in Africa. Washington DC. Brookings Institution. Asiimwe, D and B, M Nakanyike,(2007). Decentralization and Transformations of Governance in Uganda. Kampala, Fountain Publishers. Azfar, O., Satu, K. Layi P., Meagher, P. and D. Rutherford (1999). Decentralization, Governance and Public Services. The Impact of Institutional Arrangements. Brinkerhoff, D. (2001). Taking account of Accountability: A Conceptual Over View and Strategic Options. Washington, DC. United States Agency for International Development. Brett, E.A. (1994). Rebuilding Organization Capacity in Uganda Under the N.R.M., Journal of Modern Africa, Studies 32(1) 53-80. Burki, S.J., Guillema E,P. and W.R. Dillinger (1999). Beyond the Centre: Decentralizing the State. Washington DC, World Bank. Byarunkana, D.K. (2006). Decentralization, Local Politics and Construction of Women’s Citizenship. The Case of Uganda. Research Report Submitted to Centre for Basic Research, June. Commsck, D.F., Bolooba-Mutebi, Kanyagol, F. and Oneil, T. (2007). Neo Patrimotical Politics, Decentralization and Local Governments in Uganda and Malawi, London, Overseas Development Institute. Cornwall, A. and Garenta, J. (2000). Bridging the Gap: Citizenship, Participation and Accountability. Participation and Governance. PRIA 8(3). Daudi, C. (2004). The Importance of De facto Decentralization in Primary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa. PTAs and Local Accountability in Uganda. Journal of Planning Education and Research. 24(1) 1 – 14. Dege Consult ( 2004). Acomparative Analysis of Decentralisation in Keanya , Tanzania and Uganda. Uganda Country Study Report. JICA Deniva (2005). Civil Society in Uganda’s Decentralization Process. Kampala, Deniva DENIVA. (2004). Effective Participation of Women Councilors in Decentralized Local Government and the Role of NGOs. Kampala, DENIVA. DFID (2002). Local Governments Decision – Making: Citizen Participation and Local Accountability. Examples of Good and Bad Practice in Uganda. University of Biraungham. Diamond, L. (1994). Rethinking and Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation, Journal of Democracy 5(3) 5 – 9. Faught, J.P. (2004). Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Balivia. Journal of Public Economics Vol. 88. Fiszbein, A(1997). The Emergence of Local Capacity. Lessons from Columbia. World Development 25(7)1029-1043.

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Golooba-Mutebi, F (1999). Decentralization, Democracy and Development Administration in Uganda, 1986-1996: Limits to popular Participation. Un published Ph.D Thesis Golooba- Mutebi, , F. (2004) “Reassessing Popular Participation in Uganda.” Public Administration and Development 24: 289-304. Golooba-Mutebi, F(2004). Politics and Social Protection In Uganda. A Background paper prepared as part

of the “Cash Transfer Pilot for Uganda” design process, The Social Protection Task Force (Ministry of Gender, Labour & Social Development), Kampala

Golooba -Mutebi.F (2005). When Popular Participation Won’t Improve Service Provision: Primary Health Care in Uganda.” Development Policy Review 23 (2): 165-182. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Golooba Mutebi (2007). The Politics of Social Protection in Uganda. Background paper Prepared as Part of the Cash Transfer Pilot for Uganda. Design and Process. The Social Action Task Force. Ministry of Gender, Labour ad Social Development, Kampala. Golooba-Mutebi, F(2007 ). “The Politcs of Local Governance in Uganda” in Foundations for local

Governance, Edited by Saito F, Heideraberg, Physica Verlag (pp 137 – 161) GoU (1994). Decentralization in Uganda. The Policy and Its Implications. Kampala. GoU (2001). Fiscal Decentralization in Uganda. The Way forward. Kampala, MFPED. GoU (2002). Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Report. Kampala, MFPED. GoU (2004). Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) Revision. Kampala, MFPED. GoU (2004). Learning From the Poor: Voices of the Poor from Kotido. Kampala, MFPED. Hepworth, N.P. (1990). The Finances of Local Government. London, UN Win Hymen. Joint Annual Review of Decentralization in Uganda (JARD) 2004 Joint Annual Review of Decentralization in Uganda (JARD) 2005 Joint Annual Review of Decentralization in Uganda (JARD) 2006 Kabwegyere T.B.(2000). Peoples Choice, Peoples’ Power: Challenges and Prospects of Democracy in Uganda. Kampala, Fountain Publishers Kamanyi, J. (2004). Social Inclusion: A Service Delivery and Accountability Dilemma. A Review of Policies and Programmes. Bukoto Uganda. Kauzya, J.M. (2007). Political Decentralization in Africa. Experiences of Uganda, Rwanda and South Africa. New York, United Nations. Kibwana, K. (2000). Making Our Constitution: Question and Answers. Nairobi, Fredrick Elbert Stifuting. Kisakye, J.(1996). Political Background to Decentralization. In Villadens and Lubanga (eds). Democratic Decentralization in Uganda, A new Approach to Local Governance, Kampala. Kisembo, S.W. (2006). A Handbook on Decentralization in Uganda. Kampala, Fountain Publishers. Kisembo, S.W. (2006). Frequently Asked Questions on Decentralization in Uganda, Kamala, Fountain

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Publishers. Maina, B. (2005). Monitoring and Evaluation Support to Decentralisation and Local Governance: Kenya Case Study. European Centre for Development Management. Mitchinson, R.(2003).Devolution in Uganda: An experiment in Service Delivery. Pblic Administration and Development 23(3)241-248 Mugabi E. (2006).Uganda’s Decentralization Policy, Legal Framework and Local Governance Structure. Paper Presented at a one weeks course Conducted by Uganda Management Institute, Kampala Mujaju, A. B. (1999). ‘Towards a National Resistance Movement Constitution in Uganda’, Second. East African Workshop on Democratic Transitions in East Africa, Arusha, 29–30.3.1999. Muhumuza, W, J.M., Kanyamurusa and J. Baligira (2003). Participation, Empowerment and Local Accountability in Uganda. Kampala A research report submitted to, I@Mak.Com. Mukwaya, A.K(2003) Movementocracy Experiment with Special Reference to the Great Lakes Region, 1986-2000.In Uganda, Riding on the Political Tiger edited By Mukwaya, A.K. Kampala Makerere University Printery Munyoro, R. (1999). Decentralization in Uganda; Theories and Practice. Mtafiti Mwafrika. 5(1-46). Nabuguzi E. (1994). Popular Initiatives in Service Provision in Uganda. In Service Provision Under Stress in East Africa edited by Semboja J. and O. Therkildsen 192 – 208. Centre for Development Research Copenhagen. Ngoga, P.(1998). Uganda: The National Resistance Army, In African Guerillas edited by C. Clapham. Oxford,James Currey 91-106. Nsamba , A. M. (2006). Unpacking Women Representation in Uganda’s Local Government System. A case Study of Lubaga Division in Kampala District.A research Report Submitted to CBR. Nsibambi, A. (1998). Decentralization and Civil Society in Uganda. The quest for Good Governance. Kampala. Nsibambi, A( 1998). Decentralisation and Civil Society in Uganda. Kampala Fountain Publishers. Nyakirindi, L. (2007). Economic and Social Rights, Service Delivery and Local Government in Uganda. HURIPEC Working Paper No. 13. Okidi J.A., and Guloba, M. (2006). Decentralization and Development. Emerging Issues From Uganda’s Experience. Kampala, EPRC. Oloka-Onyango, J. & J. Ihonvbere. (1999). ‘Towards participatory and inclusive African constitutionalism’, International Conference on Constitutionalism in Africa, Kampala, 5–8.10.1999. Oloka – Onyango, J. (2007). Decentralization without Human Rights. Local Governance and Access to Justice in Post-Movement Uganda. HURIPEC Working Paper No. 12. Olum Y (2006): Understanding the Interface between Multiparty Politics and Decentralisation in Uganda: Issues and challenges (Unpublished paper). Pinkney, R. (2005). The International Politics of East Africa, Manchester. Manchester University Press. Regan, A.J.(1998). Decentralizing Policy: Reshaping State and Society in H.B Hansen and Micheal

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Twaddle( eds). Developing Uganda. Oxford James Curry. Reinnika, R and Svensson, J (2004). Local Capture: Evidence From a Central Government Transfer Programm inUganda. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 679-705. Ribot, J.C. (2001). Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources. Institutionalizing Popular Participation. Washington DC: WRI. Ribot, J.C. (2004). Waiting for Democracy: The Politics of Choice in Natural Resource Decentralization. Washington D.C., WR_T, Santo, F.(2000). Can Decentralization Contribute to Good Governance? Lessons from Uganda. A Paper presented at the Annual Confrence on Development Studies . University of London. 4th November. Sewakiryanga, R.(2004). Donor Dependent Decentralization and the Political Economy of Aid in Uganda, CBR Working Paper No. 11 Sewakilyanga. R. (2006). Moving out of Poverty. Kampala Steiners, S.(2006).Decentralization in Uganda, Exploring the Constraints for Poverty Reduction. GIGA Working Paper No. 31. Stiglitz, J. (1998).More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Towards Post Washington Consensus. The 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture. Helsinki, WIDER. Tripp, A. (1997). Changing the Rules. Berkley University of California. Tukahebwa, G (1998). The role of District Councils in Decentralisation. In Decentralisation and Civil Society in Uganda. Edited by Nsibambi, A. Kampala Fountain Publishers. Pg 12-30 . Tusasirwe, B. (2007) Enforcing Civil and Political Rights in a Decentralized system of Governance. HURIPEC Working Paper No. 14 UDN (2006). Local Governments and Budgets in Uganda. Kampala UDN. UDN (2006.). How Pro Poor are Local Government Budgets in Uganda? A Review of Kampala and Rakai Local Government Budgets. Kampala, UDN. ULGA (2007). Naturing Good Local Governanace. The Role of Uganda Local Government Association.Kampala. ULGA (2007).Position Paper on Decentralization in Uganda. Kampala Weetaka – Wadala, A. (2007). The Politics of Decentralization in Uganda in Decentralize and Transformation of Governance in Uganda, edited by D. Asiimwe and Prof. Nakanyike B.M., Kampala Fountain Publishers. Villadsen Y (2006): “Decentraiisation of Governance” in Villadensen S & Lubanga F Democrataaic Decentralisation in Uganda, Kampala Fountain Publishers. William, A (1968). Constitutions and Constitutionalism Dvian Nostrand Company. World Bank (2000). Entering the 21 Century, World Development Report 1999/2000. Attacking Poverty, Washington D.C, Oxford University Press. World Bank (2002). World Development Report. Building Institutions for the Market. Washington, World

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Bank. World Bank (2007). Creating Genuine Demand with Social Accountability Mechanisms. Washington D.C., World Bank.

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8.0 Annex 1: List of Key Informants

NAME DESIGNATION

1. Mr. Zie Gariyo Executive Director, Coret Centre, Bukoto.

2. Mr. Daniel Lukwago Senior Policy Analyst, Uganda Debt Network.

3. Mr. Martin Bachu HIV/AIDS Program Coordinator, National Union of Disabled

Persons of Uganda.

4. Mr. James Kunobwa Speaker, Mukono District Council.

5. Mr. Evaristo Kakuma Councilor, Mukono District – Seeta.

6. Mr. Frederick William Wasswa Councilor, Mukono District - Buikwe.

7. Dr. Elly K. Tumushabe Director District Health Services, Mukono District.

8. Mr. Michael Kikaawa Chief Finance Officer, Mukono District.

9. Mr. George Gakwandi Chief Administrative Officer, Mukono District.

10. Mr. Lawrence Banyoya Commission Secretary, Local Government Finance Commission.

11. Mr. Adam Babale Principal Economist, Local Government Finance Commission.

12. Engineer Kagina Commissioner, M&E, Ministry of Works and Housing.

13. Mr. John Behangana Chairman, Urban Authorities Association.

14. Mr. Joseph Lwanga Secretary for Works and Planning, Entebbe Town Coucil.

15. Ms Rose Tumusiime Secretary for Health and Education, Entebbe Town Council

16. Mr. Frederick Kaweesi. Mutagubya Chief Finance Officer, Entebbe Town Council.

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9.0 Annex 2: Interview Guides Key Informant Interview Checklist for Central Government & Local Government Officials We are a team of researchers from Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR), but we are here on behalf of the World Bank to gather your opinions on a variety of issues regarding the role of appointed officials and elected councillors in promoting good governance in district local governments. This information is being collected from a wide cross-section of stakeholders at national and district levels. The information will be analysed and used to design interventions to support in-country and regional dialogues on good governance and building partnerships among the local councils, executive branch of local governments, NGOs, and community based organizations. It will also facilitate the building of more transparent and accountable local governance mechanisms. . Please feel free to express your ideas and opinions on this subject. All the information collected from you will be strictly kept confidential. [Interviewer to ask the key informant for any comments, clarifications, or questions. Inform the respondent that the interview will last about 45 minutes and thereafter request for permission to start the interview. First introduce yourself [name] to the respondent before asking him/her for his/her names] A. Organisational Information A1. Name of Interviewee _____________________________________________ A2. Designation _______________________________________________________ A3. Name of Ministry / Local Government/Agency ____________________________________ A4. Location of Local Government / Agency [Name of District/ Municipality] __________._______________________________________-

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1. How do you understand the following terms in the context of Uganda ? i. citizens; ii. local councillor; iii. civil society; and iv. local communities

2. In what ways (and to what extent) are citizens and civil society organisations

engaged in activities and processes that promote good governance in local governments?

3. What mechanisms / avenues are available to local councillors to enable them

fulfil their oversight roles and responsibilities? Probe LC Oversight Mechanisms in:

a) revenue allocation and expenditure b) ; tender awards; c) monitoring of projects d) such as road works and building of schools; e) hiring and firing human resource; f) monitoring delivery of social services such as health care provision and

educational services etc. 4. How effective are these mechanisms? What are the constraints/barriers to

effective local council oversight in: a) revenue allocation and expenditure; b) tender awards; c) monitoring of projects such as road works and building of schools; d) hiring and firing human resource; e) monitoring delivery of social services such as health care provision and

educational services etc. 5. Do the local councils have powers to initiate committees of hearings or

enquiries? Can they question procurements or stop questionable transactions including payments, recruitments etc? How? Give examples.

6. How and to what extent have the powers of local councillors impacted on

delivery of public services? Give examples. 7. In your opinion, what factors drive the performance of locally elected leaders?

Elaborate on each of the factors.

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8. Are there any deficiencies in the public financial and expenditures management system for local governments? If yes, which ones? How can these deficiencies be addressed?

9. In what ways can citizens, communities and civil society organisations get more

involved to improve public financial and expenditures management system for local governments?

10. How has the centralisation of the appointment of the CAO affected decision-

making at the local level? 11. How does the local government electoral system work under the new multi-party

dispensation?

• How do parties nominate their candidates? • How are local political campaigns financed? • What are the challenges?

12. How does the local government electoral system impact on the degree of

accountability of local governments to citizens? 13. Does the existence of safeguards (such as reserved seats for special interest

groups e.g. women, PWDs and youth, permission for independent candidates, recall options) enhance the quality of the local government system and increase political accountability? How?

14. What are the laws available to allow for accountability mechanisms between

citizens and communities? 15. How do communities relate with:

a. local councils; and b. technocrats in the local government system? c. How does this interaction impact on service delivery? Give examples.

16. How do NGOs relate with:

a) local councils; and b) technocrats in the local government system? c) How does this interaction impact on service delivery? Give examples.

17. How do family networks; relate with

a) local councils; and b) technocrats in the local government system?

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c) How does this interaction impact on service delivery? Give examples.

18. How are these marginalised groups currently represented in the local government system? Are they legal or they operate only in name? Are there any efforts to streamline representation of marginalised groups under the multi-party dispensation?

19. What suggestions/recommendations do you have that you think can help improve performance of local councillors and appointed technocrats in their oversight functions?

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Key Informant Checklist for NGOs, Family Networks and Business Groups We are a team of researchers from Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR), but we are here on behalf of the World Bank to gather your opinions on a variety of issues regarding the role of civil society in promoting good governance in district local governments. This information is being collected from a wide cross-section of stakeholders at national and district levels. The information will be analysed and used to design interventions to support in-country and regional dialogues on good governance and building partnerships among the local councils, executive branch of local governments, NGOs, and community based organizations. It will also facilitate the building of more transparent and accountable local governance mechanisms. . Please feel free to express your ideas and opinions on this subject. All the information collected from you will be strictly kept confidential. [Interviewer to ask the key informant for any comments, clarifications, or questions. Inform the respondent that the interview will last about 45 minutes and thereafter request for permission to start the interview. First introduce yourself [name] to the respondent before asking him/her for his/her names] A. Organisational Information A1. Name of interviewee _____________________________________________ A2. Designation _______________________________________________________ A3. Name of the Organisation/ Institution _______________________________________________ A4. Type of organisation: INGO/NNGO/CBO/FBO/ etc ___________________________________ A5. Location of Organisation [Name of District] __________________________________.

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1. What (civic) activities are this organisation involved in? 2. Whose interests does your organisation represent? 3. How does your organisation relate with citizens, local governments and service

providers? 4. What mechanisms does your organisation have in place to make it accountable to

the people whose interests it represents (or to the citizens)? 5. Does your organisation interact with other organisations/networks in

implementing its activities and how? 6. What impact - if any (give examples) – does that interaction have on:

a) Delivery of public services by the local governments? b) Accountability of local governments to the citizens?

7. What challenges does your organisation face when dealing with local

governments? 8. How have local councils impacted on local service delivery? 9. What are the factors that drive the performance of locally elected leaders? 10. What deficiencies are in the public financial and expenditures management

system for local governments? How can these deficiencies be addressed? 11. How has the centralisation of the appointment of the CAO affected decision-

making at the local level? 12. What do you understand by the following terms?

i. citizens; ii. local councilors; iii. civil society; and iv. local communities understood in Uganda?

13. What are the perceived roles and responsibilities of: i) citizens; ii) civil society;

and iii) local communities in promoting good governance in local governments? 14. To what extent do they fulfill these roles and responsibilities? What are the major

challenges and barriers they face in fulfilling those roles and responsibilities?

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15. What are the different types of CSOs that are involved in promoting good governance in local governments? How do they interact?

16. What suggestions/recommendations do you have that you think can help

improve performance of local councilors and appointed technocrats in their oversight functions?

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10.0 Annex 3: Interview Transcripts

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Transcript No 1

Name of respondent: Dr. Elly K. Tumushabe Designation: DDHS Name of Organisation: Mukono District Local Government Date of Interview: Mar 25, 2008 Qn 1: How do you understand the following terms in the context of Uganda? Citizen is a Ugandan by birth, descent and/ or adoption

Local Communities are people who share common values and services, they must have something they share as a group. Civil Society are private organisations that fall under the category of NGOs and CBOs registered locally. Local Councillor is a representative of the people elected through Adult sufferage or colleges at different levels from LC1 to LC 5. At the LC 1 level, a council is constituted of people who are the members.

Qn 2: In what ways (and to what extent) are citizens and civil society organisations engaged in activities and processes that promote good governance in local governments? CSOs participate in governance through policies that are in place. For example, in MoH there is a public/private partnership policy. This mandates CSOs to participate in good governance through their monitoring functions and give feed back reports to consumers. Also, during implementation they participate in good governance. Citizens participate in good governance through their involvement in electing leaders. Their decisions are paramount. Qn 3: What mechanisms / avenues are available to local councillors to enable them fulfil their oversight roles and responsibilities? Executives of the local government structure are facilitated through the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) to physically monitor and evaluate projects and programmes on behalf of the councillors. For Tender Awards, unlike in the past, councillors do not monitor/ oversee award of tenders. They only participate in monitoring of the implementation process of the tenders.

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Qn 5. Do the local councils have powers to initiate committees of hearings or enquiries? Can they question procurements or stop questionable transactions including payments, recruitments etc? How? Give examples. Yes, local councils have powers to initiate committees of inquiry if they are not satisfied with any report submitted by the Executive. In this case, a committee of inquiry can be formed by the council. The instituted committee, however, has to be approved by the entire council, partly due to the budgetary implication involved. Qn 6. How and to what extent have the powers of local councillors impacted on delivery of public services? Districts receive both conditional and unconditional grants. For unconditional grants, the councillors have full say over usage of the grant. Hence, they may determine allocation of money in preference for some sectors to the disadvantage of other sectors, particularly those that do not submit convincing workplans and budgets. This of course impacts on service delivery. Even for the conditional grants, the Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy gives powers to the council to retain 10% of the conditional grant allocated to each sector in a pool fund. This is geared towards allowing some flexibility in the usage of conditional grants so that councillors can re-allocate the 10% pooled into the common fund to those sectors deemed to be in more needs than others. For example, some districts like Kasese may need to re-allocate more funds from the pool to the Health sector due to the district’s vulnerability to border-related heath problems. Mukono District Health Sector, received shs 350 million as conditional grant (2007/08), out of which 10% (30 million) was contributed to the pool. As a return, the Health sector was allocated Shs 40 million from the pool, which implies that the sector benefited more from the pool than what it contributed. This means that some sectors end up receiving less and other more from the pool than what they contributed. “If your proposal is not well packaged and politically supported, you may get zero depending on the investments you will have made to the councillors – the production sector (agriculture), for example, appears to be getting a raw deal due to its poor services, largely composed of software investments. Hence, it is not uncommon for the agriculture sector to contribute 60 million into the pool and only gets 5 million in return. Politicians are more interested in spending money on tangible investments than say spending it on sensitisation and extension services where NAADS spends most of their money”. Arising from above, the disadvantage of the Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy is that those sectors that are not packaging their investment packages well are likely to suffer and this has a direct negative impact on the potential beneficiaries. Qn 7: In your opinion, what factors drive the performance of locally elected leaders?

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(a) Local leaders need facilitation to do their work.

(b) Lack of capacity impacts on the local councillors’ performance. They need to be in the know-how if they are to perform efficiently.

Qn 10: How has the centralisation of the appointment of the CAO affected decision-making at the local level? Re-centralisation of the CAO is ok. He is an accounting officer of all resources from the Center, so to whom should he account?—definitely to Government. During the period when the district was the appointing authority, who was the supervisor of the CAO? This was the chairperson LC 5, but did he have the capacity to do this? Now, someone qualified from the MoLG can query a CAO. Qn 11: How does the local government electoral system work under the new multi-party dispensation? Multiparty dispensation does not conflict with decentralisation. You can have decentralisation with multi-party dispensation. Qn 15 How do communities relate with:

d. local councils; and e. technocrats in the local government system? f. How does this interaction impact on service delivery? Give examples.

(a) Councillors are representatives of communities and represent their needs. Through lobbying, each councillor tries to see that his electorates benefit from the services. Indeed, councillors live within the community and only come for meetings at the district once every two months, which implies that they stay and relate more with the community than the members of parliament.

(b) Through committees such as the Health and Education Management committees at

different levels, communities are able to interact with the technocrats. Such committees are looked at by technocrats as conduits. For sectors that have peoples’ committees [e.g. Health and Education], people tend to understand those sectors better and tend to be part and parcel of them than would be the case with other sectors like Agriculture. Right now, nobody can talk about agriculture because this sector has no committees. Also during the planning process, communities relate greatly with technocrats.

Qn 17 How do family networks relate with

d) local councils; and e) technocrats in the local government system? f) How does this interaction impact on service delivery? Give examples.

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(a): Family networks relate with local councils as opinion leaders at community level especially during the time for planning and discussing policies. The fact that opion leaders are part of the community, they are greatly respected. So there is respect for clan leaders, elders, religious leaders, etc. Note that councillors stay just for a short time and will be back to the family networks thereafter their tenure.

(b) Family networks have a lot of influence on our population and as technical providers of services, if we are to get anything from the common person, we involve them in various programmes because they have a lot of influence. People respect them, so for you as a health worker, you need to go through them to be effective and relevant.

Qn 19: What suggestions/recommendations do you have that you think can help improve performance of local councillors and appointed technocrats in their oversight functions?

(a) Govt should strengthen the supervisory roles of local councils. Councils are supposed to carry out monitoring and legislative function but they are never followed-up from the Center. There should be a follow-up by government to see, for example, how many legislations have been put in place as well as looking at their agenda. The Center should undertake supervisory roles, otherwise the principle of local councils is good if government could ensure value for money for these councils. Even CSOs can be hired by government to look after the performance of local councils so that there is value for money.

(b) Local councils should also be accountable for their actions to make sure there

is value for the tax payers’ money they spend. Without this, Councils will not be very effective. This mentoring role should be put in place right from LC5 downwards to all levels.

(c) Local councils need to be trained in monitoring and legislation skills so that

they can do a better job. Thereafter, the inspectors should regularly check on what the councillors are doing.

(d) Within the MoLG there should be a unit that mentors lower local

government councils.

(e) There should be an incentive scheme in the MoLG to help service providers working in “marginalised districts”, which include the newly created districts, as most of them are very poor. “All the new districts have the poorest performance indicators as per National Health Assembly of October 2007”. So when you create new districts, you are not necessarily bringing services nearer to the people, from the perspective of the common person, instead you are just creating positions for those who run the district.

(f) Education level of councillors needs to be fixed. Those who are university

graduates capture issues better than school certificate holders.

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Transcript No 2

Name of respondent: Mr. Michael Kikaawa Designation: Chief Finance Officer Name of Organisation: Mukono District Local Government Date of Interview: Mar 25, 2008 Qn 1: How do you understand the following terms in the context of Uganda?

(i) Citizen – Literally, from the perspective of an ordinary person, anyone who has a permanent palace of residence in Uganda, earning income from within or outsides the country is a citizen.

(ii) Local councillor: Any elected representative on a local council is a councillor. At LC1 and LC2, the Executive works as a council but at the LC3 and LC5, people elect the councillors from whom the chairperson nominates the executive. Village meetings are composed of residents who are members of the council. The members of the village/ LC1 are councillors by law, not by election because when members meet, they all contribute to the debate on table. (iii) Civil Society: These are organisations both from within and outside the country serving people resident in a particular area. CSOs work within a defined boundary.

(iv) Local Communities: These are homesteads defined as belonging to a particular area as may be defined by a particular institution. For example, the definition of a local community by the church can be different from that of the local government.

Qn 2: In what ways (and to what extent) are citizens and civil society organisations engaged in activities and processes that promote good governance in local governments? Citizens, through a bottom-up approach, participate in activities before they become a reality for endorsement by the above local government structures. Hence, whatever is included in the district or national workplans and budgets comes from needs derived from the citizens – hence, citizens participate in promotion of good governance. CSOs, on the other hand, bring the idea to the citizens and in most cases it the CSOs that identify the needs on behalf of communities. Qn 3: What mechanisms / avenues are available to local councillors to enable them fulfil their oversight roles and responsibilities?

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The LC5 Executive gets a “PAF Monitoring and Accountability Grant” that enables them to undertake their oversight functions with regard to monitoring projects and programmes. Even at the lower level (LC3), budgets and workplans take care of the line item on monitoring and evaluation. With regard to tender awards, in the past (i.e. prior to 2006/07), Tender Board used to constituted and monitored by the Council. Since then, the appointment of the Contract Committee became technical. Nonetheless, the implementation process of the tender awards is monitored by the executive. Regarding the recruitment of public servants, the council oversees the process to ensure that all the approved positions are filled. Qn 4. How effective are these mechanisms? What are the constraints/barriers to effective local council oversight in:

f) revenue allocation and expenditure; g) tender awards; h) monitoring of projects such as road works and building of schools; i) hiring and firing human resource; j) monitoring delivery of social services such as health care provision and

educational services etc. Despite setting up a technical Contract Committee, the councillors somehow still can influence allocation of contracts in their favour, which compromises their capacity to monitor implementation of activities in which they are, in one way or another, involved in the implementation process. Worst of all, councillors do not have any technical skills, which ends up doing substandard work. Qn 5. Do the local councils have powers to initiate committees of hearings or enquiries? Can they question procurements or stop questionable transactions including payments, recruitments etc? How? Give examples. Local councils have powers to initiate committees of inquiry in case they are not satisfied with any technical process undertaken as long there is established proof of abuse. This is, however, done with the awareness and consent of the CAO. It is not always right to assume that whatever is done by the council is right, so the CAO has to be involved in any inquiry. Qn 6. How and to what extent have the powers of local councillors impacted on delivery of public services? There can be victimisation of a technocrat, for one reason or another, including due to one’s political affiliation. Sometimes, wearing a shirt with a color of a particular political party can cause you being labelled a supporter. We are on standby because of differences in political affiliations and we are employees of the district council, which can influence our sacking through the District Service Commission. Some colleagues have lost their jobs in this manner.

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Qn 7: In your opinion, what factors drive the performance of locally elected leaders? Politicians tend to think that everything is possible, leading to changing planned activities every financial year to satisfy their constituency emerging demands despite that there is a 3yr rolling development plan. Hence, local demands drive performance of councillors, though sometimes out of the approved budget. “When we technically advise, we are rendered negative”. When there are benefits (allowances), meetings are attended and they are full board. Allowance is a very big influential factor and once you institute allowances, councillors perform. Qn 8: Are there any deficiencies in the public financial and expenditures management system for local governments? If yes, which ones? How can these deficiencies be addressed?

(a) Up to June 2006 when the position of CAO was re-centralised, district mismanagement of public funds was high, the fact that the CAO had no guts to say No to scrupulous demands and usage of public funds by the council, the fact that the council was his boss by appointment. Otherwise, refusal would be tantamount to being insubordinate and could lead to sacking. Now, the CAO can say No to dubious financial demands from the council.

(b) The central government has a tendency of imposing accounting systems that are not applicable to local governments without their consultations and/ or prior research to assess the applicability of such financial management systems to local governments. For example, the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) was imported from the Center and piloted in 10 districts. This IFMS is not compatible with the local government structure and its harmonisation with the district financial management systems has been problematic.

Qn 9: In what ways can citizens, communities and civil society organisations get more involved to improve public financial and expenditures management system for local governments? By being involved in planning and monitoring performance of projects, the communities and CSOs get involved in public finance management and expenditure. When funds are received from the Center, say for road construction, we inform lower local governments and the public (notification put on notice boards), how much money was sent out for a particular activity. At this point, it is up to the CSOs and the community to see to it that there is value for the money allocated to them. The responsibility for informing the communities on monies allocated to projects in their localities is passed onto them by the office of the Community-based Service Officer (CBSO) and their assistants at the lower level. Qn 10: Qn 10: How has the centralisation of the appointment of the CAO affected decision-making at the local level?

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Centralisation of CAOs improved decision making because the technical officers now have a technical input in technical decision making. In the past, there was a saying among the councillors that “If you want your name to appear on the pay roll, do what we have told you”. Qn 12: How does the local government electoral system impact on the degree of accountability of local governments to citizens? Those who corrupted the electoral process have to fill up gaps, and because of this, they cease being accountable to the electorates. After all, those people down there were bought to give votes to the councillor, so on what basis can they ask for a return in terms of services? Qn 15: How does the local government electoral system impact on the degree of accountability of local governments to citizens?

(a) People soon forget what happened during the election period however bad the process was. People are always aware that councillors, once they get elected, do not necessarily bring anything back to the electorates, so the relationship between them and the elected councillors remains good and interactive.

(b) The Planning Unit, on behalf of the technocrats, interacts greatly with communities especially during the stage of compiling their needs (wish list) for planning purposes.

Qn 16: How do NGOs relate with:

d) local councils; and e) technocrats in the local government system? f) How does this interaction impact on service delivery? Give examples.

(a) NGOs and local council interaction is limited. NGOs prefer getting information direct from the community rather than from political leaders. One of the reasons for direct contact with communities is to avoid bias among politicians. For example, a politician may reject an intervention to be set up at a particular point simply because the proposed location has communities supporting a different political party.

(b) Only when an NGO has a technical need that they do not have, that is when they link with technocrats. Otherwise, if an NGO has all the technical expertise it requires [e.g. World Vision], it goes direct to the community.

Qn 18. How are these marginalised groups currently represented in the local government system? Are they legal or they operate only in name? Are there any efforts to streamline representation of marginalised groups under the multi-party dispensation Two councillors at the district and sub-county levels represent people with disabilities.

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Qn 19: What suggestions/recommendations do you have that you think can help improve performance of local councillors and appointed technocrats in their oversight functions?

(a) Government should put forward a fund that promotes monitoring by all the district councillors. Originally, some money used to come from the district budget to enable monitoring by councillors, but since the collection of local revenue was interfered with by the Center, there are no funds at the district to enable monitoring by councillors.

(b) Local leaders should be trained in monitoring and evaluation techniques. Some of them when they do monitoring, they think they can even fire civil servants. Local leaders lack capacity to appreciate their roles and responsibilities as monitors/ overseers. (c) For technocrats, Information Technology (IT) should be enforced in the local government structure, originating from the Center (MoLG). The council has not yet seen the advantages of IT. Even buying computers for technocrats is a struggle to pass through the council. It is only the Center that can push this to move down.

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Transcript No 3 Name of Respondent: Gakwandi George Designation: CAO Organisation: Mukono District Date of Interview: March 26, 2008 Qn 1: How do you understand the following terms in the context of Uganda? Citizens promote good governance through participation in village council meetings geared towards planning and budgeting for their local area. Also, by participating in the electoral process, citizens participate in good governance practices. CSOs basically represent citizens both at local and upper levels of administration. They are the vanguard of the citizens’ problems, for example through assisting the citizens in forming opinions about their needs. “But from my experience, CSOs are autonomous insititutiions in respect to the local government structures. Although there has been a lot of drumming that CSOs work with local governments, this has never worked. They continue working parallel to local government structjures”. Qn 3: What mechanisms / avenues are available to local councillors to enable them fulfil their oversight roles and responsibilities? Local government councils have a budget line item to enable councillors perform their oversight functions. For example, the chairperson LC 5 has a full time vehicle fully fuelled all the time to enable him execute his roles and responsibilities. The Executive Committee too has an allocation under PAF to enable monitoring of government programmes. In addition, these Executive Secretaries are attached to their respective technical sectors, which sectors are equipped with vehicles which can be accessed by the Executives whenever there is need for transport facilitation to perform their oversight functions of projects. With regard to Tender Awards, although the local councillors no longer have a direct political influence in the appointment and management of the Contract Committee, which is now technical, they have an oversight function to see to it that whatever contracts are made are in conformity with the District Development Plan and Budget. They also make follow-ups on the implementation of contracts to ensure quality and timely implementation. Qn 4. How effective are these mechanisms? What are the constraints/barriers to effective local council oversight in:

k) revenue allocation and expenditure; l) tender awards;

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m) monitoring of projects such as road works and building of schools; n) hiring and firing human resource; o) monitoring delivery of social services such as health care provision and

educational services etc. Constraints:

a) Facilitation of oversight functions is limited to only the five members of the Executive. These are too few to be effective in monitoring implementation of projects and programmes throughout the entire district. Consideration needs to be made so that PAF funds are extended to the entire council.

b) Councillors are not professionally suitable to undertake effective oversight

functions without the involvement of the technical people in respective sectors. Yet they prefer doing it alone, as they consider their role being that of watchdogs over what the technocrats do. There are times when they condemn some work technically well done as being of substandard and there are times when the reverse is true for work poorly done. One councillor, out of ingnorance, was reported to have used a harmer to hit repeatedly a constructed wall as a means of verifying that the job had been well done.

c) At times some oversight functions by the elected councillors are not done as a

result of having diverted the funds to personal use activities. Qn 5. Do the local councils have powers to initiate committees of hearings or enquiries? Can they question procurements or stop questionable transactions including payments, recruitments etc? How? Give examples. Yes, local councils have powers to institute commissions of enquiry should they establish some malpractice in any of the sectors. The CAO, however, is fully informed of what is going on as at the end of the day, he will be the one to implement whatever resolution the council will come up with. From the perspectives of the CAO, the practice of local councils having powers is ok, as it is one way to safeguard the office of CAO from being accused of not taking action against malpractices. Qn 6. How and to what extent have the powers of local councillors impacted on delivery of public services? All employees of the district are appointed by the Council. So whether right or wrong, they (councillors) will always show that they are the ones in power. Councillors can reject an advice of the technocrat and this does not augur well with regard of delivery of services to the beneficiaries. There are cases of political interference where someone goes to monitor implementation of activities with intent to frustrate or get something from the implementer. Also sometimes when civil servants fail to dance to the tune of politicians [kickbacks] , they may be punished. Another problem impacting on service delivery is the tendency of politicians to want to do things haphazardly. When politicians want to do something they think is politically correct to their advantage, they

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will do it regardless of the workplan and budgetary implications. For example, if a school unexpectedly collapses, they want to divert funds from other scheduled activities to get the school rebuilt immediately. For them, they want to implement what has come onboard because this is where they gain popularity. Qn 7: In your opinion, what factors drive the performance of locally elected leaders? (a) Performance of elected leaders is relative. First of all, elected leaders have their manifestos where they sometimes make heavier promises [such as constructing a bridge] than they can undertake. So what drives them to perform comes from their manifesto.

(b) Sometimes their performance is based on instant demands from the local

communities. This is a big problem as leaders come up with things that were never budgeted for.

(c) Some leaders perform on basis of what they get in terms of benefits such as

allowances. In this respect, performance depends on the financial gain from doing something.

Qn 8: Are there any deficiencies in the public financial and expenditures management system for local governments? If yes, which ones? How can these deficiencies be addressed? As an Accounting Officer, there are areas that I find wanting in the management of finance under the local government structure:

a) Most of the funds used by local governments come as conditioned grants from the centre, which leaves very little funds [generated from local revenue] for the districts to argue about. District budgets and workplan priorities cannot be changed as money is not ours. The Center sets its own national priorities against which districts plan. So we plan on basis of the priorities of the Center and we call it our own planning.

b) Although the Local Government Act says that political leaders, just like the

technocrats, are supposed to account for the funds they use and mismanage, in reality this does not happen. It only happens to the technocrats. For example, when it comes to accounting before the Parliamentary Local Government Public Accounts Committee, it is only the CAO who is called to answer his part, but political leaders are never called even when they are implicated. Yet in most cases, it is the political leaders who put the technocrats in trouble. If you want to streamline Accountability, whoever commits financial mismanagement should be answerable before the authority. This is catered for by the law but not practiced.

Qn 10: Qn 10: How has the centralisation of the appointment of the CAO affected decision-making at the local level?

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I for one, am not happy with the re-centralisation of the position of CAO. You still serve the same people from whom you were detached and you are answerable to the same local council. The only difference is that the appointment papers come from the Centre. Even then, if the council says they don’t want you, they will do it and you may end up on a “Katebe” as the Center struggles with where to put you. We are now torn between two masters: the Center and Local Government, and this is not healthy. Initially while under the local council, one could argue a case before the council and win it on merit, now even if you win an argument on merit, councillors have a tendency to think that your line of argument is based on your linkage to the Center. Qn 16: How do NGOs relate with:

g) local councils; and h) technocrats in the local government system? i) How does this interaction impact on service delivery? Give examples.

(a): NGOs relate well with communities but not with local councils. They do not want to give local councils their budgets or workplans. Qn 19: What suggestions/recommendations do you have that you think can help improve performance of local councillors and appointed technocrats in their oversight functions? (a) For effective oversight functions by the local councils, there should either be an involvement of the relevant technocrats on the monitoring team, or building of capacity of local councils in monitoring skills.

(b) There should be a minimum level of education for district and lower level councils.

When this level of minimum education is attained, there should then be some sensitisation /capacity building of councillors in rules and regulations governing local governments. Thereafter, there should be no excuse of poor oversight functions among councillors. As of now, you find that even the Chair LC 5 does not know the contents of the Local Government Act, nor the Financial Regulations Act.

(c) There should be punishment of councillors who do not account for funds given to

them. There is a law on this, but it has not worked.

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Transcript No 4 Name of respondent: Behengana John Designation: Chairman Name of Organisation: Urban Authorities Association

1. How do you understand the following terms in the context of Uganda? i) Citizens: Citizens are people living within the boundaries of Uganda as

defined by the Constitution of Uganda, i.e. these are people who are Ugandans either by descent, naturalisation or by birth.

ii) Local Councillor: A councillor is everybody 18 years and above living within the boundaries of a village local council. Probe: Does a councillor has to be a citizen? The constitution is silent about that. However, in practice, all residents of a local council I (including non-citizens) are councillors.

iii) Civil Society: These are organised institutions – registered and non-registered- which are in place to promote people’s rights.

iv) Local Communities: They are groups of people living within certain geographical boundaries and are sharing same goods and or services or having a strong social/business network.

2. In what ways (and to what extent) are citizens and civil society organisations

engaged in activities and processes that promote good governance in local governments? The ways are ad-hoc. There are no formal ways for citizens except through participating in elections. Otherwise, participatory planning and budgeting is not followed. Its like Govt has deliberately planned that people remain ignorant of participatory planning. The citizens are not aware. There is no organised intervention to streamline communication of information to citizens for them to participate in planning processes.

3. What mechanisms / avenues are available to local councillors to enable them fulfil

their oversight roles and responsibilities? At LC I & II, there is no oversight because these are merely administrative units – they don’t have revenues, no expenditures and no property. So oversight role starts at LCIII. But the citizens are powerless as far as oversight is concerned. First, they don’t know the provisions of the law in order to play the oversight role. Second, there is no political will to enforce the laws because it is the “big men” (Chairpersons, chief accounting officers and people high up in Govt) themselves who are flouting the law.

Nevertheless, at LC3 and above, they have standing committees. These regularly receive reports and briefs from the technocrats/implementers.

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They also physically visit projects being implemented. Of course, they are under-facilitated because the LGs do not have financial autonomy and their own internally generated funds which would be used to finance oversight activities are very little. LCs have been antagonised – their sources of revenue have been messed up; they have no revenue. Politicking has disorganised them. So, oversight functions are sometimes facilitated, sometimes they are not. So, these standing committees largely depend on reports such as those from the district service commission and different technical departments such as DDHS etc. They look at performance indicators to monitor progress.

4. Dealt with under Qn 3

5. Do the local councils have powers to initiate committees of hearings or enquiries?

Can they question procurements or stop questionable transactions including payments, recruitments etc? How?

They do - but that is at LC III level upwards. For example, when he (the key informant) was still a CAO, he was often stopped to pay contractors until they (contractors) deliver as per the contracts. These powers are clearly stipulated in the LG Act (LGA) as well as in the Public Finance and Accountability Regulations Act. Also, not ensure value for money, there is some money that is retained for a duration (Defects Liability Period) and it is supposed to be paid only after the delivered goods or services conform to the set standards at least until the expiry of the Defects Liability period.

6. How and to what extent have the powers of local councillors impacted on delivery

of public services?

Standing committees do provide checks and balances and, on the whole, this has led to better service delivery. However, there is a problem of corruption – limited political will to fight it. So, these committees have been able to impact on service delivery only to some extent. And of course, the lack resources. If they had their own resources, they would do better. They need to be facilitated and empowered to know what to do.

7. In your opinion, what factors drive the performance of locally elected leaders?

A number of factors impact on their performance:

a) Knowledge and experience they have regarding their roles and responsibilities and how fulfilment of their roles and responsibilities this contributes to the wellbeing of their areas.

b) Facilitation. They need adequate compensation for the time lost in doing LG work. If possible, pay for their transport and lunch.

c) Good leadership of the Chairperson also motivates them

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d) The hope to be re-elected also motivates them. e) On the other hand, negative political statements demotes councillors from

doing their work (for example – they come up with innovative ways of collecting new taxes but politicking leaders kill off such innovations).

8. Are there any deficiencies in the public financial and expenditures management

system for local governments? If yes, which ones? How can these deficiencies be addressed? The legal framework is thorough and detailed. There are no deficiencies as far as the legal framework is concerned. The problem is the issue of corruption: inflating goods, lost vouchers, false accounting, not accounting in time, people not following set procedures, misuse of govt property etc.

9. In what ways can citizens, communities and civil society organisations get more

involved to improve public financial and expenditures management system for local governments? One way would be to provide CSOs with books of accounts and budgets so that they can scrutinise them. Although this is supposed to be public information, there is no law requiring LGs to provide this information to CSOs. Moreover, there is no good working relationship between most CSOs and the LGs because the CSOs themselves do not disclose their budgets and workplans to the LGs – so they have no moral authority to demand accountability/transparency from the LGs.

10. How has the centralisation of the appointment of the CAO affected decision-

making at the local level?

It has led to taking administrative decisions quickly. Before the recentralisation of the CAOs, even small issues had to go through Council although the law did not require so. On the negative side, unlike before, the CAOs are now threatened by the Central Govt (CG) because it can now easily take action against them.

11. How does the local government electoral system work under the new multi-party

dispensation?

There is no mechanism at all. Even the seating arrangement in Council meetings is haphazard (no demarcation between government side and opposition). There is no guidance on use of party colours and symbols; neither is there guidance on how to moderate Council debates in a multi-party setting. This state of affairs can easily lead to a stalemate – for example, where the Council Executive is pro-NRM and the Council is FDC. It can lead to a paralysis in conducting Council business.

12. How does the local government electoral system impact on the degree of

accountability of local governments to citizens?

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It impacts very negatively. The electioneering process in the LGs is heavily commercialised. So councillors join the LGs with the spirit of recouping -what they spent during the electoral campaigns. So by hook or crook, they have to involve themselves in such as such as getting/influencing district tenders. The electoral system needs to be revamped. While there is law against bribery of voters, what is on the ground is very different. Government must take up the mantle and set standards.

13. Does the existence of safeguards (such as reserved seats for special interest groups

e.g. women, PWDs and youth, permission for independent candidates, recall options) enhance the quality of the local government system and increase political accountability? How? Not necessarily. Beyond representation of these groups, you need to enhance their performance – by empowering them in terms of skills and debating. There is also stigmatisation.

14. What are the laws available to allow for accountability mechanisms between

citizens and communities?

Public Finance and Accountability Regulations Act; LGA; Leadership Code; Public Service Act and Penal Code.

15. Dealt with earlier

16. How do NGOs relate with:

Adhoc. NGOs themselves do not transparently conduct their business.

17. How do family networks; relate with

18. How are these marginalised groups currently represented in the local government

system? Are they legal or they operate only in name? Are there any efforts to streamline representation of marginalised groups under the multi-party dispensation?

There is provision for them. For example, 1/3 of all council seats are for women. However, multi-party is not yet provided for.

19. What suggestions/recommendations do you have that you think can help improve

performance of local councillors and appointed technocrats in their oversight functions?

LGs are based on a thinking of decentralising power as well as resources. Decentralisation depends on support and close and elaborate supervision from the CG. These are lacking. LGs didn’t demand decentralisation. It was initiated by the Centre. However, it is apparent that the Centre’s willingness

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to share power is dwindling – the Centre is now disorganising the LGs. There is little supervision and support from the Centre. Instead of strengthening decentralisation – they have started recentralising powers and disrupting the financial resource base. Probe: What is the future of decentralisation? Slowly by slowly, the Centre is incapacitating the LGs. To stem this, we (MUK, World Bank etc) need to focus on empowering the LGs – build their capacity so that the CG finds them organised. Otherwise, if they are disorganised, then their future is bleak. There is need for other actors to assist the LGs build their capacities. Probe: What can be done? We can work together to consolidate the gains/successes achieved so far (e.g. building on the i@mak achievements). We need to consolidate such programs.

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Transcript No 5 Name of respondent: Mr. Lawrence Banyoya Designation: Commission Secretary Name of respondent: Mr. Adam Babale Designation: Principal Economist Name of Organisation: Local Government Financial Commission 20. How do you understand the following terms in the context of Uganda?

v) Citizens: It is understood as defined in the Constitution of Uganda, i.e. One is a citizen by birth, naturalisation or descent. But when planning, they count all people living in an area - including non-citizens. Also, the situation is citizenship is not very firm – given our porous national boundaries. People from neighbouring countries walk in at will; there is no citizenship identity cards. So, when they are planning, they plan for the entire population – no just citizens.

vi) Local Councillor: A local councillor must be a resident of a local council (not necessarily a citizen).

vii) Civil Society: These are organised groupings that are non-Governmental and represent citizen interests. Some are pressure groups while others provide services in partnership with Government. CSOs are supposed to be involved in the LG planning processes but they too ought to inform the LGs about their activities so that they are integrated in the district plans. Probe: Does the LGFC know how much the CSOs contribute to district budgets? It is not known. Probe: What role do the CSOs play in the oversight and whom do they account to? They only account to donors. There is no good working relationship between the CSOs and the LGs. There are cases – such as in Gulu – where the Chairman has had to suspend some NGOs from working in the district.

viii) Local Communities: LC I is the lowest organised community. These develop their plans and send them to LC II. They are also supposed to play an oversight role over public goods and services provided within their area of jurisdiction.

21. Covered in Qn1

22. What mechanisms / avenues are available to local councillors to enable them fulfil their oversight roles and responsibilities? Local councils are avenues for allocating revenue and discussing the expenditures. They are supposed to monitor projects. They have standing committees (e.g. for production, education or health) that carry out routine oversight. Probe: How are these oversight functions facilitated? (Not sure)

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but they could be facilitated either using the unconditional grant, departmental budgets or using internally generated funds. Up to 5% of non-wage funds are used to facilitate activities such as planning and supervision. There is also a PAF grant for monitoring, evaluation and accountability allocated to LGs by the Min. of Finance. This is shared among departments as well as the District Council. This is under MTEF. Probe: Do local councils have a role to play in revenue mobilisation? They do. The committee for Finance and Planning lays strategies for mobilisation of revenue. But political messages particularly from the CG continue to disorganise revenue collection by the LGs. There is a hazy area regarding what the local councils can tax and what they cannot tax. Any tax must be passed by parliament. Local Councils must first pass an ordinance to approve the tax and then seek parliamentary approval. This bureaucracy suffocates internal revenue generation for the LGs. Suggestion: Instead of going through this winded, bureaucratic political process, the LG ordinances should be handled by the Solicitor General - to avoid getting political and taking too long to be passed.

23. Dealt with under Qn 3

24. Do the local councils have powers to initiate committees of hearings or enquiries?

Can they question procurements or stop questionable transactions including payments, recruitments etc? How?

The LG Public Accounts Committee is mandated to look at some of these – they can request for explanations from the Auditor general report. But We have not heard of any LGs instituting committees of inquiry. Probe: What powers do the Public Service Commission (PSC) have over the District Service Commission (DSC)? In theory, the PSC is supposed to set standards and give guidance. But, in general, technocrats who fall victim of the local councils usually resort to court to address their grievances rather than appealing to the PSC. They have been a number of such cases – especially for the CAOs.

25. How and to what extent have the powers of local councillors impacted on delivery

of public services?

They have played a role. Technocrats know that they are being monitored. On the other hand, you cannot rule out political interference - whereby technical decisions are interfered with by the politicians. But also there are some services that have little connection with the local councils (e.g. health and education). While Health Unit Management Committees are supposed to provide oversight over health care service delivery, they are not effective. Health Units and Educational Institutions (Secondary Schools) has remained unchanged. Secondary schools, for example, report directly to the DEOs. Sub-county budgets do not even reflect budgets of health units and secondary schools. Even primary schools report directly to the DEO yet the law shows that they should report to the sub-counties.

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26. In your opinion, what factors drive the performance of locally elected leaders?

They are not driven by desire to serve; it is mainly their political interests that drive their performance - so that they can be re-elected. That is why they struggle to make roads because a road is easily appreciated by the entire electorate rather than say protection of water wells. Water wells are not that much appreciated by the electorate compared to roads.

27. Are there any deficiencies in the public financial and expenditures management system for local governments? If yes, which ones? How can these deficiencies be addressed?

There deficiencies are mainly in reporting. You see most monies are conditional grants so they find it easy to account for it to the CG. But they are also supposed to make the reports public – by putting them on notice boards. Downward accountability is still very weak. Probe: Has the public been made aware that these accountabilities are supposed to be public? Not really (refer to Fiduciary Report). But also with regard to auditing, there is no effective way of handling the audit reports even when they are sent to parliament. Probe: In the budgeting, how participatory is it? Some LGs say they don’t have money to hold budget conferences as required in the Budget Framework Paper. Although the budgeting process looks very elaborate on paper, it is always a hasty process due to lack of funds. The Cg requires LGs to use their funds to finance the budget conference.

28. In what ways can citizens, communities and civil society organisations get more

involved to improve public financial and expenditures management system for local governments? It is provided for but such information is not disseminated to the general public.

29. How has the centralisation of the appointment of the CAO affected decision-

making at the local level?

It will impact on local accountability because the CAO no longer feel obligated to account to the council (although s/he is supposed to). Local accountability may be compromised. For example, recently, the MOLG organised a meeting for CAOs. Once the Ministry got their views regarding vacant posts, they just went

30. How does the local government electoral system work under the new multi-party

dispensation?

There is no mechanism at all. Even the seating arrangement in Council meetings is haphazard (no demarcation between government side and

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opposition). There is no guidance on use of party colours and symbols; neither is there guidance on how to moderate Council debates in a multi-party setting. This state of affairs can easily lead to a stalemate – for example, where the Council Executive is pro-NRM and the Council is FDC. It can lead to a paralysis in conducting Council business.

31. How does the local government electoral system impact on the degree of

accountability of local governments to citizens? It impacts very negatively. The electioneering process in the LGs is heavily commercialised. So councillors join the LGs with the spirit of recouping -what they spent during the electoral campaigns. So by hook or crook, they have to involve themselves in such as such as getting/influencing district tenders. The electoral system needs to be revamped. While there is law against bribery of voters, what is on the ground is very different. Government must take up the mantle and set standards.

32. Does the existence of safeguards (such as reserved seats for special interest groups

e.g. women, PWDs and youth, permission for independent candidates, recall options) enhance the quality of the local government system and increase political accountability? How? Not necessarily. Beyond representation of these groups, you need to enhance their performance – by empowering them in terms of skills and debating. There is also stigmatisation.

33. What are the laws available to allow for accountability mechanisms between

citizens and communities?

Public Finance and Accountability Regulations Act; LGA; Leadership Code; Public Service Act and Penal Code.

34. Dealt with earlier

35. How do NGOs relate with:

Adhoc. NGOs themselves do not transparently conduct their business.

36. How do family networks; relate with

37. How are these marginalised groups currently represented in the local government

system? Are they legal or they operate only in name? Are there any efforts to streamline representation of marginalised groups under the multi-party dispensation? There is provision for them. For example, 1/3 of all council seats are for women. However, multi-party is not yet provided for.

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38. What suggestions/recommendations do you have that you think can help improve performance of local councillors and appointed technocrats in their oversight functions?

LGs are based on a thinking of decentralising power as well as resources. Decentralisation depends on support and close and elaborate supervision from the CG. These are lacking. LGs didn’t demand decentralisation. It was initiated by the Centre. However, it is apparent that the Centre’s willingness to share power is dwindling – the Centre is now disorganising the LGs. There is little supervision and support from the Centre. Instead of strengthening decentralisation – they have started recentralising powers and disrupting the financial resource base. Probe: What is the future of decentralisation? Slowly by slowly, the Centre is incapacitating the LGs. To stem this, we (MUK, World Bank etc) need to focus on empowering the LGs – build their capacity so that the CG finds them organised. Otherwise, if they are disorganised, then their future is bleak. There is need for other actors to assist the LGs build their capacities. Probe: What can be done? We can work together to consolidate the gains/successes achieved so far (e.g. building on the i@mak achievements). We need to consolidate such programs.

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Transcript No 6 Name of Respondent: Engineer Kagina Designation: Commissioner M&E Organisation: Ministry of Works What is the role of citizens, local communities and CSOs in the road works sector?

There is theory and practice. Roads differ substantially from other services mainly because they are more visible to every citizen – everybody uses roads. When roads are in poor condition, access to other services is affected. So citizens notice very quickly. When there are no medicines in public health units, one can go to a private clinic; but there is no alternative to roads – that is why they are very visible/conspicuous but also because there is money there. When they talk about shoddy work, they are really talking about money – rightly but most times – wrongly. Councils are very important because they sit and haggle about which road should be done – especially towards elections. A councillor who initiates a few protected springs may never get votes for it but a road is a vote catcher. So councillors are very important in the road sector because they are all keen to have roads in their constituencies fixed. There is a Secretary for Works. He can be responsible for roads being done very well or not being done. Road maintenance has been as much as possible been privatised to small labour-based contractors but in the LGs, the contracts are being awarded in exchange for favours or self-awarded. In some parts of the country, the roads are extremely bad because of bad leadership starting with the Sec. for Works and the District Chairperson. I know a couple of districts – and it is one of the main reasons why district tender boards were scrapped – where a lot of the underhand dealings were being done but not because the tender boards were incompetent but because of greed. It is very good to use labour-based contractors because it offers people a living and many contractors have been trained but after sometime you cannot find them because contracts are awarded to those who exchange favours – other contractors are squeezed out of the business. My job is monitoring but there are very many monitors including the councillors, RDCs, IGG etc. Keeping in mind that there are now over 80 districts, one can’t humanly visit all the districts – so the Ministry relies on reports. We are relying on the accuracy of the reports from the District engineers. But the problem is that there is a high turnover of district staff – they are trained and they just leave. You see, the

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newer the district the more enthusiastic its political leadership, the more prone they are too go wrong. There are many district engineers who are on interdiction – but once they are interdicted, the posts remain vacant and because there are no plans submitted (due to the staffing gap created by the interdiction) the district does not receive money for road works. The Ministry cannot release money to districts without comprehensive plans. Probe: Do the citizens have powers to bring technocrats and politicians to account? The community is far removed from in terms of providing oversight – and “because they don’t pay tax”3 - they can’t demand for services. The CG provides about 40% of District Road Requirements. The rest is not done because districts don’t have an alternative source of revenue. The money is sent as conditional grants and there are endless battles with the districts over this money – most of the battles are when the districts break the conditions. Other bodies such as AAMP, CARE, World Vision, USAID and BUCADEV also set aside some money for road works. These do their road works locally (they work with the district not the CG) and the districts usually don’t disclose these monies because of fear that the Ministry would reduce their fund allocation from the centre. Probe: How does the Ministry relate to the CAO? The CAO is the Chief Executive Officer of a District. Plans are all submitted by the CAO but they have to be endorsed by the Council. For example, by end of March, all districts would have submitted all their workplans, Ministry provides comments and send the plans back to the districts. Probe: What are your views about recentralisation of the CAOs? Decentralisation would be good but the situation was running out of control. Actually, the district engineers are under much more threat. The LCs want to award contracts to themselves or to “home boys”. The solution is to reduce government – we have too many politicians. And you see, every five years (new election) we get more riff-raff councillors who intimidate technocrats – especially young technocrats who have not yet stamped their authority on the departments they are in charge of. The elective process that is in place has brought riff-raff politicians. Before, they used to be nominated/appointed and those were better.

3 Most people perceived graduated tax as the only tax they used o pay and once that was scrapped, they believe they don’t pay any tax.

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Transcript No 7 Name of Respondents: Hon. Kunobwa – Deputy Speak Hon. Wasswa F. William – Councillor Buyikwe

Hon. Evaristo Kafuma – District Councilor Seeta

Name of Organisation: Mukono District Council Qn. 1 How do you understand the following terms in the context of Uganda ?

v. citizens; vi. local councillor;

vii. civil society; and viii. local communities

-A citizen is a person born in Uganda as stipulated the 1995 constitution. -A local councilor is a person who represents a specific area as outlined in the 1997 LGA for example a village, parish or sub-county or district. -civil society refers to a group of people or organizations the represent specific interests

Qn 2 In what ways (and to what extent) are citizens and civil society organisations engaged in activities and processes that promote good governance in local governments?

CSOs register in the district and they do perform the functions related to advocacy and sensitization of citizens on issues that relate to their right to services as well as demanding for accountability from their representatives. Citizens promote good governance by participating in activities such as attending and participating in local council activities such as village meetings.

Qn 3 What mechanisms / avenues are available to local councillors to enable them fulfil their oversight roles and responsibilities? Probe LC Oversight Mechanisms in:

Local councilors fulfill their roles their oversight roles through attending council meetings and contributing to council debates. The local councilors are also involved in the monitoring of projects in their areas. Similarly local councilors are also involved in the bottom-up consultations, which contribute to the formulation of the local government policies. Local councilors are also involved in the supervision of the local council projects

Qn4. How effective are these mechanisms? What are the constraints/barriers to effective local council oversight in:

p) revenue allocation and expenditure; q) tender awards;

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r) monitoring of projects such as road works and building of schools; s) hiring and firing human resource; t) monitoring delivery of social services such as health care provision and

educational services etc.

The above mechanisms are effective but of course there are constraints. For example, the elected representative doesn’t take part in the procurement process. When the councilors query a contract, the technical officers call it interference. Councilors also face financial constraints in the execution of their work. Councilors also face constraints in making the right evaluations especially in regard to the monitoring of projects because they are not technical people.

Qn 5 Do the local councils have powers to initiate committees of hearings or enquiries? Can they question procurements or stop questionable transactions including payments, recruitments etc? How? Give examples.

Councilors have the powers to initiate hearings on various issues. Many of these hearings take places in the respective committees such as health and education. Feedback is the given to the council. Most of the hearing relate to shoddy work done by contracts as well as poor service delivery by the technical people.

Qn 6. How and to what extent have the powers of local councillors impacted on delivery of public services? Give examples.

To a less extent the local councilors have impacted on service delivery because the keep an eye on the local contractors as well as the technical personnel in the provision of services. Secondly through committees policies are initiated and such policies help in governing the local governments.

Qn 7. In your opinion, what factors drive the performance of locally elected leaders? Elaborate on each of the factors.

The performance of the locally elected leaders is driven by the electorate’s satisfaction. If the electorate is not satisfied then chances of being re-elected are very slim hence the issue of accountability to the electorate is the most important driving factor.

Qn.8. Are there any deficiencies in the public financial and expenditures management system for local governments? If yes, which ones? How can these deficiencies be addressed?

There are financial, budgeting and auditing guidelines to be followed in the spending of local government finances, so I would not say there are financial deficiencies but they are problems related to lack of information and transparency. This is not only on the side of the in the elected representatives but also appointed leaders. There is sometimes no forum through which the councilors can get to know of how much money has been released from the center. The LGA stipulates that the LCV chairman.

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Q9. In what ways can citizens, communities and civil society organisations get more involved to improve public financial and expenditures management system for local governments?

Citizens participate in the budgetary planning process especially at the initiating stage – But the citizens seem not to know the importance of budgeting. In many cases citizens are not empowered to ask about financial matter.

Qn.10 How has the centralisation of the appointment of the CAO affected decision-making at the local level?

The centralization of the CAO has given more powers to the CAOs. Now they look at themselves as answerable to the center, yet they are under decentralization, they are more answerable to the elected councilors.

Qn11, How does the local government electoral system work under the new multi-party dispensation?

• How do parties nominate their candidates? • How are local political campaigns financed? • What are the challenges?

Every party fields its own candidate but in some instance people look beyond

party wishes. => Political campaigns are financed from individual sources. Qn12. How does the local government electoral system impact on the degree of accountability of local governments to citizens?

Physical accountability => citizens want to see returns in terms of services e.g Councilor Night introduced USE in Namataba – Councillor Wasswa lobbied the Hon. Mutagambwa, the Minister of water to have water piped from Kawolo to Nagojje, to Namataba.

Qn.13. Does the existence of safeguards (such as reserved seats for special interest groups e.g. women, PWDs and youth, permission for independent candidates, recall options) enhance the quality of the local government system and increase political accountability? How?

There are reserved served seat the marginalized people. But that is only for representation but not delivery e.g the PWD have a wider constituency, but not facilitated.

15. How do communities relate with:

g. local councils; and h. technocrats in the local government system? i. How does this interaction impact on service delivery? Give examples.

Councillors are seen a people who should rescue the communities. Councilors are in touch the local people yet not with the technocrat. The councilors are elected

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and they know the technocrats are accountable to the council but, the technocrats pay little attention to issue raised by council, much mention attention is given to the CAO because he is supervisor.

16. How do NGOs relate with:

j) local councils; and k) technocrats in the local government system? l) How does this interaction impact on service delivery? Give examples.

The councilors described the CSO selfish! They think they are different people from the districts CSO are obliged to present their budgets to the districts but rarely do they do this. However, CSOs interface with the line technocrats, perhaps because technocrats will second extension of an operation license.

Qn 17 How do family networks; relate with

g) local councils; and h) technocrats in the local government system? i) How does this interaction impact on service delivery? Give examples.

Family networks rarely influence the decision in council .

18. How are these marginalised groups currently represented in the local government system? Are they legal or they operate only in name? Are there any efforts to streamline representation of marginalised groups under the multi-party dispensation?

The marginalized still remain under represented. Their representation remains at 30% and should compete under individual merit.

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Name of respondent: Mr Zïe Garioyo Designation: Consultant and Board Member Name of Organisation: Uganda Debt Network Qn 1 What (civic) activities are this organisation involved in? 1 Research, training and activities that relate to helping CSOs by helping them develop capacity and strategies to demand accountability from local leaders Qn 2 Whose interests does your organisation represent? NGOs and other civil society, groups

Qn3 How does your organisation relate with citizens, local governments and service providers? Improve local governance through research, carryout training for citizens and civil society organizations, as well as interface more closely with local governments to increase the local governments’ knowledge and sensitivity to concerns of local groups Qn 4 What mechanisms does your organisation have in place to make it accountable to the people whose interests it represents (or to the citizens)? By empowering citzens’ ability to demand for accountability. Citizens have the duty to demand accountability that is why there is a duty to build citizens’ capacity in demanding for their rights from public servants. This is the purpose of local governance. It is about empowering local communities with tools of asking questions for service delivery. The aim of decentralizing is to promote democratic decision making Qn 5 Does your organisation interact with other organisations/networks in implementing its activities and how? Yes, we do interact with a host of other organizations. Some are local while others are international networks Qn 6. What impact - if any (give examples) – does that interaction have on:

c) Delivery of public services by the local governments? d) Accountability of local governments to the citizens?

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The local government has a duty to provide service but is negative towards citizen Demands!!! However enhancing the citizens’ capacities to make demands makes the local government leadership responsive to the local peoples demands through ensuring that the services are delivered on time. It also keeps the appointed officials on their toes because they are aware that the citizens will demand for accountability on how resources were utilized. Qn 7. What challenges does your organisation face when dealing with local governments? Local governments are negative towards citizen Demands. This makes our work as promoters of public accountability very challenging. Qn 8. How have local councils impacted on local service delivery? Local councils are very important because they watch over the appointed officials and represent the community in promoting service delivery especially through contributing towards the development of policies in districts as well as monitoring the implementation of those policies. In so doing local councils positively contribute to service delivery Qn 9.What are the factors that drive the performance of locally elected leaders? Elected representatives are chosen to do their work. They are motivated because this a form of employment which is periodically evaluated which through elections – somebody has to contest that position so there is a motivation to do work and present results. Qn 10. T What deficiencies are in the public financial and expenditures management system for local governments? How can these deficiencies be addressed? The deficiencies relate to the whole financial system in the country –There is secrecy of transaction. They are weaknesses in the local government auditing systems. The whole hierarchy of accounting is that of accounting from above not below. For example the way the government budget is structured at the local and central level is unfair. The incomes of civil servant come from allowance and they will always work for an opportunity to create an allowance including the CAO, CFO, etc. Civil savants spend time chasing vouchers instead of working. This is the biggest source of inefficiency. Accountability There are so many unauthorized expenditures that take place within the local government financial management system e.g advances – not provided for in the laws – Many take advances and never pay back Qn 11. How has the centralisation of the appointment of the CAO affected decision-making at the local level? CAO is the overseer of local government funds. It is worse with CAO being appointed. He is protected – has job security and works to protect that job by appeasing his bosses at the center. Qn 12 How are the terms:

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i. citizens; ii. local councillors; iii. civil society; and iv. local communities understood in Uganda?

In Uganda there are issues like citizen. The whole issue of citizens relates to patriotism – may be citizens for those in power but not those out of power.

Local councilors refer to peoples’ representatives from LC1 to LC 5. The village is the

main power center. – Councillor is a source of power and a representative of the vulnerable people at the most local level.

Civil Society as an area – larger whole interns of interests, values vs – small functional

institutions like state and private sector.

-> Local communities are the groups that form the pivot for civil society. Qn13. What are the perceived roles and responsibilities of: i) citizens; ii) civil society; and iii) local communities in promoting good governance in local governments? => The three groups are supposed to play a role in Building a democracy, .Building accountability, upholding good governance principles, pay the taxes and demand the facilities the are entitled to, but as citizens we always fail in our duty to uphold all these and this has an impact on promoting good governance in local governments. Qn 14. To what extent do they fulfil these roles and responsibilities? What are the major challenges and barriers they face in fulfilling those roles and responsibilities? Local people lack knowledge on their civic duties. They cannot take part in participating in debates and meetings. They are not aware what are their powers and responsibilities what are the limits? Above all local people are lacking in governance issue. Qn 15. What are the different types of CSOs that are involved in promoting good governance in local governments? How do they interact? There are so many but can not make a distinction in types Qn 16 What suggestions/recommendations do you have that you think can help improve performance of local councillors and appointed technocrats in their oversight functions? 1. There must be Salary Reforms especially on the side of the civil savants.

2. There is need for improvement in documentation in local government. For example a local government may have over 30 account e.g education may have 10 Accounts. These need to be must be consolidated. Votes are managed differently by different people.

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3. There must be Salary Reforms especially on the side of the civil savants. There is need for improvement in documentation in local government. For example a local government may have over 30 account e.g education may have 10 Accounts. These need to be must be consolidated.