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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ffiISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCE!4ENT

REGION V

Report No. 50-312/78-021

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Docket No. 50-312 License No. DPR - 54 Safeguards Group

Licensee:j,

Sacramento Municipal Utility District

j P. O. Box'15830

Sacramento, California 95813

Facility Name: Rancho Seco

; Inspection at: Rancho Seco

Inspection Conducted: January 30-31 and February 2-3, 1978

Inspectors: t. .f f .h~ Y2Md

O <: %[j ohnson, Reactor Inspector1/nj, ,P. H Date Signeo4

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H.dC nter, Reactor Inspector Date Signed

Y A WW)&hG. W h n, Reactor Inspector Intern Date Signed

Approved By: 't [)4# ";1/p3/f8,

J. L. fews(Thief,ReactorOperationsand 7 ate 41gned' -

Nuclear Support Branch*

Sumary:.

Inspection on January 30-31 and February 2-3,1978 (Report No. 50-312/78-02)i

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of facility operation,organization and administration,10 CFR 21 reporting, reported licensee

; events, Integrated Leak ' Rate Test report, and licensee action on previousI inspection findings. The inspection involved 48 inspector-hours on-sita

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by three NRC inspectors.

Results: No noncompliance items or deviations were identified.,

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IE:V Form 219 (2) .

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted.

R. Rodriguez, Plant Superintendent / Manager, Nuclear Operations*R. Columbo, Technical Assistant

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*D. Cass, Maintenance SupervisorN. Brock, Instrument Control Supervisor

*M. Carter, Shift Supervisor*G. Coward, Plant Mechanical . Engineer !, .

: D. Whitney, Plant Nuclear Engineer i

*J. Sullivan, Quality Arsurance Engineer |

A. Locy, Electrical Maintenance Foreman

The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several otherlicensee employees, including members of the technical and engineer-ing staff, technicians, reactor operators, and maintenance personnel. j

* Denotes those present at the exit interview.|

2. Licensee Action on Previous I.;scection Findings

I (Closed) Inspection of Limitorque Valve Operators (50-312/77-06).A previous inspection report discussed the licensee's plans to inspectvalve operators similar to the BWST isolation valve which had previously-

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failed to operate, as described in LER 77-12. A licensee representa-tive stated that these inspections had been completed with no other

'inoperable valves observed, although a similar condition of wear,in varying degrees, had been found in some of. the other valve opera-tors. As stated in LER 77-12, the problem affects the ability ofthe motor operator to reengage following manual operation. A follow-up report submitted by the licensee on January 26, 1978, described -the conditions observed and stated that the valves concerned wouldbe cycled in automatic following manual operation to ensure properreengagement and alignment for. automatic operation. The licenseewas observed to have issued an operating order to this effect.

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(Closed) Minimum sensitivity of LLRT's (50-312/77-06). The use of -

minimum instrument sensitivities in accounting for local leak ratetest (LLRT) measurements rather than logging penetration leakage as-0SCFMwasreviewedbytheliegnsee. The values in question wereon the order of a factor of 10 below related limits and thereforewere not significant. Also, inaccuracies associated with assigninga minimum sensitivity numb?r for the LLRT measurements created otheraccuracy errors. Therefore, the licensee will continue the pastlogging practices in the area of local leak rate testing.

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W(0 pen) Test, vent and drain connections (50-312/77-06). A licenseerepresentative stated that a signature space will be added to theLLRT data sheet to document the cognizant engineer's review of testresults. The cognizant engineer's signature on the local leak ratetest data sheet (SP 205.02) will indicate that all appropriate

-barriers to containment leakage during a postulated loss of coolantaccident for the tested penetration have been tested and/or verifiedin the proper position. This includes test, vent and drain linescoming off lines penetrating the containment, between the containmentisolation valves.

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3. Organization and Administration

Facility organization and administration were examined during theinspection. Included were consideration of personnel qualifications,shift crew composition, and membership and qualifications of the PlantReview Comittee and Management Safety Review Committee. A change infacility organizational structure was noted to be pending. This wasdescribed in a letter to the NRC dated January 10, 1978, and was stillunder discussion between the licensee and NRR.

No noncompliance items or deviations were identified._

4. Plant Ooerations/

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A review of plant operations was conducted, including examination ofselected logs and records, operating orders, jumper (bypass) log en-tries, and " reportable occurrence" reports. During a tour of the plant,observations were made regarding the status of alarms, monitoringinstruments, seismic re:traints, valve positions, piping system con-ditions, houseceeping, control room manning, and other plant conditions.The status of the plant was discussed with licensed operators on duty.

No noncompliance items or deviations were identified.

5. 10 CFR Part 21 Reouirements -

The inspector conducted a review of the licensee's actions to implement10 CFR Part 21. This included examination of the licensee's imple-menting procedure (QCI No.10) and of documents posted in accordancewith Section 21.6 of Part 21. Review of procurement documents dateds'ubsequent to January 6,1978, showed none subject to 10 CFR 21. Onlyone condition had been considered by the licensee, and this wasreported pursuant to Part 21 (letter, SMUD to Region V, dated Dec-ember 30,1977). The following comments were presented to the licenseefollowing the review.

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Oa. The licensee's proeddure (QCI No.10) discussed the review and

reporting of defects, but did not cover the reporting of failuresto comply with NRC requirements (when related to a substantialsafetyhazard). The inspector stated that this should be in-cluded. .

b. The procedure provided for QA review of certain documents toidentify deviations which should be reviewed for possible report-ing under 10 CFR 21. The procedure should also provide forpossible initiation of a Part 21 report based upon deviations ornoncompliance identified by other groups or individuals (thiswas included in the notice posted pursuant to Section 21.6).-

c. The term " defect" was used in place of " deviation" four timesin the QCI 10 description of the evaluation process (a " deviation"becomes a " defect" only after the evaluation determines it to beone).

d. The inspector observed that certain information had been postedpursuant to Section 21.6, but noted that the manner in whichit was posted might not assure permanence of posting.

e. According to licensee representatives, the Management SafetyReview Committee (MSRC) determined that posting pursuant toOs Section 21.6 would be done only at three locations at the plantsite. The inspector observed that activities subject to Part 21 iare also conducted at the district offices in Sacramento, most '

notably procurement, design review, core management and quality |assurance activities. A representative of the MSRC stated ;

during a subsequent phone conversation that posting in accord-ance with Section 21.6 would also be provided at the district ;

offices. 1.

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On December 30, 1977, the licensee submitted a. written Part 21 reportto the regional office regarding an error in the computer software ;used for calculating DNBR valves. Based upon review of the licensee's '

report and a related report fro'm Babcock and Wilcox, the Office of i

Inspection and Enforcement detemined that other Babcock and Wilcoxfacilities were not affected. Review during the current inspectionof the condition reported by the licensee established that correctiveactions had been taken at Rancho Seco as described in the. licensee'sDecember 30 letter.

No noncompliance items or deviations were identified.

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6. Review of ILRT Report

The inspector verified that the first Type A test report - Reactor |

Containment Building Integrated Leak Rate test, dated January,1978- ,

includes the information required to be reported by Appendix J to i<

10 CFR 50. The test results and/or supporting information discussed ;

in the report appeared to be consistent with design predictions and .'

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performance specifications. The reported mass point leak rate atthe 95% upper confidence limit was 0.026 weight-per-cent-per-day.(acceptance criteria is 0.075 weight-per-cent-per-day.)

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The inspector noticed that penetration 62, the penetration that was'

used to pressurize and depressurize the containment, was not localleak rate tested after use. The licensee had no requirement to testthis penetration, but did commit during the exit interview to run alocal leak rate test on P62 by March 1,1978. This item will be;

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reviewed by the licensee for inclusion in the test procedure for thenext Type A test.

No noncompliance items or deviations were identified.

7. Licensee Event Followup

O The circumstances and corrective actions described-in Licensee EventReports submitted since the previous inspection were verified. Thedetails of each event had been reported to facility management and,

reviewed by the Plant Review Committee. Licensee Event Reports re-viewed were as follows:

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LER No. 77-20 - Failure of high pressure injection valve toopen.

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LER No. 77-21 - Computer software error.

Discussions and log (review showed that the breaker for valve SFV-23812had been inspected as stated in LER 77-20), with no obvious problemsnoted. During subsequent discussiens.by phone, licensee representa-tives stated that further review and discussions with those involvedhad led to the conclusion that a loose fuse holder had been the cause.,

| The licensee also stated that a followup would be submitted.

! No noncompliance items or deviations were identified.

8. Independent Inspection Effort

The inspector verified that it is not possible to disable the SFAS,

i feature (s) associated with reactor building pressure by capping the

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O sensing lines or closing isolation valves inside the containment. :!Calibration records were reviewed to verify that the calibration

program on the pressure transmitters and indicators was up to date.

No noncompliance items or deviations were identified.

9. Exit Interview _

The inspectors conducted an exit interview with licensee representatives(denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection onJanuary 3. The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed.Licensee representatives.made the following remarks in response to.

certain of the items discussed by the inspectors:

Stated that a signature space would be added to the LLRT datasheet to document test completion and the cognizant engineer'sreview of test results. (Paragraph 2)

Stated that procedure QCI No.10 would be revised to incorporatethe inspector's coments. (Paragraph 5)

Subsequent to the inspection, licensee representatives stated duringtelephone discussions that posting in accordance with 10 CFR 21.6would be provided at the District Office (Paragraph 5).

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