ú: Aesthetic Experience

lssues in Aesthetics

f Marxism, extensions of Wittgen-m Philosophical lnuestigations. Thosed before the most far-out sorts ofin all the arts became familiar and,hers. All of these developments, asrnany other philosophers and art

lerstanding of various matters andoints.a strong central thread of concernny work in aesthetics since I firstularly in ry47; and, looking back,e articulation of the distinctivelyrr with systematic solutions to theon this enterprise. Several funda-ld during the r95os have been oc-et I have not found it reasonable-,me have even (in my judgment)rlopments, or at least have provednecessary improvements, to thosetheir turn, seem to hold up underfundamental views are mistaken,.ve to be scrapped, I believe it isey can be carried, without beingrto tautology. They still commendlking up into themselves ideas ofrnd present, and giving reasonablythe most serious questions in aes-

rot of course propose to review allbeen interesting developments inhich my views have been affected.I issues that are still plainly basic,rssion, and that I dealì with in onelhis volume. I welcome the oppor-nore recent thoughts on these is-time to criticisms or to altemativeive manner that I hope will not be: very many other writings I could

ú: Aesthetic Experience

fUOUCH some members of each opposing party would im-I pugn so balanced a judgment, it is in my opinion still an open

question whether it is possible-or, if possible, worthwhile-todistinguish a peculiarly aesthetic sort of experience. The questionof possibility involves the debatability of the claim that there is acommon character that is (r) discernible in a wide range of ourencounters with the world and (z) justifiably called "aesthetic."The question of worthwhileness involves the debatability of thefurther claim that, once distinguished, this character is sufficientlysubstantial and noteworthy to serve as the ground for importanttheoretical constructions such as we shall come to in subsequentessays.

Before we begin our own search for this character, or inquirewhether it has already been found, we ought to consider carefullywhat it is we are searching for, and how we shall know that wehave found it. Our hope is to end up justified in saying that someexperiences are marked by aesthetic character and some are not;and of those that have it, that some have it more markedly thanothers. Experiences with such character need not be universallyassociated with objects that belong to familiar artistic categories.(It is convenient to have the term "artkind instance" to coverpoems, paintings, sculptures, musical compositions, dances, andso on, without-at this stage-raising or begging questions aboutthe definition of art in general.) But to deserve the epithet "aes-thetic," such experiences ought (r) to be obtainable commonlythrough, or in, the cognition of artkind instances, (z) to be ob-tainable in their most pronounced character from artkind instancesthat have been judged to be outstanding examples of their kind,and (3) to be obtainable in some degree from other objects orsituations (especially natural objects) that are often grouped withartkind instances in respect to an interest we take in them.

285

286

It is not surprising that it has proved very difficult to distin-guish and articulate an aesthetic character of experience. Accuratephenomenological description, especially of common strains in sorichly varied a class of phenomena, requires more care and effortthan (I am afraid) many of us have been willing to make, andperhaps were too easily discouraged because *e oJtetr had unrea-sonable expectations of exactness in our results. It is also, andconsequently, not surprising that there has been a good deal ofhonest difference of opinion about what the aesthetic-character is,even among those who agree that there is such a thing. But herewe must not follow those who have magnified and emphasizedthese differences in order to cast doubt on the whole inquiry.some features very widely and frequently found in experienËes ôfartkind instances have been noted by perceptive aestheticians,and very often their divergent descriptions, when carefully ana-lyzed in relation to_the examples offered, turn out to be quiteclose in meaning. Moreover, if we do not insist a priori thai theaesthetic character must be a single and simple o.,", b.,t look in-stead for a set of central criteria, we may find that we can ac-commodate and reconcile insights and discoveries from severalquarters.

This last conclusion, I must confess, is one that I have come toonly over a long period of intermittent reflection on the problemarrd after a gradual recognition that my earlier attempts to capturethe aesthetic character were defective and incomplete in wayå thateither became apparent to me as I tried to apply them aná workout their consequences or were thoughtfully called to my atten-tion. My struggles with the problem have taken two forms, whichare not utterly hopeless, but which have not managed to satisfyme fully.

For some time I tried working with the concept on aesthetic ex-perience, trying to make the most of Dewey,s inipiring ideas (asthey have always struck me) by sharpening-them ànd säeing howthey_ can actually be applied to concrete u.lkind instances. L *yAesthetics,t I made a somewhat sketchy attempt to fix this conceptusably, and ten years later, in Essay 5, I trièd to revive and re_new it, after it had wilted somewhat in the intervening climate ofopinion. I must say that I am still a partisan of aesthetic experi-

t. Aesthetics: Problems in the philosophy of Criticism, zd ed. (Indianapolis, rggr).See "Postscript tg9o."

Some Persistent lssues in Aesthetics Aesthetic Exp

ence; I don't fully understand howare clear and exemplary cases of r

Dewey's words (at least as supplemAnd if there are such experiences,one could reasonably refuse to callcome to see that, even so/ only ;aesthetic life can be given in such I

one of Dewey's most insistent and Ihave an unusually high degree of tpleteness, and when you listen, fcquartet, the experience has this clgree. But even if you tune in the qrfor a minute or two before you ar€that something aesthetic has happerness or consummation. During thaence has taken on a character (and t

music-hearing experience) that iswas present before you tuned in tsome of it, of course, may linger ertelephone or the inopportune (evetman at the door. So it seems imprtroduce a broader concept of thereserving the term "aesthetic experather special occasions.

It was such considerations as thrand z, to explore the possibility ofas a species of hedonic quality, wment," "satisfaction," and "pleasuhave a good deal of support from a

thinkers, especially in Great Britasuaded that there is important trrfound any serious and cogent refution that experiences with aesthetijoyable (which is not to say the¡course; see Essay 3). Examples ofbeen placed in galleries (for exampling corpses by Gaetano Zumbo-bthey are not hard to find these daysant objects have been placed inargue (r) that our experience of th(z) that, taken all in all, our experi

i Issues in Aesthetics

ras proved very difficult to distin-ic character of experience. Accurateespecially of common strains in so

rena, requires more care and efforts have been willing to make, andraged because we often had unrea-ress in our results. It is also, andhat there has been a good deal ofrout what the aesthetic character is,:hat there is such a thing. But here: have magnified and emphasizedcast doubt on the whole inquiry.frequently found in experiences of

roted by perceptive aestheticians,: descriptions, when carefully ana-ples offered, turn out to be quitef we do not insist a priori that theringle and simple one, but look in-ria, we may find that we can ac-ghts and discoveries from several

confess, is one that I have come to:rmittent reflection on the problemthat my earlier attempts to capturefective and incomplete in ways thatas I tried to apply them and work:e thoughtfully called to my atten-rblem have taken two forms, whichvhich have not managed to satisfy

ng with the concept of aesthetic ex-ost of Dewey's inspiring ideas (as¡ sharpening them and seeing howr concrete artkind instances. In mysketchy attempt to fix this concept

L Essay 5, I tried to revive and re-ewhat in the intervening climate ofstill a partisan of aesthetic experi-

Ity of Críticisnt, zd ed. (lndianapolis, r98r).

Aesthetic Experience 287

ence; I don't fully understand how anyone could deny that thereare clear and exemplary cases of such experience, described inDewey's words (at least as supplemented and qualified by mine!).And if there are such experiences, I do not understand how any-one could reasonably refuse to call them "aesthetic." But I havecome to see that, even so, only a very limited account of ouraesthetic life can be given in such terms. Aesthetic experiences-one of Dewey's most insistent and most eloquently made points-have an unusually high degree of unity in the dimension of com-pleteness, and when you listen, for example, to an entire stringquartet, the experience has this character to a very marked de-gree. But even if you tune in the quartet in the middle, and listenfor a minute or two before you are torn away, there is no doubtthat something aesthetic has happened to you-without complete-ness or consummation. During that stretch of time, your experi-ence has taken on a character (and not just the property of being amusic-hearing experience) that is strongly different from whatwas present before you tuned in or after you tune out-thoughsome of it, of course, may linger even as you turn to the janglingtelephone or the inopportune (even if welcome) television repair-man at the door. So it seems important, indeed essential, to in-troduce a broader concept of the aesthetic in experience, whilereserving the term "aesthetic experience," as a count noun, forrather special occasions.

It was such considerations as these that led me, as in Essays rand z, to explore the possibility of treating the aesthetic characteras a species of hedonic quality, working with the terms "enjoy-ment," "satisfaction," and "pleasure." Here I believed myself tohave a good deal of support from a number of eighteenth-centurythinkers, especially in Great Britain. And again, I am still per-suaded that there is important truth in this doctrine: I haven'tfound any serious and cogent refutation, at least, of the proposi-tion that experiences with aesthetic character are intrinsically en-joyable (which is not to say they are intrinsically valuable, ofcourse; see Essay 3). Examples of unpleasant objects that havebeen placed in galleries (for example, the famous figures of decay-ing corpses by Gaetano Zumbo-but choose your own examples;they are not hard to find these days) only go to show that unpleas-ant objects have been placed in galleries, unless we go on toargue (r) that our experience of them has aesthetic character and(z) that, taken all in all, our experience of them does not involve

an enioyment that encompasses or assimilates the disgust (thesmall size of Zumbo's figures creates a certain detachment). Still,enjoying is taking pleasure in, and a particular kind of enjovmentmust in the end be a function of the kind of thing in whichpleasure is taken. There is something threateningly reductionisticabout taking the defining feature of aesthetically characterizedexperiences to be a particular kind of pleasure; and there aretheoretical problems that arise in relating such a view to the justi-fication of reasons in art criticism (see Essay z). So I have thoughtit worthwhile to cast about for a promising alternative.

My present disposition' is to work with a set of five criteria of theaesthetic character of experience. I suggest that we apply these crite-ria as a family, with one exception of a necessary condition: an ex-perience has aesthetic character if and only if it has the first of thefollowing features and at least three of the others. (But I am notwedded to a particular formula, rather trying to open up a line offurther inquiry; it may be that the list of criteria should be ex-panded or that the number of features specified for the applica-tion of the term "aesthetic character" snould be decreased.)

-

r. Obiect directedness. A willingly accepted guidance over the suc-cession of one's mental states by phenomenally objective prop-erties (qualities and relations) of a perceptual or intentional fieldon which attention is fixed with a feeling that things are work-ing or have worked themselves out fittingly.

z. Felt freedom. A sense of release from the dominance of someantecedent concerns about past and future, a relaxation andsense of harmony with what is presented or semantically in-voked by it or implicitly promised by it, so that what comes hasthe air of having been freely chosen.

3. Detached øffect. A sense that the objects on which interest isconcentrated are set a little at a distance emotionally-a certaindetachment of affect, so that even when we are confronted withdark and terrible things, and feel them sharply, they do notoppress but make us aware of our power to rise above them.

4. Actiae discoaery. A sense of actively exercising constructive pow-ers of the mind, of being challenged by a variety of potentiallyconflicting stimuli to try to make them cohere; a keyed-up state

e. Fi¡st presented in a presidential address to the Eastern Division of the Amer-ican Philosophical Association, December r¡78 ("In Defense of Aesthetic Value");see Proceedings and. Addresses ofThe American Philosophical Association 5z(197):721-49.See also Essay 6, sec. z.

Some Persistent Issues ín Aesthetics

amounting to exhilaration in ser

cepts and between meanings, a s

intelligibilitY'5. Wholeness. A sense of integratioi

to wholeness from distractingby inclusive sYnthesis as wellsþonding contentment, even thiñvolves-self-acceptance and self

Each of these features calls for a Ione takes us back to a continuing cc

resume brieflY.The first feature, object directedr

general agreement can be had. It i

quite broadlY. I have in mind not orwhere we are intenselY absorbed iring or paying close and undivide<musicaf composition, but also othsituation in question is merely interwhat is hapPening in the world otensely and seriouslY of the sYmbopainting, or, confrontecl with an irart, we consider a ProPosition oraffairs the artist brings to our atteninstructions for apprehending it infollow the waY it works itself outcovery; but even in the case of a Pacourse the same Process of discov¡nature as we exPlore it ProbinglY; i

controlling or emerging sense thatis accepted for what it is. This I

actively engaged as it is, has oftenour experience of artkind instance¡seems to me PlainlY Present even I

is a tragedy of horrors or a Poiglminder of real evils about us' If wecourse there can be no claim thailasted, had aesthetic character (weto, or ordered to, or in some otherwe willinglY accePted the object'sIf we choose to continue the exPet

ú lssues in Aesthetics

sses or assimilates the disgust (the¡ creates a certain detachment). Stitl,., and a particular kind of enjoymention of the kind of thing in whichmething threateningly reductionistic:ature of aesthetically characterizedar kind of pleasure; and there aree in relating such a view to the justi-:ism (see Essay z). So I have thoughtrr a promising alternative.o work with a set of five criteria of theI suggest that we apply these crite-

ption of a necessary condition: an ex-ler if and only if it has the first of thest three of the others. (But I am notrla, rather trying to open up a line ofrat the list of criteria should be ex-of features specified for the applica-raracter" should be decreased.)

ingly accepted guidance over the suc-tates by phenomenally objective prop-ons) of a perceptual or intentional field:d with a feeling that things are work-rselves out fittingly.release from the dominance of somerut past and future, a relaxation andwhat is presented or semantically in->romised by it, so that what comes has:ely chosen.that the objects on which interest islle at a distance emotionally-a certainhat even when we are confronted with, and feel them sharply, they do notrre of our power to rise above them.of actively exercising constructive pow-; challenged by a variety of potentiallyto make them cohere; a keyed-up state

rl add¡ess to the Eastem Division of the Amer-rmber 1978 ("In Defense of Aesthetic Value");nerican Philosophical Association 5z (rg7g\:723-49.

Aesthetic Experience

amounting to exhilaration in seeing connections between per-cepts and between meanings, a sense (which may be illusory) ofintelligibility.

5. Wholeiess. A sense of integration as a Person, of being restoredto wholeness from distracting and disruptive influences þutby inclusive synthesis as well as by exclusion), and a cone-sponding contentment, even through disturbing feelings, thatinvolves self-acceptance and self-expansion.

Each of these features calls for a little commentary; and the lastone takes us back to a continuing controversy that I should like toresume briefly.

The first feature, object directedness, is one on which I believegeneral agreement can be had. It is, of course, framed to applyquite broadly. I have in mind not only the plain and obvious caseswhere we are intensely absorbed in the contemplation of a paint-ing or paying close and undivided attention to the course of amusical composition, but also other cases where the object orsituation in question is merely intentional: we are concerned withwhat is happening in the world of a novel, we are thinking in-tensely and seriously of the symbolic significance of a figure in apainting, or, confronted with an instance of conceptual or "idea"ãrt, we consider a proposition or a theme or a possible state ofaffairs the artist brings to our attention. When the work embodiesinstructions for apprehending it in a determinate serial order, wefollow the way it works itself out, and this is a process of dis-covery; but even in the case of a painting or a sculpture there is ofcourse the same process of discovery, of gradual revelation of itsnature as we explore it probingly; and thus there can be the samecontrolling or emerging sense that something is worked out andis accepted for what it is. This willing surrender, limited andactively engaged as it is, has often been noted as characteristic ofour experience of artkind instances. And, as I suggested above, itseems to me plainly present even when what we are dealing withis a tragedy of horrors or a poignant and (by itself) painful re-minder of real evils about us. If we are repelled and turn away, ofcourse there can be no claim that the experience, even while itlasted, had aesthetic character (we looked because we were forcedto, or ordered to, or in some other way involuntarily, not becausewe willingly accepted the object's control over our mental states).If we choose to continue the experience because we must actually

289

290

see and feel the working out of what is there, and the rightness ofthat working out, then our experience satisfies at least the first-and necessary----criterion of aesthetic chafacter.

Felt freedom is perhaps the hardest feature to talk about verydefinitely. I point to it as a notable ingredient in that experience Ialluded to earlier, of turning on the radio and suddenly hearing,say, the first-movement second subject of Mozart's String Quartetin A: that lift of the spirit, sudden dropping away of thoughts andfeelings that were problematic, that were obstacles to be over-come or hindrances of some kind-a sense of being on top ofthings, of having one's real way, even though not having actuallychosen it or won it, Much deeper senses of "freedom"-meta-physically and epistemologically speaking-have been invoked intalking about the arts, by Kant and Schiller and others; I amstaying with what I take to be phenomenology here, however,without moving to transcendental psychology (of course there is agood deal of valid phenomenology in Kant and Schiller, too). It is,I take it, this felt freedom that has been so feared and condemnedby the Puritan-religious or political-as a temptation to danger-ous escapism and failure of nerve amid the actual trials of thereligious or the revolutionary life. And he is right to be con-cerned. For it is in respect to this second feature that art hasaffinities with certain drugs, which can also generate (though ofcourse not through their mere cognition) intense forms of feltfreedom. It is in this respect that art can be enervating and anti-social, and many other unfortunate things it has often been ac-cused of. I am convinced that this second feature is real andsignificant. Nevertheless, I do not want to make it a necessarycondition of the aesthetic; in our encounter with artkind instancesthat are intricate and puzzling and hard to make out, that offerresistances and obstacles to understanding or perception, this feltfreedom may be absent or at a low pitch. Yet even such experi-ences may have the aesthetic character if they meet the othercriteria.

The element of detachment in aesthetic experience, under var-ious terms, such as "disinterestedness," "psychical distance," and"will-less contemplation," has very often been remarked, and (atleast before the post-World War II avant-garde) has very oftenbeen considered central to its nature. I do not wish to formulatethis feature so that it becomes enmeshed in the controversiessurrounding the terms in which it has been described, or in such

Some Persistent lssues in Aesthetics Aesthetic ExP

a way that it is tied to anY Particulogical or ethical theory. The heart

'

viéw, say, the Gaetano Zumbo scteven violentlY we maY resPond, ittant to add that we do not confusrthat we can avoid feeling full emotiwith corpses, that our feelings artgently screened from direct contactãures themselves' In manY differeartkinds are designed to lend somtaffects they Produce: giving an aiautonomy and reflexiveness, of seP

so on. But of course this is not alwbeen pointed out, there is often tlmansñip, coming close to the bolriskingihe disappearance of detacally try not to come as catastroPhhigh-wire artist falls to his death, oof a museum guard is asked forSergei Eisenstein remarks that whGa{Masks (tg4-4), about a gas f;it was a failure-l take it, from theit might not have been a failure

'

realistic to preserve detachment othing else to offer in the waY of ar

to mãke even this imPortant and e:

experience a necessary condition'It is extraordinarily difficult to c¡

in which the practical or technologcannot enter into the exPerience othis third feature of detached afnomenologY of aesthetic exPerierZenzen-drawing uPon Heideggethese difficulties' For example, henormal PercePtion where objectstems of instrumentalitY, in an aestripped of its instrumental 'valutaffect there is a lack of concern ab'

3. M. I. Zenze¡, "4 Ground for Aesth'Art Criticism 14 þ976):47r'

I

Issues in Aesthetics

what is there, and the rightness ofrerience satisfies at least the first-thetic chaJacter.hardest feature to talk about veryrble ingredient in that experience In the radio and suddenly hearing,subject of Mozart's String Quartet

en dropping away of thoughts and:, that were obstacles to be over-kind-a sense of being on top ofy, even though not having actually)eper senses of "freedo¡¡'/-¡1gf¿-y speaking-have been invoked innt and Schiller and others; I ame phenomenology here, however,rtal psychology (of course there is aogy in Kant and Schiller, too). It is,ras been so feared and condemnedrlitical-as a temptation to danger-Lerve amid the actual trials of thelife. And he is right to be con-

r this second feature that art has¡hich can also generate (though ofe cognition) intense forms of feltrat art can be enervating and anti-unate things it has often been ac-rt this second feature is real andnot want to make it a necessary

rr encounter with artkind instances; and hard to make out, that offerderstanding or perception, this felta low pitch. Yet even such experi-: character if they meet the other

in aesthetic experience, under var-;edness," "psychical distance," andvery often been remarked, and (aty'ar II avant-garde) has very oftennature. I do not wish to formulate:s enmeshed in the controversiesh it has been described, or in such


a way that it is tied to any particular metaphysical or epistemo-logical or ethical theory. The heart of the matter is that when weview, say, the Gaetano Zumbo sculptures, however strongly oreven violently we may respond, it is still true and highly impor-tant to add that we do not confuse them with genuine corpses,that we can avoid feeling full emotions as we naturally would dowith corpses, that our feelings are therefore somewhat muted,gently screened from direct contact with reality outside the sculp-tures themselves. In many different typical ways, instances ofartkinds are designed to lend some degree of detachment to theaffects they produce: giving an air of artifice, of fictionality, ofautonomy and reflexiveness, of separation from other things, andso on. But of course this is not always true, and as has also oftenbeen pointed out, there is often the attempt at a kind of brink-manship, coming close to the borders of the seeming-real andrisking the disappearance of detachment. Even so, artists gener-ally try not to come as catastrophically close as, say, when thehigh-wire artist falls to his death, or the realistic life-size imitationof a museum guard is asked for directions to the men's room.Sergei Eisenstein remarks that when he staged Tretiakov's playGas Masks (t923-24), about a gas factory, in an actual gas factory,it was a failure-I take it, from the aesthetic point of view. Now,it might not have been a failure even if the setting proved toorealistic to preserve detachment of affect, provided it had some-thing else to offer in the way of aestheticity; so I do not proposeto make even this important and extremely common feature of artexperience a necessary condition.

It is extraordinarily difficult to capture in words the exact waysin which the practical or technological aspect of an object can andcannot enter into the experience of it if that experience is to havethis third feature of detached affect. Even so excellent a phe-nomenology of aesthetic experience as that presented by M. J.Zenzen-drawing upon Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty-exhibitsthese difficulties. For example, he remarks that "unlike the case ofnormal perception where objects are always experienced as sys-tems of instrumentality, in an aesthetic experience the object isstripped of its instrumental 'values."'3 It is true that in detachedaffect there is a lack of concern about the instrumental values, but

3 M. J Zenzen, "A Ground for Aesthetic Experience," lournal of Aesthetics andArt Criticism y þ976):47r-

292

there need not be a lack of awareness of such values-and in theaesthetic experience of architectural works, for example, suchawareness ought to be present. Zenzen also holcls that in aes-thetic experience of a painting the knowledge "that the work atwhich I am looking can be taken as canvas and paint . , . must beforgotten and transcended to the painting as art-work. . . . [tlmust hide itself jn order for the art-work to show itself; but inhiding itself the knowledge must not be lost."a Here the para-doxical language, I think, helps to bring us close to a grasp ofthe subtle difference between the way in which the knowlédgeis present and the way in which it is absent.

It seems to me that I have always thought of the act of appre-hending an artkind instance as basically a cognitive act, thouþh Imay have insufficiently stressed this point or failed to grasp itsconsequences. Certainly I did not adequately understand the im-portance of this fact until such thinkers as Gombrich, Goodman,and Arnheim taught it to me in recent years. At any rate, I seenow more clearly than I ever did before that one of the centralcomponents in art experience must be the experience of discov-ery, of insight into connections and organizations-the elationthat comes from the apparent opening up of intelligibility. I callthis "active discovery" to draw attention to the excitement of meet-ing a cognitive challenge, of flexing one's powers to make infel-Iigible-where this combines making sense of something with makingsomething møke sense, In this aspect, experiences with aestheticcharacter overlap with experiences of empirical scientists andmathematicians; here is the link between them. There is a com-mon thrill-speaking as always phenomenologically, and remind-ing ourselves that the enjovment of emerging intelligibility ororder or system may be exactly the same, even for the scholar orscientist, whether the order turns out to be empirically real (suchas the table of the elements, the taxonomy of animals and plants,and the progression of artistic styles from r35o to 165o) or an illu-sion (such as the classification of people according to the signsthey were born under, the distinction of autonomous Spengleriancultures, and the Baconian cypher). In some artkind instances onthe minimalist side, the experience is mainly, or at least primarily,one of coming to see how some few things are related, and thisby itself doth not an aesthetically characterized experience make.

4. lbid., p. 4V.

Some Persistent lssues in Aesthetics

ln other artkind instances, the inteattribuie this feature of active dis<must alwavs be something there toalways something going on that c,

understanding.sThe fifth feature, wholeness, is

ceptable account of the aestheticmay well deserve to be ranked witlto clarify this concept for myself a

fully) bowed to well-formed criticirDickie, and steered awaY from unitness in order to concentrate on ulence. And I want to keeP in vievthe coherence of the elements ofverse mental acts and events goin¡of time; and the coherence of the(which, again, may be illusory) olencompass its perceptions, feelin¡integrated personhood. To a largeart experience may be a consequelthink, distinct. It is found, of coucommerce with nature, in certain lthe exciting climaxes of games, antual activity, though in these lattachieve unification of experience I

of focus and the pushing awaY ofthrough the widening and deePerrelations to take in contrasting ele

The legitimacy of this concePt r

phenomenological rather than a Iof contention between George Dìbate that has continued intermiyears-part of a genuine dialogutof my most cherished memories'writing, has had the latest word,'debate into another round, bY retinteresting new criticisms he has

'

5. See "Understanding Music," in Onspectiaes, ed. Kingsley Price (Baltimore, r9l

6. In the lst chapter of Art and the A¿1974\.

Aesthetic Ex

lssues in Aesthetics

areness of such values-and in theectural works, for example, such'¡t. Zenzen also holds that in aes-; the knowledge "that the work atrn as canvas and paint . . . must bethe painting as art-work. . . . tltl:he art-work to show itself; but innust not be lost."n Here the para-ps to bring us close to a grasp ofthe way in which the knowledge

:h it is absent.rlways thought of the act of appre-; basically a cognitive act, though Ied this point or failed to grasp itsnot adequately understand the im-r thinkers as Gombrich, Goodman,in recent years. At any rate, I seedid before that one of the centralmust be the experience of discov-ns and organizations--the elationopening up of intelligibility. I callattention to the excitement of meet-lexing one's powers to make infel-aking sense of something with makingaspect, experiences with aestheticiences of empirical scientists andrk between them. There is a com-; phenomenologically, and remind-nent of emerging intelligibility ory the same, even for the scholar orrns out to be empirically real (suchre taxonomy of animals and plants,styles from r35o to 165o) or an illu-r of people according to the signsinction of autonomous Spenglerianrher). In some artkind instances on:nce is mainly, or at least primarily,ne few things are related, and thisrlly characterized experience make.


ln other artkind instances, the intellectual element is too small toattribute this feature of active discovery, though of course theremust always be something there to be apprehended, and there isalways something golngon that can be ialled, in a broad sense,understanding.s

The fifth feature, wholeness, is surely very central to any ac-ceptable account of the aesthetic character-so much so that itmay well deserve to be ranked with the first as essential. In tryingto clarify this concept for myself as well as others, I have (grate-fully) bowed to well-formed criticisms, especially those of GeorgeDickie, and steered away from unity in the dimension of complete-ness in order to concent¡ate on unity in the dimension of coher-ence. And I want to keep in view two levels of this wholeness:the coherence of the elements of the experience itself, of the di-verse mental acts and events going on in one mind over a stretchof time; and the coherence of the self, the mind's healing sense(which, again, may be illusory) of being all together and able toencompass its perceptions, feelings, emotions, ideas, in a singleintegrated personhood. To a large degree this feature of the usualart experience may be a consequence of other features; but it is, Ithink, distinct. It is found, of course, in many other regions-incommerce with nature, in certain kinds of religious experience, inthe exciting climaxes of games, and even in concentrated intellec-tual activity, though in these latter cases there is a tendency toachieve unification of experience and of self through narrownessof focus and the pushing away of intrusive elements, rather thanthrough the widening and deepening of a pattern or network ofrelations to take in contrasting elements.

The legitimary of this concept of the unity of experience (in aphenomenological rather than a Kantian sense) has been a pointof contention between George Dickie and myself through a de-bate that has continued intermittently and happily for manyyears-part of a genuine dialogue between us that has been oneof my most cherished memories. Since Dickie, at the time of thiswriting, has had the latest word,'I think it's my turn to carry thedebate into another round, by responding briefly to a few of theinteresting new criticisms he has offered.

5. See "Understanding Music," in On Criticizing Music: Fiae Philosophical Per-spectíaes, ed. Kingsley Price (Baltimore, r98r).

6. In the lst chapter of Art and the Aesthetic: An Instittttionnl Analysis (Ithaca,tgzù.

My concept of experiential coherence is that of the elements ofexperience having the appearance of belonging together: someparts of the phenomenally obiective (perceptual or intentional)field with other parts, some feelings with other feelings, somethoughts with other thoughts-and each of these sorts of mentalelement with the others (see Essay 5).

The first d{fiçglty with Beardsley's view is that there are manycases.regarded by everyone as aesthetic experiences but having nôaffective content caused by a work of art. . . . I have in mind] forexample, the experience of a certain kind of abstract painting whichhas a good but simple design and which can be takeñ in, asit were,at a glance.T

This comment is to the point, and helps me to clarify my view, aswell as to defend it. First, I should like to formulate my fifthcriterion of the aesthetic in experience so as to render it immuneto this criticism: f there are experiences with aesthetic characterthat are affect-free-that include no feelings at all-then whateverelements they do include may still more or less cohere. The crite-rion can still be applied, only there will be less to apply it to,fewer sorts of element to take into account. But second, and moreimportant, I cannot bring myself to accept the antecedent of theabove conditional. If the design of a painting is in fact "taken in ata glance," I agree that there may be no affect, but I don't thinkthere is an aesthetically characterized experience, either----onecould do no more than scan and mentally classify, and that doesn'tgive room for a buildup of the features I have described. If, on theother hand, we stay with the picture-"such paintings frequentlyrepay continued attention," Dickie sayss-something more couldhappen, an intensification of interest, an increasingly keen ap-preciation of the color relationships, a feeling of uneasiness aboutthe violent hard-edge contrasts, a touch of vertigo, or an unanti-cipated calmness. If Dickie is "inclined to think that many of ouraesthetic experiences are without affective content, not just a fewones of abstract paintings,"e it may be, as his examples (from Goyaand Arthur Miller) of affective works suggest, that he thinks offeelings as like full-fledged emotions, whereas I do not.

Finally, Dickie is still doubtful about the concept of a coherenceof emotions, when they vary and succeed each other. OÍ Hamlet

7. Ibid,., p. r89.8. Ibid., p. r9o.9. Ibid., p. r9r.

Some Persistent lssues in Aesthetics

he says: "During the course of theanger, distrust, irritation, pity, indigsadness, not to mention the manY t

produce in a sPectator' How does tliute a unity?"'o This is a difficulty, buif we do not invoke the nonnecessitemotions directed to the events ofsay, brought into coherence in thethân they would be in ordinary life'degree of detachment through the fithiã helps to keeP them from flYing"real" emotions. Second, to the exteplay are tied together by psychologino doubt not the best examPle of ttcan be felt to follow naturally upontions, when considered in their sPeintensity (as resPonses to the devcertain Patterns, rhYthms of contFourth, involved in all the differerone emotional Phase to the next,ences, there are other imPortant fconcern that Hamlet will not extricwithout bringing tragedy to himselfually growing feeling of acceptancerelease from torment, and as anHamlet's brilliance and sensitivityThese pervasive feelings give the ethe unity that it has'

When we look again at the five c

their intended tentativeness-thatunuseful. TheY are vague, of coursthis stage, and PerhaPs to a conrThey cannot be used in certain cc

open if we had a set of necessary ¿

seems that we must be content I

show how, and in what waYs, aesence overlaPs with exPeriences obmote from art; theY allow for thethe aesthetic character in unexpet

ro. Ibid., P. r9z.

Aesthetic ExPe

lt lssues in Aesthetics

coherence is that of the elements ofrrance of belonging together: somerbjective (perceptual or intentional)feelings with other feelings, some

;-and each of these sorts of mentalEssay 5).dsley's view is that there are manys aesthetic experiences but having nowork of art. . I have in mind, forrertain kind of abstract painting whichand which can be taken in, as it were,

and helps me to clarify my view, asI should like to formulate my fifth<perience so as to render it immuneexperiences with aesthetic characterLde no feelings at all-then whatever¡ still more or less cohere. The crite-ly there will be less to apply it to,into account. But second, and more

'self to accept the antecedent of the;n of a painting is in fact "taken in atmay be no affect, but I don't thinklracterized .experience, either---onerd mentally classify, and that doesn'tl features I have described. If, on thepicture-"such paintings frequently)ickie says'-something more couldÍ interest, an increasingly keen ap-rships, a feeling of uneasiness aboutts, a touch of vertigo, or an unanti-"inclined to think that many of our

Lout affective content, not just a fewmay be, as his examples (from Goya'e works suggest, that he thinks ofnotions, whereas I do not.ful about the concept of a coherenceand succeed each other. Of Hamlet


he says: "During the course of the play I might have felt fear,anger, distrust, irritation, pity, indignation, excitement, pity, andsadness, not to mention the many other feelings the play mightproduce in a spectator. How does this sequence of affects consti-tute a unity?"'o This is a difficulty, but I think not a fatal one--€venif we do not invoke the nonnecessity of my fifth criterion. Theseemotions directed to the events of the play are indeed, I wouldsay, brought into coherence in the playgoing situation far morethan they would be in ordinary life. First, they are all muted by adegree of detachment through the fictionality of their objects, andthis helps to keep them from flying off in different directions like"real" emotions. Second, to the extent to which the events of theplay are tied together by psychological inevitability (and Hamlet isno doubt not the best example of this!), the emotions themselvescan be felt to follow naturally upon one another. Third, the emo-tions, when considered in their specific quality as well as in theirintensity (as responses to the developments in the plot), formcertain patterns, rhythms of contrast and curves of strength'Fourth, involved in all the different emotions, continuing fromone emotional phase to the next, and underlying their differ-ences, there are other important feelings-a gradually growingconcern that Hamlet will not extricate himself from his situationwithout bringing tragedy to himself and others, along with a grad-ually growing feeling of acceptance of this tragic denouement as arelease from torment, and as an inevitable expression both ofHamlet's brilliance and sensitivity and of his fatal limitations'These pervasive feelings give the experience of the play much ofthe unity that it has.

When we look again at the five criteria, we see, I think-for allthei¡ intended tentativeness-that they may well prove to be notunuseful. They are vague, of course; but that is to be expected atthis stage, and perhaps to a considerable extent at any stage.They cannot be used in certain convenient ways that would beopen if we had a set of necessary and sufficient conditions; but itseems that we must be content with what we can find. Theyshow how, and in what ways, aesthetically characterized experi-ence overlaps with experiences obtained in areas of life quite re-mote from art; they allow for the evident fact that we even findthe aesthetic character in unexpected places. In a recent essay,

ro. Ibid., p. r9:.

zg6

Ioel I. Kupperman has commented on my earlier remarks aboutaesthetic experience, especially in Essay 5; quoting my character-ization of aesthetic experience,rl he writes: "This definition on onehand appears too broad, since it could apply to a sexual experi-ence as well as an aesthetic experience. On the other hand therequirement of unity appears unwarrantedly to legislate a priorithat aesthetic experiences have firm boundaries."l2 I am not fullyconvinced of either of these charges. But if my earlier wordingdoes admit sexual experience, I hope that the new criteria revealboth the ways in which aesthetic experience differs from, andsome features it may share with, sexual experience, Moreover, ifthe earlier formula did insist too much on completeness, thatinsistence has been properly withdrawn.

In any case, the proposed account of aesthetic character doesenable us to admit numerous clear-cut cases of artkind instancesto the class of things capable of providing experience with thischaracter (it would be absurd if it turned out that a competenthearing of Mozart's A-major string quartet had no aesthetic char-acter after all). And it shows us how to rule out other phenomenathat either have some pretensions to provide aesthetic characteror may be expected or mistakenly believed to do so. I cite twoexamples.

Commenting on an exhibition of "color-field optical paintings,,by Wojciech Fangor, David L. Shirley writes:

If Mr. Nangor has masterfully used space and color to create a veryspecial experience, albeit at times unpleasant, the experience is nômore than just that. Attempts to dazzle, blind, overwhelm, even insuch a spectacular way, are still attempts to dazzle, blind, andoverwhelm. Even when the canvasses are generating their ownparticular environments, they are much closer to artiÍice than toart. 13

I make no assumptions, of course, either about the paintings,which I have not seen, or the critic, whom I know little about. Butif he is right in his account, the experience of viewing these paint-ings does seem not to be an aesthetic one, by my criteria. (Whetherthe paintings are art is another question, to be taken up in thefollowing essay.)

rr. See p. 8t above.tz. "Art and Aesthetic Experience," British lourml of Aesthetics 15 jg7)34.13. Nao YorkTimes, December :r9, tg7o.

Some Persistent lssues in Aesthetics Aesthetic Ex1

Somewhat later, commenting orsame critic saYS it contains

a sustained, sinister threat of imminthat Pose a threat to the viewer alstackäd up on a glass plate that learelass benèh that; if sat uPon, coulcäoo.*uy stretched tight with rubbwhen ybu try to go through therrIights éet uP on door iambs so as I

vóu pass them. There is noáot.råyot belt that sweePs throughoezist- and the bricks that have a k'movement. If the other works haP¡Ievel, they never challenge us on al

This is the sort of discriminationmake-distinguishing as clearly as

that push aesthetic experience intcrange of qualities it can encompass,their interest in aesthetic experielsomething else, something quitefor example, is also described bYreview, a "Destruction in Art SYrlege, in which a live chicken was I

arid "seve¡al artists scratched, bruntil their clothes were in shredblood"-these "realizations" accolmembered mannequins, slit andture, defaced books, Plastic dressviolins that had been shattered in

:..4. New York Times, January 21, 7977'

Issues in Aesthetics

:nted on my earlier remarks aboutI in Essay 5i Quoting my character-1' he writes: "This definition on one: it could apply to a sexual experi-rxperience. On the other hand theunwarrantedly to legislate a priori: firm boundaries."l2 I am not fully:harges. But if my earlier wordingI hope that the new criteria revealhetic experience differs from, andth, sexual experience. Moreover, iftoo much on completeness, that

¡ithdrawn.lccount of aesthetic character doesclear-cut cases of artkind instancesof providing experience with thisif it turned out that a competent

tring quartet had no aesthetic char-s how to rule out other phenomenarions to provide aesthetic characterrenly believed to do so. I cite two

rn of "color-field optical paintings"Shirley writes:rsed space and color to create a veryres unpleasant, the experience is no:o dazzle, blind, overwhelm, even in;till attempts to dazzle, blind, and:anvasses are generating their ownare much closer to artifice than to

ourse, either about the paintings,:ritic, whom I know little about. Butl experience of viewing these paint-;thetic one, by my criteria. (Whetherer question, to be taken up in the


Somewhat later, commenting on a show by G. E. Moore, thesame critic says it contains

a sustained, sinister threat of imminent destruction' . . . The worksthat pose a threat to the viewer are a pile of rough-hewn bricksstackèd up on a glass plate that leans out toward the viewer, a lowglass bench that; if sat upon, could splinter into painful pieces, aáoor*ay stretched tight with rubber strips that pinch and presswhen you try to go through them and two sets_of blinding.hotlights ðet up-on dõor jambs so as to cause great discomfort whenyõ.t pass tirem. .'There is nothing visually exciting brrt theionnêyot belt that sweePs through the air with the élan of a tra-pezist and the bricks thãt have a kind of power in their potentialinovement. If the other works happen to threaten us on a physicallevel, they never challenge us on an esthetic level.'n

This is the sort of discrimination that critics are called upon tomake-distinguishing as clearly as possible between those worksthat push aesthetic experience into new directions, expanding therange of qualities it can encomPass, and those works that renouncetheir interest in aesthetic experience and abandon it in favor ofsomething else, something quite different. Such an alternative,for example, is also described by Shirley, recalling, in the samereview, a "Destruction in Art Symposium" in t96g at Finch Col-lege, in which a live chicken was beheaded with a pair of scissorsan¡ "several artists scratched, beat, and punched one anotheruntil their clothes were in shreds and their flesh running withblood"-these "realizat,Lons" accompanying an exhibition of "dis-membered mannequins, slit and gouged canvases, gutted furni-ture, defaced books, plastic dresses burnt full of holes, and newviolins that had been shattered into splinters."

t4. Nau YorkTimes, January 23, 1977.

' British lournal of Aesthetics 15 þ975\:34.970.

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